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home: add new systemd-homed service that can manage LUKS homes
[thirdparty/systemd.git] / src / home / home-util.c
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70a5db58
LP
1/* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1+ */
2
3#include "dns-domain.h"
4#include "errno-util.h"
5#include "home-util.h"
6#include "libcrypt-util.h"
7#include "memory-util.h"
8#include "path-util.h"
9#include "string-util.h"
10#include "strv.h"
11#include "user-util.h"
12
13bool suitable_user_name(const char *name) {
14
15 /* Checks whether the specified name is suitable for management via homed. Note that our client side
16 * usually validate susing a simple valid_user_group_name(), while server side we are a bit more
17 * restrictive, so that we can change the rules server side without having to update things client
18 * side, too. */
19
20 if (!valid_user_group_name(name))
21 return false;
22
23 /* We generally rely on NSS to tell us which users not to care for, but let's filter out some
24 * particularly well-known users. */
25 if (STR_IN_SET(name,
26 "root",
27 "nobody",
28 NOBODY_USER_NAME, NOBODY_GROUP_NAME))
29 return false;
30
31 /* Let's also defend our own namespace, as well as Debian's (unwritten?) logic of prefixing system
32 * users with underscores. */
33 if (STARTSWITH_SET(name, "systemd-", "_"))
34 return false;
35
36 return true;
37}
38
39int suitable_realm(const char *realm) {
40 _cleanup_free_ char *normalized = NULL;
41 int r;
42
43 /* Similar to the above: let's validate the realm a bit stricter server-side than client side */
44
45 r = dns_name_normalize(realm, 0, &normalized); /* this also checks general validity */
46 if (r == -EINVAL)
47 return 0;
48 if (r < 0)
49 return r;
50
51 if (!streq(realm, normalized)) /* is this normalized? */
52 return false;
53
54 if (dns_name_is_root(realm)) /* Don't allow top level domain */
55 return false;
56
57 return true;
58}
59
60int suitable_image_path(const char *path) {
61
62 return !empty_or_root(path) &&
63 path_is_valid(path) &&
64 path_is_absolute(path);
65}
66
67int split_user_name_realm(const char *t, char **ret_user_name, char **ret_realm) {
68 _cleanup_free_ char *user_name = NULL, *realm = NULL;
69 const char *c;
70 int r;
71
72 assert(t);
73 assert(ret_user_name);
74 assert(ret_realm);
75
76 c = strchr(t, '@');
77 if (!c) {
78 user_name = strdup(t);
79 if (!user_name)
80 return -ENOMEM;
81 } else {
82 user_name = strndup(t, c - t);
83 if (!user_name)
84 return -ENOMEM;
85
86 realm = strdup(c + 1);
87 if (!realm)
88 return -ENOMEM;
89 }
90
91 if (!suitable_user_name(user_name))
92 return -EINVAL;
93
94 if (realm) {
95 r = suitable_realm(realm);
96 if (r < 0)
97 return r;
98 if (r == 0)
99 return -EINVAL;
100 }
101
102 *ret_user_name = TAKE_PTR(user_name);
103 *ret_realm = TAKE_PTR(realm);
104
105 return 0;
106}
107
108int bus_message_append_secret(sd_bus_message *m, UserRecord *secret) {
109 _cleanup_(erase_and_freep) char *formatted = NULL;
110 JsonVariant *v;
111 int r;
112
113 assert(m);
114 assert(secret);
115
116 if (!FLAGS_SET(secret->mask, USER_RECORD_SECRET))
117 return sd_bus_message_append(m, "s", "{}");
118
119 v = json_variant_by_key(secret->json, "secret");
120 if (!v)
121 return -EINVAL;
122
123 r = json_variant_format(v, 0, &formatted);
124 if (r < 0)
125 return r;
126
127 return sd_bus_message_append(m, "s", formatted);
128}
129
130int test_password_one(const char *hashed_password, const char *password) {
131 struct crypt_data cc = {};
132 const char *k;
133 bool b;
134
135 errno = 0;
136 k = crypt_r(password, hashed_password, &cc);
137 if (!k) {
138 explicit_bzero_safe(&cc, sizeof(cc));
139 return errno_or_else(EINVAL);
140 }
141
142 b = streq(k, hashed_password);
143 explicit_bzero_safe(&cc, sizeof(cc));
144 return b;
145}
146
147int test_password_many(char **hashed_password, const char *password) {
148 char **hpw;
149 int r;
150
151 STRV_FOREACH(hpw, hashed_password) {
152 r = test_password_one(*hpw, password);
153 if (r < 0)
154 return r;
155 if (r > 0)
156 return true;
157 }
158
159 return false;
160}