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1 | /* |
2 | * Copyright 2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. | |
3 | * | |
4 | * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use | |
5 | * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy | |
6 | * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at | |
7 | * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html | |
8 | */ | |
9 | ||
10 | #include <openssl/crypto.h> | |
11 | #include <openssl/evp.h> | |
12 | #include <openssl/err.h> | |
13 | #include "internal/refcount.h" | |
14 | #include "internal/evp_int.h" | |
15 | #include "internal/provider.h" | |
16 | #include "evp_locl.h" | |
17 | ||
18 | static EVP_KEYEXCH *evp_keyexch_new(OSSL_PROVIDER *prov) | |
19 | { | |
20 | EVP_KEYEXCH *exchange = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(EVP_KEYEXCH)); | |
21 | ||
22 | exchange->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(); | |
23 | if (exchange->lock == NULL) { | |
24 | OPENSSL_free(exchange); | |
25 | return NULL; | |
26 | } | |
27 | exchange->prov = prov; | |
28 | ossl_provider_up_ref(prov); | |
29 | exchange->refcnt = 1; | |
30 | ||
31 | return exchange; | |
32 | } | |
33 | ||
34 | static void *evp_keyexch_from_dispatch(const OSSL_DISPATCH *fns, | |
35 | OSSL_PROVIDER *prov) | |
36 | { | |
37 | EVP_KEYEXCH *exchange = NULL; | |
38 | int fncnt = 0; | |
39 | ||
40 | if ((exchange = evp_keyexch_new(prov)) == NULL) | |
41 | return NULL; | |
42 | ||
43 | for (; fns->function_id != 0; fns++) { | |
44 | switch (fns->function_id) { | |
45 | case OSSL_FUNC_KEYEXCH_NEWCTX: | |
46 | if (exchange->newctx != NULL) | |
47 | break; | |
48 | exchange->newctx = OSSL_get_OP_keyexch_newctx(fns); | |
49 | fncnt++; | |
50 | break; | |
51 | case OSSL_FUNC_KEYEXCH_INIT: | |
52 | if (exchange->init != NULL) | |
53 | break; | |
54 | exchange->init = OSSL_get_OP_keyexch_init(fns); | |
55 | fncnt++; | |
56 | break; | |
57 | case OSSL_FUNC_KEYEXCH_SET_PEER: | |
58 | if (exchange->set_peer != NULL) | |
59 | break; | |
60 | exchange->set_peer = OSSL_get_OP_keyexch_set_peer(fns); | |
61 | break; | |
62 | case OSSL_FUNC_KEYEXCH_DERIVE: | |
63 | if (exchange->derive != NULL) | |
64 | break; | |
65 | exchange->derive = OSSL_get_OP_keyexch_derive(fns); | |
66 | fncnt++; | |
67 | break; | |
68 | case OSSL_FUNC_KEYEXCH_FREECTX: | |
69 | if (exchange->freectx != NULL) | |
70 | break; | |
71 | exchange->freectx = OSSL_get_OP_keyexch_freectx(fns); | |
72 | fncnt++; | |
73 | break; | |
74 | case OSSL_FUNC_KEYEXCH_DUPCTX: | |
75 | if (exchange->dupctx != NULL) | |
76 | break; | |
77 | exchange->dupctx = OSSL_get_OP_keyexch_dupctx(fns); | |
78 | break; | |
79 | } | |
80 | } | |
81 | if (fncnt != 4) { | |
82 | /* | |
83 | * In order to be a consistent set of functions we must have at least | |
84 | * a complete set of "exchange" functions: init, derive, newctx, | |
85 | * and freectx. The dupctx and set_peer functions are optional. | |
86 | */ | |
87 | EVP_KEYEXCH_free(exchange); | |
88 | EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_KEYEXCH_FROM_DISPATCH, | |
89 | EVP_R_INVALID_PROVIDER_FUNCTIONS); | |
90 | return NULL; | |
91 | } | |
92 | ||
93 | return exchange; | |
94 | } | |
95 | ||
96 | void EVP_KEYEXCH_free(EVP_KEYEXCH *exchange) | |
97 | { | |
98 | if (exchange != NULL) { | |
99 | int i; | |
100 | ||
101 | CRYPTO_DOWN_REF(&exchange->refcnt, &i, exchange->lock); | |
102 | if (i > 0) | |
103 | return; | |
104 | ossl_provider_free(exchange->prov); | |
105 | CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(exchange->lock); | |
106 | OPENSSL_free(exchange); | |
107 | } | |
108 | } | |
109 | ||
110 | int EVP_KEYEXCH_up_ref(EVP_KEYEXCH *exchange) | |
111 | { | |
112 | int ref = 0; | |
113 | ||
114 | CRYPTO_UP_REF(&exchange->refcnt, &ref, exchange->lock); | |
115 | return 1; | |
116 | } | |
117 | ||
118 | EVP_KEYEXCH *EVP_KEYEXCH_fetch(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx, const char *algorithm, | |
119 | const char *properties) | |
120 | { | |
121 | return evp_generic_fetch(ctx, OSSL_OP_KEYEXCH, algorithm, properties, | |
122 | evp_keyexch_from_dispatch, | |
123 | (int (*)(void *))EVP_KEYEXCH_up_ref, | |
124 | (void (*)(void *))EVP_KEYEXCH_free); | |
125 | } | |
126 | ||
127 | int EVP_PKEY_derive_init_ex(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_KEYEXCH *exchange) | |
128 | { | |
129 | int ret; | |
130 | OSSL_PARAM *param = NULL; | |
131 | size_t paramsz = 0; | |
132 | ||
133 | ctx->operation = EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE; | |
134 | ||
135 | if (ctx->engine != NULL) | |
136 | goto legacy; | |
137 | ||
138 | if (exchange != NULL) { | |
139 | if (!EVP_KEYEXCH_up_ref(exchange)) | |
140 | goto err; | |
141 | } else { | |
142 | int nid = ctx->pkey != NULL ? ctx->pkey->type : ctx->pmeth->pkey_id; | |
143 | ||
144 | /* | |
145 | * TODO(3.0): Check for legacy handling. Remove this once all all | |
146 | * algorithms are moved to providers. | |
147 | */ | |
148 | if (ctx->pkey != NULL) { | |
149 | switch (ctx->pkey->type) { | |
ff64702b MC |
150 | case EVP_PKEY_DH: |
151 | break; | |
ff64702b MC |
152 | default: |
153 | goto legacy; | |
154 | } | |
155 | exchange = EVP_KEYEXCH_fetch(NULL, OBJ_nid2sn(nid), NULL); | |
156 | } else { | |
157 | goto legacy; | |
158 | } | |
159 | ||
160 | if (exchange == NULL) { | |
161 | EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_DERIVE_INIT_EX, EVP_R_INITIALIZATION_ERROR); | |
162 | goto err; | |
163 | } | |
164 | } | |
165 | ||
166 | if (ctx->exchprovctx != NULL && ctx->exchange != NULL) | |
167 | ctx->exchange->freectx(ctx->exchprovctx); | |
168 | EVP_KEYEXCH_free(ctx->exchange); | |
169 | ctx->exchange = exchange; | |
170 | if (ctx->pkey != NULL) { | |
171 | param = evp_pkey_to_param(ctx->pkey, ¶msz); | |
172 | if (param == NULL) { | |
173 | EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_DERIVE_INIT_EX, EVP_R_INITIALIZATION_ERROR); | |
174 | goto err; | |
175 | } | |
176 | } | |
177 | ctx->exchprovctx = exchange->newctx(ossl_provider_ctx(exchange->prov)); | |
178 | if (ctx->exchprovctx == NULL) { | |
179 | OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(param, paramsz); | |
180 | EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_DERIVE_INIT_EX, EVP_R_INITIALIZATION_ERROR); | |
181 | goto err; | |
182 | } | |
183 | ret = exchange->init(ctx->exchprovctx, param); | |
184 | /* | |
185 | * TODO(3.0): Really we should detect whether to call OPENSSL_free or | |
186 | * OPENSSL_secure_clear_free based on the presence of a private key or not. | |
187 | * Since we always expect a private key to be present we just call | |
188 | * OPENSSL_secure_clear_free for now. | |
189 | */ | |
190 | OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(param, paramsz); | |
191 | ||
192 | return ret ? 1 : 0; | |
193 | err: | |
194 | ctx->operation = EVP_PKEY_OP_UNDEFINED; | |
195 | return 0; | |
196 | ||
197 | legacy: | |
198 | if (ctx == NULL || ctx->pmeth == NULL || ctx->pmeth->derive == NULL) { | |
199 | EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_DERIVE_INIT_EX, | |
200 | EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE); | |
201 | return -2; | |
202 | } | |
203 | ||
204 | if (ctx->pmeth->derive_init == NULL) | |
205 | return 1; | |
206 | ret = ctx->pmeth->derive_init(ctx); | |
207 | if (ret <= 0) | |
208 | ctx->operation = EVP_PKEY_OP_UNDEFINED; | |
209 | return ret; | |
210 | } | |
211 | ||
212 | int EVP_PKEY_derive_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) | |
213 | { | |
214 | return EVP_PKEY_derive_init_ex(ctx, NULL); | |
215 | } | |
216 | ||
217 | int EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *peer) | |
218 | { | |
219 | int ret; | |
220 | OSSL_PARAM *param = NULL; | |
221 | ||
222 | if (ctx == NULL) { | |
223 | EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_DERIVE_SET_PEER, | |
224 | EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE); | |
225 | return -2; | |
226 | } | |
227 | ||
228 | if (ctx->exchprovctx == NULL) | |
229 | goto legacy; | |
230 | ||
231 | if (ctx->operation != EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE) { | |
232 | EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_DERIVE_SET_PEER, | |
233 | EVP_R_OPERATON_NOT_INITIALIZED); | |
234 | return -1; | |
235 | } | |
236 | ||
237 | if (ctx->exchange->set_peer == NULL) { | |
238 | EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_DERIVE_SET_PEER, | |
239 | EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE); | |
240 | return -2; | |
241 | } | |
242 | ||
243 | param = evp_pkey_to_param(peer, NULL); | |
244 | if (param == NULL) { | |
245 | EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_DERIVE_SET_PEER, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
246 | return 0; | |
247 | } | |
248 | ret = ctx->exchange->set_peer(ctx->exchprovctx, param); | |
249 | /* | |
250 | * TODO(3.0): Really we should detect whether to call OPENSSL_free or | |
251 | * OPENSSL_secure_clear_free based on the presence of a private key or not. | |
252 | * Since we always expect a public key to be present we just call | |
253 | * OPENSSL_free for now. | |
254 | */ | |
255 | OPENSSL_free(param); | |
256 | ||
257 | return ret; | |
258 | ||
259 | legacy: | |
260 | if (ctx->pmeth == NULL | |
261 | || !(ctx->pmeth->derive != NULL | |
262 | || ctx->pmeth->encrypt != NULL | |
263 | || ctx->pmeth->decrypt != NULL) | |
264 | || ctx->pmeth->ctrl == NULL) { | |
265 | EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_DERIVE_SET_PEER, | |
266 | EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE); | |
267 | return -2; | |
268 | } | |
269 | if (ctx->operation != EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE | |
270 | && ctx->operation != EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT | |
271 | && ctx->operation != EVP_PKEY_OP_DECRYPT) { | |
272 | EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_DERIVE_SET_PEER, | |
273 | EVP_R_OPERATON_NOT_INITIALIZED); | |
274 | return -1; | |
275 | } | |
276 | ||
277 | ret = ctx->pmeth->ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 0, peer); | |
278 | ||
279 | if (ret <= 0) | |
280 | return ret; | |
281 | ||
282 | if (ret == 2) | |
283 | return 1; | |
284 | ||
285 | if (ctx->pkey == NULL) { | |
286 | EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_DERIVE_SET_PEER, EVP_R_NO_KEY_SET); | |
287 | return -1; | |
288 | } | |
289 | ||
290 | if (ctx->pkey->type != peer->type) { | |
291 | EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_DERIVE_SET_PEER, EVP_R_DIFFERENT_KEY_TYPES); | |
292 | return -1; | |
293 | } | |
294 | ||
295 | /* | |
296 | * For clarity. The error is if parameters in peer are | |
297 | * present (!missing) but don't match. EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters may return | |
298 | * 1 (match), 0 (don't match) and -2 (comparison is not defined). -1 | |
299 | * (different key types) is impossible here because it is checked earlier. | |
300 | * -2 is OK for us here, as well as 1, so we can check for 0 only. | |
301 | */ | |
302 | if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(peer) && | |
303 | !EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(ctx->pkey, peer)) { | |
304 | EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_DERIVE_SET_PEER, EVP_R_DIFFERENT_PARAMETERS); | |
305 | return -1; | |
306 | } | |
307 | ||
308 | EVP_PKEY_free(ctx->peerkey); | |
309 | ctx->peerkey = peer; | |
310 | ||
311 | ret = ctx->pmeth->ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 1, peer); | |
312 | ||
313 | if (ret <= 0) { | |
314 | ctx->peerkey = NULL; | |
315 | return ret; | |
316 | } | |
317 | ||
318 | EVP_PKEY_up_ref(peer); | |
319 | return 1; | |
320 | } | |
321 | ||
322 | int EVP_PKEY_derive(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *key, size_t *pkeylen) | |
323 | { | |
324 | int ret; | |
325 | ||
326 | if (ctx == NULL) { | |
327 | EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_DERIVE, | |
328 | EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE); | |
329 | return -2; | |
330 | } | |
331 | ||
332 | if (ctx->operation != EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE) { | |
333 | EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_DERIVE, EVP_R_OPERATON_NOT_INITIALIZED); | |
334 | return -1; | |
335 | } | |
336 | ||
337 | if (ctx->exchprovctx == NULL) | |
338 | goto legacy; | |
339 | ||
340 | ret = ctx->exchange->derive(ctx->exchprovctx, key, pkeylen, SIZE_MAX); | |
341 | ||
342 | return ret; | |
343 | legacy: | |
344 | if (ctx == NULL || ctx->pmeth == NULL || ctx->pmeth->derive == NULL) { | |
345 | EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_DERIVE, | |
346 | EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE); | |
347 | return -2; | |
348 | } | |
349 | ||
350 | M_check_autoarg(ctx, key, pkeylen, EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_DERIVE) | |
351 | return ctx->pmeth->derive(ctx, key, pkeylen); | |
352 | } |