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a6aa71ff | 1 | /* crypto/rand/md_rand.c */ |
58964a49 | 2 | /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) |
d02b48c6 RE |
3 | * All rights reserved. |
4 | * | |
5 | * This package is an SSL implementation written | |
6 | * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). | |
7 | * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. | |
8 | * | |
9 | * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as | |
10 | * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions | |
11 | * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, | |
12 | * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation | |
13 | * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms | |
14 | * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). | |
15 | * | |
16 | * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in | |
17 | * the code are not to be removed. | |
18 | * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution | |
19 | * as the author of the parts of the library used. | |
20 | * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or | |
21 | * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. | |
22 | * | |
23 | * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without | |
24 | * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | |
25 | * are met: | |
26 | * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright | |
27 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. | |
28 | * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | |
29 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the | |
30 | * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. | |
31 | * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software | |
32 | * must display the following acknowledgement: | |
33 | * "This product includes cryptographic software written by | |
34 | * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" | |
35 | * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library | |
36 | * being used are not cryptographic related :-). | |
37 | * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from | |
38 | * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: | |
39 | * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" | |
40 | * | |
41 | * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND | |
42 | * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE | |
43 | * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE | |
44 | * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE | |
45 | * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL | |
46 | * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS | |
47 | * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) | |
48 | * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT | |
49 | * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY | |
50 | * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF | |
51 | * SUCH DAMAGE. | |
52 | * | |
53 | * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or | |
54 | * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be | |
55 | * copied and put under another distribution licence | |
56 | * [including the GNU Public Licence.] | |
57 | */ | |
863fe2ec | 58 | /* ==================================================================== |
f9b0f47c | 59 | * Copyright (c) 1998-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. |
863fe2ec BM |
60 | * |
61 | * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without | |
62 | * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | |
63 | * are met: | |
64 | * | |
65 | * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright | |
66 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. | |
67 | * | |
68 | * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | |
69 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in | |
70 | * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the | |
71 | * distribution. | |
72 | * | |
73 | * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this | |
74 | * software must display the following acknowledgment: | |
75 | * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project | |
76 | * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" | |
77 | * | |
78 | * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to | |
79 | * endorse or promote products derived from this software without | |
80 | * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact | |
81 | * openssl-core@openssl.org. | |
82 | * | |
83 | * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" | |
84 | * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written | |
85 | * permission of the OpenSSL Project. | |
86 | * | |
87 | * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following | |
88 | * acknowledgment: | |
89 | * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project | |
90 | * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" | |
91 | * | |
92 | * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY | |
93 | * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE | |
94 | * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR | |
95 | * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR | |
96 | * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, | |
97 | * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT | |
98 | * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; | |
99 | * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) | |
100 | * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, | |
101 | * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) | |
102 | * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED | |
103 | * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. | |
104 | * ==================================================================== | |
105 | * | |
106 | * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young | |
107 | * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim | |
108 | * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). | |
109 | * | |
110 | */ | |
d02b48c6 | 111 | |
2ace287d | 112 | #ifdef MD_RAND_DEBUG |
c1e744b9 BM |
113 | # ifndef NDEBUG |
114 | # define NDEBUG | |
115 | # endif | |
116 | #endif | |
117 | ||
118 | #include <assert.h> | |
d02b48c6 | 119 | #include <stdio.h> |
a224de3f | 120 | #include <string.h> |
17e3dd1c | 121 | |
41d2a336 | 122 | #include "e_os.h" |
17e3dd1c | 123 | |
8ad7635e UM |
124 | #include <openssl/rand.h> |
125 | #include "rand_lcl.h" | |
126 | ||
ec577822 | 127 | #include <openssl/crypto.h> |
eb952088 | 128 | #include <openssl/err.h> |
d02b48c6 | 129 | |
e64dceab UM |
130 | #ifdef BN_DEBUG |
131 | # define PREDICT | |
132 | #endif | |
133 | ||
dfeab068 | 134 | /* #define PREDICT 1 */ |
d02b48c6 RE |
135 | |
136 | #define STATE_SIZE 1023 | |
137 | static int state_num=0,state_index=0; | |
58964a49 | 138 | static unsigned char state[STATE_SIZE+MD_DIGEST_LENGTH]; |
d02b48c6 | 139 | static unsigned char md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH]; |
dfeab068 | 140 | static long md_count[2]={0,0}; |
853f757e | 141 | static double entropy=0; |
4ec2d4d2 | 142 | static int initialized=0; |
d02b48c6 | 143 | |
6e6d04e2 BM |
144 | static unsigned int crypto_lock_rand = 0; /* may be set only when a thread |
145 | * holds CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND | |
146 | * (to prevent double locking) */ | |
daba492c | 147 | /* access to lockin_thread is synchronized by CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2 */ |
4c329696 | 148 | static CRYPTO_THREADID locking_threadid; /* valid iff crypto_lock_rand is set */ |
6e6d04e2 | 149 | |
a4125514 | 150 | |
e64dceab UM |
151 | #ifdef PREDICT |
152 | int rand_predictable=0; | |
153 | #endif | |
154 | ||
560b79cb | 155 | const char RAND_version[]="RAND" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT; |
d02b48c6 | 156 | |
dfeab068 | 157 | static void ssleay_rand_cleanup(void); |
5e4430e7 BL |
158 | static void ssleay_rand_seed(const void *buf, size_t num); |
159 | static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *buf, size_t num, double add_entropy); | |
160 | static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, size_t num); | |
161 | static int ssleay_rand_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, size_t num); | |
5eb8ca4d | 162 | static int ssleay_rand_status(void); |
dfeab068 | 163 | |
651d0aff | 164 | RAND_METHOD rand_ssleay_meth={ |
dfeab068 RE |
165 | ssleay_rand_seed, |
166 | ssleay_rand_bytes, | |
167 | ssleay_rand_cleanup, | |
eb952088 | 168 | ssleay_rand_add, |
373b575f | 169 | ssleay_rand_pseudo_bytes, |
5eb8ca4d | 170 | ssleay_rand_status |
dfeab068 RE |
171 | }; |
172 | ||
6b691a5c | 173 | RAND_METHOD *RAND_SSLeay(void) |
dfeab068 | 174 | { |
651d0aff | 175 | return(&rand_ssleay_meth); |
dfeab068 RE |
176 | } |
177 | ||
6b691a5c | 178 | static void ssleay_rand_cleanup(void) |
d02b48c6 | 179 | { |
4579924b | 180 | OPENSSL_cleanse(state,sizeof(state)); |
d02b48c6 RE |
181 | state_num=0; |
182 | state_index=0; | |
4579924b | 183 | OPENSSL_cleanse(md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH); |
dfeab068 RE |
184 | md_count[0]=0; |
185 | md_count[1]=0; | |
eb952088 | 186 | entropy=0; |
d3093944 | 187 | initialized=0; |
d02b48c6 RE |
188 | } |
189 | ||
5e4430e7 | 190 | static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *buf, size_t num, double add) |
d02b48c6 | 191 | { |
5e4430e7 BL |
192 | int i,st_idx; |
193 | size_t j,k; | |
c1e744b9 BM |
194 | long md_c[2]; |
195 | unsigned char local_md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH]; | |
dbad1690 | 196 | EVP_MD_CTX m; |
6e6d04e2 | 197 | int do_not_lock; |
d02b48c6 | 198 | |
c1e744b9 | 199 | /* |
60b52453 | 200 | * (Based on the rand(3) manpage) |
c1e744b9 | 201 | * |
c88a900f | 202 | * The input is chopped up into units of 20 bytes (or less for |
60b52453 | 203 | * the last block). Each of these blocks is run through the hash |
0b5cfe32 | 204 | * function as follows: The data passed to the hash function |
c1e744b9 BM |
205 | * is the current 'md', the same number of bytes from the 'state' |
206 | * (the location determined by in incremented looping index) as | |
207 | * the current 'block', the new key data 'block', and 'count' | |
208 | * (which is incremented after each use). | |
209 | * The result of this is kept in 'md' and also xored into the | |
60b52453 UM |
210 | * 'state' at the same locations that were used as input into the |
211 | * hash function. | |
c1e744b9 BM |
212 | */ |
213 | ||
6e6d04e2 | 214 | /* check if we already have the lock */ |
daba492c BM |
215 | if (crypto_lock_rand) |
216 | { | |
4c329696 GT |
217 | CRYPTO_THREADID cur; |
218 | CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&cur); | |
daba492c | 219 | CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2); |
4c329696 | 220 | do_not_lock = !CRYPTO_THREADID_cmp(&locking_threadid, &cur); |
daba492c BM |
221 | CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2); |
222 | } | |
223 | else | |
224 | do_not_lock = 0; | |
6e6d04e2 BM |
225 | |
226 | if (!do_not_lock) CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND); | |
d02b48c6 | 227 | st_idx=state_index; |
d02b48c6 | 228 | |
c1e744b9 BM |
229 | /* use our own copies of the counters so that even |
230 | * if a concurrent thread seeds with exactly the | |
231 | * same data and uses the same subarray there's _some_ | |
232 | * difference */ | |
233 | md_c[0] = md_count[0]; | |
234 | md_c[1] = md_count[1]; | |
235 | ||
236 | memcpy(local_md, md, sizeof md); | |
237 | ||
238 | /* state_index <= state_num <= STATE_SIZE */ | |
239 | state_index += num; | |
58964a49 | 240 | if (state_index >= STATE_SIZE) |
d02b48c6 RE |
241 | { |
242 | state_index%=STATE_SIZE; | |
243 | state_num=STATE_SIZE; | |
244 | } | |
245 | else if (state_num < STATE_SIZE) | |
246 | { | |
247 | if (state_index > state_num) | |
248 | state_num=state_index; | |
249 | } | |
c1e744b9 BM |
250 | /* state_index <= state_num <= STATE_SIZE */ |
251 | ||
252 | /* state[st_idx], ..., state[(st_idx + num - 1) % STATE_SIZE] | |
253 | * are what we will use now, but other threads may use them | |
254 | * as well */ | |
255 | ||
256 | md_count[1] += (num / MD_DIGEST_LENGTH) + (num % MD_DIGEST_LENGTH > 0); | |
257 | ||
6e6d04e2 | 258 | if (!do_not_lock) CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND); |
d02b48c6 | 259 | |
dbad1690 | 260 | EVP_MD_CTX_init(&m); |
d02b48c6 RE |
261 | for (i=0; i<num; i+=MD_DIGEST_LENGTH) |
262 | { | |
263 | j=(num-i); | |
264 | j=(j > MD_DIGEST_LENGTH)?MD_DIGEST_LENGTH:j; | |
265 | ||
266 | MD_Init(&m); | |
c1e744b9 | 267 | MD_Update(&m,local_md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH); |
d02b48c6 RE |
268 | k=(st_idx+j)-STATE_SIZE; |
269 | if (k > 0) | |
270 | { | |
271 | MD_Update(&m,&(state[st_idx]),j-k); | |
272 | MD_Update(&m,&(state[0]),k); | |
273 | } | |
274 | else | |
275 | MD_Update(&m,&(state[st_idx]),j); | |
276 | ||
277 | MD_Update(&m,buf,j); | |
c1e744b9 | 278 | MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]),sizeof(md_c)); |
323f289c | 279 | MD_Final(&m,local_md); |
c1e744b9 | 280 | md_c[1]++; |
d02b48c6 | 281 | |
e778802f | 282 | buf=(const char *)buf + j; |
d02b48c6 RE |
283 | |
284 | for (k=0; k<j; k++) | |
285 | { | |
c1e744b9 BM |
286 | /* Parallel threads may interfere with this, |
287 | * but always each byte of the new state is | |
288 | * the XOR of some previous value of its | |
289 | * and local_md (itermediate values may be lost). | |
290 | * Alway using locking could hurt performance more | |
291 | * than necessary given that conflicts occur only | |
292 | * when the total seeding is longer than the random | |
293 | * state. */ | |
294 | state[st_idx++]^=local_md[k]; | |
d02b48c6 | 295 | if (st_idx >= STATE_SIZE) |
d02b48c6 | 296 | st_idx=0; |
d02b48c6 RE |
297 | } |
298 | } | |
dbad1690 | 299 | EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&m); |
c1e744b9 | 300 | |
6e6d04e2 | 301 | if (!do_not_lock) CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND); |
c1e744b9 BM |
302 | /* Don't just copy back local_md into md -- this could mean that |
303 | * other thread's seeding remains without effect (except for | |
304 | * the incremented counter). By XORing it we keep at least as | |
305 | * much entropy as fits into md. */ | |
27545970 | 306 | for (k = 0; k < (int)sizeof(md); k++) |
c1e744b9 BM |
307 | { |
308 | md[k] ^= local_md[k]; | |
309 | } | |
c6709c6b BM |
310 | if (entropy < ENTROPY_NEEDED) /* stop counting when we have enough */ |
311 | entropy += add; | |
6e6d04e2 | 312 | if (!do_not_lock) CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND); |
c1e744b9 | 313 | |
bc36ee62 | 314 | #if !defined(OPENSSL_THREADS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) |
c1e744b9 BM |
315 | assert(md_c[1] == md_count[1]); |
316 | #endif | |
eb952088 UM |
317 | } |
318 | ||
5e4430e7 | 319 | static void ssleay_rand_seed(const void *buf, size_t num) |
eb952088 | 320 | { |
ec37635c | 321 | ssleay_rand_add(buf, num, (double)num); |
d02b48c6 RE |
322 | } |
323 | ||
5e4430e7 | 324 | static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, size_t num) |
d02b48c6 | 325 | { |
361ee973 | 326 | static volatile int stirred_pool = 0; |
5e4430e7 BL |
327 | int i,st_num,st_idx; |
328 | size_t j,k; | |
e9ad0d2c | 329 | int num_ceil; |
eb952088 | 330 | int ok; |
c1e744b9 BM |
331 | long md_c[2]; |
332 | unsigned char local_md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH]; | |
dbad1690 | 333 | EVP_MD_CTX m; |
9a1e34e5 | 334 | #ifndef GETPID_IS_MEANINGLESS |
62ac2938 | 335 | pid_t curr_pid = getpid(); |
c1e744b9 | 336 | #endif |
361ee973 | 337 | int do_stir_pool = 0; |
d02b48c6 RE |
338 | |
339 | #ifdef PREDICT | |
e64dceab UM |
340 | if (rand_predictable) |
341 | { | |
342 | static unsigned char val=0; | |
d02b48c6 | 343 | |
e64dceab UM |
344 | for (i=0; i<num; i++) |
345 | buf[i]=val++; | |
346 | return(1); | |
347 | } | |
d02b48c6 RE |
348 | #endif |
349 | ||
e9ad0d2c BM |
350 | if (num <= 0) |
351 | return 1; | |
dbad1690 BL |
352 | |
353 | EVP_MD_CTX_init(&m); | |
e9ad0d2c BM |
354 | /* round upwards to multiple of MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2 */ |
355 | num_ceil = (1 + (num-1)/(MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2)) * (MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2); | |
356 | ||
c1e744b9 | 357 | /* |
2c8aeddc | 358 | * (Based on the rand(3) manpage:) |
c1e744b9 | 359 | * |
c88a900f | 360 | * For each group of 10 bytes (or less), we do the following: |
c1e744b9 | 361 | * |
e9ad0d2c BM |
362 | * Input into the hash function the local 'md' (which is initialized from |
363 | * the global 'md' before any bytes are generated), the bytes that are to | |
364 | * be overwritten by the random bytes, and bytes from the 'state' | |
365 | * (incrementing looping index). From this digest output (which is kept | |
366 | * in 'md'), the top (up to) 10 bytes are returned to the caller and the | |
367 | * bottom 10 bytes are xored into the 'state'. | |
368 | * | |
c1e744b9 | 369 | * Finally, after we have finished 'num' random bytes for the |
2c8aeddc BM |
370 | * caller, 'count' (which is incremented) and the local and global 'md' |
371 | * are fed into the hash function and the results are kept in the | |
372 | * global 'md'. | |
c1e744b9 BM |
373 | */ |
374 | ||
8ad7635e | 375 | CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND); |
d02b48c6 | 376 | |
6e6d04e2 | 377 | /* prevent ssleay_rand_bytes() from trying to obtain the lock again */ |
daba492c | 378 | CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2); |
4c329696 | 379 | CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&locking_threadid); |
daba492c | 380 | CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2); |
badb910f | 381 | crypto_lock_rand = 1; |
6e6d04e2 BM |
382 | |
383 | if (!initialized) | |
384 | { | |
385 | RAND_poll(); | |
386 | initialized = 1; | |
387 | } | |
388 | ||
361ee973 BM |
389 | if (!stirred_pool) |
390 | do_stir_pool = 1; | |
391 | ||
eb952088 | 392 | ok = (entropy >= ENTROPY_NEEDED); |
c6709c6b BM |
393 | if (!ok) |
394 | { | |
395 | /* If the PRNG state is not yet unpredictable, then seeing | |
396 | * the PRNG output may help attackers to determine the new | |
397 | * state; thus we have to decrease the entropy estimate. | |
398 | * Once we've had enough initial seeding we don't bother to | |
399 | * adjust the entropy count, though, because we're not ambitious | |
400 | * to provide *information-theoretic* randomness. | |
361ee973 BM |
401 | * |
402 | * NOTE: This approach fails if the program forks before | |
403 | * we have enough entropy. Entropy should be collected | |
404 | * in a separate input pool and be transferred to the | |
405 | * output pool only when the entropy limit has been reached. | |
c6709c6b BM |
406 | */ |
407 | entropy -= num; | |
408 | if (entropy < 0) | |
409 | entropy = 0; | |
410 | } | |
eb952088 | 411 | |
361ee973 BM |
412 | if (do_stir_pool) |
413 | { | |
e9ad0d2c BM |
414 | /* In the output function only half of 'md' remains secret, |
415 | * so we better make sure that the required entropy gets | |
416 | * 'evenly distributed' through 'state', our randomness pool. | |
417 | * The input function (ssleay_rand_add) chains all of 'md', | |
418 | * which makes it more suitable for this purpose. | |
361ee973 BM |
419 | */ |
420 | ||
421 | int n = STATE_SIZE; /* so that the complete pool gets accessed */ | |
422 | while (n > 0) | |
423 | { | |
424 | #if MD_DIGEST_LENGTH > 20 | |
425 | # error "Please adjust DUMMY_SEED." | |
426 | #endif | |
427 | #define DUMMY_SEED "...................." /* at least MD_DIGEST_LENGTH */ | |
428 | /* Note that the seed does not matter, it's just that | |
429 | * ssleay_rand_add expects to have something to hash. */ | |
430 | ssleay_rand_add(DUMMY_SEED, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH, 0.0); | |
431 | n -= MD_DIGEST_LENGTH; | |
432 | } | |
433 | if (ok) | |
434 | stirred_pool = 1; | |
435 | } | |
436 | ||
d02b48c6 RE |
437 | st_idx=state_index; |
438 | st_num=state_num; | |
c1e744b9 BM |
439 | md_c[0] = md_count[0]; |
440 | md_c[1] = md_count[1]; | |
441 | memcpy(local_md, md, sizeof md); | |
442 | ||
e9ad0d2c | 443 | state_index+=num_ceil; |
d02b48c6 | 444 | if (state_index > state_num) |
c1e744b9 BM |
445 | state_index %= state_num; |
446 | ||
e9ad0d2c | 447 | /* state[st_idx], ..., state[(st_idx + num_ceil - 1) % st_num] |
c1e744b9 | 448 | * are now ours (but other threads may use them too) */ |
d02b48c6 | 449 | |
c1e744b9 | 450 | md_count[0] += 1; |
a4125514 | 451 | |
6e6d04e2 BM |
452 | /* before unlocking, we must clear 'crypto_lock_rand' */ |
453 | crypto_lock_rand = 0; | |
d02b48c6 RE |
454 | CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND); |
455 | ||
456 | while (num > 0) | |
457 | { | |
e9ad0d2c | 458 | /* num_ceil -= MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2 */ |
d02b48c6 RE |
459 | j=(num >= MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2)?MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2:num; |
460 | num-=j; | |
461 | MD_Init(&m); | |
9a1e34e5 | 462 | #ifndef GETPID_IS_MEANINGLESS |
62ac2938 BM |
463 | if (curr_pid) /* just in the first iteration to save time */ |
464 | { | |
465 | MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char*)&curr_pid,sizeof curr_pid); | |
466 | curr_pid = 0; | |
467 | } | |
468 | #endif | |
e9ad0d2c | 469 | MD_Update(&m,local_md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH); |
c1e744b9 | 470 | MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]),sizeof(md_c)); |
d02b48c6 RE |
471 | #ifndef PURIFY |
472 | MD_Update(&m,buf,j); /* purify complains */ | |
473 | #endif | |
e9ad0d2c | 474 | k=(st_idx+MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2)-st_num; |
d02b48c6 RE |
475 | if (k > 0) |
476 | { | |
e9ad0d2c | 477 | MD_Update(&m,&(state[st_idx]),MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2-k); |
d02b48c6 RE |
478 | MD_Update(&m,&(state[0]),k); |
479 | } | |
480 | else | |
e9ad0d2c | 481 | MD_Update(&m,&(state[st_idx]),MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2); |
323f289c | 482 | MD_Final(&m,local_md); |
d02b48c6 | 483 | |
e9ad0d2c | 484 | for (i=0; i<MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2; i++) |
d02b48c6 | 485 | { |
c1e744b9 | 486 | state[st_idx++]^=local_md[i]; /* may compete with other threads */ |
d02b48c6 RE |
487 | if (st_idx >= st_num) |
488 | st_idx=0; | |
e9ad0d2c BM |
489 | if (i < j) |
490 | *(buf++)=local_md[i+MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2]; | |
d02b48c6 RE |
491 | } |
492 | } | |
493 | ||
494 | MD_Init(&m); | |
c1e744b9 BM |
495 | MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]),sizeof(md_c)); |
496 | MD_Update(&m,local_md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH); | |
497 | CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND); | |
d02b48c6 | 498 | MD_Update(&m,md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH); |
323f289c | 499 | MD_Final(&m,md); |
c1e744b9 BM |
500 | CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND); |
501 | ||
dbad1690 | 502 | EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&m); |
eb952088 UM |
503 | if (ok) |
504 | return(1); | |
505 | else | |
506 | { | |
507 | RANDerr(RAND_F_SSLEAY_RAND_BYTES,RAND_R_PRNG_NOT_SEEDED); | |
3b3bc455 RL |
508 | ERR_add_error_data(1, "You need to read the OpenSSL FAQ, " |
509 | "http://www.openssl.org/support/faq.html"); | |
eb952088 UM |
510 | return(0); |
511 | } | |
d02b48c6 RE |
512 | } |
513 | ||
373b575f UM |
514 | /* pseudo-random bytes that are guaranteed to be unique but not |
515 | unpredictable */ | |
5e4430e7 | 516 | static int ssleay_rand_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, size_t num) |
373b575f | 517 | { |
85628011 | 518 | int ret; |
47b0f48d | 519 | unsigned long err; |
373b575f UM |
520 | |
521 | ret = RAND_bytes(buf, num); | |
522 | if (ret == 0) | |
523 | { | |
47b0f48d | 524 | err = ERR_peek_error(); |
373b575f UM |
525 | if (ERR_GET_LIB(err) == ERR_LIB_RAND && |
526 | ERR_GET_REASON(err) == RAND_R_PRNG_NOT_SEEDED) | |
f763e0b5 | 527 | ERR_clear_error(); |
373b575f UM |
528 | } |
529 | return (ret); | |
530 | } | |
531 | ||
5eb8ca4d | 532 | static int ssleay_rand_status(void) |
4ec2d4d2 | 533 | { |
4c329696 | 534 | CRYPTO_THREADID cur; |
b841e0ac | 535 | int ret; |
6e6d04e2 | 536 | int do_not_lock; |
b841e0ac | 537 | |
4c329696 | 538 | CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&cur); |
6e6d04e2 BM |
539 | /* check if we already have the lock |
540 | * (could happen if a RAND_poll() implementation calls RAND_status()) */ | |
daba492c BM |
541 | if (crypto_lock_rand) |
542 | { | |
543 | CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2); | |
4c329696 | 544 | do_not_lock = !CRYPTO_THREADID_cmp(&locking_threadid, &cur); |
daba492c BM |
545 | CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2); |
546 | } | |
547 | else | |
548 | do_not_lock = 0; | |
6e6d04e2 BM |
549 | |
550 | if (!do_not_lock) | |
551 | { | |
552 | CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND); | |
553 | ||
554 | /* prevent ssleay_rand_bytes() from trying to obtain the lock again */ | |
daba492c | 555 | CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2); |
4c329696 | 556 | CRYPTO_THREADID_cpy(&locking_threadid, &cur); |
daba492c | 557 | CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2); |
badb910f | 558 | crypto_lock_rand = 1; |
6e6d04e2 BM |
559 | } |
560 | ||
4ec2d4d2 | 561 | if (!initialized) |
6e6d04e2 | 562 | { |
8ad7635e | 563 | RAND_poll(); |
6e6d04e2 BM |
564 | initialized = 1; |
565 | } | |
7ae634de | 566 | |
8ad7635e | 567 | ret = entropy >= ENTROPY_NEEDED; |
7ae634de | 568 | |
6e6d04e2 BM |
569 | if (!do_not_lock) |
570 | { | |
571 | /* before unlocking, we must clear 'crypto_lock_rand' */ | |
572 | crypto_lock_rand = 0; | |
6e6d04e2 BM |
573 | |
574 | CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND); | |
575 | } | |
576 | ||
b841e0ac | 577 | return ret; |
4ec2d4d2 | 578 | } |