2 * Copyright 1995-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
4 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
6 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
7 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
8 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
9 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
15 #include "../ssl_local.h"
16 #include "statem_local.h"
17 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
18 #include <openssl/rand.h>
19 #include <openssl/objects.h>
20 #include <openssl/evp.h>
21 #include <openssl/md5.h>
22 #include <openssl/dh.h>
23 #include <openssl/rsa.h>
24 #include <openssl/bn.h>
25 #include <openssl/engine.h>
26 #include <openssl/trace.h>
27 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
28 #include <openssl/param_build.h>
29 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
31 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
33 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
36 static ossl_inline
int cert_req_allowed(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
);
37 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
);
38 static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
,
42 * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
48 static ossl_inline
int cert_req_allowed(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
50 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
51 if ((s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
52 && (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aNULL
))
53 || (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aSRP
| SSL_aPSK
)))
60 * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
66 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
68 long alg_k
= s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
71 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
72 * ciphersuite or for SRP
74 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
83 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
84 * handshake state transitions when a TLS1.3 client is reading messages from the
85 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
86 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
88 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
89 * (transition not allowed)
91 static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, int mt
)
93 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
96 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO, because we haven't
97 * yet negotiated TLSv1.3 at that point so that is handled by
98 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition()
101 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
105 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
107 * This must a ClientHello following a HelloRetryRequest, so the only
108 * thing we can get now is a ServerHello.
110 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
) {
111 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
;
116 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
117 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
) {
118 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
;
123 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
:
125 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
126 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
;
130 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
) {
131 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
;
134 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
135 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT
;
141 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
142 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
143 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT
;
149 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
) {
150 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
;
155 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
:
156 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
157 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
;
163 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
) {
164 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
;
167 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE
) {
168 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE
;
171 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
) {
172 #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL != DTLS1_2_VERSION
173 /* Restore digest for PHA before adding message.*/
174 # error Internal DTLS version error
176 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)
177 && s
->post_handshake_auth
== SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT
) {
178 s
->post_handshake_auth
= SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
;
180 * In TLS, this is called before the message is added to the
181 * digest. In DTLS, this is expected to be called after adding
182 * to the digest. Either move the digest restore, or add the
183 * message here after the swap, or do it after the clientFinished?
185 if (!tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(s
)) {
186 /* SSLfatal() already called */
189 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
;
196 /* No valid transition found */
201 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
202 * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
203 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
204 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
206 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
207 * (transition not allowed)
209 int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, int mt
)
211 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
215 * Note that after writing the first ClientHello we don't know what version
216 * we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later.
218 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
219 if (!ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(s
, mt
))
224 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
228 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
229 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
) {
230 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
;
234 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
235 if (mt
== DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
) {
236 st
->hand_state
= DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
;
242 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
:
244 * We've not actually selected TLSv1.3 yet, but we have sent early
245 * data. The only thing allowed now is a ServerHello or a
248 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
) {
249 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
;
254 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
256 if (s
->ext
.ticket_expected
) {
257 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
) {
258 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
;
261 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
262 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
266 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)
267 && mt
== DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
) {
268 st
->hand_state
= DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
;
270 } else if (s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
271 && s
->ext
.session_secret_cb
!= NULL
272 && s
->session
->ext
.tick
!= NULL
273 && mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
275 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
276 * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
277 * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
278 * the server is resuming.
281 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
283 } else if (!(s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
284 & (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
| SSL_aPSK
))) {
285 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
286 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT
;
290 ske_expected
= key_exchange_expected(s
);
291 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
293 || ((s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_PSK
)
294 && mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
)) {
295 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
296 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
;
299 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
300 && cert_req_allowed(s
)) {
301 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
;
303 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
) {
304 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
;
313 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
314 * |ext.status_expected| is set
316 if (s
->ext
.status_expected
&& mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS
) {
317 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
;
322 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
:
323 ske_expected
= key_exchange_expected(s
);
324 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
325 if (ske_expected
|| ((s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_PSK
)
326 && mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
)) {
327 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
328 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
;
335 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
:
336 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
) {
337 if (cert_req_allowed(s
)) {
338 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
;
345 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
346 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
) {
347 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
;
352 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
353 if (s
->ext
.ticket_expected
) {
354 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
) {
355 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
;
358 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
359 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
364 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
365 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
366 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
371 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
:
372 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
373 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
;
379 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST
) {
380 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ
;
387 /* No valid transition found */
388 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
) && mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
392 * CCS messages don't have a message sequence number so this is probably
393 * because of an out-of-order CCS. We'll just drop it.
396 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
397 rbio
= SSL_get_rbio(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
));
398 BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio
);
399 BIO_set_retry_read(rbio
);
402 SSLfatal(s
, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
407 * ossl_statem_client13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
408 * move to next when the TLSv1.3 client is writing messages to be sent to the
411 static WRITE_TRAN
ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
413 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
416 * Note: There are no cases for TLS_ST_BEFORE because we haven't negotiated
417 * TLSv1.3 yet at that point. They are handled by
418 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition().
420 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
422 /* Shouldn't happen */
423 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
424 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
426 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
427 if (s
->post_handshake_auth
== SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
) {
428 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CERT
;
429 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
432 * We should only get here if we received a CertificateRequest after
433 * we already sent close_notify
435 if (!ossl_assert((s
->shutdown
& SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN
) != 0)) {
436 /* Shouldn't happen - same as default case */
437 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
438 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
440 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
441 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
443 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
444 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
445 || s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
)
446 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END
;
447 else if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT
) != 0
448 && s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_NONE
)
449 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
451 st
->hand_state
= (s
->s3
.tmp
.cert_req
!= 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
452 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
453 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
455 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END
:
456 if (s
->ext
.early_data
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED
) {
457 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
;
458 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
462 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
:
463 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
464 st
->hand_state
= (s
->s3
.tmp
.cert_req
!= 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
465 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
466 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
469 /* If a non-empty Certificate we also send CertificateVerify */
470 st
->hand_state
= (s
->s3
.tmp
.cert_req
== 1) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
471 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
472 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
474 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
:
475 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
476 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
478 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE
:
479 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
:
480 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
481 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
482 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
483 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
486 if (s
->key_update
!= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE
) {
487 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
;
488 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
491 /* Try to read from the server instead */
492 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
497 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
498 * move to next when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
500 WRITE_TRAN
ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
502 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
505 * Note that immediately before/after a ClientHello we don't know what
506 * version we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until
509 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
))
510 return ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(s
);
512 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
514 /* Shouldn't happen */
515 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
516 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
519 if (!s
->renegotiate
) {
521 * We haven't requested a renegotiation ourselves so we must have
522 * received a message from the server. Better read it.
524 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
529 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
530 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
532 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
533 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
) {
535 * We are assuming this is a TLSv1.3 connection, although we haven't
536 * actually selected a version yet.
538 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT
) != 0)
539 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
541 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
;
542 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
545 * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
548 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
550 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
552 * We only get here in TLSv1.3. We just received an HRR, so issue a
553 * CCS unless middlebox compat mode is off, or we already issued one
554 * because we did early data.
556 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT
) != 0
557 && s
->early_data_state
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
)
558 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
560 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
561 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
563 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
:
564 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
566 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
567 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
568 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
570 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
:
571 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.cert_req
)
572 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CERT
;
574 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
;
575 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
578 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
;
579 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
581 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
:
583 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
584 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
587 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
588 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
589 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
590 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
592 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.cert_req
== 1) {
593 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
;
595 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
597 if (s
->s3
.flags
& TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY
) {
598 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
600 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
602 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
:
603 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
604 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
606 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
607 if (s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_PENDING
) {
608 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
609 } else if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
) {
610 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
;
612 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
613 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
615 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->s3
.npn_seen
)
616 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO
;
618 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
621 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
623 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
624 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO
:
625 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
626 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
629 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
631 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
632 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
634 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
637 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
639 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
640 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
642 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
643 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
646 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ
:
648 * If we can renegotiate now then do so, otherwise wait for a more
651 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
), 1)) {
652 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s
)) {
653 /* SSLfatal() already called */
654 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
656 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
657 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
659 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
660 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
665 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
666 * the client to the server.
668 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
670 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
672 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
674 /* No pre work to be done */
677 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
679 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
680 /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
681 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
)) {
682 /* SSLfatal() already called */
688 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
689 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
692 * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
693 * messages unless we need to.
697 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
698 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
)))) {
699 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
700 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s
);
706 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END
:
708 * If we've been called by SSL_do_handshake()/SSL_write(), or we did not
709 * attempt to write early data before calling SSL_read() then we press
710 * on with the handshake. Otherwise we pause here.
712 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
713 || s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_NONE
)
714 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
717 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
:
718 return tls_finish_handshake(s
, wst
, 0, 1);
721 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
722 return tls_finish_handshake(s
, wst
, 1, 1);
725 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
729 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
730 * client to the server.
732 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
734 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
735 SSL
*ssl
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
);
739 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
741 /* No post work to be done */
744 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
745 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
746 && s
->max_early_data
> 0) {
748 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
749 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
750 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
752 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT
) == 0) {
753 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s
,
754 SSL3_CC_EARLY
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
)) {
755 /* SSLfatal() already called */
759 /* else we're in compat mode so we delay flushing until after CCS */
760 } else if (!statem_flush(s
)) {
764 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
765 /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
770 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
:
772 * We set the enc_write_ctx back to NULL because we may end up writing
773 * in cleartext again if we get a HelloRetryRequest from the server.
775 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s
->enc_write_ctx
);
776 s
->enc_write_ctx
= NULL
;
779 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
:
780 if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s
) == 0) {
781 /* SSLfatal() already called */
786 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
787 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)
788 || s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_PENDING
)
790 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
791 && s
->max_early_data
> 0) {
793 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
794 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
795 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
797 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s
,
798 SSL3_CC_EARLY
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
))
802 s
->session
->cipher
= s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
;
803 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
804 s
->session
->compress_meth
= 0;
806 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
)
807 s
->session
->compress_meth
= 0;
809 s
->session
->compress_meth
= s
->s3
.tmp
.new_compression
->id
;
811 if (!ssl
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
)) {
812 /* SSLfatal() already called */
816 if (!ssl
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
817 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
)) {
818 /* SSLfatal() already called */
822 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
823 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
826 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
829 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(ssl
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY
,
834 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s
, SSL3_CC_WRITE
);
838 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
839 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
840 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
&& SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->hit
== 0) {
842 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
845 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(ssl
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY
,
849 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
852 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
853 if (!tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(s
)) {
854 /* SSLfatal() already called */
857 if (s
->post_handshake_auth
!= SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
) {
858 if (!ssl
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
859 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
)) {
860 /* SSLfatal() already called */
867 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
:
868 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
870 if (!tls13_update_key(s
, 1)) {
871 /* SSLfatal() already called */
877 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
881 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
884 * Valid return values are:
888 int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
889 confunc_f
*confunc
, int *mt
)
891 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
893 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
895 /* Shouldn't happen */
896 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE
);
899 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
900 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
))
901 *confunc
= dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec
;
903 *confunc
= tls_construct_change_cipher_spec
;
904 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
;
907 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
908 *confunc
= tls_construct_client_hello
;
909 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
;
912 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
:
913 *confunc
= tls_construct_end_of_early_data
;
914 *mt
= SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
;
917 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END
:
923 *confunc
= tls_construct_client_certificate
;
924 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
;
927 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
:
928 *confunc
= tls_construct_client_key_exchange
;
929 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
;
932 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
:
933 *confunc
= tls_construct_cert_verify
;
934 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
;
937 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
938 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO
:
939 *confunc
= tls_construct_next_proto
;
940 *mt
= SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO
;
943 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
944 *confunc
= tls_construct_finished
;
945 *mt
= SSL3_MT_FINISHED
;
948 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
:
949 *confunc
= tls_construct_key_update
;
950 *mt
= SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE
;
958 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
959 * reading. Excludes the message header.
961 size_t ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
963 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
965 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
967 /* Shouldn't happen */
970 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
971 return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH
;
973 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
974 return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH
;
977 return s
->max_cert_list
;
979 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
:
980 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
;
982 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
:
983 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
;
985 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
:
986 return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH
;
988 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
990 * Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In
991 * practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured
992 * to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
994 return s
->max_cert_list
;
996 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
:
997 return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH
;
999 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
:
1000 if (s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
)
1002 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH
;
1004 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
1005 return (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) ? SESSION_TICKET_MAX_LENGTH_TLS13
1006 : SESSION_TICKET_MAX_LENGTH_TLS12
;
1008 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
1009 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH
;
1011 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
:
1012 return ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS_MAX_LENGTH
;
1014 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE
:
1015 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH
;
1020 * Process a message that the client has received from the server.
1022 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
1025 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
1027 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
1029 /* Shouldn't happen */
1030 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1031 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1033 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
1034 return tls_process_server_hello(s
, pkt
);
1036 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
1037 return dtls_process_hello_verify(s
, pkt
);
1039 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT
:
1040 return tls_process_server_certificate(s
, pkt
);
1042 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
:
1043 return tls_process_cert_verify(s
, pkt
);
1045 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
:
1046 return tls_process_cert_status(s
, pkt
);
1048 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
:
1049 return tls_process_key_exchange(s
, pkt
);
1051 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
1052 return tls_process_certificate_request(s
, pkt
);
1054 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
:
1055 return tls_process_server_done(s
, pkt
);
1057 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
:
1058 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s
, pkt
);
1060 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
1061 return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s
, pkt
);
1063 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
1064 return tls_process_finished(s
, pkt
);
1066 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ
:
1067 return tls_process_hello_req(s
, pkt
);
1069 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
:
1070 return tls_process_encrypted_extensions(s
, pkt
);
1072 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE
:
1073 return tls_process_key_update(s
, pkt
);
1078 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
1081 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
1084 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
1086 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
1088 /* Shouldn't happen */
1089 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1092 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT
:
1093 return tls_post_process_server_certificate(s
, wst
);
1095 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
:
1096 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
1097 return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s
, wst
);
1101 CON_FUNC_RETURN
tls_construct_client_hello(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
1106 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1109 SSL_SESSION
*sess
= s
->session
;
1110 unsigned char *session_id
;
1111 SSL_CTX
*sctx
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
);
1113 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
1114 protverr
= ssl_set_client_hello_version(s
);
1115 if (protverr
!= 0) {
1116 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, protverr
);
1117 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
1121 || !ssl_version_supported(s
, sess
->ssl_version
, NULL
)
1122 || !SSL_SESSION_is_resumable(sess
)) {
1123 if (s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_NONE
1124 && !ssl_get_new_session(s
, 0)) {
1125 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1126 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
1129 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
1131 p
= s
->s3
.client_random
;
1134 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
1135 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
1137 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1140 for (idx
= 0; idx
< sizeof(s
->s3
.client_random
); idx
++) {
1147 i
= (s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_NONE
);
1150 if (i
&& ssl_fill_hello_random(s
, 0, p
, sizeof(s
->s3
.client_random
),
1151 DOWNGRADE_NONE
) <= 0) {
1152 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1153 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
1157 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
1158 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
1159 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
1160 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
1161 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
1162 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
1163 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
1164 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
1167 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
1168 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
1169 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
1170 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
1171 * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0.
1172 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
1173 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
1174 * know that is maximum server supports.
1175 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
1176 * containing version 1.0.
1178 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
1179 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
1180 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
1181 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
1182 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
1183 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
1184 * the negotiated version.
1186 * For TLS 1.3 we always set the ClientHello version to 1.2 and rely on the
1187 * supported_versions extension for the real supported versions.
1189 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, s
->client_version
)
1190 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, s
->s3
.client_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
)) {
1191 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1192 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
1196 session_id
= s
->session
->session_id
;
1197 if (s
->new_session
|| s
->session
->ssl_version
== TLS1_3_VERSION
) {
1198 if (s
->version
== TLS1_3_VERSION
1199 && (s
->options
& SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT
) != 0) {
1200 sess_id_len
= sizeof(s
->tmp_session_id
);
1201 s
->tmp_session_id_len
= sess_id_len
;
1202 session_id
= s
->tmp_session_id
;
1203 if (s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_NONE
1204 && RAND_bytes_ex(sctx
->libctx
, s
->tmp_session_id
,
1205 sess_id_len
, 0) <= 0) {
1206 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1207 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
1213 assert(s
->session
->session_id_length
<= sizeof(s
->session
->session_id
));
1214 sess_id_len
= s
->session
->session_id_length
;
1215 if (s
->version
== TLS1_3_VERSION
) {
1216 s
->tmp_session_id_len
= sess_id_len
;
1217 memcpy(s
->tmp_session_id
, s
->session
->session_id
, sess_id_len
);
1220 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt
)
1221 || (sess_id_len
!= 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, session_id
,
1223 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
1224 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1225 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
1228 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
1229 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1230 if (s
->d1
->cookie_len
> sizeof(s
->d1
->cookie
)
1231 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, s
->d1
->cookie
,
1232 s
->d1
->cookie_len
)) {
1233 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1234 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
1238 /* Ciphers supported */
1239 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)) {
1240 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1241 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
1244 if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s
, SSL_get_ciphers(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
)),
1246 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1247 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
1249 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
1250 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1251 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
1255 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt
)) {
1256 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1257 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
1259 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1260 if (ssl_allow_compression(s
)
1261 && sctx
->comp_methods
1262 && (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)
1263 || s
->s3
.tmp
.max_ver
< TLS1_3_VERSION
)) {
1264 int compnum
= sk_SSL_COMP_num(sctx
->comp_methods
);
1265 for (i
= 0; i
< compnum
; i
++) {
1266 comp
= sk_SSL_COMP_value(sctx
->comp_methods
, i
);
1267 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, comp
->id
)) {
1268 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1269 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
1274 /* Add the NULL method */
1275 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
1276 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1277 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
1280 /* TLS extensions */
1281 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s
, pkt
, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO
, NULL
, 0)) {
1282 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1283 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
1286 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS
;
1289 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1294 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt
, 2)
1295 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &cookiepkt
)) {
1296 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1297 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1300 cookie_len
= PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt
);
1301 if (cookie_len
> sizeof(s
->d1
->cookie
)) {
1302 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
1303 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1306 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt
, s
->d1
->cookie
, cookie_len
)) {
1307 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1308 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1310 s
->d1
->cookie_len
= cookie_len
;
1312 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
1315 static int set_client_ciphersuite(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
1316 const unsigned char *cipherchars
)
1318 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
;
1319 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
;
1321 SSL_CTX
*sctx
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
);
1323 c
= ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s
, cipherchars
, 0);
1325 /* unknown cipher */
1326 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1330 * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello,
1331 * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error.
1333 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s
, c
, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK
, 1)) {
1334 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1338 sk
= ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s
);
1339 i
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk
, c
);
1341 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1342 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1346 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
) && s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
!= NULL
1347 && s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->id
!= c
->id
) {
1348 /* ServerHello selected a different ciphersuite to that in the HRR */
1349 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1354 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1355 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1356 * set and use it for comparison.
1358 if (s
->session
->cipher
!= NULL
)
1359 s
->session
->cipher_id
= s
->session
->cipher
->id
;
1360 if (s
->hit
&& (s
->session
->cipher_id
!= c
->id
)) {
1361 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1362 const EVP_MD
*md
= ssl_md(sctx
, c
->algorithm2
);
1365 * In TLSv1.3 it is valid for the server to select a different
1366 * ciphersuite as long as the hash is the same.
1369 || md
!= ssl_md(sctx
, s
->session
->cipher
->algorithm2
)) {
1370 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1371 SSL_R_CIPHERSUITE_DIGEST_HAS_CHANGED
);
1376 * Prior to TLSv1.3 resuming a session always meant using the same
1379 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1380 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED
);
1384 s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
= c
;
1389 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_server_hello(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1391 PACKET session_id
, extpkt
;
1392 size_t session_id_len
;
1393 const unsigned char *cipherchars
;
1395 unsigned int compression
;
1396 unsigned int sversion
;
1397 unsigned int context
;
1398 RAW_EXTENSION
*extensions
= NULL
;
1399 SSL
*ssl
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
);
1400 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1404 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &sversion
)) {
1405 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1409 /* load the server random */
1410 if (s
->version
== TLS1_3_VERSION
1411 && sversion
== TLS1_2_VERSION
1412 && PACKET_remaining(pkt
) >= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1413 && memcmp(hrrrandom
, PACKET_data(pkt
), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) == 0) {
1414 if (s
->hello_retry_request
!= SSL_HRR_NONE
) {
1415 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
1418 s
->hello_retry_request
= SSL_HRR_PENDING
;
1419 /* Tell the record layer that we know we're going to get TLSv1.3 */
1420 s
->rlayer
.rrlmethod
->set_protocol_version(s
->rlayer
.rrl
, s
->version
);
1422 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
)) {
1423 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1427 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, s
->s3
.server_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
)) {
1428 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1433 /* Get the session-id. */
1434 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &session_id
)) {
1435 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1438 session_id_len
= PACKET_remaining(&session_id
);
1439 if (session_id_len
> sizeof(s
->session
->session_id
)
1440 || session_id_len
> SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE
) {
1441 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG
);
1445 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &cipherchars
, TLS_CIPHER_LEN
)) {
1446 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1450 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &compression
)) {
1451 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1455 /* TLS extensions */
1456 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0 && !hrr
) {
1457 PACKET_null_init(&extpkt
);
1458 } else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extpkt
)
1459 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1460 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH
);
1465 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extpkt
,
1466 SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
1467 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
,
1468 &extensions
, NULL
, 1)) {
1469 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1473 if (!ssl_choose_client_version(s
, sversion
, extensions
)) {
1474 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1479 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
) || hrr
) {
1480 if (compression
!= 0) {
1481 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1482 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1486 if (session_id_len
!= s
->tmp_session_id_len
1487 || memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id
), s
->tmp_session_id
,
1488 session_id_len
) != 0) {
1489 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_INVALID_SESSION_ID
);
1495 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s
, cipherchars
)) {
1496 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1500 return tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(s
, &extpkt
);
1504 * Now we have chosen the version we need to check again that the extensions
1505 * are appropriate for this version.
1507 context
= SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
) ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
1508 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
;
1509 if (!tls_validate_all_contexts(s
, context
, extensions
)) {
1510 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION
);
1516 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1518 * In TLSv1.3 a ServerHello message signals a key change so the end of
1519 * the message must be on a record boundary.
1521 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s
->rlayer
)) {
1522 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
,
1523 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY
);
1527 /* This will set s->hit if we are resuming */
1528 if (!tls_parse_extension(s
, TLSEXT_IDX_psk
,
1529 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
,
1530 extensions
, NULL
, 0)) {
1531 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1536 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared
1537 * secret. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
1538 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
1539 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
1540 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
1541 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether
1542 * EAP-FAST servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session
1543 * ID alone is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we
1544 * first check if we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake
1545 * message to see if the server wants to resume.
1547 if (s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
1548 && s
->ext
.session_secret_cb
!= NULL
&& s
->session
->ext
.tick
) {
1549 const SSL_CIPHER
*pref_cipher
= NULL
;
1551 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1552 * backwards compat reasons
1554 int master_key_length
;
1556 master_key_length
= sizeof(s
->session
->master_key
);
1557 if (s
->ext
.session_secret_cb(ssl
, s
->session
->master_key
,
1560 s
->ext
.session_secret_cb_arg
)
1561 && master_key_length
> 0) {
1562 s
->session
->master_key_length
= master_key_length
;
1563 s
->session
->cipher
= pref_cipher
?
1564 pref_cipher
: ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s
, cipherchars
, 0);
1566 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1571 if (session_id_len
!= 0
1572 && session_id_len
== s
->session
->session_id_length
1573 && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id
), s
->session
->session_id
,
1574 session_id_len
) == 0)
1579 if (s
->sid_ctx_length
!= s
->session
->sid_ctx_length
1580 || memcmp(s
->session
->sid_ctx
, s
->sid_ctx
, s
->sid_ctx_length
)) {
1581 /* actually a client application bug */
1582 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1583 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT
);
1588 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1589 * didn't resume, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1590 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1591 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1592 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1594 if (s
->session
->session_id_length
> 0) {
1595 ssl_tsan_counter(s
->session_ctx
, &s
->session_ctx
->stats
.sess_miss
);
1596 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 0)) {
1597 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1602 s
->session
->ssl_version
= s
->version
;
1604 * In TLSv1.2 and below we save the session id we were sent so we can
1605 * resume it later. In TLSv1.3 the session id we were sent is just an
1606 * echo of what we originally sent in the ClientHello and should not be
1607 * used for resumption.
1609 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1610 s
->session
->session_id_length
= session_id_len
;
1611 /* session_id_len could be 0 */
1612 if (session_id_len
> 0)
1613 memcpy(s
->session
->session_id
, PACKET_data(&session_id
),
1618 /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */
1619 if (s
->version
!= s
->session
->ssl_version
) {
1620 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
,
1621 SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH
);
1625 * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed
1628 s
->s3
.tmp
.min_ver
= s
->version
;
1629 s
->s3
.tmp
.max_ver
= s
->version
;
1631 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s
, cipherchars
)) {
1632 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1636 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1637 if (compression
!= 0) {
1638 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1639 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1643 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1644 * using compression.
1646 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0) {
1647 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1651 if (s
->hit
&& compression
!= s
->session
->compress_meth
) {
1652 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1653 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED
);
1656 if (compression
== 0)
1658 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s
)) {
1659 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED
);
1662 comp
= ssl3_comp_find(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
)->comp_methods
,
1666 if (compression
!= 0 && comp
== NULL
) {
1667 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1668 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1671 s
->s3
.tmp
.new_compression
= comp
;
1675 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, context
, extensions
, NULL
, 0, 1)) {
1676 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1680 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1681 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->hit
) {
1682 unsigned char sctpauthkey
[64];
1683 char labelbuffer
[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
)];
1687 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
1690 memcpy(labelbuffer
, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
,
1691 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
));
1693 /* Don't include the terminating zero. */
1694 labellen
= sizeof(labelbuffer
) - 1;
1695 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG
)
1698 if (SSL_export_keying_material(ssl
, sctpauthkey
,
1699 sizeof(sctpauthkey
),
1701 labellen
, NULL
, 0, 0) <= 0) {
1702 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1706 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(ssl
),
1707 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY
,
1708 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), sctpauthkey
);
1713 * In TLSv1.3 we have some post-processing to change cipher state, otherwise
1714 * we're done with this message
1716 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)
1717 && (!ssl
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
)
1718 || !ssl
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
1719 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ
))) {
1720 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1724 OPENSSL_free(extensions
);
1725 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
1727 OPENSSL_free(extensions
);
1728 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1731 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
1734 RAW_EXTENSION
*extensions
= NULL
;
1737 * If we were sending early_data then the enc_write_ctx is now invalid and
1738 * should not be used.
1740 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s
->enc_write_ctx
);
1741 s
->enc_write_ctx
= NULL
;
1743 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, extpkt
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
,
1744 &extensions
, NULL
, 1)
1745 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
,
1746 extensions
, NULL
, 0, 1)) {
1747 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1751 OPENSSL_free(extensions
);
1754 if (s
->ext
.tls13_cookie_len
== 0 && s
->s3
.tmp
.pkey
!= NULL
) {
1756 * We didn't receive a cookie or a new key_share so the next
1757 * ClientHello will not change
1759 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_NO_CHANGE_FOLLOWING_HRR
);
1764 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
1765 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
1767 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s
, NULL
, 0, NULL
, 0)) {
1768 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1773 * Add this message to the Transcript Hash. Normally this is done
1774 * automatically prior to the message processing stage. However due to the
1775 * need to create the synthetic message hash, we defer that step until now
1778 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s
, (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
,
1779 s
->init_num
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
)) {
1780 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1784 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
1786 OPENSSL_free(extensions
);
1787 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1790 /* prepare server cert verification by setting s->session->peer_chain from pkt */
1791 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_server_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
1794 unsigned long cert_list_len
, cert_len
;
1796 const unsigned char *certstart
, *certbytes
;
1798 unsigned int context
= 0;
1799 SSL_CTX
*sctx
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
);
1801 if ((s
->session
->peer_chain
= sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
) {
1802 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1806 if ((SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
) && !PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &context
))
1808 || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt
, &cert_list_len
)
1809 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != cert_list_len
1810 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0) {
1811 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1814 for (chainidx
= 0; PACKET_remaining(pkt
); chainidx
++) {
1815 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt
, &cert_len
)
1816 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &certbytes
, cert_len
)) {
1817 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1821 certstart
= certbytes
;
1822 x
= X509_new_ex(sctx
->libctx
, sctx
->propq
);
1824 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1825 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1828 if (d2i_X509(&x
, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes
,
1829 cert_len
) == NULL
) {
1830 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
1834 if (certbytes
!= (certstart
+ cert_len
)) {
1835 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1839 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1840 RAW_EXTENSION
*rawexts
= NULL
;
1843 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extensions
)) {
1844 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH
);
1847 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extensions
,
1848 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE
, &rawexts
,
1849 NULL
, chainidx
== 0)
1850 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE
,
1851 rawexts
, x
, chainidx
,
1852 PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0)) {
1853 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
1854 /* SSLfatal already called */
1857 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
1860 if (!sk_X509_push(s
->session
->peer_chain
, x
)) {
1861 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1866 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
1870 OSSL_STACK_OF_X509_free(s
->session
->peer_chain
);
1871 s
->session
->peer_chain
= NULL
;
1872 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1876 * Verify the s->session->peer_chain and check server cert type.
1877 * On success set s->session->peer and s->session->verify_result.
1878 * Else the peer certificate verification callback may request retry.
1880 WORK_STATE
tls_post_process_server_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
1884 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
1885 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP
*clu
;
1889 if (s
->rwstate
== SSL_RETRY_VERIFY
)
1890 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1891 i
= ssl_verify_cert_chain(s
, s
->session
->peer_chain
);
1892 if (i
> 0 && s
->rwstate
== SSL_RETRY_VERIFY
) {
1896 * The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order
1897 * for client side verification of the server certificate to take place.
1898 * However, historically the code has only checked that *any* flag is set
1899 * to cause server verification to take place. Use of the other flags makes
1900 * no sense in client mode. An attempt to clean up the semantics was
1901 * reverted because at least one application *only* set
1902 * SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT. Prior to the clean up this still caused
1903 * server verification to take place, after the clean up it silently did
1904 * nothing. SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() cannot validate the flags
1905 * sent to them because they are void functions. Therefore, we now use the
1906 * (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is
1907 * set. The *documented* interface remains the same.
1909 if (s
->verify_mode
!= SSL_VERIFY_NONE
&& i
<= 0) {
1910 SSLfatal(s
, ssl_x509err2alert(s
->verify_result
),
1911 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED
);
1914 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1917 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1918 * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c
1920 x
= sk_X509_value(s
->session
->peer_chain
, 0);
1922 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(x
);
1924 if (pkey
== NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey
)) {
1925 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1926 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS
);
1930 if ((clu
= ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey
, &certidx
)) == NULL
) {
1931 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
);
1935 * Check certificate type is consistent with ciphersuite. For TLS 1.3
1936 * skip check since TLS 1.3 ciphersuites can be used with any certificate
1939 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1940 if ((clu
->amask
& s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
) == 0) {
1941 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
);
1946 X509_free(s
->session
->peer
);
1948 s
->session
->peer
= x
;
1949 s
->session
->verify_result
= s
->verify_result
;
1951 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
1952 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)
1953 && !ssl_handshake_hash(s
, s
->cert_verify_hash
,
1954 sizeof(s
->cert_verify_hash
),
1955 &s
->cert_verify_hash_len
)) {
1956 /* SSLfatal() already called */;
1959 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
1962 static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1964 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1965 PACKET psk_identity_hint
;
1967 /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
1969 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &psk_identity_hint
)) {
1970 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1975 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
1976 * tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
1977 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
1980 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint
) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
1981 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
1985 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint
) == 0) {
1986 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
);
1987 s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
= NULL
;
1988 } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint
,
1989 &s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
)) {
1990 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1996 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2001 static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, EVP_PKEY
**pkey
)
2003 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2004 PACKET prime
, generator
, salt
, server_pub
;
2006 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &prime
)
2007 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &generator
)
2008 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &salt
)
2009 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &server_pub
)) {
2010 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2015 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime
),
2016 (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime
), NULL
)) == NULL
2018 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator
),
2019 (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator
), NULL
)) == NULL
2021 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt
),
2022 (int)PACKET_remaining(&salt
), NULL
)) == NULL
2024 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub
),
2025 (int)PACKET_remaining(&server_pub
), NULL
)) == NULL
) {
2026 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
2030 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s
)) {
2031 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2035 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
2036 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aRSA
| SSL_aDSS
))
2037 *pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2041 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2046 static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, EVP_PKEY
**pkey
)
2048 PACKET prime
, generator
, pub_key
;
2049 EVP_PKEY
*peer_tmp
= NULL
;
2050 BIGNUM
*p
= NULL
, *g
= NULL
, *bnpub_key
= NULL
;
2051 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
2052 OSSL_PARAM
*params
= NULL
;
2053 OSSL_PARAM_BLD
*tmpl
= NULL
;
2054 SSL_CTX
*sctx
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
);
2057 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &prime
)
2058 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &generator
)
2059 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &pub_key
)) {
2060 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2064 p
= BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime
), (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime
), NULL
);
2065 g
= BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator
), (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator
),
2067 bnpub_key
= BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key
),
2068 (int)PACKET_remaining(&pub_key
), NULL
);
2069 if (p
== NULL
|| g
== NULL
|| bnpub_key
== NULL
) {
2070 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
2074 tmpl
= OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new();
2076 || !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(tmpl
, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P
, p
)
2077 || !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(tmpl
, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G
, g
)
2078 || !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(tmpl
, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY
,
2080 || (params
= OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(tmpl
)) == NULL
) {
2081 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2085 pctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(sctx
->libctx
, "DH", sctx
->propq
);
2087 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2090 if (EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(pctx
) <= 0
2091 || EVP_PKEY_fromdata(pctx
, &peer_tmp
, EVP_PKEY_KEYPAIR
, params
) <= 0) {
2092 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE
);
2096 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
2097 pctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(sctx
->libctx
, peer_tmp
, sctx
->propq
);
2100 * EVP_PKEY_param_check() will verify that the DH params are using
2101 * a safe prime. In this context, because we're using ephemeral DH,
2102 * we're ok with it not being a safe prime.
2103 * EVP_PKEY_param_check_quick() skips the safe prime check.
2105 || EVP_PKEY_param_check_quick(pctx
) != 1
2106 || EVP_PKEY_public_check(pctx
) != 1) {
2107 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE
);
2111 if (!ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH
,
2112 EVP_PKEY_get_security_bits(peer_tmp
),
2114 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL
);
2118 s
->s3
.peer_tmp
= peer_tmp
;
2122 * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with
2123 * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this
2125 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aRSA
| SSL_aDSS
))
2126 *pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2127 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2132 OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(tmpl
);
2133 OSSL_PARAM_free(params
);
2134 EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp
);
2135 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
2143 static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, EVP_PKEY
**pkey
)
2146 unsigned int curve_type
, curve_id
;
2149 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
2150 * public key. We only support named (not generic) curves and
2151 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
2153 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &curve_type
) || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &curve_id
)) {
2154 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
2158 * Check curve is named curve type and one of our preferences, if not
2159 * server has sent an invalid curve.
2161 if (curve_type
!= NAMED_CURVE_TYPE
2162 || !tls1_check_group_id(s
, curve_id
, 1)) {
2163 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE
);
2167 if ((s
->s3
.peer_tmp
= ssl_generate_param_group(s
, curve_id
)) == NULL
) {
2168 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2169 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS
);
2173 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &encoded_pt
)) {
2174 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2178 if (EVP_PKEY_set1_encoded_public_key(s
->s3
.peer_tmp
,
2179 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt
),
2180 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt
)) <= 0) {
2181 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT
);
2186 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
2187 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
2190 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aECDSA
)
2191 *pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2192 else if (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aRSA
)
2193 *pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2194 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2196 /* Cache the agreed upon group in the SSL_SESSION */
2197 s
->session
->kex_group
= curve_id
;
2201 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_key_exchange(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2204 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
2205 EVP_MD_CTX
*md_ctx
= NULL
;
2206 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
2207 PACKET save_param_start
, signature
;
2208 SSL_CTX
*sctx
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
);
2210 alg_k
= s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
2212 save_param_start
= *pkt
;
2214 EVP_PKEY_free(s
->s3
.peer_tmp
);
2215 s
->s3
.peer_tmp
= NULL
;
2217 if (alg_k
& SSL_PSK
) {
2218 if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s
, pkt
)) {
2219 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2224 /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
2225 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kPSK
| SSL_kRSAPSK
)) {
2226 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2227 if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s
, pkt
, &pkey
)) {
2228 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2231 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
)) {
2232 if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s
, pkt
, &pkey
)) {
2233 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2236 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
2237 if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s
, pkt
, &pkey
)) {
2238 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2242 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
2246 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
2249 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
2255 * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
2256 * equals the length of the parameters.
2258 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start
, ¶ms
,
2259 PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start
) -
2260 PACKET_remaining(pkt
))) {
2261 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2265 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
2266 unsigned int sigalg
;
2268 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &sigalg
)) {
2269 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
2272 if (tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s
, sigalg
, pkey
) <=0) {
2273 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2276 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s
, pkey
)) {
2277 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2281 if (!tls1_lookup_md(sctx
, s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalg
, &md
)) {
2282 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2283 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_DIGEST_ALGORITHM
);
2286 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
))
2287 OSSL_TRACE1(TLS
, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n",
2288 md
== NULL
? "n/a" : EVP_MD_get0_name(md
));
2290 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &signature
)
2291 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2292 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2296 md_ctx
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2297 if (md_ctx
== NULL
) {
2298 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2302 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit_ex(md_ctx
, &pctx
,
2303 md
== NULL
? NULL
: EVP_MD_get0_name(md
),
2304 sctx
->libctx
, sctx
->propq
, pkey
,
2306 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2309 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s
)) {
2310 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx
, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING
) <= 0
2311 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx
,
2312 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST
) <= 0) {
2313 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2317 tbslen
= construct_key_exchange_tbs(s
, &tbs
, PACKET_data(¶ms
),
2318 PACKET_remaining(¶ms
));
2320 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2324 rv
= EVP_DigestVerify(md_ctx
, PACKET_data(&signature
),
2325 PACKET_remaining(&signature
), tbs
, tbslen
);
2328 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE
);
2331 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx
);
2334 /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
2335 if (!(s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
))
2336 && !(alg_k
& SSL_PSK
)) {
2337 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
2338 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s
)) {
2339 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_BAD_DATA
);
2341 /* else this shouldn't happen, SSLfatal() already called */
2344 /* still data left over */
2345 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2346 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE
);
2351 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2353 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx
);
2354 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2357 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_certificate_request(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
2362 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
2363 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++)
2364 s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
[i
] = 0;
2366 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2367 PACKET reqctx
, extensions
;
2368 RAW_EXTENSION
*rawexts
= NULL
;
2370 if ((s
->shutdown
& SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN
) != 0) {
2372 * We already sent close_notify. This can only happen in TLSv1.3
2373 * post-handshake messages. We can't reasonably respond to this, so
2376 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
2379 /* Free and zero certificate types: it is not present in TLS 1.3 */
2380 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
.tmp
.ctype
);
2381 s
->s3
.tmp
.ctype
= NULL
;
2382 s
->s3
.tmp
.ctype_len
= 0;
2383 OPENSSL_free(s
->pha_context
);
2384 s
->pha_context
= NULL
;
2385 s
->pha_context_len
= 0;
2387 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &reqctx
) ||
2388 !PACKET_memdup(&reqctx
, &s
->pha_context
, &s
->pha_context_len
)) {
2389 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2390 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2393 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extensions
)) {
2394 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH
);
2395 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2397 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extensions
,
2398 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2400 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2401 rawexts
, NULL
, 0, 1)) {
2402 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2403 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
2404 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2406 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
2407 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s
)) {
2408 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH
);
2409 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2414 /* get the certificate types */
2415 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &ctypes
)) {
2416 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2417 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2420 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ctypes
, &s
->s3
.tmp
.ctype
, &s
->s3
.tmp
.ctype_len
)) {
2421 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2422 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2425 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
2428 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &sigalgs
)) {
2429 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2430 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2434 * Despite this being for certificates, preserve compatibility
2435 * with pre-TLS 1.3 and use the regular sigalgs field.
2437 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s
, &sigalgs
, 0)) {
2438 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2439 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR
);
2440 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2442 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s
)) {
2443 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2444 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2448 /* get the CA RDNs */
2449 if (!parse_ca_names(s
, pkt
)) {
2450 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2451 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2455 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2456 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2457 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2460 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2461 s
->s3
.tmp
.cert_req
= 1;
2464 * In TLSv1.3 we don't prepare the client certificate yet. We wait until
2465 * after the CertificateVerify message has been received. This is because
2466 * in TLSv1.3 the CertificateRequest arrives before the Certificate message
2467 * but in TLSv1.2 it is the other way around. We want to make sure that
2468 * SSL_get1_peer_certificate() returns something sensible in
2471 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)
2472 && s
->post_handshake_auth
!= SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
)
2473 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2475 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
2478 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
2481 unsigned int ticklen
;
2482 unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint
, age_add
= 0;
2483 unsigned int sess_len
;
2484 RAW_EXTENSION
*exts
= NULL
;
2486 EVP_MD
*sha256
= NULL
;
2487 SSL_CTX
*sctx
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
);
2489 PACKET_null_init(&nonce
);
2491 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt
, &ticket_lifetime_hint
)
2492 || (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)
2493 && (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt
, &age_add
)
2494 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &nonce
)))
2495 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &ticklen
)
2496 || (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
) ? (ticklen
== 0
2497 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) < ticklen
)
2498 : PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != ticklen
)) {
2499 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2504 * Server is allowed to change its mind (in <=TLSv1.2) and send an empty
2505 * ticket. We already checked this TLSv1.3 case above, so it should never
2506 * be 0 here in that instance
2509 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2512 * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise
2513 * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions,
2514 * we replace them with a duplicate. In TLSv1.3 we need to do this every
2515 * time a NewSessionTicket arrives because those messages arrive
2516 * post-handshake and the session may have already gone into the session
2519 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
) || s
->session
->session_id_length
> 0) {
2520 SSL_SESSION
*new_sess
;
2523 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
2526 if ((new_sess
= ssl_session_dup(s
->session
, 0)) == 0) {
2527 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2531 if ((s
->session_ctx
->session_cache_mode
& SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT
) != 0
2532 && !SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2534 * In TLSv1.2 and below the arrival of a new tickets signals that
2535 * any old ticket we were using is now out of date, so we remove the
2536 * old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
2538 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s
->session_ctx
, s
->session
);
2541 SSL_SESSION_free(s
->session
);
2542 s
->session
= new_sess
;
2545 s
->session
->time
= ossl_time_now();
2546 ssl_session_calculate_timeout(s
->session
);
2548 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->ext
.tick
);
2549 s
->session
->ext
.tick
= NULL
;
2550 s
->session
->ext
.ticklen
= 0;
2552 s
->session
->ext
.tick
= OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen
);
2553 if (s
->session
->ext
.tick
== NULL
) {
2554 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2557 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, s
->session
->ext
.tick
, ticklen
)) {
2558 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2562 s
->session
->ext
.tick_lifetime_hint
= ticket_lifetime_hint
;
2563 s
->session
->ext
.tick_age_add
= age_add
;
2564 s
->session
->ext
.ticklen
= ticklen
;
2566 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2569 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extpkt
)
2570 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2571 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2575 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extpkt
,
2576 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, &exts
,
2578 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
,
2579 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
2580 exts
, NULL
, 0, 1)) {
2581 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2587 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2588 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2589 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2590 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2591 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2592 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2593 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2594 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 hash of the
2597 sha256
= EVP_MD_fetch(sctx
->libctx
, "SHA2-256", sctx
->propq
);
2598 if (sha256
== NULL
) {
2599 /* Error is already recorded */
2600 SSLfatal_alert(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2604 * We use sess_len here because EVP_Digest expects an int
2605 * but s->session->session_id_length is a size_t
2607 if (!EVP_Digest(s
->session
->ext
.tick
, ticklen
,
2608 s
->session
->session_id
, &sess_len
,
2610 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2613 EVP_MD_free(sha256
);
2615 s
->session
->session_id_length
= sess_len
;
2616 s
->session
->not_resumable
= 0;
2618 /* This is a standalone message in TLSv1.3, so there is no more to read */
2619 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2620 const EVP_MD
*md
= ssl_handshake_md(s
);
2621 int hashleni
= EVP_MD_get_size(md
);
2623 static const unsigned char nonce_label
[] = "resumption";
2625 /* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */
2626 if (!ossl_assert(hashleni
>= 0)) {
2627 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2630 hashlen
= (size_t)hashleni
;
2632 if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s
, md
, s
->resumption_master_secret
,
2634 sizeof(nonce_label
) - 1,
2635 PACKET_data(&nonce
),
2636 PACKET_remaining(&nonce
),
2637 s
->session
->master_key
,
2639 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2642 s
->session
->master_key_length
= hashlen
;
2645 ssl_update_cache(s
, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT
);
2646 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
2649 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2651 EVP_MD_free(sha256
);
2653 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2657 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
2658 * parse a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure
2660 int tls_process_cert_status_body(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2665 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &type
)
2666 || type
!= TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp
) {
2667 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE
);
2670 if (!PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt
, &resplen
)
2671 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != resplen
) {
2672 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2675 s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp
= OPENSSL_malloc(resplen
);
2676 if (s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp
== NULL
) {
2677 s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp_len
= 0;
2678 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2681 s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp_len
= resplen
;
2682 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp
, resplen
)) {
2683 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2691 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_cert_status(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2693 if (!tls_process_cert_status_body(s
, pkt
)) {
2694 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2695 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2698 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2702 * Perform miscellaneous checks and processing after we have received the
2703 * server's initial flight. In TLS1.3 this is after the Server Finished message.
2704 * In <=TLS1.2 this is after the ServerDone message. Returns 1 on success or 0
2707 int tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
2709 SSL_CTX
*sctx
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
);
2712 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
2715 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s
)) {
2716 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2721 * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |ext.ocsp.resp| and
2722 * |ext.ocsp.resp_len| values will be set if we actually received a status
2723 * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise
2725 if (s
->ext
.status_type
!= TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing
2726 && sctx
->ext
.status_cb
!= NULL
) {
2727 int ret
= sctx
->ext
.status_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
),
2728 sctx
->ext
.status_arg
);
2731 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE
,
2732 SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE
);
2736 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2737 SSL_R_OCSP_CALLBACK_FAILURE
);
2741 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2742 if (s
->ct_validation_callback
!= NULL
) {
2743 /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */
2744 if (!ssl_validate_ct(s
) && (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
)) {
2745 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2754 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_server_done(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2756 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) > 0) {
2757 /* should contain no data */
2758 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2759 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2761 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2762 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2763 if (ssl_srp_calc_a_param_intern(s
) <= 0) {
2764 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC
);
2765 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2770 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s
)) {
2771 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2772 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2775 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
2778 static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
2780 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2783 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2784 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2787 char identity
[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+ 1];
2788 size_t identitylen
= 0;
2789 unsigned char psk
[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
];
2790 unsigned char *tmppsk
= NULL
;
2791 char *tmpidentity
= NULL
;
2794 if (s
->psk_client_callback
== NULL
) {
2795 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB
);
2799 memset(identity
, 0, sizeof(identity
));
2801 psklen
= s
->psk_client_callback(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
),
2802 s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
,
2803 identity
, sizeof(identity
) - 1,
2806 if (psklen
> PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
) {
2807 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2808 psklen
= PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
; /* Avoid overrunning the array on cleanse */
2810 } else if (psklen
== 0) {
2811 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
);
2815 identitylen
= strlen(identity
);
2816 if (identitylen
> PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
2817 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2821 tmppsk
= OPENSSL_memdup(psk
, psklen
);
2822 tmpidentity
= OPENSSL_strdup(identity
);
2823 if (tmppsk
== NULL
|| tmpidentity
== NULL
) {
2824 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2828 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
.tmp
.psk
);
2829 s
->s3
.tmp
.psk
= tmppsk
;
2830 s
->s3
.tmp
.psklen
= psklen
;
2832 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity
);
2833 s
->session
->psk_identity
= tmpidentity
;
2836 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt
, identity
, identitylen
)) {
2837 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2844 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk
, psklen
);
2845 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity
, sizeof(identity
));
2846 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk
, psklen
);
2847 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity
, identitylen
);
2851 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2856 static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
2858 unsigned char *encdata
= NULL
;
2859 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
2860 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
2862 unsigned char *pms
= NULL
;
2864 SSL_CTX
*sctx
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
);
2866 if (s
->session
->peer
== NULL
) {
2868 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2870 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2874 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2875 if (!EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey
, "RSA")) {
2876 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2880 pmslen
= SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
;
2881 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
2883 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2887 pms
[0] = s
->client_version
>> 8;
2888 pms
[1] = s
->client_version
& 0xff;
2889 if (RAND_bytes_ex(sctx
->libctx
, pms
+ 2, pmslen
- 2, 0) <= 0) {
2890 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2894 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2895 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
&& !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)) {
2896 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2900 pctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(sctx
->libctx
, pkey
, sctx
->propq
);
2901 if (pctx
== NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx
) <= 0
2902 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx
, NULL
, &enclen
, pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
2903 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2906 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, enclen
, &encdata
)
2907 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx
, encdata
, &enclen
, pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
2908 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT
);
2911 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
2914 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2915 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
&& !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
2916 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2920 /* Log the premaster secret, if logging is enabled. */
2921 if (!ssl_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(s
, encdata
, enclen
, pms
, pmslen
)) {
2922 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2926 s
->s3
.tmp
.pms
= pms
;
2927 s
->s3
.tmp
.pmslen
= pmslen
;
2931 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms
, pmslen
);
2932 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
2937 static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
2939 EVP_PKEY
*ckey
= NULL
, *skey
= NULL
;
2940 unsigned char *keybytes
= NULL
;
2942 unsigned char *encoded_pub
= NULL
;
2943 size_t encoded_pub_len
, pad_len
;
2946 skey
= s
->s3
.peer_tmp
;
2948 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2952 ckey
= ssl_generate_pkey(s
, skey
);
2954 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2958 if (ssl_derive(s
, ckey
, skey
, 0) == 0) {
2959 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2963 /* send off the data */
2965 /* Generate encoding of server key */
2966 encoded_pub_len
= EVP_PKEY_get1_encoded_public_key(ckey
, &encoded_pub
);
2967 if (encoded_pub_len
== 0) {
2968 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2969 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
2970 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
2974 * For interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
2975 * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
2978 prime_len
= EVP_PKEY_get_size(ckey
);
2979 pad_len
= prime_len
- encoded_pub_len
;
2981 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt
, pad_len
, &keybytes
)) {
2982 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2985 memset(keybytes
, 0, pad_len
);
2988 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt
, encoded_pub
, encoded_pub_len
)) {
2989 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2995 OPENSSL_free(encoded_pub
);
2996 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
3000 static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3002 unsigned char *encodedPoint
= NULL
;
3003 size_t encoded_pt_len
= 0;
3004 EVP_PKEY
*ckey
= NULL
, *skey
= NULL
;
3007 skey
= s
->s3
.peer_tmp
;
3009 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3013 ckey
= ssl_generate_pkey(s
, skey
);
3015 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3019 if (ssl_derive(s
, ckey
, skey
, 0) == 0) {
3020 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3024 /* Generate encoding of client key */
3025 encoded_pt_len
= EVP_PKEY_get1_encoded_public_key(ckey
, &encodedPoint
);
3027 if (encoded_pt_len
== 0) {
3028 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
3032 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, encodedPoint
, encoded_pt_len
)) {
3033 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3039 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
3040 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
3044 static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3046 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3047 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
3048 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pkey_ctx
= NULL
;
3051 unsigned int md_len
;
3052 unsigned char shared_ukm
[32], tmp
[256];
3053 EVP_MD_CTX
*ukm_hash
= NULL
;
3054 int dgst_nid
= NID_id_GostR3411_94
;
3055 unsigned char *pms
= NULL
;
3057 SSL_CTX
*sctx
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
);
3059 if ((s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aGOST12
) != 0)
3060 dgst_nid
= NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256
;
3063 * Get server certificate PKEY and create ctx from it
3065 peer_cert
= s
->session
->peer
;
3066 if (peer_cert
== NULL
) {
3067 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3068 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER
);
3072 pkey_ctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(sctx
->libctx
,
3073 X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert
),
3075 if (pkey_ctx
== NULL
) {
3076 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3080 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
3081 * parameters match those of server certificate, use
3082 * certificate key for key exchange
3085 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
3087 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
3089 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3093 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx
) <= 0
3094 /* Generate session key
3096 || RAND_bytes_ex(sctx
->libctx
, pms
, pmslen
, 0) <= 0) {
3097 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3101 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
3104 ukm_hash
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
3105 if (ukm_hash
== NULL
3106 || EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash
, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid
)) <= 0
3107 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash
, s
->s3
.client_random
,
3108 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
3109 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash
, s
->s3
.server_random
,
3110 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
3111 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash
, shared_ukm
, &md_len
) <= 0) {
3112 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3115 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash
);
3117 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx
, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT
,
3118 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV
, 8, shared_ukm
) <= 0) {
3119 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG
);
3122 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
3124 * Encapsulate it into sequence
3127 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx
, tmp
, &msglen
, pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
3128 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG
);
3132 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
)
3133 || (msglen
>= 0x80 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0x81))
3134 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, tmp
, msglen
)) {
3135 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3139 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
3140 s
->s3
.tmp
.pms
= pms
;
3141 s
->s3
.tmp
.pmslen
= pmslen
;
3145 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
3146 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms
, pmslen
);
3147 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash
);
3150 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3155 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3156 int ossl_gost18_cke_cipher_nid(const SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
3158 if ((s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_enc
& SSL_MAGMA
) != 0)
3159 return NID_magma_ctr
;
3160 else if ((s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_enc
& SSL_KUZNYECHIK
) != 0)
3161 return NID_kuznyechik_ctr
;
3166 int ossl_gost_ukm(const SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, unsigned char *dgst_buf
)
3168 EVP_MD_CTX
* hash
= NULL
;
3169 unsigned int md_len
;
3170 SSL_CTX
*sctx
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
);
3171 const EVP_MD
*md
= ssl_evp_md_fetch(sctx
->libctx
, NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256
,
3177 if ((hash
= EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL
3178 || EVP_DigestInit(hash
, md
) <= 0
3179 || EVP_DigestUpdate(hash
, s
->s3
.client_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
3180 || EVP_DigestUpdate(hash
, s
->s3
.server_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
3181 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(hash
, dgst_buf
, &md_len
) <= 0) {
3182 EVP_MD_CTX_free(hash
);
3183 ssl_evp_md_free(md
);
3187 EVP_MD_CTX_free(hash
);
3188 ssl_evp_md_free(md
);
3193 static int tls_construct_cke_gost18(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3195 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3196 /* GOST 2018 key exchange message creation */
3197 unsigned char rnd_dgst
[32];
3198 unsigned char *encdata
= NULL
;
3199 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pkey_ctx
= NULL
;
3201 unsigned char *pms
= NULL
;
3204 int cipher_nid
= ossl_gost18_cke_cipher_nid(s
);
3205 SSL_CTX
*sctx
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
);
3207 if (cipher_nid
== NID_undef
) {
3208 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3212 if (ossl_gost_ukm(s
, rnd_dgst
) <= 0) {
3213 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3217 /* Pre-master secret - random bytes */
3219 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
3221 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3225 if (RAND_bytes_ex(sctx
->libctx
, pms
, pmslen
, 0) <= 0) {
3226 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3230 /* Get server certificate PKEY and create ctx from it */
3231 peer_cert
= s
->session
->peer
;
3232 if (peer_cert
== NULL
) {
3233 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3234 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER
);
3238 pkey_ctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(sctx
->libctx
,
3239 X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert
),
3241 if (pkey_ctx
== NULL
) {
3242 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3246 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx
) <= 0) {
3247 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3251 /* Reuse EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, make choice in engine code */
3252 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx
, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT
,
3253 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV
, 32, rnd_dgst
) <= 0) {
3254 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG
);
3258 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx
, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT
,
3259 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CIPHER
, cipher_nid
, NULL
) <= 0) {
3260 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG
);
3264 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx
, NULL
, &msglen
, pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
3265 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
3269 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, msglen
, &encdata
)
3270 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx
, encdata
, &msglen
, pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
3271 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
3275 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
3277 s
->s3
.tmp
.pms
= pms
;
3278 s
->s3
.tmp
.pmslen
= pmslen
;
3282 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
3283 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms
, pmslen
);
3286 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3291 static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3293 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3294 unsigned char *abytes
= NULL
;
3296 if (s
->srp_ctx
.A
== NULL
3297 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt
, BN_num_bytes(s
->srp_ctx
.A
),
3299 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3302 BN_bn2bin(s
->srp_ctx
.A
, abytes
);
3304 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->srp_username
);
3305 s
->session
->srp_username
= OPENSSL_strdup(s
->srp_ctx
.login
);
3306 if (s
->session
->srp_username
== NULL
) {
3307 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3313 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3318 CON_FUNC_RETURN
tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
3321 unsigned long alg_k
;
3323 alg_k
= s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
3326 * All of the construct functions below call SSLfatal() if necessary so
3327 * no need to do so here.
3329 if ((alg_k
& SSL_PSK
)
3330 && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s
, pkt
))
3333 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kRSA
| SSL_kRSAPSK
)) {
3334 if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s
, pkt
))
3336 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
)) {
3337 if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s
, pkt
))
3339 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
3340 if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s
, pkt
))
3342 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kGOST
) {
3343 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s
, pkt
))
3345 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kGOST18
) {
3346 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost18(s
, pkt
))
3348 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
3349 if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s
, pkt
))
3351 } else if (!(alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
)) {
3352 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3356 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS
;
3358 OPENSSL_clear_free(s
->s3
.tmp
.pms
, s
->s3
.tmp
.pmslen
);
3359 s
->s3
.tmp
.pms
= NULL
;
3360 s
->s3
.tmp
.pmslen
= 0;
3361 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3362 OPENSSL_clear_free(s
->s3
.tmp
.psk
, s
->s3
.tmp
.psklen
);
3363 s
->s3
.tmp
.psk
= NULL
;
3364 s
->s3
.tmp
.psklen
= 0;
3366 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
3369 int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
3371 unsigned char *pms
= NULL
;
3374 pms
= s
->s3
.tmp
.pms
;
3375 pmslen
= s
->s3
.tmp
.pmslen
;
3377 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3379 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) {
3380 if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s
)) {
3381 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3388 if (pms
== NULL
&& !(s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kPSK
)) {
3389 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3392 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s
, pms
, pmslen
, 1)) {
3393 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3394 /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */
3402 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3403 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
3404 unsigned char sctpauthkey
[64];
3405 char labelbuffer
[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
)];
3407 SSL
*ssl
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
);
3410 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3413 memcpy(labelbuffer
, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
,
3414 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
));
3416 /* Don't include the terminating zero. */
3417 labellen
= sizeof(labelbuffer
) - 1;
3418 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG
)
3421 if (SSL_export_keying_material(ssl
, sctpauthkey
,
3422 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), labelbuffer
,
3423 labellen
, NULL
, 0, 0) <= 0) {
3424 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3428 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(ssl
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY
,
3429 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), sctpauthkey
);
3435 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms
, pmslen
);
3436 s
->s3
.tmp
.pms
= NULL
;
3437 s
->s3
.tmp
.pmslen
= 0;
3442 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
3443 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
3444 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
3446 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
3448 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
3449 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s
, 0) || s
->s3
.tmp
.sigalg
== NULL
)
3452 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
3453 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
3455 if (s
->cert
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
&&
3456 !tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, -2))
3461 WORK_STATE
tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
3464 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
3466 SSL
*ssl
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
);
3468 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
) {
3469 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
3470 if (s
->cert
->cert_cb
) {
3471 i
= s
->cert
->cert_cb(ssl
, s
->cert
->cert_cb_arg
);
3473 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
3477 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED
);
3480 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
3482 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s
)) {
3483 if (s
->post_handshake_auth
== SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
) {
3484 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP
;
3486 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
3489 /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
3493 /* We need to get a client cert */
3494 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_B
) {
3496 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3497 * return(-1); We then get retied later
3499 i
= ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s
, &x509
, &pkey
);
3501 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
3504 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
3505 if ((i
== 1) && (pkey
!= NULL
) && (x509
!= NULL
)) {
3506 if (!SSL_use_certificate(ssl
, x509
)
3507 || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(ssl
, pkey
))
3509 } else if (i
== 1) {
3511 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK
);
3515 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
3516 if (i
&& !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s
))
3519 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
3520 s
->s3
.tmp
.cert_req
= 0;
3521 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_WARNING
, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE
);
3522 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
3524 s
->s3
.tmp
.cert_req
= 2;
3525 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
3526 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3532 if (s
->post_handshake_auth
== SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
)
3533 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP
;
3534 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
3537 /* Shouldn't ever get here */
3538 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3542 CON_FUNC_RETURN
tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
3545 SSL
*ssl
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
);
3547 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
3548 if (s
->pha_context
== NULL
) {
3549 /* no context available, add 0-length context */
3550 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0)) {
3551 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3552 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
3554 } else if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, s
->pha_context
, s
->pha_context_len
)) {
3555 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3556 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
3559 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s
, pkt
,
3560 (s
->s3
.tmp
.cert_req
== 2) ? NULL
3562 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3563 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
3566 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)
3567 && SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
)
3568 && (!ssl
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
3569 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
))) {
3571 * This is a fatal error, which leaves enc_write_ctx in an inconsistent
3572 * state and thus ssl3_send_alert may crash.
3574 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT
, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER
);
3575 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
3578 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS
;
3581 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
3583 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP
*clu
;
3587 alg_k
= s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
3588 alg_a
= s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
;
3590 /* we don't have a certificate */
3591 if (!(alg_a
& SSL_aCERT
))
3594 /* This is the passed certificate */
3595 clu
= ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
), &idx
);
3597 /* Check certificate is recognised and suitable for cipher */
3598 if (clu
== NULL
|| (alg_a
& clu
->amask
) == 0) {
3599 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_R_MISSING_SIGNING_CERT
);
3603 if (clu
->amask
& SSL_aECDSA
) {
3604 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s
->session
->peer
, s
))
3606 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT
);
3610 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kRSA
| SSL_kRSAPSK
) && idx
!= SSL_PKEY_RSA
) {
3611 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3612 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT
);
3616 if ((alg_k
& SSL_kDHE
) && (s
->s3
.peer_tmp
== NULL
)) {
3617 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3624 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3625 CON_FUNC_RETURN
tls_construct_next_proto(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3627 size_t len
, padding_len
;
3628 unsigned char *padding
= NULL
;
3630 len
= s
->ext
.npn_len
;
3631 padding_len
= 32 - ((len
+ 2) % 32);
3633 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, s
->ext
.npn
, len
)
3634 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt
, padding_len
, &padding
)) {
3635 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3636 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
3639 memset(padding
, 0, padding_len
);
3641 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS
;
3645 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_hello_req(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3647 SSL
*ssl
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
);
3649 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) > 0) {
3650 /* should contain no data */
3651 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3652 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
3655 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION
)) {
3656 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_WARNING
, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION
);
3657 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
3661 * This is a historical discrepancy (not in the RFC) maintained for
3662 * compatibility reasons. If a TLS client receives a HelloRequest it will
3663 * attempt an abbreviated handshake. However if a DTLS client receives a
3664 * HelloRequest it will do a full handshake. Either behaviour is reasonable
3665 * but doing one for TLS and another for DTLS is odd.
3667 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
))
3668 SSL_renegotiate(ssl
);
3670 SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(ssl
);
3672 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
3675 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
3679 RAW_EXTENSION
*rawexts
= NULL
;
3681 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extensions
)
3682 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
3683 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3687 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extensions
,
3688 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
, &rawexts
,
3690 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
,
3691 rawexts
, NULL
, 0, 1)) {
3692 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3696 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
3697 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
3700 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
3701 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
3704 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, X509
**px509
, EVP_PKEY
**ppkey
)
3707 SSL_CTX
*sctx
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
);
3709 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
3710 if (sctx
->client_cert_engine
) {
3711 i
= tls_engine_load_ssl_client_cert(s
, px509
, ppkey
);
3716 if (sctx
->client_cert_cb
)
3717 i
= sctx
->client_cert_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
), px509
, ppkey
);
3721 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
,
3725 size_t totlen
= 0, len
, maxlen
, maxverok
= 0;
3726 int empty_reneg_info_scsv
= !s
->renegotiate
;
3727 SSL
*ssl
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
);
3729 /* Set disabled masks for this session */
3730 if (!ssl_set_client_disabled(s
)) {
3731 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE
);
3736 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3740 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
3741 # if OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH < 6
3742 # error Max cipher length too short
3745 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
3746 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
3749 if (TLS1_get_version(ssl
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
)
3750 maxlen
= OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
& ~1;
3753 /* Maximum length that can be stored in 2 bytes. Length must be even */
3756 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv
)
3758 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV
)
3761 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk
) && totlen
< maxlen
; i
++) {
3762 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
;
3764 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk
, i
);
3765 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
3766 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s
, c
, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED
, 0))
3769 if (!ssl
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(c
, pkt
, &len
)) {
3770 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3774 /* Sanity check that the maximum version we offer has ciphers enabled */
3776 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
3777 if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(c
->max_dtls
, s
->s3
.tmp
.max_ver
)
3778 && DTLS_VERSION_LE(c
->min_dtls
, s
->s3
.tmp
.max_ver
))
3781 if (c
->max_tls
>= s
->s3
.tmp
.max_ver
3782 && c
->min_tls
<= s
->s3
.tmp
.max_ver
)
3790 if (totlen
== 0 || !maxverok
) {
3791 const char *maxvertext
=
3793 ? "No ciphers enabled for max supported SSL/TLS version"
3796 SSLfatal_data(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE
,
3802 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv
) {
3803 static SSL_CIPHER scsv
= {
3804 0, NULL
, NULL
, SSL3_CK_SCSV
, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3806 if (!ssl
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv
, pkt
, &len
)) {
3807 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3811 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV
) {
3812 static SSL_CIPHER scsv
= {
3813 0, NULL
, NULL
, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV
, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3815 if (!ssl
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv
, pkt
, &len
)) {
3816 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3825 CON_FUNC_RETURN
tls_construct_end_of_early_data(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3827 if (s
->early_data_state
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
3828 && s
->early_data_state
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
) {
3829 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED
);
3830 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
3833 s
->early_data_state
= SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
;
3834 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS
;