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31b28ad9 DDO |
1 | /* |
2 | * Copyright 2007-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. | |
3 | * Copyright Nokia 2007-2020 | |
4 | * Copyright Siemens AG 2015-2020 | |
5 | * | |
6 | * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use | |
7 | * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy | |
8 | * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at | |
9 | * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html | |
10 | */ | |
11 | ||
12 | /* CMP functions for PKIMessage checking */ | |
13 | ||
14 | #include "cmp_local.h" | |
15 | #include <openssl/cmp_util.h> | |
16 | ||
17 | /* explicit #includes not strictly needed since implied by the above: */ | |
18 | #include <openssl/asn1t.h> | |
19 | #include <openssl/cmp.h> | |
20 | #include <openssl/crmf.h> | |
21 | #include <openssl/err.h> | |
22 | #include <openssl/x509.h> | |
23 | #include "crypto/x509.h" | |
24 | ||
852c2ed2 RS |
25 | DEFINE_STACK_OF(X509) |
26 | ||
23000838 | 27 | /* Verify a message protected by signature according to RFC section 5.1.3.3 */ |
31b28ad9 DDO |
28 | static int verify_signature(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *cmp_ctx, |
29 | const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg, X509 *cert) | |
30 | { | |
642f60d8 | 31 | OSSL_CMP_PROTECTEDPART prot_part; |
31b28ad9 | 32 | EVP_PKEY *pubkey = NULL; |
31b28ad9 DDO |
33 | BIO *bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); /* may be NULL */ |
34 | int res = 0; | |
35 | ||
36 | if (!ossl_assert(cmp_ctx != NULL && msg != NULL && cert != NULL)) | |
37 | return 0; | |
38 | ||
39 | /* verify that keyUsage, if present, contains digitalSignature */ | |
40 | if (!cmp_ctx->ignore_keyusage | |
41 | && (X509_get_key_usage(cert) & X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE) == 0) { | |
42 | CMPerr(0, CMP_R_MISSING_KEY_USAGE_DIGITALSIGNATURE); | |
43 | goto sig_err; | |
44 | } | |
45 | ||
46 | pubkey = X509_get_pubkey(cert); | |
47 | if (pubkey == NULL) { | |
48 | CMPerr(0, CMP_R_FAILED_EXTRACTING_PUBKEY); | |
49 | goto sig_err; | |
50 | } | |
51 | ||
31b28ad9 DDO |
52 | prot_part.header = msg->header; |
53 | prot_part.body = msg->body; | |
54 | ||
6d1f50b5 DDO |
55 | if (ASN1_item_verify_with_libctx(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(OSSL_CMP_PROTECTEDPART), |
56 | msg->header->protectionAlg, | |
57 | msg->protection, &prot_part, NULL, pubkey, | |
58 | cmp_ctx->libctx, cmp_ctx->propq) > 0) { | |
31b28ad9 DDO |
59 | res = 1; |
60 | goto end; | |
61 | } | |
62 | ||
63 | sig_err: | |
64 | res = x509_print_ex_brief(bio, cert, X509_FLAG_NO_EXTENSIONS); | |
032b13c7 | 65 | CMPerr(0, CMP_R_ERROR_VALIDATING_SIGNATURE); |
31b28ad9 DDO |
66 | if (res) |
67 | ERR_add_error_mem_bio("\n", bio); | |
68 | res = 0; | |
69 | ||
70 | end: | |
31b28ad9 DDO |
71 | EVP_PKEY_free(pubkey); |
72 | BIO_free(bio); | |
73 | ||
74 | return res; | |
75 | } | |
76 | ||
77 | /* Verify a message protected with PBMAC */ | |
6d1f50b5 | 78 | static int verify_PBMAC(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg) |
31b28ad9 DDO |
79 | { |
80 | ASN1_BIT_STRING *protection = NULL; | |
81 | int valid = 0; | |
82 | ||
83 | /* generate expected protection for the message */ | |
6d1f50b5 | 84 | if ((protection = ossl_cmp_calc_protection(ctx, msg)) == NULL) |
31b28ad9 DDO |
85 | return 0; /* failed to generate protection string! */ |
86 | ||
87 | valid = msg->protection != NULL && msg->protection->length >= 0 | |
88 | && msg->protection->type == protection->type | |
89 | && msg->protection->length == protection->length | |
90 | && CRYPTO_memcmp(msg->protection->data, protection->data, | |
91 | protection->length) == 0; | |
92 | ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(protection); | |
93 | if (!valid) | |
94 | CMPerr(0, CMP_R_WRONG_PBM_VALUE); | |
95 | ||
96 | return valid; | |
97 | } | |
98 | ||
c4a9e3eb | 99 | /*- |
31b28ad9 DDO |
100 | * Attempt to validate certificate and path using any given store with trusted |
101 | * certs (possibly including CRLs and a cert verification callback function) | |
102 | * and non-trusted intermediate certs from the given ctx. | |
103 | * | |
104 | * Returns 1 on successful validation and 0 otherwise. | |
105 | */ | |
c4a9e3eb DDO |
106 | int OSSL_CMP_validate_cert_path(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, |
107 | X509_STORE *trusted_store, X509 *cert) | |
31b28ad9 DDO |
108 | { |
109 | int valid = 0; | |
110 | X509_STORE_CTX *csc = NULL; | |
111 | int err; | |
112 | ||
113 | if (ctx == NULL || cert == NULL) { | |
114 | CMPerr(0, CMP_R_NULL_ARGUMENT); | |
115 | return 0; | |
116 | } | |
117 | ||
118 | if (trusted_store == NULL) { | |
119 | CMPerr(0, CMP_R_MISSING_TRUST_STORE); | |
120 | return 0; | |
121 | } | |
122 | ||
28e9f62b | 123 | if ((csc = X509_STORE_CTX_new_with_libctx(ctx->libctx, ctx->propq)) == NULL |
31b28ad9 | 124 | || !X509_STORE_CTX_init(csc, trusted_store, |
0b86eefd | 125 | cert, ctx->untrusted)) |
31b28ad9 DDO |
126 | goto err; |
127 | ||
128 | valid = X509_verify_cert(csc) > 0; | |
129 | ||
130 | /* make sure suitable error is queued even if callback did not do */ | |
131 | err = ERR_peek_last_error(); | |
132 | if (!valid && ERR_GET_REASON(err) != CMP_R_POTENTIALLY_INVALID_CERTIFICATE) | |
133 | CMPerr(0, CMP_R_POTENTIALLY_INVALID_CERTIFICATE); | |
134 | ||
135 | err: | |
a1e4c8ef DDO |
136 | /* directly output any fresh errors, needed for check_msg_find_cert() */ |
137 | OSSL_CMP_CTX_print_errors(ctx); | |
31b28ad9 DDO |
138 | X509_STORE_CTX_free(csc); |
139 | return valid; | |
140 | } | |
141 | ||
142 | /* Return 0 if expect_name != NULL and there is no matching actual_name */ | |
c4a9e3eb | 143 | static int check_name(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, int log_success, |
31b28ad9 DDO |
144 | const char *actual_desc, const X509_NAME *actual_name, |
145 | const char *expect_desc, const X509_NAME *expect_name) | |
146 | { | |
147 | char *str; | |
148 | ||
149 | if (expect_name == NULL) | |
150 | return 1; /* no expectation, thus trivially fulfilled */ | |
151 | ||
152 | /* make sure that a matching name is there */ | |
153 | if (actual_name == NULL) { | |
154 | ossl_cmp_log1(WARN, ctx, "missing %s", actual_desc); | |
155 | return 0; | |
156 | } | |
ca6f1ba9 DDO |
157 | str = X509_NAME_oneline(actual_name, NULL, 0); |
158 | if (X509_NAME_cmp(actual_name, expect_name) == 0) { | |
159 | if (log_success && str != NULL) | |
160 | ossl_cmp_log2(INFO, ctx, " subject matches %s: %s", expect_desc, | |
161 | str); | |
162 | OPENSSL_free(str); | |
31b28ad9 | 163 | return 1; |
ca6f1ba9 | 164 | } |
31b28ad9 | 165 | |
ca6f1ba9 | 166 | if (str != NULL) |
31b28ad9 DDO |
167 | ossl_cmp_log2(INFO, ctx, " actual name in %s = %s", actual_desc, str); |
168 | OPENSSL_free(str); | |
169 | if ((str = X509_NAME_oneline(expect_name, NULL, 0)) != NULL) | |
170 | ossl_cmp_log2(INFO, ctx, " does not match %s = %s", expect_desc, str); | |
171 | OPENSSL_free(str); | |
172 | return 0; | |
173 | } | |
174 | ||
175 | /* Return 0 if skid != NULL and there is no matching subject key ID in cert */ | |
c4a9e3eb DDO |
176 | static int check_kid(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, |
177 | const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ckid, | |
178 | const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *skid) | |
31b28ad9 | 179 | { |
ca6f1ba9 | 180 | char *str; |
31b28ad9 DDO |
181 | |
182 | if (skid == NULL) | |
183 | return 1; /* no expectation, thus trivially fulfilled */ | |
184 | ||
185 | /* make sure that the expected subject key identifier is there */ | |
186 | if (ckid == NULL) { | |
187 | ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, "missing Subject Key Identifier in certificate"); | |
188 | return 0; | |
189 | } | |
ca6f1ba9 DDO |
190 | str = OPENSSL_buf2hexstr(ckid->data, ckid->length); |
191 | if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(ckid, skid) == 0) { | |
192 | if (str != NULL) | |
193 | ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, " subjectKID matches senderKID: %s", str); | |
194 | OPENSSL_free(str); | |
31b28ad9 | 195 | return 1; |
ca6f1ba9 | 196 | } |
31b28ad9 | 197 | |
ca6f1ba9 DDO |
198 | if (str != NULL) |
199 | ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, " cert Subject Key Identifier = %s", str); | |
200 | OPENSSL_free(str); | |
201 | if ((str = OPENSSL_buf2hexstr(skid->data, skid->length)) != NULL) | |
202 | ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, " does not match senderKID = %s", str); | |
203 | OPENSSL_free(str); | |
31b28ad9 DDO |
204 | return 0; |
205 | } | |
206 | ||
c4a9e3eb DDO |
207 | static int already_checked(const X509 *cert, |
208 | const STACK_OF(X509) *already_checked) | |
31b28ad9 DDO |
209 | { |
210 | int i; | |
211 | ||
212 | for (i = sk_X509_num(already_checked /* may be NULL */); i > 0; i--) | |
213 | if (X509_cmp(sk_X509_value(already_checked, i - 1), cert) == 0) | |
214 | return 1; | |
215 | return 0; | |
216 | } | |
217 | ||
c4a9e3eb | 218 | /*- |
31b28ad9 DDO |
219 | * Check if the given cert is acceptable as sender cert of the given message. |
220 | * The subject DN must match, the subject key ID as well if present in the msg, | |
221 | * and the cert must be current (checked if ctx->trusted is not NULL). | |
222 | * Note that cert revocation etc. is checked by OSSL_CMP_validate_cert_path(). | |
223 | * | |
224 | * Returns 0 on error or not acceptable, else 1. | |
225 | */ | |
c4a9e3eb | 226 | static int cert_acceptable(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, |
31b28ad9 DDO |
227 | const char *desc1, const char *desc2, X509 *cert, |
228 | const STACK_OF(X509) *already_checked1, | |
229 | const STACK_OF(X509) *already_checked2, | |
230 | const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg) | |
231 | { | |
232 | X509_STORE *ts = ctx->trusted; | |
a1e4c8ef DDO |
233 | int self_issued = X509_check_issued(cert, cert) == X509_V_OK; |
234 | char *str; | |
31b28ad9 DDO |
235 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = ts != NULL ? X509_STORE_get0_param(ts) : NULL; |
236 | int time_cmp; | |
237 | ||
a1e4c8ef DDO |
238 | ossl_cmp_log3(INFO, ctx, " considering %s%s %s with..", |
239 | self_issued ? "self-issued ": "", desc1, desc2); | |
240 | if ((str = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert), NULL, 0)) != NULL) | |
241 | ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, " subject = %s", str); | |
242 | OPENSSL_free(str); | |
243 | if (!self_issued) { | |
244 | str = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(cert), NULL, 0); | |
245 | if (str != NULL) | |
246 | ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, " issuer = %s", str); | |
247 | OPENSSL_free(str); | |
248 | } | |
31b28ad9 DDO |
249 | |
250 | if (already_checked(cert, already_checked1) | |
251 | || already_checked(cert, already_checked2)) { | |
252 | ossl_cmp_info(ctx, " cert has already been checked"); | |
253 | return 0; | |
254 | } | |
255 | ||
256 | time_cmp = X509_cmp_timeframe(vpm, X509_get0_notBefore(cert), | |
257 | X509_get0_notAfter(cert)); | |
258 | if (time_cmp != 0) { | |
259 | ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, time_cmp > 0 ? "cert has expired" | |
260 | : "cert is not yet valid"); | |
261 | return 0; | |
262 | } | |
263 | ||
ca6f1ba9 | 264 | if (!check_name(ctx, 1, |
31b28ad9 DDO |
265 | "cert subject", X509_get_subject_name(cert), |
266 | "sender field", msg->header->sender->d.directoryName)) | |
267 | return 0; | |
268 | ||
c4a9e3eb | 269 | if (!check_kid(ctx, X509_get0_subject_key_id(cert), msg->header->senderKID)) |
31b28ad9 | 270 | return 0; |
23000838 DDO |
271 | /* prevent misleading error later in case x509v3_cache_extensions() fails */ |
272 | if (!x509v3_cache_extensions(cert)) { | |
273 | ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, "cert appears to be invalid"); | |
274 | return 0; | |
275 | } | |
7b1a3a50 DDO |
276 | if (!verify_signature(ctx, msg, cert)) { |
277 | ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, "msg signature verification failed"); | |
278 | return 0; | |
279 | } | |
31b28ad9 | 280 | /* acceptable also if there is no senderKID in msg header */ |
a1e4c8ef | 281 | ossl_cmp_info(ctx, " cert seems acceptable"); |
31b28ad9 DDO |
282 | return 1; |
283 | } | |
284 | ||
7b1a3a50 DDO |
285 | static int check_cert_path(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, |
286 | X509 *scrt) | |
31b28ad9 | 287 | { |
a1e4c8ef DDO |
288 | if (OSSL_CMP_validate_cert_path(ctx, store, scrt)) |
289 | return 1; | |
290 | ||
291 | ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, | |
292 | "msg signature validates but cert path validation failed"); | |
293 | return 0; | |
31b28ad9 DDO |
294 | } |
295 | ||
296 | /* | |
297 | * Exceptional handling for 3GPP TS 33.310 [3G/LTE Network Domain Security | |
a1e4c8ef DDO |
298 | * (NDS); Authentication Framework (AF)], only to use for IP messages |
299 | * and if the ctx option is explicitly set: use self-issued certificates | |
7b1a3a50 | 300 | * from extraCerts as trust anchor to validate sender cert - |
31b28ad9 DDO |
301 | * provided it also can validate the newly enrolled certificate |
302 | */ | |
7b1a3a50 DDO |
303 | static int check_cert_path_3gpp(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, |
304 | const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg, X509 *scrt) | |
31b28ad9 DDO |
305 | { |
306 | int valid = 0; | |
a1e4c8ef DDO |
307 | X509_STORE *store; |
308 | ||
309 | if (!ctx->permitTAInExtraCertsForIR) | |
310 | return 0; | |
31b28ad9 | 311 | |
a1e4c8ef DDO |
312 | if ((store = X509_STORE_new()) == NULL |
313 | || !ossl_cmp_X509_STORE_add1_certs(store, msg->extraCerts, | |
314 | 1 /* self-issued only */)) | |
315 | goto err; | |
316 | ||
317 | /* store does not include CRLs */ | |
318 | valid = OSSL_CMP_validate_cert_path(ctx, store, scrt); | |
319 | if (!valid) { | |
320 | ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, | |
321 | "also exceptional 3GPP mode cert path validation failed"); | |
322 | } else { | |
31b28ad9 | 323 | /* |
a1e4c8ef DDO |
324 | * verify that the newly enrolled certificate (which assumed rid == |
325 | * OSSL_CMP_CERTREQID) can also be validated with the same trusted store | |
31b28ad9 | 326 | */ |
6d1f50b5 | 327 | EVP_PKEY *pkey = OSSL_CMP_CTX_get0_newPkey(ctx, 1); |
31b28ad9 | 328 | OSSL_CMP_CERTRESPONSE *crep = |
a1e4c8ef DDO |
329 | ossl_cmp_certrepmessage_get0_certresponse(msg->body->value.ip, |
330 | OSSL_CMP_CERTREQID); | |
6d1f50b5 | 331 | X509 *newcrt = ossl_cmp_certresponse_get1_cert(crep, ctx, pkey); |
31b28ad9 DDO |
332 | /* |
333 | * maybe better use get_cert_status() from cmp_client.c, which catches | |
334 | * errors | |
335 | */ | |
336 | valid = OSSL_CMP_validate_cert_path(ctx, store, newcrt); | |
337 | X509_free(newcrt); | |
338 | } | |
a1e4c8ef DDO |
339 | |
340 | err: | |
31b28ad9 DDO |
341 | X509_STORE_free(store); |
342 | return valid; | |
343 | } | |
344 | ||
c4a9e3eb | 345 | static int check_msg_given_cert(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert, |
ca6f1ba9 DDO |
346 | const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg) |
347 | { | |
348 | return cert_acceptable(ctx, "previously validated", "sender cert", | |
349 | cert, NULL, NULL, msg) | |
7b1a3a50 DDO |
350 | && (check_cert_path(ctx, ctx->trusted, cert) |
351 | || check_cert_path_3gpp(ctx, msg, cert)); | |
ca6f1ba9 DDO |
352 | } |
353 | ||
c4a9e3eb | 354 | /*- |
31b28ad9 DDO |
355 | * Try all certs in given list for verifying msg, normally or in 3GPP mode. |
356 | * If already_checked1 == NULL then certs are assumed to be the msg->extraCerts. | |
c4a9e3eb | 357 | * On success cache the found cert using ossl_cmp_ctx_set0_validatedSrvCert(). |
31b28ad9 | 358 | */ |
c4a9e3eb | 359 | static int check_msg_with_certs(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const STACK_OF(X509) *certs, |
31b28ad9 DDO |
360 | const char *desc, |
361 | const STACK_OF(X509) *already_checked1, | |
362 | const STACK_OF(X509) *already_checked2, | |
363 | const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg, int mode_3gpp) | |
364 | { | |
365 | int in_extraCerts = already_checked1 == NULL; | |
366 | int n_acceptable_certs = 0; | |
367 | int i; | |
368 | ||
369 | if (sk_X509_num(certs) <= 0) { | |
370 | ossl_cmp_log1(WARN, ctx, "no %s", desc); | |
371 | return 0; | |
372 | } | |
373 | ||
374 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) { /* certs may be NULL */ | |
375 | X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(certs, i); | |
376 | ||
377 | if (!ossl_assert(cert != NULL)) | |
378 | return 0; | |
379 | if (!cert_acceptable(ctx, "cert from", desc, cert, | |
380 | already_checked1, already_checked2, msg)) | |
381 | continue; | |
382 | n_acceptable_certs++; | |
7b1a3a50 DDO |
383 | if (mode_3gpp ? check_cert_path_3gpp(ctx, msg, cert) |
384 | : check_cert_path(ctx, ctx->trusted, cert)) { | |
31b28ad9 DDO |
385 | /* store successful sender cert for further msgs in transaction */ |
386 | if (!X509_up_ref(cert)) | |
387 | return 0; | |
388 | if (!ossl_cmp_ctx_set0_validatedSrvCert(ctx, cert)) { | |
389 | X509_free(cert); | |
390 | return 0; | |
391 | } | |
392 | return 1; | |
393 | } | |
394 | } | |
395 | if (in_extraCerts && n_acceptable_certs == 0) | |
396 | ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, "no acceptable cert in extraCerts"); | |
397 | return 0; | |
398 | } | |
399 | ||
c4a9e3eb | 400 | /*- |
0b86eefd | 401 | * Verify msg trying first ctx->untrusted, which should include extraCerts |
31b28ad9 | 402 | * at its front, then trying the trusted certs in truststore (if any) of ctx. |
c4a9e3eb | 403 | * On success cache the found cert using ossl_cmp_ctx_set0_validatedSrvCert(). |
31b28ad9 DDO |
404 | */ |
405 | static int check_msg_all_certs(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg, | |
406 | int mode_3gpp) | |
407 | { | |
408 | int ret = 0; | |
409 | ||
a1e4c8ef DDO |
410 | if (mode_3gpp |
411 | && ((!ctx->permitTAInExtraCertsForIR | |
412 | || ossl_cmp_msg_get_bodytype(msg) != OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_IP))) | |
413 | return 0; | |
414 | ||
31b28ad9 | 415 | ossl_cmp_info(ctx, |
a1e4c8ef | 416 | mode_3gpp ? "normal mode failed; trying now 3GPP mode trusting extraCerts" |
31b28ad9 DDO |
417 | : "trying first normal mode using trust store"); |
418 | if (check_msg_with_certs(ctx, msg->extraCerts, "extraCerts", | |
419 | NULL, NULL, msg, mode_3gpp)) | |
420 | return 1; | |
0b86eefd | 421 | if (check_msg_with_certs(ctx, ctx->untrusted, "untrusted certs", |
31b28ad9 DDO |
422 | msg->extraCerts, NULL, msg, mode_3gpp)) |
423 | return 1; | |
424 | ||
425 | if (ctx->trusted == NULL) { | |
426 | ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, mode_3gpp ? "no self-issued extraCerts" | |
427 | : "no trusted store"); | |
428 | } else { | |
429 | STACK_OF(X509) *trusted = X509_STORE_get1_all_certs(ctx->trusted); | |
430 | ret = check_msg_with_certs(ctx, trusted, | |
431 | mode_3gpp ? "self-issued extraCerts" | |
432 | : "certs in trusted store", | |
0b86eefd | 433 | msg->extraCerts, ctx->untrusted, |
31b28ad9 DDO |
434 | msg, mode_3gpp); |
435 | sk_X509_pop_free(trusted, X509_free); | |
436 | } | |
437 | return ret; | |
438 | } | |
439 | ||
a1e4c8ef DDO |
440 | static int no_log_cb(const char *func, const char *file, int line, |
441 | OSSL_CMP_severity level, const char *msg) | |
442 | { | |
443 | return 1; | |
444 | } | |
445 | ||
c4a9e3eb DDO |
446 | /*- |
447 | * Verify message signature with any acceptable and valid candidate cert. | |
448 | * On success cache the found cert using ossl_cmp_ctx_set0_validatedSrvCert(). | |
449 | */ | |
31b28ad9 DDO |
450 | static int check_msg_find_cert(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg) |
451 | { | |
452 | X509 *scrt = ctx->validatedSrvCert; /* previous successful sender cert */ | |
453 | GENERAL_NAME *sender = msg->header->sender; | |
454 | char *sname = NULL; | |
455 | char *skid_str = NULL; | |
456 | const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *skid = msg->header->senderKID; | |
7e765f46 | 457 | OSSL_CMP_log_cb_t backup_log_cb = ctx->log_cb; |
31b28ad9 DDO |
458 | int res = 0; |
459 | ||
460 | if (sender == NULL || msg->body == NULL) | |
461 | return 0; /* other NULL cases already have been checked */ | |
462 | if (sender->type != GEN_DIRNAME) { | |
463 | CMPerr(0, CMP_R_SENDER_GENERALNAME_TYPE_NOT_SUPPORTED); | |
464 | return 0; | |
465 | } | |
466 | ||
a1e4c8ef DDO |
467 | /* dump any hitherto errors to avoid confusion when printing further ones */ |
468 | OSSL_CMP_CTX_print_errors(ctx); | |
469 | ||
ca6f1ba9 DDO |
470 | /* enable clearing irrelevant errors in attempts to validate sender certs */ |
471 | (void)ERR_set_mark(); | |
472 | ctx->log_cb = no_log_cb; /* temporarily disable logging */ | |
473 | ||
31b28ad9 DDO |
474 | /* |
475 | * try first cached scrt, used successfully earlier in same transaction, | |
476 | * for validating this and any further msgs where extraCerts may be left out | |
477 | */ | |
a1e4c8ef | 478 | if (scrt != NULL) { |
ca6f1ba9 DDO |
479 | if (check_msg_given_cert(ctx, scrt, msg)) { |
480 | ctx->log_cb = backup_log_cb; | |
a1e4c8ef DDO |
481 | (void)ERR_pop_to_mark(); |
482 | return 1; | |
483 | } | |
a1e4c8ef DDO |
484 | /* cached sender cert has shown to be no more successfully usable */ |
485 | (void)ossl_cmp_ctx_set0_validatedSrvCert(ctx, NULL); | |
ca6f1ba9 DDO |
486 | /* re-do the above check (just) for adding diagnostic information */ |
487 | ossl_cmp_info(ctx, | |
488 | "trying to verify msg signature with previously validated cert"); | |
489 | (void)check_msg_given_cert(ctx, scrt, msg); | |
31b28ad9 | 490 | } |
31b28ad9 | 491 | |
a1e4c8ef DDO |
492 | res = check_msg_all_certs(ctx, msg, 0 /* using ctx->trusted */) |
493 | || check_msg_all_certs(ctx, msg, 1 /* 3gpp */); | |
494 | ctx->log_cb = backup_log_cb; | |
495 | if (res) { | |
496 | /* discard any diagnostic information on trying to use certs */ | |
31b28ad9 | 497 | (void)ERR_pop_to_mark(); |
31b28ad9 DDO |
498 | goto end; |
499 | } | |
500 | /* failed finding a sender cert that verifies the message signature */ | |
31b28ad9 DDO |
501 | (void)ERR_clear_last_mark(); |
502 | ||
503 | sname = X509_NAME_oneline(sender->d.directoryName, NULL, 0); | |
504 | skid_str = skid == NULL ? NULL | |
505 | : OPENSSL_buf2hexstr(skid->data, skid->length); | |
506 | if (ctx->log_cb != NULL) { | |
a1e4c8ef | 507 | ossl_cmp_info(ctx, "trying to verify msg signature with a valid cert that.."); |
31b28ad9 | 508 | if (sname != NULL) |
a1e4c8ef | 509 | ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, "matches msg sender = %s", sname); |
31b28ad9 | 510 | if (skid_str != NULL) |
a1e4c8ef | 511 | ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, "matches msg senderKID = %s", skid_str); |
31b28ad9 DDO |
512 | else |
513 | ossl_cmp_info(ctx, "while msg header does not contain senderKID"); | |
514 | /* re-do the above checks (just) for adding diagnostic information */ | |
ca6f1ba9 DDO |
515 | (void)check_msg_all_certs(ctx, msg, 0 /* using ctx->trusted */); |
516 | (void)check_msg_all_certs(ctx, msg, 1 /* 3gpp */); | |
31b28ad9 DDO |
517 | } |
518 | ||
519 | CMPerr(0, CMP_R_NO_SUITABLE_SENDER_CERT); | |
520 | if (sname != NULL) { | |
521 | ERR_add_error_txt(NULL, "for msg sender name = "); | |
522 | ERR_add_error_txt(NULL, sname); | |
523 | } | |
524 | if (skid_str != NULL) { | |
525 | ERR_add_error_txt(" and ", "for msg senderKID = "); | |
526 | ERR_add_error_txt(NULL, skid_str); | |
527 | } | |
528 | ||
529 | end: | |
530 | OPENSSL_free(sname); | |
531 | OPENSSL_free(skid_str); | |
532 | return res; | |
533 | } | |
534 | ||
c4a9e3eb | 535 | /*- |
31b28ad9 DDO |
536 | * Validate the protection of the given PKIMessage using either password- |
537 | * based mac (PBM) or a signature algorithm. In the case of signature algorithm, | |
538 | * the sender certificate can have been pinned by providing it in ctx->srvCert, | |
0b86eefd | 539 | * else it is searched in msg->extraCerts, ctx->untrusted, in ctx->trusted |
31b28ad9 | 540 | * (in this order) and is path is validated against ctx->trusted. |
c4a9e3eb | 541 | * On success cache the found cert using ossl_cmp_ctx_set0_validatedSrvCert(). |
31b28ad9 DDO |
542 | * |
543 | * If ctx->permitTAInExtraCertsForIR is true and when validating a CMP IP msg, | |
544 | * the trust anchor for validating the IP msg may be taken from msg->extraCerts | |
545 | * if a self-issued certificate is found there that can be used to | |
546 | * validate the enrolled certificate returned in the IP. | |
547 | * This is according to the need given in 3GPP TS 33.310. | |
548 | * | |
549 | * Returns 1 on success, 0 on error or validation failed. | |
550 | */ | |
551 | int OSSL_CMP_validate_msg(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg) | |
552 | { | |
31b28ad9 DDO |
553 | X509 *scrt; |
554 | ||
1a5ae1da | 555 | ossl_cmp_debug(ctx, "validating CMP message"); |
31b28ad9 DDO |
556 | if (ctx == NULL || msg == NULL |
557 | || msg->header == NULL || msg->body == NULL) { | |
558 | CMPerr(0, CMP_R_NULL_ARGUMENT); | |
559 | return 0; | |
560 | } | |
561 | ||
12bbcee2 | 562 | if (msg->header->protectionAlg == NULL /* unprotected message */ |
31b28ad9 DDO |
563 | || msg->protection == NULL || msg->protection->data == NULL) { |
564 | CMPerr(0, CMP_R_MISSING_PROTECTION); | |
565 | return 0; | |
566 | } | |
567 | ||
12bbcee2 | 568 | switch (ossl_cmp_hdr_get_protection_nid(msg->header)) { |
31b28ad9 DDO |
569 | /* 5.1.3.1. Shared Secret Information */ |
570 | case NID_id_PasswordBasedMAC: | |
6d1f50b5 DDO |
571 | if (verify_PBMAC(ctx, msg)) { |
572 | /* | |
573 | * RFC 4210, 5.3.2: 'Note that if the PKI Message Protection is | |
574 | * "shared secret information", then any certificate transported in | |
575 | * the caPubs field may be directly trusted as a root CA | |
576 | * certificate by the initiator.' | |
577 | */ | |
578 | switch (ossl_cmp_msg_get_bodytype(msg)) { | |
579 | case -1: | |
580 | return 0; | |
581 | case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_IP: | |
582 | case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_CP: | |
583 | case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_KUP: | |
584 | case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_CCP: | |
585 | if (ctx->trusted != NULL) { | |
586 | STACK_OF(X509) *certs = msg->body->value.ip->caPubs; | |
587 | /* value.ip is same for cp, kup, and ccp */ | |
588 | ||
589 | if (!ossl_cmp_X509_STORE_add1_certs(ctx->trusted, certs, 0)) | |
590 | /* adds both self-issued and not self-issued certs */ | |
591 | return 0; | |
592 | } | |
593 | break; | |
594 | default: | |
595 | break; | |
596 | } | |
1a5ae1da DDO |
597 | ossl_cmp_debug(ctx, |
598 | "sucessfully validated PBM-based CMP message protection"); | |
31b28ad9 | 599 | return 1; |
6d1f50b5 | 600 | } |
1a5ae1da | 601 | ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, "verifying PBM-based CMP message protection failed"); |
31b28ad9 DDO |
602 | break; |
603 | ||
604 | /* | |
605 | * 5.1.3.2 DH Key Pairs | |
606 | * Not yet supported | |
607 | */ | |
608 | case NID_id_DHBasedMac: | |
609 | CMPerr(0, CMP_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTECTION_ALG_DHBASEDMAC); | |
610 | break; | |
611 | ||
612 | /* | |
613 | * 5.1.3.3. Signature | |
614 | */ | |
615 | default: | |
31b28ad9 DDO |
616 | scrt = ctx->srvCert; |
617 | if (scrt == NULL) { | |
618 | if (check_msg_find_cert(ctx, msg)) | |
619 | return 1; | |
620 | } else { /* use pinned sender cert */ | |
621 | /* use ctx->srvCert for signature check even if not acceptable */ | |
1a5ae1da DDO |
622 | if (verify_signature(ctx, msg, scrt)) { |
623 | ossl_cmp_debug(ctx, | |
624 | "sucessfully validated signature-based CMP message protection"); | |
625 | ||
31b28ad9 | 626 | return 1; |
1a5ae1da DDO |
627 | } |
628 | ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, "CMP message signature verification failed"); | |
31b28ad9 DDO |
629 | CMPerr(0, CMP_R_SRVCERT_DOES_NOT_VALIDATE_MSG); |
630 | } | |
631 | break; | |
632 | } | |
633 | return 0; | |
634 | } | |
635 | ||
636 | ||
637 | /*- | |
638 | * Check received message (i.e., response by server or request from client) | |
0b86eefd | 639 | * Any msg->extraCerts are prepended to ctx->untrusted. |
31b28ad9 DDO |
640 | * |
641 | * Ensures that: | |
c4a9e3eb DDO |
642 | * its sender is of appropriate type (curently only X509_NAME) and |
643 | * matches any expected sender or srvCert subject given in the ctx | |
31b28ad9 | 644 | * it has a valid body type |
7e765f46 DDO |
645 | * its protection is valid (or invalid/absent, but only if a callback function |
646 | * is present and yields a positive result using also the supplied argument) | |
31b28ad9 DDO |
647 | * its transaction ID matches the previous transaction ID stored in ctx (if any) |
648 | * its recipNonce matches the previous senderNonce stored in the ctx (if any) | |
649 | * | |
650 | * If everything is fine: | |
651 | * learns the senderNonce from the received message, | |
c4a9e3eb DDO |
652 | * learns the transaction ID if it is not yet in ctx, |
653 | * and makes any certs in caPubs directly trusted. | |
31b28ad9 | 654 | * |
c4a9e3eb | 655 | * Returns 1 on success, 0 on error. |
31b28ad9 | 656 | */ |
430efff1 DDO |
657 | int ossl_cmp_msg_check_update(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg, |
658 | ossl_cmp_allow_unprotected_cb_t cb, int cb_arg) | |
31b28ad9 | 659 | { |
c4a9e3eb DDO |
660 | OSSL_CMP_PKIHEADER *hdr; |
661 | const X509_NAME *expected_sender; | |
662 | ||
663 | if (!ossl_assert(ctx != NULL && msg != NULL && msg->header != NULL)) | |
664 | return 0; | |
665 | hdr = OSSL_CMP_MSG_get0_header(msg); | |
666 | ||
667 | /* validate sender name of received msg */ | |
668 | if (hdr->sender->type != GEN_DIRNAME) { | |
669 | CMPerr(0, CMP_R_SENDER_GENERALNAME_TYPE_NOT_SUPPORTED); | |
670 | return 0; /* TODO FR#42: support for more than X509_NAME */ | |
671 | } | |
672 | /* | |
673 | * Compare actual sender name of response with expected sender name. | |
674 | * Mitigates risk to accept misused PBM secret | |
675 | * or misused certificate of an unauthorized entity of a trusted hierarchy. | |
676 | */ | |
677 | expected_sender = ctx->expected_sender; | |
678 | if (expected_sender == NULL && ctx->srvCert != NULL) | |
679 | expected_sender = X509_get_subject_name(ctx->srvCert); | |
680 | if (!check_name(ctx, 0, "sender DN field", hdr->sender->d.directoryName, | |
681 | "expected sender", expected_sender)) | |
430efff1 | 682 | return 0; |
c4a9e3eb | 683 | /* Note: if recipient was NULL-DN it could be learned here if needed */ |
31b28ad9 DDO |
684 | |
685 | if (sk_X509_num(msg->extraCerts) > 10) | |
686 | ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, | |
687 | "received CMP message contains more than 10 extraCerts"); | |
430efff1 DDO |
688 | /* |
689 | * Store any provided extraCerts in ctx for use in OSSL_CMP_validate_msg() | |
690 | * and for future use, such that they are available to ctx->certConf_cb and | |
691 | * the peer does not need to send them again in the same transaction. | |
692 | * Note that it does not help validating the message before storing the | |
693 | * extraCerts because they do not belong to the protected msg part anyway. | |
694 | * For efficiency, the extraCerts are prepended so they get used first. | |
695 | */ | |
0b86eefd | 696 | if (!X509_add_certs(ctx->untrusted, msg->extraCerts, |
eeccc237 DDO |
697 | /* this allows self-signed certs */ |
698 | X509_ADD_FLAG_UP_REF | X509_ADD_FLAG_NO_DUP | |
699 | | X509_ADD_FLAG_PREPEND)) | |
430efff1 | 700 | return 0; |
31b28ad9 DDO |
701 | |
702 | /* validate message protection */ | |
c4a9e3eb | 703 | if (hdr->protectionAlg != NULL) { |
31b28ad9 DDO |
704 | /* detect explicitly permitted exceptions for invalid protection */ |
705 | if (!OSSL_CMP_validate_msg(ctx, msg) | |
7e765f46 | 706 | && (cb == NULL || (*cb)(ctx, msg, 1, cb_arg) <= 0)) { |
e599d0ae | 707 | #ifndef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION |
31b28ad9 | 708 | CMPerr(0, CMP_R_ERROR_VALIDATING_PROTECTION); |
430efff1 | 709 | return 0; |
e599d0ae | 710 | #endif |
31b28ad9 DDO |
711 | } |
712 | } else { | |
713 | /* detect explicitly permitted exceptions for missing protection */ | |
7e765f46 | 714 | if (cb == NULL || (*cb)(ctx, msg, 0, cb_arg) <= 0) { |
e599d0ae | 715 | #ifndef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION |
31b28ad9 | 716 | CMPerr(0, CMP_R_MISSING_PROTECTION); |
430efff1 | 717 | return 0; |
e599d0ae | 718 | #endif |
31b28ad9 DDO |
719 | } |
720 | } | |
721 | ||
31b28ad9 | 722 | /* check CMP version number in header */ |
c4a9e3eb | 723 | if (ossl_cmp_hdr_get_pvno(hdr) != OSSL_CMP_PVNO) { |
e599d0ae | 724 | #ifndef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION |
31b28ad9 | 725 | CMPerr(0, CMP_R_UNEXPECTED_PVNO); |
430efff1 | 726 | return 0; |
e599d0ae | 727 | #endif |
31b28ad9 DDO |
728 | } |
729 | ||
430efff1 | 730 | if (ossl_cmp_msg_get_bodytype(msg) < 0) { |
e599d0ae | 731 | #ifndef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION |
7e765f46 | 732 | CMPerr(0, CMP_R_PKIBODY_ERROR); |
430efff1 | 733 | return 0; |
e599d0ae | 734 | #endif |
7e765f46 DDO |
735 | } |
736 | ||
31b28ad9 DDO |
737 | /* compare received transactionID with the expected one in previous msg */ |
738 | if (ctx->transactionID != NULL | |
c4a9e3eb | 739 | && (hdr->transactionID == NULL |
31b28ad9 | 740 | || ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(ctx->transactionID, |
c4a9e3eb | 741 | hdr->transactionID) != 0)) { |
e599d0ae | 742 | #ifndef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION |
31b28ad9 | 743 | CMPerr(0, CMP_R_TRANSACTIONID_UNMATCHED); |
430efff1 | 744 | return 0; |
e599d0ae | 745 | #endif |
31b28ad9 DDO |
746 | } |
747 | ||
748 | /* compare received nonce with the one we sent */ | |
749 | if (ctx->senderNonce != NULL | |
750 | && (msg->header->recipNonce == NULL | |
751 | || ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(ctx->senderNonce, | |
c4a9e3eb | 752 | hdr->recipNonce) != 0)) { |
e599d0ae | 753 | #ifndef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION |
31b28ad9 | 754 | CMPerr(0, CMP_R_RECIPNONCE_UNMATCHED); |
430efff1 | 755 | return 0; |
e599d0ae | 756 | #endif |
31b28ad9 DDO |
757 | } |
758 | ||
759 | /* | |
760 | * RFC 4210 section 5.1.1 states: the recipNonce is copied from | |
761 | * the senderNonce of the previous message in the transaction. | |
762 | * --> Store for setting in next message | |
763 | */ | |
c4a9e3eb | 764 | if (!ossl_cmp_ctx_set1_recipNonce(ctx, hdr->senderNonce)) |
430efff1 | 765 | return 0; |
31b28ad9 DDO |
766 | |
767 | /* if not yet present, learn transactionID */ | |
768 | if (ctx->transactionID == NULL | |
c4a9e3eb | 769 | && !OSSL_CMP_CTX_set1_transactionID(ctx, hdr->transactionID)) |
eeccc237 DDO |
770 | return -1; |
771 | ||
772 | /* | |
773 | * Store any provided extraCerts in ctx for future use, | |
774 | * such that they are available to ctx->certConf_cb and | |
775 | * the peer does not need to send them again in the same transaction. | |
776 | * For efficiency, the extraCerts are prepended so they get used first. | |
777 | */ | |
0b86eefd | 778 | if (!X509_add_certs(ctx->untrusted, msg->extraCerts, |
eeccc237 DDO |
779 | /* this allows self-signed certs */ |
780 | X509_ADD_FLAG_UP_REF | X509_ADD_FLAG_NO_DUP | |
781 | | X509_ADD_FLAG_PREPEND)) | |
782 | return -1; | |
7e765f46 | 783 | |
c4a9e3eb DDO |
784 | if (ossl_cmp_hdr_get_protection_nid(hdr) == NID_id_PasswordBasedMAC) { |
785 | /* | |
786 | * RFC 4210, 5.3.2: 'Note that if the PKI Message Protection is | |
787 | * "shared secret information", then any certificate transported in | |
788 | * the caPubs field may be directly trusted as a root CA | |
789 | * certificate by the initiator.' | |
790 | */ | |
791 | switch (ossl_cmp_msg_get_bodytype(msg)) { | |
792 | case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_IP: | |
793 | case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_CP: | |
794 | case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_KUP: | |
795 | case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_CCP: | |
796 | if (ctx->trusted != NULL) { | |
797 | STACK_OF(X509) *certs = msg->body->value.ip->caPubs; | |
798 | /* value.ip is same for cp, kup, and ccp */ | |
799 | ||
800 | if (!ossl_cmp_X509_STORE_add1_certs(ctx->trusted, certs, 0)) | |
801 | /* adds both self-issued and not self-issued certs */ | |
802 | return 0; | |
7b1a3a50 | 803 | } |
c4a9e3eb DDO |
804 | break; |
805 | default: | |
806 | break; | |
807 | } | |
808 | } | |
430efff1 | 809 | return 1; |
31b28ad9 DDO |
810 | } |
811 | ||
6d1f50b5 DDO |
812 | int ossl_cmp_verify_popo(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, |
813 | const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg, int acceptRAVerified) | |
31b28ad9 DDO |
814 | { |
815 | if (!ossl_assert(msg != NULL && msg->body != NULL)) | |
816 | return 0; | |
817 | switch (msg->body->type) { | |
818 | case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_P10CR: | |
819 | { | |
820 | X509_REQ *req = msg->body->value.p10cr; | |
821 | ||
6d1f50b5 DDO |
822 | if (X509_REQ_verify_with_libctx(req, X509_REQ_get0_pubkey(req), |
823 | ctx->libctx, ctx->propq) <= 0) { | |
e599d0ae DDO |
824 | #ifndef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION |
825 | CMPerr(0, CMP_R_REQUEST_NOT_ACCEPTED); | |
826 | return 0; | |
827 | #endif | |
828 | } | |
31b28ad9 | 829 | } |
e599d0ae | 830 | break; |
31b28ad9 DDO |
831 | case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_IR: |
832 | case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_CR: | |
833 | case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_KUR: | |
e599d0ae | 834 | if (!OSSL_CRMF_MSGS_verify_popo(msg->body->value.ir, OSSL_CMP_CERTREQID, |
6d1f50b5 DDO |
835 | acceptRAVerified, |
836 | ctx->libctx, ctx->propq)) { | |
e599d0ae DDO |
837 | #ifndef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION |
838 | return 0; | |
839 | #endif | |
840 | } | |
841 | break; | |
31b28ad9 DDO |
842 | default: |
843 | CMPerr(0, CMP_R_PKIBODY_ERROR); | |
844 | return 0; | |
845 | } | |
e599d0ae | 846 | return 1; |
31b28ad9 | 847 | } |