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2039c421 | 1 | /* |
83cf7abf | 2 | * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. |
d02b48c6 | 3 | * |
2a7b6f39 | 4 | * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use |
2039c421 RS |
5 | * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy |
6 | * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at | |
7 | * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html | |
d02b48c6 RE |
8 | */ |
9 | ||
10 | #include <stdio.h> | |
ec577822 | 11 | #include <openssl/crypto.h> |
89abd1b6 MC |
12 | #include <openssl/core_names.h> |
13 | #include <openssl/engine.h> | |
14 | #include <openssl/evp.h> | |
b39fc560 | 15 | #include "internal/cryptlib.h" |
cd420b0b | 16 | #include "internal/refcount.h" |
25f2138b | 17 | #include "crypto/bn.h" |
25f2138b | 18 | #include "crypto/evp.h" |
c3a4fa4c | 19 | #include "crypto/rsa.h" |
706457b7 | 20 | #include "rsa_local.h" |
d02b48c6 | 21 | |
6b691a5c | 22 | RSA *RSA_new(void) |
0f113f3e | 23 | { |
076fc555 | 24 | return RSA_new_method(NULL); |
0f113f3e | 25 | } |
ce8b2574 | 26 | |
29c1f061 | 27 | const RSA_METHOD *RSA_get_method(const RSA *rsa) |
0f113f3e MC |
28 | { |
29 | return rsa->meth; | |
30 | } | |
cb78486d GT |
31 | |
32 | int RSA_set_method(RSA *rsa, const RSA_METHOD *meth) | |
0f113f3e MC |
33 | { |
34 | /* | |
35 | * NB: The caller is specifically setting a method, so it's not up to us | |
36 | * to deal with which ENGINE it comes from. | |
37 | */ | |
38 | const RSA_METHOD *mtmp; | |
39 | mtmp = rsa->meth; | |
40 | if (mtmp->finish) | |
41 | mtmp->finish(rsa); | |
0b13e9f0 | 42 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE |
7c96dbcd RS |
43 | ENGINE_finish(rsa->engine); |
44 | rsa->engine = NULL; | |
0b13e9f0 | 45 | #endif |
0f113f3e MC |
46 | rsa->meth = meth; |
47 | if (meth->init) | |
48 | meth->init(rsa); | |
49 | return 1; | |
50 | } | |
ce8b2574 | 51 | |
5270e702 | 52 | RSA *RSA_new_method(ENGINE *engine) |
0f113f3e | 53 | { |
11ed851d | 54 | RSA *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret)); |
d02b48c6 | 55 | |
0f113f3e MC |
56 | if (ret == NULL) { |
57 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
58 | return NULL; | |
59 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 60 | |
11ed851d F |
61 | ret->references = 1; |
62 | ret->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(); | |
63 | if (ret->lock == NULL) { | |
64 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
65 | OPENSSL_free(ret); | |
66 | return NULL; | |
67 | } | |
68 | ||
0f113f3e | 69 | ret->meth = RSA_get_default_method(); |
0b13e9f0 | 70 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE |
11ed851d | 71 | ret->flags = ret->meth->flags & ~RSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW; |
0f113f3e MC |
72 | if (engine) { |
73 | if (!ENGINE_init(engine)) { | |
74 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_ENGINE_LIB); | |
11ed851d | 75 | goto err; |
0f113f3e MC |
76 | } |
77 | ret->engine = engine; | |
90862ab4 | 78 | } else { |
0f113f3e | 79 | ret->engine = ENGINE_get_default_RSA(); |
90862ab4 | 80 | } |
0f113f3e MC |
81 | if (ret->engine) { |
82 | ret->meth = ENGINE_get_RSA(ret->engine); | |
7c96dbcd | 83 | if (ret->meth == NULL) { |
0f113f3e | 84 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_ENGINE_LIB); |
11ed851d | 85 | goto err; |
0f113f3e MC |
86 | } |
87 | } | |
0b13e9f0 | 88 | #endif |
0c9de428 | 89 | |
0f113f3e MC |
90 | ret->flags = ret->meth->flags & ~RSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW; |
91 | if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_RSA, ret, &ret->ex_data)) { | |
11ed851d | 92 | goto err; |
d188a536 AG |
93 | } |
94 | ||
95 | if ((ret->meth->init != NULL) && !ret->meth->init(ret)) { | |
11ed851d F |
96 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_INIT_FAIL); |
97 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e | 98 | } |
d188a536 AG |
99 | |
100 | return ret; | |
11ed851d | 101 | |
544648a8 | 102 | err: |
11ed851d F |
103 | RSA_free(ret); |
104 | return NULL; | |
0f113f3e | 105 | } |
d02b48c6 | 106 | |
6b691a5c | 107 | void RSA_free(RSA *r) |
0f113f3e MC |
108 | { |
109 | int i; | |
d02b48c6 | 110 | |
0f113f3e MC |
111 | if (r == NULL) |
112 | return; | |
d02b48c6 | 113 | |
2f545ae4 | 114 | CRYPTO_DOWN_REF(&r->references, &i, r->lock); |
f3f1cf84 | 115 | REF_PRINT_COUNT("RSA", r); |
0f113f3e MC |
116 | if (i > 0) |
117 | return; | |
f3f1cf84 | 118 | REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 0); |
d02b48c6 | 119 | |
0c5d725e | 120 | if (r->meth != NULL && r->meth->finish != NULL) |
0f113f3e | 121 | r->meth->finish(r); |
0b13e9f0 | 122 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE |
412bafdc | 123 | ENGINE_finish(r->engine); |
0b13e9f0 | 124 | #endif |
d02b48c6 | 125 | |
0f113f3e | 126 | CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_RSA, r, &r->ex_data); |
7abe8305 | 127 | |
d188a536 AG |
128 | CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(r->lock); |
129 | ||
c033101d MB |
130 | BN_free(r->n); |
131 | BN_free(r->e); | |
23a1d5e9 RS |
132 | BN_clear_free(r->d); |
133 | BN_clear_free(r->p); | |
134 | BN_clear_free(r->q); | |
135 | BN_clear_free(r->dmp1); | |
136 | BN_clear_free(r->dmq1); | |
137 | BN_clear_free(r->iqmp); | |
d771441d | 138 | RSA_PSS_PARAMS_free(r->pss); |
665d899f | 139 | sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_pop_free(r->prime_infos, rsa_multip_info_free); |
23a1d5e9 RS |
140 | BN_BLINDING_free(r->blinding); |
141 | BN_BLINDING_free(r->mt_blinding); | |
4c42ebd2 | 142 | OPENSSL_free(r->bignum_data); |
0f113f3e MC |
143 | OPENSSL_free(r); |
144 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 145 | |
6ac4e8bd | 146 | int RSA_up_ref(RSA *r) |
0f113f3e | 147 | { |
d188a536 AG |
148 | int i; |
149 | ||
2f545ae4 | 150 | if (CRYPTO_UP_REF(&r->references, &i, r->lock) <= 0) |
d188a536 | 151 | return 0; |
f3f1cf84 RS |
152 | |
153 | REF_PRINT_COUNT("RSA", r); | |
154 | REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 2); | |
8686c474 | 155 | return i > 1 ? 1 : 0; |
0f113f3e | 156 | } |
5cbc2e8b | 157 | |
dd9d233e | 158 | int RSA_set_ex_data(RSA *r, int idx, void *arg) |
0f113f3e | 159 | { |
8686c474 | 160 | return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&r->ex_data, idx, arg); |
0f113f3e | 161 | } |
58964a49 | 162 | |
29c1f061 | 163 | void *RSA_get_ex_data(const RSA *r, int idx) |
0f113f3e | 164 | { |
8686c474 | 165 | return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&r->ex_data, idx); |
0f113f3e | 166 | } |
58964a49 | 167 | |
97b0b713 P |
168 | /* |
169 | * Define a scaling constant for our fixed point arithmetic. | |
170 | * This value must be a power of two because the base two logarithm code | |
171 | * makes this assumption. The exponent must also be a multiple of three so | |
172 | * that the scale factor has an exact cube root. Finally, the scale factor | |
173 | * should not be so large that a multiplication of two scaled numbers | |
174 | * overflows a 64 bit unsigned integer. | |
175 | */ | |
176 | static const unsigned int scale = 1 << 18; | |
177 | static const unsigned int cbrt_scale = 1 << (2 * 18 / 3); | |
178 | ||
179 | /* Define some constants, none exceed 32 bits */ | |
180 | static const unsigned int log_2 = 0x02c5c8; /* scale * log(2) */ | |
181 | static const unsigned int log_e = 0x05c551; /* scale * log2(M_E) */ | |
182 | static const unsigned int c1_923 = 0x07b126; /* scale * 1.923 */ | |
183 | static const unsigned int c4_690 = 0x12c28f; /* scale * 4.690 */ | |
184 | ||
185 | /* | |
2beb004b | 186 | * Multiply two scaled integers together and rescale the result. |
97b0b713 P |
187 | */ |
188 | static ossl_inline uint64_t mul2(uint64_t a, uint64_t b) | |
189 | { | |
190 | return a * b / scale; | |
191 | } | |
192 | ||
193 | /* | |
194 | * Calculate the cube root of a 64 bit scaled integer. | |
195 | * Although the cube root of a 64 bit number does fit into a 32 bit unsigned | |
196 | * integer, this is not guaranteed after scaling, so this function has a | |
197 | * 64 bit return. This uses the shifting nth root algorithm with some | |
198 | * algebraic simplifications. | |
199 | */ | |
200 | static uint64_t icbrt64(uint64_t x) | |
201 | { | |
202 | uint64_t r = 0; | |
203 | uint64_t b; | |
204 | int s; | |
205 | ||
206 | for (s = 63; s >= 0; s -= 3) { | |
207 | r <<= 1; | |
208 | b = 3 * r * (r + 1) + 1; | |
209 | if ((x >> s) >= b) { | |
210 | x -= b << s; | |
211 | r++; | |
212 | } | |
213 | } | |
214 | return r * cbrt_scale; | |
215 | } | |
216 | ||
217 | /* | |
218 | * Calculate the natural logarithm of a 64 bit scaled integer. | |
219 | * This is done by calculating a base two logarithm and scaling. | |
220 | * The maximum logarithm (base 2) is 64 and this reduces base e, so | |
221 | * a 32 bit result should not overflow. The argument passed must be | |
222 | * greater than unity so we don't need to handle negative results. | |
223 | */ | |
224 | static uint32_t ilog_e(uint64_t v) | |
225 | { | |
226 | uint32_t i, r = 0; | |
227 | ||
228 | /* | |
229 | * Scale down the value into the range 1 .. 2. | |
230 | * | |
231 | * If fractional numbers need to be processed, another loop needs | |
232 | * to go here that checks v < scale and if so multiplies it by 2 and | |
233 | * reduces r by scale. This also means making r signed. | |
234 | */ | |
235 | while (v >= 2 * scale) { | |
236 | v >>= 1; | |
237 | r += scale; | |
238 | } | |
239 | for (i = scale / 2; i != 0; i /= 2) { | |
240 | v = mul2(v, v); | |
241 | if (v >= 2 * scale) { | |
242 | v >>= 1; | |
243 | r += i; | |
244 | } | |
245 | } | |
246 | r = (r * (uint64_t)scale) / log_e; | |
247 | return r; | |
248 | } | |
249 | ||
250 | /* | |
251 | * NIST SP 800-56B rev 2 Appendix D: Maximum Security Strength Estimates for IFC | |
252 | * Modulus Lengths. | |
253 | * | |
254 | * E = \frac{1.923 \sqrt[3]{nBits \cdot log_e(2)} | |
255 | * \cdot(log_e(nBits \cdot log_e(2))^{2/3} - 4.69}{log_e(2)} | |
256 | * The two cube roots are merged together here. | |
257 | */ | |
8240d5fa | 258 | uint16_t rsa_compute_security_bits(int n) |
97b0b713 P |
259 | { |
260 | uint64_t x; | |
261 | uint32_t lx; | |
262 | uint16_t y; | |
263 | ||
264 | /* Look for common values as listed in SP 800-56B rev 2 Appendix D */ | |
265 | switch (n) { | |
266 | case 2048: | |
267 | return 112; | |
268 | case 3072: | |
269 | return 128; | |
270 | case 4096: | |
271 | return 152; | |
272 | case 6144: | |
273 | return 176; | |
274 | case 8192: | |
275 | return 200; | |
276 | } | |
277 | /* | |
278 | * The first incorrect result (i.e. not accurate or off by one low) occurs | |
279 | * for n = 699668. The true value here is 1200. Instead of using this n | |
280 | * as the check threshold, the smallest n such that the correct result is | |
281 | * 1200 is used instead. | |
282 | */ | |
283 | if (n >= 687737) | |
284 | return 1200; | |
285 | if (n < 8) | |
286 | return 0; | |
287 | ||
288 | x = n * (uint64_t)log_2; | |
289 | lx = ilog_e(x); | |
290 | y = (uint16_t)((mul2(c1_923, icbrt64(mul2(mul2(x, lx), lx))) - c4_690) | |
291 | / log_2); | |
292 | return (y + 4) & ~7; | |
293 | } | |
294 | ||
2514fa79 | 295 | int RSA_security_bits(const RSA *rsa) |
0f113f3e | 296 | { |
0122add6 AP |
297 | int bits = BN_num_bits(rsa->n); |
298 | ||
299 | if (rsa->version == RSA_ASN1_VERSION_MULTI) { | |
300 | /* This ought to mean that we have private key at hand. */ | |
301 | int ex_primes = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_num(rsa->prime_infos); | |
302 | ||
303 | if (ex_primes <= 0 || (ex_primes + 2) > rsa_multip_cap(bits)) | |
304 | return 0; | |
305 | } | |
97b0b713 | 306 | return rsa_compute_security_bits(bits); |
0f113f3e | 307 | } |
9862e9aa RL |
308 | |
309 | int RSA_set0_key(RSA *r, BIGNUM *n, BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *d) | |
310 | { | |
fd809cfd | 311 | /* If the fields n and e in r are NULL, the corresponding input |
1da12e34 RL |
312 | * parameters MUST be non-NULL for n and e. d may be |
313 | * left NULL (in case only the public key is used). | |
1da12e34 | 314 | */ |
b84e1226 MC |
315 | if ((r->n == NULL && n == NULL) |
316 | || (r->e == NULL && e == NULL)) | |
9862e9aa RL |
317 | return 0; |
318 | ||
1da12e34 RL |
319 | if (n != NULL) { |
320 | BN_free(r->n); | |
321 | r->n = n; | |
322 | } | |
323 | if (e != NULL) { | |
324 | BN_free(r->e); | |
325 | r->e = e; | |
326 | } | |
327 | if (d != NULL) { | |
c033101d | 328 | BN_clear_free(r->d); |
1da12e34 | 329 | r->d = d; |
311e903d | 330 | BN_set_flags(r->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); |
1da12e34 | 331 | } |
29be6023 | 332 | r->dirty_cnt++; |
9862e9aa RL |
333 | |
334 | return 1; | |
335 | } | |
336 | ||
337 | int RSA_set0_factors(RSA *r, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q) | |
338 | { | |
fd809cfd | 339 | /* If the fields p and q in r are NULL, the corresponding input |
1da12e34 | 340 | * parameters MUST be non-NULL. |
1da12e34 | 341 | */ |
b84e1226 MC |
342 | if ((r->p == NULL && p == NULL) |
343 | || (r->q == NULL && q == NULL)) | |
9862e9aa RL |
344 | return 0; |
345 | ||
1da12e34 | 346 | if (p != NULL) { |
c033101d | 347 | BN_clear_free(r->p); |
1da12e34 | 348 | r->p = p; |
311e903d | 349 | BN_set_flags(r->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); |
1da12e34 RL |
350 | } |
351 | if (q != NULL) { | |
c033101d | 352 | BN_clear_free(r->q); |
1da12e34 | 353 | r->q = q; |
311e903d | 354 | BN_set_flags(r->q, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); |
1da12e34 | 355 | } |
29be6023 | 356 | r->dirty_cnt++; |
9862e9aa RL |
357 | |
358 | return 1; | |
359 | } | |
360 | ||
361 | int RSA_set0_crt_params(RSA *r, BIGNUM *dmp1, BIGNUM *dmq1, BIGNUM *iqmp) | |
362 | { | |
fd809cfd | 363 | /* If the fields dmp1, dmq1 and iqmp in r are NULL, the corresponding input |
1da12e34 | 364 | * parameters MUST be non-NULL. |
1da12e34 | 365 | */ |
b84e1226 MC |
366 | if ((r->dmp1 == NULL && dmp1 == NULL) |
367 | || (r->dmq1 == NULL && dmq1 == NULL) | |
368 | || (r->iqmp == NULL && iqmp == NULL)) | |
9862e9aa RL |
369 | return 0; |
370 | ||
1da12e34 | 371 | if (dmp1 != NULL) { |
c033101d | 372 | BN_clear_free(r->dmp1); |
1da12e34 | 373 | r->dmp1 = dmp1; |
311e903d | 374 | BN_set_flags(r->dmp1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); |
1da12e34 RL |
375 | } |
376 | if (dmq1 != NULL) { | |
c033101d | 377 | BN_clear_free(r->dmq1); |
1da12e34 | 378 | r->dmq1 = dmq1; |
311e903d | 379 | BN_set_flags(r->dmq1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); |
1da12e34 RL |
380 | } |
381 | if (iqmp != NULL) { | |
c033101d | 382 | BN_clear_free(r->iqmp); |
1da12e34 | 383 | r->iqmp = iqmp; |
311e903d | 384 | BN_set_flags(r->iqmp, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); |
1da12e34 | 385 | } |
29be6023 | 386 | r->dirty_cnt++; |
9862e9aa RL |
387 | |
388 | return 1; | |
389 | } | |
390 | ||
665d899f PY |
391 | /* |
392 | * Is it better to export RSA_PRIME_INFO structure | |
393 | * and related functions to let user pass a triplet? | |
394 | */ | |
395 | int RSA_set0_multi_prime_params(RSA *r, BIGNUM *primes[], BIGNUM *exps[], | |
396 | BIGNUM *coeffs[], int pnum) | |
397 | { | |
398 | STACK_OF(RSA_PRIME_INFO) *prime_infos, *old = NULL; | |
399 | RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo; | |
400 | int i; | |
401 | ||
402 | if (primes == NULL || exps == NULL || coeffs == NULL || pnum == 0) | |
403 | return 0; | |
404 | ||
405 | prime_infos = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_new_reserve(NULL, pnum); | |
406 | if (prime_infos == NULL) | |
407 | return 0; | |
408 | ||
409 | if (r->prime_infos != NULL) | |
410 | old = r->prime_infos; | |
411 | ||
412 | for (i = 0; i < pnum; i++) { | |
413 | pinfo = rsa_multip_info_new(); | |
414 | if (pinfo == NULL) | |
415 | goto err; | |
416 | if (primes[i] != NULL && exps[i] != NULL && coeffs[i] != NULL) { | |
d2baf88c CPG |
417 | BN_clear_free(pinfo->r); |
418 | BN_clear_free(pinfo->d); | |
419 | BN_clear_free(pinfo->t); | |
665d899f PY |
420 | pinfo->r = primes[i]; |
421 | pinfo->d = exps[i]; | |
422 | pinfo->t = coeffs[i]; | |
d2baf88c CPG |
423 | BN_set_flags(pinfo->r, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); |
424 | BN_set_flags(pinfo->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); | |
425 | BN_set_flags(pinfo->t, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); | |
665d899f PY |
426 | } else { |
427 | rsa_multip_info_free(pinfo); | |
428 | goto err; | |
429 | } | |
430 | (void)sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_push(prime_infos, pinfo); | |
431 | } | |
432 | ||
433 | r->prime_infos = prime_infos; | |
434 | ||
435 | if (!rsa_multip_calc_product(r)) { | |
436 | r->prime_infos = old; | |
437 | goto err; | |
438 | } | |
439 | ||
440 | if (old != NULL) { | |
441 | /* | |
442 | * This is hard to deal with, since the old infos could | |
443 | * also be set by this function and r, d, t should not | |
444 | * be freed in that case. So currently, stay consistent | |
445 | * with other *set0* functions: just free it... | |
446 | */ | |
447 | sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_pop_free(old, rsa_multip_info_free); | |
448 | } | |
449 | ||
450 | r->version = RSA_ASN1_VERSION_MULTI; | |
29be6023 | 451 | r->dirty_cnt++; |
665d899f PY |
452 | |
453 | return 1; | |
454 | err: | |
455 | /* r, d, t should not be freed */ | |
456 | sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_pop_free(prime_infos, rsa_multip_info_free_ex); | |
457 | return 0; | |
458 | } | |
459 | ||
fd809cfd RL |
460 | void RSA_get0_key(const RSA *r, |
461 | const BIGNUM **n, const BIGNUM **e, const BIGNUM **d) | |
9862e9aa RL |
462 | { |
463 | if (n != NULL) | |
464 | *n = r->n; | |
465 | if (e != NULL) | |
466 | *e = r->e; | |
467 | if (d != NULL) | |
468 | *d = r->d; | |
469 | } | |
470 | ||
fd809cfd | 471 | void RSA_get0_factors(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q) |
9862e9aa RL |
472 | { |
473 | if (p != NULL) | |
474 | *p = r->p; | |
475 | if (q != NULL) | |
476 | *q = r->q; | |
477 | } | |
478 | ||
665d899f PY |
479 | int RSA_get_multi_prime_extra_count(const RSA *r) |
480 | { | |
481 | int pnum; | |
482 | ||
483 | pnum = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_num(r->prime_infos); | |
484 | if (pnum <= 0) | |
485 | pnum = 0; | |
486 | return pnum; | |
487 | } | |
488 | ||
489 | int RSA_get0_multi_prime_factors(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM *primes[]) | |
490 | { | |
491 | int pnum, i; | |
492 | RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo; | |
493 | ||
494 | if ((pnum = RSA_get_multi_prime_extra_count(r)) == 0) | |
495 | return 0; | |
496 | ||
497 | /* | |
498 | * return other primes | |
499 | * it's caller's responsibility to allocate oth_primes[pnum] | |
500 | */ | |
501 | for (i = 0; i < pnum; i++) { | |
502 | pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(r->prime_infos, i); | |
503 | primes[i] = pinfo->r; | |
504 | } | |
505 | ||
506 | return 1; | |
507 | } | |
508 | ||
9862e9aa | 509 | void RSA_get0_crt_params(const RSA *r, |
fd809cfd RL |
510 | const BIGNUM **dmp1, const BIGNUM **dmq1, |
511 | const BIGNUM **iqmp) | |
9862e9aa RL |
512 | { |
513 | if (dmp1 != NULL) | |
514 | *dmp1 = r->dmp1; | |
515 | if (dmq1 != NULL) | |
516 | *dmq1 = r->dmq1; | |
517 | if (iqmp != NULL) | |
518 | *iqmp = r->iqmp; | |
519 | } | |
520 | ||
665d899f PY |
521 | int RSA_get0_multi_prime_crt_params(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM *exps[], |
522 | const BIGNUM *coeffs[]) | |
523 | { | |
524 | int pnum; | |
525 | ||
526 | if ((pnum = RSA_get_multi_prime_extra_count(r)) == 0) | |
527 | return 0; | |
528 | ||
529 | /* return other primes */ | |
530 | if (exps != NULL || coeffs != NULL) { | |
531 | RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo; | |
532 | int i; | |
533 | ||
534 | /* it's the user's job to guarantee the buffer length */ | |
535 | for (i = 0; i < pnum; i++) { | |
536 | pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(r->prime_infos, i); | |
537 | if (exps != NULL) | |
538 | exps[i] = pinfo->d; | |
539 | if (coeffs != NULL) | |
540 | coeffs[i] = pinfo->t; | |
541 | } | |
542 | } | |
543 | ||
544 | return 1; | |
545 | } | |
546 | ||
6692ff77 DMSP |
547 | const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_n(const RSA *r) |
548 | { | |
549 | return r->n; | |
550 | } | |
551 | ||
552 | const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_e(const RSA *r) | |
553 | { | |
554 | return r->e; | |
555 | } | |
556 | ||
557 | const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_d(const RSA *r) | |
558 | { | |
559 | return r->d; | |
560 | } | |
561 | ||
562 | const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_p(const RSA *r) | |
563 | { | |
564 | return r->p; | |
565 | } | |
566 | ||
567 | const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_q(const RSA *r) | |
568 | { | |
569 | return r->q; | |
570 | } | |
571 | ||
572 | const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_dmp1(const RSA *r) | |
573 | { | |
574 | return r->dmp1; | |
575 | } | |
576 | ||
577 | const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_dmq1(const RSA *r) | |
578 | { | |
579 | return r->dmq1; | |
580 | } | |
581 | ||
582 | const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_iqmp(const RSA *r) | |
583 | { | |
584 | return r->iqmp; | |
585 | } | |
586 | ||
677add38 RL |
587 | const RSA_PSS_PARAMS *RSA_get0_pss_params(const RSA *r) |
588 | { | |
589 | return r->pss; | |
590 | } | |
591 | ||
9862e9aa RL |
592 | void RSA_clear_flags(RSA *r, int flags) |
593 | { | |
594 | r->flags &= ~flags; | |
595 | } | |
596 | ||
597 | int RSA_test_flags(const RSA *r, int flags) | |
598 | { | |
599 | return r->flags & flags; | |
600 | } | |
601 | ||
602 | void RSA_set_flags(RSA *r, int flags) | |
603 | { | |
604 | r->flags |= flags; | |
605 | } | |
606 | ||
665d899f PY |
607 | int RSA_get_version(RSA *r) |
608 | { | |
609 | /* { two-prime(0), multi(1) } */ | |
610 | return r->version; | |
611 | } | |
612 | ||
e0685d24 | 613 | ENGINE *RSA_get0_engine(const RSA *r) |
9862e9aa RL |
614 | { |
615 | return r->engine; | |
616 | } | |
e5e04ee3 DSH |
617 | |
618 | int RSA_pkey_ctx_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int optype, int cmd, int p1, void *p2) | |
619 | { | |
620 | /* If key type not RSA or RSA-PSS return error */ | |
621 | if (ctx != NULL && ctx->pmeth != NULL | |
622 | && ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA | |
623 | && ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) | |
624 | return -1; | |
625 | return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, -1, optype, cmd, p1, p2); | |
626 | } | |
c3a4fa4c RL |
627 | |
628 | DEFINE_STACK_OF(BIGNUM) | |
629 | ||
630 | int rsa_set0_all_params(RSA *r, const STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *primes, | |
631 | const STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *exps, | |
632 | const STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *coeffs) | |
633 | { | |
634 | STACK_OF(RSA_PRIME_INFO) *prime_infos, *old_infos = NULL; | |
635 | int pnum; | |
636 | ||
637 | if (primes == NULL || exps == NULL || coeffs == NULL) | |
638 | return 0; | |
639 | ||
640 | pnum = sk_BIGNUM_num(primes); | |
641 | if (pnum < 2 | |
642 | || pnum != sk_BIGNUM_num(exps) | |
643 | || pnum != sk_BIGNUM_num(coeffs) + 1) | |
644 | return 0; | |
645 | ||
646 | if (!RSA_set0_factors(r, sk_BIGNUM_value(primes, 0), | |
647 | sk_BIGNUM_value(primes, 1)) | |
648 | || !RSA_set0_crt_params(r, sk_BIGNUM_value(exps, 0), | |
649 | sk_BIGNUM_value(exps, 1), | |
650 | sk_BIGNUM_value(coeffs, 0))) | |
651 | return 0; | |
652 | ||
653 | old_infos = r->prime_infos; | |
654 | ||
655 | if (pnum > 2) { | |
656 | int i; | |
657 | ||
658 | prime_infos = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_new_reserve(NULL, pnum); | |
659 | if (prime_infos == NULL) | |
660 | return 0; | |
661 | ||
662 | for (i = 2; i < pnum; i++) { | |
663 | BIGNUM *prime = sk_BIGNUM_value(primes, i); | |
664 | BIGNUM *exp = sk_BIGNUM_value(exps, i); | |
665 | BIGNUM *coeff = sk_BIGNUM_value(coeffs, i - 1); | |
666 | RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo = NULL; | |
667 | ||
668 | if (!ossl_assert(prime != NULL && exp != NULL && coeff != NULL)) | |
669 | goto err; | |
670 | ||
671 | /* Using rsa_multip_info_new() is wasteful, so allocate directly */ | |
672 | if ((pinfo = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*pinfo))) == NULL) { | |
673 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
674 | goto err; | |
675 | } | |
676 | ||
677 | pinfo->r = prime; | |
678 | pinfo->d = exp; | |
679 | pinfo->t = coeff; | |
680 | BN_set_flags(pinfo->r, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); | |
681 | BN_set_flags(pinfo->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); | |
682 | BN_set_flags(pinfo->t, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); | |
683 | (void)sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_push(prime_infos, pinfo); | |
684 | } | |
685 | ||
686 | r->prime_infos = prime_infos; | |
687 | ||
688 | if (!rsa_multip_calc_product(r)) { | |
689 | r->prime_infos = old_infos; | |
690 | goto err; | |
691 | } | |
692 | } | |
693 | ||
694 | if (old_infos != NULL) { | |
695 | /* | |
696 | * This is hard to deal with, since the old infos could | |
697 | * also be set by this function and r, d, t should not | |
698 | * be freed in that case. So currently, stay consistent | |
699 | * with other *set0* functions: just free it... | |
700 | */ | |
701 | sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_pop_free(old_infos, rsa_multip_info_free); | |
702 | } | |
703 | ||
704 | r->version = pnum > 2 ? RSA_ASN1_VERSION_MULTI : RSA_ASN1_VERSION_DEFAULT; | |
705 | r->dirty_cnt++; | |
706 | ||
707 | return 1; | |
708 | err: | |
709 | /* r, d, t should not be freed */ | |
710 | sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_pop_free(prime_infos, rsa_multip_info_free_ex); | |
711 | return 0; | |
712 | } | |
713 | ||
714 | DEFINE_SPECIAL_STACK_OF_CONST(BIGNUM_const, BIGNUM) | |
715 | ||
716 | int rsa_get0_all_params(RSA *r, STACK_OF(BIGNUM_const) *primes, | |
717 | STACK_OF(BIGNUM_const) *exps, | |
718 | STACK_OF(BIGNUM_const) *coeffs) | |
719 | { | |
720 | RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo; | |
721 | int i, pnum; | |
722 | ||
723 | if (r == NULL) | |
724 | return 0; | |
725 | ||
726 | pnum = RSA_get_multi_prime_extra_count(r); | |
727 | ||
728 | sk_BIGNUM_const_push(primes, RSA_get0_p(r)); | |
729 | sk_BIGNUM_const_push(primes, RSA_get0_q(r)); | |
730 | sk_BIGNUM_const_push(exps, RSA_get0_dmp1(r)); | |
731 | sk_BIGNUM_const_push(exps, RSA_get0_dmq1(r)); | |
732 | sk_BIGNUM_const_push(coeffs, RSA_get0_iqmp(r)); | |
733 | for (i = 0; i < pnum; i++) { | |
734 | pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(r->prime_infos, i); | |
735 | sk_BIGNUM_const_push(primes, pinfo->r); | |
736 | sk_BIGNUM_const_push(exps, pinfo->d); | |
737 | sk_BIGNUM_const_push(coeffs, pinfo->t); | |
738 | } | |
739 | ||
740 | return 1; | |
741 | } | |
89abd1b6 MC |
742 | |
743 | int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int pad_mode) | |
744 | { | |
745 | OSSL_PARAM pad_params[2], *p = pad_params; | |
746 | ||
747 | if (ctx == NULL) { | |
748 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED); | |
749 | /* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */ | |
750 | return -2; | |
751 | } | |
752 | ||
753 | /* If key type not RSA or RSA-PSS return error */ | |
754 | if (ctx->pmeth != NULL | |
755 | && ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA | |
756 | && ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) | |
757 | return -1; | |
758 | ||
759 | /* TODO(3.0): Remove this eventually when no more legacy */ | |
760 | if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_ASYM_CIPHER_OP(ctx) | |
761 | || ctx->op.ciph.ciphprovctx == NULL) | |
762 | return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PADDING, | |
763 | pad_mode, NULL); | |
764 | ||
765 | *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_PAD_MODE, &pad_mode); | |
766 | *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end(); | |
767 | ||
768 | return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(ctx, pad_params); | |
769 | } | |
770 | ||
771 | int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_padding(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int *pad_mode) | |
772 | { | |
773 | OSSL_PARAM pad_params[2], *p = pad_params; | |
774 | ||
775 | if (ctx == NULL || pad_mode == NULL) { | |
776 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED); | |
777 | /* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */ | |
778 | return -2; | |
779 | } | |
780 | ||
781 | /* If key type not RSA or RSA-PSS return error */ | |
782 | if (ctx->pmeth != NULL | |
783 | && ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA | |
784 | && ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) | |
785 | return -1; | |
786 | ||
787 | /* TODO(3.0): Remove this eventually when no more legacy */ | |
788 | if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_ASYM_CIPHER_OP(ctx) | |
789 | || ctx->op.ciph.ciphprovctx == NULL) | |
790 | return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PADDING, 0, | |
791 | pad_mode); | |
792 | ||
793 | *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_PAD_MODE, pad_mode); | |
794 | *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end(); | |
795 | ||
796 | if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_params(ctx, pad_params)) | |
797 | return 0; | |
798 | ||
799 | return 1; | |
800 | ||
801 | } | |
802 | ||
803 | int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_oaep_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md) | |
804 | { | |
805 | const char *name; | |
806 | ||
807 | if (ctx == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_ASYM_CIPHER_OP(ctx)) { | |
808 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED); | |
809 | /* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */ | |
810 | return -2; | |
811 | } | |
812 | ||
813 | /* If key type not RSA return error */ | |
814 | if (ctx->pmeth != NULL && ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA) | |
815 | return -1; | |
816 | ||
817 | /* TODO(3.0): Remove this eventually when no more legacy */ | |
818 | if (ctx->op.ciph.ciphprovctx == NULL) | |
819 | return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT, | |
820 | EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_MD, 0, (void *)md); | |
821 | ||
822 | name = (md == NULL) ? "" : EVP_MD_name(md); | |
823 | ||
824 | return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_oaep_md_name(ctx, name, NULL); | |
825 | } | |
826 | ||
827 | int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_oaep_md_name(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const char *mdname, | |
828 | const char *mdprops) | |
829 | { | |
830 | OSSL_PARAM rsa_params[3], *p = rsa_params; | |
831 | ||
832 | if (ctx == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_ASYM_CIPHER_OP(ctx)) { | |
833 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED); | |
834 | /* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */ | |
835 | return -2; | |
836 | } | |
837 | ||
838 | /* If key type not RSA return error */ | |
839 | if (ctx->pmeth != NULL && ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA) | |
840 | return -1; | |
841 | ||
842 | ||
843 | *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_OAEP_DIGEST, | |
844 | /* | |
845 | * Cast away the const. This is read | |
846 | * only so should be safe | |
847 | */ | |
848 | (char *)mdname, | |
849 | strlen(mdname) + 1); | |
850 | if (mdprops != NULL) { | |
851 | *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string( | |
852 | OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_OAEP_DIGEST_PROPS, | |
853 | /* | |
854 | * Cast away the const. This is read | |
855 | * only so should be safe | |
856 | */ | |
857 | (char *)mdprops, | |
858 | strlen(mdprops) + 1); | |
859 | } | |
860 | *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end(); | |
861 | ||
862 | return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(ctx, rsa_params); | |
863 | } | |
864 | ||
865 | int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_oaep_md_name(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, char *name, | |
866 | size_t namelen) | |
867 | { | |
868 | OSSL_PARAM rsa_params[2], *p = rsa_params; | |
869 | ||
870 | if (ctx == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_ASYM_CIPHER_OP(ctx)) { | |
871 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED); | |
872 | /* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */ | |
873 | return -2; | |
874 | } | |
875 | ||
876 | /* If key type not RSA return error */ | |
877 | if (ctx->pmeth != NULL && ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA) | |
878 | return -1; | |
879 | ||
880 | *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_OAEP_DIGEST, | |
881 | name, namelen); | |
882 | *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end(); | |
883 | ||
884 | if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_params(ctx, rsa_params)) | |
885 | return -1; | |
886 | ||
887 | return 1; | |
888 | } | |
889 | ||
890 | int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_oaep_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD **md) | |
891 | { | |
892 | /* 80 should be big enough */ | |
893 | char name[80] = ""; | |
894 | ||
895 | if (ctx == NULL || md == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_ASYM_CIPHER_OP(ctx)) { | |
896 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED); | |
897 | /* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */ | |
898 | return -2; | |
899 | } | |
900 | ||
901 | /* If key type not RSA return error */ | |
902 | if (ctx->pmeth != NULL && ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA) | |
903 | return -1; | |
904 | ||
905 | /* TODO(3.0): Remove this eventually when no more legacy */ | |
906 | if (ctx->op.ciph.ciphprovctx == NULL) | |
907 | return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT, | |
908 | EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_OAEP_MD, 0, (void *)md); | |
909 | ||
910 | if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_oaep_md_name(ctx, name, sizeof(name)) <= 0) | |
911 | return -1; | |
912 | ||
913 | /* May be NULL meaning "unknown" */ | |
914 | *md = EVP_get_digestbyname(name); | |
915 | ||
916 | return 1; | |
917 | } | |
918 | ||
919 | int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_mgf1_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md) | |
920 | { | |
921 | const char *name; | |
922 | ||
923 | if (ctx == NULL | |
924 | || (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_ASYM_CIPHER_OP(ctx) | |
925 | && !EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_SIGNATURE_OP(ctx))) { | |
926 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED); | |
927 | /* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */ | |
928 | return -2; | |
929 | } | |
930 | ||
931 | /* If key type not RSA return error */ | |
932 | if (ctx->pmeth != NULL | |
933 | && ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA | |
934 | && ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) | |
935 | return -1; | |
936 | ||
937 | /* TODO(3.0): Remove this eventually when no more legacy */ | |
938 | if ((EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_ASYM_CIPHER_OP(ctx) | |
939 | && ctx->op.ciph.ciphprovctx == NULL) | |
940 | || (EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_SIGNATURE_OP(ctx) | |
941 | && ctx->op.sig.sigprovctx == NULL)) | |
942 | return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, | |
943 | EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG | EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT, | |
944 | EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_MGF1_MD, 0, (void *)md); | |
945 | ||
946 | name = (md == NULL) ? "" : EVP_MD_name(md); | |
947 | ||
948 | return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_mgf1_md_name(ctx, name, NULL); | |
949 | } | |
950 | ||
951 | int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_mgf1_md_name(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const char *mdname, | |
952 | const char *mdprops) | |
953 | { | |
954 | OSSL_PARAM rsa_params[3], *p = rsa_params; | |
955 | ||
956 | if (ctx == NULL | |
957 | || mdname == NULL | |
958 | || (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_ASYM_CIPHER_OP(ctx) | |
959 | && !EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_SIGNATURE_OP(ctx))) { | |
960 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED); | |
961 | /* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */ | |
962 | return -2; | |
963 | } | |
964 | ||
965 | /* If key type not RSA return error */ | |
966 | if (ctx->pmeth != NULL | |
967 | && ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA | |
968 | && ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) | |
969 | return -1; | |
970 | ||
971 | *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST, | |
972 | /* | |
973 | * Cast away the const. This is read | |
974 | * only so should be safe | |
975 | */ | |
976 | (char *)mdname, | |
977 | strlen(mdname) + 1); | |
978 | if (mdprops != NULL) { | |
979 | *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string( | |
980 | OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST_PROPS, | |
981 | /* | |
982 | * Cast away the const. This is read | |
983 | * only so should be safe | |
984 | */ | |
985 | (char *)mdprops, | |
986 | strlen(mdprops) + 1); | |
987 | } | |
988 | *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end(); | |
989 | ||
990 | return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(ctx, rsa_params); | |
991 | } | |
992 | ||
993 | int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_mgf1_md_name(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, char *name, | |
994 | size_t namelen) | |
995 | { | |
996 | OSSL_PARAM rsa_params[2], *p = rsa_params; | |
997 | ||
998 | if (ctx == NULL | |
999 | || (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_ASYM_CIPHER_OP(ctx) | |
1000 | && !EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_SIGNATURE_OP(ctx))) { | |
1001 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED); | |
1002 | /* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */ | |
1003 | return -2; | |
1004 | } | |
1005 | ||
1006 | /* If key type not RSA or RSA-PSS return error */ | |
1007 | if (ctx->pmeth != NULL | |
1008 | && ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA | |
1009 | && ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) | |
1010 | return -1; | |
1011 | ||
1012 | *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST, | |
1013 | name, namelen); | |
1014 | *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end(); | |
1015 | ||
1016 | if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_params(ctx, rsa_params)) | |
1017 | return -1; | |
1018 | ||
1019 | return 1; | |
1020 | } | |
1021 | ||
1022 | int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_mgf1_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD **md) | |
1023 | { | |
1024 | /* 80 should be big enough */ | |
1025 | char name[80] = ""; | |
1026 | ||
1027 | if (ctx == NULL | |
1028 | || (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_ASYM_CIPHER_OP(ctx) | |
1029 | && !EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_SIGNATURE_OP(ctx))) { | |
1030 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED); | |
1031 | /* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */ | |
1032 | return -2; | |
1033 | } | |
1034 | ||
1035 | /* If key type not RSA or RSA-PSS return error */ | |
1036 | if (ctx->pmeth != NULL | |
1037 | && ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA | |
1038 | && ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) | |
1039 | return -1; | |
1040 | ||
1041 | /* TODO(3.0): Remove this eventually when no more legacy */ | |
1042 | if ((EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_ASYM_CIPHER_OP(ctx) | |
1043 | && ctx->op.ciph.ciphprovctx == NULL) | |
1044 | || (EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_SIGNATURE_OP(ctx) | |
1045 | && ctx->op.sig.sigprovctx == NULL)) | |
1046 | return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, -1, | |
1047 | EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG | EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT, | |
1048 | EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_MGF1_MD, 0, (void *)md); | |
1049 | ||
1050 | if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_mgf1_md_name(ctx, name, sizeof(name)) <= 0) | |
1051 | return -1; | |
1052 | ||
1053 | /* May be NULL meaning "unknown" */ | |
1054 | *md = EVP_get_digestbyname(name); | |
1055 | ||
1056 | return 1; | |
1057 | } | |
1058 | ||
1059 | int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_rsa_oaep_label(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, void *label, int llen) | |
1060 | { | |
1061 | OSSL_PARAM rsa_params[2], *p = rsa_params; | |
1062 | ||
1063 | if (ctx == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_ASYM_CIPHER_OP(ctx)) { | |
1064 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED); | |
1065 | /* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */ | |
1066 | return -2; | |
1067 | } | |
1068 | ||
1069 | /* If key type not RSA return error */ | |
1070 | if (ctx->pmeth != NULL && ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA) | |
1071 | return -1; | |
1072 | ||
1073 | /* TODO(3.0): Remove this eventually when no more legacy */ | |
1074 | if (ctx->op.ciph.ciphprovctx == NULL) | |
1075 | return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT, | |
1076 | EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_LABEL, llen, | |
1077 | (void *)label); | |
1078 | ||
1079 | *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_OAEP_LABEL, | |
1080 | /* | |
1081 | * Cast away the const. This is read | |
1082 | * only so should be safe | |
1083 | */ | |
1084 | (void *)label, | |
1085 | (size_t)llen); | |
1086 | *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end(); | |
1087 | ||
1088 | if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(ctx, rsa_params)) | |
1089 | return 0; | |
1090 | ||
1091 | OPENSSL_free(label); | |
1092 | return 1; | |
1093 | } | |
1094 | ||
1095 | int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_rsa_oaep_label(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char **label) | |
1096 | { | |
1097 | OSSL_PARAM rsa_params[3], *p = rsa_params; | |
1098 | size_t labellen; | |
1099 | ||
1100 | if (ctx == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_ASYM_CIPHER_OP(ctx)) { | |
1101 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED); | |
1102 | /* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */ | |
1103 | return -2; | |
1104 | } | |
1105 | ||
1106 | /* If key type not RSA return error */ | |
1107 | if (ctx->pmeth != NULL && ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA) | |
1108 | return -1; | |
1109 | ||
1110 | /* TODO(3.0): Remove this eventually when no more legacy */ | |
1111 | if (ctx->op.ciph.ciphprovctx == NULL) | |
1112 | return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT, | |
1113 | EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_OAEP_LABEL, 0, | |
1114 | (void *)label); | |
1115 | ||
1116 | *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_ptr(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_OAEP_LABEL, | |
1117 | (void **)label, 0); | |
1118 | *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_OAEP_LABEL_LEN, | |
1119 | &labellen); | |
1120 | *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end(); | |
1121 | ||
1122 | if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_params(ctx, rsa_params)) | |
1123 | return -1; | |
1124 | ||
1125 | if (labellen > INT_MAX) | |
1126 | return -1; | |
1127 | ||
1128 | return (int)labellen; | |
1129 | } |