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[thirdparty/openssl.git] / ssl / tls13_enc.c
1 /*
2 * Copyright 2016-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 *
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
8 */
9
10 #include <stdlib.h>
11 #include "ssl_local.h"
12 #include "internal/ktls.h"
13 #include "record/record_local.h"
14 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
15 #include <openssl/evp.h>
16 #include <openssl/kdf.h>
17 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
18
19 #define TLS13_MAX_LABEL_LEN 249
20
21 /* Always filled with zeros */
22 static const unsigned char default_zeros[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
23
24 /*
25 * Given a |secret|; a |label| of length |labellen|; and |data| of length
26 * |datalen| (e.g. typically a hash of the handshake messages), derive a new
27 * secret |outlen| bytes long and store it in the location pointed to be |out|.
28 * The |data| value may be zero length. Any errors will be treated as fatal if
29 * |fatal| is set. Returns 1 on success 0 on failure.
30 */
31 int tls13_hkdf_expand(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *secret,
32 const unsigned char *label, size_t labellen,
33 const unsigned char *data, size_t datalen,
34 unsigned char *out, size_t outlen, int fatal)
35 {
36 #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
37 static const unsigned char label_prefix[] = { 0x74, 0x6C, 0x73, 0x31, 0x33, 0x20, 0x00 };
38 #else
39 static const unsigned char label_prefix[] = "tls13 ";
40 #endif
41 EVP_KDF *kdf = EVP_KDF_fetch(s->ctx->libctx, OSSL_KDF_NAME_HKDF,
42 s->ctx->propq);
43 EVP_KDF_CTX *kctx;
44 OSSL_PARAM params[5], *p = params;
45 int mode = EVP_PKEY_HKDEF_MODE_EXPAND_ONLY;
46 const char *mdname = EVP_MD_name(md);
47 int ret;
48 size_t hkdflabellen;
49 size_t hashlen;
50 /*
51 * 2 bytes for length of derived secret + 1 byte for length of combined
52 * prefix and label + bytes for the label itself + 1 byte length of hash
53 * + bytes for the hash itself
54 */
55 unsigned char hkdflabel[sizeof(uint16_t) + sizeof(uint8_t)
56 + (sizeof(label_prefix) - 1) + TLS13_MAX_LABEL_LEN
57 + 1 + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
58 WPACKET pkt;
59
60 kctx = EVP_KDF_new_ctx(kdf);
61 EVP_KDF_free(kdf);
62 if (kctx == NULL)
63 return 0;
64
65 if (labellen > TLS13_MAX_LABEL_LEN) {
66 if (fatal) {
67 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS13_HKDF_EXPAND,
68 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
69 } else {
70 /*
71 * Probably we have been called from SSL_export_keying_material(),
72 * or SSL_export_keying_material_early().
73 */
74 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS13_HKDF_EXPAND, SSL_R_TLS_ILLEGAL_EXPORTER_LABEL);
75 }
76 EVP_KDF_free_ctx(kctx);
77 return 0;
78 }
79
80 hashlen = EVP_MD_size(md);
81
82 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt, hkdflabel, sizeof(hkdflabel), 0)
83 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&pkt, outlen)
84 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(&pkt)
85 || !WPACKET_memcpy(&pkt, label_prefix, sizeof(label_prefix) - 1)
86 || !WPACKET_memcpy(&pkt, label, labellen)
87 || !WPACKET_close(&pkt)
88 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(&pkt, data, (data == NULL) ? 0 : datalen)
89 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(&pkt, &hkdflabellen)
90 || !WPACKET_finish(&pkt)) {
91 EVP_KDF_free_ctx(kctx);
92 WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt);
93 if (fatal)
94 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS13_HKDF_EXPAND,
95 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
96 else
97 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS13_HKDF_EXPAND, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
98 return 0;
99 }
100
101 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_MODE, &mode);
102 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST,
103 (char *)mdname, 0);
104 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY,
105 (unsigned char *)secret, hashlen);
106 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_INFO,
107 hkdflabel, hkdflabellen);
108 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
109
110 ret = EVP_KDF_set_ctx_params(kctx, params) <= 0
111 || EVP_KDF_derive(kctx, out, outlen) <= 0;
112
113 EVP_KDF_free_ctx(kctx);
114
115 if (ret != 0) {
116 if (fatal)
117 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS13_HKDF_EXPAND,
118 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
119 else
120 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS13_HKDF_EXPAND, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
121 }
122
123 return ret == 0;
124 }
125
126 /*
127 * Given a |secret| generate a |key| of length |keylen| bytes. Returns 1 on
128 * success 0 on failure.
129 */
130 int tls13_derive_key(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *secret,
131 unsigned char *key, size_t keylen)
132 {
133 #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
134 static const unsigned char keylabel[] ={ 0x6B, 0x65, 0x79, 0x00 };
135 #else
136 static const unsigned char keylabel[] = "key";
137 #endif
138
139 return tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, secret, keylabel, sizeof(keylabel) - 1,
140 NULL, 0, key, keylen, 1);
141 }
142
143 /*
144 * Given a |secret| generate an |iv| of length |ivlen| bytes. Returns 1 on
145 * success 0 on failure.
146 */
147 int tls13_derive_iv(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *secret,
148 unsigned char *iv, size_t ivlen)
149 {
150 #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
151 static const unsigned char ivlabel[] = { 0x69, 0x76, 0x00 };
152 #else
153 static const unsigned char ivlabel[] = "iv";
154 #endif
155
156 return tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, secret, ivlabel, sizeof(ivlabel) - 1,
157 NULL, 0, iv, ivlen, 1);
158 }
159
160 int tls13_derive_finishedkey(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md,
161 const unsigned char *secret,
162 unsigned char *fin, size_t finlen)
163 {
164 #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
165 static const unsigned char finishedlabel[] = { 0x66, 0x69, 0x6E, 0x69, 0x73, 0x68, 0x65, 0x64, 0x00 };
166 #else
167 static const unsigned char finishedlabel[] = "finished";
168 #endif
169
170 return tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, secret, finishedlabel,
171 sizeof(finishedlabel) - 1, NULL, 0, fin, finlen, 1);
172 }
173
174 /*
175 * Given the previous secret |prevsecret| and a new input secret |insecret| of
176 * length |insecretlen|, generate a new secret and store it in the location
177 * pointed to by |outsecret|. Returns 1 on success 0 on failure.
178 */
179 int tls13_generate_secret(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md,
180 const unsigned char *prevsecret,
181 const unsigned char *insecret,
182 size_t insecretlen,
183 unsigned char *outsecret)
184 {
185 size_t mdlen, prevsecretlen;
186 int mdleni;
187 int ret;
188 EVP_KDF *kdf;
189 EVP_KDF_CTX *kctx;
190 OSSL_PARAM params[5], *p = params;
191 int mode = EVP_PKEY_HKDEF_MODE_EXTRACT_ONLY;
192 const char *mdname = EVP_MD_name(md);
193 #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
194 static const char derived_secret_label[] = { 0x64, 0x65, 0x72, 0x69, 0x76, 0x65, 0x64, 0x00 };
195 #else
196 static const char derived_secret_label[] = "derived";
197 #endif
198 unsigned char preextractsec[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
199
200 kdf = EVP_KDF_fetch(s->ctx->libctx, OSSL_KDF_NAME_HKDF, s->ctx->propq);
201 kctx = EVP_KDF_new_ctx(kdf);
202 EVP_KDF_free(kdf);
203 if (kctx == NULL) {
204 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS13_GENERATE_SECRET,
205 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
206 return 0;
207 }
208
209 mdleni = EVP_MD_size(md);
210 /* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */
211 if (!ossl_assert(mdleni >= 0)) {
212 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS13_GENERATE_SECRET,
213 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
214 EVP_KDF_free_ctx(kctx);
215 return 0;
216 }
217 mdlen = (size_t)mdleni;
218
219 if (insecret == NULL) {
220 insecret = default_zeros;
221 insecretlen = mdlen;
222 }
223 if (prevsecret == NULL) {
224 prevsecret = default_zeros;
225 prevsecretlen = 0;
226 } else {
227 EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
228 unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
229
230 /* The pre-extract derive step uses a hash of no messages */
231 if (mctx == NULL
232 || EVP_DigestInit_ex(mctx, md, NULL) <= 0
233 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(mctx, hash, NULL) <= 0) {
234 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS13_GENERATE_SECRET,
235 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
236 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
237 EVP_KDF_free_ctx(kctx);
238 return 0;
239 }
240 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
241
242 /* Generate the pre-extract secret */
243 if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, prevsecret,
244 (unsigned char *)derived_secret_label,
245 sizeof(derived_secret_label) - 1, hash, mdlen,
246 preextractsec, mdlen, 1)) {
247 /* SSLfatal() already called */
248 EVP_KDF_free_ctx(kctx);
249 return 0;
250 }
251
252 prevsecret = preextractsec;
253 prevsecretlen = mdlen;
254 }
255
256 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_MODE, &mode);
257 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST,
258 (char *)mdname, 0);
259 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY,
260 (unsigned char *)insecret,
261 insecretlen);
262 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SALT,
263 (unsigned char *)prevsecret,
264 prevsecretlen);
265 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
266
267 ret = EVP_KDF_set_ctx_params(kctx, params) <= 0
268 || EVP_KDF_derive(kctx, outsecret, mdlen) <= 0;
269
270 if (ret != 0)
271 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS13_GENERATE_SECRET,
272 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
273
274 EVP_KDF_free_ctx(kctx);
275 if (prevsecret == preextractsec)
276 OPENSSL_cleanse(preextractsec, mdlen);
277 return ret == 0;
278 }
279
280 /*
281 * Given an input secret |insecret| of length |insecretlen| generate the
282 * handshake secret. This requires the early secret to already have been
283 * generated. Returns 1 on success 0 on failure.
284 */
285 int tls13_generate_handshake_secret(SSL *s, const unsigned char *insecret,
286 size_t insecretlen)
287 {
288 /* Calls SSLfatal() if required */
289 return tls13_generate_secret(s, ssl_handshake_md(s), s->early_secret,
290 insecret, insecretlen,
291 (unsigned char *)&s->handshake_secret);
292 }
293
294 /*
295 * Given the handshake secret |prev| of length |prevlen| generate the master
296 * secret and store its length in |*secret_size|. Returns 1 on success 0 on
297 * failure.
298 */
299 int tls13_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
300 unsigned char *prev, size_t prevlen,
301 size_t *secret_size)
302 {
303 const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
304
305 *secret_size = EVP_MD_size(md);
306 /* Calls SSLfatal() if required */
307 return tls13_generate_secret(s, md, prev, NULL, 0, out);
308 }
309
310 /*
311 * Generates the mac for the Finished message. Returns the length of the MAC or
312 * 0 on error.
313 */
314 size_t tls13_final_finish_mac(SSL *s, const char *str, size_t slen,
315 unsigned char *out)
316 {
317 const char *mdname = EVP_MD_name(ssl_handshake_md(s));
318 EVP_MAC *hmac = EVP_MAC_fetch(s->ctx->libctx, "HMAC", s->ctx->propq);
319 unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
320 unsigned char finsecret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
321 size_t hashlen, ret = 0;
322 EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx = NULL;
323 OSSL_PARAM params[4], *p = params;
324
325 if (hmac == NULL) {
326 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS13_FINAL_FINISH_MAC,
327 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
328 goto err;
329 }
330
331 /* Safe to cast away const here since we're not "getting" any data */
332 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_ALG_PARAM_DIGEST,
333 (char *)mdname, 0);
334 if (s->ctx->propq != NULL)
335 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_ALG_PARAM_PROPERTIES,
336 (char *)s->ctx->propq,
337 0);
338
339 if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, hash, sizeof(hash), &hashlen)) {
340 /* SSLfatal() already called */
341 goto err;
342 }
343
344 if (str == s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label) {
345 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_KEY,
346 s->server_finished_secret,
347 hashlen);
348 } else if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
349 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_KEY,
350 s->client_finished_secret,
351 hashlen);
352 } else {
353 if (!tls13_derive_finishedkey(s, ssl_handshake_md(s),
354 s->client_app_traffic_secret,
355 finsecret, hashlen))
356 goto err;
357
358 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_KEY, finsecret,
359 hashlen);
360 }
361 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
362
363 ctx = EVP_MAC_CTX_new(hmac);
364 if (ctx == NULL
365 || !EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(ctx, params)
366 || !EVP_MAC_init(ctx)
367 || !EVP_MAC_update(ctx, hash, hashlen)
368 /* outsize as per sizeof(peer_finish_md) */
369 || !EVP_MAC_final(ctx, out, &hashlen, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2)) {
370 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS13_FINAL_FINISH_MAC,
371 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
372 goto err;
373 }
374
375 ret = hashlen;
376 err:
377 OPENSSL_cleanse(finsecret, sizeof(finsecret));
378 EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx);
379 EVP_MAC_free(hmac);
380 return ret;
381 }
382
383 /*
384 * There isn't really a key block in TLSv1.3, but we still need this function
385 * for initialising the cipher and hash. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
386 */
387 int tls13_setup_key_block(SSL *s)
388 {
389 const EVP_CIPHER *c;
390 const EVP_MD *hash;
391
392 s->session->cipher = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher;
393 if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(s->ctx, s->session, &c, &hash, NULL, NULL, NULL,
394 0)) {
395 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS13_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK,
396 SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE);
397 return 0;
398 }
399
400 ssl_evp_cipher_free(s->s3.tmp.new_sym_enc);
401 s->s3.tmp.new_sym_enc = c;
402 ssl_evp_md_free(s->s3.tmp.new_hash);
403 s->s3.tmp.new_hash = hash;
404
405 return 1;
406 }
407
408 static int derive_secret_key_and_iv(SSL *s, int sending, const EVP_MD *md,
409 const EVP_CIPHER *ciph,
410 const unsigned char *insecret,
411 const unsigned char *hash,
412 const unsigned char *label,
413 size_t labellen, unsigned char *secret,
414 unsigned char *key, unsigned char *iv,
415 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ciph_ctx)
416 {
417 size_t ivlen, keylen, taglen;
418 int hashleni = EVP_MD_size(md);
419 size_t hashlen;
420
421 /* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */
422 if (!ossl_assert(hashleni >= 0)) {
423 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DERIVE_SECRET_KEY_AND_IV,
424 ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
425 return 0;
426 }
427 hashlen = (size_t)hashleni;
428
429 if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, insecret, label, labellen, hash, hashlen,
430 secret, hashlen, 1)) {
431 /* SSLfatal() already called */
432 return 0;
433 }
434
435 /* TODO(size_t): convert me */
436 keylen = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(ciph);
437 if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(ciph) == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) {
438 uint32_t algenc;
439
440 ivlen = EVP_CCM_TLS_IV_LEN;
441 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher != NULL) {
442 algenc = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc;
443 } else if (s->session->cipher != NULL) {
444 /* We've not selected a cipher yet - we must be doing early data */
445 algenc = s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc;
446 } else if (s->psksession != NULL && s->psksession->cipher != NULL) {
447 /* We must be doing early data with out-of-band PSK */
448 algenc = s->psksession->cipher->algorithm_enc;
449 } else {
450 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DERIVE_SECRET_KEY_AND_IV,
451 ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
452 return 0;
453 }
454 if (algenc & (SSL_AES128CCM8 | SSL_AES256CCM8))
455 taglen = EVP_CCM8_TLS_TAG_LEN;
456 else
457 taglen = EVP_CCM_TLS_TAG_LEN;
458 } else {
459 ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(ciph);
460 taglen = 0;
461 }
462
463 if (!tls13_derive_key(s, md, secret, key, keylen)
464 || !tls13_derive_iv(s, md, secret, iv, ivlen)) {
465 /* SSLfatal() already called */
466 return 0;
467 }
468
469 if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(ciph_ctx, ciph, NULL, NULL, NULL, sending) <= 0
470 || !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ciph_ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN, ivlen, NULL)
471 || (taglen != 0 && !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ciph_ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG,
472 taglen, NULL))
473 || EVP_CipherInit_ex(ciph_ctx, NULL, NULL, key, NULL, -1) <= 0) {
474 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DERIVE_SECRET_KEY_AND_IV,
475 ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
476 return 0;
477 }
478
479 return 1;
480 }
481
482 int tls13_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
483 {
484 #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
485 static const unsigned char client_early_traffic[] = {0x63, 0x20, 0x65, 0x20, /*traffic*/0x74, 0x72, 0x61, 0x66, 0x66, 0x69, 0x63, 0x00};
486 static const unsigned char client_handshake_traffic[] = {0x63, 0x20, 0x68, 0x73, 0x20, /*traffic*/0x74, 0x72, 0x61, 0x66, 0x66, 0x69, 0x63, 0x00};
487 static const unsigned char client_application_traffic[] = {0x63, 0x20, 0x61, 0x70, 0x20, /*traffic*/0x74, 0x72, 0x61, 0x66, 0x66, 0x69, 0x63, 0x00};
488 static const unsigned char server_handshake_traffic[] = {0x73, 0x20, 0x68, 0x73, 0x20, /*traffic*/0x74, 0x72, 0x61, 0x66, 0x66, 0x69, 0x63, 0x00};
489 static const unsigned char server_application_traffic[] = {0x73, 0x20, 0x61, 0x70, 0x20, /*traffic*/0x74, 0x72, 0x61, 0x66, 0x66, 0x69, 0x63, 0x00};
490 static const unsigned char exporter_master_secret[] = {0x65, 0x78, 0x70, 0x20, /* master*/ 0x6D, 0x61, 0x73, 0x74, 0x65, 0x72, 0x00};
491 static const unsigned char resumption_master_secret[] = {0x72, 0x65, 0x73, 0x20, /* master*/ 0x6D, 0x61, 0x73, 0x74, 0x65, 0x72, 0x00};
492 static const unsigned char early_exporter_master_secret[] = {0x65, 0x20, 0x65, 0x78, 0x70, 0x20, /* master*/ 0x6D, 0x61, 0x73, 0x74, 0x65, 0x72, 0x00};
493 #else
494 static const unsigned char client_early_traffic[] = "c e traffic";
495 static const unsigned char client_handshake_traffic[] = "c hs traffic";
496 static const unsigned char client_application_traffic[] = "c ap traffic";
497 static const unsigned char server_handshake_traffic[] = "s hs traffic";
498 static const unsigned char server_application_traffic[] = "s ap traffic";
499 static const unsigned char exporter_master_secret[] = "exp master";
500 static const unsigned char resumption_master_secret[] = "res master";
501 static const unsigned char early_exporter_master_secret[] = "e exp master";
502 #endif
503 unsigned char *iv;
504 unsigned char key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
505 unsigned char secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
506 unsigned char hashval[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
507 unsigned char *hash = hashval;
508 unsigned char *insecret;
509 unsigned char *finsecret = NULL;
510 const char *log_label = NULL;
511 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ciph_ctx;
512 size_t finsecretlen = 0;
513 const unsigned char *label;
514 size_t labellen, hashlen = 0;
515 int ret = 0;
516 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
517 const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = NULL;
518 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_KTLS) && defined(OPENSSL_KTLS_TLS13)
519 # ifndef __FreeBSD__
520 struct tls_crypto_info_all crypto_info;
521 BIO *bio;
522 # endif
523 #endif
524
525 if (which & SSL3_CC_READ) {
526 if (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) {
527 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(s->enc_read_ctx);
528 } else {
529 s->enc_read_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
530 if (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) {
531 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
532 SSL_F_TLS13_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
533 goto err;
534 }
535 }
536 ciph_ctx = s->enc_read_ctx;
537 iv = s->read_iv;
538
539 RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(&s->rlayer);
540 } else {
541 s->statem.enc_write_state = ENC_WRITE_STATE_INVALID;
542 if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL) {
543 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(s->enc_write_ctx);
544 } else {
545 s->enc_write_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
546 if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) {
547 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
548 SSL_F_TLS13_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
549 goto err;
550 }
551 }
552 ciph_ctx = s->enc_write_ctx;
553 iv = s->write_iv;
554
555 RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(&s->rlayer);
556 }
557
558 if (((which & SSL3_CC_CLIENT) && (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE))
559 || ((which & SSL3_CC_SERVER) && (which & SSL3_CC_READ))) {
560 if (which & SSL3_CC_EARLY) {
561 EVP_MD_CTX *mdctx = NULL;
562 long handlen;
563 void *hdata;
564 unsigned int hashlenui;
565 const SSL_CIPHER *sslcipher = SSL_SESSION_get0_cipher(s->session);
566
567 insecret = s->early_secret;
568 label = client_early_traffic;
569 labellen = sizeof(client_early_traffic) - 1;
570 log_label = CLIENT_EARLY_LABEL;
571
572 handlen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3.handshake_buffer, &hdata);
573 if (handlen <= 0) {
574 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
575 SSL_F_TLS13_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
576 SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_LENGTH);
577 goto err;
578 }
579
580 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
581 && s->max_early_data > 0
582 && s->session->ext.max_early_data == 0) {
583 /*
584 * If we are attempting to send early data, and we've decided to
585 * actually do it but max_early_data in s->session is 0 then we
586 * must be using an external PSK.
587 */
588 if (!ossl_assert(s->psksession != NULL
589 && s->max_early_data ==
590 s->psksession->ext.max_early_data)) {
591 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
592 SSL_F_TLS13_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
593 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
594 goto err;
595 }
596 sslcipher = SSL_SESSION_get0_cipher(s->psksession);
597 }
598 if (sslcipher == NULL) {
599 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
600 SSL_F_TLS13_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, SSL_R_BAD_PSK);
601 goto err;
602 }
603
604 /*
605 * We need to calculate the handshake digest using the digest from
606 * the session. We haven't yet selected our ciphersuite so we can't
607 * use ssl_handshake_md().
608 */
609 mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
610 if (mdctx == NULL) {
611 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
612 SSL_F_TLS13_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
613 goto err;
614 }
615
616 /*
617 * This ups the ref count on cipher so we better make sure we free
618 * it again
619 */
620 if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp_cipher(s->ctx, sslcipher, &cipher)) {
621 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
622 SSL_F_TLS13_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
623 SSL_R_ALGORITHM_FETCH_FAILED);
624 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mdctx);
625 goto err;
626 }
627
628 md = ssl_md(s->ctx, sslcipher->algorithm2);
629 if (md == NULL || !EVP_DigestInit_ex(mdctx, md, NULL)
630 || !EVP_DigestUpdate(mdctx, hdata, handlen)
631 || !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(mdctx, hashval, &hashlenui)) {
632 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
633 SSL_F_TLS13_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
634 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mdctx);
635 goto err;
636 }
637 hashlen = hashlenui;
638 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mdctx);
639
640 if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, insecret,
641 early_exporter_master_secret,
642 sizeof(early_exporter_master_secret) - 1,
643 hashval, hashlen,
644 s->early_exporter_master_secret, hashlen,
645 1)) {
646 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
647 SSL_F_TLS13_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
648 goto err;
649 }
650
651 if (!ssl_log_secret(s, EARLY_EXPORTER_SECRET_LABEL,
652 s->early_exporter_master_secret, hashlen)) {
653 /* SSLfatal() already called */
654 goto err;
655 }
656 } else if (which & SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE) {
657 insecret = s->handshake_secret;
658 finsecret = s->client_finished_secret;
659 finsecretlen = EVP_MD_size(ssl_handshake_md(s));
660 label = client_handshake_traffic;
661 labellen = sizeof(client_handshake_traffic) - 1;
662 log_label = CLIENT_HANDSHAKE_LABEL;
663 /*
664 * The handshake hash used for the server read/client write handshake
665 * traffic secret is the same as the hash for the server
666 * write/client read handshake traffic secret. However, if we
667 * processed early data then we delay changing the server
668 * read/client write cipher state until later, and the handshake
669 * hashes have moved on. Therefore we use the value saved earlier
670 * when we did the server write/client read change cipher state.
671 */
672 hash = s->handshake_traffic_hash;
673 } else {
674 insecret = s->master_secret;
675 label = client_application_traffic;
676 labellen = sizeof(client_application_traffic) - 1;
677 log_label = CLIENT_APPLICATION_LABEL;
678 /*
679 * For this we only use the handshake hashes up until the server
680 * Finished hash. We do not include the client's Finished, which is
681 * what ssl_handshake_hash() would give us. Instead we use the
682 * previously saved value.
683 */
684 hash = s->server_finished_hash;
685 }
686 } else {
687 /* Early data never applies to client-read/server-write */
688 if (which & SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE) {
689 insecret = s->handshake_secret;
690 finsecret = s->server_finished_secret;
691 finsecretlen = EVP_MD_size(ssl_handshake_md(s));
692 label = server_handshake_traffic;
693 labellen = sizeof(server_handshake_traffic) - 1;
694 log_label = SERVER_HANDSHAKE_LABEL;
695 } else {
696 insecret = s->master_secret;
697 label = server_application_traffic;
698 labellen = sizeof(server_application_traffic) - 1;
699 log_label = SERVER_APPLICATION_LABEL;
700 }
701 }
702
703 if (!(which & SSL3_CC_EARLY)) {
704 md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
705 cipher = s->s3.tmp.new_sym_enc;
706 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)
707 || !ssl_handshake_hash(s, hashval, sizeof(hashval), &hashlen)) {
708 /* SSLfatal() already called */;
709 goto err;
710 }
711 }
712
713 /*
714 * Save the hash of handshakes up to now for use when we calculate the
715 * client application traffic secret
716 */
717 if (label == server_application_traffic)
718 memcpy(s->server_finished_hash, hashval, hashlen);
719
720 if (label == server_handshake_traffic)
721 memcpy(s->handshake_traffic_hash, hashval, hashlen);
722
723 if (label == client_application_traffic) {
724 /*
725 * We also create the resumption master secret, but this time use the
726 * hash for the whole handshake including the Client Finished
727 */
728 if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, ssl_handshake_md(s), insecret,
729 resumption_master_secret,
730 sizeof(resumption_master_secret) - 1,
731 hashval, hashlen, s->resumption_master_secret,
732 hashlen, 1)) {
733 /* SSLfatal() already called */
734 goto err;
735 }
736 }
737
738 /* check whether cipher is known */
739 if(!ossl_assert(cipher != NULL))
740 goto err;
741
742 if (!derive_secret_key_and_iv(s, which & SSL3_CC_WRITE, md, cipher,
743 insecret, hash, label, labellen, secret, key,
744 iv, ciph_ctx)) {
745 /* SSLfatal() already called */
746 goto err;
747 }
748
749 if (label == server_application_traffic) {
750 memcpy(s->server_app_traffic_secret, secret, hashlen);
751 /* Now we create the exporter master secret */
752 if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, ssl_handshake_md(s), insecret,
753 exporter_master_secret,
754 sizeof(exporter_master_secret) - 1,
755 hash, hashlen, s->exporter_master_secret,
756 hashlen, 1)) {
757 /* SSLfatal() already called */
758 goto err;
759 }
760
761 if (!ssl_log_secret(s, EXPORTER_SECRET_LABEL, s->exporter_master_secret,
762 hashlen)) {
763 /* SSLfatal() already called */
764 goto err;
765 }
766 } else if (label == client_application_traffic)
767 memcpy(s->client_app_traffic_secret, secret, hashlen);
768
769 if (!ssl_log_secret(s, log_label, secret, hashlen)) {
770 /* SSLfatal() already called */
771 goto err;
772 }
773
774 if (finsecret != NULL
775 && !tls13_derive_finishedkey(s, ssl_handshake_md(s), secret,
776 finsecret, finsecretlen)) {
777 /* SSLfatal() already called */
778 goto err;
779 }
780
781 if (!s->server && label == client_early_traffic)
782 s->statem.enc_write_state = ENC_WRITE_STATE_WRITE_PLAIN_ALERTS;
783 else
784 s->statem.enc_write_state = ENC_WRITE_STATE_VALID;
785 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KTLS
786 # if defined(OPENSSL_KTLS_TLS13)
787 # ifndef __FreeBSD__
788 if (!(which & SSL3_CC_WRITE) || !(which & SSL3_CC_APPLICATION)
789 || ((which & SSL3_CC_WRITE) && (s->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_KTLS_TX)))
790 goto skip_ktls;
791
792 /* ktls supports only the maximum fragment size */
793 if (ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s) != SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
794 goto skip_ktls;
795
796 /* ktls does not support record padding */
797 if (s->record_padding_cb != NULL)
798 goto skip_ktls;
799
800 /* check that cipher is supported */
801 if (!ktls_check_supported_cipher(cipher, ciph_ctx))
802 goto skip_ktls;
803
804 bio = s->wbio;
805
806 if (!ossl_assert(bio != NULL)) {
807 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS13_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
808 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
809 goto err;
810 }
811
812 /* All future data will get encrypted by ktls. Flush the BIO or skip ktls */
813 if (BIO_flush(bio) <= 0)
814 goto skip_ktls;
815
816 /* configure kernel crypto structure */
817 if (!ktls_configure_crypto(cipher, s->version, ciph_ctx,
818 RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&s->rlayer),
819 &crypto_info, NULL, iv, key))
820 goto skip_ktls;
821
822 /* ktls works with user provided buffers directly */
823 if (BIO_set_ktls(bio, &crypto_info, which & SSL3_CC_WRITE))
824 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
825 # endif
826 skip_ktls:
827 # endif
828 #endif
829 ret = 1;
830 err:
831 if ((which & SSL3_CC_EARLY) != 0) {
832 /* We up-refed this so now we need to down ref */
833 ssl_evp_cipher_free(cipher);
834 }
835 OPENSSL_cleanse(key, sizeof(key));
836 OPENSSL_cleanse(secret, sizeof(secret));
837 return ret;
838 }
839
840 int tls13_update_key(SSL *s, int sending)
841 {
842 #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
843 static const unsigned char application_traffic[] = { 0x74, 0x72 ,0x61 ,0x66 ,0x66 ,0x69 ,0x63 ,0x20 ,0x75 ,0x70 ,0x64, 0x00};
844 #else
845 static const unsigned char application_traffic[] = "traffic upd";
846 #endif
847 const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
848 size_t hashlen = EVP_MD_size(md);
849 unsigned char key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
850 unsigned char *insecret, *iv;
851 unsigned char secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
852 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ciph_ctx;
853 int ret = 0;
854
855 if (s->server == sending)
856 insecret = s->server_app_traffic_secret;
857 else
858 insecret = s->client_app_traffic_secret;
859
860 if (sending) {
861 s->statem.enc_write_state = ENC_WRITE_STATE_INVALID;
862 iv = s->write_iv;
863 ciph_ctx = s->enc_write_ctx;
864 RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(&s->rlayer);
865 } else {
866 iv = s->read_iv;
867 ciph_ctx = s->enc_read_ctx;
868 RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(&s->rlayer);
869 }
870
871 if (!derive_secret_key_and_iv(s, sending, ssl_handshake_md(s),
872 s->s3.tmp.new_sym_enc, insecret, NULL,
873 application_traffic,
874 sizeof(application_traffic) - 1, secret, key,
875 iv, ciph_ctx)) {
876 /* SSLfatal() already called */
877 goto err;
878 }
879
880 memcpy(insecret, secret, hashlen);
881
882 s->statem.enc_write_state = ENC_WRITE_STATE_VALID;
883 ret = 1;
884 err:
885 OPENSSL_cleanse(key, sizeof(key));
886 OPENSSL_cleanse(secret, sizeof(secret));
887 return ret;
888 }
889
890 int tls13_alert_code(int code)
891 {
892 /* There are 2 additional alerts in TLSv1.3 compared to TLSv1.2 */
893 if (code == SSL_AD_MISSING_EXTENSION || code == SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED)
894 return code;
895
896 return tls1_alert_code(code);
897 }
898
899 int tls13_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen,
900 const char *label, size_t llen,
901 const unsigned char *context,
902 size_t contextlen, int use_context)
903 {
904 unsigned char exportsecret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
905 #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
906 static const unsigned char exporterlabel[] = {0x65, 0x78, 0x70, 0x6F, 0x72, 0x74, 0x65, 0x72, 0x00};
907 #else
908 static const unsigned char exporterlabel[] = "exporter";
909 #endif
910 unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], data[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
911 const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
912 EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
913 unsigned int hashsize, datalen;
914 int ret = 0;
915
916 if (ctx == NULL || !ossl_statem_export_allowed(s))
917 goto err;
918
919 if (!use_context)
920 contextlen = 0;
921
922 if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
923 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, context, contextlen) <= 0
924 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, hash, &hashsize) <= 0
925 || EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
926 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, data, &datalen) <= 0
927 || !tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, s->exporter_master_secret,
928 (const unsigned char *)label, llen,
929 data, datalen, exportsecret, hashsize, 0)
930 || !tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, exportsecret, exporterlabel,
931 sizeof(exporterlabel) - 1, hash, hashsize,
932 out, olen, 0))
933 goto err;
934
935 ret = 1;
936 err:
937 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
938 return ret;
939 }
940
941 int tls13_export_keying_material_early(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen,
942 const char *label, size_t llen,
943 const unsigned char *context,
944 size_t contextlen)
945 {
946 #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
947 static const unsigned char exporterlabel[] = {0x65, 0x78, 0x70, 0x6F, 0x72, 0x74, 0x65, 0x72, 0x00};
948 #else
949 static const unsigned char exporterlabel[] = "exporter";
950 #endif
951 unsigned char exportsecret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
952 unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], data[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
953 const EVP_MD *md;
954 EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
955 unsigned int hashsize, datalen;
956 int ret = 0;
957 const SSL_CIPHER *sslcipher;
958
959 if (ctx == NULL || !ossl_statem_export_early_allowed(s))
960 goto err;
961
962 if (!s->server && s->max_early_data > 0
963 && s->session->ext.max_early_data == 0)
964 sslcipher = SSL_SESSION_get0_cipher(s->psksession);
965 else
966 sslcipher = SSL_SESSION_get0_cipher(s->session);
967
968 md = ssl_md(s->ctx, sslcipher->algorithm2);
969
970 /*
971 * Calculate the hash value and store it in |data|. The reason why
972 * the empty string is used is that the definition of TLS-Exporter
973 * is like so:
974 *
975 * TLS-Exporter(label, context_value, key_length) =
976 * HKDF-Expand-Label(Derive-Secret(Secret, label, ""),
977 * "exporter", Hash(context_value), key_length)
978 *
979 * Derive-Secret(Secret, Label, Messages) =
980 * HKDF-Expand-Label(Secret, Label,
981 * Transcript-Hash(Messages), Hash.length)
982 *
983 * Here Transcript-Hash is the cipher suite hash algorithm.
984 */
985 if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
986 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, context, contextlen) <= 0
987 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, hash, &hashsize) <= 0
988 || EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
989 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, data, &datalen) <= 0
990 || !tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, s->early_exporter_master_secret,
991 (const unsigned char *)label, llen,
992 data, datalen, exportsecret, hashsize, 0)
993 || !tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, exportsecret, exporterlabel,
994 sizeof(exporterlabel) - 1, hash, hashsize,
995 out, olen, 0))
996 goto err;
997
998 ret = 1;
999 err:
1000 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
1001 return ret;
1002 }
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