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2039c421 | 1 | /* |
4333b89f | 2 | * Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. |
d02b48c6 | 3 | * |
2a7b6f39 | 4 | * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use |
2039c421 RS |
5 | * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy |
6 | * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at | |
7 | * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html | |
d02b48c6 RE |
8 | */ |
9 | ||
c5f87134 P |
10 | /* |
11 | * RSA low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for | |
12 | * internal use. | |
13 | */ | |
14 | #include "internal/deprecated.h" | |
15 | ||
ec577822 | 16 | #include <openssl/crypto.h> |
89abd1b6 MC |
17 | #include <openssl/core_names.h> |
18 | #include <openssl/engine.h> | |
19 | #include <openssl/evp.h> | |
da9988e0 | 20 | #include <openssl/param_build.h> |
b39fc560 | 21 | #include "internal/cryptlib.h" |
cd420b0b | 22 | #include "internal/refcount.h" |
25f2138b | 23 | #include "crypto/bn.h" |
25f2138b | 24 | #include "crypto/evp.h" |
c3a4fa4c | 25 | #include "crypto/rsa.h" |
55f02cb6 | 26 | #include "crypto/security_bits.h" |
706457b7 | 27 | #include "rsa_local.h" |
d02b48c6 | 28 | |
b4250010 | 29 | static RSA *rsa_new_intern(ENGINE *engine, OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx); |
afb638f1 | 30 | |
f844f9eb | 31 | #ifndef FIPS_MODULE |
6b691a5c | 32 | RSA *RSA_new(void) |
0f113f3e | 33 | { |
afb638f1 | 34 | return rsa_new_intern(NULL, NULL); |
0f113f3e | 35 | } |
ce8b2574 | 36 | |
29c1f061 | 37 | const RSA_METHOD *RSA_get_method(const RSA *rsa) |
0f113f3e MC |
38 | { |
39 | return rsa->meth; | |
40 | } | |
cb78486d GT |
41 | |
42 | int RSA_set_method(RSA *rsa, const RSA_METHOD *meth) | |
0f113f3e MC |
43 | { |
44 | /* | |
45 | * NB: The caller is specifically setting a method, so it's not up to us | |
46 | * to deal with which ENGINE it comes from. | |
47 | */ | |
48 | const RSA_METHOD *mtmp; | |
49 | mtmp = rsa->meth; | |
50 | if (mtmp->finish) | |
51 | mtmp->finish(rsa); | |
0b13e9f0 | 52 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE |
7c96dbcd RS |
53 | ENGINE_finish(rsa->engine); |
54 | rsa->engine = NULL; | |
0b13e9f0 | 55 | #endif |
0f113f3e MC |
56 | rsa->meth = meth; |
57 | if (meth->init) | |
58 | meth->init(rsa); | |
59 | return 1; | |
60 | } | |
ce8b2574 | 61 | |
5270e702 | 62 | RSA *RSA_new_method(ENGINE *engine) |
afb638f1 MC |
63 | { |
64 | return rsa_new_intern(engine, NULL); | |
65 | } | |
66 | #endif | |
67 | ||
b4250010 | 68 | RSA *ossl_rsa_new_with_ctx(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx) |
afb638f1 MC |
69 | { |
70 | return rsa_new_intern(NULL, libctx); | |
71 | } | |
72 | ||
b4250010 | 73 | static RSA *rsa_new_intern(ENGINE *engine, OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx) |
0f113f3e | 74 | { |
11ed851d | 75 | RSA *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret)); |
d02b48c6 | 76 | |
0f113f3e | 77 | if (ret == NULL) { |
9311d0c4 | 78 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
0f113f3e MC |
79 | return NULL; |
80 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 81 | |
11ed851d F |
82 | ret->references = 1; |
83 | ret->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(); | |
84 | if (ret->lock == NULL) { | |
9311d0c4 | 85 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
11ed851d F |
86 | OPENSSL_free(ret); |
87 | return NULL; | |
88 | } | |
89 | ||
afb638f1 | 90 | ret->libctx = libctx; |
0f113f3e | 91 | ret->meth = RSA_get_default_method(); |
f844f9eb | 92 | #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE) && !defined(FIPS_MODULE) |
11ed851d | 93 | ret->flags = ret->meth->flags & ~RSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW; |
0f113f3e MC |
94 | if (engine) { |
95 | if (!ENGINE_init(engine)) { | |
9311d0c4 | 96 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_ENGINE_LIB); |
11ed851d | 97 | goto err; |
0f113f3e MC |
98 | } |
99 | ret->engine = engine; | |
90862ab4 | 100 | } else { |
0f113f3e | 101 | ret->engine = ENGINE_get_default_RSA(); |
90862ab4 | 102 | } |
0f113f3e MC |
103 | if (ret->engine) { |
104 | ret->meth = ENGINE_get_RSA(ret->engine); | |
7c96dbcd | 105 | if (ret->meth == NULL) { |
9311d0c4 | 106 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_ENGINE_LIB); |
11ed851d | 107 | goto err; |
0f113f3e MC |
108 | } |
109 | } | |
0b13e9f0 | 110 | #endif |
0c9de428 | 111 | |
0f113f3e | 112 | ret->flags = ret->meth->flags & ~RSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW; |
f844f9eb | 113 | #ifndef FIPS_MODULE |
0f113f3e | 114 | if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_RSA, ret, &ret->ex_data)) { |
11ed851d | 115 | goto err; |
d188a536 | 116 | } |
a3327784 | 117 | #endif |
d188a536 AG |
118 | |
119 | if ((ret->meth->init != NULL) && !ret->meth->init(ret)) { | |
9311d0c4 | 120 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INIT_FAIL); |
11ed851d | 121 | goto err; |
0f113f3e | 122 | } |
d188a536 AG |
123 | |
124 | return ret; | |
11ed851d | 125 | |
544648a8 | 126 | err: |
11ed851d F |
127 | RSA_free(ret); |
128 | return NULL; | |
0f113f3e | 129 | } |
d02b48c6 | 130 | |
6b691a5c | 131 | void RSA_free(RSA *r) |
0f113f3e MC |
132 | { |
133 | int i; | |
d02b48c6 | 134 | |
0f113f3e MC |
135 | if (r == NULL) |
136 | return; | |
d02b48c6 | 137 | |
2f545ae4 | 138 | CRYPTO_DOWN_REF(&r->references, &i, r->lock); |
f3f1cf84 | 139 | REF_PRINT_COUNT("RSA", r); |
0f113f3e MC |
140 | if (i > 0) |
141 | return; | |
f3f1cf84 | 142 | REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 0); |
d02b48c6 | 143 | |
0c5d725e | 144 | if (r->meth != NULL && r->meth->finish != NULL) |
0f113f3e | 145 | r->meth->finish(r); |
f844f9eb | 146 | #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE) && !defined(FIPS_MODULE) |
412bafdc | 147 | ENGINE_finish(r->engine); |
0b13e9f0 | 148 | #endif |
d02b48c6 | 149 | |
f844f9eb | 150 | #ifndef FIPS_MODULE |
0f113f3e | 151 | CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_RSA, r, &r->ex_data); |
a3327784 | 152 | #endif |
7abe8305 | 153 | |
d188a536 AG |
154 | CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(r->lock); |
155 | ||
c033101d MB |
156 | BN_free(r->n); |
157 | BN_free(r->e); | |
23a1d5e9 RS |
158 | BN_clear_free(r->d); |
159 | BN_clear_free(r->p); | |
160 | BN_clear_free(r->q); | |
161 | BN_clear_free(r->dmp1); | |
162 | BN_clear_free(r->dmq1); | |
163 | BN_clear_free(r->iqmp); | |
4f2271d5 SL |
164 | |
165 | #if defined(FIPS_MODULE) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ACVP_TESTS) | |
166 | rsa_acvp_test_free(r->acvp_test); | |
167 | #endif | |
168 | ||
f844f9eb | 169 | #ifndef FIPS_MODULE |
d771441d | 170 | RSA_PSS_PARAMS_free(r->pss); |
665d899f | 171 | sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_pop_free(r->prime_infos, rsa_multip_info_free); |
afb638f1 | 172 | #endif |
23a1d5e9 RS |
173 | BN_BLINDING_free(r->blinding); |
174 | BN_BLINDING_free(r->mt_blinding); | |
4c42ebd2 | 175 | OPENSSL_free(r->bignum_data); |
0f113f3e MC |
176 | OPENSSL_free(r); |
177 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 178 | |
6ac4e8bd | 179 | int RSA_up_ref(RSA *r) |
0f113f3e | 180 | { |
d188a536 AG |
181 | int i; |
182 | ||
2f545ae4 | 183 | if (CRYPTO_UP_REF(&r->references, &i, r->lock) <= 0) |
d188a536 | 184 | return 0; |
f3f1cf84 RS |
185 | |
186 | REF_PRINT_COUNT("RSA", r); | |
187 | REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 2); | |
8686c474 | 188 | return i > 1 ? 1 : 0; |
0f113f3e | 189 | } |
5cbc2e8b | 190 | |
b4250010 | 191 | OSSL_LIB_CTX *ossl_rsa_get0_libctx(RSA *r) |
8a758e96 RL |
192 | { |
193 | return r->libctx; | |
194 | } | |
195 | ||
6963979f RL |
196 | void ossl_rsa_set0_libctx(RSA *r, OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx) |
197 | { | |
198 | r->libctx = libctx; | |
199 | } | |
200 | ||
f844f9eb | 201 | #ifndef FIPS_MODULE |
dd9d233e | 202 | int RSA_set_ex_data(RSA *r, int idx, void *arg) |
0f113f3e | 203 | { |
8686c474 | 204 | return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&r->ex_data, idx, arg); |
0f113f3e | 205 | } |
58964a49 | 206 | |
29c1f061 | 207 | void *RSA_get_ex_data(const RSA *r, int idx) |
0f113f3e | 208 | { |
8686c474 | 209 | return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&r->ex_data, idx); |
0f113f3e | 210 | } |
a3327784 | 211 | #endif |
58964a49 | 212 | |
97b0b713 P |
213 | /* |
214 | * Define a scaling constant for our fixed point arithmetic. | |
215 | * This value must be a power of two because the base two logarithm code | |
216 | * makes this assumption. The exponent must also be a multiple of three so | |
217 | * that the scale factor has an exact cube root. Finally, the scale factor | |
218 | * should not be so large that a multiplication of two scaled numbers | |
219 | * overflows a 64 bit unsigned integer. | |
220 | */ | |
221 | static const unsigned int scale = 1 << 18; | |
222 | static const unsigned int cbrt_scale = 1 << (2 * 18 / 3); | |
223 | ||
224 | /* Define some constants, none exceed 32 bits */ | |
225 | static const unsigned int log_2 = 0x02c5c8; /* scale * log(2) */ | |
226 | static const unsigned int log_e = 0x05c551; /* scale * log2(M_E) */ | |
227 | static const unsigned int c1_923 = 0x07b126; /* scale * 1.923 */ | |
228 | static const unsigned int c4_690 = 0x12c28f; /* scale * 4.690 */ | |
229 | ||
230 | /* | |
2beb004b | 231 | * Multiply two scaled integers together and rescale the result. |
97b0b713 P |
232 | */ |
233 | static ossl_inline uint64_t mul2(uint64_t a, uint64_t b) | |
234 | { | |
235 | return a * b / scale; | |
236 | } | |
237 | ||
238 | /* | |
239 | * Calculate the cube root of a 64 bit scaled integer. | |
240 | * Although the cube root of a 64 bit number does fit into a 32 bit unsigned | |
241 | * integer, this is not guaranteed after scaling, so this function has a | |
242 | * 64 bit return. This uses the shifting nth root algorithm with some | |
243 | * algebraic simplifications. | |
244 | */ | |
245 | static uint64_t icbrt64(uint64_t x) | |
246 | { | |
247 | uint64_t r = 0; | |
248 | uint64_t b; | |
249 | int s; | |
250 | ||
251 | for (s = 63; s >= 0; s -= 3) { | |
252 | r <<= 1; | |
253 | b = 3 * r * (r + 1) + 1; | |
254 | if ((x >> s) >= b) { | |
255 | x -= b << s; | |
256 | r++; | |
257 | } | |
258 | } | |
259 | return r * cbrt_scale; | |
260 | } | |
261 | ||
262 | /* | |
263 | * Calculate the natural logarithm of a 64 bit scaled integer. | |
264 | * This is done by calculating a base two logarithm and scaling. | |
265 | * The maximum logarithm (base 2) is 64 and this reduces base e, so | |
266 | * a 32 bit result should not overflow. The argument passed must be | |
267 | * greater than unity so we don't need to handle negative results. | |
268 | */ | |
269 | static uint32_t ilog_e(uint64_t v) | |
270 | { | |
271 | uint32_t i, r = 0; | |
272 | ||
273 | /* | |
274 | * Scale down the value into the range 1 .. 2. | |
275 | * | |
276 | * If fractional numbers need to be processed, another loop needs | |
277 | * to go here that checks v < scale and if so multiplies it by 2 and | |
278 | * reduces r by scale. This also means making r signed. | |
279 | */ | |
280 | while (v >= 2 * scale) { | |
281 | v >>= 1; | |
282 | r += scale; | |
283 | } | |
284 | for (i = scale / 2; i != 0; i /= 2) { | |
285 | v = mul2(v, v); | |
286 | if (v >= 2 * scale) { | |
287 | v >>= 1; | |
288 | r += i; | |
289 | } | |
290 | } | |
291 | r = (r * (uint64_t)scale) / log_e; | |
292 | return r; | |
293 | } | |
294 | ||
295 | /* | |
296 | * NIST SP 800-56B rev 2 Appendix D: Maximum Security Strength Estimates for IFC | |
297 | * Modulus Lengths. | |
298 | * | |
55f02cb6 SL |
299 | * Note that this formula is also referred to in SP800-56A rev3 Appendix D: |
300 | * for FFC safe prime groups for modp and ffdhe. | |
301 | * After Table 25 and Table 26 it refers to | |
302 | * "The maximum security strength estimates were calculated using the formula in | |
303 | * Section 7.5 of the FIPS 140 IG and rounded to the nearest multiple of eight | |
304 | * bits". | |
305 | * | |
306 | * The formula is: | |
307 | * | |
97b0b713 P |
308 | * E = \frac{1.923 \sqrt[3]{nBits \cdot log_e(2)} |
309 | * \cdot(log_e(nBits \cdot log_e(2))^{2/3} - 4.69}{log_e(2)} | |
310 | * The two cube roots are merged together here. | |
311 | */ | |
55f02cb6 | 312 | uint16_t ifc_ffc_compute_security_bits(int n) |
97b0b713 P |
313 | { |
314 | uint64_t x; | |
315 | uint32_t lx; | |
316 | uint16_t y; | |
317 | ||
318 | /* Look for common values as listed in SP 800-56B rev 2 Appendix D */ | |
319 | switch (n) { | |
320 | case 2048: | |
321 | return 112; | |
322 | case 3072: | |
323 | return 128; | |
324 | case 4096: | |
325 | return 152; | |
326 | case 6144: | |
327 | return 176; | |
328 | case 8192: | |
329 | return 200; | |
330 | } | |
331 | /* | |
332 | * The first incorrect result (i.e. not accurate or off by one low) occurs | |
333 | * for n = 699668. The true value here is 1200. Instead of using this n | |
334 | * as the check threshold, the smallest n such that the correct result is | |
335 | * 1200 is used instead. | |
336 | */ | |
337 | if (n >= 687737) | |
338 | return 1200; | |
339 | if (n < 8) | |
340 | return 0; | |
341 | ||
342 | x = n * (uint64_t)log_2; | |
343 | lx = ilog_e(x); | |
344 | y = (uint16_t)((mul2(c1_923, icbrt64(mul2(mul2(x, lx), lx))) - c4_690) | |
345 | / log_2); | |
346 | return (y + 4) & ~7; | |
347 | } | |
348 | ||
55f02cb6 SL |
349 | |
350 | ||
2514fa79 | 351 | int RSA_security_bits(const RSA *rsa) |
0f113f3e | 352 | { |
0122add6 AP |
353 | int bits = BN_num_bits(rsa->n); |
354 | ||
f844f9eb | 355 | #ifndef FIPS_MODULE |
0122add6 AP |
356 | if (rsa->version == RSA_ASN1_VERSION_MULTI) { |
357 | /* This ought to mean that we have private key at hand. */ | |
358 | int ex_primes = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_num(rsa->prime_infos); | |
359 | ||
360 | if (ex_primes <= 0 || (ex_primes + 2) > rsa_multip_cap(bits)) | |
361 | return 0; | |
362 | } | |
afb638f1 | 363 | #endif |
55f02cb6 | 364 | return ifc_ffc_compute_security_bits(bits); |
0f113f3e | 365 | } |
9862e9aa RL |
366 | |
367 | int RSA_set0_key(RSA *r, BIGNUM *n, BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *d) | |
368 | { | |
fd809cfd | 369 | /* If the fields n and e in r are NULL, the corresponding input |
1da12e34 RL |
370 | * parameters MUST be non-NULL for n and e. d may be |
371 | * left NULL (in case only the public key is used). | |
1da12e34 | 372 | */ |
b84e1226 MC |
373 | if ((r->n == NULL && n == NULL) |
374 | || (r->e == NULL && e == NULL)) | |
9862e9aa RL |
375 | return 0; |
376 | ||
1da12e34 RL |
377 | if (n != NULL) { |
378 | BN_free(r->n); | |
379 | r->n = n; | |
380 | } | |
381 | if (e != NULL) { | |
382 | BN_free(r->e); | |
383 | r->e = e; | |
384 | } | |
385 | if (d != NULL) { | |
c033101d | 386 | BN_clear_free(r->d); |
1da12e34 | 387 | r->d = d; |
311e903d | 388 | BN_set_flags(r->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); |
1da12e34 | 389 | } |
29be6023 | 390 | r->dirty_cnt++; |
9862e9aa RL |
391 | |
392 | return 1; | |
393 | } | |
394 | ||
395 | int RSA_set0_factors(RSA *r, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q) | |
396 | { | |
fd809cfd | 397 | /* If the fields p and q in r are NULL, the corresponding input |
1da12e34 | 398 | * parameters MUST be non-NULL. |
1da12e34 | 399 | */ |
b84e1226 MC |
400 | if ((r->p == NULL && p == NULL) |
401 | || (r->q == NULL && q == NULL)) | |
9862e9aa RL |
402 | return 0; |
403 | ||
1da12e34 | 404 | if (p != NULL) { |
c033101d | 405 | BN_clear_free(r->p); |
1da12e34 | 406 | r->p = p; |
311e903d | 407 | BN_set_flags(r->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); |
1da12e34 RL |
408 | } |
409 | if (q != NULL) { | |
c033101d | 410 | BN_clear_free(r->q); |
1da12e34 | 411 | r->q = q; |
311e903d | 412 | BN_set_flags(r->q, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); |
1da12e34 | 413 | } |
29be6023 | 414 | r->dirty_cnt++; |
9862e9aa RL |
415 | |
416 | return 1; | |
417 | } | |
418 | ||
419 | int RSA_set0_crt_params(RSA *r, BIGNUM *dmp1, BIGNUM *dmq1, BIGNUM *iqmp) | |
420 | { | |
fd809cfd | 421 | /* If the fields dmp1, dmq1 and iqmp in r are NULL, the corresponding input |
1da12e34 | 422 | * parameters MUST be non-NULL. |
1da12e34 | 423 | */ |
b84e1226 MC |
424 | if ((r->dmp1 == NULL && dmp1 == NULL) |
425 | || (r->dmq1 == NULL && dmq1 == NULL) | |
426 | || (r->iqmp == NULL && iqmp == NULL)) | |
9862e9aa RL |
427 | return 0; |
428 | ||
1da12e34 | 429 | if (dmp1 != NULL) { |
c033101d | 430 | BN_clear_free(r->dmp1); |
1da12e34 | 431 | r->dmp1 = dmp1; |
311e903d | 432 | BN_set_flags(r->dmp1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); |
1da12e34 RL |
433 | } |
434 | if (dmq1 != NULL) { | |
c033101d | 435 | BN_clear_free(r->dmq1); |
1da12e34 | 436 | r->dmq1 = dmq1; |
311e903d | 437 | BN_set_flags(r->dmq1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); |
1da12e34 RL |
438 | } |
439 | if (iqmp != NULL) { | |
c033101d | 440 | BN_clear_free(r->iqmp); |
1da12e34 | 441 | r->iqmp = iqmp; |
311e903d | 442 | BN_set_flags(r->iqmp, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); |
1da12e34 | 443 | } |
29be6023 | 444 | r->dirty_cnt++; |
9862e9aa RL |
445 | |
446 | return 1; | |
447 | } | |
448 | ||
f844f9eb | 449 | #ifndef FIPS_MODULE |
665d899f PY |
450 | /* |
451 | * Is it better to export RSA_PRIME_INFO structure | |
452 | * and related functions to let user pass a triplet? | |
453 | */ | |
454 | int RSA_set0_multi_prime_params(RSA *r, BIGNUM *primes[], BIGNUM *exps[], | |
455 | BIGNUM *coeffs[], int pnum) | |
456 | { | |
457 | STACK_OF(RSA_PRIME_INFO) *prime_infos, *old = NULL; | |
458 | RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo; | |
459 | int i; | |
460 | ||
461 | if (primes == NULL || exps == NULL || coeffs == NULL || pnum == 0) | |
462 | return 0; | |
463 | ||
464 | prime_infos = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_new_reserve(NULL, pnum); | |
465 | if (prime_infos == NULL) | |
466 | return 0; | |
467 | ||
468 | if (r->prime_infos != NULL) | |
469 | old = r->prime_infos; | |
470 | ||
471 | for (i = 0; i < pnum; i++) { | |
472 | pinfo = rsa_multip_info_new(); | |
473 | if (pinfo == NULL) | |
474 | goto err; | |
475 | if (primes[i] != NULL && exps[i] != NULL && coeffs[i] != NULL) { | |
d2baf88c CPG |
476 | BN_clear_free(pinfo->r); |
477 | BN_clear_free(pinfo->d); | |
478 | BN_clear_free(pinfo->t); | |
665d899f PY |
479 | pinfo->r = primes[i]; |
480 | pinfo->d = exps[i]; | |
481 | pinfo->t = coeffs[i]; | |
d2baf88c CPG |
482 | BN_set_flags(pinfo->r, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); |
483 | BN_set_flags(pinfo->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); | |
484 | BN_set_flags(pinfo->t, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); | |
665d899f PY |
485 | } else { |
486 | rsa_multip_info_free(pinfo); | |
487 | goto err; | |
488 | } | |
489 | (void)sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_push(prime_infos, pinfo); | |
490 | } | |
491 | ||
492 | r->prime_infos = prime_infos; | |
493 | ||
494 | if (!rsa_multip_calc_product(r)) { | |
495 | r->prime_infos = old; | |
496 | goto err; | |
497 | } | |
498 | ||
499 | if (old != NULL) { | |
500 | /* | |
501 | * This is hard to deal with, since the old infos could | |
502 | * also be set by this function and r, d, t should not | |
503 | * be freed in that case. So currently, stay consistent | |
504 | * with other *set0* functions: just free it... | |
505 | */ | |
506 | sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_pop_free(old, rsa_multip_info_free); | |
507 | } | |
508 | ||
509 | r->version = RSA_ASN1_VERSION_MULTI; | |
29be6023 | 510 | r->dirty_cnt++; |
665d899f PY |
511 | |
512 | return 1; | |
513 | err: | |
514 | /* r, d, t should not be freed */ | |
515 | sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_pop_free(prime_infos, rsa_multip_info_free_ex); | |
516 | return 0; | |
517 | } | |
afb638f1 | 518 | #endif |
665d899f | 519 | |
fd809cfd RL |
520 | void RSA_get0_key(const RSA *r, |
521 | const BIGNUM **n, const BIGNUM **e, const BIGNUM **d) | |
9862e9aa RL |
522 | { |
523 | if (n != NULL) | |
524 | *n = r->n; | |
525 | if (e != NULL) | |
526 | *e = r->e; | |
527 | if (d != NULL) | |
528 | *d = r->d; | |
529 | } | |
530 | ||
fd809cfd | 531 | void RSA_get0_factors(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q) |
9862e9aa RL |
532 | { |
533 | if (p != NULL) | |
534 | *p = r->p; | |
535 | if (q != NULL) | |
536 | *q = r->q; | |
537 | } | |
538 | ||
f844f9eb | 539 | #ifndef FIPS_MODULE |
665d899f PY |
540 | int RSA_get_multi_prime_extra_count(const RSA *r) |
541 | { | |
542 | int pnum; | |
543 | ||
544 | pnum = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_num(r->prime_infos); | |
545 | if (pnum <= 0) | |
546 | pnum = 0; | |
547 | return pnum; | |
548 | } | |
549 | ||
550 | int RSA_get0_multi_prime_factors(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM *primes[]) | |
551 | { | |
552 | int pnum, i; | |
553 | RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo; | |
554 | ||
555 | if ((pnum = RSA_get_multi_prime_extra_count(r)) == 0) | |
556 | return 0; | |
557 | ||
558 | /* | |
559 | * return other primes | |
560 | * it's caller's responsibility to allocate oth_primes[pnum] | |
561 | */ | |
562 | for (i = 0; i < pnum; i++) { | |
563 | pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(r->prime_infos, i); | |
564 | primes[i] = pinfo->r; | |
565 | } | |
566 | ||
567 | return 1; | |
568 | } | |
afb638f1 | 569 | #endif |
665d899f | 570 | |
9862e9aa | 571 | void RSA_get0_crt_params(const RSA *r, |
fd809cfd RL |
572 | const BIGNUM **dmp1, const BIGNUM **dmq1, |
573 | const BIGNUM **iqmp) | |
9862e9aa RL |
574 | { |
575 | if (dmp1 != NULL) | |
576 | *dmp1 = r->dmp1; | |
577 | if (dmq1 != NULL) | |
578 | *dmq1 = r->dmq1; | |
579 | if (iqmp != NULL) | |
580 | *iqmp = r->iqmp; | |
581 | } | |
582 | ||
f844f9eb | 583 | #ifndef FIPS_MODULE |
665d899f PY |
584 | int RSA_get0_multi_prime_crt_params(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM *exps[], |
585 | const BIGNUM *coeffs[]) | |
586 | { | |
587 | int pnum; | |
588 | ||
589 | if ((pnum = RSA_get_multi_prime_extra_count(r)) == 0) | |
590 | return 0; | |
591 | ||
592 | /* return other primes */ | |
593 | if (exps != NULL || coeffs != NULL) { | |
594 | RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo; | |
595 | int i; | |
596 | ||
597 | /* it's the user's job to guarantee the buffer length */ | |
598 | for (i = 0; i < pnum; i++) { | |
599 | pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(r->prime_infos, i); | |
600 | if (exps != NULL) | |
601 | exps[i] = pinfo->d; | |
602 | if (coeffs != NULL) | |
603 | coeffs[i] = pinfo->t; | |
604 | } | |
605 | } | |
606 | ||
607 | return 1; | |
608 | } | |
afb638f1 | 609 | #endif |
665d899f | 610 | |
6692ff77 DMSP |
611 | const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_n(const RSA *r) |
612 | { | |
613 | return r->n; | |
614 | } | |
615 | ||
616 | const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_e(const RSA *r) | |
617 | { | |
618 | return r->e; | |
619 | } | |
620 | ||
621 | const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_d(const RSA *r) | |
622 | { | |
623 | return r->d; | |
624 | } | |
625 | ||
626 | const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_p(const RSA *r) | |
627 | { | |
628 | return r->p; | |
629 | } | |
630 | ||
631 | const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_q(const RSA *r) | |
632 | { | |
633 | return r->q; | |
634 | } | |
635 | ||
636 | const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_dmp1(const RSA *r) | |
637 | { | |
638 | return r->dmp1; | |
639 | } | |
640 | ||
641 | const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_dmq1(const RSA *r) | |
642 | { | |
643 | return r->dmq1; | |
644 | } | |
645 | ||
646 | const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_iqmp(const RSA *r) | |
647 | { | |
648 | return r->iqmp; | |
649 | } | |
650 | ||
677add38 RL |
651 | const RSA_PSS_PARAMS *RSA_get0_pss_params(const RSA *r) |
652 | { | |
15671090 RL |
653 | #ifdef FIPS_MODULE |
654 | return NULL; | |
655 | #else | |
677add38 | 656 | return r->pss; |
15671090 RL |
657 | #endif |
658 | } | |
659 | ||
660 | /* Internal */ | |
23b2fc0b | 661 | RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 *ossl_rsa_get0_pss_params_30(RSA *r) |
15671090 RL |
662 | { |
663 | return &r->pss_params; | |
677add38 RL |
664 | } |
665 | ||
9862e9aa RL |
666 | void RSA_clear_flags(RSA *r, int flags) |
667 | { | |
668 | r->flags &= ~flags; | |
669 | } | |
670 | ||
671 | int RSA_test_flags(const RSA *r, int flags) | |
672 | { | |
673 | return r->flags & flags; | |
674 | } | |
675 | ||
676 | void RSA_set_flags(RSA *r, int flags) | |
677 | { | |
678 | r->flags |= flags; | |
679 | } | |
680 | ||
665d899f PY |
681 | int RSA_get_version(RSA *r) |
682 | { | |
683 | /* { two-prime(0), multi(1) } */ | |
684 | return r->version; | |
685 | } | |
686 | ||
f844f9eb | 687 | #ifndef FIPS_MODULE |
e0685d24 | 688 | ENGINE *RSA_get0_engine(const RSA *r) |
9862e9aa RL |
689 | { |
690 | return r->engine; | |
691 | } | |
e5e04ee3 DSH |
692 | |
693 | int RSA_pkey_ctx_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int optype, int cmd, int p1, void *p2) | |
694 | { | |
695 | /* If key type not RSA or RSA-PSS return error */ | |
696 | if (ctx != NULL && ctx->pmeth != NULL | |
697 | && ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA | |
698 | && ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) | |
699 | return -1; | |
700 | return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, -1, optype, cmd, p1, p2); | |
701 | } | |
afb638f1 | 702 | #endif |
c3a4fa4c RL |
703 | |
704 | DEFINE_STACK_OF(BIGNUM) | |
705 | ||
23b2fc0b P |
706 | int ossl_rsa_set0_all_params(RSA *r, const STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *primes, |
707 | const STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *exps, | |
708 | const STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *coeffs) | |
c3a4fa4c | 709 | { |
f844f9eb | 710 | #ifndef FIPS_MODULE |
c3a4fa4c | 711 | STACK_OF(RSA_PRIME_INFO) *prime_infos, *old_infos = NULL; |
afb638f1 | 712 | #endif |
c3a4fa4c RL |
713 | int pnum; |
714 | ||
715 | if (primes == NULL || exps == NULL || coeffs == NULL) | |
716 | return 0; | |
717 | ||
718 | pnum = sk_BIGNUM_num(primes); | |
719 | if (pnum < 2 | |
720 | || pnum != sk_BIGNUM_num(exps) | |
721 | || pnum != sk_BIGNUM_num(coeffs) + 1) | |
722 | return 0; | |
723 | ||
724 | if (!RSA_set0_factors(r, sk_BIGNUM_value(primes, 0), | |
725 | sk_BIGNUM_value(primes, 1)) | |
726 | || !RSA_set0_crt_params(r, sk_BIGNUM_value(exps, 0), | |
727 | sk_BIGNUM_value(exps, 1), | |
728 | sk_BIGNUM_value(coeffs, 0))) | |
729 | return 0; | |
730 | ||
f844f9eb | 731 | #ifndef FIPS_MODULE |
c3a4fa4c | 732 | old_infos = r->prime_infos; |
afb638f1 | 733 | #endif |
c3a4fa4c RL |
734 | |
735 | if (pnum > 2) { | |
f844f9eb | 736 | #ifndef FIPS_MODULE |
c3a4fa4c RL |
737 | int i; |
738 | ||
739 | prime_infos = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_new_reserve(NULL, pnum); | |
740 | if (prime_infos == NULL) | |
741 | return 0; | |
742 | ||
743 | for (i = 2; i < pnum; i++) { | |
744 | BIGNUM *prime = sk_BIGNUM_value(primes, i); | |
745 | BIGNUM *exp = sk_BIGNUM_value(exps, i); | |
746 | BIGNUM *coeff = sk_BIGNUM_value(coeffs, i - 1); | |
747 | RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo = NULL; | |
748 | ||
749 | if (!ossl_assert(prime != NULL && exp != NULL && coeff != NULL)) | |
750 | goto err; | |
751 | ||
752 | /* Using rsa_multip_info_new() is wasteful, so allocate directly */ | |
753 | if ((pinfo = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*pinfo))) == NULL) { | |
754 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
755 | goto err; | |
756 | } | |
757 | ||
758 | pinfo->r = prime; | |
759 | pinfo->d = exp; | |
760 | pinfo->t = coeff; | |
761 | BN_set_flags(pinfo->r, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); | |
762 | BN_set_flags(pinfo->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); | |
763 | BN_set_flags(pinfo->t, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); | |
764 | (void)sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_push(prime_infos, pinfo); | |
765 | } | |
766 | ||
767 | r->prime_infos = prime_infos; | |
768 | ||
769 | if (!rsa_multip_calc_product(r)) { | |
770 | r->prime_infos = old_infos; | |
771 | goto err; | |
772 | } | |
afb638f1 MC |
773 | #else |
774 | return 0; | |
775 | #endif | |
c3a4fa4c RL |
776 | } |
777 | ||
f844f9eb | 778 | #ifndef FIPS_MODULE |
c3a4fa4c RL |
779 | if (old_infos != NULL) { |
780 | /* | |
781 | * This is hard to deal with, since the old infos could | |
782 | * also be set by this function and r, d, t should not | |
783 | * be freed in that case. So currently, stay consistent | |
784 | * with other *set0* functions: just free it... | |
785 | */ | |
786 | sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_pop_free(old_infos, rsa_multip_info_free); | |
787 | } | |
afb638f1 | 788 | #endif |
c3a4fa4c RL |
789 | |
790 | r->version = pnum > 2 ? RSA_ASN1_VERSION_MULTI : RSA_ASN1_VERSION_DEFAULT; | |
791 | r->dirty_cnt++; | |
792 | ||
793 | return 1; | |
f844f9eb | 794 | #ifndef FIPS_MODULE |
c3a4fa4c RL |
795 | err: |
796 | /* r, d, t should not be freed */ | |
797 | sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_pop_free(prime_infos, rsa_multip_info_free_ex); | |
798 | return 0; | |
afb638f1 | 799 | #endif |
c3a4fa4c RL |
800 | } |
801 | ||
802 | DEFINE_SPECIAL_STACK_OF_CONST(BIGNUM_const, BIGNUM) | |
803 | ||
23b2fc0b P |
804 | int ossl_rsa_get0_all_params(RSA *r, STACK_OF(BIGNUM_const) *primes, |
805 | STACK_OF(BIGNUM_const) *exps, | |
806 | STACK_OF(BIGNUM_const) *coeffs) | |
c3a4fa4c | 807 | { |
f844f9eb | 808 | #ifndef FIPS_MODULE |
c3a4fa4c RL |
809 | RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo; |
810 | int i, pnum; | |
afb638f1 | 811 | #endif |
c3a4fa4c RL |
812 | |
813 | if (r == NULL) | |
814 | return 0; | |
815 | ||
a9127c1d RL |
816 | /* If |p| is NULL, there are no CRT parameters */ |
817 | if (RSA_get0_p(r) == NULL) | |
818 | return 1; | |
819 | ||
c3a4fa4c RL |
820 | sk_BIGNUM_const_push(primes, RSA_get0_p(r)); |
821 | sk_BIGNUM_const_push(primes, RSA_get0_q(r)); | |
822 | sk_BIGNUM_const_push(exps, RSA_get0_dmp1(r)); | |
823 | sk_BIGNUM_const_push(exps, RSA_get0_dmq1(r)); | |
824 | sk_BIGNUM_const_push(coeffs, RSA_get0_iqmp(r)); | |
afb638f1 | 825 | |
f844f9eb | 826 | #ifndef FIPS_MODULE |
afb638f1 | 827 | pnum = RSA_get_multi_prime_extra_count(r); |
c3a4fa4c RL |
828 | for (i = 0; i < pnum; i++) { |
829 | pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(r->prime_infos, i); | |
830 | sk_BIGNUM_const_push(primes, pinfo->r); | |
831 | sk_BIGNUM_const_push(exps, pinfo->d); | |
832 | sk_BIGNUM_const_push(coeffs, pinfo->t); | |
833 | } | |
afb638f1 | 834 | #endif |
c3a4fa4c RL |
835 | |
836 | return 1; | |
837 | } | |
89abd1b6 | 838 | |
f844f9eb | 839 | #ifndef FIPS_MODULE |
13f91a72 RL |
840 | /* Helpers to set or get diverse hash algorithm names */ |
841 | static int int_set_rsa_md_name(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, | |
842 | /* For checks */ | |
843 | int keytype, int optype, | |
844 | /* For EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params() */ | |
845 | const char *mdkey, const char *mdname, | |
846 | const char *propkey, const char *mdprops) | |
89abd1b6 | 847 | { |
13f91a72 | 848 | OSSL_PARAM params[3], *p = params; |
89abd1b6 | 849 | |
13f91a72 | 850 | if (ctx == NULL || mdname == NULL || (ctx->operation & optype) == 0) { |
89abd1b6 MC |
851 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED); |
852 | /* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */ | |
853 | return -2; | |
854 | } | |
855 | ||
13f91a72 RL |
856 | /* If key type not RSA return error */ |
857 | switch (keytype) { | |
858 | case -1: | |
859 | if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_is_a(ctx, "RSA") | |
860 | && !EVP_PKEY_CTX_is_a(ctx, "RSA-PSS")) | |
861 | return -1; | |
862 | break; | |
863 | default: | |
864 | if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_is_a(ctx, evp_pkey_type2name(keytype))) | |
865 | return -1; | |
866 | break; | |
867 | } | |
89abd1b6 | 868 | |
13f91a72 RL |
869 | /* Cast away the const. This is read only so should be safe */ |
870 | *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(mdkey, (char *)mdname, 0); | |
871 | if (evp_pkey_ctx_is_provided(ctx) && mdprops != NULL) { | |
872 | /* Cast away the const. This is read only so should be safe */ | |
873 | *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(propkey, (char *)mdprops, 0); | |
874 | } | |
89abd1b6 MC |
875 | *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end(); |
876 | ||
13f91a72 | 877 | return evp_pkey_ctx_set_params_strict(ctx, params); |
89abd1b6 MC |
878 | } |
879 | ||
13f91a72 RL |
880 | /* Helpers to set or get diverse hash algorithm names */ |
881 | static int int_get_rsa_md_name(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, | |
882 | /* For checks */ | |
883 | int keytype, int optype, | |
884 | /* For EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_params() */ | |
885 | const char *mdkey, | |
886 | char *mdname, size_t mdnamesize) | |
89abd1b6 | 887 | { |
13f91a72 | 888 | OSSL_PARAM params[2], *p = params; |
89abd1b6 | 889 | |
13f91a72 | 890 | if (ctx == NULL || mdname == NULL || (ctx->operation & optype) == 0) { |
89abd1b6 MC |
891 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED); |
892 | /* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */ | |
893 | return -2; | |
894 | } | |
895 | ||
13f91a72 RL |
896 | /* If key type not RSA return error */ |
897 | switch (keytype) { | |
898 | case -1: | |
899 | if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_is_a(ctx, "RSA") | |
900 | && !EVP_PKEY_CTX_is_a(ctx, "RSA-PSS")) | |
901 | return -1; | |
902 | break; | |
903 | default: | |
904 | if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_is_a(ctx, evp_pkey_type2name(keytype))) | |
905 | return -1; | |
906 | break; | |
907 | } | |
89abd1b6 | 908 | |
13f91a72 RL |
909 | /* Cast away the const. This is read only so should be safe */ |
910 | *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(mdkey, (char *)mdname, mdnamesize); | |
89abd1b6 MC |
911 | *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end(); |
912 | ||
13f91a72 RL |
913 | return evp_pkey_ctx_get_params_strict(ctx, params); |
914 | } | |
89abd1b6 | 915 | |
13f91a72 RL |
916 | /* |
917 | * This one is currently implemented as an EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl() wrapper, | |
918 | * simply because that's easier. | |
919 | * TODO(3.0) Should this be deprecated? | |
920 | */ | |
921 | int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int pad_mode) | |
922 | { | |
923 | return RSA_pkey_ctx_ctrl(ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PADDING, | |
924 | pad_mode, NULL); | |
925 | } | |
89abd1b6 | 926 | |
13f91a72 RL |
927 | /* |
928 | * This one is currently implemented as an EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl() wrapper, | |
929 | * simply because that's easier. | |
930 | * TODO(3.0) Should this be deprecated? | |
931 | */ | |
932 | int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_padding(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int *pad_mode) | |
933 | { | |
934 | return RSA_pkey_ctx_ctrl(ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PADDING, | |
935 | 0, pad_mode); | |
89abd1b6 MC |
936 | } |
937 | ||
13f91a72 RL |
938 | /* |
939 | * This one is currently implemented as an EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl() wrapper, | |
940 | * simply because that's easier. | |
941 | * TODO(3.0) Should this be deprecated in favor of passing a name? | |
942 | */ | |
e947a064 DB |
943 | int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_keygen_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md) |
944 | { | |
13f91a72 RL |
945 | return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN, |
946 | EVP_PKEY_CTRL_MD, 0, (void *)(md)); | |
e947a064 DB |
947 | } |
948 | ||
949 | int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_keygen_md_name(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, | |
950 | const char *mdname, | |
951 | const char *mdprops) | |
952 | { | |
13f91a72 RL |
953 | return int_set_rsa_md_name(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN, |
954 | OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_DIGEST, mdname, | |
955 | OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_DIGEST_PROPS, mdprops); | |
e947a064 DB |
956 | } |
957 | ||
13f91a72 RL |
958 | /* |
959 | * This one is currently implemented as an EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl() wrapper, | |
960 | * simply because that's easier. | |
961 | * TODO(3.0) Should this be deprecated in favor of passing a name? | |
962 | */ | |
89abd1b6 MC |
963 | int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_oaep_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md) |
964 | { | |
13f91a72 RL |
965 | return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT, |
966 | EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_MD, 0, (void *)(md)); | |
89abd1b6 MC |
967 | } |
968 | ||
969 | int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_oaep_md_name(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const char *mdname, | |
970 | const char *mdprops) | |
971 | { | |
13f91a72 RL |
972 | return |
973 | int_set_rsa_md_name(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT, | |
974 | OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_OAEP_DIGEST, mdname, | |
975 | OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_OAEP_DIGEST_PROPS, mdprops); | |
89abd1b6 MC |
976 | } |
977 | ||
978 | int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_oaep_md_name(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, char *name, | |
13f91a72 | 979 | size_t namesize) |
89abd1b6 | 980 | { |
13f91a72 RL |
981 | return int_get_rsa_md_name(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT, |
982 | OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_OAEP_DIGEST, | |
983 | name, namesize); | |
89abd1b6 MC |
984 | } |
985 | ||
13f91a72 RL |
986 | /* |
987 | * This one is currently implemented as an EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl() wrapper, | |
988 | * simply because that's easier. | |
989 | * TODO(3.0) Should this be deprecated in favor of getting a name? | |
990 | */ | |
89abd1b6 MC |
991 | int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_oaep_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD **md) |
992 | { | |
13f91a72 RL |
993 | return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT, |
994 | EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_OAEP_MD, 0, (void *)md); | |
89abd1b6 MC |
995 | } |
996 | ||
13f91a72 RL |
997 | /* |
998 | * This one is currently implemented as an EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl() wrapper, | |
999 | * simply because that's easier. | |
1000 | * TODO(3.0) Should this be deprecated in favor of passing a name? | |
1001 | */ | |
1002 | int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_mgf1_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md) | |
89abd1b6 | 1003 | { |
13f91a72 RL |
1004 | return RSA_pkey_ctx_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG | EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT, |
1005 | EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_MGF1_MD, 0, (void *)(md)); | |
89abd1b6 MC |
1006 | } |
1007 | ||
13f91a72 RL |
1008 | int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_mgf1_md_name(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const char *mdname, |
1009 | const char *mdprops) | |
e25761b1 | 1010 | { |
13f91a72 | 1011 | return int_set_rsa_md_name(ctx, -1, |
e25761b1 | 1012 | EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT | EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG, |
13f91a72 RL |
1013 | OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST, mdname, |
1014 | OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_MGF1_PROPERTIES, mdprops); | |
e25761b1 RL |
1015 | } |
1016 | ||
13f91a72 RL |
1017 | int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_mgf1_md_name(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, char *name, |
1018 | size_t namesize) | |
e25761b1 | 1019 | { |
13f91a72 | 1020 | return int_get_rsa_md_name(ctx, -1, |
e25761b1 | 1021 | EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT | EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG, |
13f91a72 | 1022 | OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST, name, namesize); |
e25761b1 RL |
1023 | } |
1024 | ||
13f91a72 RL |
1025 | /* |
1026 | * This one is currently implemented as an EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl() wrapper, | |
1027 | * simply because that's easier. | |
1028 | * TODO(3.0) Should this be deprecated in favor of passing a name? | |
1029 | */ | |
e25761b1 RL |
1030 | int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_keygen_mgf1_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md) |
1031 | { | |
13f91a72 RL |
1032 | return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN, |
1033 | EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_MGF1_MD, 0, (void *)(md)); | |
e25761b1 RL |
1034 | } |
1035 | ||
1036 | int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_keygen_mgf1_md_name(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, | |
1037 | const char *mdname) | |
1038 | { | |
13f91a72 RL |
1039 | return int_set_rsa_md_name(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN, |
1040 | OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST, mdname, | |
1041 | NULL, NULL); | |
89abd1b6 MC |
1042 | } |
1043 | ||
13f91a72 RL |
1044 | /* |
1045 | * This one is currently implemented as an EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl() wrapper, | |
1046 | * simply because that's easier. | |
1047 | * TODO(3.0) Should this be deprecated in favor of getting a name? | |
1048 | */ | |
89abd1b6 MC |
1049 | int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_mgf1_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD **md) |
1050 | { | |
13f91a72 RL |
1051 | return RSA_pkey_ctx_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG | EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT, |
1052 | EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_MGF1_MD, 0, (void *)(md)); | |
89abd1b6 MC |
1053 | } |
1054 | ||
1055 | int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_rsa_oaep_label(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, void *label, int llen) | |
1056 | { | |
1057 | OSSL_PARAM rsa_params[2], *p = rsa_params; | |
1058 | ||
1059 | if (ctx == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_ASYM_CIPHER_OP(ctx)) { | |
1060 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED); | |
1061 | /* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */ | |
1062 | return -2; | |
1063 | } | |
1064 | ||
1065 | /* If key type not RSA return error */ | |
13f91a72 | 1066 | if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_is_a(ctx, "RSA")) |
89abd1b6 MC |
1067 | return -1; |
1068 | ||
13f91a72 | 1069 | /* Cast away the const. This is read only so should be safe */ |
89abd1b6 | 1070 | *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_OAEP_LABEL, |
13f91a72 | 1071 | (void *)label, (size_t)llen); |
89abd1b6 MC |
1072 | *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end(); |
1073 | ||
13f91a72 | 1074 | if (!evp_pkey_ctx_set_params_strict(ctx, rsa_params)) |
89abd1b6 MC |
1075 | return 0; |
1076 | ||
da9988e0 | 1077 | /* Ownership is supposed to be transfered to the callee. */ |
89abd1b6 MC |
1078 | OPENSSL_free(label); |
1079 | return 1; | |
1080 | } | |
1081 | ||
1082 | int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_rsa_oaep_label(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char **label) | |
1083 | { | |
ba0a6d1d | 1084 | OSSL_PARAM rsa_params[2], *p = rsa_params; |
89abd1b6 MC |
1085 | size_t labellen; |
1086 | ||
1087 | if (ctx == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_ASYM_CIPHER_OP(ctx)) { | |
1088 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED); | |
1089 | /* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */ | |
1090 | return -2; | |
1091 | } | |
1092 | ||
1093 | /* If key type not RSA return error */ | |
13f91a72 | 1094 | if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_is_a(ctx, "RSA")) |
89abd1b6 MC |
1095 | return -1; |
1096 | ||
89abd1b6 MC |
1097 | *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_ptr(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_OAEP_LABEL, |
1098 | (void **)label, 0); | |
89abd1b6 MC |
1099 | *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end(); |
1100 | ||
1101 | if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_params(ctx, rsa_params)) | |
1102 | return -1; | |
1103 | ||
ba0a6d1d | 1104 | labellen = rsa_params[0].return_size; |
89abd1b6 MC |
1105 | if (labellen > INT_MAX) |
1106 | return -1; | |
1107 | ||
1108 | return (int)labellen; | |
1109 | } | |
6f4b7663 | 1110 | |
13f91a72 RL |
1111 | /* |
1112 | * This one is currently implemented as an EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl() wrapper, | |
1113 | * simply because that's easier. | |
1114 | */ | |
e25761b1 RL |
1115 | int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int saltlen) |
1116 | { | |
13f91a72 RL |
1117 | /* |
1118 | * For some reason, the optype was set to this: | |
1119 | * | |
1120 | * EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN|EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY | |
1121 | * | |
1122 | * However, we do use RSA-PSS with the whole gamut of diverse signature | |
1123 | * and verification operations, so the optype gets upgraded to this: | |
1124 | * | |
1125 | * EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG | |
1126 | */ | |
1127 | return RSA_pkey_ctx_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG, | |
1128 | EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN, saltlen, NULL); | |
e25761b1 RL |
1129 | } |
1130 | ||
13f91a72 RL |
1131 | /* |
1132 | * This one is currently implemented as an EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl() wrapper, | |
1133 | * simply because that's easier. | |
1134 | */ | |
1135 | int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_pss_saltlen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int *saltlen) | |
e25761b1 | 1136 | { |
13f91a72 RL |
1137 | /* |
1138 | * Because of circumstances, the optype is updated from: | |
1139 | * | |
1140 | * EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN|EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY | |
1141 | * | |
1142 | * to: | |
1143 | * | |
1144 | * EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG | |
1145 | */ | |
1146 | return RSA_pkey_ctx_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG, | |
1147 | EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN, 0, saltlen); | |
e25761b1 RL |
1148 | } |
1149 | ||
13f91a72 | 1150 | int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_keygen_saltlen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int saltlen) |
6f4b7663 RL |
1151 | { |
1152 | OSSL_PARAM pad_params[2], *p = pad_params; | |
1153 | ||
13f91a72 | 1154 | if (ctx == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_GEN_OP(ctx)) { |
6f4b7663 RL |
1155 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED); |
1156 | /* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */ | |
1157 | return -2; | |
1158 | } | |
1159 | ||
13f91a72 | 1160 | if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_is_a(ctx, "RSA-PSS")) |
6f4b7663 RL |
1161 | return -1; |
1162 | ||
13f91a72 RL |
1163 | *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN, |
1164 | &saltlen); | |
6f4b7663 RL |
1165 | *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end(); |
1166 | ||
13f91a72 | 1167 | return evp_pkey_ctx_set_params_strict(ctx, pad_params); |
6f4b7663 | 1168 | } |
2972af10 RL |
1169 | |
1170 | int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_bits(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int bits) | |
1171 | { | |
1172 | OSSL_PARAM params[2], *p = params; | |
1173 | size_t bits2 = bits; | |
1174 | ||
1175 | if (ctx == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_GEN_OP(ctx)) { | |
1176 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED); | |
1177 | /* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */ | |
1178 | return -2; | |
1179 | } | |
1180 | ||
1181 | /* If key type not RSA return error */ | |
13f91a72 RL |
1182 | if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_is_a(ctx, "RSA") |
1183 | && !EVP_PKEY_CTX_is_a(ctx, "RSA-PSS")) | |
2972af10 RL |
1184 | return -1; |
1185 | ||
2972af10 RL |
1186 | *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_BITS, &bits2); |
1187 | *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end(); | |
1188 | ||
13f91a72 | 1189 | return evp_pkey_ctx_set_params_strict(ctx, params); |
2972af10 RL |
1190 | } |
1191 | ||
13f91a72 | 1192 | int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_pubexp(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, BIGNUM *pubexp) |
2972af10 | 1193 | { |
13f91a72 | 1194 | int ret = RSA_pkey_ctx_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN, |
3786d748 | 1195 | EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_PUBEXP, 0, pubexp); |
3786d748 | 1196 | |
1197 | /* | |
1198 | * Satisfy memory semantics for pre-3.0 callers of | |
1199 | * EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_pubexp(): their expectation is that input | |
1200 | * pubexp BIGNUM becomes managed by the EVP_PKEY_CTX on success. | |
1201 | */ | |
13f91a72 RL |
1202 | if (ret > 0 && evp_pkey_ctx_is_provided(ctx)) { |
1203 | BN_free(ctx->rsa_pubexp); | |
3786d748 | 1204 | ctx->rsa_pubexp = pubexp; |
13f91a72 | 1205 | } |
3786d748 | 1206 | |
2972af10 RL |
1207 | return ret; |
1208 | } | |
1209 | ||
3786d748 | 1210 | int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_rsa_keygen_pubexp(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, BIGNUM *pubexp) |
1211 | { | |
13f91a72 RL |
1212 | int ret = 0; |
1213 | ||
1214 | /* | |
1215 | * When we're dealing with a provider, there's no need to duplicate | |
1216 | * pubexp, as it gets copied when transforming to an OSSL_PARAM anyway. | |
1217 | */ | |
1218 | if (evp_pkey_ctx_is_legacy(ctx)) | |
1219 | pubexp = BN_dup(pubexp); | |
1220 | ret = EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN, | |
1221 | EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_PUBEXP, 0, pubexp); | |
1222 | if (evp_pkey_ctx_is_legacy(ctx) && ret <= 0) | |
1223 | BN_free(pubexp); | |
1224 | return ret; | |
3786d748 | 1225 | } |
1226 | ||
2972af10 RL |
1227 | int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_primes(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int primes) |
1228 | { | |
1229 | OSSL_PARAM params[2], *p = params; | |
1230 | size_t primes2 = primes; | |
1231 | ||
1232 | if (ctx == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_GEN_OP(ctx)) { | |
1233 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED); | |
1234 | /* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */ | |
1235 | return -2; | |
1236 | } | |
1237 | ||
1238 | /* If key type not RSA return error */ | |
13f91a72 RL |
1239 | if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_is_a(ctx, "RSA") |
1240 | && !EVP_PKEY_CTX_is_a(ctx, "RSA-PSS")) | |
2972af10 RL |
1241 | return -1; |
1242 | ||
2972af10 RL |
1243 | *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_PRIMES, &primes2); |
1244 | *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end(); | |
1245 | ||
13f91a72 | 1246 | return evp_pkey_ctx_set_params_strict(ctx, params); |
2972af10 | 1247 | } |
afb638f1 | 1248 | #endif |