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8c798690 | 1 | /* crypto/cms/cms_kari.c */ |
ae5c8664 MC |
2 | /* |
3 | * Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL | |
8c798690 DSH |
4 | * project. |
5 | */ | |
6 | /* ==================================================================== | |
7 | * Copyright (c) 2013 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. | |
8 | * | |
9 | * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without | |
10 | * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | |
11 | * are met: | |
12 | * | |
13 | * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright | |
ae5c8664 | 14 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
8c798690 DSH |
15 | * |
16 | * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | |
17 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in | |
18 | * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the | |
19 | * distribution. | |
20 | * | |
21 | * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this | |
22 | * software must display the following acknowledgment: | |
23 | * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project | |
24 | * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" | |
25 | * | |
26 | * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to | |
27 | * endorse or promote products derived from this software without | |
28 | * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact | |
29 | * licensing@OpenSSL.org. | |
30 | * | |
31 | * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" | |
32 | * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written | |
33 | * permission of the OpenSSL Project. | |
34 | * | |
35 | * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following | |
36 | * acknowledgment: | |
37 | * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project | |
38 | * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" | |
39 | * | |
40 | * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY | |
41 | * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE | |
42 | * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR | |
43 | * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR | |
44 | * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, | |
45 | * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT | |
46 | * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; | |
47 | * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) | |
48 | * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, | |
49 | * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) | |
50 | * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED | |
51 | * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. | |
52 | * ==================================================================== | |
53 | */ | |
54 | ||
55 | #include "cryptlib.h" | |
56 | #include <openssl/asn1t.h> | |
57 | #include <openssl/pem.h> | |
58 | #include <openssl/x509v3.h> | |
59 | #include <openssl/err.h> | |
60 | #include <openssl/cms.h> | |
61 | #include <openssl/rand.h> | |
62 | #include <openssl/aes.h> | |
63 | #include "cms_lcl.h" | |
64 | #include "asn1_locl.h" | |
65 | ||
66 | DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo) | |
67 | DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey) | |
68 | DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(CMS_OriginatorPublicKey) | |
69 | ||
70 | /* Key Agreement Recipient Info (KARI) routines */ | |
71 | ||
72 | int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_alg(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, | |
ae5c8664 MC |
73 | X509_ALGOR **palg, |
74 | ASN1_OCTET_STRING **pukm) | |
75 | { | |
76 | if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) { | |
77 | CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_GET0_ALG, | |
78 | CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT); | |
79 | return 0; | |
80 | } | |
81 | if (palg) | |
82 | *palg = ri->d.kari->keyEncryptionAlgorithm; | |
83 | if (pukm) | |
84 | *pukm = ri->d.kari->ukm; | |
85 | return 1; | |
86 | } | |
8c798690 DSH |
87 | |
88 | /* Retrieve recipient encrypted keys from a kari */ | |
89 | ||
ae5c8664 MC |
90 | STACK_OF(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey) |
91 | *CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_reks(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri) | |
92 | { | |
93 | if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) { | |
94 | CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_GET0_REKS, | |
95 | CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT); | |
96 | return NULL; | |
97 | } | |
98 | return ri->d.kari->recipientEncryptedKeys; | |
99 | } | |
8c798690 DSH |
100 | |
101 | int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_orig_id(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, | |
ae5c8664 MC |
102 | X509_ALGOR **pubalg, |
103 | ASN1_BIT_STRING **pubkey, | |
104 | ASN1_OCTET_STRING **keyid, | |
105 | X509_NAME **issuer, | |
106 | ASN1_INTEGER **sno) | |
107 | { | |
108 | CMS_OriginatorIdentifierOrKey *oik; | |
109 | if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) { | |
110 | CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_GET0_ORIG_ID, | |
111 | CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT); | |
112 | return 0; | |
113 | } | |
114 | oik = ri->d.kari->originator; | |
115 | if (issuer) | |
116 | *issuer = NULL; | |
117 | if (sno) | |
118 | *sno = NULL; | |
119 | if (keyid) | |
120 | *keyid = NULL; | |
121 | if (pubalg) | |
122 | *pubalg = NULL; | |
123 | if (pubkey) | |
124 | *pubkey = NULL; | |
125 | if (oik->type == CMS_OIK_ISSUER_SERIAL) { | |
126 | if (issuer) | |
127 | *issuer = oik->d.issuerAndSerialNumber->issuer; | |
128 | if (sno) | |
129 | *sno = oik->d.issuerAndSerialNumber->serialNumber; | |
130 | } else if (oik->type == CMS_OIK_KEYIDENTIFIER) { | |
131 | if (keyid) | |
132 | *keyid = oik->d.subjectKeyIdentifier; | |
133 | } else if (oik->type == CMS_OIK_PUBKEY) { | |
134 | if (pubalg) | |
135 | *pubalg = oik->d.originatorKey->algorithm; | |
136 | if (pubkey) | |
137 | *pubkey = oik->d.originatorKey->publicKey; | |
138 | } else | |
139 | return 0; | |
140 | return 1; | |
141 | } | |
8c798690 DSH |
142 | |
143 | int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_orig_id_cmp(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, X509 *cert) | |
ae5c8664 MC |
144 | { |
145 | CMS_OriginatorIdentifierOrKey *oik; | |
146 | if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) { | |
147 | CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_ORIG_ID_CMP, | |
148 | CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT); | |
149 | return -2; | |
150 | } | |
151 | oik = ri->d.kari->originator; | |
152 | if (oik->type == CMS_OIK_ISSUER_SERIAL) | |
153 | return cms_ias_cert_cmp(oik->d.issuerAndSerialNumber, cert); | |
154 | else if (oik->type == CMS_OIK_KEYIDENTIFIER) | |
155 | return cms_keyid_cert_cmp(oik->d.subjectKeyIdentifier, cert); | |
156 | return -1; | |
157 | } | |
8c798690 DSH |
158 | |
159 | int CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_get0_id(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek, | |
ae5c8664 MC |
160 | ASN1_OCTET_STRING **keyid, |
161 | ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME **tm, | |
162 | CMS_OtherKeyAttribute **other, | |
163 | X509_NAME **issuer, ASN1_INTEGER **sno) | |
164 | { | |
165 | CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier *rid = rek->rid; | |
166 | if (rid->type == CMS_REK_ISSUER_SERIAL) { | |
167 | if (issuer) | |
168 | *issuer = rid->d.issuerAndSerialNumber->issuer; | |
169 | if (sno) | |
170 | *sno = rid->d.issuerAndSerialNumber->serialNumber; | |
171 | if (keyid) | |
172 | *keyid = NULL; | |
173 | if (tm) | |
174 | *tm = NULL; | |
175 | if (other) | |
176 | *other = NULL; | |
177 | } else if (rid->type == CMS_REK_KEYIDENTIFIER) { | |
178 | if (keyid) | |
179 | *keyid = rid->d.rKeyId->subjectKeyIdentifier; | |
180 | if (tm) | |
181 | *tm = rid->d.rKeyId->date; | |
182 | if (other) | |
183 | *other = rid->d.rKeyId->other; | |
184 | if (issuer) | |
185 | *issuer = NULL; | |
186 | if (sno) | |
187 | *sno = NULL; | |
188 | } else | |
189 | return 0; | |
190 | return 1; | |
191 | } | |
8c798690 DSH |
192 | |
193 | int CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_cert_cmp(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek, | |
ae5c8664 MC |
194 | X509 *cert) |
195 | { | |
196 | CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier *rid = rek->rid; | |
197 | if (rid->type == CMS_REK_ISSUER_SERIAL) | |
198 | return cms_ias_cert_cmp(rid->d.issuerAndSerialNumber, cert); | |
199 | else if (rid->type == CMS_REK_KEYIDENTIFIER) | |
200 | return cms_keyid_cert_cmp(rid->d.rKeyId->subjectKeyIdentifier, cert); | |
201 | else | |
202 | return -1; | |
203 | } | |
8c798690 DSH |
204 | |
205 | int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_set0_pkey(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, EVP_PKEY *pk) | |
ae5c8664 MC |
206 | { |
207 | EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx; | |
208 | CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari = ri->d.kari; | |
209 | if (kari->pctx) { | |
210 | EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(kari->pctx); | |
211 | kari->pctx = NULL; | |
212 | } | |
213 | if (!pk) | |
214 | return 1; | |
215 | pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL); | |
216 | if (!pctx || !EVP_PKEY_derive_init(pctx)) | |
217 | goto err; | |
218 | kari->pctx = pctx; | |
219 | return 1; | |
220 | err: | |
221 | if (pctx) | |
222 | EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); | |
223 | return 0; | |
224 | } | |
8c798690 DSH |
225 | |
226 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX *CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_ctx(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri) | |
ae5c8664 MC |
227 | { |
228 | if (ri->type == CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) | |
229 | return &ri->d.kari->ctx; | |
230 | return NULL; | |
231 | } | |
232 | ||
233 | /* | |
234 | * Derive KEK and decrypt/encrypt with it to produce either the original CEK | |
235 | * or the encrypted CEK. | |
8c798690 DSH |
236 | */ |
237 | ||
ae5c8664 MC |
238 | static int cms_kek_cipher(unsigned char **pout, size_t *poutlen, |
239 | const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen, | |
240 | CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari, int enc) | |
241 | { | |
242 | /* Key encryption key */ | |
243 | unsigned char kek[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH]; | |
244 | size_t keklen; | |
245 | int rv = 0; | |
246 | unsigned char *out = NULL; | |
247 | int outlen; | |
248 | keklen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(&kari->ctx); | |
249 | if (keklen > EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH) | |
250 | return 0; | |
251 | /* Derive KEK */ | |
252 | if (EVP_PKEY_derive(kari->pctx, kek, &keklen) <= 0) | |
253 | goto err; | |
254 | /* Set KEK in context */ | |
255 | if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(&kari->ctx, NULL, NULL, kek, NULL, enc)) | |
256 | goto err; | |
257 | /* obtain output length of ciphered key */ | |
258 | if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(&kari->ctx, NULL, &outlen, in, inlen)) | |
259 | goto err; | |
260 | out = OPENSSL_malloc(outlen); | |
261 | if (!out) | |
262 | goto err; | |
263 | if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(&kari->ctx, out, &outlen, in, inlen)) | |
264 | goto err; | |
265 | *pout = out; | |
266 | *poutlen = (size_t)outlen; | |
267 | rv = 1; | |
268 | ||
269 | err: | |
270 | OPENSSL_cleanse(kek, keklen); | |
271 | if (!rv && out) | |
272 | OPENSSL_free(out); | |
273 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&kari->ctx); | |
274 | EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(kari->pctx); | |
275 | kari->pctx = NULL; | |
276 | return rv; | |
277 | } | |
278 | ||
279 | int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, | |
280 | CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, | |
281 | CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek) | |
282 | { | |
283 | int rv = 0; | |
284 | unsigned char *enckey = NULL, *cek = NULL; | |
285 | size_t enckeylen; | |
286 | size_t ceklen; | |
287 | CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec; | |
288 | enckeylen = rek->encryptedKey->length; | |
289 | enckey = rek->encryptedKey->data; | |
290 | /* Setup all parameters to derive KEK */ | |
291 | if (!cms_env_asn1_ctrl(ri, 1)) | |
292 | goto err; | |
293 | /* Attempt to decrypt CEK */ | |
294 | if (!cms_kek_cipher(&cek, &ceklen, enckey, enckeylen, ri->d.kari, 0)) | |
295 | goto err; | |
296 | ec = cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo; | |
297 | if (ec->key) { | |
298 | OPENSSL_cleanse(ec->key, ec->keylen); | |
299 | OPENSSL_free(ec->key); | |
300 | } | |
301 | ec->key = cek; | |
302 | ec->keylen = ceklen; | |
303 | cek = NULL; | |
304 | rv = 1; | |
305 | err: | |
306 | if (cek) | |
307 | OPENSSL_free(cek); | |
308 | return rv; | |
309 | } | |
8c798690 DSH |
310 | |
311 | /* Create ephemeral key and initialise context based on it */ | |
312 | static int cms_kari_create_ephemeral_key(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari, | |
ae5c8664 MC |
313 | EVP_PKEY *pk) |
314 | { | |
315 | EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; | |
316 | EVP_PKEY *ekey = NULL; | |
317 | int rv = 0; | |
318 | pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL); | |
319 | if (!pctx) | |
320 | goto err; | |
321 | if (EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(pctx) <= 0) | |
322 | goto err; | |
323 | if (EVP_PKEY_keygen(pctx, &ekey) <= 0) | |
324 | goto err; | |
325 | EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); | |
326 | pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(ekey, NULL); | |
327 | if (!pctx) | |
328 | goto err; | |
329 | if (EVP_PKEY_derive_init(pctx) <= 0) | |
330 | goto err; | |
331 | kari->pctx = pctx; | |
332 | rv = 1; | |
333 | err: | |
334 | if (!rv && pctx) | |
335 | EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); | |
336 | if (ekey) | |
337 | EVP_PKEY_free(ekey); | |
338 | return rv; | |
339 | } | |
8c798690 DSH |
340 | |
341 | /* Initialise a ktri based on passed certificate and key */ | |
342 | ||
343 | int cms_RecipientInfo_kari_init(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, X509 *recip, | |
ae5c8664 MC |
344 | EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned int flags) |
345 | { | |
346 | CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari; | |
347 | CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek = NULL; | |
348 | ||
349 | ri->d.kari = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo); | |
350 | if (!ri->d.kari) | |
351 | return 0; | |
352 | ri->type = CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE; | |
353 | ||
354 | kari = ri->d.kari; | |
355 | kari->version = 3; | |
356 | ||
357 | rek = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey); | |
358 | if (!sk_CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_push(kari->recipientEncryptedKeys, rek)) { | |
359 | M_ASN1_free_of(rek, CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey); | |
360 | return 0; | |
361 | } | |
362 | ||
363 | if (flags & CMS_USE_KEYID) { | |
364 | rek->rid->type = CMS_REK_KEYIDENTIFIER; | |
365 | if (!cms_set1_keyid(&rek->rid->d.rKeyId->subjectKeyIdentifier, recip)) | |
366 | return 0; | |
367 | } else { | |
368 | rek->rid->type = CMS_REK_ISSUER_SERIAL; | |
369 | if (!cms_set1_ias(&rek->rid->d.issuerAndSerialNumber, recip)) | |
370 | return 0; | |
371 | } | |
372 | ||
373 | /* Create ephemeral key */ | |
374 | if (!cms_kari_create_ephemeral_key(kari, pk)) | |
375 | return 0; | |
376 | ||
377 | CRYPTO_add(&pk->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY); | |
378 | rek->pkey = pk; | |
379 | return 1; | |
380 | } | |
8c798690 DSH |
381 | |
382 | static int cms_wrap_init(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari, | |
ae5c8664 MC |
383 | const EVP_CIPHER *cipher) |
384 | { | |
385 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = &kari->ctx; | |
386 | const EVP_CIPHER *kekcipher; | |
387 | int keylen = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher); | |
388 | /* If a suitable wrap algorithm is already set nothing to do */ | |
389 | kekcipher = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ctx); | |
390 | ||
391 | if (kekcipher) { | |
392 | if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ctx) != EVP_CIPH_WRAP_MODE) | |
393 | return 0; | |
394 | return 1; | |
395 | } | |
396 | /* | |
397 | * Pick a cipher based on content encryption cipher. If it is DES3 use | |
398 | * DES3 wrap otherwise use AES wrap similar to key size. | |
399 | */ | |
400 | if (EVP_CIPHER_type(cipher) == NID_des_ede3_cbc) | |
401 | kekcipher = EVP_des_ede3_wrap(); | |
402 | else if (keylen <= 16) | |
403 | kekcipher = EVP_aes_128_wrap(); | |
404 | else if (keylen <= 24) | |
405 | kekcipher = EVP_aes_192_wrap(); | |
406 | else | |
407 | kekcipher = EVP_aes_256_wrap(); | |
408 | return EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, kekcipher, NULL, NULL, NULL); | |
409 | } | |
8c798690 DSH |
410 | |
411 | /* Encrypt content key in key agreement recipient info */ | |
412 | ||
ae5c8664 MC |
413 | int cms_RecipientInfo_kari_encrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, |
414 | CMS_RecipientInfo *ri) | |
415 | { | |
416 | CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari; | |
417 | CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec; | |
418 | CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek; | |
419 | STACK_OF(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey) *reks; | |
420 | int i; | |
421 | ||
422 | if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) { | |
423 | CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_ENCRYPT, CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT); | |
424 | return 0; | |
425 | } | |
426 | kari = ri->d.kari; | |
427 | reks = kari->recipientEncryptedKeys; | |
428 | ec = cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo; | |
429 | /* Initialise wrap algorithm parameters */ | |
430 | if (!cms_wrap_init(kari, ec->cipher)) | |
431 | return 0; | |
432 | /* | |
433 | * If no orignator key set up initialise for ephemeral key the public key | |
434 | * ASN1 structure will set the actual public key value. | |
435 | */ | |
436 | if (kari->originator->type == -1) { | |
437 | CMS_OriginatorIdentifierOrKey *oik = kari->originator; | |
438 | oik->type = CMS_OIK_PUBKEY; | |
439 | oik->d.originatorKey = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_OriginatorPublicKey); | |
440 | if (!oik->d.originatorKey) | |
441 | return 0; | |
442 | } | |
443 | /* Initialise KDF algorithm */ | |
444 | if (!cms_env_asn1_ctrl(ri, 0)) | |
445 | return 0; | |
446 | /* For each rek, derive KEK, encrypt CEK */ | |
447 | for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_num(reks); i++) { | |
448 | unsigned char *enckey; | |
449 | size_t enckeylen; | |
450 | rek = sk_CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_value(reks, i); | |
451 | if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(kari->pctx, rek->pkey) <= 0) | |
452 | return 0; | |
453 | if (!cms_kek_cipher(&enckey, &enckeylen, ec->key, ec->keylen, | |
454 | kari, 1)) | |
455 | return 0; | |
456 | ASN1_STRING_set0(rek->encryptedKey, enckey, enckeylen); | |
457 | } | |
458 | ||
459 | return 1; | |
460 | ||
461 | } |