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Merge pull request #17092 from keszybz/libtool-excorcism
[thirdparty/systemd.git] / src / core / namespace.c
1 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1+ */
2
3 #include <errno.h>
4 #include <linux/loop.h>
5 #include <sched.h>
6 #include <stdio.h>
7 #include <sys/mount.h>
8 #include <unistd.h>
9 #include <linux/fs.h>
10
11 #include "alloc-util.h"
12 #include "base-filesystem.h"
13 #include "dev-setup.h"
14 #include "fd-util.h"
15 #include "format-util.h"
16 #include "fs-util.h"
17 #include "label.h"
18 #include "list.h"
19 #include "loop-util.h"
20 #include "loopback-setup.h"
21 #include "mkdir.h"
22 #include "mount-util.h"
23 #include "mountpoint-util.h"
24 #include "namespace-util.h"
25 #include "namespace.h"
26 #include "nulstr-util.h"
27 #include "path-util.h"
28 #include "selinux-util.h"
29 #include "socket-util.h"
30 #include "sort-util.h"
31 #include "stat-util.h"
32 #include "string-table.h"
33 #include "string-util.h"
34 #include "strv.h"
35 #include "tmpfile-util.h"
36 #include "umask-util.h"
37 #include "user-util.h"
38
39 #define DEV_MOUNT_OPTIONS (MS_NOSUID|MS_STRICTATIME|MS_NOEXEC)
40
41 typedef enum MountMode {
42 /* This is ordered by priority! */
43 INACCESSIBLE,
44 MOUNT_IMAGES,
45 BIND_MOUNT,
46 BIND_MOUNT_RECURSIVE,
47 PRIVATE_TMP,
48 PRIVATE_TMP_READONLY,
49 PRIVATE_DEV,
50 BIND_DEV,
51 EMPTY_DIR,
52 SYSFS,
53 PROCFS,
54 READONLY,
55 READWRITE,
56 TMPFS,
57 READWRITE_IMPLICIT, /* Should have the lowest priority. */
58 _MOUNT_MODE_MAX,
59 } MountMode;
60
61 typedef struct MountEntry {
62 const char *path_const; /* Memory allocated on stack or static */
63 MountMode mode:5;
64 bool ignore:1; /* Ignore if path does not exist? */
65 bool has_prefix:1; /* Already is prefixed by the root dir? */
66 bool read_only:1; /* Shall this mount point be read-only? */
67 bool nosuid:1; /* Shall set MS_NOSUID on the mount itself */
68 bool applied:1; /* Already applied */
69 char *path_malloc; /* Use this instead of 'path_const' if we had to allocate memory */
70 const char *source_const; /* The source path, for bind mounts or images */
71 char *source_malloc;
72 const char *options_const;/* Mount options for tmpfs */
73 char *options_malloc;
74 unsigned long flags; /* Mount flags used by EMPTY_DIR and TMPFS. Do not include MS_RDONLY here, but please use read_only. */
75 unsigned n_followed;
76 LIST_HEAD(MountOptions, image_options);
77 } MountEntry;
78
79 /* If MountAPIVFS= is used, let's mount /sys and /proc into the it, but only as a fallback if the user hasn't mounted
80 * something there already. These mounts are hence overridden by any other explicitly configured mounts. */
81 static const MountEntry apivfs_table[] = {
82 { "/proc", PROCFS, false },
83 { "/dev", BIND_DEV, false },
84 { "/sys", SYSFS, false },
85 };
86
87 /* ProtectKernelTunables= option and the related filesystem APIs */
88 static const MountEntry protect_kernel_tunables_table[] = {
89 { "/proc/acpi", READONLY, true },
90 { "/proc/apm", READONLY, true }, /* Obsolete API, there's no point in permitting access to this, ever */
91 { "/proc/asound", READONLY, true },
92 { "/proc/bus", READONLY, true },
93 { "/proc/fs", READONLY, true },
94 { "/proc/irq", READONLY, true },
95 { "/proc/kallsyms", INACCESSIBLE, true },
96 { "/proc/kcore", INACCESSIBLE, true },
97 { "/proc/latency_stats", READONLY, true },
98 { "/proc/mtrr", READONLY, true },
99 { "/proc/scsi", READONLY, true },
100 { "/proc/sys", READONLY, true },
101 { "/proc/sysrq-trigger", READONLY, true },
102 { "/proc/timer_stats", READONLY, true },
103 { "/sys", READONLY, false },
104 { "/sys/fs/bpf", READONLY, true },
105 { "/sys/fs/cgroup", READWRITE_IMPLICIT, false }, /* READONLY is set by ProtectControlGroups= option */
106 { "/sys/fs/selinux", READWRITE_IMPLICIT, true },
107 { "/sys/kernel/debug", READONLY, true },
108 { "/sys/kernel/tracing", READONLY, true },
109 };
110
111 /* ProtectKernelModules= option */
112 static const MountEntry protect_kernel_modules_table[] = {
113 #if HAVE_SPLIT_USR
114 { "/lib/modules", INACCESSIBLE, true },
115 #endif
116 { "/usr/lib/modules", INACCESSIBLE, true },
117 };
118
119 /* ProtectKernelLogs= option */
120 static const MountEntry protect_kernel_logs_table[] = {
121 { "/proc/kmsg", INACCESSIBLE, true },
122 { "/dev/kmsg", INACCESSIBLE, true },
123 };
124
125 /*
126 * ProtectHome=read-only table, protect $HOME and $XDG_RUNTIME_DIR and rest of
127 * system should be protected by ProtectSystem=
128 */
129 static const MountEntry protect_home_read_only_table[] = {
130 { "/home", READONLY, true },
131 { "/run/user", READONLY, true },
132 { "/root", READONLY, true },
133 };
134
135 /* ProtectHome=tmpfs table */
136 static const MountEntry protect_home_tmpfs_table[] = {
137 { "/home", TMPFS, true, .read_only = true, .options_const = "mode=0755" TMPFS_LIMITS_EMPTY_OR_ALMOST, .flags = MS_NODEV|MS_STRICTATIME },
138 { "/run/user", TMPFS, true, .read_only = true, .options_const = "mode=0755" TMPFS_LIMITS_EMPTY_OR_ALMOST, .flags = MS_NODEV|MS_STRICTATIME },
139 { "/root", TMPFS, true, .read_only = true, .options_const = "mode=0700" TMPFS_LIMITS_EMPTY_OR_ALMOST, .flags = MS_NODEV|MS_STRICTATIME },
140 };
141
142 /* ProtectHome=yes table */
143 static const MountEntry protect_home_yes_table[] = {
144 { "/home", INACCESSIBLE, true },
145 { "/run/user", INACCESSIBLE, true },
146 { "/root", INACCESSIBLE, true },
147 };
148
149 /* ProtectSystem=yes table */
150 static const MountEntry protect_system_yes_table[] = {
151 { "/usr", READONLY, false },
152 { "/boot", READONLY, true },
153 { "/efi", READONLY, true },
154 #if HAVE_SPLIT_USR
155 { "/lib", READONLY, true },
156 { "/lib64", READONLY, true },
157 { "/bin", READONLY, true },
158 # if HAVE_SPLIT_BIN
159 { "/sbin", READONLY, true },
160 # endif
161 #endif
162 };
163
164 /* ProtectSystem=full includes ProtectSystem=yes */
165 static const MountEntry protect_system_full_table[] = {
166 { "/usr", READONLY, false },
167 { "/boot", READONLY, true },
168 { "/efi", READONLY, true },
169 { "/etc", READONLY, false },
170 #if HAVE_SPLIT_USR
171 { "/lib", READONLY, true },
172 { "/lib64", READONLY, true },
173 { "/bin", READONLY, true },
174 # if HAVE_SPLIT_BIN
175 { "/sbin", READONLY, true },
176 # endif
177 #endif
178 };
179
180 /*
181 * ProtectSystem=strict table. In this strict mode, we mount everything
182 * read-only, except for /proc, /dev, /sys which are the kernel API VFS,
183 * which are left writable, but PrivateDevices= + ProtectKernelTunables=
184 * protect those, and these options should be fully orthogonal.
185 * (And of course /home and friends are also left writable, as ProtectHome=
186 * shall manage those, orthogonally).
187 */
188 static const MountEntry protect_system_strict_table[] = {
189 { "/", READONLY, false },
190 { "/proc", READWRITE_IMPLICIT, false }, /* ProtectKernelTunables= */
191 { "/sys", READWRITE_IMPLICIT, false }, /* ProtectKernelTunables= */
192 { "/dev", READWRITE_IMPLICIT, false }, /* PrivateDevices= */
193 { "/home", READWRITE_IMPLICIT, true }, /* ProtectHome= */
194 { "/run/user", READWRITE_IMPLICIT, true }, /* ProtectHome= */
195 { "/root", READWRITE_IMPLICIT, true }, /* ProtectHome= */
196 };
197
198 static const char * const mount_mode_table[_MOUNT_MODE_MAX] = {
199 [INACCESSIBLE] = "inaccessible",
200 [BIND_MOUNT] = "bind",
201 [BIND_MOUNT_RECURSIVE] = "rbind",
202 [PRIVATE_TMP] = "private-tmp",
203 [PRIVATE_DEV] = "private-dev",
204 [BIND_DEV] = "bind-dev",
205 [EMPTY_DIR] = "empty",
206 [SYSFS] = "sysfs",
207 [PROCFS] = "procfs",
208 [READONLY] = "read-only",
209 [READWRITE] = "read-write",
210 [TMPFS] = "tmpfs",
211 [MOUNT_IMAGES] = "mount-images",
212 [READWRITE_IMPLICIT] = "rw-implicit",
213 };
214
215 DEFINE_PRIVATE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP_TO_STRING(mount_mode, MountMode);
216
217 static const char *mount_entry_path(const MountEntry *p) {
218 assert(p);
219
220 /* Returns the path of this bind mount. If the malloc()-allocated ->path_buffer field is set we return that,
221 * otherwise the stack/static ->path field is returned. */
222
223 return p->path_malloc ?: p->path_const;
224 }
225
226 static bool mount_entry_read_only(const MountEntry *p) {
227 assert(p);
228
229 return p->read_only || IN_SET(p->mode, READONLY, INACCESSIBLE, PRIVATE_TMP_READONLY);
230 }
231
232 static const char *mount_entry_source(const MountEntry *p) {
233 assert(p);
234
235 return p->source_malloc ?: p->source_const;
236 }
237
238 static const char *mount_entry_options(const MountEntry *p) {
239 assert(p);
240
241 return p->options_malloc ?: p->options_const;
242 }
243
244 static void mount_entry_done(MountEntry *p) {
245 assert(p);
246
247 p->path_malloc = mfree(p->path_malloc);
248 p->source_malloc = mfree(p->source_malloc);
249 p->options_malloc = mfree(p->options_malloc);
250 p->image_options = mount_options_free_all(p->image_options);
251 }
252
253 static int append_access_mounts(MountEntry **p, char **strv, MountMode mode, bool forcibly_require_prefix) {
254 char **i;
255
256 assert(p);
257
258 /* Adds a list of user-supplied READWRITE/READWRITE_IMPLICIT/READONLY/INACCESSIBLE entries */
259
260 STRV_FOREACH(i, strv) {
261 bool ignore = false, needs_prefix = false;
262 const char *e = *i;
263
264 /* Look for any prefixes */
265 if (startswith(e, "-")) {
266 e++;
267 ignore = true;
268 }
269 if (startswith(e, "+")) {
270 e++;
271 needs_prefix = true;
272 }
273
274 if (!path_is_absolute(e))
275 return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL),
276 "Path is not absolute: %s", e);
277
278 *((*p)++) = (MountEntry) {
279 .path_const = e,
280 .mode = mode,
281 .ignore = ignore,
282 .has_prefix = !needs_prefix && !forcibly_require_prefix,
283 };
284 }
285
286 return 0;
287 }
288
289 static int append_empty_dir_mounts(MountEntry **p, char **strv) {
290 char **i;
291
292 assert(p);
293
294 /* Adds tmpfs mounts to provide readable but empty directories. This is primarily used to implement the
295 * "/private/" boundary directories for DynamicUser=1. */
296
297 STRV_FOREACH(i, strv) {
298
299 *((*p)++) = (MountEntry) {
300 .path_const = *i,
301 .mode = EMPTY_DIR,
302 .ignore = false,
303 .read_only = true,
304 .options_const = "mode=755" TMPFS_LIMITS_EMPTY_OR_ALMOST,
305 .flags = MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV|MS_STRICTATIME,
306 };
307 }
308
309 return 0;
310 }
311
312 static int append_bind_mounts(MountEntry **p, const BindMount *binds, size_t n) {
313 size_t i;
314
315 assert(p);
316
317 for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
318 const BindMount *b = binds + i;
319
320 *((*p)++) = (MountEntry) {
321 .path_const = b->destination,
322 .mode = b->recursive ? BIND_MOUNT_RECURSIVE : BIND_MOUNT,
323 .read_only = b->read_only,
324 .nosuid = b->nosuid,
325 .source_const = b->source,
326 .ignore = b->ignore_enoent,
327 };
328 }
329
330 return 0;
331 }
332
333 static int append_mount_images(MountEntry **p, const MountImage *mount_images, size_t n) {
334 assert(p);
335
336 for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++) {
337 const MountImage *m = mount_images + i;
338
339 *((*p)++) = (MountEntry) {
340 .path_const = m->destination,
341 .mode = MOUNT_IMAGES,
342 .source_const = m->source,
343 .image_options = m->mount_options,
344 .ignore = m->ignore_enoent,
345 };
346 }
347
348 return 0;
349 }
350
351 static int append_tmpfs_mounts(MountEntry **p, const TemporaryFileSystem *tmpfs, size_t n) {
352 assert(p);
353
354 for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++) {
355 const TemporaryFileSystem *t = tmpfs + i;
356 _cleanup_free_ char *o = NULL, *str = NULL;
357 unsigned long flags;
358 bool ro = false;
359 int r;
360
361 if (!path_is_absolute(t->path))
362 return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL),
363 "Path is not absolute: %s",
364 t->path);
365
366 str = strjoin("mode=0755" NESTED_TMPFS_LIMITS ",", t->options);
367 if (!str)
368 return -ENOMEM;
369
370 r = mount_option_mangle(str, MS_NODEV|MS_STRICTATIME, &flags, &o);
371 if (r < 0)
372 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to parse mount option '%s': %m", str);
373
374 ro = flags & MS_RDONLY;
375 if (ro)
376 flags ^= MS_RDONLY;
377
378 *((*p)++) = (MountEntry) {
379 .path_const = t->path,
380 .mode = TMPFS,
381 .read_only = ro,
382 .options_malloc = TAKE_PTR(o),
383 .flags = flags,
384 };
385 }
386
387 return 0;
388 }
389
390 static int append_static_mounts(MountEntry **p, const MountEntry *mounts, size_t n, bool ignore_protect) {
391 size_t i;
392
393 assert(p);
394 assert(mounts);
395
396 /* Adds a list of static pre-defined entries */
397
398 for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
399 *((*p)++) = (MountEntry) {
400 .path_const = mount_entry_path(mounts+i),
401 .mode = mounts[i].mode,
402 .ignore = mounts[i].ignore || ignore_protect,
403 };
404
405 return 0;
406 }
407
408 static int append_protect_home(MountEntry **p, ProtectHome protect_home, bool ignore_protect) {
409 assert(p);
410
411 switch (protect_home) {
412
413 case PROTECT_HOME_NO:
414 return 0;
415
416 case PROTECT_HOME_READ_ONLY:
417 return append_static_mounts(p, protect_home_read_only_table, ELEMENTSOF(protect_home_read_only_table), ignore_protect);
418
419 case PROTECT_HOME_TMPFS:
420 return append_static_mounts(p, protect_home_tmpfs_table, ELEMENTSOF(protect_home_tmpfs_table), ignore_protect);
421
422 case PROTECT_HOME_YES:
423 return append_static_mounts(p, protect_home_yes_table, ELEMENTSOF(protect_home_yes_table), ignore_protect);
424
425 default:
426 assert_not_reached("Unexpected ProtectHome= value");
427 }
428 }
429
430 static int append_protect_system(MountEntry **p, ProtectSystem protect_system, bool ignore_protect) {
431 assert(p);
432
433 switch (protect_system) {
434
435 case PROTECT_SYSTEM_NO:
436 return 0;
437
438 case PROTECT_SYSTEM_STRICT:
439 return append_static_mounts(p, protect_system_strict_table, ELEMENTSOF(protect_system_strict_table), ignore_protect);
440
441 case PROTECT_SYSTEM_YES:
442 return append_static_mounts(p, protect_system_yes_table, ELEMENTSOF(protect_system_yes_table), ignore_protect);
443
444 case PROTECT_SYSTEM_FULL:
445 return append_static_mounts(p, protect_system_full_table, ELEMENTSOF(protect_system_full_table), ignore_protect);
446
447 default:
448 assert_not_reached("Unexpected ProtectSystem= value");
449 }
450 }
451
452 static int mount_path_compare(const MountEntry *a, const MountEntry *b) {
453 int d;
454
455 /* If the paths are not equal, then order prefixes first */
456 d = path_compare(mount_entry_path(a), mount_entry_path(b));
457 if (d != 0)
458 return d;
459
460 /* If the paths are equal, check the mode */
461 return CMP((int) a->mode, (int) b->mode);
462 }
463
464 static int prefix_where_needed(MountEntry *m, size_t n, const char *root_directory) {
465 size_t i;
466
467 /* Prefixes all paths in the bind mount table with the root directory if the entry needs that. */
468
469 for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
470 char *s;
471
472 if (m[i].has_prefix)
473 continue;
474
475 s = path_join(root_directory, mount_entry_path(m+i));
476 if (!s)
477 return -ENOMEM;
478
479 free_and_replace(m[i].path_malloc, s);
480 m[i].has_prefix = true;
481 }
482
483 return 0;
484 }
485
486 static void drop_duplicates(MountEntry *m, size_t *n) {
487 MountEntry *f, *t, *previous;
488
489 assert(m);
490 assert(n);
491
492 /* Drops duplicate entries. Expects that the array is properly ordered already. */
493
494 for (f = m, t = m, previous = NULL; f < m + *n; f++) {
495
496 /* The first one wins (which is the one with the more restrictive mode), see mount_path_compare()
497 * above. Note that we only drop duplicates that haven't been mounted yet. */
498 if (previous &&
499 path_equal(mount_entry_path(f), mount_entry_path(previous)) &&
500 !f->applied && !previous->applied) {
501 log_debug("%s (%s) is duplicate.", mount_entry_path(f), mount_mode_to_string(f->mode));
502 previous->read_only = previous->read_only || mount_entry_read_only(f); /* Propagate the read-only flag to the remaining entry */
503 mount_entry_done(f);
504 continue;
505 }
506
507 *t = *f;
508 previous = t;
509 t++;
510 }
511
512 *n = t - m;
513 }
514
515 static void drop_inaccessible(MountEntry *m, size_t *n) {
516 MountEntry *f, *t;
517 const char *clear = NULL;
518
519 assert(m);
520 assert(n);
521
522 /* Drops all entries obstructed by another entry further up the tree. Expects that the array is properly
523 * ordered already. */
524
525 for (f = m, t = m; f < m + *n; f++) {
526
527 /* If we found a path set for INACCESSIBLE earlier, and this entry has it as prefix we should drop
528 * it, as inaccessible paths really should drop the entire subtree. */
529 if (clear && path_startswith(mount_entry_path(f), clear)) {
530 log_debug("%s is masked by %s.", mount_entry_path(f), clear);
531 mount_entry_done(f);
532 continue;
533 }
534
535 clear = f->mode == INACCESSIBLE ? mount_entry_path(f) : NULL;
536
537 *t = *f;
538 t++;
539 }
540
541 *n = t - m;
542 }
543
544 static void drop_nop(MountEntry *m, size_t *n) {
545 MountEntry *f, *t;
546
547 assert(m);
548 assert(n);
549
550 /* Drops all entries which have an immediate parent that has the same type, as they are redundant. Assumes the
551 * list is ordered by prefixes. */
552
553 for (f = m, t = m; f < m + *n; f++) {
554
555 /* Only suppress such subtrees for READONLY, READWRITE and READWRITE_IMPLICIT entries */
556 if (IN_SET(f->mode, READONLY, READWRITE, READWRITE_IMPLICIT)) {
557 MountEntry *p;
558 bool found = false;
559
560 /* Now let's find the first parent of the entry we are looking at. */
561 for (p = t-1; p >= m; p--) {
562 if (path_startswith(mount_entry_path(f), mount_entry_path(p))) {
563 found = true;
564 break;
565 }
566 }
567
568 /* We found it, let's see if it's the same mode, if so, we can drop this entry */
569 if (found && p->mode == f->mode) {
570 log_debug("%s (%s) is made redundant by %s (%s)",
571 mount_entry_path(f), mount_mode_to_string(f->mode),
572 mount_entry_path(p), mount_mode_to_string(p->mode));
573 mount_entry_done(f);
574 continue;
575 }
576 }
577
578 *t = *f;
579 t++;
580 }
581
582 *n = t - m;
583 }
584
585 static void drop_outside_root(const char *root_directory, MountEntry *m, size_t *n) {
586 MountEntry *f, *t;
587
588 assert(m);
589 assert(n);
590
591 /* Nothing to do */
592 if (!root_directory)
593 return;
594
595 /* Drops all mounts that are outside of the root directory. */
596
597 for (f = m, t = m; f < m + *n; f++) {
598
599 if (!path_startswith(mount_entry_path(f), root_directory)) {
600 log_debug("%s is outside of root directory.", mount_entry_path(f));
601 mount_entry_done(f);
602 continue;
603 }
604
605 *t = *f;
606 t++;
607 }
608
609 *n = t - m;
610 }
611
612 static int clone_device_node(
613 const char *d,
614 const char *temporary_mount,
615 bool *make_devnode) {
616
617 _cleanup_free_ char *sl = NULL;
618 const char *dn, *bn, *t;
619 struct stat st;
620 int r;
621
622 if (stat(d, &st) < 0) {
623 if (errno == ENOENT) {
624 log_debug_errno(errno, "Device node '%s' to clone does not exist, ignoring.", d);
625 return -ENXIO;
626 }
627
628 return log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to stat() device node '%s' to clone, ignoring: %m", d);
629 }
630
631 if (!S_ISBLK(st.st_mode) &&
632 !S_ISCHR(st.st_mode))
633 return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL),
634 "Device node '%s' to clone is not a device node, ignoring.",
635 d);
636
637 dn = strjoina(temporary_mount, d);
638
639 /* First, try to create device node properly */
640 if (*make_devnode) {
641 mac_selinux_create_file_prepare(d, st.st_mode);
642 r = mknod(dn, st.st_mode, st.st_rdev);
643 mac_selinux_create_file_clear();
644 if (r >= 0)
645 goto add_symlink;
646 if (errno != EPERM)
647 return log_debug_errno(errno, "mknod failed for %s: %m", d);
648
649 /* This didn't work, let's not try this again for the next iterations. */
650 *make_devnode = false;
651 }
652
653 /* We're about to fall back to bind-mounting the device
654 * node. So create a dummy bind-mount target.
655 * Do not prepare device-node SELinux label (see issue 13762) */
656 r = mknod(dn, S_IFREG, 0);
657 if (r < 0 && errno != EEXIST)
658 return log_debug_errno(errno, "mknod() fallback failed for '%s': %m", d);
659
660 /* Fallback to bind-mounting:
661 * The assumption here is that all used device nodes carry standard
662 * properties. Specifically, the devices nodes we bind-mount should
663 * either be owned by root:root or root:tty (e.g. /dev/tty, /dev/ptmx)
664 * and should not carry ACLs. */
665 if (mount(d, dn, NULL, MS_BIND, NULL) < 0)
666 return log_debug_errno(errno, "Bind mounting failed for '%s': %m", d);
667
668 add_symlink:
669 bn = path_startswith(d, "/dev/");
670 if (!bn)
671 return 0;
672
673 /* Create symlinks like /dev/char/1:9 → ../urandom */
674 if (asprintf(&sl, "%s/dev/%s/%u:%u",
675 temporary_mount,
676 S_ISCHR(st.st_mode) ? "char" : "block",
677 major(st.st_rdev), minor(st.st_rdev)) < 0)
678 return log_oom();
679
680 (void) mkdir_parents(sl, 0755);
681
682 t = strjoina("../", bn);
683 if (symlink(t, sl) < 0)
684 log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to symlink '%s' to '%s', ignoring: %m", t, sl);
685
686 return 0;
687 }
688
689 static int mount_private_dev(MountEntry *m) {
690 static const char devnodes[] =
691 "/dev/null\0"
692 "/dev/zero\0"
693 "/dev/full\0"
694 "/dev/random\0"
695 "/dev/urandom\0"
696 "/dev/tty\0";
697
698 char temporary_mount[] = "/tmp/namespace-dev-XXXXXX";
699 const char *d, *dev = NULL, *devpts = NULL, *devshm = NULL, *devhugepages = NULL, *devmqueue = NULL, *devlog = NULL, *devptmx = NULL;
700 bool can_mknod = true;
701 _cleanup_umask_ mode_t u;
702 int r;
703
704 assert(m);
705
706 u = umask(0000);
707
708 if (!mkdtemp(temporary_mount))
709 return log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to create temporary directory '%s': %m", temporary_mount);
710
711 dev = strjoina(temporary_mount, "/dev");
712 (void) mkdir(dev, 0755);
713 if (mount("tmpfs", dev, "tmpfs", DEV_MOUNT_OPTIONS, "mode=755" TMPFS_LIMITS_DEV) < 0) {
714 r = log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to mount tmpfs on '%s': %m", dev);
715 goto fail;
716 }
717 r = label_fix_container(dev, "/dev", 0);
718 if (r < 0) {
719 log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to fix label of '%s' as /dev: %m", dev);
720 goto fail;
721 }
722
723 devpts = strjoina(temporary_mount, "/dev/pts");
724 (void) mkdir(devpts, 0755);
725 if (mount("/dev/pts", devpts, NULL, MS_BIND, NULL) < 0) {
726 r = log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to bind mount /dev/pts on '%s': %m", devpts);
727 goto fail;
728 }
729
730 /* /dev/ptmx can either be a device node or a symlink to /dev/pts/ptmx.
731 * When /dev/ptmx a device node, /dev/pts/ptmx has 000 permissions making it inaccessible.
732 * Thus, in that case make a clone.
733 * In nspawn and other containers it will be a symlink, in that case make it a symlink. */
734 r = is_symlink("/dev/ptmx");
735 if (r < 0) {
736 log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to detect whether /dev/ptmx is a symlink or not: %m");
737 goto fail;
738 } else if (r > 0) {
739 devptmx = strjoina(temporary_mount, "/dev/ptmx");
740 if (symlink("pts/ptmx", devptmx) < 0) {
741 r = log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to create a symlink '%s' to pts/ptmx: %m", devptmx);
742 goto fail;
743 }
744 } else {
745 r = clone_device_node("/dev/ptmx", temporary_mount, &can_mknod);
746 if (r < 0)
747 goto fail;
748 }
749
750 devshm = strjoina(temporary_mount, "/dev/shm");
751 (void) mkdir(devshm, 0755);
752 r = mount("/dev/shm", devshm, NULL, MS_BIND, NULL);
753 if (r < 0) {
754 r = log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to bind mount /dev/shm on '%s': %m", devshm);
755 goto fail;
756 }
757
758 devmqueue = strjoina(temporary_mount, "/dev/mqueue");
759 (void) mkdir(devmqueue, 0755);
760 if (mount("/dev/mqueue", devmqueue, NULL, MS_BIND, NULL) < 0)
761 log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to bind mount /dev/mqueue on '%s', ignoring: %m", devmqueue);
762
763 devhugepages = strjoina(temporary_mount, "/dev/hugepages");
764 (void) mkdir(devhugepages, 0755);
765 if (mount("/dev/hugepages", devhugepages, NULL, MS_BIND, NULL) < 0)
766 log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to bind mount /dev/hugepages on '%s', ignoring: %m", devhugepages);
767
768 devlog = strjoina(temporary_mount, "/dev/log");
769 if (symlink("/run/systemd/journal/dev-log", devlog) < 0)
770 log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to create a symlink '%s' to /run/systemd/journal/dev-log, ignoring: %m", devlog);
771
772 NULSTR_FOREACH(d, devnodes) {
773 r = clone_device_node(d, temporary_mount, &can_mknod);
774 /* ENXIO means the *source* is not a device file, skip creation in that case */
775 if (r < 0 && r != -ENXIO)
776 goto fail;
777 }
778
779 r = dev_setup(temporary_mount, UID_INVALID, GID_INVALID);
780 if (r < 0)
781 log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to set up basic device tree at '%s', ignoring: %m", temporary_mount);
782
783 /* Create the /dev directory if missing. It is more likely to be
784 * missing when the service is started with RootDirectory. This is
785 * consistent with mount units creating the mount points when missing.
786 */
787 (void) mkdir_p_label(mount_entry_path(m), 0755);
788
789 /* Unmount everything in old /dev */
790 r = umount_recursive(mount_entry_path(m), 0);
791 if (r < 0)
792 log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to unmount directories below '%s', ignoring: %m", mount_entry_path(m));
793
794 if (mount(dev, mount_entry_path(m), NULL, MS_MOVE, NULL) < 0) {
795 r = log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to move mount point '%s' to '%s': %m", dev, mount_entry_path(m));
796 goto fail;
797 }
798
799 (void) rmdir(dev);
800 (void) rmdir(temporary_mount);
801
802 return 0;
803
804 fail:
805 if (devpts)
806 (void) umount(devpts);
807
808 if (devshm)
809 (void) umount(devshm);
810
811 if (devhugepages)
812 (void) umount(devhugepages);
813
814 if (devmqueue)
815 (void) umount(devmqueue);
816
817 (void) umount(dev);
818 (void) rmdir(dev);
819 (void) rmdir(temporary_mount);
820
821 return r;
822 }
823
824 static int mount_bind_dev(const MountEntry *m) {
825 int r;
826
827 assert(m);
828
829 /* Implements the little brother of mount_private_dev(): simply bind mounts the host's /dev into the service's
830 * /dev. This is only used when RootDirectory= is set. */
831
832 (void) mkdir_p_label(mount_entry_path(m), 0755);
833
834 r = path_is_mount_point(mount_entry_path(m), NULL, 0);
835 if (r < 0)
836 return log_debug_errno(r, "Unable to determine whether /dev is already mounted: %m");
837 if (r > 0) /* make this a NOP if /dev is already a mount point */
838 return 0;
839
840 if (mount("/dev", mount_entry_path(m), NULL, MS_BIND|MS_REC, NULL) < 0)
841 return log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to bind mount %s: %m", mount_entry_path(m));
842
843 return 1;
844 }
845
846 static int mount_sysfs(const MountEntry *m) {
847 int r;
848
849 assert(m);
850
851 (void) mkdir_p_label(mount_entry_path(m), 0755);
852
853 r = path_is_mount_point(mount_entry_path(m), NULL, 0);
854 if (r < 0)
855 return log_debug_errno(r, "Unable to determine whether /sys is already mounted: %m");
856 if (r > 0) /* make this a NOP if /sys is already a mount point */
857 return 0;
858
859 /* Bind mount the host's version so that we get all child mounts of it, too. */
860 if (mount("/sys", mount_entry_path(m), NULL, MS_BIND|MS_REC, NULL) < 0)
861 return log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to mount %s: %m", mount_entry_path(m));
862
863 return 1;
864 }
865
866 static int mount_procfs(const MountEntry *m, const NamespaceInfo *ns_info) {
867 const char *entry_path;
868
869 assert(m);
870 assert(ns_info);
871
872 entry_path = mount_entry_path(m);
873
874 /* Mount a new instance, so that we get the one that matches our user namespace, if we are running in
875 * one. i.e we don't reuse existing mounts here under any condition, we want a new instance owned by
876 * our user namespace and with our hidepid= settings applied. Hence, let's get rid of everything
877 * mounted on /proc/ first. */
878
879 (void) mkdir_p_label(entry_path, 0755);
880 (void) umount_recursive(entry_path, 0);
881
882 if (ns_info->protect_proc != PROTECT_PROC_DEFAULT ||
883 ns_info->proc_subset != PROC_SUBSET_ALL) {
884 _cleanup_free_ char *opts = NULL;
885
886 /* Starting with kernel 5.8 procfs' hidepid= logic is truly per-instance (previously it
887 * pretended to be per-instance but actually was per-namespace), hence let's make use of it
888 * if requested. To make sure this logic succeeds only on kernels where hidepid= is
889 * per-instance, we'll exclusively use the textual value for hidepid=, since support was
890 * added in the same commit: if it's supported it is thus also per-instance. */
891
892 opts = strjoin("hidepid=",
893 ns_info->protect_proc == PROTECT_PROC_DEFAULT ? "off" :
894 protect_proc_to_string(ns_info->protect_proc),
895 ns_info->proc_subset == PROC_SUBSET_PID ? ",subset=pid" : "");
896 if (!opts)
897 return -ENOMEM;
898
899 if (mount("proc", entry_path, "proc", MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV, opts) < 0) {
900 if (errno != EINVAL)
901 return log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to mount %s (options=%s): %m", mount_entry_path(m), opts);
902
903 /* If this failed with EINVAL then this likely means the textual hidepid= stuff is
904 * not supported by the kernel, and thus the per-instance hidepid= neither, which
905 * means we really don't want to use it, since it would affect our host's /proc
906 * mount. Hence let's gracefully fallback to a classic, unrestricted version. */
907 } else
908 return 1;
909 }
910
911 if (mount("proc", entry_path, "proc", MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV, NULL) < 0)
912 return log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to mount %s (no options): %m", mount_entry_path(m));
913
914 return 1;
915 }
916
917 static int mount_tmpfs(const MountEntry *m) {
918 const char *entry_path, *inner_path;
919 int r;
920
921 assert(m);
922
923 entry_path = mount_entry_path(m);
924 inner_path = m->path_const;
925
926 /* First, get rid of everything that is below if there is anything. Then, overmount with our new tmpfs */
927
928 (void) mkdir_p_label(entry_path, 0755);
929 (void) umount_recursive(entry_path, 0);
930
931 if (mount("tmpfs", entry_path, "tmpfs", m->flags, mount_entry_options(m)) < 0)
932 return log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to mount %s: %m", entry_path);
933
934 r = label_fix_container(entry_path, inner_path, 0);
935 if (r < 0)
936 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to fix label of '%s' as '%s': %m", entry_path, inner_path);
937
938 return 1;
939 }
940
941 static int mount_images(const MountEntry *m) {
942 _cleanup_(loop_device_unrefp) LoopDevice *loop_device = NULL;
943 _cleanup_(decrypted_image_unrefp) DecryptedImage *decrypted_image = NULL;
944 _cleanup_(dissected_image_unrefp) DissectedImage *dissected_image = NULL;
945 _cleanup_(verity_settings_done) VeritySettings verity = {};
946 DissectImageFlags dissect_image_flags;
947 int r;
948
949 assert(m);
950
951 r = verity_settings_load(&verity, mount_entry_source(m), NULL, NULL);
952 if (r < 0)
953 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to load root hash: %m");
954
955 dissect_image_flags =
956 (m->read_only ? DISSECT_IMAGE_READ_ONLY : 0) |
957 (verity.data_path ? DISSECT_IMAGE_NO_PARTITION_TABLE : 0);
958
959 r = loop_device_make_by_path(
960 mount_entry_source(m),
961 m->read_only ? O_RDONLY : -1 /* < 0 means writable if possible, read-only as fallback */,
962 verity.data_path ? 0 : LO_FLAGS_PARTSCAN,
963 &loop_device);
964 if (r < 0)
965 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to create loop device for image: %m");
966
967 r = dissect_image(
968 loop_device->fd,
969 &verity,
970 m->image_options,
971 dissect_image_flags,
972 &dissected_image);
973 /* No partition table? Might be a single-filesystem image, try again */
974 if (!verity.data_path && r == -ENOPKG)
975 r = dissect_image(
976 loop_device->fd,
977 &verity,
978 m->image_options,
979 dissect_image_flags|DISSECT_IMAGE_NO_PARTITION_TABLE,
980 &dissected_image);
981 if (r < 0)
982 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to dissect image: %m");
983
984 r = dissected_image_decrypt(
985 dissected_image,
986 NULL,
987 &verity,
988 dissect_image_flags,
989 &decrypted_image);
990 if (r < 0)
991 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to decrypt dissected image: %m");
992
993 r = mkdir_p_label(mount_entry_path(m), 0755);
994 if (r < 0)
995 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to create destination directory %s: %m", mount_entry_path(m));
996 r = umount_recursive(mount_entry_path(m), 0);
997 if (r < 0)
998 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to umount under destination directory %s: %m", mount_entry_path(m));
999
1000 r = dissected_image_mount(dissected_image, mount_entry_path(m), UID_INVALID, dissect_image_flags);
1001 if (r < 0)
1002 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to mount image: %m");
1003
1004 if (decrypted_image) {
1005 r = decrypted_image_relinquish(decrypted_image);
1006 if (r < 0)
1007 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to relinquish decrypted image: %m");
1008 }
1009
1010 loop_device_relinquish(loop_device);
1011
1012 return 1;
1013 }
1014
1015 static int follow_symlink(
1016 const char *root_directory,
1017 MountEntry *m) {
1018
1019 _cleanup_free_ char *target = NULL;
1020 int r;
1021
1022 /* Let's chase symlinks, but only one step at a time. That's because depending where the symlink points we
1023 * might need to change the order in which we mount stuff. Hence: let's normalize piecemeal, and do one step at
1024 * a time by specifying CHASE_STEP. This function returns 0 if we resolved one step, and > 0 if we reached the
1025 * end and already have a fully normalized name. */
1026
1027 r = chase_symlinks(mount_entry_path(m), root_directory, CHASE_STEP|CHASE_NONEXISTENT, &target, NULL);
1028 if (r < 0)
1029 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to chase symlinks '%s': %m", mount_entry_path(m));
1030 if (r > 0) /* Reached the end, nothing more to resolve */
1031 return 1;
1032
1033 if (m->n_followed >= CHASE_SYMLINKS_MAX) /* put a boundary on things */
1034 return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ELOOP),
1035 "Symlink loop on '%s'.",
1036 mount_entry_path(m));
1037
1038 log_debug("Followed mount entry path symlink %s → %s.", mount_entry_path(m), target);
1039
1040 free_and_replace(m->path_malloc, target);
1041 m->has_prefix = true;
1042
1043 m->n_followed ++;
1044
1045 return 0;
1046 }
1047
1048 static int apply_mount(
1049 const char *root_directory,
1050 MountEntry *m,
1051 const NamespaceInfo *ns_info) {
1052
1053 _cleanup_free_ char *inaccessible = NULL;
1054 bool rbind = true, make = false;
1055 const char *what;
1056 int r;
1057
1058 assert(m);
1059 assert(ns_info);
1060
1061 log_debug("Applying namespace mount on %s", mount_entry_path(m));
1062
1063 switch (m->mode) {
1064
1065 case INACCESSIBLE: {
1066 _cleanup_free_ char *tmp = NULL;
1067 const char *runtime_dir;
1068 struct stat target;
1069
1070 /* First, get rid of everything that is below if there
1071 * is anything... Then, overmount it with an
1072 * inaccessible path. */
1073 (void) umount_recursive(mount_entry_path(m), 0);
1074
1075 if (lstat(mount_entry_path(m), &target) < 0) {
1076 if (errno == ENOENT && m->ignore)
1077 return 0;
1078
1079 return log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to lstat() %s to determine what to mount over it: %m",
1080 mount_entry_path(m));
1081 }
1082
1083 if (geteuid() == 0)
1084 runtime_dir = "/run";
1085 else {
1086 if (asprintf(&tmp, "/run/user/" UID_FMT, geteuid()) < 0)
1087 return -ENOMEM;
1088
1089 runtime_dir = tmp;
1090 }
1091
1092 r = mode_to_inaccessible_node(runtime_dir, target.st_mode, &inaccessible);
1093 if (r < 0)
1094 return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ELOOP),
1095 "File type not supported for inaccessible mounts. Note that symlinks are not allowed");
1096 what = inaccessible;
1097 break;
1098 }
1099
1100 case READONLY:
1101 case READWRITE:
1102 case READWRITE_IMPLICIT:
1103 r = path_is_mount_point(mount_entry_path(m), root_directory, 0);
1104 if (r == -ENOENT && m->ignore)
1105 return 0;
1106 if (r < 0)
1107 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to determine whether %s is already a mount point: %m",
1108 mount_entry_path(m));
1109 if (r > 0) /* Nothing to do here, it is already a mount. We just later toggle the MS_RDONLY
1110 * bit for the mount point if needed. */
1111 return 0;
1112 /* This isn't a mount point yet, let's make it one. */
1113 what = mount_entry_path(m);
1114 break;
1115
1116 case BIND_MOUNT:
1117 rbind = false;
1118
1119 _fallthrough_;
1120 case BIND_MOUNT_RECURSIVE: {
1121 _cleanup_free_ char *chased = NULL;
1122
1123 /* Since mount() will always follow symlinks we chase the symlinks on our own first. Note
1124 * that bind mount source paths are always relative to the host root, hence we pass NULL as
1125 * root directory to chase_symlinks() here. */
1126
1127 r = chase_symlinks(mount_entry_source(m), NULL, CHASE_TRAIL_SLASH, &chased, NULL);
1128 if (r == -ENOENT && m->ignore) {
1129 log_debug_errno(r, "Path %s does not exist, ignoring.", mount_entry_source(m));
1130 return 0;
1131 }
1132 if (r < 0)
1133 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to follow symlinks on %s: %m", mount_entry_source(m));
1134
1135 log_debug("Followed source symlinks %s → %s.", mount_entry_source(m), chased);
1136
1137 free_and_replace(m->source_malloc, chased);
1138
1139 what = mount_entry_source(m);
1140 make = true;
1141 break;
1142 }
1143
1144 case EMPTY_DIR:
1145 case TMPFS:
1146 return mount_tmpfs(m);
1147
1148 case PRIVATE_TMP:
1149 case PRIVATE_TMP_READONLY:
1150 what = mount_entry_source(m);
1151 make = true;
1152 break;
1153
1154 case PRIVATE_DEV:
1155 return mount_private_dev(m);
1156
1157 case BIND_DEV:
1158 return mount_bind_dev(m);
1159
1160 case SYSFS:
1161 return mount_sysfs(m);
1162
1163 case PROCFS:
1164 return mount_procfs(m, ns_info);
1165
1166 case MOUNT_IMAGES:
1167 return mount_images(m);
1168
1169 default:
1170 assert_not_reached("Unknown mode");
1171 }
1172
1173 assert(what);
1174
1175 if (mount(what, mount_entry_path(m), NULL, MS_BIND|(rbind ? MS_REC : 0), NULL) < 0) {
1176 bool try_again = false;
1177 r = -errno;
1178
1179 if (r == -ENOENT && make) {
1180 struct stat st;
1181
1182 /* Hmm, either the source or the destination are missing. Let's see if we can create
1183 the destination, then try again. */
1184
1185 if (stat(what, &st) < 0)
1186 log_error_errno(errno, "Mount point source '%s' is not accessible: %m", what);
1187 else {
1188 int q;
1189
1190 (void) mkdir_parents(mount_entry_path(m), 0755);
1191
1192 if (S_ISDIR(st.st_mode))
1193 q = mkdir(mount_entry_path(m), 0755) < 0 ? -errno : 0;
1194 else
1195 q = touch(mount_entry_path(m));
1196
1197 if (q < 0)
1198 log_error_errno(q, "Failed to create destination mount point node '%s': %m",
1199 mount_entry_path(m));
1200 else
1201 try_again = true;
1202 }
1203 }
1204
1205 if (try_again) {
1206 if (mount(what, mount_entry_path(m), NULL, MS_BIND|(rbind ? MS_REC : 0), NULL) < 0)
1207 r = -errno;
1208 else
1209 r = 0;
1210 }
1211
1212 if (r < 0)
1213 return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to mount %s to %s: %m", what, mount_entry_path(m));
1214 }
1215
1216 log_debug("Successfully mounted %s to %s", what, mount_entry_path(m));
1217 return 0;
1218 }
1219
1220 static int make_read_only(const MountEntry *m, char **deny_list, FILE *proc_self_mountinfo) {
1221 unsigned long new_flags = 0, flags_mask = 0;
1222 bool submounts = false;
1223 int r = 0;
1224
1225 assert(m);
1226 assert(proc_self_mountinfo);
1227
1228 if (mount_entry_read_only(m) || m->mode == PRIVATE_DEV) {
1229 new_flags |= MS_RDONLY;
1230 flags_mask |= MS_RDONLY;
1231 }
1232
1233 if (m->nosuid) {
1234 new_flags |= MS_NOSUID;
1235 flags_mask |= MS_NOSUID;
1236 }
1237
1238 if (flags_mask == 0) /* No Change? */
1239 return 0;
1240
1241 /* We generally apply these changes recursively, except for /dev, and the cases we know there's
1242 * nothing further down. Set /dev readonly, but not submounts like /dev/shm. Also, we only set the
1243 * per-mount read-only flag. We can't set it on the superblock, if we are inside a user namespace
1244 * and running Linux <= 4.17. */
1245 submounts =
1246 mount_entry_read_only(m) &&
1247 !IN_SET(m->mode, EMPTY_DIR, TMPFS);
1248 if (submounts)
1249 r = bind_remount_recursive_with_mountinfo(mount_entry_path(m), new_flags, flags_mask, deny_list, proc_self_mountinfo);
1250 else
1251 r = bind_remount_one_with_mountinfo(mount_entry_path(m), new_flags, flags_mask, proc_self_mountinfo);
1252
1253 /* Not that we only turn on the MS_RDONLY flag here, we never turn it off. Something that was marked
1254 * read-only already stays this way. This improves compatibility with container managers, where we
1255 * won't attempt to undo read-only mounts already applied. */
1256
1257 if (r == -ENOENT && m->ignore)
1258 return 0;
1259 if (r < 0)
1260 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to re-mount '%s'%s: %m", mount_entry_path(m),
1261 submounts ? " and its submounts" : "");
1262 return 0;
1263 }
1264
1265 static bool namespace_info_mount_apivfs(const NamespaceInfo *ns_info) {
1266 assert(ns_info);
1267
1268 /*
1269 * ProtectControlGroups= and ProtectKernelTunables= imply MountAPIVFS=,
1270 * since to protect the API VFS mounts, they need to be around in the
1271 * first place...
1272 */
1273
1274 return ns_info->mount_apivfs ||
1275 ns_info->protect_control_groups ||
1276 ns_info->protect_kernel_tunables ||
1277 ns_info->protect_proc != PROTECT_PROC_DEFAULT ||
1278 ns_info->proc_subset != PROC_SUBSET_ALL;
1279 }
1280
1281 static size_t namespace_calculate_mounts(
1282 const NamespaceInfo *ns_info,
1283 char** read_write_paths,
1284 char** read_only_paths,
1285 char** inaccessible_paths,
1286 char** empty_directories,
1287 size_t n_bind_mounts,
1288 size_t n_temporary_filesystems,
1289 size_t n_mount_images,
1290 const char* tmp_dir,
1291 const char* var_tmp_dir,
1292 const char *creds_path,
1293 const char* log_namespace) {
1294
1295 size_t protect_home_cnt;
1296 size_t protect_system_cnt =
1297 (ns_info->protect_system == PROTECT_SYSTEM_STRICT ?
1298 ELEMENTSOF(protect_system_strict_table) :
1299 ((ns_info->protect_system == PROTECT_SYSTEM_FULL) ?
1300 ELEMENTSOF(protect_system_full_table) :
1301 ((ns_info->protect_system == PROTECT_SYSTEM_YES) ?
1302 ELEMENTSOF(protect_system_yes_table) : 0)));
1303
1304 protect_home_cnt =
1305 (ns_info->protect_home == PROTECT_HOME_YES ?
1306 ELEMENTSOF(protect_home_yes_table) :
1307 ((ns_info->protect_home == PROTECT_HOME_READ_ONLY) ?
1308 ELEMENTSOF(protect_home_read_only_table) :
1309 ((ns_info->protect_home == PROTECT_HOME_TMPFS) ?
1310 ELEMENTSOF(protect_home_tmpfs_table) : 0)));
1311
1312 return !!tmp_dir + !!var_tmp_dir +
1313 strv_length(read_write_paths) +
1314 strv_length(read_only_paths) +
1315 strv_length(inaccessible_paths) +
1316 strv_length(empty_directories) +
1317 n_bind_mounts +
1318 n_mount_images +
1319 n_temporary_filesystems +
1320 ns_info->private_dev +
1321 (ns_info->protect_kernel_tunables ? ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_tunables_table) : 0) +
1322 (ns_info->protect_kernel_modules ? ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_modules_table) : 0) +
1323 (ns_info->protect_kernel_logs ? ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_logs_table) : 0) +
1324 (ns_info->protect_control_groups ? 1 : 0) +
1325 protect_home_cnt + protect_system_cnt +
1326 (ns_info->protect_hostname ? 2 : 0) +
1327 (namespace_info_mount_apivfs(ns_info) ? ELEMENTSOF(apivfs_table) : 0) +
1328 (creds_path ? 2 : 1) +
1329 !!log_namespace;
1330 }
1331
1332 static void normalize_mounts(const char *root_directory, MountEntry *mounts, size_t *n_mounts) {
1333 assert(root_directory);
1334 assert(n_mounts);
1335 assert(mounts || *n_mounts == 0);
1336
1337 typesafe_qsort(mounts, *n_mounts, mount_path_compare);
1338
1339 drop_duplicates(mounts, n_mounts);
1340 drop_outside_root(root_directory, mounts, n_mounts);
1341 drop_inaccessible(mounts, n_mounts);
1342 drop_nop(mounts, n_mounts);
1343 }
1344
1345 static bool root_read_only(
1346 char **read_only_paths,
1347 ProtectSystem protect_system) {
1348
1349 /* Determine whether the root directory is going to be read-only given the configured settings. */
1350
1351 if (protect_system == PROTECT_SYSTEM_STRICT)
1352 return true;
1353
1354 if (prefixed_path_strv_contains(read_only_paths, "/"))
1355 return true;
1356
1357 return false;
1358 }
1359
1360 static bool home_read_only(
1361 char** read_only_paths,
1362 char** inaccessible_paths,
1363 char** empty_directories,
1364 const BindMount *bind_mounts,
1365 size_t n_bind_mounts,
1366 const TemporaryFileSystem *temporary_filesystems,
1367 size_t n_temporary_filesystems,
1368 ProtectHome protect_home) {
1369
1370 size_t i;
1371
1372 /* Determine whether the /home directory is going to be read-only given the configured settings. Yes,
1373 * this is a bit sloppy, since we don't bother checking for cases where / is affected by multiple
1374 * settings. */
1375
1376 if (protect_home != PROTECT_HOME_NO)
1377 return true;
1378
1379 if (prefixed_path_strv_contains(read_only_paths, "/home") ||
1380 prefixed_path_strv_contains(inaccessible_paths, "/home") ||
1381 prefixed_path_strv_contains(empty_directories, "/home"))
1382 return true;
1383
1384 for (i = 0; i < n_temporary_filesystems; i++)
1385 if (path_equal(temporary_filesystems[i].path, "/home"))
1386 return true;
1387
1388 /* If /home is overmounted with some dir from the host it's not writable. */
1389 for (i = 0; i < n_bind_mounts; i++)
1390 if (path_equal(bind_mounts[i].destination, "/home"))
1391 return true;
1392
1393 return false;
1394 }
1395
1396 static int verity_settings_prepare(
1397 VeritySettings *verity,
1398 const char *root_image,
1399 const void *root_hash,
1400 size_t root_hash_size,
1401 const char *root_hash_path,
1402 const void *root_hash_sig,
1403 size_t root_hash_sig_size,
1404 const char *root_hash_sig_path,
1405 const char *verity_data_path) {
1406
1407 int r;
1408
1409 assert(verity);
1410
1411 if (root_hash) {
1412 void *d;
1413
1414 d = memdup(root_hash, root_hash_size);
1415 if (!d)
1416 return -ENOMEM;
1417
1418 free_and_replace(verity->root_hash, d);
1419 verity->root_hash_size = root_hash_size;
1420 }
1421
1422 if (root_hash_sig) {
1423 void *d;
1424
1425 d = memdup(root_hash_sig, root_hash_sig_size);
1426 if (!d)
1427 return -ENOMEM;
1428
1429 free_and_replace(verity->root_hash_sig, d);
1430 verity->root_hash_sig_size = root_hash_sig_size;
1431 }
1432
1433 if (verity_data_path) {
1434 r = free_and_strdup(&verity->data_path, verity_data_path);
1435 if (r < 0)
1436 return r;
1437 }
1438
1439 r = verity_settings_load(
1440 verity,
1441 root_image,
1442 root_hash_path,
1443 root_hash_sig_path);
1444 if (r < 0)
1445 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to load root hash: %m");
1446
1447 return 0;
1448 }
1449
1450 int setup_namespace(
1451 const char* root_directory,
1452 const char* root_image,
1453 const MountOptions *root_image_options,
1454 const NamespaceInfo *ns_info,
1455 char** read_write_paths,
1456 char** read_only_paths,
1457 char** inaccessible_paths,
1458 char** empty_directories,
1459 const BindMount *bind_mounts,
1460 size_t n_bind_mounts,
1461 const TemporaryFileSystem *temporary_filesystems,
1462 size_t n_temporary_filesystems,
1463 const MountImage *mount_images,
1464 size_t n_mount_images,
1465 const char* tmp_dir,
1466 const char* var_tmp_dir,
1467 const char *creds_path,
1468 const char *log_namespace,
1469 unsigned long mount_flags,
1470 const void *root_hash,
1471 size_t root_hash_size,
1472 const char *root_hash_path,
1473 const void *root_hash_sig,
1474 size_t root_hash_sig_size,
1475 const char *root_hash_sig_path,
1476 const char *verity_data_path,
1477 DissectImageFlags dissect_image_flags,
1478 char **error_path) {
1479
1480 _cleanup_(loop_device_unrefp) LoopDevice *loop_device = NULL;
1481 _cleanup_(decrypted_image_unrefp) DecryptedImage *decrypted_image = NULL;
1482 _cleanup_(dissected_image_unrefp) DissectedImage *dissected_image = NULL;
1483 _cleanup_(verity_settings_done) VeritySettings verity = {};
1484 MountEntry *m = NULL, *mounts = NULL;
1485 bool require_prefix = false;
1486 const char *root;
1487 size_t n_mounts;
1488 int r;
1489
1490 assert(ns_info);
1491
1492 if (mount_flags == 0)
1493 mount_flags = MS_SHARED;
1494
1495 if (root_image) {
1496 dissect_image_flags |= DISSECT_IMAGE_REQUIRE_ROOT;
1497
1498 /* Make the whole image read-only if we can determine that we only access it in a read-only fashion. */
1499 if (root_read_only(read_only_paths,
1500 ns_info->protect_system) &&
1501 home_read_only(read_only_paths, inaccessible_paths, empty_directories,
1502 bind_mounts, n_bind_mounts, temporary_filesystems, n_temporary_filesystems,
1503 ns_info->protect_home) &&
1504 strv_isempty(read_write_paths))
1505 dissect_image_flags |= DISSECT_IMAGE_READ_ONLY;
1506
1507 r = verity_settings_prepare(
1508 &verity,
1509 root_image,
1510 root_hash, root_hash_size, root_hash_path,
1511 root_hash_sig, root_hash_sig_size, root_hash_sig_path,
1512 verity_data_path);
1513 if (r < 0)
1514 return r;
1515
1516 SET_FLAG(dissect_image_flags, DISSECT_IMAGE_NO_PARTITION_TABLE, verity.data_path);
1517
1518 r = loop_device_make_by_path(
1519 root_image,
1520 FLAGS_SET(dissect_image_flags, DISSECT_IMAGE_READ_ONLY) ? O_RDONLY : -1 /* < 0 means writable if possible, read-only as fallback */,
1521 FLAGS_SET(dissect_image_flags, DISSECT_IMAGE_NO_PARTITION_TABLE) ? 0 : LO_FLAGS_PARTSCAN,
1522 &loop_device);
1523 if (r < 0)
1524 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to create loop device for root image: %m");
1525
1526 r = dissect_image(
1527 loop_device->fd,
1528 &verity,
1529 root_image_options,
1530 dissect_image_flags,
1531 &dissected_image);
1532 if (r < 0)
1533 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to dissect image: %m");
1534
1535 r = dissected_image_decrypt(
1536 dissected_image,
1537 NULL,
1538 &verity,
1539 dissect_image_flags,
1540 &decrypted_image);
1541 if (r < 0)
1542 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to decrypt dissected image: %m");
1543 }
1544
1545 if (root_directory)
1546 root = root_directory;
1547 else {
1548 /* Always create the mount namespace in a temporary directory, instead of operating
1549 * directly in the root. The temporary directory prevents any mounts from being
1550 * potentially obscured my other mounts we already applied.
1551 * We use the same mount point for all images, which is safe, since they all live
1552 * in their own namespaces after all, and hence won't see each other. */
1553
1554 root = "/run/systemd/unit-root";
1555 (void) mkdir_label(root, 0700);
1556 require_prefix = true;
1557 }
1558
1559 n_mounts = namespace_calculate_mounts(
1560 ns_info,
1561 read_write_paths,
1562 read_only_paths,
1563 inaccessible_paths,
1564 empty_directories,
1565 n_bind_mounts,
1566 n_temporary_filesystems,
1567 n_mount_images,
1568 tmp_dir, var_tmp_dir,
1569 creds_path,
1570 log_namespace);
1571
1572 if (n_mounts > 0) {
1573 m = mounts = new0(MountEntry, n_mounts);
1574 if (!mounts)
1575 return -ENOMEM;
1576
1577 r = append_access_mounts(&m, read_write_paths, READWRITE, require_prefix);
1578 if (r < 0)
1579 goto finish;
1580
1581 r = append_access_mounts(&m, read_only_paths, READONLY, require_prefix);
1582 if (r < 0)
1583 goto finish;
1584
1585 r = append_access_mounts(&m, inaccessible_paths, INACCESSIBLE, require_prefix);
1586 if (r < 0)
1587 goto finish;
1588
1589 r = append_empty_dir_mounts(&m, empty_directories);
1590 if (r < 0)
1591 goto finish;
1592
1593 r = append_bind_mounts(&m, bind_mounts, n_bind_mounts);
1594 if (r < 0)
1595 goto finish;
1596
1597 r = append_tmpfs_mounts(&m, temporary_filesystems, n_temporary_filesystems);
1598 if (r < 0)
1599 goto finish;
1600
1601 if (tmp_dir) {
1602 bool ro = streq(tmp_dir, RUN_SYSTEMD_EMPTY);
1603
1604 *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
1605 .path_const = "/tmp",
1606 .mode = ro ? PRIVATE_TMP_READONLY : PRIVATE_TMP,
1607 .source_const = tmp_dir,
1608 };
1609 }
1610
1611 if (var_tmp_dir) {
1612 bool ro = streq(var_tmp_dir, RUN_SYSTEMD_EMPTY);
1613
1614 *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
1615 .path_const = "/var/tmp",
1616 .mode = ro ? PRIVATE_TMP_READONLY : PRIVATE_TMP,
1617 .source_const = var_tmp_dir,
1618 };
1619 }
1620
1621 r = append_mount_images(&m, mount_images, n_mount_images);
1622 if (r < 0)
1623 goto finish;
1624
1625 if (ns_info->private_dev) {
1626 *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
1627 .path_const = "/dev",
1628 .mode = PRIVATE_DEV,
1629 .flags = DEV_MOUNT_OPTIONS,
1630 };
1631 }
1632
1633 if (ns_info->protect_kernel_tunables) {
1634 r = append_static_mounts(&m,
1635 protect_kernel_tunables_table,
1636 ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_tunables_table),
1637 ns_info->ignore_protect_paths);
1638 if (r < 0)
1639 goto finish;
1640 }
1641
1642 if (ns_info->protect_kernel_modules) {
1643 r = append_static_mounts(&m,
1644 protect_kernel_modules_table,
1645 ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_modules_table),
1646 ns_info->ignore_protect_paths);
1647 if (r < 0)
1648 goto finish;
1649 }
1650
1651 if (ns_info->protect_kernel_logs) {
1652 r = append_static_mounts(&m,
1653 protect_kernel_logs_table,
1654 ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_logs_table),
1655 ns_info->ignore_protect_paths);
1656 if (r < 0)
1657 goto finish;
1658 }
1659
1660 if (ns_info->protect_control_groups) {
1661 *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
1662 .path_const = "/sys/fs/cgroup",
1663 .mode = READONLY,
1664 };
1665 }
1666
1667 r = append_protect_home(&m, ns_info->protect_home, ns_info->ignore_protect_paths);
1668 if (r < 0)
1669 goto finish;
1670
1671 r = append_protect_system(&m, ns_info->protect_system, false);
1672 if (r < 0)
1673 goto finish;
1674
1675 if (namespace_info_mount_apivfs(ns_info)) {
1676 r = append_static_mounts(&m,
1677 apivfs_table,
1678 ELEMENTSOF(apivfs_table),
1679 ns_info->ignore_protect_paths);
1680 if (r < 0)
1681 goto finish;
1682 }
1683
1684 if (ns_info->protect_hostname) {
1685 *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
1686 .path_const = "/proc/sys/kernel/hostname",
1687 .mode = READONLY,
1688 };
1689 *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
1690 .path_const = "/proc/sys/kernel/domainname",
1691 .mode = READONLY,
1692 };
1693 }
1694
1695 if (creds_path) {
1696 /* If our service has a credentials store configured, then bind that one in, but hide
1697 * everything else. */
1698
1699 *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
1700 .path_const = "/run/credentials",
1701 .mode = TMPFS,
1702 .read_only = true,
1703 .options_const = "mode=0755" TMPFS_LIMITS_EMPTY_OR_ALMOST,
1704 .flags = MS_NODEV|MS_STRICTATIME|MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC,
1705 };
1706
1707 *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
1708 .path_const = creds_path,
1709 .mode = BIND_MOUNT,
1710 .read_only = true,
1711 .source_const = creds_path,
1712 };
1713 } else {
1714 /* If our service has no credentials store configured, then make the whole
1715 * credentials tree inaccessible wholesale. */
1716
1717 *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
1718 .path_const = "/run/credentials",
1719 .mode = INACCESSIBLE,
1720 .ignore = true,
1721 };
1722 }
1723
1724 if (log_namespace) {
1725 _cleanup_free_ char *q;
1726
1727 q = strjoin("/run/systemd/journal.", log_namespace);
1728 if (!q) {
1729 r = -ENOMEM;
1730 goto finish;
1731 }
1732
1733 *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
1734 .path_const = "/run/systemd/journal",
1735 .mode = BIND_MOUNT_RECURSIVE,
1736 .read_only = true,
1737 .source_malloc = TAKE_PTR(q),
1738 };
1739 }
1740
1741 assert(mounts + n_mounts == m);
1742
1743 /* Prepend the root directory where that's necessary */
1744 r = prefix_where_needed(mounts, n_mounts, root);
1745 if (r < 0)
1746 goto finish;
1747
1748 normalize_mounts(root, mounts, &n_mounts);
1749 }
1750
1751 /* All above is just preparation, figuring out what to do. Let's now actually start doing something. */
1752
1753 if (unshare(CLONE_NEWNS) < 0) {
1754 r = log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to unshare the mount namespace: %m");
1755 if (IN_SET(r, -EACCES, -EPERM, -EOPNOTSUPP, -ENOSYS))
1756 /* If the kernel doesn't support namespaces, or when there's a MAC or seccomp filter
1757 * in place that doesn't allow us to create namespaces (or a missing cap), then
1758 * propagate a recognizable error back, which the caller can use to detect this case
1759 * (and only this) and optionally continue without namespacing applied. */
1760 r = -ENOANO;
1761
1762 goto finish;
1763 }
1764
1765 /* Remount / as SLAVE so that nothing now mounted in the namespace
1766 * shows up in the parent */
1767 if (mount(NULL, "/", NULL, MS_SLAVE|MS_REC, NULL) < 0) {
1768 r = log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to remount '/' as SLAVE: %m");
1769 goto finish;
1770 }
1771
1772 if (root_image) {
1773 /* A root image is specified, mount it to the right place */
1774 r = dissected_image_mount(dissected_image, root, UID_INVALID, dissect_image_flags);
1775 if (r < 0) {
1776 log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to mount root image: %m");
1777 goto finish;
1778 }
1779
1780 if (decrypted_image) {
1781 r = decrypted_image_relinquish(decrypted_image);
1782 if (r < 0) {
1783 log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to relinquish decrypted image: %m");
1784 goto finish;
1785 }
1786 }
1787
1788 loop_device_relinquish(loop_device);
1789
1790 } else if (root_directory) {
1791
1792 /* A root directory is specified. Turn its directory into bind mount, if it isn't one yet. */
1793 r = path_is_mount_point(root, NULL, AT_SYMLINK_FOLLOW);
1794 if (r < 0) {
1795 log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to detect that %s is a mount point or not: %m", root);
1796 goto finish;
1797 }
1798 if (r == 0) {
1799 if (mount(root, root, NULL, MS_BIND|MS_REC, NULL) < 0) {
1800 r = log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to bind mount '%s': %m", root);
1801 goto finish;
1802 }
1803 }
1804
1805 } else {
1806
1807 /* Let's mount the main root directory to the root directory to use */
1808 if (mount("/", root, NULL, MS_BIND|MS_REC, NULL) < 0) {
1809 r = log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to bind mount '/' on '%s': %m", root);
1810 goto finish;
1811 }
1812 }
1813
1814 /* Try to set up the new root directory before mounting anything else there. */
1815 if (root_image || root_directory)
1816 (void) base_filesystem_create(root, UID_INVALID, GID_INVALID);
1817
1818 if (n_mounts > 0) {
1819 _cleanup_fclose_ FILE *proc_self_mountinfo = NULL;
1820 _cleanup_free_ char **deny_list = NULL;
1821 size_t j;
1822
1823 /* Open /proc/self/mountinfo now as it may become unavailable if we mount anything on top of
1824 * /proc. For example, this is the case with the option: 'InaccessiblePaths=/proc'. */
1825 proc_self_mountinfo = fopen("/proc/self/mountinfo", "re");
1826 if (!proc_self_mountinfo) {
1827 r = log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to open /proc/self/mountinfo: %m");
1828 if (error_path)
1829 *error_path = strdup("/proc/self/mountinfo");
1830 goto finish;
1831 }
1832
1833 /* First round, establish all mounts we need */
1834 for (;;) {
1835 bool again = false;
1836
1837 for (m = mounts; m < mounts + n_mounts; ++m) {
1838
1839 if (m->applied)
1840 continue;
1841
1842 r = follow_symlink(root, m);
1843 if (r < 0) {
1844 if (error_path && mount_entry_path(m))
1845 *error_path = strdup(mount_entry_path(m));
1846 goto finish;
1847 }
1848 if (r == 0) {
1849 /* We hit a symlinked mount point. The entry got rewritten and might
1850 * point to a very different place now. Let's normalize the changed
1851 * list, and start from the beginning. After all to mount the entry
1852 * at the new location we might need some other mounts first */
1853 again = true;
1854 break;
1855 }
1856
1857 r = apply_mount(root, m, ns_info);
1858 if (r < 0) {
1859 if (error_path && mount_entry_path(m))
1860 *error_path = strdup(mount_entry_path(m));
1861 goto finish;
1862 }
1863
1864 m->applied = true;
1865 }
1866
1867 if (!again)
1868 break;
1869
1870 normalize_mounts(root, mounts, &n_mounts);
1871 }
1872
1873 /* Create a deny list we can pass to bind_mount_recursive() */
1874 deny_list = new(char*, n_mounts+1);
1875 if (!deny_list) {
1876 r = -ENOMEM;
1877 goto finish;
1878 }
1879 for (j = 0; j < n_mounts; j++)
1880 deny_list[j] = (char*) mount_entry_path(mounts+j);
1881 deny_list[j] = NULL;
1882
1883 /* Second round, flip the ro bits if necessary. */
1884 for (m = mounts; m < mounts + n_mounts; ++m) {
1885 r = make_read_only(m, deny_list, proc_self_mountinfo);
1886 if (r < 0) {
1887 if (error_path && mount_entry_path(m))
1888 *error_path = strdup(mount_entry_path(m));
1889 goto finish;
1890 }
1891 }
1892 }
1893
1894 /* MS_MOVE does not work on MS_SHARED so the remount MS_SHARED will be done later */
1895 r = mount_move_root(root);
1896 if (r < 0) {
1897 log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to mount root with MS_MOVE: %m");
1898 goto finish;
1899 }
1900
1901 /* Remount / as the desired mode. Note that this will not
1902 * reestablish propagation from our side to the host, since
1903 * what's disconnected is disconnected. */
1904 if (mount(NULL, "/", NULL, mount_flags | MS_REC, NULL) < 0) {
1905 r = log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to remount '/' with desired mount flags: %m");
1906 goto finish;
1907 }
1908
1909 r = 0;
1910
1911 finish:
1912 if (n_mounts > 0)
1913 for (m = mounts; m < mounts + n_mounts; m++)
1914 mount_entry_done(m);
1915
1916 free(mounts);
1917
1918 return r;
1919 }
1920
1921 void bind_mount_free_many(BindMount *b, size_t n) {
1922 size_t i;
1923
1924 assert(b || n == 0);
1925
1926 for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
1927 free(b[i].source);
1928 free(b[i].destination);
1929 }
1930
1931 free(b);
1932 }
1933
1934 int bind_mount_add(BindMount **b, size_t *n, const BindMount *item) {
1935 _cleanup_free_ char *s = NULL, *d = NULL;
1936 BindMount *c;
1937
1938 assert(b);
1939 assert(n);
1940 assert(item);
1941
1942 s = strdup(item->source);
1943 if (!s)
1944 return -ENOMEM;
1945
1946 d = strdup(item->destination);
1947 if (!d)
1948 return -ENOMEM;
1949
1950 c = reallocarray(*b, *n + 1, sizeof(BindMount));
1951 if (!c)
1952 return -ENOMEM;
1953
1954 *b = c;
1955
1956 c[(*n) ++] = (BindMount) {
1957 .source = TAKE_PTR(s),
1958 .destination = TAKE_PTR(d),
1959 .read_only = item->read_only,
1960 .nosuid = item->nosuid,
1961 .recursive = item->recursive,
1962 .ignore_enoent = item->ignore_enoent,
1963 };
1964
1965 return 0;
1966 }
1967
1968 MountImage* mount_image_free_many(MountImage *m, size_t *n) {
1969 size_t i;
1970
1971 assert(n);
1972 assert(m || *n == 0);
1973
1974 for (i = 0; i < *n; i++) {
1975 free(m[i].source);
1976 free(m[i].destination);
1977 mount_options_free_all(m[i].mount_options);
1978 }
1979
1980 free(m);
1981 *n = 0;
1982 return NULL;
1983 }
1984
1985 int mount_image_add(MountImage **m, size_t *n, const MountImage *item) {
1986 _cleanup_free_ char *s = NULL, *d = NULL;
1987 _cleanup_(mount_options_free_allp) MountOptions *options = NULL;
1988 MountOptions *i;
1989 MountImage *c;
1990
1991 assert(m);
1992 assert(n);
1993 assert(item);
1994
1995 s = strdup(item->source);
1996 if (!s)
1997 return -ENOMEM;
1998
1999 d = strdup(item->destination);
2000 if (!d)
2001 return -ENOMEM;
2002
2003 LIST_FOREACH(mount_options, i, item->mount_options) {
2004 _cleanup_(mount_options_free_allp) MountOptions *o;
2005
2006 o = new(MountOptions, 1);
2007 if (!o)
2008 return -ENOMEM;
2009
2010 *o = (MountOptions) {
2011 .partition_designator = i->partition_designator,
2012 .options = strdup(i->options),
2013 };
2014 if (!o->options)
2015 return -ENOMEM;
2016
2017 LIST_APPEND(mount_options, options, TAKE_PTR(o));
2018 }
2019
2020 c = reallocarray(*m, *n + 1, sizeof(MountImage));
2021 if (!c)
2022 return -ENOMEM;
2023
2024 *m = c;
2025
2026 c[(*n) ++] = (MountImage) {
2027 .source = TAKE_PTR(s),
2028 .destination = TAKE_PTR(d),
2029 .mount_options = TAKE_PTR(options),
2030 .ignore_enoent = item->ignore_enoent,
2031 };
2032
2033 return 0;
2034 }
2035
2036 void temporary_filesystem_free_many(TemporaryFileSystem *t, size_t n) {
2037 size_t i;
2038
2039 assert(t || n == 0);
2040
2041 for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
2042 free(t[i].path);
2043 free(t[i].options);
2044 }
2045
2046 free(t);
2047 }
2048
2049 int temporary_filesystem_add(
2050 TemporaryFileSystem **t,
2051 size_t *n,
2052 const char *path,
2053 const char *options) {
2054
2055 _cleanup_free_ char *p = NULL, *o = NULL;
2056 TemporaryFileSystem *c;
2057
2058 assert(t);
2059 assert(n);
2060 assert(path);
2061
2062 p = strdup(path);
2063 if (!p)
2064 return -ENOMEM;
2065
2066 if (!isempty(options)) {
2067 o = strdup(options);
2068 if (!o)
2069 return -ENOMEM;
2070 }
2071
2072 c = reallocarray(*t, *n + 1, sizeof(TemporaryFileSystem));
2073 if (!c)
2074 return -ENOMEM;
2075
2076 *t = c;
2077
2078 c[(*n) ++] = (TemporaryFileSystem) {
2079 .path = TAKE_PTR(p),
2080 .options = TAKE_PTR(o),
2081 };
2082
2083 return 0;
2084 }
2085
2086 static int make_tmp_prefix(const char *prefix) {
2087 _cleanup_free_ char *t = NULL;
2088 int r;
2089
2090 /* Don't do anything unless we know the dir is actually missing */
2091 r = access(prefix, F_OK);
2092 if (r >= 0)
2093 return 0;
2094 if (errno != ENOENT)
2095 return -errno;
2096
2097 r = mkdir_parents(prefix, 0755);
2098 if (r < 0)
2099 return r;
2100
2101 r = tempfn_random(prefix, NULL, &t);
2102 if (r < 0)
2103 return r;
2104
2105 if (mkdir(t, 0777) < 0)
2106 return -errno;
2107
2108 if (chmod(t, 01777) < 0) {
2109 r = -errno;
2110 (void) rmdir(t);
2111 return r;
2112 }
2113
2114 if (rename(t, prefix) < 0) {
2115 r = -errno;
2116 (void) rmdir(t);
2117 return r == -EEXIST ? 0 : r; /* it's fine if someone else created the dir by now */
2118 }
2119
2120 return 0;
2121
2122 }
2123
2124 static int make_tmp_subdir(const char *parent, char **ret) {
2125 _cleanup_free_ char *y = NULL;
2126
2127 y = path_join(parent, "/tmp");
2128 if (!y)
2129 return -ENOMEM;
2130
2131 RUN_WITH_UMASK(0000) {
2132 if (mkdir(y, 0777 | S_ISVTX) < 0)
2133 return -errno;
2134 }
2135
2136 if (ret)
2137 *ret = TAKE_PTR(y);
2138 return 0;
2139 }
2140
2141 static int setup_one_tmp_dir(const char *id, const char *prefix, char **path, char **tmp_path) {
2142 _cleanup_free_ char *x = NULL;
2143 char bid[SD_ID128_STRING_MAX];
2144 sd_id128_t boot_id;
2145 bool rw = true;
2146 int r;
2147
2148 assert(id);
2149 assert(prefix);
2150 assert(path);
2151
2152 /* We include the boot id in the directory so that after a
2153 * reboot we can easily identify obsolete directories. */
2154
2155 r = sd_id128_get_boot(&boot_id);
2156 if (r < 0)
2157 return r;
2158
2159 x = strjoin(prefix, "/systemd-private-", sd_id128_to_string(boot_id, bid), "-", id, "-XXXXXX");
2160 if (!x)
2161 return -ENOMEM;
2162
2163 r = make_tmp_prefix(prefix);
2164 if (r < 0)
2165 return r;
2166
2167 RUN_WITH_UMASK(0077)
2168 if (!mkdtemp(x)) {
2169 if (errno == EROFS || ERRNO_IS_DISK_SPACE(errno))
2170 rw = false;
2171 else
2172 return -errno;
2173 }
2174
2175 if (rw) {
2176 r = make_tmp_subdir(x, tmp_path);
2177 if (r < 0)
2178 return r;
2179 } else {
2180 /* Trouble: we failed to create the directory. Instead of failing, let's simulate /tmp being
2181 * read-only. This way the service will get the EROFS result as if it was writing to the real
2182 * file system. */
2183 r = mkdir_p(RUN_SYSTEMD_EMPTY, 0500);
2184 if (r < 0)
2185 return r;
2186
2187 r = free_and_strdup(&x, RUN_SYSTEMD_EMPTY);
2188 if (r < 0)
2189 return r;
2190 }
2191
2192 *path = TAKE_PTR(x);
2193 return 0;
2194 }
2195
2196 int setup_tmp_dirs(const char *id, char **tmp_dir, char **var_tmp_dir) {
2197 _cleanup_(namespace_cleanup_tmpdirp) char *a = NULL;
2198 _cleanup_(rmdir_and_freep) char *a_tmp = NULL;
2199 char *b;
2200 int r;
2201
2202 assert(id);
2203 assert(tmp_dir);
2204 assert(var_tmp_dir);
2205
2206 r = setup_one_tmp_dir(id, "/tmp", &a, &a_tmp);
2207 if (r < 0)
2208 return r;
2209
2210 r = setup_one_tmp_dir(id, "/var/tmp", &b, NULL);
2211 if (r < 0)
2212 return r;
2213
2214 a_tmp = mfree(a_tmp); /* avoid rmdir */
2215 *tmp_dir = TAKE_PTR(a);
2216 *var_tmp_dir = TAKE_PTR(b);
2217
2218 return 0;
2219 }
2220
2221 int setup_netns(const int netns_storage_socket[static 2]) {
2222 _cleanup_close_ int netns = -1;
2223 int r, q;
2224
2225 assert(netns_storage_socket);
2226 assert(netns_storage_socket[0] >= 0);
2227 assert(netns_storage_socket[1] >= 0);
2228
2229 /* We use the passed socketpair as a storage buffer for our
2230 * namespace reference fd. Whatever process runs this first
2231 * shall create a new namespace, all others should just join
2232 * it. To serialize that we use a file lock on the socket
2233 * pair.
2234 *
2235 * It's a bit crazy, but hey, works great! */
2236
2237 if (lockf(netns_storage_socket[0], F_LOCK, 0) < 0)
2238 return -errno;
2239
2240 netns = receive_one_fd(netns_storage_socket[0], MSG_DONTWAIT);
2241 if (netns == -EAGAIN) {
2242 /* Nothing stored yet, so let's create a new namespace. */
2243
2244 if (unshare(CLONE_NEWNET) < 0) {
2245 r = -errno;
2246 goto fail;
2247 }
2248
2249 (void) loopback_setup();
2250
2251 netns = open("/proc/self/ns/net", O_RDONLY|O_CLOEXEC|O_NOCTTY);
2252 if (netns < 0) {
2253 r = -errno;
2254 goto fail;
2255 }
2256
2257 r = 1;
2258
2259 } else if (netns < 0) {
2260 r = netns;
2261 goto fail;
2262
2263 } else {
2264 /* Yay, found something, so let's join the namespace */
2265 if (setns(netns, CLONE_NEWNET) < 0) {
2266 r = -errno;
2267 goto fail;
2268 }
2269
2270 r = 0;
2271 }
2272
2273 q = send_one_fd(netns_storage_socket[1], netns, MSG_DONTWAIT);
2274 if (q < 0) {
2275 r = q;
2276 goto fail;
2277 }
2278
2279 fail:
2280 (void) lockf(netns_storage_socket[0], F_ULOCK, 0);
2281 return r;
2282 }
2283
2284 int open_netns_path(const int netns_storage_socket[static 2], const char *path) {
2285 _cleanup_close_ int netns = -1;
2286 int q, r;
2287
2288 assert(netns_storage_socket);
2289 assert(netns_storage_socket[0] >= 0);
2290 assert(netns_storage_socket[1] >= 0);
2291 assert(path);
2292
2293 /* If the storage socket doesn't contain a netns fd yet, open one via the file system and store it in
2294 * it. This is supposed to be called ahead of time, i.e. before setup_netns() which will allocate a
2295 * new anonymous netns if needed. */
2296
2297 if (lockf(netns_storage_socket[0], F_LOCK, 0) < 0)
2298 return -errno;
2299
2300 netns = receive_one_fd(netns_storage_socket[0], MSG_DONTWAIT);
2301 if (netns == -EAGAIN) {
2302 /* Nothing stored yet. Open the file from the file system. */
2303
2304 netns = open(path, O_RDONLY|O_NOCTTY|O_CLOEXEC);
2305 if (netns < 0) {
2306 r = -errno;
2307 goto fail;
2308 }
2309
2310 r = fd_is_network_ns(netns);
2311 if (r == 0) { /* Not a netns? Refuse early. */
2312 r = -EINVAL;
2313 goto fail;
2314 }
2315 if (r < 0 && r != -EUCLEAN) /* EUCLEAN: we don't know */
2316 goto fail;
2317
2318 r = 1;
2319
2320 } else if (netns < 0) {
2321 r = netns;
2322 goto fail;
2323 } else
2324 r = 0; /* Already allocated */
2325
2326 q = send_one_fd(netns_storage_socket[1], netns, MSG_DONTWAIT);
2327 if (q < 0) {
2328 r = q;
2329 goto fail;
2330 }
2331
2332 fail:
2333 (void) lockf(netns_storage_socket[0], F_ULOCK, 0);
2334 return r;
2335 }
2336
2337 bool ns_type_supported(NamespaceType type) {
2338 const char *t, *ns_proc;
2339
2340 t = namespace_type_to_string(type);
2341 if (!t) /* Don't know how to translate this? Then it's not supported */
2342 return false;
2343
2344 ns_proc = strjoina("/proc/self/ns/", t);
2345 return access(ns_proc, F_OK) == 0;
2346 }
2347
2348 static const char *const protect_home_table[_PROTECT_HOME_MAX] = {
2349 [PROTECT_HOME_NO] = "no",
2350 [PROTECT_HOME_YES] = "yes",
2351 [PROTECT_HOME_READ_ONLY] = "read-only",
2352 [PROTECT_HOME_TMPFS] = "tmpfs",
2353 };
2354
2355 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP_WITH_BOOLEAN(protect_home, ProtectHome, PROTECT_HOME_YES);
2356
2357 static const char *const protect_system_table[_PROTECT_SYSTEM_MAX] = {
2358 [PROTECT_SYSTEM_NO] = "no",
2359 [PROTECT_SYSTEM_YES] = "yes",
2360 [PROTECT_SYSTEM_FULL] = "full",
2361 [PROTECT_SYSTEM_STRICT] = "strict",
2362 };
2363
2364 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP_WITH_BOOLEAN(protect_system, ProtectSystem, PROTECT_SYSTEM_YES);
2365
2366 static const char* const namespace_type_table[] = {
2367 [NAMESPACE_MOUNT] = "mnt",
2368 [NAMESPACE_CGROUP] = "cgroup",
2369 [NAMESPACE_UTS] = "uts",
2370 [NAMESPACE_IPC] = "ipc",
2371 [NAMESPACE_USER] = "user",
2372 [NAMESPACE_PID] = "pid",
2373 [NAMESPACE_NET] = "net",
2374 };
2375
2376 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(namespace_type, NamespaceType);
2377
2378 static const char* const protect_proc_table[_PROTECT_PROC_MAX] = {
2379 [PROTECT_PROC_DEFAULT] = "default",
2380 [PROTECT_PROC_NOACCESS] = "noaccess",
2381 [PROTECT_PROC_INVISIBLE] = "invisible",
2382 [PROTECT_PROC_PTRACEABLE] = "ptraceable",
2383 };
2384
2385 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(protect_proc, ProtectProc);
2386
2387 static const char* const proc_subset_table[_PROC_SUBSET_MAX] = {
2388 [PROC_SUBSET_ALL] = "all",
2389 [PROC_SUBSET_PID] = "pid",
2390 };
2391
2392 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(proc_subset, ProcSubset);
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