crypto/cmp: Prevent misleading errors in case x509v3_cache_extensions() fails

Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11808)

diff --git a/crypto/cmp/cmp_ctx.c b/crypto/cmp/cmp_ctx.c
index 5b9c0f3120457ce399b221c3c0596334b8b9e9dc..0d15551e35777a915b2e638b5d6894eef02b901c 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/cmp/cmp_ctx.c
+++ b/crypto/cmp/cmp_ctx.c
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
 #include <openssl/trace.h>
 #include <openssl/bio.h>
 #include <openssl/ocsp.h> /* for OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_* */
+#include "crypto/x509.h" /* for x509v3_cache_extensions() */
 
 #include "cmp_local.h"
 
@@ -579,6 +580,8 @@ int OSSL_CMP_CTX_set1_##FIELD(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const TYPE *val) \
     return 1; \
 }
 
+#define X509_invalid(cert) (!x509v3_cache_extensions(cert))
+#define EVP_PKEY_invalid(key) 0
 #define DEFINE_OSSL_CMP_CTX_set1_up_ref(FIELD, TYPE) \
 int OSSL_CMP_CTX_set1_##FIELD(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, TYPE *val) \
 { \
@@ -587,6 +590,11 @@ int OSSL_CMP_CTX_set1_##FIELD(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, TYPE *val) \
         return 0; \
     } \
     \
+    /* prevent misleading error later on malformed cert or provider issue */ \
+    if (val != NULL && TYPE##_invalid(val)) { \
+        CMPerr(0, CMP_R_POTENTIALLY_INVALID_CERTIFICATE); \
+        return 0; \
+    } \
     if (val != NULL && !TYPE##_up_ref(val)) \
         return 0; \
     TYPE##_free(ctx->FIELD); \

diff --git a/crypto/cmp/cmp_vfy.c b/crypto/cmp/cmp_vfy.c
index aa7b916a8c1e0102aa8dc37671a53b92526caf3f..7ab96590a55aa968857d0e38713eb42cff8c8a70 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/cmp/cmp_vfy.c
+++ b/crypto/cmp/cmp_vfy.c
@@ -24,12 +24,7 @@
 
 DEFINE_STACK_OF(X509)
 
-/*-
- * Verify a message protected by signature according to section 5.1.3.3
- * (sha1+RSA/DSA or any other algorithm supported by OpenSSL).
- *
- * Returns 1 on successful validation and 0 otherwise.
- */
+/* Verify a message protected by signature according to RFC section 5.1.3.3 */
 static int verify_signature(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *cmp_ctx,
                             const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg, X509 *cert)
 {
@@ -304,6 +299,11 @@ static int cert_acceptable(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx,
 
     if (!check_kid(ctx, X509_get0_subject_key_id(cert), msg->header->senderKID))
         return 0;
+    /* prevent misleading error later in case x509v3_cache_extensions() fails */
+    if (!x509v3_cache_extensions(cert)) {
+        ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, "cert appears to be invalid");
+        return 0;
+    }
     if (!verify_signature(ctx, msg, cert)) {
         ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, "msg signature verification failed");
         return 0;