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1 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later */
2
3 #include <errno.h>
4 #include <linux/loop.h>
5 #include <sched.h>
6 #include <stdio.h>
7 #include <sys/file.h>
8 #include <sys/mount.h>
9 #include <unistd.h>
10 #if WANT_LINUX_FS_H
11 #include <linux/fs.h>
12 #endif
13
14 #include "alloc-util.h"
15 #include "base-filesystem.h"
16 #include "chase-symlinks.h"
17 #include "dev-setup.h"
18 #include "devnum-util.h"
19 #include "env-util.h"
20 #include "escape.h"
21 #include "extension-release.h"
22 #include "fd-util.h"
23 #include "format-util.h"
24 #include "glyph-util.h"
25 #include "label.h"
26 #include "list.h"
27 #include "loop-util.h"
28 #include "loopback-setup.h"
29 #include "missing_syscall.h"
30 #include "mkdir-label.h"
31 #include "mount-util.h"
32 #include "mountpoint-util.h"
33 #include "namespace-util.h"
34 #include "namespace.h"
35 #include "nsflags.h"
36 #include "nulstr-util.h"
37 #include "os-util.h"
38 #include "path-util.h"
39 #include "selinux-util.h"
40 #include "socket-util.h"
41 #include "sort-util.h"
42 #include "stat-util.h"
43 #include "string-table.h"
44 #include "string-util.h"
45 #include "strv.h"
46 #include "tmpfile-util.h"
47 #include "umask-util.h"
48 #include "user-util.h"
49
50 #define DEV_MOUNT_OPTIONS (MS_NOSUID|MS_STRICTATIME|MS_NOEXEC)
51
52 typedef enum MountMode {
53 /* This is ordered by priority! */
54 INACCESSIBLE,
55 OVERLAY_MOUNT,
56 MOUNT_IMAGES,
57 BIND_MOUNT,
58 BIND_MOUNT_RECURSIVE,
59 PRIVATE_TMP,
60 PRIVATE_TMP_READONLY,
61 PRIVATE_DEV,
62 BIND_DEV,
63 EMPTY_DIR,
64 SYSFS,
65 PROCFS,
66 READONLY,
67 READWRITE,
68 NOEXEC,
69 EXEC,
70 TMPFS,
71 RUN,
72 EXTENSION_DIRECTORIES, /* Bind-mounted outside the root directory, and used by subsequent mounts */
73 EXTENSION_IMAGES, /* Mounted outside the root directory, and used by subsequent mounts */
74 MQUEUEFS,
75 READWRITE_IMPLICIT, /* Should have the lowest priority. */
76 _MOUNT_MODE_MAX,
77 } MountMode;
78
79 typedef struct MountEntry {
80 const char *path_const; /* Memory allocated on stack or static */
81 MountMode mode:5;
82 bool ignore:1; /* Ignore if path does not exist? */
83 bool has_prefix:1; /* Already is prefixed by the root dir? */
84 bool read_only:1; /* Shall this mount point be read-only? */
85 bool nosuid:1; /* Shall set MS_NOSUID on the mount itself */
86 bool noexec:1; /* Shall set MS_NOEXEC on the mount itself */
87 bool exec:1; /* Shall clear MS_NOEXEC on the mount itself */
88 bool applied:1; /* Already applied */
89 char *path_malloc; /* Use this instead of 'path_const' if we had to allocate memory */
90 const char *unprefixed_path_const; /* If the path was amended with a prefix, these will save the original */
91 char *unprefixed_path_malloc;
92 const char *source_const; /* The source path, for bind mounts or images */
93 char *source_malloc;
94 const char *options_const;/* Mount options for tmpfs */
95 char *options_malloc;
96 unsigned long flags; /* Mount flags used by EMPTY_DIR and TMPFS. Do not include MS_RDONLY here, but please use read_only. */
97 unsigned n_followed;
98 LIST_HEAD(MountOptions, image_options);
99 } MountEntry;
100
101 /* If MountAPIVFS= is used, let's mount /sys, /proc, /dev and /run into the it, but only as a fallback if the user hasn't mounted
102 * something there already. These mounts are hence overridden by any other explicitly configured mounts. */
103 static const MountEntry apivfs_table[] = {
104 { "/proc", PROCFS, false },
105 { "/dev", BIND_DEV, false },
106 { "/sys", SYSFS, false },
107 { "/run", RUN, false, .options_const = "mode=0755" TMPFS_LIMITS_RUN, .flags = MS_NOSUID|MS_NODEV|MS_STRICTATIME },
108 };
109
110 /* ProtectKernelTunables= option and the related filesystem APIs */
111 static const MountEntry protect_kernel_tunables_proc_table[] = {
112 { "/proc/acpi", READONLY, true },
113 { "/proc/apm", READONLY, true }, /* Obsolete API, there's no point in permitting access to this, ever */
114 { "/proc/asound", READONLY, true },
115 { "/proc/bus", READONLY, true },
116 { "/proc/fs", READONLY, true },
117 { "/proc/irq", READONLY, true },
118 { "/proc/kallsyms", INACCESSIBLE, true },
119 { "/proc/kcore", INACCESSIBLE, true },
120 { "/proc/latency_stats", READONLY, true },
121 { "/proc/mtrr", READONLY, true },
122 { "/proc/scsi", READONLY, true },
123 { "/proc/sys", READONLY, true },
124 { "/proc/sysrq-trigger", READONLY, true },
125 { "/proc/timer_stats", READONLY, true },
126 };
127
128 static const MountEntry protect_kernel_tunables_sys_table[] = {
129 { "/sys", READONLY, false },
130 { "/sys/fs/bpf", READONLY, true },
131 { "/sys/fs/cgroup", READWRITE_IMPLICIT, false }, /* READONLY is set by ProtectControlGroups= option */
132 { "/sys/fs/selinux", READWRITE_IMPLICIT, true },
133 { "/sys/kernel/debug", READONLY, true },
134 { "/sys/kernel/tracing", READONLY, true },
135 };
136
137 /* ProtectKernelModules= option */
138 static const MountEntry protect_kernel_modules_table[] = {
139 #if HAVE_SPLIT_USR
140 { "/lib/modules", INACCESSIBLE, true },
141 #endif
142 { "/usr/lib/modules", INACCESSIBLE, true },
143 };
144
145 /* ProtectKernelLogs= option */
146 static const MountEntry protect_kernel_logs_proc_table[] = {
147 { "/proc/kmsg", INACCESSIBLE, true },
148 };
149
150 static const MountEntry protect_kernel_logs_dev_table[] = {
151 { "/dev/kmsg", INACCESSIBLE, true },
152 };
153
154 /*
155 * ProtectHome=read-only table, protect $HOME and $XDG_RUNTIME_DIR and rest of
156 * system should be protected by ProtectSystem=
157 */
158 static const MountEntry protect_home_read_only_table[] = {
159 { "/home", READONLY, true },
160 { "/run/user", READONLY, true },
161 { "/root", READONLY, true },
162 };
163
164 /* ProtectHome=tmpfs table */
165 static const MountEntry protect_home_tmpfs_table[] = {
166 { "/home", TMPFS, true, .read_only = true, .options_const = "mode=0755" TMPFS_LIMITS_EMPTY_OR_ALMOST, .flags = MS_NODEV|MS_STRICTATIME },
167 { "/run/user", TMPFS, true, .read_only = true, .options_const = "mode=0755" TMPFS_LIMITS_EMPTY_OR_ALMOST, .flags = MS_NODEV|MS_STRICTATIME },
168 { "/root", TMPFS, true, .read_only = true, .options_const = "mode=0700" TMPFS_LIMITS_EMPTY_OR_ALMOST, .flags = MS_NODEV|MS_STRICTATIME },
169 };
170
171 /* ProtectHome=yes table */
172 static const MountEntry protect_home_yes_table[] = {
173 { "/home", INACCESSIBLE, true },
174 { "/run/user", INACCESSIBLE, true },
175 { "/root", INACCESSIBLE, true },
176 };
177
178 /* ProtectSystem=yes table */
179 static const MountEntry protect_system_yes_table[] = {
180 { "/usr", READONLY, false },
181 { "/boot", READONLY, true },
182 { "/efi", READONLY, true },
183 #if HAVE_SPLIT_USR
184 { "/lib", READONLY, true },
185 { "/lib64", READONLY, true },
186 { "/bin", READONLY, true },
187 # if HAVE_SPLIT_BIN
188 { "/sbin", READONLY, true },
189 # endif
190 #endif
191 };
192
193 /* ProtectSystem=full includes ProtectSystem=yes */
194 static const MountEntry protect_system_full_table[] = {
195 { "/usr", READONLY, false },
196 { "/boot", READONLY, true },
197 { "/efi", READONLY, true },
198 { "/etc", READONLY, false },
199 #if HAVE_SPLIT_USR
200 { "/lib", READONLY, true },
201 { "/lib64", READONLY, true },
202 { "/bin", READONLY, true },
203 # if HAVE_SPLIT_BIN
204 { "/sbin", READONLY, true },
205 # endif
206 #endif
207 };
208
209 /*
210 * ProtectSystem=strict table. In this strict mode, we mount everything
211 * read-only, except for /proc, /dev, /sys which are the kernel API VFS,
212 * which are left writable, but PrivateDevices= + ProtectKernelTunables=
213 * protect those, and these options should be fully orthogonal.
214 * (And of course /home and friends are also left writable, as ProtectHome=
215 * shall manage those, orthogonally).
216 */
217 static const MountEntry protect_system_strict_table[] = {
218 { "/", READONLY, false },
219 { "/proc", READWRITE_IMPLICIT, false }, /* ProtectKernelTunables= */
220 { "/sys", READWRITE_IMPLICIT, false }, /* ProtectKernelTunables= */
221 { "/dev", READWRITE_IMPLICIT, false }, /* PrivateDevices= */
222 { "/home", READWRITE_IMPLICIT, true }, /* ProtectHome= */
223 { "/run/user", READWRITE_IMPLICIT, true }, /* ProtectHome= */
224 { "/root", READWRITE_IMPLICIT, true }, /* ProtectHome= */
225 };
226
227 static const char * const mount_mode_table[_MOUNT_MODE_MAX] = {
228 [INACCESSIBLE] = "inaccessible",
229 [OVERLAY_MOUNT] = "overlay",
230 [BIND_MOUNT] = "bind",
231 [BIND_MOUNT_RECURSIVE] = "rbind",
232 [PRIVATE_TMP] = "private-tmp",
233 [PRIVATE_DEV] = "private-dev",
234 [BIND_DEV] = "bind-dev",
235 [EMPTY_DIR] = "empty",
236 [SYSFS] = "sysfs",
237 [PROCFS] = "procfs",
238 [READONLY] = "read-only",
239 [READWRITE] = "read-write",
240 [TMPFS] = "tmpfs",
241 [MOUNT_IMAGES] = "mount-images",
242 [READWRITE_IMPLICIT] = "rw-implicit",
243 [EXEC] = "exec",
244 [NOEXEC] = "noexec",
245 [MQUEUEFS] = "mqueuefs",
246 };
247
248 DEFINE_PRIVATE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP_TO_STRING(mount_mode, MountMode);
249
250 static const char *mount_entry_path(const MountEntry *p) {
251 assert(p);
252
253 /* Returns the path of this bind mount. If the malloc()-allocated ->path_buffer field is set we return that,
254 * otherwise the stack/static ->path field is returned. */
255
256 return p->path_malloc ?: p->path_const;
257 }
258
259 static const char *mount_entry_unprefixed_path(const MountEntry *p) {
260 assert(p);
261
262 /* Returns the unprefixed path (ie: before prefix_where_needed() ran), if any */
263
264 return p->unprefixed_path_malloc ?: p->unprefixed_path_const ?: mount_entry_path(p);
265 }
266
267 static void mount_entry_consume_prefix(MountEntry *p, char *new_path) {
268 assert(p);
269 assert(p->path_malloc || p->path_const);
270 assert(new_path);
271
272 /* Saves current path in unprefixed_ variable, and takes over new_path */
273
274 free_and_replace(p->unprefixed_path_malloc, p->path_malloc);
275 /* If we didn't have a path on the heap, then it's a static one */
276 if (!p->unprefixed_path_malloc)
277 p->unprefixed_path_const = p->path_const;
278 p->path_malloc = new_path;
279 p->has_prefix = true;
280 }
281
282 static bool mount_entry_read_only(const MountEntry *p) {
283 assert(p);
284
285 return p->read_only || IN_SET(p->mode, READONLY, INACCESSIBLE, PRIVATE_TMP_READONLY);
286 }
287
288 static bool mount_entry_noexec(const MountEntry *p) {
289 assert(p);
290
291 return p->noexec || IN_SET(p->mode, NOEXEC, INACCESSIBLE, SYSFS, PROCFS);
292 }
293
294 static bool mount_entry_exec(const MountEntry *p) {
295 assert(p);
296
297 return p->exec || p->mode == EXEC;
298 }
299
300 static const char *mount_entry_source(const MountEntry *p) {
301 assert(p);
302
303 return p->source_malloc ?: p->source_const;
304 }
305
306 static const char *mount_entry_options(const MountEntry *p) {
307 assert(p);
308
309 return p->options_malloc ?: p->options_const;
310 }
311
312 static void mount_entry_done(MountEntry *p) {
313 assert(p);
314
315 p->path_malloc = mfree(p->path_malloc);
316 p->unprefixed_path_malloc = mfree(p->unprefixed_path_malloc);
317 p->source_malloc = mfree(p->source_malloc);
318 p->options_malloc = mfree(p->options_malloc);
319 p->image_options = mount_options_free_all(p->image_options);
320 }
321
322 static int append_access_mounts(MountEntry **p, char **strv, MountMode mode, bool forcibly_require_prefix) {
323 assert(p);
324
325 /* Adds a list of user-supplied READWRITE/READWRITE_IMPLICIT/READONLY/INACCESSIBLE entries */
326
327 STRV_FOREACH(i, strv) {
328 bool ignore = false, needs_prefix = false;
329 const char *e = *i;
330
331 /* Look for any prefixes */
332 if (startswith(e, "-")) {
333 e++;
334 ignore = true;
335 }
336 if (startswith(e, "+")) {
337 e++;
338 needs_prefix = true;
339 }
340
341 if (!path_is_absolute(e))
342 return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL),
343 "Path is not absolute: %s", e);
344
345 *((*p)++) = (MountEntry) {
346 .path_const = e,
347 .mode = mode,
348 .ignore = ignore,
349 .has_prefix = !needs_prefix && !forcibly_require_prefix,
350 };
351 }
352
353 return 0;
354 }
355
356 static int append_empty_dir_mounts(MountEntry **p, char **strv) {
357 assert(p);
358
359 /* Adds tmpfs mounts to provide readable but empty directories. This is primarily used to implement the
360 * "/private/" boundary directories for DynamicUser=1. */
361
362 STRV_FOREACH(i, strv) {
363
364 *((*p)++) = (MountEntry) {
365 .path_const = *i,
366 .mode = EMPTY_DIR,
367 .ignore = false,
368 .read_only = true,
369 .options_const = "mode=0755" TMPFS_LIMITS_EMPTY_OR_ALMOST,
370 .flags = MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV|MS_STRICTATIME,
371 };
372 }
373
374 return 0;
375 }
376
377 static int append_bind_mounts(MountEntry **p, const BindMount *binds, size_t n) {
378 assert(p);
379
380 for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++) {
381 const BindMount *b = binds + i;
382
383 *((*p)++) = (MountEntry) {
384 .path_const = b->destination,
385 .mode = b->recursive ? BIND_MOUNT_RECURSIVE : BIND_MOUNT,
386 .read_only = b->read_only,
387 .nosuid = b->nosuid,
388 .source_const = b->source,
389 .ignore = b->ignore_enoent,
390 };
391 }
392
393 return 0;
394 }
395
396 static int append_mount_images(MountEntry **p, const MountImage *mount_images, size_t n) {
397 assert(p);
398
399 for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++) {
400 const MountImage *m = mount_images + i;
401
402 *((*p)++) = (MountEntry) {
403 .path_const = m->destination,
404 .mode = MOUNT_IMAGES,
405 .source_const = m->source,
406 .image_options = m->mount_options,
407 .ignore = m->ignore_enoent,
408 };
409 }
410
411 return 0;
412 }
413
414 static int append_extensions(
415 MountEntry **p,
416 const char *root,
417 const char *extension_dir,
418 char **hierarchies,
419 const MountImage *mount_images,
420 size_t n,
421 char **extension_directories) {
422
423 _cleanup_strv_free_ char **overlays = NULL;
424 int r;
425
426 if (n == 0 && strv_isempty(extension_directories))
427 return 0;
428
429 assert(p);
430 assert(extension_dir);
431
432 /* Prepare a list of overlays, that will have as each element a string suitable for being
433 * passed as a lowerdir= parameter, so start with the hierarchy on the root.
434 * The overlays vector will have the same number of elements and will correspond to the
435 * hierarchies vector, so they can be iterated upon together. */
436 STRV_FOREACH(hierarchy, hierarchies) {
437 _cleanup_free_ char *prefixed_hierarchy = NULL;
438
439 prefixed_hierarchy = path_join(root, *hierarchy);
440 if (!prefixed_hierarchy)
441 return -ENOMEM;
442
443 r = strv_consume(&overlays, TAKE_PTR(prefixed_hierarchy));
444 if (r < 0)
445 return r;
446 }
447
448 /* First, prepare a mount for each image, but these won't be visible to the unit, instead
449 * they will be mounted in our propagate directory, and used as a source for the overlay. */
450 for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++) {
451 _cleanup_free_ char *mount_point = NULL;
452 const MountImage *m = mount_images + i;
453
454 r = asprintf(&mount_point, "%s/%zu", extension_dir, i);
455 if (r < 0)
456 return -ENOMEM;
457
458 for (size_t j = 0; hierarchies && hierarchies[j]; ++j) {
459 _cleanup_free_ char *prefixed_hierarchy = NULL, *escaped = NULL, *lowerdir = NULL;
460
461 prefixed_hierarchy = path_join(mount_point, hierarchies[j]);
462 if (!prefixed_hierarchy)
463 return -ENOMEM;
464
465 escaped = shell_escape(prefixed_hierarchy, ",:");
466 if (!escaped)
467 return -ENOMEM;
468
469 /* Note that lowerdir= parameters are in 'reverse' order, so the
470 * top-most directory in the overlay comes first in the list. */
471 lowerdir = strjoin(escaped, ":", overlays[j]);
472 if (!lowerdir)
473 return -ENOMEM;
474
475 free_and_replace(overlays[j], lowerdir);
476 }
477
478 *((*p)++) = (MountEntry) {
479 .path_malloc = TAKE_PTR(mount_point),
480 .image_options = m->mount_options,
481 .ignore = m->ignore_enoent,
482 .source_const = m->source,
483 .mode = EXTENSION_IMAGES,
484 .has_prefix = true,
485 };
486 }
487
488 /* Secondly, extend the lowerdir= parameters with each ExtensionDirectory.
489 * Bind mount them in the same location as the ExtensionImages, so that we
490 * can check that they are valid trees (extension-release.d). */
491 STRV_FOREACH(extension_directory, extension_directories) {
492 _cleanup_free_ char *mount_point = NULL, *source = NULL;
493 const char *e = *extension_directory;
494 bool ignore_enoent = false;
495
496 /* Pick up the counter where the ExtensionImages left it. */
497 r = asprintf(&mount_point, "%s/%zu", extension_dir, n++);
498 if (r < 0)
499 return -ENOMEM;
500
501 /* Look for any prefixes */
502 if (startswith(e, "-")) {
503 e++;
504 ignore_enoent = true;
505 }
506 /* Ignore this for now */
507 if (startswith(e, "+"))
508 e++;
509
510 source = strdup(e);
511 if (!source)
512 return -ENOMEM;
513
514 for (size_t j = 0; hierarchies && hierarchies[j]; ++j) {
515 _cleanup_free_ char *prefixed_hierarchy = NULL, *escaped = NULL, *lowerdir = NULL;
516
517 prefixed_hierarchy = path_join(mount_point, hierarchies[j]);
518 if (!prefixed_hierarchy)
519 return -ENOMEM;
520
521 escaped = shell_escape(prefixed_hierarchy, ",:");
522 if (!escaped)
523 return -ENOMEM;
524
525 /* Note that lowerdir= parameters are in 'reverse' order, so the
526 * top-most directory in the overlay comes first in the list. */
527 lowerdir = strjoin(escaped, ":", overlays[j]);
528 if (!lowerdir)
529 return -ENOMEM;
530
531 free_and_replace(overlays[j], lowerdir);
532 }
533
534 *((*p)++) = (MountEntry) {
535 .path_malloc = TAKE_PTR(mount_point),
536 .source_const = TAKE_PTR(source),
537 .mode = EXTENSION_DIRECTORIES,
538 .ignore = ignore_enoent,
539 .has_prefix = true,
540 .read_only = true,
541 };
542 }
543
544 /* Then, for each hierarchy, prepare an overlay with the list of lowerdir= strings
545 * set up earlier. */
546 for (size_t i = 0; hierarchies && hierarchies[i]; ++i) {
547 _cleanup_free_ char *prefixed_hierarchy = NULL;
548
549 prefixed_hierarchy = path_join(root, hierarchies[i]);
550 if (!prefixed_hierarchy)
551 return -ENOMEM;
552
553 *((*p)++) = (MountEntry) {
554 .path_malloc = TAKE_PTR(prefixed_hierarchy),
555 .options_malloc = TAKE_PTR(overlays[i]),
556 .mode = OVERLAY_MOUNT,
557 .has_prefix = true,
558 .ignore = true, /* If the source image doesn't set the ignore bit it will fail earlier. */
559 };
560 }
561
562 return 0;
563 }
564
565 static int append_tmpfs_mounts(MountEntry **p, const TemporaryFileSystem *tmpfs, size_t n) {
566 assert(p);
567
568 for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++) {
569 const TemporaryFileSystem *t = tmpfs + i;
570 _cleanup_free_ char *o = NULL, *str = NULL;
571 unsigned long flags;
572 bool ro = false;
573 int r;
574
575 if (!path_is_absolute(t->path))
576 return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL),
577 "Path is not absolute: %s",
578 t->path);
579
580 str = strjoin("mode=0755" NESTED_TMPFS_LIMITS ",", t->options);
581 if (!str)
582 return -ENOMEM;
583
584 r = mount_option_mangle(str, MS_NODEV|MS_STRICTATIME, &flags, &o);
585 if (r < 0)
586 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to parse mount option '%s': %m", str);
587
588 ro = flags & MS_RDONLY;
589 if (ro)
590 flags ^= MS_RDONLY;
591
592 *((*p)++) = (MountEntry) {
593 .path_const = t->path,
594 .mode = TMPFS,
595 .read_only = ro,
596 .options_malloc = TAKE_PTR(o),
597 .flags = flags,
598 };
599 }
600
601 return 0;
602 }
603
604 static int append_static_mounts(MountEntry **p, const MountEntry *mounts, size_t n, bool ignore_protect) {
605 assert(p);
606 assert(mounts);
607
608 /* Adds a list of static pre-defined entries */
609
610 for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++)
611 *((*p)++) = (MountEntry) {
612 .path_const = mount_entry_path(mounts+i),
613 .mode = mounts[i].mode,
614 .ignore = mounts[i].ignore || ignore_protect,
615 };
616
617 return 0;
618 }
619
620 static int append_protect_home(MountEntry **p, ProtectHome protect_home, bool ignore_protect) {
621 assert(p);
622
623 switch (protect_home) {
624
625 case PROTECT_HOME_NO:
626 return 0;
627
628 case PROTECT_HOME_READ_ONLY:
629 return append_static_mounts(p, protect_home_read_only_table, ELEMENTSOF(protect_home_read_only_table), ignore_protect);
630
631 case PROTECT_HOME_TMPFS:
632 return append_static_mounts(p, protect_home_tmpfs_table, ELEMENTSOF(protect_home_tmpfs_table), ignore_protect);
633
634 case PROTECT_HOME_YES:
635 return append_static_mounts(p, protect_home_yes_table, ELEMENTSOF(protect_home_yes_table), ignore_protect);
636
637 default:
638 assert_not_reached();
639 }
640 }
641
642 static int append_protect_system(MountEntry **p, ProtectSystem protect_system, bool ignore_protect) {
643 assert(p);
644
645 switch (protect_system) {
646
647 case PROTECT_SYSTEM_NO:
648 return 0;
649
650 case PROTECT_SYSTEM_STRICT:
651 return append_static_mounts(p, protect_system_strict_table, ELEMENTSOF(protect_system_strict_table), ignore_protect);
652
653 case PROTECT_SYSTEM_YES:
654 return append_static_mounts(p, protect_system_yes_table, ELEMENTSOF(protect_system_yes_table), ignore_protect);
655
656 case PROTECT_SYSTEM_FULL:
657 return append_static_mounts(p, protect_system_full_table, ELEMENTSOF(protect_system_full_table), ignore_protect);
658
659 default:
660 assert_not_reached();
661 }
662 }
663
664 static int mount_path_compare(const MountEntry *a, const MountEntry *b) {
665 int d;
666
667 /* ExtensionImages/Directories will be used by other mounts as a base, so sort them first
668 * regardless of the prefix - they are set up in the propagate directory anyway */
669 d = -CMP(a->mode == EXTENSION_IMAGES, b->mode == EXTENSION_IMAGES);
670 if (d != 0)
671 return d;
672 d = -CMP(a->mode == EXTENSION_DIRECTORIES, b->mode == EXTENSION_DIRECTORIES);
673 if (d != 0)
674 return d;
675
676 /* If the paths are not equal, then order prefixes first */
677 d = path_compare(mount_entry_path(a), mount_entry_path(b));
678 if (d != 0)
679 return d;
680
681 /* If the paths are equal, check the mode */
682 return CMP((int) a->mode, (int) b->mode);
683 }
684
685 static int prefix_where_needed(MountEntry *m, size_t n, const char *root_directory) {
686 /* Prefixes all paths in the bind mount table with the root directory if the entry needs that. */
687
688 assert(m || n == 0);
689
690 for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++) {
691 char *s;
692
693 if (m[i].has_prefix)
694 continue;
695
696 s = path_join(root_directory, mount_entry_path(m+i));
697 if (!s)
698 return -ENOMEM;
699
700 mount_entry_consume_prefix(&m[i], s);
701 }
702
703 return 0;
704 }
705
706 static void drop_duplicates(MountEntry *m, size_t *n) {
707 MountEntry *f, *t, *previous;
708
709 assert(m);
710 assert(n);
711
712 /* Drops duplicate entries. Expects that the array is properly ordered already. */
713
714 for (f = m, t = m, previous = NULL; f < m + *n; f++) {
715
716 /* The first one wins (which is the one with the more restrictive mode), see mount_path_compare()
717 * above. Note that we only drop duplicates that haven't been mounted yet. */
718 if (previous &&
719 path_equal(mount_entry_path(f), mount_entry_path(previous)) &&
720 !f->applied && !previous->applied) {
721 log_debug("%s (%s) is duplicate.", mount_entry_path(f), mount_mode_to_string(f->mode));
722 /* Propagate the flags to the remaining entry */
723 previous->read_only = previous->read_only || mount_entry_read_only(f);
724 previous->noexec = previous->noexec || mount_entry_noexec(f);
725 previous->exec = previous->exec || mount_entry_exec(f);
726 mount_entry_done(f);
727 continue;
728 }
729
730 *t = *f;
731 previous = t;
732 t++;
733 }
734
735 *n = t - m;
736 }
737
738 static void drop_inaccessible(MountEntry *m, size_t *n) {
739 MountEntry *f, *t;
740 const char *clear = NULL;
741
742 assert(m);
743 assert(n);
744
745 /* Drops all entries obstructed by another entry further up the tree. Expects that the array is properly
746 * ordered already. */
747
748 for (f = m, t = m; f < m + *n; f++) {
749
750 /* If we found a path set for INACCESSIBLE earlier, and this entry has it as prefix we should drop
751 * it, as inaccessible paths really should drop the entire subtree. */
752 if (clear && path_startswith(mount_entry_path(f), clear)) {
753 log_debug("%s is masked by %s.", mount_entry_path(f), clear);
754 mount_entry_done(f);
755 continue;
756 }
757
758 clear = f->mode == INACCESSIBLE ? mount_entry_path(f) : NULL;
759
760 *t = *f;
761 t++;
762 }
763
764 *n = t - m;
765 }
766
767 static void drop_nop(MountEntry *m, size_t *n) {
768 MountEntry *f, *t;
769
770 assert(m);
771 assert(n);
772
773 /* Drops all entries which have an immediate parent that has the same type, as they are redundant. Assumes the
774 * list is ordered by prefixes. */
775
776 for (f = m, t = m; f < m + *n; f++) {
777
778 /* Only suppress such subtrees for READONLY, READWRITE and READWRITE_IMPLICIT entries */
779 if (IN_SET(f->mode, READONLY, READWRITE, READWRITE_IMPLICIT)) {
780 MountEntry *found = NULL;
781
782 /* Now let's find the first parent of the entry we are looking at. */
783 for (MountEntry *p = PTR_SUB1(t, m); p; p = PTR_SUB1(p, m))
784 if (path_startswith(mount_entry_path(f), mount_entry_path(p))) {
785 found = p;
786 break;
787 }
788
789 /* We found it, let's see if it's the same mode, if so, we can drop this entry */
790 if (found && found->mode == f->mode) {
791 log_debug("%s (%s) is made redundant by %s (%s)",
792 mount_entry_path(f), mount_mode_to_string(f->mode),
793 mount_entry_path(found), mount_mode_to_string(found->mode));
794 mount_entry_done(f);
795 continue;
796 }
797 }
798
799 *t = *f;
800 t++;
801 }
802
803 *n = t - m;
804 }
805
806 static void drop_outside_root(const char *root_directory, MountEntry *m, size_t *n) {
807 MountEntry *f, *t;
808
809 assert(m);
810 assert(n);
811
812 /* Nothing to do */
813 if (!root_directory)
814 return;
815
816 /* Drops all mounts that are outside of the root directory. */
817
818 for (f = m, t = m; f < m + *n; f++) {
819
820 /* ExtensionImages/Directories bases are opened in /run/systemd/unit-extensions on the host */
821 if (!IN_SET(f->mode, EXTENSION_IMAGES, EXTENSION_DIRECTORIES) && !path_startswith(mount_entry_path(f), root_directory)) {
822 log_debug("%s is outside of root directory.", mount_entry_path(f));
823 mount_entry_done(f);
824 continue;
825 }
826
827 *t = *f;
828 t++;
829 }
830
831 *n = t - m;
832 }
833
834 static int clone_device_node(
835 const char *d,
836 const char *temporary_mount,
837 bool *make_devnode) {
838
839 _cleanup_free_ char *sl = NULL;
840 const char *dn, *bn, *t;
841 struct stat st;
842 int r;
843
844 if (stat(d, &st) < 0) {
845 if (errno == ENOENT) {
846 log_debug_errno(errno, "Device node '%s' to clone does not exist, ignoring.", d);
847 return -ENXIO;
848 }
849
850 return log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to stat() device node '%s' to clone, ignoring: %m", d);
851 }
852
853 if (!S_ISBLK(st.st_mode) &&
854 !S_ISCHR(st.st_mode))
855 return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL),
856 "Device node '%s' to clone is not a device node, ignoring.",
857 d);
858
859 dn = strjoina(temporary_mount, d);
860
861 /* First, try to create device node properly */
862 if (*make_devnode) {
863 mac_selinux_create_file_prepare(d, st.st_mode);
864 r = mknod(dn, st.st_mode, st.st_rdev);
865 mac_selinux_create_file_clear();
866 if (r >= 0)
867 goto add_symlink;
868 if (errno != EPERM)
869 return log_debug_errno(errno, "mknod failed for %s: %m", d);
870
871 /* This didn't work, let's not try this again for the next iterations. */
872 *make_devnode = false;
873 }
874
875 /* We're about to fall back to bind-mounting the device node. So create a dummy bind-mount target.
876 * Do not prepare device-node SELinux label (see issue 13762) */
877 r = mknod(dn, S_IFREG, 0);
878 if (r < 0 && errno != EEXIST)
879 return log_debug_errno(errno, "mknod() fallback failed for '%s': %m", d);
880
881 /* Fallback to bind-mounting: The assumption here is that all used device nodes carry standard
882 * properties. Specifically, the devices nodes we bind-mount should either be owned by root:root or
883 * root:tty (e.g. /dev/tty, /dev/ptmx) and should not carry ACLs. */
884 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, d, dn, NULL, MS_BIND, NULL);
885 if (r < 0)
886 return r;
887
888 add_symlink:
889 bn = path_startswith(d, "/dev/");
890 if (!bn)
891 return 0;
892
893 /* Create symlinks like /dev/char/1:9 → ../urandom */
894 if (asprintf(&sl, "%s/dev/%s/" DEVNUM_FORMAT_STR,
895 temporary_mount,
896 S_ISCHR(st.st_mode) ? "char" : "block",
897 DEVNUM_FORMAT_VAL(st.st_rdev)) < 0)
898 return log_oom();
899
900 (void) mkdir_parents(sl, 0755);
901
902 t = strjoina("../", bn);
903 if (symlink(t, sl) < 0)
904 log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to symlink '%s' to '%s', ignoring: %m", t, sl);
905
906 return 0;
907 }
908
909 static int mount_private_dev(MountEntry *m) {
910 static const char devnodes[] =
911 "/dev/null\0"
912 "/dev/zero\0"
913 "/dev/full\0"
914 "/dev/random\0"
915 "/dev/urandom\0"
916 "/dev/tty\0";
917
918 char temporary_mount[] = "/tmp/namespace-dev-XXXXXX";
919 const char *dev = NULL, *devpts = NULL, *devshm = NULL, *devhugepages = NULL, *devmqueue = NULL, *devlog = NULL, *devptmx = NULL;
920 bool can_mknod = true;
921 int r;
922
923 assert(m);
924
925 if (!mkdtemp(temporary_mount))
926 return log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to create temporary directory '%s': %m", temporary_mount);
927
928 dev = strjoina(temporary_mount, "/dev");
929 (void) mkdir(dev, 0755);
930 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "tmpfs", dev, "tmpfs", DEV_MOUNT_OPTIONS, "mode=0755" TMPFS_LIMITS_PRIVATE_DEV);
931 if (r < 0)
932 goto fail;
933
934 r = label_fix_full(AT_FDCWD, dev, "/dev", 0);
935 if (r < 0) {
936 log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to fix label of '%s' as /dev: %m", dev);
937 goto fail;
938 }
939
940 devpts = strjoina(temporary_mount, "/dev/pts");
941 (void) mkdir(devpts, 0755);
942 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "/dev/pts", devpts, NULL, MS_BIND, NULL);
943 if (r < 0)
944 goto fail;
945
946 /* /dev/ptmx can either be a device node or a symlink to /dev/pts/ptmx.
947 * When /dev/ptmx a device node, /dev/pts/ptmx has 000 permissions making it inaccessible.
948 * Thus, in that case make a clone.
949 * In nspawn and other containers it will be a symlink, in that case make it a symlink. */
950 r = is_symlink("/dev/ptmx");
951 if (r < 0) {
952 log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to detect whether /dev/ptmx is a symlink or not: %m");
953 goto fail;
954 } else if (r > 0) {
955 devptmx = strjoina(temporary_mount, "/dev/ptmx");
956 if (symlink("pts/ptmx", devptmx) < 0) {
957 r = log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to create a symlink '%s' to pts/ptmx: %m", devptmx);
958 goto fail;
959 }
960 } else {
961 r = clone_device_node("/dev/ptmx", temporary_mount, &can_mknod);
962 if (r < 0)
963 goto fail;
964 }
965
966 devshm = strjoina(temporary_mount, "/dev/shm");
967 (void) mkdir(devshm, 0755);
968 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "/dev/shm", devshm, NULL, MS_BIND, NULL);
969 if (r < 0)
970 goto fail;
971
972 devmqueue = strjoina(temporary_mount, "/dev/mqueue");
973 (void) mkdir(devmqueue, 0755);
974 (void) mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "/dev/mqueue", devmqueue, NULL, MS_BIND, NULL);
975
976 devhugepages = strjoina(temporary_mount, "/dev/hugepages");
977 (void) mkdir(devhugepages, 0755);
978 (void) mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "/dev/hugepages", devhugepages, NULL, MS_BIND, NULL);
979
980 devlog = strjoina(temporary_mount, "/dev/log");
981 if (symlink("/run/systemd/journal/dev-log", devlog) < 0)
982 log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to create a symlink '%s' to /run/systemd/journal/dev-log, ignoring: %m", devlog);
983
984 NULSTR_FOREACH(d, devnodes) {
985 r = clone_device_node(d, temporary_mount, &can_mknod);
986 /* ENXIO means the *source* is not a device file, skip creation in that case */
987 if (r < 0 && r != -ENXIO)
988 goto fail;
989 }
990
991 r = dev_setup(temporary_mount, UID_INVALID, GID_INVALID);
992 if (r < 0)
993 log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to set up basic device tree at '%s', ignoring: %m", temporary_mount);
994
995 /* Create the /dev directory if missing. It is more likely to be missing when the service is started
996 * with RootDirectory. This is consistent with mount units creating the mount points when missing. */
997 (void) mkdir_p_label(mount_entry_path(m), 0755);
998
999 /* Unmount everything in old /dev */
1000 r = umount_recursive(mount_entry_path(m), 0);
1001 if (r < 0)
1002 log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to unmount directories below '%s', ignoring: %m", mount_entry_path(m));
1003
1004 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, dev, mount_entry_path(m), NULL, MS_MOVE, NULL);
1005 if (r < 0)
1006 goto fail;
1007
1008 (void) rmdir(dev);
1009 (void) rmdir(temporary_mount);
1010
1011 return 0;
1012
1013 fail:
1014 if (devpts)
1015 (void) umount_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, devpts, UMOUNT_NOFOLLOW);
1016
1017 if (devshm)
1018 (void) umount_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, devshm, UMOUNT_NOFOLLOW);
1019
1020 if (devhugepages)
1021 (void) umount_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, devhugepages, UMOUNT_NOFOLLOW);
1022
1023 if (devmqueue)
1024 (void) umount_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, devmqueue, UMOUNT_NOFOLLOW);
1025
1026 (void) umount_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, dev, UMOUNT_NOFOLLOW);
1027 (void) rmdir(dev);
1028 (void) rmdir(temporary_mount);
1029
1030 return r;
1031 }
1032
1033 static int mount_bind_dev(const MountEntry *m) {
1034 int r;
1035
1036 assert(m);
1037
1038 /* Implements the little brother of mount_private_dev(): simply bind mounts the host's /dev into the
1039 * service's /dev. This is only used when RootDirectory= is set. */
1040
1041 (void) mkdir_p_label(mount_entry_path(m), 0755);
1042
1043 r = path_is_mount_point(mount_entry_path(m), NULL, 0);
1044 if (r < 0)
1045 return log_debug_errno(r, "Unable to determine whether /dev is already mounted: %m");
1046 if (r > 0) /* make this a NOP if /dev is already a mount point */
1047 return 0;
1048
1049 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "/dev", mount_entry_path(m), NULL, MS_BIND|MS_REC, NULL);
1050 if (r < 0)
1051 return r;
1052
1053 return 1;
1054 }
1055
1056 static int mount_sysfs(const MountEntry *m) {
1057 int r;
1058
1059 assert(m);
1060
1061 (void) mkdir_p_label(mount_entry_path(m), 0755);
1062
1063 r = path_is_mount_point(mount_entry_path(m), NULL, 0);
1064 if (r < 0)
1065 return log_debug_errno(r, "Unable to determine whether /sys is already mounted: %m");
1066 if (r > 0) /* make this a NOP if /sys is already a mount point */
1067 return 0;
1068
1069 /* Bind mount the host's version so that we get all child mounts of it, too. */
1070 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "/sys", mount_entry_path(m), NULL, MS_BIND|MS_REC, NULL);
1071 if (r < 0)
1072 return r;
1073
1074 return 1;
1075 }
1076
1077 static bool mount_option_supported(const char *fstype, const char *key, const char *value) {
1078 _cleanup_close_ int fd = -EBADF;
1079 int r;
1080
1081 /* This function assumes support by default. Only if the fsconfig() call fails with -EINVAL/-EOPNOTSUPP
1082 * will it report that the option/value is not supported. */
1083
1084 fd = fsopen(fstype, FSOPEN_CLOEXEC);
1085 if (fd < 0) {
1086 if (errno != ENOSYS)
1087 log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to open superblock context for '%s': %m", fstype);
1088 return true; /* If fsopen() fails for whatever reason, assume the value is supported. */
1089 }
1090
1091 r = fsconfig(fd, FSCONFIG_SET_STRING, key, value, 0);
1092 if (r < 0 && !IN_SET(errno, EINVAL, EOPNOTSUPP, ENOSYS))
1093 log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to set '%s=%s' on '%s' superblock context: %m", key, value, fstype);
1094
1095 return r >= 0 || !IN_SET(errno, EINVAL, EOPNOTSUPP);
1096 }
1097
1098 static int mount_procfs(const MountEntry *m, const NamespaceInfo *ns_info) {
1099 _cleanup_free_ char *opts = NULL;
1100 const char *entry_path;
1101 int r, n;
1102
1103 assert(m);
1104 assert(ns_info);
1105
1106 if (ns_info->protect_proc != PROTECT_PROC_DEFAULT ||
1107 ns_info->proc_subset != PROC_SUBSET_ALL) {
1108
1109 /* Starting with kernel 5.8 procfs' hidepid= logic is truly per-instance (previously it
1110 * pretended to be per-instance but actually was per-namespace), hence let's make use of it
1111 * if requested. To make sure this logic succeeds only on kernels where hidepid= is
1112 * per-instance, we'll exclusively use the textual value for hidepid=, since support was
1113 * added in the same commit: if it's supported it is thus also per-instance. */
1114
1115 const char *hpv = ns_info->protect_proc == PROTECT_PROC_DEFAULT ?
1116 "off" :
1117 protect_proc_to_string(ns_info->protect_proc);
1118
1119 /* hidepid= support was added in 5.8, so we can use fsconfig()/fsopen() (which were added in
1120 * 5.2) to check if hidepid= is supported. This avoids a noisy dmesg log by the kernel when
1121 * trying to use hidepid= on systems where it isn't supported. The same applies for subset=.
1122 * fsopen()/fsconfig() was also backported on some distros which allows us to detect
1123 * hidepid=/subset= support in even more scenarios. */
1124
1125 if (mount_option_supported("proc", "hidepid", hpv)) {
1126 opts = strjoin("hidepid=", hpv);
1127 if (!opts)
1128 return -ENOMEM;
1129 }
1130
1131 if (ns_info->proc_subset == PROC_SUBSET_PID && mount_option_supported("proc", "subset", "pid"))
1132 if (!strextend_with_separator(&opts, ",", "subset=pid"))
1133 return -ENOMEM;
1134 }
1135
1136 entry_path = mount_entry_path(m);
1137 (void) mkdir_p_label(entry_path, 0755);
1138
1139 /* Mount a new instance, so that we get the one that matches our user namespace, if we are running in
1140 * one. i.e we don't reuse existing mounts here under any condition, we want a new instance owned by
1141 * our user namespace and with our hidepid= settings applied. Hence, let's get rid of everything
1142 * mounted on /proc/ first. */
1143
1144 n = umount_recursive(entry_path, 0);
1145
1146 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "proc", entry_path, "proc", MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV, opts);
1147 if (r == -EINVAL && opts)
1148 /* If this failed with EINVAL then this likely means the textual hidepid= stuff is
1149 * not supported by the kernel, and thus the per-instance hidepid= neither, which
1150 * means we really don't want to use it, since it would affect our host's /proc
1151 * mount. Hence let's gracefully fallback to a classic, unrestricted version. */
1152 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "proc", entry_path, "proc", MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV, NULL);
1153 if (r == -EPERM) {
1154 /* When we do not have enough privileges to mount /proc, fallback to use existing /proc. */
1155
1156 if (n > 0)
1157 /* /proc or some of sub-mounts are umounted in the above. Refuse incomplete tree.
1158 * Propagate the original error code returned by mount() in the above. */
1159 return -EPERM;
1160
1161 r = path_is_mount_point(entry_path, NULL, 0);
1162 if (r < 0)
1163 return log_debug_errno(r, "Unable to determine whether /proc is already mounted: %m");
1164 if (r == 0) {
1165 /* We lack permissions to mount a new instance of /proc, and it is not already
1166 * mounted. But we can access the host's, so as a final fallback bind-mount it to
1167 * the destination, as most likely we are inside a user manager in an unprivileged
1168 * user namespace. */
1169 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "/proc", entry_path, NULL, MS_BIND|MS_REC, NULL);
1170 if (r < 0)
1171 return -EPERM;
1172 }
1173 } else if (r < 0)
1174 return r;
1175
1176 return 1;
1177 }
1178
1179 static int mount_tmpfs(const MountEntry *m) {
1180 const char *entry_path, *inner_path;
1181 int r;
1182
1183 assert(m);
1184
1185 entry_path = mount_entry_path(m);
1186 inner_path = mount_entry_unprefixed_path(m);
1187
1188 /* First, get rid of everything that is below if there is anything. Then, overmount with our new
1189 * tmpfs */
1190
1191 (void) mkdir_p_label(entry_path, 0755);
1192 (void) umount_recursive(entry_path, 0);
1193
1194 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "tmpfs", entry_path, "tmpfs", m->flags, mount_entry_options(m));
1195 if (r < 0)
1196 return r;
1197
1198 r = label_fix_full(AT_FDCWD, entry_path, inner_path, 0);
1199 if (r < 0)
1200 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to fix label of '%s' as '%s': %m", entry_path, inner_path);
1201
1202 return 1;
1203 }
1204
1205 static int mount_run(const MountEntry *m) {
1206 int r;
1207
1208 assert(m);
1209
1210 r = path_is_mount_point(mount_entry_path(m), NULL, 0);
1211 if (r < 0 && r != -ENOENT)
1212 return log_debug_errno(r, "Unable to determine whether /run is already mounted: %m");
1213 if (r > 0) /* make this a NOP if /run is already a mount point */
1214 return 0;
1215
1216 return mount_tmpfs(m);
1217 }
1218
1219 static int mount_mqueuefs(const MountEntry *m) {
1220 int r;
1221 const char *entry_path;
1222
1223 assert(m);
1224
1225 entry_path = mount_entry_path(m);
1226
1227 (void) mkdir_p_label(entry_path, 0755);
1228 (void) umount_recursive(entry_path, 0);
1229
1230 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "mqueue", entry_path, "mqueue", m->flags, mount_entry_options(m));
1231 if (r < 0)
1232 return r;
1233
1234 return 0;
1235 }
1236
1237 static int mount_image(const MountEntry *m, const char *root_directory) {
1238
1239 _cleanup_free_ char *host_os_release_id = NULL, *host_os_release_version_id = NULL,
1240 *host_os_release_sysext_level = NULL;
1241 int r;
1242
1243 assert(m);
1244
1245 if (m->mode == EXTENSION_IMAGES) {
1246 r = parse_os_release(
1247 empty_to_root(root_directory),
1248 "ID", &host_os_release_id,
1249 "VERSION_ID", &host_os_release_version_id,
1250 "SYSEXT_LEVEL", &host_os_release_sysext_level,
1251 NULL);
1252 if (r < 0)
1253 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to acquire 'os-release' data of OS tree '%s': %m", empty_to_root(root_directory));
1254 if (isempty(host_os_release_id))
1255 return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "'ID' field not found or empty in 'os-release' data of OS tree '%s': %m", empty_to_root(root_directory));
1256 }
1257
1258 r = verity_dissect_and_mount(
1259 /* src_fd= */ -1, mount_entry_source(m), mount_entry_path(m), m->image_options,
1260 host_os_release_id, host_os_release_version_id, host_os_release_sysext_level, NULL);
1261 if (r == -ENOENT && m->ignore)
1262 return 0;
1263 if (r == -ESTALE && host_os_release_id)
1264 return log_error_errno(r,
1265 "Failed to mount image %s, extension-release metadata does not match the lower layer's: ID=%s%s%s%s%s",
1266 mount_entry_source(m),
1267 host_os_release_id,
1268 host_os_release_version_id ? " VERSION_ID=" : "",
1269 strempty(host_os_release_version_id),
1270 host_os_release_sysext_level ? " SYSEXT_LEVEL=" : "",
1271 strempty(host_os_release_sysext_level));
1272 if (r < 0)
1273 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to mount image %s on %s: %m", mount_entry_source(m), mount_entry_path(m));
1274
1275 return 1;
1276 }
1277
1278 static int mount_overlay(const MountEntry *m) {
1279 const char *options;
1280 int r;
1281
1282 assert(m);
1283
1284 options = strjoina("lowerdir=", mount_entry_options(m));
1285
1286 (void) mkdir_p_label(mount_entry_path(m), 0755);
1287
1288 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "overlay", mount_entry_path(m), "overlay", MS_RDONLY, options);
1289 if (r == -ENOENT && m->ignore)
1290 return 0;
1291 if (r < 0)
1292 return r;
1293
1294 return 1;
1295 }
1296
1297 static int follow_symlink(
1298 const char *root_directory,
1299 MountEntry *m) {
1300
1301 _cleanup_free_ char *target = NULL;
1302 int r;
1303
1304 /* Let's chase symlinks, but only one step at a time. That's because depending where the symlink points we
1305 * might need to change the order in which we mount stuff. Hence: let's normalize piecemeal, and do one step at
1306 * a time by specifying CHASE_STEP. This function returns 0 if we resolved one step, and > 0 if we reached the
1307 * end and already have a fully normalized name. */
1308
1309 r = chase_symlinks(mount_entry_path(m), root_directory, CHASE_STEP|CHASE_NONEXISTENT, &target, NULL);
1310 if (r < 0)
1311 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to chase symlinks '%s': %m", mount_entry_path(m));
1312 if (r > 0) /* Reached the end, nothing more to resolve */
1313 return 1;
1314
1315 if (m->n_followed >= CHASE_SYMLINKS_MAX) /* put a boundary on things */
1316 return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ELOOP),
1317 "Symlink loop on '%s'.",
1318 mount_entry_path(m));
1319
1320 log_debug("Followed mount entry path symlink %s %s %s.",
1321 mount_entry_path(m), special_glyph(SPECIAL_GLYPH_ARROW_RIGHT), target);
1322
1323 mount_entry_consume_prefix(m, TAKE_PTR(target));
1324
1325 m->n_followed ++;
1326
1327 return 0;
1328 }
1329
1330 static int apply_one_mount(
1331 const char *root_directory,
1332 MountEntry *m,
1333 const NamespaceInfo *ns_info) {
1334
1335 _cleanup_free_ char *inaccessible = NULL;
1336 bool rbind = true, make = false;
1337 const char *what;
1338 int r;
1339
1340 assert(m);
1341 assert(ns_info);
1342
1343 log_debug("Applying namespace mount on %s", mount_entry_path(m));
1344
1345 switch (m->mode) {
1346
1347 case INACCESSIBLE: {
1348 _cleanup_free_ char *tmp = NULL;
1349 const char *runtime_dir;
1350 struct stat target;
1351
1352 /* First, get rid of everything that is below if there
1353 * is anything... Then, overmount it with an
1354 * inaccessible path. */
1355 (void) umount_recursive(mount_entry_path(m), 0);
1356
1357 if (lstat(mount_entry_path(m), &target) < 0) {
1358 if (errno == ENOENT && m->ignore)
1359 return 0;
1360
1361 return log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to lstat() %s to determine what to mount over it: %m",
1362 mount_entry_path(m));
1363 }
1364
1365 if (geteuid() == 0)
1366 runtime_dir = "/run";
1367 else {
1368 if (asprintf(&tmp, "/run/user/" UID_FMT, geteuid()) < 0)
1369 return -ENOMEM;
1370
1371 runtime_dir = tmp;
1372 }
1373
1374 r = mode_to_inaccessible_node(runtime_dir, target.st_mode, &inaccessible);
1375 if (r < 0)
1376 return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ELOOP),
1377 "File type not supported for inaccessible mounts. Note that symlinks are not allowed");
1378 what = inaccessible;
1379 break;
1380 }
1381
1382 case READONLY:
1383 case READWRITE:
1384 case READWRITE_IMPLICIT:
1385 case EXEC:
1386 case NOEXEC:
1387 r = path_is_mount_point(mount_entry_path(m), root_directory, 0);
1388 if (r == -ENOENT && m->ignore)
1389 return 0;
1390 if (r < 0)
1391 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to determine whether %s is already a mount point: %m",
1392 mount_entry_path(m));
1393 if (r > 0) /* Nothing to do here, it is already a mount. We just later toggle the MS_RDONLY
1394 * and MS_NOEXEC bits for the mount point if needed. */
1395 return 0;
1396 /* This isn't a mount point yet, let's make it one. */
1397 what = mount_entry_path(m);
1398 break;
1399
1400 case EXTENSION_DIRECTORIES: {
1401 _cleanup_free_ char *host_os_release_id = NULL, *host_os_release_version_id = NULL,
1402 *host_os_release_sysext_level = NULL, *extension_name = NULL;
1403 _cleanup_strv_free_ char **extension_release = NULL;
1404
1405 r = path_extract_filename(mount_entry_source(m), &extension_name);
1406 if (r < 0)
1407 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to extract extension name from %s: %m", mount_entry_source(m));
1408
1409 r = parse_os_release(
1410 empty_to_root(root_directory),
1411 "ID", &host_os_release_id,
1412 "VERSION_ID", &host_os_release_version_id,
1413 "SYSEXT_LEVEL", &host_os_release_sysext_level,
1414 NULL);
1415 if (r < 0)
1416 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to acquire 'os-release' data of OS tree '%s': %m", empty_to_root(root_directory));
1417 if (isempty(host_os_release_id))
1418 return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "'ID' field not found or empty in 'os-release' data of OS tree '%s': %m", empty_to_root(root_directory));
1419
1420 r = load_extension_release_pairs(mount_entry_source(m), extension_name, /* relax_extension_release_check= */ false, &extension_release);
1421 if (r == -ENOENT && m->ignore)
1422 return 0;
1423 if (r < 0)
1424 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to parse directory %s extension-release metadata: %m", extension_name);
1425
1426 r = extension_release_validate(
1427 extension_name,
1428 host_os_release_id,
1429 host_os_release_version_id,
1430 host_os_release_sysext_level,
1431 /* host_sysext_scope */ NULL, /* Leave empty, we need to accept both system and portable */
1432 extension_release);
1433 if (r == 0)
1434 return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ESTALE), "Directory %s extension-release metadata does not match the root's", extension_name);
1435 if (r < 0)
1436 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to compare directory %s extension-release metadata with the root's os-release: %m", extension_name);
1437
1438 _fallthrough_;
1439 }
1440
1441 case BIND_MOUNT:
1442 rbind = false;
1443
1444 _fallthrough_;
1445 case BIND_MOUNT_RECURSIVE: {
1446 _cleanup_free_ char *chased = NULL;
1447
1448 /* Since mount() will always follow symlinks we chase the symlinks on our own first. Note
1449 * that bind mount source paths are always relative to the host root, hence we pass NULL as
1450 * root directory to chase_symlinks() here. */
1451
1452 r = chase_symlinks(mount_entry_source(m), NULL, CHASE_TRAIL_SLASH, &chased, NULL);
1453 if (r == -ENOENT && m->ignore) {
1454 log_debug_errno(r, "Path %s does not exist, ignoring.", mount_entry_source(m));
1455 return 0;
1456 }
1457 if (r < 0)
1458 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to follow symlinks on %s: %m", mount_entry_source(m));
1459
1460 log_debug("Followed source symlinks %s %s %s.",
1461 mount_entry_source(m), special_glyph(SPECIAL_GLYPH_ARROW_RIGHT), chased);
1462
1463 free_and_replace(m->source_malloc, chased);
1464
1465 what = mount_entry_source(m);
1466 make = true;
1467 break;
1468 }
1469
1470 case EMPTY_DIR:
1471 case TMPFS:
1472 return mount_tmpfs(m);
1473
1474 case PRIVATE_TMP:
1475 case PRIVATE_TMP_READONLY:
1476 what = mount_entry_source(m);
1477 make = true;
1478 break;
1479
1480 case PRIVATE_DEV:
1481 return mount_private_dev(m);
1482
1483 case BIND_DEV:
1484 return mount_bind_dev(m);
1485
1486 case SYSFS:
1487 return mount_sysfs(m);
1488
1489 case PROCFS:
1490 return mount_procfs(m, ns_info);
1491
1492 case RUN:
1493 return mount_run(m);
1494
1495 case MQUEUEFS:
1496 return mount_mqueuefs(m);
1497
1498 case MOUNT_IMAGES:
1499 return mount_image(m, NULL);
1500
1501 case EXTENSION_IMAGES:
1502 return mount_image(m, root_directory);
1503
1504 case OVERLAY_MOUNT:
1505 return mount_overlay(m);
1506
1507 default:
1508 assert_not_reached();
1509 }
1510
1511 assert(what);
1512
1513 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, what, mount_entry_path(m), NULL, MS_BIND|(rbind ? MS_REC : 0), NULL);
1514 if (r < 0) {
1515 bool try_again = false;
1516
1517 if (r == -ENOENT && make) {
1518 int q;
1519
1520 /* Hmm, either the source or the destination are missing. Let's see if we can create
1521 the destination, then try again. */
1522
1523 (void) mkdir_parents(mount_entry_path(m), 0755);
1524
1525 q = make_mount_point_inode_from_path(what, mount_entry_path(m), 0755);
1526 if (q < 0 && q != -EEXIST)
1527 log_error_errno(q, "Failed to create destination mount point node '%s': %m",
1528 mount_entry_path(m));
1529 else
1530 try_again = true;
1531 }
1532
1533 if (try_again)
1534 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, what, mount_entry_path(m), NULL, MS_BIND|(rbind ? MS_REC : 0), NULL);
1535 if (r < 0)
1536 return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to mount %s to %s: %m", what, mount_entry_path(m));
1537 }
1538
1539 log_debug("Successfully mounted %s to %s", what, mount_entry_path(m));
1540 return 0;
1541 }
1542
1543 static int make_read_only(const MountEntry *m, char **deny_list, FILE *proc_self_mountinfo) {
1544 unsigned long new_flags = 0, flags_mask = 0;
1545 bool submounts;
1546 int r;
1547
1548 assert(m);
1549 assert(proc_self_mountinfo);
1550
1551 if (mount_entry_read_only(m) || m->mode == PRIVATE_DEV) {
1552 new_flags |= MS_RDONLY;
1553 flags_mask |= MS_RDONLY;
1554 }
1555
1556 if (m->nosuid) {
1557 new_flags |= MS_NOSUID;
1558 flags_mask |= MS_NOSUID;
1559 }
1560
1561 if (flags_mask == 0) /* No Change? */
1562 return 0;
1563
1564 /* We generally apply these changes recursively, except for /dev, and the cases we know there's
1565 * nothing further down. Set /dev readonly, but not submounts like /dev/shm. Also, we only set the
1566 * per-mount read-only flag. We can't set it on the superblock, if we are inside a user namespace
1567 * and running Linux <= 4.17. */
1568 submounts =
1569 mount_entry_read_only(m) &&
1570 !IN_SET(m->mode, EMPTY_DIR, TMPFS);
1571 if (submounts)
1572 r = bind_remount_recursive_with_mountinfo(mount_entry_path(m), new_flags, flags_mask, deny_list, proc_self_mountinfo);
1573 else
1574 r = bind_remount_one_with_mountinfo(mount_entry_path(m), new_flags, flags_mask, proc_self_mountinfo);
1575
1576 /* Note that we only turn on the MS_RDONLY flag here, we never turn it off. Something that was marked
1577 * read-only already stays this way. This improves compatibility with container managers, where we
1578 * won't attempt to undo read-only mounts already applied. */
1579
1580 if (r == -ENOENT && m->ignore)
1581 return 0;
1582 if (r < 0)
1583 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to re-mount '%s'%s: %m", mount_entry_path(m),
1584 submounts ? " and its submounts" : "");
1585 return 0;
1586 }
1587
1588 static int make_noexec(const MountEntry *m, char **deny_list, FILE *proc_self_mountinfo) {
1589 unsigned long new_flags = 0, flags_mask = 0;
1590 bool submounts;
1591 int r;
1592
1593 assert(m);
1594 assert(proc_self_mountinfo);
1595
1596 if (mount_entry_noexec(m)) {
1597 new_flags |= MS_NOEXEC;
1598 flags_mask |= MS_NOEXEC;
1599 } else if (mount_entry_exec(m)) {
1600 new_flags &= ~MS_NOEXEC;
1601 flags_mask |= MS_NOEXEC;
1602 }
1603
1604 if (flags_mask == 0) /* No Change? */
1605 return 0;
1606
1607 submounts = !IN_SET(m->mode, EMPTY_DIR, TMPFS);
1608
1609 if (submounts)
1610 r = bind_remount_recursive_with_mountinfo(mount_entry_path(m), new_flags, flags_mask, deny_list, proc_self_mountinfo);
1611 else
1612 r = bind_remount_one_with_mountinfo(mount_entry_path(m), new_flags, flags_mask, proc_self_mountinfo);
1613
1614 if (r == -ENOENT && m->ignore)
1615 return 0;
1616 if (r < 0)
1617 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to re-mount '%s'%s: %m", mount_entry_path(m),
1618 submounts ? " and its submounts" : "");
1619 return 0;
1620 }
1621
1622 static int make_nosuid(const MountEntry *m, FILE *proc_self_mountinfo) {
1623 bool submounts;
1624 int r;
1625
1626 assert(m);
1627 assert(proc_self_mountinfo);
1628
1629 submounts = !IN_SET(m->mode, EMPTY_DIR, TMPFS);
1630
1631 if (submounts)
1632 r = bind_remount_recursive_with_mountinfo(mount_entry_path(m), MS_NOSUID, MS_NOSUID, NULL, proc_self_mountinfo);
1633 else
1634 r = bind_remount_one_with_mountinfo(mount_entry_path(m), MS_NOSUID, MS_NOSUID, proc_self_mountinfo);
1635 if (r == -ENOENT && m->ignore)
1636 return 0;
1637 if (r < 0)
1638 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to re-mount '%s'%s: %m", mount_entry_path(m),
1639 submounts ? " and its submounts" : "");
1640 return 0;
1641 }
1642
1643 static bool namespace_info_mount_apivfs(const NamespaceInfo *ns_info) {
1644 assert(ns_info);
1645
1646 /*
1647 * ProtectControlGroups= and ProtectKernelTunables= imply MountAPIVFS=,
1648 * since to protect the API VFS mounts, they need to be around in the
1649 * first place...
1650 */
1651
1652 return ns_info->mount_apivfs ||
1653 ns_info->protect_control_groups ||
1654 ns_info->protect_kernel_tunables ||
1655 ns_info->protect_proc != PROTECT_PROC_DEFAULT ||
1656 ns_info->proc_subset != PROC_SUBSET_ALL;
1657 }
1658
1659 static size_t namespace_calculate_mounts(
1660 const NamespaceInfo *ns_info,
1661 char** read_write_paths,
1662 char** read_only_paths,
1663 char** inaccessible_paths,
1664 char** exec_paths,
1665 char** no_exec_paths,
1666 char** empty_directories,
1667 size_t n_bind_mounts,
1668 size_t n_temporary_filesystems,
1669 size_t n_mount_images,
1670 size_t n_extension_images,
1671 size_t n_extension_directories,
1672 size_t n_hierarchies,
1673 const char* tmp_dir,
1674 const char* var_tmp_dir,
1675 const char *creds_path,
1676 const char* log_namespace,
1677 bool setup_propagate,
1678 const char* notify_socket) {
1679
1680 size_t protect_home_cnt;
1681 size_t protect_system_cnt =
1682 (ns_info->protect_system == PROTECT_SYSTEM_STRICT ?
1683 ELEMENTSOF(protect_system_strict_table) :
1684 ((ns_info->protect_system == PROTECT_SYSTEM_FULL) ?
1685 ELEMENTSOF(protect_system_full_table) :
1686 ((ns_info->protect_system == PROTECT_SYSTEM_YES) ?
1687 ELEMENTSOF(protect_system_yes_table) : 0)));
1688
1689 protect_home_cnt =
1690 (ns_info->protect_home == PROTECT_HOME_YES ?
1691 ELEMENTSOF(protect_home_yes_table) :
1692 ((ns_info->protect_home == PROTECT_HOME_READ_ONLY) ?
1693 ELEMENTSOF(protect_home_read_only_table) :
1694 ((ns_info->protect_home == PROTECT_HOME_TMPFS) ?
1695 ELEMENTSOF(protect_home_tmpfs_table) : 0)));
1696
1697 return !!tmp_dir + !!var_tmp_dir +
1698 strv_length(read_write_paths) +
1699 strv_length(read_only_paths) +
1700 strv_length(inaccessible_paths) +
1701 strv_length(exec_paths) +
1702 strv_length(no_exec_paths) +
1703 strv_length(empty_directories) +
1704 n_bind_mounts +
1705 n_mount_images +
1706 (n_extension_images > 0 || n_extension_directories > 0 ? /* Mount each image and directory plus an overlay per hierarchy */
1707 n_hierarchies + n_extension_images + n_extension_directories: 0) +
1708 n_temporary_filesystems +
1709 ns_info->private_dev +
1710 (ns_info->protect_kernel_tunables ?
1711 ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_tunables_proc_table) + ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_tunables_sys_table) : 0) +
1712 (ns_info->protect_kernel_modules ? ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_modules_table) : 0) +
1713 (ns_info->protect_kernel_logs ?
1714 ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_logs_proc_table) + ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_logs_dev_table) : 0) +
1715 (ns_info->protect_control_groups ? 1 : 0) +
1716 protect_home_cnt + protect_system_cnt +
1717 (ns_info->protect_hostname ? 2 : 0) +
1718 (namespace_info_mount_apivfs(ns_info) ? ELEMENTSOF(apivfs_table) : 0) +
1719 (creds_path ? 2 : 1) +
1720 !!log_namespace +
1721 setup_propagate + /* /run/systemd/incoming */
1722 !!notify_socket +
1723 ns_info->private_ipc; /* /dev/mqueue */
1724 }
1725
1726 /* Walk all mount entries and dropping any unused mounts. This affects all
1727 * mounts:
1728 * - that are implicitly protected by a path that has been rendered inaccessible
1729 * - whose immediate parent requests the same protection mode as the mount itself
1730 * - that are outside of the relevant root directory
1731 * - which are duplicates
1732 */
1733 static void drop_unused_mounts(const char *root_directory, MountEntry *mounts, size_t *n_mounts) {
1734 assert(root_directory);
1735 assert(n_mounts);
1736 assert(mounts || *n_mounts == 0);
1737
1738 typesafe_qsort(mounts, *n_mounts, mount_path_compare);
1739
1740 drop_duplicates(mounts, n_mounts);
1741 drop_outside_root(root_directory, mounts, n_mounts);
1742 drop_inaccessible(mounts, n_mounts);
1743 drop_nop(mounts, n_mounts);
1744 }
1745
1746 static int create_symlinks_from_tuples(const char *root, char **strv_symlinks) {
1747 int r;
1748
1749 STRV_FOREACH_PAIR(src, dst, strv_symlinks) {
1750 _cleanup_free_ char *src_abs = NULL, *dst_abs = NULL;
1751
1752 src_abs = path_join(root, *src);
1753 dst_abs = path_join(root, *dst);
1754 if (!src_abs || !dst_abs)
1755 return -ENOMEM;
1756
1757 r = mkdir_parents_label(dst_abs, 0755);
1758 if (r < 0)
1759 return r;
1760
1761 r = symlink_idempotent(src_abs, dst_abs, true);
1762 if (r < 0)
1763 return r;
1764 }
1765
1766 return 0;
1767 }
1768
1769 static int apply_mounts(
1770 const char *root,
1771 const NamespaceInfo *ns_info,
1772 MountEntry *mounts,
1773 size_t *n_mounts,
1774 char **exec_dir_symlinks,
1775 char **error_path) {
1776
1777 _cleanup_fclose_ FILE *proc_self_mountinfo = NULL;
1778 _cleanup_free_ char **deny_list = NULL;
1779 int r;
1780
1781 if (n_mounts == 0) /* Shortcut: nothing to do */
1782 return 0;
1783
1784 assert(root);
1785 assert(mounts);
1786 assert(n_mounts);
1787
1788 /* Open /proc/self/mountinfo now as it may become unavailable if we mount anything on top of
1789 * /proc. For example, this is the case with the option: 'InaccessiblePaths=/proc'. */
1790 proc_self_mountinfo = fopen("/proc/self/mountinfo", "re");
1791 if (!proc_self_mountinfo) {
1792 r = -errno;
1793
1794 if (error_path)
1795 *error_path = strdup("/proc/self/mountinfo");
1796
1797 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to open /proc/self/mountinfo: %m");
1798 }
1799
1800 /* First round, establish all mounts we need */
1801 for (;;) {
1802 bool again = false;
1803
1804 for (MountEntry *m = mounts; m < mounts + *n_mounts; ++m) {
1805
1806 if (m->applied)
1807 continue;
1808
1809 /* ExtensionImages/Directories are first opened in the propagate directory, not in the root_directory */
1810 r = follow_symlink(!IN_SET(m->mode, EXTENSION_IMAGES, EXTENSION_DIRECTORIES) ? root : NULL, m);
1811 if (r < 0) {
1812 if (error_path && mount_entry_path(m))
1813 *error_path = strdup(mount_entry_path(m));
1814 return r;
1815 }
1816 if (r == 0) {
1817 /* We hit a symlinked mount point. The entry got rewritten and might
1818 * point to a very different place now. Let's normalize the changed
1819 * list, and start from the beginning. After all to mount the entry
1820 * at the new location we might need some other mounts first */
1821 again = true;
1822 break;
1823 }
1824
1825 r = apply_one_mount(root, m, ns_info);
1826 if (r < 0) {
1827 if (error_path && mount_entry_path(m))
1828 *error_path = strdup(mount_entry_path(m));
1829 return r;
1830 }
1831
1832 m->applied = true;
1833 }
1834
1835 if (!again)
1836 break;
1837
1838 drop_unused_mounts(root, mounts, n_mounts);
1839 }
1840
1841 /* Now that all filesystems have been set up, but before the
1842 * read-only switches are flipped, create the exec dirs symlinks.
1843 * Note that when /var/lib is not empty/tmpfs, these symlinks will already
1844 * exist, which means this will be a no-op. */
1845 r = create_symlinks_from_tuples(root, exec_dir_symlinks);
1846 if (r < 0)
1847 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to set up ExecDirectories symlinks inside mount namespace: %m");
1848
1849 /* Create a deny list we can pass to bind_mount_recursive() */
1850 deny_list = new(char*, (*n_mounts)+1);
1851 if (!deny_list)
1852 return -ENOMEM;
1853 for (size_t j = 0; j < *n_mounts; j++)
1854 deny_list[j] = (char*) mount_entry_path(mounts+j);
1855 deny_list[*n_mounts] = NULL;
1856
1857 /* Second round, flip the ro bits if necessary. */
1858 for (MountEntry *m = mounts; m < mounts + *n_mounts; ++m) {
1859 r = make_read_only(m, deny_list, proc_self_mountinfo);
1860 if (r < 0) {
1861 if (error_path && mount_entry_path(m))
1862 *error_path = strdup(mount_entry_path(m));
1863 return r;
1864 }
1865 }
1866
1867 /* Third round, flip the noexec bits with a simplified deny list. */
1868 for (size_t j = 0; j < *n_mounts; j++)
1869 if (IN_SET((mounts+j)->mode, EXEC, NOEXEC))
1870 deny_list[j] = (char*) mount_entry_path(mounts+j);
1871 deny_list[*n_mounts] = NULL;
1872
1873 for (MountEntry *m = mounts; m < mounts + *n_mounts; ++m) {
1874 r = make_noexec(m, deny_list, proc_self_mountinfo);
1875 if (r < 0) {
1876 if (error_path && mount_entry_path(m))
1877 *error_path = strdup(mount_entry_path(m));
1878 return r;
1879 }
1880 }
1881
1882 /* Fourth round, flip the nosuid bits without a deny list. */
1883 if (ns_info->mount_nosuid)
1884 for (MountEntry *m = mounts; m < mounts + *n_mounts; ++m) {
1885 r = make_nosuid(m, proc_self_mountinfo);
1886 if (r < 0) {
1887 if (error_path && mount_entry_path(m))
1888 *error_path = strdup(mount_entry_path(m));
1889 return r;
1890 }
1891 }
1892
1893 return 1;
1894 }
1895
1896 static bool root_read_only(
1897 char **read_only_paths,
1898 ProtectSystem protect_system) {
1899
1900 /* Determine whether the root directory is going to be read-only given the configured settings. */
1901
1902 if (protect_system == PROTECT_SYSTEM_STRICT)
1903 return true;
1904
1905 if (prefixed_path_strv_contains(read_only_paths, "/"))
1906 return true;
1907
1908 return false;
1909 }
1910
1911 static bool home_read_only(
1912 char** read_only_paths,
1913 char** inaccessible_paths,
1914 char** empty_directories,
1915 const BindMount *bind_mounts,
1916 size_t n_bind_mounts,
1917 const TemporaryFileSystem *temporary_filesystems,
1918 size_t n_temporary_filesystems,
1919 ProtectHome protect_home) {
1920
1921 /* Determine whether the /home directory is going to be read-only given the configured settings. Yes,
1922 * this is a bit sloppy, since we don't bother checking for cases where / is affected by multiple
1923 * settings. */
1924
1925 if (protect_home != PROTECT_HOME_NO)
1926 return true;
1927
1928 if (prefixed_path_strv_contains(read_only_paths, "/home") ||
1929 prefixed_path_strv_contains(inaccessible_paths, "/home") ||
1930 prefixed_path_strv_contains(empty_directories, "/home"))
1931 return true;
1932
1933 for (size_t i = 0; i < n_temporary_filesystems; i++)
1934 if (path_equal(temporary_filesystems[i].path, "/home"))
1935 return true;
1936
1937 /* If /home is overmounted with some dir from the host it's not writable. */
1938 for (size_t i = 0; i < n_bind_mounts; i++)
1939 if (path_equal(bind_mounts[i].destination, "/home"))
1940 return true;
1941
1942 return false;
1943 }
1944
1945 static int verity_settings_prepare(
1946 VeritySettings *verity,
1947 const char *root_image,
1948 const void *root_hash,
1949 size_t root_hash_size,
1950 const char *root_hash_path,
1951 const void *root_hash_sig,
1952 size_t root_hash_sig_size,
1953 const char *root_hash_sig_path,
1954 const char *verity_data_path) {
1955
1956 int r;
1957
1958 assert(verity);
1959
1960 if (root_hash) {
1961 void *d;
1962
1963 d = memdup(root_hash, root_hash_size);
1964 if (!d)
1965 return -ENOMEM;
1966
1967 free_and_replace(verity->root_hash, d);
1968 verity->root_hash_size = root_hash_size;
1969 verity->designator = PARTITION_ROOT;
1970 }
1971
1972 if (root_hash_sig) {
1973 void *d;
1974
1975 d = memdup(root_hash_sig, root_hash_sig_size);
1976 if (!d)
1977 return -ENOMEM;
1978
1979 free_and_replace(verity->root_hash_sig, d);
1980 verity->root_hash_sig_size = root_hash_sig_size;
1981 verity->designator = PARTITION_ROOT;
1982 }
1983
1984 if (verity_data_path) {
1985 r = free_and_strdup(&verity->data_path, verity_data_path);
1986 if (r < 0)
1987 return r;
1988 }
1989
1990 r = verity_settings_load(
1991 verity,
1992 root_image,
1993 root_hash_path,
1994 root_hash_sig_path);
1995 if (r < 0)
1996 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to load root hash: %m");
1997
1998 return 0;
1999 }
2000
2001 int setup_namespace(
2002 const char* root_directory,
2003 const char* root_image,
2004 const MountOptions *root_image_options,
2005 const NamespaceInfo *ns_info,
2006 char** read_write_paths,
2007 char** read_only_paths,
2008 char** inaccessible_paths,
2009 char** exec_paths,
2010 char** no_exec_paths,
2011 char** empty_directories,
2012 char** exec_dir_symlinks,
2013 const BindMount *bind_mounts,
2014 size_t n_bind_mounts,
2015 const TemporaryFileSystem *temporary_filesystems,
2016 size_t n_temporary_filesystems,
2017 const MountImage *mount_images,
2018 size_t n_mount_images,
2019 const char* tmp_dir,
2020 const char* var_tmp_dir,
2021 const char *creds_path,
2022 const char *log_namespace,
2023 unsigned long mount_flags,
2024 const void *root_hash,
2025 size_t root_hash_size,
2026 const char *root_hash_path,
2027 const void *root_hash_sig,
2028 size_t root_hash_sig_size,
2029 const char *root_hash_sig_path,
2030 const char *verity_data_path,
2031 const MountImage *extension_images,
2032 size_t n_extension_images,
2033 char **extension_directories,
2034 const char *propagate_dir,
2035 const char *incoming_dir,
2036 const char *extension_dir,
2037 const char *notify_socket,
2038 char **error_path) {
2039
2040 _cleanup_(loop_device_unrefp) LoopDevice *loop_device = NULL;
2041 _cleanup_(dissected_image_unrefp) DissectedImage *dissected_image = NULL;
2042 _cleanup_(verity_settings_done) VeritySettings verity = VERITY_SETTINGS_DEFAULT;
2043 _cleanup_strv_free_ char **hierarchies = NULL;
2044 MountEntry *m = NULL, *mounts = NULL;
2045 bool require_prefix = false, setup_propagate = false;
2046 const char *root;
2047 DissectImageFlags dissect_image_flags =
2048 DISSECT_IMAGE_GENERIC_ROOT |
2049 DISSECT_IMAGE_REQUIRE_ROOT |
2050 DISSECT_IMAGE_DISCARD_ON_LOOP |
2051 DISSECT_IMAGE_RELAX_VAR_CHECK |
2052 DISSECT_IMAGE_FSCK |
2053 DISSECT_IMAGE_USR_NO_ROOT |
2054 DISSECT_IMAGE_GROWFS |
2055 DISSECT_IMAGE_ADD_PARTITION_DEVICES |
2056 DISSECT_IMAGE_PIN_PARTITION_DEVICES;
2057 size_t n_mounts;
2058 int r;
2059
2060 assert(ns_info);
2061
2062 /* Make sure that all mknod(), mkdir() calls we do are unaffected by the umask, and the access modes
2063 * we configure take effect */
2064 BLOCK_WITH_UMASK(0000);
2065
2066 if (!isempty(propagate_dir) && !isempty(incoming_dir))
2067 setup_propagate = true;
2068
2069 if (mount_flags == 0)
2070 mount_flags = MS_SHARED;
2071
2072 if (root_image) {
2073 /* Make the whole image read-only if we can determine that we only access it in a read-only fashion. */
2074 if (root_read_only(read_only_paths,
2075 ns_info->protect_system) &&
2076 home_read_only(read_only_paths, inaccessible_paths, empty_directories,
2077 bind_mounts, n_bind_mounts, temporary_filesystems, n_temporary_filesystems,
2078 ns_info->protect_home) &&
2079 strv_isempty(read_write_paths))
2080 dissect_image_flags |= DISSECT_IMAGE_READ_ONLY;
2081
2082 r = verity_settings_prepare(
2083 &verity,
2084 root_image,
2085 root_hash, root_hash_size, root_hash_path,
2086 root_hash_sig, root_hash_sig_size, root_hash_sig_path,
2087 verity_data_path);
2088 if (r < 0)
2089 return r;
2090
2091 SET_FLAG(dissect_image_flags, DISSECT_IMAGE_NO_PARTITION_TABLE, verity.data_path);
2092
2093 r = loop_device_make_by_path(
2094 root_image,
2095 FLAGS_SET(dissect_image_flags, DISSECT_IMAGE_DEVICE_READ_ONLY) ? O_RDONLY : -1 /* < 0 means writable if possible, read-only as fallback */,
2096 FLAGS_SET(dissect_image_flags, DISSECT_IMAGE_NO_PARTITION_TABLE) ? 0 : LO_FLAGS_PARTSCAN,
2097 LOCK_SH,
2098 &loop_device);
2099 if (r < 0)
2100 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to create loop device for root image: %m");
2101
2102 r = dissect_loop_device(
2103 loop_device,
2104 &verity,
2105 root_image_options,
2106 dissect_image_flags,
2107 &dissected_image);
2108 if (r < 0)
2109 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to dissect image: %m");
2110
2111 r = dissected_image_load_verity_sig_partition(
2112 dissected_image,
2113 loop_device->fd,
2114 &verity);
2115 if (r < 0)
2116 return r;
2117
2118 r = dissected_image_decrypt(
2119 dissected_image,
2120 NULL,
2121 &verity,
2122 dissect_image_flags);
2123 if (r < 0)
2124 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to decrypt dissected image: %m");
2125 }
2126
2127 if (root_directory)
2128 root = root_directory;
2129 else {
2130 /* /run/systemd should have been created by PID 1 early on already, but in some cases, like
2131 * when running tests (test-execute), it might not have been created yet so let's make sure
2132 * we create it if it doesn't already exist. */
2133 (void) mkdir_p_label("/run/systemd", 0755);
2134
2135 /* Always create the mount namespace in a temporary directory, instead of operating directly
2136 * in the root. The temporary directory prevents any mounts from being potentially obscured
2137 * my other mounts we already applied. We use the same mount point for all images, which is
2138 * safe, since they all live in their own namespaces after all, and hence won't see each
2139 * other. */
2140
2141 root = "/run/systemd/unit-root";
2142 (void) mkdir_label(root, 0700);
2143 require_prefix = true;
2144 }
2145
2146 if (n_extension_images > 0 || !strv_isempty(extension_directories)) {
2147 r = parse_env_extension_hierarchies(&hierarchies);
2148 if (r < 0)
2149 return r;
2150 }
2151
2152 n_mounts = namespace_calculate_mounts(
2153 ns_info,
2154 read_write_paths,
2155 read_only_paths,
2156 inaccessible_paths,
2157 exec_paths,
2158 no_exec_paths,
2159 empty_directories,
2160 n_bind_mounts,
2161 n_temporary_filesystems,
2162 n_mount_images,
2163 n_extension_images,
2164 strv_length(extension_directories),
2165 strv_length(hierarchies),
2166 tmp_dir, var_tmp_dir,
2167 creds_path,
2168 log_namespace,
2169 setup_propagate,
2170 notify_socket);
2171
2172 if (n_mounts > 0) {
2173 m = mounts = new0(MountEntry, n_mounts);
2174 if (!mounts)
2175 return -ENOMEM;
2176
2177 r = append_access_mounts(&m, read_write_paths, READWRITE, require_prefix);
2178 if (r < 0)
2179 goto finish;
2180
2181 r = append_access_mounts(&m, read_only_paths, READONLY, require_prefix);
2182 if (r < 0)
2183 goto finish;
2184
2185 r = append_access_mounts(&m, inaccessible_paths, INACCESSIBLE, require_prefix);
2186 if (r < 0)
2187 goto finish;
2188
2189 r = append_access_mounts(&m, exec_paths, EXEC, require_prefix);
2190 if (r < 0)
2191 goto finish;
2192
2193 r = append_access_mounts(&m, no_exec_paths, NOEXEC, require_prefix);
2194 if (r < 0)
2195 goto finish;
2196
2197 r = append_empty_dir_mounts(&m, empty_directories);
2198 if (r < 0)
2199 goto finish;
2200
2201 r = append_bind_mounts(&m, bind_mounts, n_bind_mounts);
2202 if (r < 0)
2203 goto finish;
2204
2205 r = append_tmpfs_mounts(&m, temporary_filesystems, n_temporary_filesystems);
2206 if (r < 0)
2207 goto finish;
2208
2209 if (tmp_dir) {
2210 bool ro = streq(tmp_dir, RUN_SYSTEMD_EMPTY);
2211
2212 *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
2213 .path_const = "/tmp",
2214 .mode = ro ? PRIVATE_TMP_READONLY : PRIVATE_TMP,
2215 .source_const = tmp_dir,
2216 };
2217 }
2218
2219 if (var_tmp_dir) {
2220 bool ro = streq(var_tmp_dir, RUN_SYSTEMD_EMPTY);
2221
2222 *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
2223 .path_const = "/var/tmp",
2224 .mode = ro ? PRIVATE_TMP_READONLY : PRIVATE_TMP,
2225 .source_const = var_tmp_dir,
2226 };
2227 }
2228
2229 r = append_mount_images(&m, mount_images, n_mount_images);
2230 if (r < 0)
2231 goto finish;
2232
2233 r = append_extensions(&m, root, extension_dir, hierarchies, extension_images, n_extension_images, extension_directories);
2234 if (r < 0)
2235 goto finish;
2236
2237 if (ns_info->private_dev)
2238 *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
2239 .path_const = "/dev",
2240 .mode = PRIVATE_DEV,
2241 .flags = DEV_MOUNT_OPTIONS,
2242 };
2243
2244 /* In case /proc is successfully mounted with pid tree subset only (ProcSubset=pid), the
2245 protective mounts to non-pid /proc paths would fail. But the pid only option may have
2246 failed gracefully, so let's try the mounts but it's not fatal if they don't succeed. */
2247 bool ignore_protect_proc = ns_info->ignore_protect_paths || ns_info->proc_subset == PROC_SUBSET_PID;
2248 if (ns_info->protect_kernel_tunables) {
2249 r = append_static_mounts(&m,
2250 protect_kernel_tunables_proc_table,
2251 ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_tunables_proc_table),
2252 ignore_protect_proc);
2253 if (r < 0)
2254 goto finish;
2255
2256 r = append_static_mounts(&m,
2257 protect_kernel_tunables_sys_table,
2258 ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_tunables_sys_table),
2259 ns_info->ignore_protect_paths);
2260 if (r < 0)
2261 goto finish;
2262 }
2263
2264 if (ns_info->protect_kernel_modules) {
2265 r = append_static_mounts(&m,
2266 protect_kernel_modules_table,
2267 ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_modules_table),
2268 ns_info->ignore_protect_paths);
2269 if (r < 0)
2270 goto finish;
2271 }
2272
2273 if (ns_info->protect_kernel_logs) {
2274 r = append_static_mounts(&m,
2275 protect_kernel_logs_proc_table,
2276 ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_logs_proc_table),
2277 ignore_protect_proc);
2278 if (r < 0)
2279 goto finish;
2280
2281 r = append_static_mounts(&m,
2282 protect_kernel_logs_dev_table,
2283 ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_logs_dev_table),
2284 ns_info->ignore_protect_paths);
2285 if (r < 0)
2286 goto finish;
2287 }
2288
2289 if (ns_info->protect_control_groups)
2290 *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
2291 .path_const = "/sys/fs/cgroup",
2292 .mode = READONLY,
2293 };
2294
2295 r = append_protect_home(&m, ns_info->protect_home, ns_info->ignore_protect_paths);
2296 if (r < 0)
2297 goto finish;
2298
2299 r = append_protect_system(&m, ns_info->protect_system, false);
2300 if (r < 0)
2301 goto finish;
2302
2303 if (namespace_info_mount_apivfs(ns_info)) {
2304 r = append_static_mounts(&m,
2305 apivfs_table,
2306 ELEMENTSOF(apivfs_table),
2307 ns_info->ignore_protect_paths);
2308 if (r < 0)
2309 goto finish;
2310 }
2311
2312 /* Note, if proc is mounted with subset=pid then neither of the
2313 * two paths will exist, i.e. they are implicitly protected by
2314 * the mount option. */
2315 if (ns_info->protect_hostname) {
2316 *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
2317 .path_const = "/proc/sys/kernel/hostname",
2318 .mode = READONLY,
2319 .ignore = ignore_protect_proc,
2320 };
2321 *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
2322 .path_const = "/proc/sys/kernel/domainname",
2323 .mode = READONLY,
2324 .ignore = ignore_protect_proc,
2325 };
2326 }
2327
2328 if (ns_info->private_ipc)
2329 *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
2330 .path_const = "/dev/mqueue",
2331 .mode = MQUEUEFS,
2332 .flags = MS_NOSUID | MS_NODEV | MS_NOEXEC | MS_RELATIME,
2333 };
2334
2335 if (creds_path) {
2336 /* If our service has a credentials store configured, then bind that one in, but hide
2337 * everything else. */
2338
2339 *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
2340 .path_const = "/run/credentials",
2341 .mode = TMPFS,
2342 .read_only = true,
2343 .options_const = "mode=0755" TMPFS_LIMITS_EMPTY_OR_ALMOST,
2344 .flags = MS_NODEV|MS_STRICTATIME|MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC,
2345 };
2346
2347 *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
2348 .path_const = creds_path,
2349 .mode = BIND_MOUNT,
2350 .read_only = true,
2351 .source_const = creds_path,
2352 };
2353 } else {
2354 /* If our service has no credentials store configured, then make the whole
2355 * credentials tree inaccessible wholesale. */
2356
2357 *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
2358 .path_const = "/run/credentials",
2359 .mode = INACCESSIBLE,
2360 .ignore = true,
2361 };
2362 }
2363
2364 if (log_namespace) {
2365 _cleanup_free_ char *q = NULL;
2366
2367 q = strjoin("/run/systemd/journal.", log_namespace);
2368 if (!q) {
2369 r = -ENOMEM;
2370 goto finish;
2371 }
2372
2373 *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
2374 .path_const = "/run/systemd/journal",
2375 .mode = BIND_MOUNT_RECURSIVE,
2376 .read_only = true,
2377 .source_malloc = TAKE_PTR(q),
2378 };
2379 }
2380
2381 /* Will be used to add bind mounts at runtime */
2382 if (setup_propagate)
2383 *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
2384 .source_const = propagate_dir,
2385 .path_const = incoming_dir,
2386 .mode = BIND_MOUNT,
2387 .read_only = true,
2388 };
2389
2390 if (notify_socket)
2391 *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
2392 .path_const = notify_socket,
2393 .source_const = notify_socket,
2394 .mode = BIND_MOUNT,
2395 .read_only = true,
2396 };
2397
2398 assert(mounts + n_mounts == m);
2399
2400 /* Prepend the root directory where that's necessary */
2401 r = prefix_where_needed(mounts, n_mounts, root);
2402 if (r < 0)
2403 goto finish;
2404
2405 drop_unused_mounts(root, mounts, &n_mounts);
2406 }
2407
2408 /* All above is just preparation, figuring out what to do. Let's now actually start doing something. */
2409
2410 if (unshare(CLONE_NEWNS) < 0) {
2411 r = log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to unshare the mount namespace: %m");
2412 if (IN_SET(r, -EACCES, -EPERM, -EOPNOTSUPP, -ENOSYS))
2413 /* If the kernel doesn't support namespaces, or when there's a MAC or seccomp filter
2414 * in place that doesn't allow us to create namespaces (or a missing cap), then
2415 * propagate a recognizable error back, which the caller can use to detect this case
2416 * (and only this) and optionally continue without namespacing applied. */
2417 r = -ENOANO;
2418
2419 goto finish;
2420 }
2421
2422 /* Create the source directory to allow runtime propagation of mounts */
2423 if (setup_propagate)
2424 (void) mkdir_p(propagate_dir, 0600);
2425
2426 if (n_extension_images > 0 || !strv_isempty(extension_directories))
2427 /* ExtensionImages/Directories mountpoint directories will be created while parsing the
2428 * mounts to create, so have the parent ready */
2429 (void) mkdir_p(extension_dir, 0600);
2430
2431 /* Remount / as SLAVE so that nothing now mounted in the namespace
2432 * shows up in the parent */
2433 if (mount(NULL, "/", NULL, MS_SLAVE|MS_REC, NULL) < 0) {
2434 r = log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to remount '/' as SLAVE: %m");
2435 goto finish;
2436 }
2437
2438 if (root_image) {
2439 /* A root image is specified, mount it to the right place */
2440 r = dissected_image_mount(dissected_image, root, UID_INVALID, UID_INVALID, dissect_image_flags);
2441 if (r < 0) {
2442 log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to mount root image: %m");
2443 goto finish;
2444 }
2445
2446 /* Now release the block device lock, so that udevd is free to call BLKRRPART on the device
2447 * if it likes. */
2448 r = loop_device_flock(loop_device, LOCK_UN);
2449 if (r < 0) {
2450 log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to release lock on loopback block device: %m");
2451 goto finish;
2452 }
2453
2454 r = dissected_image_relinquish(dissected_image);
2455 if (r < 0) {
2456 log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to relinquish dissected image: %m");
2457 goto finish;
2458 }
2459
2460 } else if (root_directory) {
2461
2462 /* A root directory is specified. Turn its directory into bind mount, if it isn't one yet. */
2463 r = path_is_mount_point(root, NULL, AT_SYMLINK_FOLLOW);
2464 if (r < 0) {
2465 log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to detect that %s is a mount point or not: %m", root);
2466 goto finish;
2467 }
2468 if (r == 0) {
2469 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, root, root, NULL, MS_BIND|MS_REC, NULL);
2470 if (r < 0)
2471 goto finish;
2472 }
2473
2474 } else {
2475 /* Let's mount the main root directory to the root directory to use */
2476 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "/", root, NULL, MS_BIND|MS_REC, NULL);
2477 if (r < 0)
2478 goto finish;
2479 }
2480
2481 /* Try to set up the new root directory before mounting anything else there. */
2482 if (root_image || root_directory)
2483 (void) base_filesystem_create(root, UID_INVALID, GID_INVALID);
2484
2485 /* Now make the magic happen */
2486 r = apply_mounts(root, ns_info, mounts, &n_mounts, exec_dir_symlinks, error_path);
2487 if (r < 0)
2488 goto finish;
2489
2490 /* MS_MOVE does not work on MS_SHARED so the remount MS_SHARED will be done later */
2491 r = mount_switch_root(root, /* mount_propagation_flag = */ 0);
2492 if (r == -EINVAL && root_directory) {
2493 /* If we are using root_directory and we don't have privileges (ie: user manager in a user
2494 * namespace) and the root_directory is already a mount point in the parent namespace,
2495 * MS_MOVE will fail as we don't have permission to change it (with EINVAL rather than
2496 * EPERM). Attempt to bind-mount it over itself (like we do above if it's not already a
2497 * mount point) and try again. */
2498 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, root, root, NULL, MS_BIND|MS_REC, NULL);
2499 if (r < 0)
2500 goto finish;
2501 r = mount_switch_root(root, /* mount_propagation_flag = */ 0);
2502 }
2503 if (r < 0) {
2504 log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to mount root with MS_MOVE: %m");
2505 goto finish;
2506 }
2507
2508 /* Remount / as the desired mode. Note that this will not
2509 * reestablish propagation from our side to the host, since
2510 * what's disconnected is disconnected. */
2511 if (mount(NULL, "/", NULL, mount_flags | MS_REC, NULL) < 0) {
2512 r = log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to remount '/' with desired mount flags: %m");
2513 goto finish;
2514 }
2515
2516 /* bind_mount_in_namespace() will MS_MOVE into that directory, and that's only
2517 * supported for non-shared mounts. This needs to happen after remounting / or it will fail. */
2518 if (setup_propagate) {
2519 r = mount(NULL, incoming_dir, NULL, MS_SLAVE, NULL);
2520 if (r < 0) {
2521 log_error_errno(r, "Failed to remount %s with MS_SLAVE: %m", incoming_dir);
2522 goto finish;
2523 }
2524 }
2525
2526 r = 0;
2527
2528 finish:
2529 if (n_mounts > 0)
2530 for (m = mounts; m < mounts + n_mounts; m++)
2531 mount_entry_done(m);
2532
2533 free(mounts);
2534
2535 return r;
2536 }
2537
2538 void bind_mount_free_many(BindMount *b, size_t n) {
2539 assert(b || n == 0);
2540
2541 for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++) {
2542 free(b[i].source);
2543 free(b[i].destination);
2544 }
2545
2546 free(b);
2547 }
2548
2549 int bind_mount_add(BindMount **b, size_t *n, const BindMount *item) {
2550 _cleanup_free_ char *s = NULL, *d = NULL;
2551 BindMount *c;
2552
2553 assert(b);
2554 assert(n);
2555 assert(item);
2556
2557 s = strdup(item->source);
2558 if (!s)
2559 return -ENOMEM;
2560
2561 d = strdup(item->destination);
2562 if (!d)
2563 return -ENOMEM;
2564
2565 c = reallocarray(*b, *n + 1, sizeof(BindMount));
2566 if (!c)
2567 return -ENOMEM;
2568
2569 *b = c;
2570
2571 c[(*n) ++] = (BindMount) {
2572 .source = TAKE_PTR(s),
2573 .destination = TAKE_PTR(d),
2574 .read_only = item->read_only,
2575 .nosuid = item->nosuid,
2576 .recursive = item->recursive,
2577 .ignore_enoent = item->ignore_enoent,
2578 };
2579
2580 return 0;
2581 }
2582
2583 MountImage* mount_image_free_many(MountImage *m, size_t *n) {
2584 assert(n);
2585 assert(m || *n == 0);
2586
2587 for (size_t i = 0; i < *n; i++) {
2588 free(m[i].source);
2589 free(m[i].destination);
2590 mount_options_free_all(m[i].mount_options);
2591 }
2592
2593 free(m);
2594 *n = 0;
2595 return NULL;
2596 }
2597
2598 int mount_image_add(MountImage **m, size_t *n, const MountImage *item) {
2599 _cleanup_free_ char *s = NULL, *d = NULL;
2600 _cleanup_(mount_options_free_allp) MountOptions *options = NULL;
2601 MountImage *c;
2602
2603 assert(m);
2604 assert(n);
2605 assert(item);
2606
2607 s = strdup(item->source);
2608 if (!s)
2609 return -ENOMEM;
2610
2611 if (item->destination) {
2612 d = strdup(item->destination);
2613 if (!d)
2614 return -ENOMEM;
2615 }
2616
2617 LIST_FOREACH(mount_options, i, item->mount_options) {
2618 _cleanup_(mount_options_free_allp) MountOptions *o = NULL;
2619
2620 o = new(MountOptions, 1);
2621 if (!o)
2622 return -ENOMEM;
2623
2624 *o = (MountOptions) {
2625 .partition_designator = i->partition_designator,
2626 .options = strdup(i->options),
2627 };
2628 if (!o->options)
2629 return -ENOMEM;
2630
2631 LIST_APPEND(mount_options, options, TAKE_PTR(o));
2632 }
2633
2634 c = reallocarray(*m, *n + 1, sizeof(MountImage));
2635 if (!c)
2636 return -ENOMEM;
2637
2638 *m = c;
2639
2640 c[(*n) ++] = (MountImage) {
2641 .source = TAKE_PTR(s),
2642 .destination = TAKE_PTR(d),
2643 .mount_options = TAKE_PTR(options),
2644 .ignore_enoent = item->ignore_enoent,
2645 .type = item->type,
2646 };
2647
2648 return 0;
2649 }
2650
2651 void temporary_filesystem_free_many(TemporaryFileSystem *t, size_t n) {
2652 assert(t || n == 0);
2653
2654 for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++) {
2655 free(t[i].path);
2656 free(t[i].options);
2657 }
2658
2659 free(t);
2660 }
2661
2662 int temporary_filesystem_add(
2663 TemporaryFileSystem **t,
2664 size_t *n,
2665 const char *path,
2666 const char *options) {
2667
2668 _cleanup_free_ char *p = NULL, *o = NULL;
2669 TemporaryFileSystem *c;
2670
2671 assert(t);
2672 assert(n);
2673 assert(path);
2674
2675 p = strdup(path);
2676 if (!p)
2677 return -ENOMEM;
2678
2679 if (!isempty(options)) {
2680 o = strdup(options);
2681 if (!o)
2682 return -ENOMEM;
2683 }
2684
2685 c = reallocarray(*t, *n + 1, sizeof(TemporaryFileSystem));
2686 if (!c)
2687 return -ENOMEM;
2688
2689 *t = c;
2690
2691 c[(*n) ++] = (TemporaryFileSystem) {
2692 .path = TAKE_PTR(p),
2693 .options = TAKE_PTR(o),
2694 };
2695
2696 return 0;
2697 }
2698
2699 static int make_tmp_prefix(const char *prefix) {
2700 _cleanup_free_ char *t = NULL;
2701 _cleanup_close_ int fd = -EBADF;
2702 int r;
2703
2704 /* Don't do anything unless we know the dir is actually missing */
2705 r = access(prefix, F_OK);
2706 if (r >= 0)
2707 return 0;
2708 if (errno != ENOENT)
2709 return -errno;
2710
2711 WITH_UMASK(000)
2712 r = mkdir_parents(prefix, 0755);
2713 if (r < 0)
2714 return r;
2715
2716 r = tempfn_random(prefix, NULL, &t);
2717 if (r < 0)
2718 return r;
2719
2720 /* umask will corrupt this access mode, but that doesn't matter, we need to call chmod() anyway for
2721 * the suid bit, below. */
2722 fd = open_mkdir_at(AT_FDCWD, t, O_EXCL|O_CLOEXEC, 0777);
2723 if (fd < 0)
2724 return fd;
2725
2726 r = RET_NERRNO(fchmod(fd, 01777));
2727 if (r < 0) {
2728 (void) rmdir(t);
2729 return r;
2730 }
2731
2732 r = RET_NERRNO(rename(t, prefix));
2733 if (r < 0) {
2734 (void) rmdir(t);
2735 return r == -EEXIST ? 0 : r; /* it's fine if someone else created the dir by now */
2736 }
2737
2738 return 0;
2739
2740 }
2741
2742 static int setup_one_tmp_dir(const char *id, const char *prefix, char **path, char **tmp_path) {
2743 _cleanup_free_ char *x = NULL;
2744 _cleanup_free_ char *y = NULL;
2745 sd_id128_t boot_id;
2746 bool rw = true;
2747 int r;
2748
2749 assert(id);
2750 assert(prefix);
2751 assert(path);
2752
2753 /* We include the boot id in the directory so that after a
2754 * reboot we can easily identify obsolete directories. */
2755
2756 r = sd_id128_get_boot(&boot_id);
2757 if (r < 0)
2758 return r;
2759
2760 x = strjoin(prefix, "/systemd-private-", SD_ID128_TO_STRING(boot_id), "-", id, "-XXXXXX");
2761 if (!x)
2762 return -ENOMEM;
2763
2764 r = make_tmp_prefix(prefix);
2765 if (r < 0)
2766 return r;
2767
2768 WITH_UMASK(0077)
2769 if (!mkdtemp(x)) {
2770 if (errno == EROFS || ERRNO_IS_DISK_SPACE(errno))
2771 rw = false;
2772 else
2773 return -errno;
2774 }
2775
2776 if (rw) {
2777 y = strjoin(x, "/tmp");
2778 if (!y)
2779 return -ENOMEM;
2780
2781 WITH_UMASK(0000)
2782 if (mkdir(y, 0777 | S_ISVTX) < 0)
2783 return -errno;
2784
2785 r = label_fix_full(AT_FDCWD, y, prefix, 0);
2786 if (r < 0)
2787 return r;
2788
2789 if (tmp_path)
2790 *tmp_path = TAKE_PTR(y);
2791 } else {
2792 /* Trouble: we failed to create the directory. Instead of failing, let's simulate /tmp being
2793 * read-only. This way the service will get the EROFS result as if it was writing to the real
2794 * file system. */
2795 WITH_UMASK(0000)
2796 r = mkdir_p(RUN_SYSTEMD_EMPTY, 0500);
2797 if (r < 0)
2798 return r;
2799
2800 r = free_and_strdup(&x, RUN_SYSTEMD_EMPTY);
2801 if (r < 0)
2802 return r;
2803 }
2804
2805 *path = TAKE_PTR(x);
2806 return 0;
2807 }
2808
2809 int setup_tmp_dirs(const char *id, char **tmp_dir, char **var_tmp_dir) {
2810 _cleanup_(namespace_cleanup_tmpdirp) char *a = NULL;
2811 _cleanup_(rmdir_and_freep) char *a_tmp = NULL;
2812 char *b;
2813 int r;
2814
2815 assert(id);
2816 assert(tmp_dir);
2817 assert(var_tmp_dir);
2818
2819 r = setup_one_tmp_dir(id, "/tmp", &a, &a_tmp);
2820 if (r < 0)
2821 return r;
2822
2823 r = setup_one_tmp_dir(id, "/var/tmp", &b, NULL);
2824 if (r < 0)
2825 return r;
2826
2827 a_tmp = mfree(a_tmp); /* avoid rmdir */
2828 *tmp_dir = TAKE_PTR(a);
2829 *var_tmp_dir = TAKE_PTR(b);
2830
2831 return 0;
2832 }
2833
2834 int setup_shareable_ns(const int ns_storage_socket[static 2], unsigned long nsflag) {
2835 _cleanup_close_ int ns = -1;
2836 int r, q;
2837 const char *ns_name, *ns_path;
2838
2839 assert(ns_storage_socket);
2840 assert(ns_storage_socket[0] >= 0);
2841 assert(ns_storage_socket[1] >= 0);
2842
2843 ns_name = namespace_single_flag_to_string(nsflag);
2844 assert(ns_name);
2845
2846 /* We use the passed socketpair as a storage buffer for our
2847 * namespace reference fd. Whatever process runs this first
2848 * shall create a new namespace, all others should just join
2849 * it. To serialize that we use a file lock on the socket
2850 * pair.
2851 *
2852 * It's a bit crazy, but hey, works great! */
2853
2854 if (lockf(ns_storage_socket[0], F_LOCK, 0) < 0)
2855 return -errno;
2856
2857 ns = receive_one_fd(ns_storage_socket[0], MSG_DONTWAIT);
2858 if (ns == -EAGAIN) {
2859 /* Nothing stored yet, so let's create a new namespace. */
2860
2861 if (unshare(nsflag) < 0) {
2862 r = -errno;
2863 goto fail;
2864 }
2865
2866 (void) loopback_setup();
2867
2868 ns_path = strjoina("/proc/self/ns/", ns_name);
2869 ns = open(ns_path, O_RDONLY|O_CLOEXEC|O_NOCTTY);
2870 if (ns < 0) {
2871 r = -errno;
2872 goto fail;
2873 }
2874
2875 r = 1;
2876
2877 } else if (ns < 0) {
2878 r = ns;
2879 goto fail;
2880
2881 } else {
2882 /* Yay, found something, so let's join the namespace */
2883 if (setns(ns, nsflag) < 0) {
2884 r = -errno;
2885 goto fail;
2886 }
2887
2888 r = 0;
2889 }
2890
2891 q = send_one_fd(ns_storage_socket[1], ns, MSG_DONTWAIT);
2892 if (q < 0) {
2893 r = q;
2894 goto fail;
2895 }
2896
2897 fail:
2898 (void) lockf(ns_storage_socket[0], F_ULOCK, 0);
2899 return r;
2900 }
2901
2902 int open_shareable_ns_path(const int ns_storage_socket[static 2], const char *path, unsigned long nsflag) {
2903 _cleanup_close_ int ns = -1;
2904 int q, r;
2905
2906 assert(ns_storage_socket);
2907 assert(ns_storage_socket[0] >= 0);
2908 assert(ns_storage_socket[1] >= 0);
2909 assert(path);
2910
2911 /* If the storage socket doesn't contain a ns fd yet, open one via the file system and store it in
2912 * it. This is supposed to be called ahead of time, i.e. before setup_shareable_ns() which will
2913 * allocate a new anonymous ns if needed. */
2914
2915 if (lockf(ns_storage_socket[0], F_LOCK, 0) < 0)
2916 return -errno;
2917
2918 ns = receive_one_fd(ns_storage_socket[0], MSG_DONTWAIT);
2919 if (ns == -EAGAIN) {
2920 /* Nothing stored yet. Open the file from the file system. */
2921
2922 ns = open(path, O_RDONLY|O_NOCTTY|O_CLOEXEC);
2923 if (ns < 0) {
2924 r = -errno;
2925 goto fail;
2926 }
2927
2928 r = fd_is_ns(ns, nsflag);
2929 if (r == 0) { /* Not a ns of our type? Refuse early. */
2930 r = -EINVAL;
2931 goto fail;
2932 }
2933 if (r < 0 && r != -EUCLEAN) /* EUCLEAN: we don't know */
2934 goto fail;
2935
2936 r = 1;
2937
2938 } else if (ns < 0) {
2939 r = ns;
2940 goto fail;
2941 } else
2942 r = 0; /* Already allocated */
2943
2944 q = send_one_fd(ns_storage_socket[1], ns, MSG_DONTWAIT);
2945 if (q < 0) {
2946 r = q;
2947 goto fail;
2948 }
2949
2950 fail:
2951 (void) lockf(ns_storage_socket[0], F_ULOCK, 0);
2952 return r;
2953 }
2954
2955 bool ns_type_supported(NamespaceType type) {
2956 const char *t, *ns_proc;
2957
2958 t = namespace_type_to_string(type);
2959 if (!t) /* Don't know how to translate this? Then it's not supported */
2960 return false;
2961
2962 ns_proc = strjoina("/proc/self/ns/", t);
2963 return access(ns_proc, F_OK) == 0;
2964 }
2965
2966 static const char *const protect_home_table[_PROTECT_HOME_MAX] = {
2967 [PROTECT_HOME_NO] = "no",
2968 [PROTECT_HOME_YES] = "yes",
2969 [PROTECT_HOME_READ_ONLY] = "read-only",
2970 [PROTECT_HOME_TMPFS] = "tmpfs",
2971 };
2972
2973 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP_WITH_BOOLEAN(protect_home, ProtectHome, PROTECT_HOME_YES);
2974
2975 static const char *const protect_system_table[_PROTECT_SYSTEM_MAX] = {
2976 [PROTECT_SYSTEM_NO] = "no",
2977 [PROTECT_SYSTEM_YES] = "yes",
2978 [PROTECT_SYSTEM_FULL] = "full",
2979 [PROTECT_SYSTEM_STRICT] = "strict",
2980 };
2981
2982 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP_WITH_BOOLEAN(protect_system, ProtectSystem, PROTECT_SYSTEM_YES);
2983
2984 static const char* const namespace_type_table[] = {
2985 [NAMESPACE_MOUNT] = "mnt",
2986 [NAMESPACE_CGROUP] = "cgroup",
2987 [NAMESPACE_UTS] = "uts",
2988 [NAMESPACE_IPC] = "ipc",
2989 [NAMESPACE_USER] = "user",
2990 [NAMESPACE_PID] = "pid",
2991 [NAMESPACE_NET] = "net",
2992 [NAMESPACE_TIME] = "time",
2993 };
2994
2995 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(namespace_type, NamespaceType);
2996
2997 static const char* const protect_proc_table[_PROTECT_PROC_MAX] = {
2998 [PROTECT_PROC_DEFAULT] = "default",
2999 [PROTECT_PROC_NOACCESS] = "noaccess",
3000 [PROTECT_PROC_INVISIBLE] = "invisible",
3001 [PROTECT_PROC_PTRACEABLE] = "ptraceable",
3002 };
3003
3004 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(protect_proc, ProtectProc);
3005
3006 static const char* const proc_subset_table[_PROC_SUBSET_MAX] = {
3007 [PROC_SUBSET_ALL] = "all",
3008 [PROC_SUBSET_PID] = "pid",
3009 };
3010
3011 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(proc_subset, ProcSubset);