2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 /* ====================================================================
11 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
13 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
14 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
16 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
17 * license provided above.
19 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
20 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
23 /* ====================================================================
24 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
26 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
27 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
30 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
31 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
32 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
34 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
35 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
36 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
38 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
39 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
40 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
41 * to make use of the Contribution.
43 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
44 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
45 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
46 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
51 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
52 #include "statem_locl.h"
53 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
54 #include <openssl/rand.h>
55 #include <openssl/objects.h>
56 #include <openssl/evp.h>
57 #include <openssl/md5.h>
58 #include <openssl/dh.h>
59 #include <openssl/bn.h>
60 #include <openssl/engine.h>
62 static ossl_inline
int cert_req_allowed(SSL
*s
);
63 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL
*s
);
64 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME
*const *a
, const X509_NAME
*const *b
);
65 static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL
*s
, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
,
69 * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
75 static ossl_inline
int cert_req_allowed(SSL
*s
)
77 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
78 if ((s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
79 && (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aNULL
))
80 || (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aSRP
| SSL_aPSK
)))
87 * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
93 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL
*s
)
95 long alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
98 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
99 * ciphersuite or for SRP
101 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
110 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
111 * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
112 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
113 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
116 * 1: Success (transition allowed)
117 * 0: Error (transition not allowed)
119 int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL
*s
, int mt
)
121 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
124 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
128 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
129 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
) {
130 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
;
134 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
135 if (mt
== DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
) {
136 st
->hand_state
= DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
;
142 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
144 if (s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
) {
145 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
) {
146 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
;
149 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
150 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
154 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && mt
== DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
) {
155 st
->hand_state
= DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
;
157 } else if (s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
158 && s
->tls_session_secret_cb
!= NULL
159 && s
->session
->tlsext_tick
!= NULL
160 && mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
162 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
163 * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
164 * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
165 * the server is resuming.
168 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
170 } else if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
171 & (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
| SSL_aPSK
))) {
172 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
173 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT
;
177 ske_expected
= key_exchange_expected(s
);
178 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
180 || ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_PSK
)
181 && mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
)) {
182 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
183 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
;
186 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
187 && cert_req_allowed(s
)) {
188 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
;
190 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
) {
191 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
;
200 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
201 * |tlsext_status_expected| is set
203 if (s
->tlsext_status_expected
&& mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS
) {
204 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
;
209 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
:
210 ske_expected
= key_exchange_expected(s
);
211 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
212 if (ske_expected
|| ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_PSK
)
213 && mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
)) {
214 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
215 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
;
222 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
:
223 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
) {
224 if (cert_req_allowed(s
)) {
225 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
;
232 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
233 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
) {
234 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
;
239 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
240 if (s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
) {
241 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
) {
242 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
;
245 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
246 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
251 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
252 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
253 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
258 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
:
259 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
260 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
;
267 /* No valid transition found */
268 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
269 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_READ_TRANSITION
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
274 * client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move to next
275 * when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
277 WRITE_TRAN
ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL
*s
)
279 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
281 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
283 /* Shouldn't happen */
284 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
287 /* Renegotiation - fall through */
289 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
290 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
292 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
294 * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
297 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
299 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
300 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
301 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
303 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
:
304 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
)
305 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CERT
;
307 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
;
308 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
311 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
;
312 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
314 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
:
316 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
317 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
320 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
321 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
322 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
323 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
325 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
== 1) {
326 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
;
328 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
330 if (s
->s3
->flags
& TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY
) {
331 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
333 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
335 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
:
336 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
337 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
339 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
340 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
341 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
343 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
)
344 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO
;
346 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
348 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
350 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
351 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO
:
352 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
353 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
356 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
358 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
359 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 0);
360 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
362 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
365 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
367 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
368 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
370 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
371 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 0);
372 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
378 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
379 * the client to the server.
381 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
383 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
385 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
387 /* No pre work to be done */
390 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
392 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
393 /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
394 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
)) {
395 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
401 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
402 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
405 * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
406 * messages unless we need to.
410 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
411 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s
)))
412 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s
);
418 return tls_finish_handshake(s
, wst
);
421 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
425 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
426 * client to the server.
428 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
430 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
434 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
436 /* No post work to be done */
439 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
440 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
&& statem_flush(s
) != 1)
443 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
444 /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
449 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
:
450 if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s
) == 0)
454 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
455 s
->session
->cipher
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
;
456 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
457 s
->session
->compress_meth
= 0;
459 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
)
460 s
->session
->compress_meth
= 0;
462 s
->session
->compress_meth
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
->id
;
464 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
))
467 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
468 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
))
471 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
472 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
475 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
478 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY
,
483 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s
, SSL3_CC_WRITE
);
487 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
488 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
489 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
&& SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->hit
== 0) {
491 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
494 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY
,
498 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
503 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
507 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
510 * Valid return values are:
514 int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
515 int (**confunc
) (SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
),
518 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
520 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
522 /* Shouldn't happen */
525 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
527 *confunc
= dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec
;
529 *confunc
= tls_construct_change_cipher_spec
;
530 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
;
533 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
534 *confunc
= tls_construct_client_hello
;
535 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
;
539 *confunc
= tls_construct_client_certificate
;
540 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
;
543 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
:
544 *confunc
= tls_construct_client_key_exchange
;
545 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
;
548 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
:
549 *confunc
= tls_construct_client_verify
;
550 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
;
553 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
554 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO
:
555 *confunc
= tls_construct_next_proto
;
556 *mt
= SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO
;
559 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
560 *confunc
= tls_construct_finished
;
561 *mt
= SSL3_MT_FINISHED
;
569 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
570 * reading. Excludes the message header.
572 unsigned long ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL
*s
)
574 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
576 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
578 /* Shouldn't happen */
581 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
582 return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH
;
584 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
585 return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH
;
588 return s
->max_cert_list
;
590 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
:
591 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
;
593 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
:
594 return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH
;
596 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
598 * Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In
599 * practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured
600 * to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
602 return s
->max_cert_list
;
604 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
:
605 return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH
;
607 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
:
608 if (s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
)
610 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH
;
612 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
613 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
;
615 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
616 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH
;
621 * Process a message that the client has been received from the server.
623 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
625 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
627 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
629 /* Shouldn't happen */
630 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
632 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
633 return tls_process_server_hello(s
, pkt
);
635 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
636 return dtls_process_hello_verify(s
, pkt
);
639 return tls_process_server_certificate(s
, pkt
);
641 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
:
642 return tls_process_cert_status(s
, pkt
);
644 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
:
645 return tls_process_key_exchange(s
, pkt
);
647 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
648 return tls_process_certificate_request(s
, pkt
);
650 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
:
651 return tls_process_server_done(s
, pkt
);
653 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
:
654 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s
, pkt
);
656 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
657 return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s
, pkt
);
659 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
660 return tls_process_finished(s
, pkt
);
665 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
668 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
670 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
672 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
674 /* Shouldn't happen */
677 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
678 return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s
, wst
);
680 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
681 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
:
682 /* We only get here if we are using SCTP and we are renegotiating */
683 if (BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s
))) {
684 s
->s3
->in_read_app_data
= 2;
685 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
686 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s
));
687 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s
));
688 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s
, 1);
691 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s
, 0);
692 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP
;
697 int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
702 int al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
703 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
706 SSL_SESSION
*sess
= s
->session
;
708 if (!WPACKET_set_max_size(pkt
, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
)) {
709 /* Should not happen */
710 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
714 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
715 protverr
= ssl_set_client_hello_version(s
);
717 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, protverr
);
721 if ((sess
== NULL
) || !ssl_version_supported(s
, sess
->ssl_version
) ||
723 * In the case of EAP-FAST, we can have a pre-shared
724 * "ticket" without a session ID.
726 (!sess
->session_id_length
&& !sess
->tlsext_tick
) ||
727 (sess
->not_resumable
)) {
728 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 0))
731 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
733 p
= s
->s3
->client_random
;
736 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
737 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
739 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
742 for (idx
= 0; idx
< sizeof(s
->s3
->client_random
); idx
++) {
751 if (i
&& ssl_fill_hello_random(s
, 0, p
, sizeof(s
->s3
->client_random
)) <= 0)
755 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
756 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
757 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
758 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
759 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
760 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
761 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
762 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
765 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
766 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
767 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
768 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
769 * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0.
770 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
771 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
772 * know that is maximum server supports.
773 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
774 * containing version 1.0.
776 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
777 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
778 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
779 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
780 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
781 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
782 * the negotiated version.
784 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, s
->client_version
)
785 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, s
->s3
->client_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
)) {
786 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
794 i
= s
->session
->session_id_length
;
795 if (i
> (int)sizeof(s
->session
->session_id
)
796 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt
)
797 || (i
!= 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, s
->session
->session_id
, i
))
798 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
799 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
803 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
804 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
805 if (s
->d1
->cookie_len
> sizeof(s
->d1
->cookie
)
806 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, s
->d1
->cookie
,
807 s
->d1
->cookie_len
)) {
808 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
813 /* Ciphers supported */
814 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)) {
815 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
818 /* ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes() raises SSLerr if appropriate */
819 if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s
, SSL_get_ciphers(s
), pkt
))
821 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
822 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
827 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt
)) {
828 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
831 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
832 if (ssl_allow_compression(s
) && s
->ctx
->comp_methods
) {
833 int compnum
= sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
);
834 for (i
= 0; i
< compnum
; i
++) {
835 comp
= sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, i
);
836 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, comp
->id
)) {
837 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
843 /* Add the NULL method */
844 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
845 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
850 if (ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(s
) <= 0) {
851 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
854 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
856 * If extensions are of zero length then we don't even add the
857 * extensions length bytes
859 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt
, WPACKET_FLAGS_ABANDON_ON_ZERO_LENGTH
)
860 || !ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s
, pkt
, &al
)
861 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
862 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
863 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
870 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
873 unsigned int cookie_len
;
876 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt
, 2)
877 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &cookiepkt
)) {
878 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
879 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
883 cookie_len
= PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt
);
884 if (cookie_len
> sizeof(s
->d1
->cookie
)) {
885 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
886 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
890 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt
, s
->d1
->cookie
, cookie_len
)) {
891 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
892 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
895 s
->d1
->cookie_len
= cookie_len
;
897 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
899 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
900 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
901 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
904 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_server_hello(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
906 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
;
909 size_t session_id_len
;
910 const unsigned char *cipherchars
;
911 int i
, al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
912 unsigned int compression
;
913 unsigned int sversion
;
915 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
919 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &sversion
)) {
920 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
921 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
925 protverr
= ssl_choose_client_version(s
, sversion
);
927 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
928 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, protverr
);
932 /* load the server hello data */
933 /* load the server random */
934 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, s
->s3
->server_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
)) {
935 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
936 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
942 /* Get the session-id. */
943 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &session_id
)) {
944 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
945 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
948 session_id_len
= PACKET_remaining(&session_id
);
949 if (session_id_len
> sizeof s
->session
->session_id
950 || session_id_len
> SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE
) {
951 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
952 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG
);
956 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &cipherchars
, TLS_CIPHER_LEN
)) {
957 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
958 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
963 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared secret.
964 * EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
965 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
966 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
967 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
968 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether EAP-FAST
969 * servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session ID alone
970 * is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we first check if
971 * we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake message to see if the
972 * server wants to resume.
974 if (s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
&& s
->tls_session_secret_cb
&&
975 s
->session
->tlsext_tick
) {
976 const SSL_CIPHER
*pref_cipher
= NULL
;
977 s
->session
->master_key_length
= sizeof(s
->session
->master_key
);
978 if (s
->tls_session_secret_cb(s
, s
->session
->master_key
,
979 &s
->session
->master_key_length
,
981 s
->tls_session_secret_cb_arg
)) {
982 s
->session
->cipher
= pref_cipher
?
983 pref_cipher
: ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s
, cipherchars
);
985 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
986 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
991 if (session_id_len
!= 0 && session_id_len
== s
->session
->session_id_length
992 && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id
), s
->session
->session_id
,
993 session_id_len
) == 0) {
994 if (s
->sid_ctx_length
!= s
->session
->sid_ctx_length
995 || memcmp(s
->session
->sid_ctx
, s
->sid_ctx
, s
->sid_ctx_length
)) {
996 /* actually a client application bug */
997 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
998 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
999 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT
);
1005 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1006 * didn't echo the ID, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1007 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1008 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1009 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1011 if (s
->session
->session_id_length
> 0) {
1012 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_miss
++;
1013 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 0)) {
1018 s
->session
->ssl_version
= s
->version
;
1019 s
->session
->session_id_length
= session_id_len
;
1020 /* session_id_len could be 0 */
1021 memcpy(s
->session
->session_id
, PACKET_data(&session_id
),
1025 /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */
1026 if (s
->version
!= s
->session
->ssl_version
) {
1027 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
1029 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1030 SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH
);
1034 c
= ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s
, cipherchars
);
1036 /* unknown cipher */
1037 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1038 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1042 * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed
1045 s
->s3
->tmp
.min_ver
= s
->version
;
1046 s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
= s
->version
;
1048 * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello,
1049 * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error.
1051 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s
, c
, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK
)) {
1052 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1053 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1057 sk
= ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s
);
1058 i
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk
, c
);
1060 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1061 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1062 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1067 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1068 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1069 * set and use it for comparison.
1071 if (s
->session
->cipher
)
1072 s
->session
->cipher_id
= s
->session
->cipher
->id
;
1073 if (s
->hit
&& (s
->session
->cipher_id
!= c
->id
)) {
1074 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1075 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1076 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED
);
1079 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
= c
;
1080 /* lets get the compression algorithm */
1082 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &compression
)) {
1083 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1084 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1087 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1088 if (compression
!= 0) {
1089 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1090 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1091 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1095 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1096 * using compression.
1098 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0) {
1099 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1103 if (s
->hit
&& compression
!= s
->session
->compress_meth
) {
1104 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1105 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1106 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED
);
1109 if (compression
== 0)
1111 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s
)) {
1112 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1113 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED
);
1116 comp
= ssl3_comp_find(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, compression
);
1119 if (compression
!= 0 && comp
== NULL
) {
1120 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1121 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1122 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1125 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
= comp
;
1129 /* TLS extensions */
1130 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(s
, pkt
)) {
1131 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT
);
1135 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1136 /* wrong packet length */
1137 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1138 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH
);
1141 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1142 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->hit
) {
1143 unsigned char sctpauthkey
[64];
1144 char labelbuffer
[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
)];
1147 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
1150 memcpy(labelbuffer
, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
,
1151 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
));
1153 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s
, sctpauthkey
,
1154 sizeof(sctpauthkey
),
1156 sizeof(labelbuffer
), NULL
, 0, 0) <= 0)
1159 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
),
1160 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY
,
1161 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), sctpauthkey
);
1165 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
1167 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1169 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1170 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1173 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_server_certificate(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1175 int al
, i
, ret
= MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
, exp_idx
;
1176 unsigned long cert_list_len
, cert_len
;
1178 const unsigned char *certstart
, *certbytes
;
1179 STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
= NULL
;
1180 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
1182 if ((sk
= sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
) {
1183 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1187 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt
, &cert_list_len
)
1188 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != cert_list_len
) {
1189 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1190 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1193 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt
)) {
1194 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt
, &cert_len
)
1195 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &certbytes
, cert_len
)) {
1196 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1197 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1198 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1202 certstart
= certbytes
;
1203 x
= d2i_X509(NULL
, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes
, cert_len
);
1205 al
= SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
;
1206 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
1209 if (certbytes
!= (certstart
+ cert_len
)) {
1210 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1211 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1212 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1215 if (!sk_X509_push(sk
, x
)) {
1216 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1222 i
= ssl_verify_cert_chain(s
, sk
);
1223 if ((s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
) && i
<= 0) {
1224 al
= ssl_verify_alarm_type(s
->verify_result
);
1225 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1226 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED
);
1229 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1231 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, i
);
1232 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1236 s
->session
->peer_chain
= sk
;
1238 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1239 * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c
1241 x
= sk_X509_value(sk
, 0);
1244 * VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end
1247 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(x
);
1249 if (pkey
== NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey
)) {
1252 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1253 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS
);
1257 i
= ssl_cert_type(x
, pkey
);
1261 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1262 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
);
1266 exp_idx
= ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
);
1267 if (exp_idx
>= 0 && i
!= exp_idx
1268 && (exp_idx
!= SSL_PKEY_GOST_EC
||
1269 (i
!= SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
&& i
!= SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
1270 && i
!= SSL_PKEY_GOST01
))) {
1272 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1273 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1274 SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
);
1277 s
->session
->peer_type
= i
;
1279 X509_free(s
->session
->peer
);
1281 s
->session
->peer
= x
;
1282 s
->session
->verify_result
= s
->verify_result
;
1285 ret
= MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
1289 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1291 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1294 sk_X509_pop_free(sk
, X509_free
);
1298 static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
1300 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1301 PACKET psk_identity_hint
;
1303 /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
1305 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &psk_identity_hint
)) {
1306 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1307 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1312 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
1313 * tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
1314 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
1317 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint
) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
1318 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1319 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
1323 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint
) == 0) {
1324 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
);
1325 s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
= NULL
;
1326 } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint
,
1327 &s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
)) {
1328 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1334 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1335 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1340 static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, EVP_PKEY
**pkey
, int *al
)
1342 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1343 PACKET prime
, generator
, salt
, server_pub
;
1345 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &prime
)
1346 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &generator
)
1347 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &salt
)
1348 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &server_pub
)) {
1349 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1350 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1355 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime
),
1356 PACKET_remaining(&prime
), NULL
)) == NULL
1358 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator
),
1359 PACKET_remaining(&generator
), NULL
)) == NULL
1361 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt
),
1362 PACKET_remaining(&salt
), NULL
)) == NULL
1364 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub
),
1365 PACKET_remaining(&server_pub
), NULL
)) == NULL
) {
1366 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1367 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1371 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s
, al
)) {
1372 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1373 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP
, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS
);
1377 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
1378 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aRSA
| SSL_aDSS
))
1379 *pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
1383 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1384 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1389 static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, EVP_PKEY
**pkey
, int *al
)
1391 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1392 PACKET prime
, generator
, pub_key
;
1393 EVP_PKEY
*peer_tmp
= NULL
;
1396 BIGNUM
*p
= NULL
, *g
= NULL
, *bnpub_key
= NULL
;
1398 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &prime
)
1399 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &generator
)
1400 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &pub_key
)) {
1401 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1402 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1406 peer_tmp
= EVP_PKEY_new();
1409 if (peer_tmp
== NULL
|| dh
== NULL
) {
1410 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1411 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1415 p
= BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime
), PACKET_remaining(&prime
), NULL
);
1416 g
= BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator
), PACKET_remaining(&generator
), NULL
);
1417 bnpub_key
= BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key
), PACKET_remaining(&pub_key
),
1419 if (p
== NULL
|| g
== NULL
|| bnpub_key
== NULL
) {
1420 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1421 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1425 if (BN_is_zero(p
) || BN_is_zero(g
) || BN_is_zero(bnpub_key
)) {
1426 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1427 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE
);
1431 if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh
, p
, NULL
, g
)) {
1432 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1433 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1438 if (!DH_set0_key(dh
, bnpub_key
, NULL
)) {
1439 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1440 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1445 if (!ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH
, DH_security_bits(dh
), 0, dh
)) {
1446 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1447 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL
);
1451 if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(peer_tmp
, dh
) == 0) {
1452 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1453 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
1457 s
->s3
->peer_tmp
= peer_tmp
;
1460 * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with
1461 * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this
1463 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aRSA
| SSL_aDSS
))
1464 *pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
1465 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1474 EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp
);
1478 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1479 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1484 static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, EVP_PKEY
**pkey
, int *al
)
1486 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1488 const unsigned char *ecparams
;
1490 unsigned int curve_flags
;
1491 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
1494 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
1495 * public key. For now we only support named (not generic) curves and
1496 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
1498 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &ecparams
, 3)) {
1499 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1500 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1504 * Check curve is one of our preferences, if not server has sent an
1505 * invalid curve. ECParameters is 3 bytes.
1507 if (!tls1_check_curve(s
, ecparams
, 3)) {
1508 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1509 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE
);
1513 curve_nid
= tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(ecparams
+ 2), &curve_flags
);
1515 if (curve_nid
== 0) {
1516 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1517 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
,
1518 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS
);
1522 if ((curve_flags
& TLS_CURVE_TYPE
) == TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM
) {
1523 EVP_PKEY
*key
= EVP_PKEY_new();
1525 if (key
== NULL
|| !EVP_PKEY_set_type(key
, curve_nid
)) {
1526 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1527 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
1531 s
->s3
->peer_tmp
= key
;
1533 /* Set up EVP_PKEY with named curve as parameters */
1534 pctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC
, NULL
);
1536 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(pctx
) <= 0
1537 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(pctx
, curve_nid
) <= 0
1538 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen(pctx
, &s
->s3
->peer_tmp
) <= 0) {
1539 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1540 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
1541 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
1544 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
1548 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &encoded_pt
)) {
1549 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1550 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1554 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s
->s3
->peer_tmp
,
1555 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt
),
1556 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt
))) {
1557 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1558 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT
);
1563 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
1564 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
1567 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aECDSA
)
1568 *pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
1569 else if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aRSA
)
1570 *pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
1571 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1575 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1576 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1581 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_key_exchange(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1585 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
1586 PACKET save_param_start
, signature
;
1588 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
1590 save_param_start
= *pkt
;
1592 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
1593 EVP_PKEY_free(s
->s3
->peer_tmp
);
1594 s
->s3
->peer_tmp
= NULL
;
1597 if (alg_k
& SSL_PSK
) {
1598 if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s
, pkt
, &al
))
1602 /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
1603 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kPSK
| SSL_kRSAPSK
)) {
1604 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
1605 if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s
, pkt
, &pkey
, &al
))
1607 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
)) {
1608 if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s
, pkt
, &pkey
, &al
))
1610 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
1611 if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s
, pkt
, &pkey
, &al
))
1614 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1615 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
1619 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
1623 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
1627 * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
1628 * equals the length of the parameters.
1630 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start
, ¶ms
,
1631 PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start
) -
1632 PACKET_remaining(pkt
))) {
1633 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1634 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1638 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
1639 const unsigned char *sigalgs
;
1641 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &sigalgs
, 2)) {
1642 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1643 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1646 rv
= tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md
, s
, sigalgs
, pkey
);
1648 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1650 } else if (rv
== 0) {
1651 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1655 fprintf(stderr
, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md
));
1657 } else if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
) == EVP_PKEY_RSA
) {
1658 md
= EVP_md5_sha1();
1663 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &signature
)
1664 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1665 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1666 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1669 maxsig
= EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
1671 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1672 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1677 * Check signature length
1679 if (PACKET_remaining(&signature
) > (size_t)maxsig
) {
1680 /* wrong packet length */
1681 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1682 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1683 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH
);
1687 md_ctx
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
1688 if (md_ctx
== NULL
) {
1689 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1690 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1694 if (EVP_VerifyInit_ex(md_ctx
, md
, NULL
) <= 0
1695 || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->client_random
[0]),
1696 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
1697 || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->server_random
[0]),
1698 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
1699 || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx
, PACKET_data(¶ms
),
1700 PACKET_remaining(¶ms
)) <= 0) {
1701 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx
);
1702 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1703 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
1706 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(md_ctx
, PACKET_data(&signature
),
1707 PACKET_remaining(&signature
), pkey
) <= 0) {
1709 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx
);
1710 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
1711 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE
);
1714 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx
);
1716 /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
1717 if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
))
1718 && !(alg_k
& SSL_PSK
)) {
1719 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
1720 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s
)) {
1721 /* Otherwise this shouldn't happen */
1722 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1723 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1725 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1729 /* still data left over */
1730 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1731 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1732 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE
);
1737 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
1740 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1741 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1742 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1745 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_certificate_request(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1747 int ret
= MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1748 unsigned int list_len
, ctype_num
, i
, name_len
;
1749 X509_NAME
*xn
= NULL
;
1750 const unsigned char *data
;
1751 const unsigned char *namestart
, *namebytes
;
1752 STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *ca_sk
= NULL
;
1754 if ((ca_sk
= sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp
)) == NULL
) {
1755 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1759 /* get the certificate types */
1760 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &ctype_num
)
1761 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, ctype_num
)) {
1762 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
1763 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1766 OPENSSL_free(s
->cert
->ctypes
);
1767 s
->cert
->ctypes
= NULL
;
1768 if (ctype_num
> SSL3_CT_NUMBER
) {
1769 /* If we exceed static buffer copy all to cert structure */
1770 s
->cert
->ctypes
= OPENSSL_malloc(ctype_num
);
1771 if (s
->cert
->ctypes
== NULL
) {
1772 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1775 memcpy(s
->cert
->ctypes
, data
, ctype_num
);
1776 s
->cert
->ctype_num
= (size_t)ctype_num
;
1777 ctype_num
= SSL3_CT_NUMBER
;
1779 for (i
= 0; i
< ctype_num
; i
++)
1780 s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype
[i
] = data
[i
];
1782 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
1783 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &list_len
)
1784 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, list_len
)) {
1785 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
1786 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
1787 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1791 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
1792 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++) {
1793 s
->s3
->tmp
.md
[i
] = NULL
;
1794 s
->s3
->tmp
.valid_flags
[i
] = 0;
1796 if ((list_len
& 1) || !tls1_save_sigalgs(s
, data
, list_len
)) {
1797 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
1798 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
1799 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR
);
1802 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s
)) {
1803 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1804 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1808 ssl_set_default_md(s
);
1811 /* get the CA RDNs */
1812 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &list_len
)
1813 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != list_len
) {
1814 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
1815 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1819 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt
)) {
1820 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &name_len
)
1821 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &namebytes
, name_len
)) {
1822 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
1823 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
1824 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1828 namestart
= namebytes
;
1830 if ((xn
= d2i_X509_NAME(NULL
, (const unsigned char **)&namebytes
,
1831 name_len
)) == NULL
) {
1832 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
1833 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
1837 if (namebytes
!= (namestart
+ name_len
)) {
1838 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
1839 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
1840 SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1843 if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk
, xn
)) {
1844 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1850 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
1851 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 1;
1852 s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype_num
= ctype_num
;
1853 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.ca_names
, X509_NAME_free
);
1854 s
->s3
->tmp
.ca_names
= ca_sk
;
1857 ret
= MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
1860 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1863 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk
, X509_NAME_free
);
1867 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME
*const *a
, const X509_NAME
*const *b
)
1869 return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a
, *b
));
1872 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1875 unsigned int ticklen
;
1876 unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint
;
1878 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt
, &ticket_lifetime_hint
)
1879 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &ticklen
)
1880 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != ticklen
) {
1881 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1882 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1886 /* Server is allowed to change its mind and send an empty ticket. */
1888 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
1890 if (s
->session
->session_id_length
> 0) {
1891 int i
= s
->session_ctx
->session_cache_mode
;
1892 SSL_SESSION
*new_sess
;
1894 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
1897 if (i
& SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT
) {
1899 * Remove the old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
1901 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s
->session_ctx
, s
->session
);
1904 if ((new_sess
= ssl_session_dup(s
->session
, 0)) == 0) {
1905 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1906 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1910 SSL_SESSION_free(s
->session
);
1911 s
->session
= new_sess
;
1914 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->tlsext_tick
);
1915 s
->session
->tlsext_ticklen
= 0;
1917 s
->session
->tlsext_tick
= OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen
);
1918 if (s
->session
->tlsext_tick
== NULL
) {
1919 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1922 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, s
->session
->tlsext_tick
, ticklen
)) {
1923 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1924 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1928 s
->session
->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint
= ticket_lifetime_hint
;
1929 s
->session
->tlsext_ticklen
= ticklen
;
1931 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
1932 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
1933 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
1934 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
1935 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
1936 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
1937 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
1938 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
1939 * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
1941 if (!EVP_Digest(s
->session
->tlsext_tick
, ticklen
,
1942 s
->session
->session_id
, &s
->session
->session_id_length
,
1943 EVP_sha256(), NULL
)) {
1944 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
1947 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
1949 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1951 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1952 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1955 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_cert_status(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1958 unsigned long resplen
;
1961 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &type
)
1962 || type
!= TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp
) {
1963 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1964 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS
, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE
);
1967 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt
, &resplen
)
1968 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != resplen
) {
1969 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1970 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1973 s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
= OPENSSL_malloc(resplen
);
1974 if (s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
== NULL
) {
1975 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1976 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1979 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
, resplen
)) {
1980 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1981 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1984 s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
= resplen
;
1985 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
1987 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1988 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1989 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1992 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_server_done(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1994 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) > 0) {
1995 /* should contain no data */
1996 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
1997 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1998 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1999 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2001 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2002 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2003 if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s
) <= 0) {
2004 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE
, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC
);
2005 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2006 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2007 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2013 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
2016 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s
)) {
2017 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
2018 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2019 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2023 * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |tlsext_ocsp_resp| and
2024 * |tlsext_ocsp_resplen| values will be set if we actually received a status
2025 * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise
2027 if (s
->tlsext_status_type
!= -1 && s
->ctx
->tlsext_status_cb
!= NULL
) {
2029 ret
= s
->ctx
->tlsext_status_cb(s
, s
->ctx
->tlsext_status_arg
);
2031 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
,
2032 SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE
);
2033 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE
,
2034 SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE
);
2035 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2038 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2039 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2040 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2043 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2044 if (s
->ct_validation_callback
!= NULL
) {
2045 /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */
2046 if (!ssl_validate_ct(s
) && (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
)) {
2047 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
2048 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2053 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2054 /* Only applies to renegotiation */
2055 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s
))
2056 && s
->renegotiate
!= 0)
2057 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
2060 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
2063 static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2065 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2068 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2069 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2072 char identity
[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+ 1];
2073 size_t identitylen
= 0;
2074 unsigned char psk
[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
];
2075 unsigned char *tmppsk
= NULL
;
2076 char *tmpidentity
= NULL
;
2079 if (s
->psk_client_callback
== NULL
) {
2080 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB
);
2081 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2085 memset(identity
, 0, sizeof(identity
));
2087 psklen
= s
->psk_client_callback(s
, s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
,
2088 identity
, sizeof(identity
) - 1,
2091 if (psklen
> PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
) {
2092 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2093 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2095 } else if (psklen
== 0) {
2096 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2097 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
);
2098 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2102 identitylen
= strlen(identity
);
2103 if (identitylen
> PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
2104 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2105 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2109 tmppsk
= OPENSSL_memdup(psk
, psklen
);
2110 tmpidentity
= OPENSSL_strdup(identity
);
2111 if (tmppsk
== NULL
|| tmpidentity
== NULL
) {
2112 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2113 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2117 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
);
2118 s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
= tmppsk
;
2119 s
->s3
->tmp
.psklen
= psklen
;
2121 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity
);
2122 s
->session
->psk_identity
= tmpidentity
;
2125 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt
, identity
, identitylen
)) {
2126 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2127 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2134 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk
, psklen
);
2135 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity
, sizeof(identity
));
2136 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk
, psklen
);
2137 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity
, identitylen
);
2141 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2142 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2147 static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2149 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2150 unsigned char *encdata
= NULL
;
2151 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
2152 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
2154 unsigned char *pms
= NULL
;
2157 if (s
->session
->peer
== NULL
) {
2159 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2161 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2165 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2166 if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey
) == NULL
) {
2167 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2171 pmslen
= SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
;
2172 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
2174 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2175 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2179 pms
[0] = s
->client_version
>> 8;
2180 pms
[1] = s
->client_version
& 0xff;
2181 if (RAND_bytes(pms
+ 2, pmslen
- 2) <= 0) {
2185 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2186 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
&& !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)) {
2187 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2190 pctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey
, NULL
);
2191 if (pctx
== NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx
) <= 0
2192 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx
, NULL
, &enclen
, pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
2193 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2196 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, enclen
, &encdata
)
2197 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx
, encdata
, &enclen
, pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
2198 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT
);
2201 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
2204 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1
)
2206 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2
)
2210 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2211 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
&& !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
2212 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2216 s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
= pms
;
2217 s
->s3
->tmp
.pmslen
= pmslen
;
2221 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms
, pmslen
);
2222 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
2226 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2227 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2232 static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2234 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2236 const BIGNUM
*pub_key
;
2237 EVP_PKEY
*ckey
= NULL
, *skey
= NULL
;
2238 unsigned char *keybytes
= NULL
;
2240 skey
= s
->s3
->peer_tmp
;
2244 ckey
= ssl_generate_pkey(skey
);
2245 dh_clnt
= EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey
);
2247 if (dh_clnt
== NULL
|| ssl_derive(s
, ckey
, skey
) == 0)
2250 /* send off the data */
2251 DH_get0_key(dh_clnt
, &pub_key
, NULL
);
2252 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt
, BN_num_bytes(pub_key
), &keybytes
))
2255 BN_bn2bin(pub_key
, keybytes
);
2256 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
2260 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
2262 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2263 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2267 static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2269 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2270 unsigned char *encodedPoint
= NULL
;
2271 int encoded_pt_len
= 0;
2272 EVP_PKEY
*ckey
= NULL
, *skey
= NULL
;
2275 skey
= s
->s3
->peer_tmp
;
2277 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2281 ckey
= ssl_generate_pkey(skey
);
2283 if (ssl_derive(s
, ckey
, skey
) == 0) {
2284 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2288 /* Generate encoding of client key */
2289 encoded_pt_len
= EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey
, &encodedPoint
);
2291 if (encoded_pt_len
== 0) {
2292 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
2296 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, encodedPoint
, encoded_pt_len
)) {
2297 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2303 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
2304 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
2307 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2308 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2313 static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2315 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2316 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
2317 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pkey_ctx
= NULL
;
2320 unsigned int md_len
;
2321 unsigned char shared_ukm
[32], tmp
[256];
2322 EVP_MD_CTX
*ukm_hash
= NULL
;
2323 int dgst_nid
= NID_id_GostR3411_94
;
2324 unsigned char *pms
= NULL
;
2327 if ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aGOST12
) != 0)
2328 dgst_nid
= NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256
;
2331 * Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it
2333 peer_cert
= s
->session
->peer
;
2335 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2336 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
,
2337 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER
);
2341 pkey_ctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert
), NULL
);
2342 if (pkey_ctx
== NULL
) {
2343 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2344 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2348 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
2349 * parameters match those of server certificate, use
2350 * certificate key for key exchange
2353 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
2355 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
2357 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2358 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2362 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx
) <= 0
2363 /* Generate session key */
2364 || RAND_bytes(pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
2365 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2366 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2370 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
2373 ukm_hash
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2374 if (ukm_hash
== NULL
2375 || EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash
, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid
)) <= 0
2376 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash
, s
->s3
->client_random
,
2377 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
2378 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash
, s
->s3
->server_random
,
2379 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
2380 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash
, shared_ukm
, &md_len
) <= 0) {
2381 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2382 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2385 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash
);
2387 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx
, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT
,
2388 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV
, 8, shared_ukm
) < 0) {
2389 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2390 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG
);
2393 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
2395 * Encapsulate it into sequence
2398 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx
, tmp
, &msglen
, pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
2399 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2400 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG
);
2404 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
)
2405 || (msglen
>= 0x80 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0x81))
2406 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, tmp
, msglen
)) {
2407 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2408 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2412 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
2413 s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
= pms
;
2414 s
->s3
->tmp
.pmslen
= pmslen
;
2418 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
2419 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms
, pmslen
);
2420 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash
);
2423 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2424 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2429 static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2431 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2432 unsigned char *abytes
= NULL
;
2434 if (s
->srp_ctx
.A
== NULL
2435 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt
, BN_num_bytes(s
->srp_ctx
.A
),
2437 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2440 BN_bn2bin(s
->srp_ctx
.A
, abytes
);
2442 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->srp_username
);
2443 s
->session
->srp_username
= OPENSSL_strdup(s
->srp_ctx
.login
);
2444 if (s
->session
->srp_username
== NULL
) {
2445 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2451 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2452 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2457 int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
2459 unsigned long alg_k
;
2462 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
2464 if ((alg_k
& SSL_PSK
)
2465 && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s
, pkt
, &al
))
2468 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kRSA
| SSL_kRSAPSK
)) {
2469 if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s
, pkt
, &al
))
2471 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
)) {
2472 if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s
, pkt
, &al
))
2474 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
2475 if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s
, pkt
, &al
))
2477 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kGOST
) {
2478 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s
, pkt
, &al
))
2480 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2481 if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s
, pkt
, &al
))
2483 } else if (!(alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
)) {
2484 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
2485 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2492 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2493 OPENSSL_clear_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
, s
->s3
->tmp
.pmslen
);
2494 s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
= NULL
;
2495 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2496 OPENSSL_clear_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
, s
->s3
->tmp
.psklen
);
2497 s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
= NULL
;
2502 int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL
*s
)
2504 unsigned char *pms
= NULL
;
2507 pms
= s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
;
2508 pmslen
= s
->s3
->tmp
.pmslen
;
2510 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2512 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2513 if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s
)) {
2514 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK
,
2515 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2522 if (pms
== NULL
&& !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kPSK
)) {
2523 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2524 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2527 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s
, pms
, pmslen
, 1)) {
2528 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2529 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2530 /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */
2538 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2539 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
2540 unsigned char sctpauthkey
[64];
2541 char labelbuffer
[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
)];
2544 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
2547 memcpy(labelbuffer
, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
,
2548 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
));
2550 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s
, sctpauthkey
,
2551 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), labelbuffer
,
2552 sizeof(labelbuffer
), NULL
, 0, 0) <= 0)
2555 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY
,
2556 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), sctpauthkey
);
2562 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms
, pmslen
);
2563 s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
= NULL
;
2567 int tls_construct_client_verify(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
2570 const EVP_MD
*md
= s
->s3
->tmp
.md
[s
->cert
->key
- s
->cert
->pkeys
];
2571 EVP_MD_CTX
*mctx
= NULL
;
2575 unsigned char *sig
= NULL
;
2577 mctx
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2579 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2582 pkey
= s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
;
2584 hdatalen
= BIO_get_mem_data(s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
, &hdata
);
2585 if (hdatalen
<= 0) {
2586 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2589 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)&& !tls12_get_sigandhash(pkt
, pkey
, md
)) {
2590 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2594 fprintf(stderr
, "Using client alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md
));
2596 sig
= OPENSSL_malloc(EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
));
2598 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2601 if (!EVP_SignInit_ex(mctx
, md
, NULL
)
2602 || !EVP_SignUpdate(mctx
, hdata
, hdatalen
)
2603 || (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
2604 && !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx
, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET
,
2605 s
->session
->master_key_length
,
2606 s
->session
->master_key
))
2607 || !EVP_SignFinal(mctx
, sig
, &u
, pkey
)) {
2608 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2611 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2613 int pktype
= EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
);
2614 if (pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
2615 || pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
2616 || pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
)
2617 BUF_reverse(sig
, NULL
, u
);
2621 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt
, sig
, u
)) {
2622 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2626 /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */
2627 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0))
2631 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx
);
2635 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx
);
2636 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2641 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
2642 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
2643 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
2645 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL
*s
)
2647 if (!s
->cert
|| !s
->cert
->key
->x509
|| !s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
)
2649 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
2650 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) && !s
->s3
->tmp
.md
[s
->cert
->key
- s
->cert
->pkeys
])
2653 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
2654 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
2656 if (s
->cert
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
&&
2657 !tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, -2))
2662 WORK_STATE
tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
2665 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
2668 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
) {
2669 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
2670 if (s
->cert
->cert_cb
) {
2671 i
= s
->cert
->cert_cb(s
, s
->cert
->cert_cb_arg
);
2673 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
2677 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2678 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2681 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
2683 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s
))
2684 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
2686 /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
2690 /* We need to get a client cert */
2691 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_B
) {
2693 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2694 * return(-1); We then get retied later
2696 i
= ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s
, &x509
, &pkey
);
2698 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
2701 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
2702 if ((i
== 1) && (pkey
!= NULL
) && (x509
!= NULL
)) {
2703 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s
, x509
) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s
, pkey
))
2705 } else if (i
== 1) {
2707 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
2708 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK
);
2712 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
2713 if (i
&& !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s
))
2716 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
2717 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 0;
2718 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_WARNING
, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE
);
2719 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
2721 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 2;
2722 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
2723 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2724 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2730 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
2733 /* Shouldn't ever get here */
2737 int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
2739 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s
, pkt
,
2740 (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
==
2741 2) ? NULL
: s
->cert
->key
)) {
2742 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2743 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2750 #define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m))
2752 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL
*s
)
2755 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2759 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
2760 int al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2762 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
2763 alg_a
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
;
2765 /* we don't have a certificate */
2766 if ((alg_a
& SSL_aNULL
) || (alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
))
2769 /* This is the passed certificate */
2771 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2772 idx
= s
->session
->peer_type
;
2773 if (idx
== SSL_PKEY_ECC
) {
2774 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s
->session
->peer
, s
) == 0) {
2776 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT
);
2781 } else if (alg_a
& SSL_aECDSA
) {
2782 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
2783 SSL_R_MISSING_ECDSA_SIGNING_CERT
);
2787 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2788 i
= X509_certificate_type(s
->session
->peer
, pkey
);
2790 /* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */
2791 if ((alg_a
& SSL_aRSA
) && !has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_RSA
| EVP_PKT_SIGN
)) {
2792 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
2793 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT
);
2796 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2797 else if ((alg_a
& SSL_aDSS
) && !has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_DSA
| EVP_PKT_SIGN
)) {
2798 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
2799 SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT
);
2803 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2804 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kRSA
| SSL_kRSAPSK
) &&
2805 !has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_RSA
| EVP_PKT_ENC
)) {
2806 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
2807 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT
);
2811 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2812 if ((alg_k
& SSL_kDHE
) && (s
->s3
->peer_tmp
== NULL
)) {
2813 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2814 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2821 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2825 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2826 int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
2828 size_t len
, padding_len
;
2829 unsigned char *padding
= NULL
;
2831 len
= s
->next_proto_negotiated_len
;
2832 padding_len
= 32 - ((len
+ 2) % 32);
2834 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, s
->next_proto_negotiated
, len
)
2835 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt
, padding_len
, &padding
)) {
2836 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEXT_PROTO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2840 memset(padding
, 0, padding_len
);
2844 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2849 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL
*s
, X509
**px509
, EVP_PKEY
**ppkey
)
2852 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
2853 if (s
->ctx
->client_cert_engine
) {
2854 i
= ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s
->ctx
->client_cert_engine
, s
,
2855 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s
),
2856 px509
, ppkey
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
);
2861 if (s
->ctx
->client_cert_cb
)
2862 i
= s
->ctx
->client_cert_cb(s
, px509
, ppkey
);
2866 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL
*s
, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
2869 size_t totlen
= 0, len
, maxlen
;
2870 int empty_reneg_info_scsv
= !s
->renegotiate
;
2871 /* Set disabled masks for this session */
2872 ssl_set_client_disabled(s
);
2877 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
2878 # if OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH < 6
2879 # error Max cipher length too short
2882 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
2883 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
2886 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
)
2887 maxlen
= OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
& ~1;
2890 /* Maximum length that can be stored in 2 bytes. Length must be even */
2893 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv
)
2895 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV
)
2898 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk
) && totlen
< maxlen
; i
++) {
2899 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
;
2901 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk
, i
);
2902 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
2903 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s
, c
, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED
))
2906 if (!s
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(c
, pkt
, &len
)) {
2907 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2915 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES
, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE
);
2920 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv
) {
2921 static SSL_CIPHER scsv
= {
2922 0, NULL
, SSL3_CK_SCSV
, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
2924 if (!s
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv
, pkt
, &len
)) {
2925 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2929 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV
) {
2930 static SSL_CIPHER scsv
= {
2931 0, NULL
, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV
, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
2933 if (!s
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv
, pkt
, &len
)) {
2934 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);