2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 /* ====================================================================
11 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
13 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
14 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
16 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
17 * license provided above.
19 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
20 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
23 /* ====================================================================
24 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
26 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
27 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
30 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
31 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
32 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
34 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
35 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
36 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
38 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
39 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
40 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
41 * to make use of the Contribution.
43 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
44 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
45 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
46 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
52 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
53 #include "statem_locl.h"
54 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
55 #include <openssl/rand.h>
56 #include <openssl/objects.h>
57 #include <openssl/evp.h>
58 #include <openssl/md5.h>
59 #include <openssl/dh.h>
60 #include <openssl/bn.h>
61 #include <openssl/engine.h>
63 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_hello_retry_request(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
);
64 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
);
66 static ossl_inline
int cert_req_allowed(SSL
*s
);
67 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL
*s
);
68 static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL
*s
, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
,
72 * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
78 static ossl_inline
int cert_req_allowed(SSL
*s
)
80 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
81 if ((s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
82 && (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aNULL
))
83 || (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aSRP
| SSL_aPSK
)))
90 * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
96 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL
*s
)
98 long alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
101 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
102 * ciphersuite or for SRP
104 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
113 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
114 * handshake state transitions when a TLS1.3 client is reading messages from the
115 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
116 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
118 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
119 * (transition not allowed)
121 static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL
*s
, int mt
)
123 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
126 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO, because we haven't
127 * yet negotiated TLSv1.3 at that point so that is handled by
128 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition()
131 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
135 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
137 * This must a ClientHello following a HelloRetryRequest, so the only
138 * thing we can get now is a ServerHello.
140 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
) {
141 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
;
146 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
147 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
) {
148 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
;
153 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
:
155 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
156 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
;
160 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
) {
161 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
;
164 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
165 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT
;
171 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
172 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
173 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT
;
179 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
) {
180 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
;
185 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
:
186 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
187 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
;
193 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
) {
194 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
;
197 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE
) {
198 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE
;
204 /* No valid transition found */
209 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
210 * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
211 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
212 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
214 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
215 * (transition not allowed)
217 int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL
*s
, int mt
)
219 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
223 * Note that after writing the first ClientHello we don't know what version
224 * we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later.
226 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
227 if (!ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(s
, mt
))
232 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
236 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
237 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
) {
238 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
;
242 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
243 if (mt
== DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
) {
244 st
->hand_state
= DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
;
248 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
) {
249 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
;
255 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
:
257 * We've not actually selected TLSv1.3 yet, but we have sent early
258 * data. The only thing allowed now is a ServerHello or a
261 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
) {
262 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
;
265 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
) {
266 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
;
271 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
273 if (s
->ext
.ticket_expected
) {
274 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
) {
275 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
;
278 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
279 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
283 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && mt
== DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
) {
284 st
->hand_state
= DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
;
286 } else if (s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
287 && s
->ext
.session_secret_cb
!= NULL
288 && s
->session
->ext
.tick
!= NULL
289 && mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
291 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
292 * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
293 * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
294 * the server is resuming.
297 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
299 } else if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
300 & (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
| SSL_aPSK
))) {
301 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
302 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT
;
306 ske_expected
= key_exchange_expected(s
);
307 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
309 || ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_PSK
)
310 && mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
)) {
311 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
312 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
;
315 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
316 && cert_req_allowed(s
)) {
317 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
;
319 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
) {
320 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
;
329 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
330 * |ext.status_expected| is set
332 if (s
->ext
.status_expected
&& mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS
) {
333 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
;
338 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
:
339 ske_expected
= key_exchange_expected(s
);
340 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
341 if (ske_expected
|| ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_PSK
)
342 && mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
)) {
343 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
344 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
;
351 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
:
352 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
) {
353 if (cert_req_allowed(s
)) {
354 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
;
361 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
362 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
) {
363 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
;
368 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
369 if (s
->ext
.ticket_expected
) {
370 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
) {
371 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
;
374 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
375 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
380 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
381 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
382 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
387 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
:
388 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
389 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
;
395 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST
) {
396 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ
;
403 /* No valid transition found */
404 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
405 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_READ_TRANSITION
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
410 * ossl_statem_client13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
411 * move to next when the TLSv1.3 client is writing messages to be sent to the
414 static WRITE_TRAN
ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL
*s
)
416 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
419 * Note: There are no cases for TLS_ST_BEFORE because we haven't negotiated
420 * TLSv1.3 yet at that point. They are handled by
421 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition().
423 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
425 /* Shouldn't happen */
426 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
428 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
429 /* We only hit this in the case of HelloRetryRequest */
430 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
432 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
:
433 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
434 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
436 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
437 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
438 || s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
)
439 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END
;
441 st
->hand_state
= (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
!= 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
442 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
443 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
445 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END
:
446 if (s
->ext
.early_data
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED
) {
447 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
;
448 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
452 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
:
453 st
->hand_state
= (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
!= 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
454 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
455 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
458 /* If a non-empty Certificate we also send CertificateVerify */
459 st
->hand_state
= (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
== 1) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
460 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
461 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
463 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
:
464 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
465 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
467 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE
:
468 if (s
->key_update
!= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE
) {
469 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
;
470 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
474 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
:
475 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
476 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
477 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
478 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
481 if (s
->key_update
!= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE
) {
482 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
;
483 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
486 /* Try to read from the server instead */
487 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
492 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
493 * move to next when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
495 WRITE_TRAN
ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL
*s
)
497 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
500 * Note that immediately before/after a ClientHello we don't know what
501 * version we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until
505 return ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(s
);
507 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
509 /* Shouldn't happen */
510 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
513 if (!s
->renegotiate
) {
515 * We haven't requested a renegotiation ourselves so we must have
516 * received a message from the server. Better read it.
518 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
520 /* Renegotiation - fall through */
522 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
523 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
525 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
526 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
) {
528 * We are assuming this is a TLSv1.3 connection, although we haven't
529 * actually selected a version yet.
531 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
;
532 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
535 * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
538 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
540 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
:
541 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
543 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
544 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
545 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
547 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
:
548 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
)
549 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CERT
;
551 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
;
552 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
555 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
;
556 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
558 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
:
560 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
561 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
564 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
565 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
566 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
567 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
569 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
== 1) {
570 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
;
572 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
574 if (s
->s3
->flags
& TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY
) {
575 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
577 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
579 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
:
580 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
581 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
583 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
584 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
586 hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
588 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->s3
->npn_seen
)
589 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO
;
591 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
593 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
595 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
596 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO
:
597 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
598 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
601 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
603 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
604 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
606 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
609 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
611 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
612 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
614 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
615 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
618 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ
:
620 * If we can renegotiate now then do so, otherwise wait for a more
623 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s
, 1)) {
624 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s
)) {
625 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
626 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
628 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
629 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
631 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
632 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
637 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
638 * the client to the server.
640 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
642 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
644 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
646 /* No pre work to be done */
649 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
651 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
652 /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
653 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
)) {
654 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
660 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
661 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
664 * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
665 * messages unless we need to.
669 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
670 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s
)))
671 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s
);
676 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END
:
678 * If we've been called by SSL_do_handshake()/SSL_write(), or we did not
679 * attempt to write early data before calling SSL_read() then we press
680 * on with the handshake. Otherwise we pause here.
682 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
683 || s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_NONE
)
684 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
687 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
:
689 return tls_finish_handshake(s
, wst
, 1);
692 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
696 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
697 * client to the server.
699 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
701 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
705 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
707 /* No post work to be done */
710 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
711 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
&& statem_flush(s
) != 1)
714 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
715 /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
719 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
720 && s
->max_early_data
> 0) {
722 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
723 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
724 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
726 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s
,
727 SSL3_CC_EARLY
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
))
732 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
:
734 * We set the enc_write_ctx back to NULL because we may end up writing
735 * in cleartext again if we get a HelloRetryRequest from the server.
737 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s
->enc_write_ctx
);
738 s
->enc_write_ctx
= NULL
;
741 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
:
742 if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s
) == 0)
746 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
747 s
->session
->cipher
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
;
748 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
749 s
->session
->compress_meth
= 0;
751 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
)
752 s
->session
->compress_meth
= 0;
754 s
->session
->compress_meth
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
->id
;
756 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
))
759 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
760 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
))
763 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
764 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
767 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
770 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY
,
775 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s
, SSL3_CC_WRITE
);
779 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
780 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
781 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
&& SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->hit
== 0) {
783 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
786 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY
,
790 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
793 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
794 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
795 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
))
800 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
:
801 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
803 if (!tls13_update_key(s
, 1))
808 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
812 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
815 * Valid return values are:
819 int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
820 confunc_f
*confunc
, int *mt
)
822 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
824 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
826 /* Shouldn't happen */
829 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
831 *confunc
= dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec
;
833 *confunc
= tls_construct_change_cipher_spec
;
834 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
;
837 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
838 *confunc
= tls_construct_client_hello
;
839 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
;
842 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
:
843 *confunc
= tls_construct_end_of_early_data
;
844 *mt
= SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
;
847 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END
:
853 *confunc
= tls_construct_client_certificate
;
854 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
;
857 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
:
858 *confunc
= tls_construct_client_key_exchange
;
859 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
;
862 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
:
863 *confunc
= tls_construct_cert_verify
;
864 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
;
867 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
868 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO
:
869 *confunc
= tls_construct_next_proto
;
870 *mt
= SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO
;
873 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
874 *confunc
= tls_construct_finished
;
875 *mt
= SSL3_MT_FINISHED
;
878 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
:
879 *confunc
= tls_construct_key_update
;
880 *mt
= SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE
;
888 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
889 * reading. Excludes the message header.
891 size_t ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL
*s
)
893 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
895 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
897 /* Shouldn't happen */
900 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
901 return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH
;
903 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
904 return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH
;
906 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
:
907 return HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH
;
910 return s
->max_cert_list
;
912 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
:
913 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
;
915 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
:
916 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
;
918 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
:
919 return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH
;
921 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
923 * Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In
924 * practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured
925 * to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
927 return s
->max_cert_list
;
929 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
:
930 return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH
;
932 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
:
933 if (s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
)
935 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH
;
937 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
938 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
;
940 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
941 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH
;
943 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
:
944 return ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS_MAX_LENGTH
;
946 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE
:
947 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH
;
952 * Process a message that the client has been received from the server.
954 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
956 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
958 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
960 /* Shouldn't happen */
961 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
963 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
964 return tls_process_server_hello(s
, pkt
);
966 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
967 return dtls_process_hello_verify(s
, pkt
);
969 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
:
970 return tls_process_hello_retry_request(s
, pkt
);
973 return tls_process_server_certificate(s
, pkt
);
975 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
:
976 return tls_process_cert_verify(s
, pkt
);
978 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
:
979 return tls_process_cert_status(s
, pkt
);
981 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
:
982 return tls_process_key_exchange(s
, pkt
);
984 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
985 return tls_process_certificate_request(s
, pkt
);
987 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
:
988 return tls_process_server_done(s
, pkt
);
990 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
:
991 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s
, pkt
);
993 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
994 return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s
, pkt
);
996 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
997 return tls_process_finished(s
, pkt
);
999 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ
:
1000 return tls_process_hello_req(s
, pkt
);
1002 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
:
1003 return tls_process_encrypted_extensions(s
, pkt
);
1005 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE
:
1006 return tls_process_key_update(s
, pkt
);
1011 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
1014 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
1016 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
1018 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
1020 /* Shouldn't happen */
1023 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
1024 return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s
, wst
);
1026 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1027 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
:
1028 /* We only get here if we are using SCTP and we are renegotiating */
1029 if (BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s
))) {
1030 s
->s3
->in_read_app_data
= 2;
1031 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
1032 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s
));
1033 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s
));
1034 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s
, 1);
1037 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s
, 0);
1038 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP
;
1043 int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
1048 int al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1049 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1052 SSL_SESSION
*sess
= s
->session
;
1054 if (!WPACKET_set_max_size(pkt
, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
)) {
1055 /* Should not happen */
1056 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1060 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
1061 protverr
= ssl_set_client_hello_version(s
);
1062 if (protverr
!= 0) {
1063 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, protverr
);
1067 if ((sess
== NULL
) || !ssl_version_supported(s
, sess
->ssl_version
) ||
1069 * In the case of EAP-FAST, we can have a pre-shared
1070 * "ticket" without a session ID.
1072 (!sess
->session_id_length
&& !sess
->ext
.tick
) ||
1073 (sess
->not_resumable
)) {
1074 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 0))
1077 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
1079 p
= s
->s3
->client_random
;
1082 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
1083 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
1085 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1088 for (idx
= 0; idx
< sizeof(s
->s3
->client_random
); idx
++) {
1097 if (i
&& ssl_fill_hello_random(s
, 0, p
, sizeof(s
->s3
->client_random
),
1098 DOWNGRADE_NONE
) <= 0)
1102 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
1103 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
1104 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
1105 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
1106 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
1107 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
1108 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
1109 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
1112 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
1113 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
1114 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
1115 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
1116 * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0.
1117 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
1118 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
1119 * know that is maximum server supports.
1120 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
1121 * containing version 1.0.
1123 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
1124 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
1125 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
1126 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
1127 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
1128 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
1129 * the negotiated version.
1131 * For TLS 1.3 we always set the ClientHello version to 1.2 and rely on the
1132 * supported_versions extension for the real supported versions.
1134 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, s
->client_version
)
1135 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, s
->s3
->client_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
)) {
1136 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1141 if (s
->new_session
|| s
->session
->ssl_version
== TLS1_3_VERSION
)
1144 sess_id_len
= s
->session
->session_id_length
;
1145 if (sess_id_len
> sizeof(s
->session
->session_id
)
1146 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt
)
1147 || (sess_id_len
!= 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, s
->session
->session_id
,
1149 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
1150 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1154 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
1155 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1156 if (s
->d1
->cookie_len
> sizeof(s
->d1
->cookie
)
1157 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, s
->d1
->cookie
,
1158 s
->d1
->cookie_len
)) {
1159 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1164 /* Ciphers supported */
1165 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)) {
1166 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1169 /* ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes() raises SSLerr if appropriate */
1170 if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s
, SSL_get_ciphers(s
), pkt
))
1172 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
1173 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1178 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt
)) {
1179 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1182 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1183 if (ssl_allow_compression(s
)
1184 && s
->ctx
->comp_methods
1185 && (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) || s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
< TLS1_3_VERSION
)) {
1186 int compnum
= sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
);
1187 for (i
= 0; i
< compnum
; i
++) {
1188 comp
= sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, i
);
1189 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, comp
->id
)) {
1190 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1196 /* Add the NULL method */
1197 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
1198 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1202 /* TLS extensions */
1203 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s
, pkt
, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO
, NULL
, 0, &al
)) {
1204 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1205 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1212 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1218 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt
, 2)
1219 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &cookiepkt
)) {
1220 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1221 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1225 cookie_len
= PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt
);
1226 if (cookie_len
> sizeof(s
->d1
->cookie
)) {
1227 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1228 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
1232 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt
, s
->d1
->cookie
, cookie_len
)) {
1233 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1234 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1237 s
->d1
->cookie_len
= cookie_len
;
1239 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
1241 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1242 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1243 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1246 static int set_client_ciphersuite(SSL
*s
, const unsigned char *cipherchars
)
1248 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
;
1249 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
;
1252 c
= ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s
, cipherchars
, 0);
1254 /* unknown cipher */
1255 SSLerr(SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1259 * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello,
1260 * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error.
1262 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s
, c
, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK
, 1)) {
1263 SSLerr(SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE
, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1267 sk
= ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s
);
1268 i
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk
, c
);
1270 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1271 SSLerr(SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE
, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1275 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
!= NULL
1276 && s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->id
!= c
->id
) {
1277 /* ServerHello selected a different ciphersuite to that in the HRR */
1278 SSLerr(SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE
, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1283 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1284 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1285 * set and use it for comparison.
1287 if (s
->session
->cipher
!= NULL
)
1288 s
->session
->cipher_id
= s
->session
->cipher
->id
;
1289 if (s
->hit
&& (s
->session
->cipher_id
!= c
->id
)) {
1290 SSLerr(SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE
,
1291 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED
);
1294 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
= c
;
1299 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_server_hello(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1301 PACKET session_id
, extpkt
;
1302 size_t session_id_len
;
1303 const unsigned char *cipherchars
;
1304 int al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1305 unsigned int compression
;
1306 unsigned int sversion
;
1307 unsigned int context
;
1309 RAW_EXTENSION
*extensions
= NULL
;
1310 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1314 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &sversion
)) {
1315 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1316 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1320 /* load the server random */
1321 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, s
->s3
->server_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
)) {
1322 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1323 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1328 * We do this immediately so we know what format the ServerHello is in.
1329 * Must be done after reading the random data so we can check for the
1330 * TLSv1.3 downgrade sentinels
1332 protverr
= ssl_choose_client_version(s
, sversion
, 1, &al
);
1333 if (protverr
!= 0) {
1334 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, protverr
);
1339 * In TLSv1.3 a ServerHello message signals a key change so the end of the
1340 * message must be on a record boundary.
1342 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s
->rlayer
)) {
1343 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1344 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY
);
1348 /* Get the session-id. */
1349 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1350 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &session_id
)) {
1351 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1352 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1355 session_id_len
= PACKET_remaining(&session_id
);
1356 if (session_id_len
> sizeof s
->session
->session_id
1357 || session_id_len
> SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE
) {
1358 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1359 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1360 SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG
);
1364 PACKET_null_init(&session_id
);
1368 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &cipherchars
, TLS_CIPHER_LEN
)) {
1369 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1370 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1374 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1375 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &compression
)) {
1376 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1377 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1384 /* TLS extensions */
1385 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0) {
1386 PACKET_null_init(&extpkt
);
1387 } else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extpkt
)) {
1388 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1389 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH
);
1393 context
= SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
1394 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
;
1395 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extpkt
, context
, &extensions
, &al
, NULL
))
1400 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1401 /* This will set s->hit if we are resuming */
1402 if (!tls_parse_extension(s
, TLSEXT_IDX_psk
,
1403 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
,
1404 extensions
, NULL
, 0, &al
))
1408 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared
1409 * secret. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
1410 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
1411 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
1412 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
1413 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether
1414 * EAP-FAST servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session
1415 * ID alone is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we
1416 * first check if we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake
1417 * message to see if the server wants to resume.
1419 if (s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
1420 && s
->ext
.session_secret_cb
!= NULL
&& s
->session
->ext
.tick
) {
1421 const SSL_CIPHER
*pref_cipher
= NULL
;
1423 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1424 * backwards compat reasons
1426 int master_key_length
;
1427 master_key_length
= sizeof(s
->session
->master_key
);
1428 if (s
->ext
.session_secret_cb(s
, s
->session
->master_key
,
1431 s
->ext
.session_secret_cb_arg
)
1432 && master_key_length
> 0) {
1433 s
->session
->master_key_length
= master_key_length
;
1434 s
->session
->cipher
= pref_cipher
?
1435 pref_cipher
: ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s
, cipherchars
, 0);
1437 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1438 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1443 if (session_id_len
!= 0
1444 && session_id_len
== s
->session
->session_id_length
1445 && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id
), s
->session
->session_id
,
1446 session_id_len
) == 0)
1451 if (s
->sid_ctx_length
!= s
->session
->sid_ctx_length
1452 || memcmp(s
->session
->sid_ctx
, s
->sid_ctx
, s
->sid_ctx_length
)) {
1453 /* actually a client application bug */
1454 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1455 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1456 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT
);
1461 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1462 * didn't resume, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1463 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1464 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1465 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1467 if (s
->session
->session_id_length
> 0
1469 && s
->session
->ext
.tick_identity
1470 != TLSEXT_PSK_BAD_IDENTITY
)) {
1471 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_miss
++;
1472 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 0)) {
1477 s
->session
->ssl_version
= s
->version
;
1478 s
->session
->session_id_length
= session_id_len
;
1479 /* session_id_len could be 0 */
1480 if (session_id_len
> 0)
1481 memcpy(s
->session
->session_id
, PACKET_data(&session_id
),
1485 /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */
1486 if (s
->version
!= s
->session
->ssl_version
) {
1487 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
1489 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1490 SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH
);
1494 * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed
1497 s
->s3
->tmp
.min_ver
= s
->version
;
1498 s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
= s
->version
;
1500 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s
, cipherchars
)) {
1501 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1505 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1506 if (compression
!= 0) {
1507 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1508 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1509 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1513 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1514 * using compression.
1516 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0) {
1517 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1521 if (s
->hit
&& compression
!= s
->session
->compress_meth
) {
1522 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1523 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1524 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED
);
1527 if (compression
== 0)
1529 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s
)) {
1530 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1531 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED
);
1534 comp
= ssl3_comp_find(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, compression
);
1537 if (compression
!= 0 && comp
== NULL
) {
1538 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1539 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1540 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1543 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
= comp
;
1547 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, context
, extensions
, NULL
, 0, &al
))
1550 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1551 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->hit
) {
1552 unsigned char sctpauthkey
[64];
1553 char labelbuffer
[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
)];
1556 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
1559 memcpy(labelbuffer
, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
,
1560 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
));
1562 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s
, sctpauthkey
,
1563 sizeof(sctpauthkey
),
1565 sizeof(labelbuffer
), NULL
, 0, 0) <= 0)
1568 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
),
1569 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY
,
1570 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), sctpauthkey
);
1575 * In TLSv1.3 we have some post-processing to change cipher state, otherwise
1576 * we're done with this message
1579 && (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
)
1580 || !s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
1581 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ
))) {
1582 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1583 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER
);
1587 OPENSSL_free(extensions
);
1588 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
1590 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1591 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1592 OPENSSL_free(extensions
);
1593 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1596 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_hello_retry_request(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1598 unsigned int sversion
;
1600 const unsigned char *cipherchars
;
1601 RAW_EXTENSION
*extensions
= NULL
;
1605 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &sversion
)) {
1606 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1607 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1611 s
->hello_retry_request
= 1;
1613 /* This will fail if it doesn't choose TLSv1.3+ */
1614 errorcode
= ssl_choose_client_version(s
, sversion
, 0, &al
);
1615 if (errorcode
!= 0) {
1616 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
, errorcode
);
1620 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &cipherchars
, TLS_CIPHER_LEN
)) {
1621 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1622 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1626 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s
, cipherchars
)) {
1627 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1631 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extpkt
)) {
1632 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1633 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH
);
1637 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extpkt
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
,
1638 &extensions
, &al
, NULL
)
1639 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
,
1640 extensions
, NULL
, 0, &al
))
1643 OPENSSL_free(extensions
);
1646 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
1647 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
1649 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s
)) {
1650 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1655 * Add this message to the Transcript Hash. Normally this is done
1656 * automatically prior to the message processing stage. However due to the
1657 * need to create the synthetic message hash, we defer that step until now
1660 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s
, (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
,
1661 s
->init_num
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
)) {
1662 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1663 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1667 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
1669 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1670 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1671 OPENSSL_free(extensions
);
1672 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1675 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_server_certificate(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1677 int al
, i
, ret
= MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
, exp_idx
;
1678 unsigned long cert_list_len
, cert_len
;
1680 const unsigned char *certstart
, *certbytes
;
1681 STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
= NULL
;
1682 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
1684 unsigned int context
= 0;
1686 if ((sk
= sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
) {
1687 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1691 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &context
))
1693 || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt
, &cert_list_len
)
1694 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != cert_list_len
) {
1695 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1696 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1699 for (chainidx
= 0; PACKET_remaining(pkt
); chainidx
++) {
1700 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt
, &cert_len
)
1701 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &certbytes
, cert_len
)) {
1702 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1703 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1704 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1708 certstart
= certbytes
;
1709 x
= d2i_X509(NULL
, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes
, cert_len
);
1711 al
= SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
;
1712 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
1715 if (certbytes
!= (certstart
+ cert_len
)) {
1716 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1717 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1718 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1722 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1723 RAW_EXTENSION
*rawexts
= NULL
;
1726 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extensions
)) {
1727 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1728 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH
);
1731 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extensions
,
1732 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE
, &rawexts
,
1734 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE
,
1735 rawexts
, x
, chainidx
, &al
)) {
1736 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
1739 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
1742 if (!sk_X509_push(sk
, x
)) {
1743 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1749 i
= ssl_verify_cert_chain(s
, sk
);
1751 * The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order
1752 * for client side verification of the server certificate to take place.
1753 * However, historically the code has only checked that *any* flag is set
1754 * to cause server verification to take place. Use of the other flags makes
1755 * no sense in client mode. An attempt to clean up the semantics was
1756 * reverted because at least one application *only* set
1757 * SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT. Prior to the clean up this still caused
1758 * server verification to take place, after the clean up it silently did
1759 * nothing. SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() cannot validate the flags
1760 * sent to them because they are void functions. Therefore, we now use the
1761 * (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is
1762 * set. The *documented* interface remains the same.
1764 if (s
->verify_mode
!= SSL_VERIFY_NONE
&& i
<= 0) {
1765 al
= ssl_verify_alarm_type(s
->verify_result
);
1766 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1767 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED
);
1770 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1772 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, i
);
1773 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1777 s
->session
->peer_chain
= sk
;
1779 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1780 * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c
1782 x
= sk_X509_value(sk
, 0);
1785 * VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end
1788 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(x
);
1790 if (pkey
== NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey
)) {
1793 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1794 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS
);
1798 i
= ssl_cert_type(x
, pkey
);
1802 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1803 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
);
1807 * Check certificate type is consistent with ciphersuite. For TLS 1.3
1808 * skip check since TLS 1.3 ciphersuites can be used with any certificate
1811 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1812 exp_idx
= ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
);
1813 if (exp_idx
>= 0 && i
!= exp_idx
1814 && (exp_idx
!= SSL_PKEY_GOST_EC
||
1815 (i
!= SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
&& i
!= SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
1816 && i
!= SSL_PKEY_GOST01
))) {
1818 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1819 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1820 SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
);
1824 s
->session
->peer_type
= i
;
1826 X509_free(s
->session
->peer
);
1828 s
->session
->peer
= x
;
1829 s
->session
->verify_result
= s
->verify_result
;
1832 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
1834 && !ssl_handshake_hash(s
, s
->cert_verify_hash
,
1835 sizeof(s
->cert_verify_hash
),
1836 &s
->cert_verify_hash_len
)) {
1837 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1838 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1842 ret
= MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
1846 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1848 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1851 sk_X509_pop_free(sk
, X509_free
);
1855 static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
1857 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1858 PACKET psk_identity_hint
;
1860 /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
1862 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &psk_identity_hint
)) {
1863 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1864 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1869 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
1870 * tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
1871 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
1874 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint
) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
1875 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1876 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
1880 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint
) == 0) {
1881 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
);
1882 s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
= NULL
;
1883 } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint
,
1884 &s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
)) {
1885 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1891 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1892 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1897 static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, EVP_PKEY
**pkey
, int *al
)
1899 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1900 PACKET prime
, generator
, salt
, server_pub
;
1902 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &prime
)
1903 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &generator
)
1904 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &salt
)
1905 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &server_pub
)) {
1906 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1907 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1911 /* TODO(size_t): Convert BN_bin2bn() calls */
1913 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime
),
1914 (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime
), NULL
)) == NULL
1916 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator
),
1917 (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator
), NULL
)) == NULL
1919 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt
),
1920 (int)PACKET_remaining(&salt
), NULL
)) == NULL
1922 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub
),
1923 (int)PACKET_remaining(&server_pub
), NULL
)) == NULL
) {
1924 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1925 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1929 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s
, al
)) {
1930 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1931 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP
, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS
);
1935 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
1936 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aRSA
| SSL_aDSS
))
1937 *pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
1941 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1942 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1947 static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, EVP_PKEY
**pkey
, int *al
)
1949 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1950 PACKET prime
, generator
, pub_key
;
1951 EVP_PKEY
*peer_tmp
= NULL
;
1954 BIGNUM
*p
= NULL
, *g
= NULL
, *bnpub_key
= NULL
;
1958 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &prime
)
1959 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &generator
)
1960 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &pub_key
)) {
1961 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1962 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1966 peer_tmp
= EVP_PKEY_new();
1969 if (peer_tmp
== NULL
|| dh
== NULL
) {
1970 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1971 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1975 /* TODO(size_t): Convert these calls */
1976 p
= BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime
), (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime
), NULL
);
1977 g
= BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator
), (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator
),
1979 bnpub_key
= BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key
),
1980 (int)PACKET_remaining(&pub_key
), NULL
);
1981 if (p
== NULL
|| g
== NULL
|| bnpub_key
== NULL
) {
1982 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1983 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1987 /* test non-zero pubkey */
1988 if (BN_is_zero(bnpub_key
)) {
1989 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1990 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE
);
1994 if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh
, p
, NULL
, g
)) {
1995 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1996 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
2001 if (DH_check_params(dh
, &check_bits
) == 0 || check_bits
!= 0) {
2002 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2003 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE
);
2007 if (!DH_set0_key(dh
, bnpub_key
, NULL
)) {
2008 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2009 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
2014 if (!ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH
, DH_security_bits(dh
), 0, dh
)) {
2015 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2016 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL
);
2020 if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(peer_tmp
, dh
) == 0) {
2021 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2022 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2026 s
->s3
->peer_tmp
= peer_tmp
;
2029 * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with
2030 * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this
2032 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aRSA
| SSL_aDSS
))
2033 *pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2034 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2043 EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp
);
2047 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2048 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2053 static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, EVP_PKEY
**pkey
, int *al
)
2055 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2057 const unsigned char *ecparams
;
2059 unsigned int curve_flags
;
2060 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
2063 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
2064 * public key. For now we only support named (not generic) curves and
2065 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
2067 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &ecparams
, 3)) {
2068 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2069 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
2073 * Check curve is one of our preferences, if not server has sent an
2074 * invalid curve. ECParameters is 3 bytes.
2076 if (!tls1_check_curve(s
, ecparams
, 3)) {
2077 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2078 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE
);
2082 curve_nid
= tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(ecparams
+ 2), &curve_flags
);
2084 if (curve_nid
== 0) {
2085 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2086 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
,
2087 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS
);
2091 if ((curve_flags
& TLS_CURVE_TYPE
) == TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM
) {
2092 EVP_PKEY
*key
= EVP_PKEY_new();
2094 if (key
== NULL
|| !EVP_PKEY_set_type(key
, curve_nid
)) {
2095 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2096 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2100 s
->s3
->peer_tmp
= key
;
2102 /* Set up EVP_PKEY with named curve as parameters */
2103 pctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC
, NULL
);
2105 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(pctx
) <= 0
2106 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(pctx
, curve_nid
) <= 0
2107 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen(pctx
, &s
->s3
->peer_tmp
) <= 0) {
2108 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2109 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2110 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
2113 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
2117 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &encoded_pt
)) {
2118 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2119 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2123 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s
->s3
->peer_tmp
,
2124 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt
),
2125 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt
))) {
2126 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2127 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT
);
2132 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
2133 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
2136 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aECDSA
)
2137 *pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2138 else if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aRSA
)
2139 *pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2140 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2144 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2145 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2150 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_key_exchange(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2154 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
2155 EVP_MD_CTX
*md_ctx
= NULL
;
2156 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
2157 PACKET save_param_start
, signature
;
2159 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
2161 save_param_start
= *pkt
;
2163 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
2164 EVP_PKEY_free(s
->s3
->peer_tmp
);
2165 s
->s3
->peer_tmp
= NULL
;
2168 if (alg_k
& SSL_PSK
) {
2169 if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s
, pkt
, &al
))
2173 /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
2174 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kPSK
| SSL_kRSAPSK
)) {
2175 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2176 if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s
, pkt
, &pkey
, &al
))
2178 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
)) {
2179 if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s
, pkt
, &pkey
, &al
))
2181 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
2182 if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s
, pkt
, &pkey
, &al
))
2185 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
2186 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
2190 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
2194 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
2197 * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
2198 * equals the length of the parameters.
2200 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start
, ¶ms
,
2201 PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start
) -
2202 PACKET_remaining(pkt
))) {
2203 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2204 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2208 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
2209 unsigned int sigalg
;
2212 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &sigalg
)) {
2213 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2214 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
2217 rv
= tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s
, sigalg
, pkey
);
2219 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2221 } else if (rv
== 0) {
2222 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2226 fprintf(stderr
, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md
));
2228 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s
, pkey
)) {
2229 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2233 md
= ssl_md(s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalg
->hash_idx
);
2235 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &signature
)
2236 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2237 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2238 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2241 maxsig
= EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
2243 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2244 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2249 * Check signature length
2251 if (PACKET_remaining(&signature
) > (size_t)maxsig
) {
2252 /* wrong packet length */
2253 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2254 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2255 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH
);
2259 md_ctx
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2260 if (md_ctx
== NULL
) {
2261 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2262 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2266 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(md_ctx
, &pctx
, md
, NULL
, pkey
) <= 0) {
2267 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2268 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2271 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s
)) {
2272 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx
, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING
) <= 0
2273 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx
,
2274 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST
) <= 0) {
2275 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2276 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2280 if (EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->client_random
[0]),
2281 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
2282 || EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->server_random
[0]),
2283 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
2284 || EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(md_ctx
, PACKET_data(¶ms
),
2285 PACKET_remaining(¶ms
)) <= 0) {
2286 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2287 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2290 if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(md_ctx
, PACKET_data(&signature
),
2291 PACKET_remaining(&signature
)) <= 0) {
2293 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
2294 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE
);
2297 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx
);
2300 /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
2301 if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
))
2302 && !(alg_k
& SSL_PSK
)) {
2303 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
2304 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s
)) {
2305 /* Otherwise this shouldn't happen */
2306 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2307 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2309 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2313 /* still data left over */
2314 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2315 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2316 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE
);
2321 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2324 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2325 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2326 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx
);
2327 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2330 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_certificate_request(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2332 int ret
= MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2333 int al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2336 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
2337 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++)
2338 s
->s3
->tmp
.valid_flags
[i
] = 0;
2340 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2341 PACKET reqctx
, extensions
;
2342 RAW_EXTENSION
*rawexts
= NULL
;
2344 /* Free and zero certificate types: it is not present in TLS 1.3 */
2345 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype
);
2346 s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype
= NULL
;
2347 s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype_len
= 0;
2349 /* TODO(TLS1.3) need to process request context, for now ignore */
2350 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &reqctx
)) {
2351 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2352 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2356 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extensions
)) {
2357 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH
);
2360 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extensions
,
2361 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2362 &rawexts
, &al
, NULL
)
2363 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2364 rawexts
, NULL
, 0, &al
)) {
2365 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
2368 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
2369 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s
)) {
2370 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2371 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2377 /* get the certificate types */
2378 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &ctypes
)) {
2379 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2380 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2384 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ctypes
, &s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype
, &s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype_len
)) {
2385 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2386 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2390 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
2393 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &sigalgs
)) {
2394 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2395 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2399 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s
, &sigalgs
)) {
2400 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2401 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR
);
2404 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s
)) {
2405 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2406 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2407 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2412 /* get the CA RDNs */
2413 if (!parse_ca_names(s
, pkt
, &al
))
2417 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2418 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2422 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2423 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 1;
2425 ret
= MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
2428 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2429 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2434 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2436 int al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2437 unsigned int ticklen
;
2438 unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint
, age_add
= 0;
2439 unsigned int sess_len
;
2440 RAW_EXTENSION
*exts
= NULL
;
2442 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt
, &ticket_lifetime_hint
)
2443 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !PACKET_get_net_4(pkt
, &age_add
))
2444 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &ticklen
)
2445 || (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != ticklen
)
2447 && (ticklen
== 0 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) < ticklen
))) {
2448 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2453 * Server is allowed to change its mind (in <=TLSv1.2) and send an empty
2454 * ticket. We already checked this TLSv1.3 case above, so it should never
2455 * be 0 here in that instance
2458 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2460 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Is this a suitable test for TLS1.3? */
2461 if (s
->session
->session_id_length
> 0) {
2462 int i
= s
->session_ctx
->session_cache_mode
;
2463 SSL_SESSION
*new_sess
;
2465 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
2468 if (i
& SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT
) {
2470 * Remove the old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
2472 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s
->session_ctx
, s
->session
);
2475 if ((new_sess
= ssl_session_dup(s
->session
, 0)) == 0) {
2476 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2477 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2481 SSL_SESSION_free(s
->session
);
2482 s
->session
= new_sess
;
2486 * Technically the cast to long here is not guaranteed by the C standard -
2487 * but we use it elsewhere, so this should be ok.
2489 s
->session
->time
= (long)time(NULL
);
2491 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->ext
.tick
);
2492 s
->session
->ext
.tick
= NULL
;
2493 s
->session
->ext
.ticklen
= 0;
2495 s
->session
->ext
.tick
= OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen
);
2496 if (s
->session
->ext
.tick
== NULL
) {
2497 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2500 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, s
->session
->ext
.tick
, ticklen
)) {
2501 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2502 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2506 s
->session
->ext
.tick_lifetime_hint
= ticket_lifetime_hint
;
2507 s
->session
->ext
.tick_age_add
= age_add
;
2508 s
->session
->ext
.ticklen
= ticklen
;
2510 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2513 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extpkt
)
2514 || !tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extpkt
,
2515 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
2517 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
,
2518 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
2519 exts
, NULL
, 0, &al
)) {
2520 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION
);
2526 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2527 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2528 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2529 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2530 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2531 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2532 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2533 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
2534 * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
2537 * TODO(size_t): we use sess_len here because EVP_Digest expects an int
2538 * but s->session->session_id_length is a size_t
2540 if (!EVP_Digest(s
->session
->ext
.tick
, ticklen
,
2541 s
->session
->session_id
, &sess_len
,
2542 EVP_sha256(), NULL
)) {
2543 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2546 s
->session
->session_id_length
= sess_len
;
2548 /* This is a standalone message in TLSv1.3, so there is no more to read */
2549 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2551 ssl_update_cache(s
, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT
);
2552 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
2555 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2557 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2559 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2561 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2565 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
2566 * parse a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure. On failure
2567 * |*al| is populated with a suitable alert code.
2569 int tls_process_cert_status_body(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2574 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &type
)
2575 || type
!= TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp
) {
2576 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2577 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY
,
2578 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE
);
2581 if (!PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt
, &resplen
)
2582 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != resplen
) {
2583 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2584 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2587 s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp
= OPENSSL_malloc(resplen
);
2588 if (s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp
== NULL
) {
2589 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2590 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2593 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp
, resplen
)) {
2594 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2595 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2598 s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp_len
= resplen
;
2604 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_cert_status(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2608 if (!tls_process_cert_status_body(s
, pkt
, &al
)) {
2609 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2610 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2611 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2614 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2618 * Perform miscellaneous checks and processing after we have received the
2619 * server's initial flight. In TLS1.3 this is after the Server Finished message.
2620 * In <=TLS1.2 this is after the ServerDone message. Returns 1 on success or 0
2623 int tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL
*s
, int *al
)
2626 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
2629 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s
)) {
2630 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2635 * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |ext.ocsp.resp| and
2636 * |ext.ocsp.resp_len| values will be set if we actually received a status
2637 * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise
2639 if (s
->ext
.status_type
!= TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing
2640 && s
->ctx
->ext
.status_cb
!= NULL
) {
2641 int ret
= s
->ctx
->ext
.status_cb(s
, s
->ctx
->ext
.status_arg
);
2644 *al
= SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE
;
2645 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT
,
2646 SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE
);
2650 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2651 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT
,
2652 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2656 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2657 if (s
->ct_validation_callback
!= NULL
) {
2658 /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */
2659 if (!ssl_validate_ct(s
) && (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
)) {
2660 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2669 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_server_done(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2671 int al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2673 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) > 0) {
2674 /* should contain no data */
2675 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2676 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2679 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2680 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2681 if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s
) <= 0) {
2682 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE
, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC
);
2689 * Error queue messages are generated directly by this function
2691 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s
, &al
))
2694 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2695 /* Only applies to renegotiation */
2696 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s
))
2697 && s
->renegotiate
!= 0)
2698 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
2701 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
2704 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2705 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2706 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2709 static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2711 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2714 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2715 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2718 char identity
[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+ 1];
2719 size_t identitylen
= 0;
2720 unsigned char psk
[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
];
2721 unsigned char *tmppsk
= NULL
;
2722 char *tmpidentity
= NULL
;
2725 if (s
->psk_client_callback
== NULL
) {
2726 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB
);
2727 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2731 memset(identity
, 0, sizeof(identity
));
2733 psklen
= s
->psk_client_callback(s
, s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
,
2734 identity
, sizeof(identity
) - 1,
2737 if (psklen
> PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
) {
2738 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2739 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2741 } else if (psklen
== 0) {
2742 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2743 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
);
2744 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2748 identitylen
= strlen(identity
);
2749 if (identitylen
> PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
2750 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2751 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2755 tmppsk
= OPENSSL_memdup(psk
, psklen
);
2756 tmpidentity
= OPENSSL_strdup(identity
);
2757 if (tmppsk
== NULL
|| tmpidentity
== NULL
) {
2758 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2759 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2763 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
);
2764 s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
= tmppsk
;
2765 s
->s3
->tmp
.psklen
= psklen
;
2767 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity
);
2768 s
->session
->psk_identity
= tmpidentity
;
2771 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt
, identity
, identitylen
)) {
2772 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2773 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2780 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk
, psklen
);
2781 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity
, sizeof(identity
));
2782 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk
, psklen
);
2783 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity
, identitylen
);
2787 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2788 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2793 static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2795 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2796 unsigned char *encdata
= NULL
;
2797 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
2798 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
2800 unsigned char *pms
= NULL
;
2803 if (s
->session
->peer
== NULL
) {
2805 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2807 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2811 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2812 if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey
) == NULL
) {
2813 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2817 pmslen
= SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
;
2818 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
2820 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2821 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2825 pms
[0] = s
->client_version
>> 8;
2826 pms
[1] = s
->client_version
& 0xff;
2827 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2828 if (RAND_bytes(pms
+ 2, (int)(pmslen
- 2)) <= 0) {
2832 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2833 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
&& !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)) {
2834 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2837 pctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey
, NULL
);
2838 if (pctx
== NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx
) <= 0
2839 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx
, NULL
, &enclen
, pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
2840 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2843 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, enclen
, &encdata
)
2844 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx
, encdata
, &enclen
, pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
2845 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT
);
2848 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
2851 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2852 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
&& !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
2853 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2857 /* Log the premaster secret, if logging is enabled. */
2858 if (!ssl_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(s
, encdata
, enclen
, pms
, pmslen
))
2861 s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
= pms
;
2862 s
->s3
->tmp
.pmslen
= pmslen
;
2866 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms
, pmslen
);
2867 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
2871 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2872 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2877 static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2879 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2881 const BIGNUM
*pub_key
;
2882 EVP_PKEY
*ckey
= NULL
, *skey
= NULL
;
2883 unsigned char *keybytes
= NULL
;
2885 skey
= s
->s3
->peer_tmp
;
2889 ckey
= ssl_generate_pkey(skey
);
2893 dh_clnt
= EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey
);
2895 if (dh_clnt
== NULL
|| ssl_derive(s
, ckey
, skey
, 0) == 0)
2898 /* send off the data */
2899 DH_get0_key(dh_clnt
, &pub_key
, NULL
);
2900 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt
, BN_num_bytes(pub_key
), &keybytes
))
2903 BN_bn2bin(pub_key
, keybytes
);
2904 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
2908 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
2910 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2911 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2915 static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2917 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2918 unsigned char *encodedPoint
= NULL
;
2919 size_t encoded_pt_len
= 0;
2920 EVP_PKEY
*ckey
= NULL
, *skey
= NULL
;
2923 skey
= s
->s3
->peer_tmp
;
2925 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2929 ckey
= ssl_generate_pkey(skey
);
2931 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2935 if (ssl_derive(s
, ckey
, skey
, 0) == 0) {
2936 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2940 /* Generate encoding of client key */
2941 encoded_pt_len
= EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey
, &encodedPoint
);
2943 if (encoded_pt_len
== 0) {
2944 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
2948 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, encodedPoint
, encoded_pt_len
)) {
2949 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2955 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
2956 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
2959 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2960 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2965 static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2967 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2968 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
2969 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pkey_ctx
= NULL
;
2972 unsigned int md_len
;
2973 unsigned char shared_ukm
[32], tmp
[256];
2974 EVP_MD_CTX
*ukm_hash
= NULL
;
2975 int dgst_nid
= NID_id_GostR3411_94
;
2976 unsigned char *pms
= NULL
;
2979 if ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aGOST12
) != 0)
2980 dgst_nid
= NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256
;
2983 * Get server certificate PKEY and create ctx from it
2985 peer_cert
= s
->session
->peer
;
2987 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2988 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
,
2989 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER
);
2993 pkey_ctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert
), NULL
);
2994 if (pkey_ctx
== NULL
) {
2995 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2996 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3000 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
3001 * parameters match those of server certificate, use
3002 * certificate key for key exchange
3005 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
3007 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
3009 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3010 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3014 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx
) <= 0
3015 /* Generate session key
3016 * TODO(size_t): Convert this function
3018 || RAND_bytes(pms
, (int)pmslen
) <= 0) {
3019 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3020 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3024 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
3027 ukm_hash
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
3028 if (ukm_hash
== NULL
3029 || EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash
, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid
)) <= 0
3030 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash
, s
->s3
->client_random
,
3031 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
3032 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash
, s
->s3
->server_random
,
3033 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
3034 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash
, shared_ukm
, &md_len
) <= 0) {
3035 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3036 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3039 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash
);
3041 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx
, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT
,
3042 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV
, 8, shared_ukm
) < 0) {
3043 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3044 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG
);
3047 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
3049 * Encapsulate it into sequence
3052 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx
, tmp
, &msglen
, pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
3053 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3054 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG
);
3058 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
)
3059 || (msglen
>= 0x80 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0x81))
3060 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, tmp
, msglen
)) {
3061 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3062 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3066 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
3067 s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
= pms
;
3068 s
->s3
->tmp
.pmslen
= pmslen
;
3072 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
3073 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms
, pmslen
);
3074 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash
);
3077 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3078 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3083 static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
3085 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3086 unsigned char *abytes
= NULL
;
3088 if (s
->srp_ctx
.A
== NULL
3089 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt
, BN_num_bytes(s
->srp_ctx
.A
),
3091 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3094 BN_bn2bin(s
->srp_ctx
.A
, abytes
);
3096 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->srp_username
);
3097 s
->session
->srp_username
= OPENSSL_strdup(s
->srp_ctx
.login
);
3098 if (s
->session
->srp_username
== NULL
) {
3099 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3105 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3106 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3111 int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3113 unsigned long alg_k
;
3116 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
3118 if ((alg_k
& SSL_PSK
)
3119 && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s
, pkt
, &al
))
3122 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kRSA
| SSL_kRSAPSK
)) {
3123 if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s
, pkt
, &al
))
3125 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
)) {
3126 if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s
, pkt
, &al
))
3128 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
3129 if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s
, pkt
, &al
))
3131 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kGOST
) {
3132 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s
, pkt
, &al
))
3134 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
3135 if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s
, pkt
, &al
))
3137 } else if (!(alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
)) {
3138 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
3139 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3146 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
3147 OPENSSL_clear_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
, s
->s3
->tmp
.pmslen
);
3148 s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
= NULL
;
3149 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3150 OPENSSL_clear_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
, s
->s3
->tmp
.psklen
);
3151 s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
= NULL
;
3156 int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL
*s
)
3158 unsigned char *pms
= NULL
;
3161 pms
= s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
;
3162 pmslen
= s
->s3
->tmp
.pmslen
;
3164 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3166 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) {
3167 if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s
)) {
3168 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK
,
3169 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3176 if (pms
== NULL
&& !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kPSK
)) {
3177 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3178 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3181 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s
, pms
, pmslen
, 1)) {
3182 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3183 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3184 /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */
3192 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3193 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
3194 unsigned char sctpauthkey
[64];
3195 char labelbuffer
[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
)];
3198 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3201 memcpy(labelbuffer
, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
,
3202 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
));
3204 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s
, sctpauthkey
,
3205 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), labelbuffer
,
3206 sizeof(labelbuffer
), NULL
, 0, 0) <= 0)
3209 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY
,
3210 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), sctpauthkey
);
3216 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms
, pmslen
);
3217 s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
= NULL
;
3222 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
3223 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
3224 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
3226 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL
*s
)
3228 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
3229 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s
, NULL
) || s
->s3
->tmp
.sigalg
== NULL
)
3232 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
3233 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
3235 if (s
->cert
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
&&
3236 !tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, -2))
3241 WORK_STATE
tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
3244 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
3247 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
) {
3248 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
3249 if (s
->cert
->cert_cb
) {
3250 i
= s
->cert
->cert_cb(s
, s
->cert
->cert_cb_arg
);
3252 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
3256 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3257 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
3260 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
3262 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s
))
3263 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
3265 /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
3269 /* We need to get a client cert */
3270 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_B
) {
3272 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3273 * return(-1); We then get retied later
3275 i
= ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s
, &x509
, &pkey
);
3277 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
3280 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
3281 if ((i
== 1) && (pkey
!= NULL
) && (x509
!= NULL
)) {
3282 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s
, x509
) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s
, pkey
))
3284 } else if (i
== 1) {
3286 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3287 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK
);
3291 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
3292 if (i
&& !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s
))
3295 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
3296 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 0;
3297 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_WARNING
, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE
);
3298 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
3300 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 2;
3301 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
3302 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3303 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
3309 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
3312 /* Shouldn't ever get here */
3316 int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3318 int al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3321 * TODO(TLS1.3): For now we must put an empty context. Needs to be filled in
3324 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0))
3325 || !ssl3_output_cert_chain(s
, pkt
,
3326 (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
== 2) ? NULL
3329 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3334 && SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
)
3335 && (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
3336 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
))) {
3337 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3338 SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER
);
3344 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
3348 #define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m))
3350 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL
*s
)
3353 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3357 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
3358 int al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
3360 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
3361 alg_a
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
;
3363 /* we don't have a certificate */
3364 if ((alg_a
& SSL_aNULL
) || (alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
))
3367 /* This is the passed certificate */
3369 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3370 idx
= s
->session
->peer_type
;
3371 if (idx
== SSL_PKEY_ECC
) {
3372 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s
->session
->peer
, s
) == 0) {
3374 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT
);
3379 } else if (alg_a
& SSL_aECDSA
) {
3380 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3381 SSL_R_MISSING_ECDSA_SIGNING_CERT
);
3385 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
3386 i
= X509_certificate_type(s
->session
->peer
, pkey
);
3388 /* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */
3389 if ((alg_a
& SSL_aRSA
) && !has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_RSA
| EVP_PKT_SIGN
)) {
3390 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3391 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT
);
3394 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3395 else if ((alg_a
& SSL_aDSS
) && !has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_DSA
| EVP_PKT_SIGN
)) {
3396 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3397 SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT
);
3401 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3402 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kRSA
| SSL_kRSAPSK
) &&
3403 !has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_RSA
| EVP_PKT_ENC
)) {
3404 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3405 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT
);
3409 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3410 if ((alg_k
& SSL_kDHE
) && (s
->s3
->peer_tmp
== NULL
)) {
3411 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3412 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3419 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
3423 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3424 int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3426 size_t len
, padding_len
;
3427 unsigned char *padding
= NULL
;
3429 len
= s
->ext
.npn_len
;
3430 padding_len
= 32 - ((len
+ 2) % 32);
3432 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, s
->ext
.npn
, len
)
3433 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt
, padding_len
, &padding
)) {
3434 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEXT_PROTO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3438 memset(padding
, 0, padding_len
);
3442 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3447 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_hello_req(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3449 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) > 0) {
3450 /* should contain no data */
3451 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_REQ
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3452 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
3453 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
3454 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
3458 * This is a historical discrepancy (not in the RFC) maintained for
3459 * compatibility reasons. If a TLS client receives a HelloRequest it will
3460 * attempt an abbreviated handshake. However if a DTLS client receives a
3461 * HelloRequest it will do a full handshake. Either behaviour is reasonable
3462 * but doing one for TLS and another for DTLS is odd.
3467 SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(s
);
3469 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
3472 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3474 int al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3476 RAW_EXTENSION
*rawexts
= NULL
;
3478 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extensions
)) {
3479 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3480 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3484 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extensions
,
3485 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
, &rawexts
,
3487 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
,
3488 rawexts
, NULL
, 0, &al
))
3491 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
3492 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
3495 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
3496 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
3497 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
3498 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
3501 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL
*s
, X509
**px509
, EVP_PKEY
**ppkey
)
3504 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
3505 if (s
->ctx
->client_cert_engine
) {
3506 i
= ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s
->ctx
->client_cert_engine
, s
,
3507 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s
),
3508 px509
, ppkey
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
);
3513 if (s
->ctx
->client_cert_cb
)
3514 i
= s
->ctx
->client_cert_cb(s
, px509
, ppkey
);
3518 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL
*s
, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3521 size_t totlen
= 0, len
, maxlen
;
3522 int empty_reneg_info_scsv
= !s
->renegotiate
;
3523 /* Set disabled masks for this session */
3524 ssl_set_client_disabled(s
);
3529 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
3530 # if OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH < 6
3531 # error Max cipher length too short
3534 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
3535 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
3538 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
)
3539 maxlen
= OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
& ~1;
3542 /* Maximum length that can be stored in 2 bytes. Length must be even */
3545 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv
)
3547 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV
)
3550 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk
) && totlen
< maxlen
; i
++) {
3551 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
;
3553 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk
, i
);
3554 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
3555 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s
, c
, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED
, 0))
3558 if (!s
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(c
, pkt
, &len
)) {
3559 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3567 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES
, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE
);
3572 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv
) {
3573 static SSL_CIPHER scsv
= {
3574 0, NULL
, SSL3_CK_SCSV
, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3576 if (!s
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv
, pkt
, &len
)) {
3577 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3581 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV
) {
3582 static SSL_CIPHER scsv
= {
3583 0, NULL
, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV
, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3585 if (!s
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv
, pkt
, &len
)) {
3586 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3595 int tls_construct_end_of_early_data(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3597 if (s
->early_data_state
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
3598 && s
->early_data_state
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
) {
3599 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
,
3600 ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED
);
3604 s
->early_data_state
= SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
;