[thirdparty/openssl.git] / crypto / cmp / cmp_protect.c

/*
 * Copyright 2007-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
 * Copyright Nokia 2007-2019
 * Copyright Siemens AG 2015-2019
 *
 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use
 * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
 */

#include "cmp_local.h"

/* explicit #includes not strictly needed since implied by the above: */
#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
#include <openssl/cmp.h>
#include <openssl/crmf.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>

DEFINE_STACK_OF(X509)

/*
 * This function is also used for verification from cmp_vfy.
 *
 * Calculate protection for given PKImessage utilizing the given credentials
 * and the algorithm parameters set inside the message header's protectionAlg.
 *
 * Either secret or pkey must be set, the other must be NULL. Attempts doing
 * PBMAC in case 'secret' is set and signature if 'pkey' is set - but will only
 * do the protection already marked in msg->header->protectionAlg.
 *
 * returns ptr to ASN1_BIT_STRING containing protection on success, else NULL
 */
ASN1_BIT_STRING *ossl_cmp_calc_protection(const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg,
                                          const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *secret,
                                          EVP_PKEY *pkey)
{
    ASN1_BIT_STRING *prot = NULL;
    OSSL_CMP_PROTECTEDPART prot_part;
    const ASN1_OBJECT *algorOID = NULL;
    int len;
    size_t prot_part_der_len;
    unsigned char *prot_part_der = NULL;
    size_t sig_len;
    unsigned char *protection = NULL;
    const void *ppval = NULL;
    int pptype = 0;
    OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER *pbm = NULL;
    ASN1_STRING *pbm_str = NULL;
    const unsigned char *pbm_str_uc = NULL;
    EVP_MD_CTX *evp_ctx = NULL;
    int md_NID;
    const EVP_MD *md = NULL;

    if (!ossl_assert(msg != NULL))
        return NULL;

    /* construct data to be signed */
    prot_part.header = msg->header;
    prot_part.body = msg->body;

    len = i2d_OSSL_CMP_PROTECTEDPART(&prot_part, &prot_part_der);
    if (len < 0 || prot_part_der == NULL) {
        CMPerr(0, CMP_R_ERROR_CALCULATING_PROTECTION);
        goto end;
    }
    prot_part_der_len = (size_t) len;

    if (msg->header->protectionAlg == NULL) {
        CMPerr(0, CMP_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_ID);
        goto end;
    }
    X509_ALGOR_get0(&algorOID, &pptype, &ppval, msg->header->protectionAlg);

    if (secret != NULL && pkey == NULL) {
        if (ppval == NULL) {
            CMPerr(0, CMP_R_ERROR_CALCULATING_PROTECTION);
            goto end;
        }
        if (NID_id_PasswordBasedMAC != OBJ_obj2nid(algorOID)) {
            CMPerr(0, CMP_R_WRONG_ALGORITHM_OID);
            goto end;
        }
        pbm_str = (ASN1_STRING *)ppval;
        pbm_str_uc = pbm_str->data;
        pbm = d2i_OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER(NULL, &pbm_str_uc, pbm_str->length);
        if (pbm == NULL) {
            CMPerr(0, CMP_R_WRONG_ALGORITHM_OID);
            goto end;
        }

        if (!OSSL_CRMF_pbm_new(pbm, prot_part_der, prot_part_der_len,
                               secret->data, secret->length,
                               &protection, &sig_len))
            goto end;
    } else if (secret == NULL && pkey != NULL) {
        /* TODO combine this with large parts of CRMF_poposigningkey_init() */
        /* EVP_DigestSignInit() checks that pkey type is correct for the alg */

        if (!OBJ_find_sigid_algs(OBJ_obj2nid(algorOID), &md_NID, NULL)
                || (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_NID)) == NULL
                || (evp_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
            CMPerr(0, CMP_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_ID);
            goto end;
        }
        if (EVP_DigestSignInit(evp_ctx, NULL, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0
                || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(evp_ctx, prot_part_der,
                                        prot_part_der_len) <= 0
                || EVP_DigestSignFinal(evp_ctx, NULL, &sig_len) <= 0
                || (protection = OPENSSL_malloc(sig_len)) == NULL
                || EVP_DigestSignFinal(evp_ctx, protection, &sig_len) <= 0) {
            CMPerr(0, CMP_R_ERROR_CALCULATING_PROTECTION);
            goto end;
        }
    } else {
        CMPerr(0, CMP_R_INVALID_ARGS);
        goto end;
    }

    if ((prot = ASN1_BIT_STRING_new()) == NULL)
        goto end;
    /* OpenSSL defaults all bit strings to be encoded as ASN.1 NamedBitList */
    prot->flags &= ~(ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT | 0x07);
    prot->flags |= ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT;
    if (!ASN1_BIT_STRING_set(prot, protection, sig_len)) {
        ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(prot);
        prot = NULL;
    }

 end:
    OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER_free(pbm);
    EVP_MD_CTX_free(evp_ctx);
    OPENSSL_free(protection);
    OPENSSL_free(prot_part_der);
    return prot;
}

int ossl_cmp_msg_add_extraCerts(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
{
    if (!ossl_assert(ctx != NULL && msg != NULL))
        return 0;

    if (msg->extraCerts == NULL
            && (msg->extraCerts = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
        return 0;

    if (ctx->clCert != NULL) {
        /* Make sure that our own cert gets sent, in the first position */
        if (!X509_up_ref(ctx->clCert))
            return 0;
        if (!sk_X509_push(msg->extraCerts, ctx->clCert)) {
            X509_free(ctx->clCert);
            return 0;
        }
        /* if we have untrusted store, try to add intermediate certs */
        if (ctx->untrusted_certs != NULL) {
            STACK_OF(X509) *chain =
                ossl_cmp_build_cert_chain(ctx->untrusted_certs, ctx->clCert);
            int res = ossl_cmp_sk_X509_add1_certs(msg->extraCerts, chain,
                                                  1 /* no self-issued */,
                                                  1 /* no duplicates */, 0);
            sk_X509_pop_free(chain, X509_free);
            if (res == 0)
                return 0;
        }
    }

    /* add any additional certificates from ctx->extraCertsOut */
    if (!ossl_cmp_sk_X509_add1_certs(msg->extraCerts, ctx->extraCertsOut, 0,
                                     1 /* no duplicates */, 0))
        return 0;

    /* if none was found avoid empty ASN.1 sequence */
    if (sk_X509_num(msg->extraCerts) == 0) {
        sk_X509_free(msg->extraCerts);
        msg->extraCerts = NULL;
    }
    return 1;
}

/*
 * Create an X509_ALGOR structure for PasswordBasedMAC protection based on
 * the pbm settings in the context
 * returns pointer to X509_ALGOR on success, NULL on error
 */
static X509_ALGOR *create_pbmac_algor(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx)
{
    X509_ALGOR *alg = NULL;
    OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER *pbm = NULL;
    unsigned char *pbm_der = NULL;
    int pbm_der_len;
    ASN1_STRING *pbm_str = NULL;

    if (!ossl_assert(ctx != NULL))
        return NULL;

    alg = X509_ALGOR_new();
    pbm = OSSL_CRMF_pbmp_new(ctx->pbm_slen, ctx->pbm_owf, ctx->pbm_itercnt,
                             ctx->pbm_mac);
    pbm_str = ASN1_STRING_new();
    if (alg == NULL || pbm == NULL || pbm_str == NULL)
        goto err;

    if ((pbm_der_len = i2d_OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER(pbm, &pbm_der)) < 0)
        goto err;

    if (!ASN1_STRING_set(pbm_str, pbm_der, pbm_der_len))
        goto err;
    OPENSSL_free(pbm_der);

    X509_ALGOR_set0(alg, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_id_PasswordBasedMAC),
                    V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, pbm_str);
    OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER_free(pbm);
    return alg;

 err:
    ASN1_STRING_free(pbm_str);
    X509_ALGOR_free(alg);
    OPENSSL_free(pbm_der);
    OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER_free(pbm);
    return NULL;
}

int ossl_cmp_msg_protect(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
{
    if (!ossl_assert(ctx != NULL && msg != NULL))
        return 0;

    if (ctx->unprotectedSend)
        return 1;

    /* use PasswordBasedMac according to 5.1.3.1 if secretValue is given */
    if (ctx->secretValue != NULL) {
        if ((msg->header->protectionAlg = create_pbmac_algor(ctx)) == NULL)
            goto err;
        if (ctx->referenceValue != NULL
                && !ossl_cmp_hdr_set1_senderKID(msg->header,
                                                ctx->referenceValue))
            goto err;

        /*
         * add any additional certificates from ctx->extraCertsOut
         * while not needed to validate the signing cert, the option to do
         * this might be handy for certain use cases
         */
        if (!ossl_cmp_msg_add_extraCerts(ctx, msg))
            goto err;

        if ((msg->protection =
             ossl_cmp_calc_protection(msg, ctx->secretValue, NULL)) == NULL)
            goto err;
    } else {
        /*
         * use MSG_SIG_ALG according to 5.1.3.3 if client Certificate and
         * private key is given
         */
        if (ctx->clCert != NULL && ctx->pkey != NULL) {
            const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *subjKeyIDStr = NULL;
            int algNID = 0;
            ASN1_OBJECT *alg = NULL;

            /* make sure that key and certificate match */
            if (!X509_check_private_key(ctx->clCert, ctx->pkey)) {
                CMPerr(0, CMP_R_CERT_AND_KEY_DO_NOT_MATCH);
                goto err;
            }

            if (msg->header->protectionAlg == NULL)
                if ((msg->header->protectionAlg = X509_ALGOR_new()) == NULL)
                    goto err;

            if (!OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(&algNID, ctx->digest,
                                        EVP_PKEY_id(ctx->pkey))) {
                CMPerr(0, CMP_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEY_TYPE);
                goto err;
            }
            if ((alg = OBJ_nid2obj(algNID)) == NULL)
                goto err;
            if (!X509_ALGOR_set0(msg->header->protectionAlg,
                                 alg, V_ASN1_UNDEF, NULL)) {
                ASN1_OBJECT_free(alg);
                goto err;
            }

            /*
             * set senderKID to keyIdentifier of the used certificate according
             * to section 5.1.1
             */
            subjKeyIDStr = X509_get0_subject_key_id(ctx->clCert);
            if (subjKeyIDStr == NULL)
                subjKeyIDStr = ctx->referenceValue; /* fallback */
            if (subjKeyIDStr != NULL
                    && !ossl_cmp_hdr_set1_senderKID(msg->header, subjKeyIDStr))
                goto err;

            /*
             * Add ctx->clCert followed, if possible, by its chain built
             * from ctx->untrusted_certs, and then ctx->extraCertsOut
             */
            if (!ossl_cmp_msg_add_extraCerts(ctx, msg))
                goto err;

            if ((msg->protection =
                 ossl_cmp_calc_protection(msg, NULL, ctx->pkey)) == NULL)
                goto err;
        } else {
            CMPerr(0, CMP_R_MISSING_KEY_INPUT_FOR_CREATING_PROTECTION);
            goto err;
        }
    }

    /*
     * As required by RFC 4210 section 5.1.1., if the sender name is not known
     * to the client it set to NULL-DN. In this case for identification at least
     * the senderKID must be set, where we took the referenceValue as fallback.
     */

    if (ossl_cmp_general_name_is_NULL_DN(msg->header->sender)
            && msg->header->senderKID == NULL)
        CMPerr(0, CMP_R_MISSING_SENDER_IDENTIFICATION);
    else
        return 1;

 err:
    CMPerr(0, CMP_R_ERROR_PROTECTING_MESSAGE);
    return 0;
}
Commit	Line	Data
3dbc5156	1	/*
33388b44	2	* Copyright 2007-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3dbc5156 DDO	3	* Copyright Nokia 2007-2019
	4	* Copyright Siemens AG 2015-2019
	5	*
	6	* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
	7	* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
	8	* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
	9	* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
	10	*/
	11
	12	#include "cmp_local.h"
	13
	14	/* explicit #includes not strictly needed since implied by the above: */
	15	#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
	16	#include <openssl/cmp.h>
	17	#include <openssl/crmf.h>
	18	#include <openssl/err.h>
	19	#include <openssl/x509.h>
	20
852c2ed2 RS	21	DEFINE_STACK_OF(X509)
852c2ed2 RS	22
3dbc5156 DDO	23	/*
	24	* This function is also used for verification from cmp_vfy.
	25	*
	26	* Calculate protection for given PKImessage utilizing the given credentials
	27	* and the algorithm parameters set inside the message header's protectionAlg.
	28	*
	29	* Either secret or pkey must be set, the other must be NULL. Attempts doing
	30	* PBMAC in case 'secret' is set and signature if 'pkey' is set - but will only
	31	* do the protection already marked in msg->header->protectionAlg.
	32	*
	33	* returns ptr to ASN1_BIT_STRING containing protection on success, else NULL
	34	*/
	35	ASN1_BIT_STRING ossl_cmp_calc_protection(const OSSL_CMP_MSG msg,
	36	const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *secret,
	37	EVP_PKEY *pkey)
	38	{
	39	ASN1_BIT_STRING *prot = NULL;
642f60d8	40	OSSL_CMP_PROTECTEDPART prot_part;
3dbc5156 DDO	41	const ASN1_OBJECT *algorOID = NULL;
	42	int len;
	43	size_t prot_part_der_len;
	44	unsigned char *prot_part_der = NULL;
	45	size_t sig_len;
	46	unsigned char *protection = NULL;
	47	const void *ppval = NULL;
	48	int pptype = 0;
	49	OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER *pbm = NULL;
	50	ASN1_STRING *pbm_str = NULL;
	51	const unsigned char *pbm_str_uc = NULL;
	52	EVP_MD_CTX *evp_ctx = NULL;
	53	int md_NID;
	54	const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
	55
	56	if (!ossl_assert(msg != NULL))
	57	return NULL;
	58
	59	/* construct data to be signed */
	60	prot_part.header = msg->header;
	61	prot_part.body = msg->body;
	62
642f60d8	63	len = i2d_OSSL_CMP_PROTECTEDPART(&prot_part, &prot_part_der);
3dbc5156 DDO	64	if (len < 0 \|\| prot_part_der == NULL) {
	65	CMPerr(0, CMP_R_ERROR_CALCULATING_PROTECTION);
	66	goto end;
	67	}
	68	prot_part_der_len = (size_t) len;
	69
	70	if (msg->header->protectionAlg == NULL) {
	71	CMPerr(0, CMP_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_ID);
	72	goto end;
	73	}
	74	X509_ALGOR_get0(&algorOID, &pptype, &ppval, msg->header->protectionAlg);
	75
	76	if (secret != NULL && pkey == NULL) {
	77	if (ppval == NULL) {
	78	CMPerr(0, CMP_R_ERROR_CALCULATING_PROTECTION);
	79	goto end;
	80	}
	81	if (NID_id_PasswordBasedMAC != OBJ_obj2nid(algorOID)) {
	82	CMPerr(0, CMP_R_WRONG_ALGORITHM_OID);
	83	goto end;
	84	}
	85	pbm_str = (ASN1_STRING *)ppval;
	86	pbm_str_uc = pbm_str->data;
	87	pbm = d2i_OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER(NULL, &pbm_str_uc, pbm_str->length);
	88	if (pbm == NULL) {
	89	CMPerr(0, CMP_R_WRONG_ALGORITHM_OID);
	90	goto end;
	91	}
	92
	93	if (!OSSL_CRMF_pbm_new(pbm, prot_part_der, prot_part_der_len,
	94	secret->data, secret->length,
	95	&protection, &sig_len))
	96	goto end;
	97	} else if (secret == NULL && pkey != NULL) {
	98	/* TODO combine this with large parts of CRMF_poposigningkey_init() */
	99	/* EVP_DigestSignInit() checks that pkey type is correct for the alg */
	100
	101	if (!OBJ_find_sigid_algs(OBJ_obj2nid(algorOID), &md_NID, NULL)
	102	\|\| (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_NID)) == NULL
	103	\|\| (evp_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
	104	CMPerr(0, CMP_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_ID);
	105	goto end;
	106	}
	107	if (EVP_DigestSignInit(evp_ctx, NULL, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0
	108	\|\| EVP_DigestSignUpdate(evp_ctx, prot_part_der,
	109	prot_part_der_len) <= 0
	110	\|\| EVP_DigestSignFinal(evp_ctx, NULL, &sig_len) <= 0
	111	\|\| (protection = OPENSSL_malloc(sig_len)) == NULL
	112	\|\| EVP_DigestSignFinal(evp_ctx, protection, &sig_len) <= 0) {
	113	CMPerr(0, CMP_R_ERROR_CALCULATING_PROTECTION);
	114	goto end;
	115	}
	116	} else {
	117	CMPerr(0, CMP_R_INVALID_ARGS);
	118	goto end;
	119	}
	120
	121	if ((prot = ASN1_BIT_STRING_new()) == NULL)
	122	goto end;
	123	/* OpenSSL defaults all bit strings to be encoded as ASN.1 NamedBitList */
	124	prot->flags &= ~(ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT \| 0x07);
	125	prot->flags \|= ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT;
	126	if (!ASN1_BIT_STRING_set(prot, protection, sig_len)) {
	127	ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(prot);
128	prot = NULL;
129	}
130
131	end:
132	OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER_free(pbm);
133	EVP_MD_CTX_free(evp_ctx);
134	OPENSSL_free(protection);
135	OPENSSL_free(prot_part_der);
136	return prot;
137	}
138
139	int ossl_cmp_msg_add_extraCerts(OSSL_CMP_CTX ctx, OSSL_CMP_MSG msg)
140	{
141	if (!ossl_assert(ctx != NULL && msg != NULL))
142	return 0;
143
144	if (msg->extraCerts == NULL
145	&& (msg->extraCerts = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
146	return 0;
147
148	if (ctx->clCert != NULL) {
149	/* Make sure that our own cert gets sent, in the first position */
150	if (!X509_up_ref(ctx->clCert))
151	return 0;
152	if (!sk_X509_push(msg->extraCerts, ctx->clCert)) {
153	X509_free(ctx->clCert);
154	return 0;
155	}
156	/* if we have untrusted store, try to add intermediate certs */
157	if (ctx->untrusted_certs != NULL) {
158	STACK_OF(X509) *chain =
159	ossl_cmp_build_cert_chain(ctx->untrusted_certs, ctx->clCert);
160	int res = ossl_cmp_sk_X509_add1_certs(msg->extraCerts, chain,
235595c4	161	1 /* no self-issued */,
3dbc5156 DDO	162	1 /* no duplicates */, 0);
	163	sk_X509_pop_free(chain, X509_free);
	164	if (res == 0)
	165	return 0;
	166	}
	167	}
	168
	169	/* add any additional certificates from ctx->extraCertsOut */
	170	if (!ossl_cmp_sk_X509_add1_certs(msg->extraCerts, ctx->extraCertsOut, 0,
	171	1 /* no duplicates */, 0))
	172	return 0;
	173
	174	/* if none was found avoid empty ASN.1 sequence */
	175	if (sk_X509_num(msg->extraCerts) == 0) {
	176	sk_X509_free(msg->extraCerts);
	177	msg->extraCerts = NULL;
	178	}
	179	return 1;
	180	}
	181
	182	/*
	183	* Create an X509_ALGOR structure for PasswordBasedMAC protection based on
	184	* the pbm settings in the context
	185	* returns pointer to X509_ALGOR on success, NULL on error
	186	*/
	187	static X509_ALGOR create_pbmac_algor(OSSL_CMP_CTX ctx)
	188	{
	189	X509_ALGOR *alg = NULL;
	190	OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER *pbm = NULL;
	191	unsigned char *pbm_der = NULL;
	192	int pbm_der_len;
	193	ASN1_STRING *pbm_str = NULL;
	194
	195	if (!ossl_assert(ctx != NULL))
	196	return NULL;
	197
	198	alg = X509_ALGOR_new();
	199	pbm = OSSL_CRMF_pbmp_new(ctx->pbm_slen, ctx->pbm_owf, ctx->pbm_itercnt,
	200	ctx->pbm_mac);
	201	pbm_str = ASN1_STRING_new();
	202	if (alg == NULL \|\| pbm == NULL \|\| pbm_str == NULL)
	203	goto err;
	204
	205	if ((pbm_der_len = i2d_OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER(pbm, &pbm_der)) < 0)
	206	goto err;
	207
	208	if (!ASN1_STRING_set(pbm_str, pbm_der, pbm_der_len))
	209	goto err;
	210	OPENSSL_free(pbm_der);
	211
	212	X509_ALGOR_set0(alg, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_id_PasswordBasedMAC),
	213	V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, pbm_str);
	214	OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER_free(pbm);
	215	return alg;
	216
	217	err:
	218	ASN1_STRING_free(pbm_str);
	219	X509_ALGOR_free(alg);
	220	OPENSSL_free(pbm_der);
	221	OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER_free(pbm);
	222	return NULL;
	223	}
	224
	225	int ossl_cmp_msg_protect(OSSL_CMP_CTX ctx, OSSL_CMP_MSG msg)
226	{
227	if (!ossl_assert(ctx != NULL && msg != NULL))
228	return 0;
229
230	if (ctx->unprotectedSend)
231	return 1;
232
233	/* use PasswordBasedMac according to 5.1.3.1 if secretValue is given */
234	if (ctx->secretValue != NULL) {
235	if ((msg->header->protectionAlg = create_pbmac_algor(ctx)) == NULL)
236	goto err;
237	if (ctx->referenceValue != NULL
238	&& !ossl_cmp_hdr_set1_senderKID(msg->header,
239	ctx->referenceValue))
240	goto err;
241
242	/*
243	* add any additional certificates from ctx->extraCertsOut
244	* while not needed to validate the signing cert, the option to do
245	* this might be handy for certain use cases
246	*/
247	if (!ossl_cmp_msg_add_extraCerts(ctx, msg))
248	goto err;
249
250	if ((msg->protection =
251	ossl_cmp_calc_protection(msg, ctx->secretValue, NULL)) == NULL)
252	goto err;
253	} else {
254	/*
255	* use MSG_SIG_ALG according to 5.1.3.3 if client Certificate and
256	* private key is given
257	*/
258	if (ctx->clCert != NULL && ctx->pkey != NULL) {
259	const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *subjKeyIDStr = NULL;
260	int algNID = 0;
261	ASN1_OBJECT *alg = NULL;
262
263	/* make sure that key and certificate match */
264	if (!X509_check_private_key(ctx->clCert, ctx->pkey)) {
265	CMPerr(0, CMP_R_CERT_AND_KEY_DO_NOT_MATCH);
266	goto err;
267	}
268
269	if (msg->header->protectionAlg == NULL)
270	if ((msg->header->protectionAlg = X509_ALGOR_new()) == NULL)
271	goto err;
272
273	if (!OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(&algNID, ctx->digest,
274	EVP_PKEY_id(ctx->pkey))) {
275	CMPerr(0, CMP_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEY_TYPE);
276	goto err;
277	}
278	if ((alg = OBJ_nid2obj(algNID)) == NULL)
279	goto err;
280	if (!X509_ALGOR_set0(msg->header->protectionAlg,
281	alg, V_ASN1_UNDEF, NULL)) {
282	ASN1_OBJECT_free(alg);
283	goto err;
284	}
285
286	/*
287	* set senderKID to keyIdentifier of the used certificate according
288	* to section 5.1.1
289	*/
290	subjKeyIDStr = X509_get0_subject_key_id(ctx->clCert);
cfca56df DDO	291	if (subjKeyIDStr == NULL)
cfca56df DDO	292	subjKeyIDStr = ctx->referenceValue; /* fallback */
3dbc5156 DDO	293	if (subjKeyIDStr != NULL
	294	&& !ossl_cmp_hdr_set1_senderKID(msg->header, subjKeyIDStr))
	295	goto err;
	296
	297	/*
	298	* Add ctx->clCert followed, if possible, by its chain built
	299	* from ctx->untrusted_certs, and then ctx->extraCertsOut
	300	*/
	301	if (!ossl_cmp_msg_add_extraCerts(ctx, msg))
	302	goto err;
	303
	304	if ((msg->protection =
	305	ossl_cmp_calc_protection(msg, NULL, ctx->pkey)) == NULL)
	306	goto err;
	307	} else {
	308	CMPerr(0, CMP_R_MISSING_KEY_INPUT_FOR_CREATING_PROTECTION);
	309	goto err;
	310	}
	311	}
	312
cfca56df DDO	313	/*
	314	* As required by RFC 4210 section 5.1.1., if the sender name is not known
	315	* to the client it set to NULL-DN. In this case for identification at least
	316	* the senderKID must be set, where we took the referenceValue as fallback.
	317	*/
	318
	319	if (ossl_cmp_general_name_is_NULL_DN(msg->header->sender)
	320	&& msg->header->senderKID == NULL)
	321	CMPerr(0, CMP_R_MISSING_SENDER_IDENTIFICATION);
	322	else
	323	return 1;
	324
3dbc5156 DDO	325	err:
	326	CMPerr(0, CMP_R_ERROR_PROTECTING_MESSAGE);
	327	return 0;
	328	}