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Commit | Line | Data |
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b1322259 | 1 | /* |
7e06a675 | 2 | * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. |
d02b48c6 | 3 | * |
3e4b43b9 | 4 | * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use |
b1322259 RS |
5 | * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy |
6 | * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at | |
7 | * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html | |
d02b48c6 RE |
8 | */ |
9 | ||
10 | #include <stdio.h> | |
b39fc560 | 11 | #include "internal/cryptlib.h" |
ec577822 BM |
12 | #include <openssl/asn1.h> |
13 | #include <openssl/objects.h> | |
14 | #include <openssl/x509.h> | |
e947f396 | 15 | #include <openssl/x509v3.h> |
47b4ccea | 16 | #include <openssl/core_names.h> |
25f2138b | 17 | #include "crypto/x509.h" |
d02b48c6 | 18 | |
ccd86b68 | 19 | int X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) |
0f113f3e MC |
20 | { |
21 | int i; | |
5cf6abd8 | 22 | const X509_CINF *ai, *bi; |
0f113f3e | 23 | |
5cf6abd8 DSH |
24 | ai = &a->cert_info; |
25 | bi = &b->cert_info; | |
81e49438 | 26 | i = ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(&ai->serialNumber, &bi->serialNumber); |
0f113f3e | 27 | if (i) |
26a7d938 K |
28 | return i; |
29 | return X509_NAME_cmp(ai->issuer, bi->issuer); | |
0f113f3e | 30 | } |
d02b48c6 | 31 | |
cf1b7d96 | 32 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 |
6b691a5c | 33 | unsigned long X509_issuer_and_serial_hash(X509 *a) |
0f113f3e MC |
34 | { |
35 | unsigned long ret = 0; | |
bfb0641f | 36 | EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); |
0f113f3e MC |
37 | unsigned char md[16]; |
38 | char *f; | |
39 | ||
6e59a892 RL |
40 | if (ctx == NULL) |
41 | goto err; | |
5cf6abd8 | 42 | f = X509_NAME_oneline(a->cert_info.issuer, NULL, 0); |
6e59a892 | 43 | if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL)) |
0f113f3e | 44 | goto err; |
6e59a892 | 45 | if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, (unsigned char *)f, strlen(f))) |
0f113f3e MC |
46 | goto err; |
47 | OPENSSL_free(f); | |
48 | if (!EVP_DigestUpdate | |
6e59a892 | 49 | (ctx, (unsigned char *)a->cert_info.serialNumber.data, |
81e49438 | 50 | (unsigned long)a->cert_info.serialNumber.length)) |
0f113f3e | 51 | goto err; |
6e59a892 | 52 | if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, &(md[0]), NULL)) |
0f113f3e MC |
53 | goto err; |
54 | ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) | | |
55 | ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L) | |
56 | ) & 0xffffffffL; | |
57 | err: | |
bfb0641f | 58 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx); |
26a7d938 | 59 | return ret; |
0f113f3e | 60 | } |
d02b48c6 | 61 | #endif |
0f113f3e | 62 | |
ccd86b68 | 63 | int X509_issuer_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) |
0f113f3e | 64 | { |
26a7d938 | 65 | return X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info.issuer, b->cert_info.issuer); |
0f113f3e | 66 | } |
d02b48c6 | 67 | |
ccd86b68 | 68 | int X509_subject_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) |
0f113f3e | 69 | { |
26a7d938 | 70 | return X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info.subject, b->cert_info.subject); |
0f113f3e | 71 | } |
d02b48c6 | 72 | |
ccd86b68 | 73 | int X509_CRL_cmp(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b) |
0f113f3e | 74 | { |
26a7d938 | 75 | return X509_NAME_cmp(a->crl.issuer, b->crl.issuer); |
0f113f3e | 76 | } |
d02b48c6 | 77 | |
edc54021 | 78 | int X509_CRL_match(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b) |
0f113f3e MC |
79 | { |
80 | return memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, 20); | |
81 | } | |
edc54021 | 82 | |
1421aead | 83 | X509_NAME *X509_get_issuer_name(const X509 *a) |
0f113f3e | 84 | { |
26a7d938 | 85 | return a->cert_info.issuer; |
0f113f3e | 86 | } |
d02b48c6 | 87 | |
6b691a5c | 88 | unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash(X509 *x) |
0f113f3e | 89 | { |
26a7d938 | 90 | return X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info.issuer); |
0f113f3e | 91 | } |
d02b48c6 | 92 | |
0e0c6821 DSH |
93 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 |
94 | unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash_old(X509 *x) | |
0f113f3e | 95 | { |
26a7d938 | 96 | return X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info.issuer); |
0f113f3e | 97 | } |
0e0c6821 DSH |
98 | #endif |
99 | ||
1421aead | 100 | X509_NAME *X509_get_subject_name(const X509 *a) |
0f113f3e | 101 | { |
26a7d938 | 102 | return a->cert_info.subject; |
0f113f3e | 103 | } |
d02b48c6 | 104 | |
22293ea1 | 105 | ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get_serialNumber(X509 *a) |
0f113f3e | 106 | { |
81e49438 | 107 | return &a->cert_info.serialNumber; |
0f113f3e | 108 | } |
d02b48c6 | 109 | |
68c12bfc DSH |
110 | const ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get0_serialNumber(const X509 *a) |
111 | { | |
112 | return &a->cert_info.serialNumber; | |
113 | } | |
114 | ||
6b691a5c | 115 | unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash(X509 *x) |
0f113f3e | 116 | { |
26a7d938 | 117 | return X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info.subject); |
0f113f3e | 118 | } |
731d9c5f | 119 | |
0e0c6821 DSH |
120 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 |
121 | unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash_old(X509 *x) | |
0f113f3e | 122 | { |
26a7d938 | 123 | return X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info.subject); |
0f113f3e | 124 | } |
0e0c6821 DSH |
125 | #endif |
126 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
127 | /* |
128 | * Compare two certificates: they must be identical for this to work. NB: | |
129 | * Although "cmp" operations are generally prototyped to take "const" | |
130 | * arguments (eg. for use in STACKs), the way X509 handling is - these | |
131 | * operations may involve ensuring the hashes are up-to-date and ensuring | |
132 | * certain cert information is cached. So this is the point where the | |
133 | * "depth-first" constification tree has to halt with an evil cast. | |
e947f396 | 134 | */ |
ccd86b68 | 135 | int X509_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) |
e947f396 | 136 | { |
0f113f3e | 137 | int rv; |
7e06a675 | 138 | |
0f113f3e | 139 | /* ensure hash is valid */ |
7e06a675 BE |
140 | if (X509_check_purpose((X509 *)a, -1, 0) != 1) |
141 | return -2; | |
142 | if (X509_check_purpose((X509 *)b, -1, 0) != 1) | |
143 | return -2; | |
0f113f3e MC |
144 | |
145 | rv = memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH); | |
146 | if (rv) | |
147 | return rv; | |
148 | /* Check for match against stored encoding too */ | |
5cf6abd8 | 149 | if (!a->cert_info.enc.modified && !b->cert_info.enc.modified) { |
87a8405b DB |
150 | if (a->cert_info.enc.len < b->cert_info.enc.len) |
151 | return -1; | |
152 | if (a->cert_info.enc.len > b->cert_info.enc.len) | |
153 | return 1; | |
5cf6abd8 DSH |
154 | return memcmp(a->cert_info.enc.enc, b->cert_info.enc.enc, |
155 | a->cert_info.enc.len); | |
0f113f3e MC |
156 | } |
157 | return rv; | |
e947f396 | 158 | } |
d02b48c6 | 159 | |
450ea834 | 160 | int X509_NAME_cmp(const X509_NAME *a, const X509_NAME *b) |
0f113f3e MC |
161 | { |
162 | int ret; | |
c81a1509 | 163 | |
0f113f3e | 164 | /* Ensure canonical encoding is present and up to date */ |
c81a1509 | 165 | |
0f113f3e MC |
166 | if (!a->canon_enc || a->modified) { |
167 | ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)a, NULL); | |
168 | if (ret < 0) | |
169 | return -2; | |
170 | } | |
1862dae8 | 171 | |
0f113f3e MC |
172 | if (!b->canon_enc || b->modified) { |
173 | ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)b, NULL); | |
174 | if (ret < 0) | |
175 | return -2; | |
176 | } | |
1862dae8 | 177 | |
0f113f3e | 178 | ret = a->canon_enclen - b->canon_enclen; |
d02b48c6 | 179 | |
511190b6 | 180 | if (ret != 0 || a->canon_enclen == 0) |
0f113f3e | 181 | return ret; |
1862dae8 | 182 | |
0f113f3e | 183 | return memcmp(a->canon_enc, b->canon_enc, a->canon_enclen); |
d02b48c6 | 184 | |
0f113f3e | 185 | } |
d02b48c6 | 186 | |
8cc86b81 | 187 | unsigned long X509_NAME_hash(const X509_NAME *x) |
0f113f3e MC |
188 | { |
189 | unsigned long ret = 0; | |
190 | unsigned char md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; | |
191 | ||
192 | /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */ | |
193 | i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL); | |
194 | if (!EVP_Digest(x->canon_enc, x->canon_enclen, md, NULL, EVP_sha1(), | |
195 | NULL)) | |
196 | return 0; | |
197 | ||
198 | ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) | | |
199 | ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L) | |
200 | ) & 0xffffffffL; | |
26a7d938 | 201 | return ret; |
0f113f3e | 202 | } |
450ea834 | 203 | |
cf1b7d96 | 204 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 |
0f113f3e MC |
205 | /* |
206 | * I now DER encode the name and hash it. Since I cache the DER encoding, | |
207 | * this is reasonably efficient. | |
208 | */ | |
c2c99e28 | 209 | |
8cc86b81 | 210 | unsigned long X509_NAME_hash_old(const X509_NAME *x) |
0f113f3e | 211 | { |
47b4ccea | 212 | EVP_MD *md5 = EVP_MD_fetch(NULL, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MD5, "-fips"); |
bfb0641f | 213 | EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); |
0f113f3e MC |
214 | unsigned long ret = 0; |
215 | unsigned char md[16]; | |
216 | ||
47b4ccea RL |
217 | if (md5 == NULL || md_ctx == NULL) |
218 | goto end; | |
6e59a892 | 219 | |
0f113f3e MC |
220 | /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */ |
221 | i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL); | |
47b4ccea | 222 | if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(md_ctx, md5, NULL) |
6e59a892 RL |
223 | && EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, x->bytes->data, x->bytes->length) |
224 | && EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL)) | |
0f113f3e MC |
225 | ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) | |
226 | ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L) | |
227 | ) & 0xffffffffL; | |
47b4ccea RL |
228 | |
229 | end: | |
bfb0641f | 230 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); |
47b4ccea | 231 | EVP_MD_free(md5); |
0f113f3e | 232 | |
26a7d938 | 233 | return ret; |
0f113f3e | 234 | } |
d02b48c6 RE |
235 | #endif |
236 | ||
237 | /* Search a stack of X509 for a match */ | |
8cc86b81 DDO |
238 | X509 *X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, const X509_NAME *name, |
239 | const ASN1_INTEGER *serial) | |
0f113f3e MC |
240 | { |
241 | int i; | |
0f113f3e MC |
242 | X509 x, *x509 = NULL; |
243 | ||
244 | if (!sk) | |
245 | return NULL; | |
246 | ||
81e49438 | 247 | x.cert_info.serialNumber = *serial; |
8cc86b81 | 248 | x.cert_info.issuer = (X509_NAME *)name; /* won't modify it */ |
0f113f3e MC |
249 | |
250 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) { | |
251 | x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i); | |
252 | if (X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(x509, &x) == 0) | |
26a7d938 | 253 | return x509; |
0f113f3e | 254 | } |
26a7d938 | 255 | return NULL; |
0f113f3e | 256 | } |
d02b48c6 | 257 | |
8cc86b81 | 258 | X509 *X509_find_by_subject(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, const X509_NAME *name) |
0f113f3e MC |
259 | { |
260 | X509 *x509; | |
261 | int i; | |
262 | ||
263 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) { | |
264 | x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i); | |
265 | if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x509), name) == 0) | |
26a7d938 | 266 | return x509; |
0f113f3e | 267 | } |
26a7d938 | 268 | return NULL; |
0f113f3e | 269 | } |
d02b48c6 | 270 | |
fdaf7bee | 271 | EVP_PKEY *X509_get0_pubkey(const X509 *x) |
c01ff880 DSH |
272 | { |
273 | if (x == NULL) | |
274 | return NULL; | |
275 | return X509_PUBKEY_get0(x->cert_info.key); | |
276 | } | |
277 | ||
6b691a5c | 278 | EVP_PKEY *X509_get_pubkey(X509 *x) |
0f113f3e | 279 | { |
5cf6abd8 | 280 | if (x == NULL) |
c01ff880 DSH |
281 | return NULL; |
282 | return X509_PUBKEY_get(x->cert_info.key); | |
0f113f3e | 283 | } |
dfeab068 | 284 | |
fdaf7bee | 285 | int X509_check_private_key(const X509 *x, const EVP_PKEY *k) |
0f113f3e | 286 | { |
fdaf7bee | 287 | const EVP_PKEY *xk; |
0f113f3e MC |
288 | int ret; |
289 | ||
c01ff880 | 290 | xk = X509_get0_pubkey(x); |
0f113f3e MC |
291 | |
292 | if (xk) | |
293 | ret = EVP_PKEY_cmp(xk, k); | |
294 | else | |
295 | ret = -2; | |
296 | ||
297 | switch (ret) { | |
298 | case 1: | |
299 | break; | |
300 | case 0: | |
301 | X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_KEY_VALUES_MISMATCH); | |
302 | break; | |
303 | case -1: | |
304 | X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH); | |
305 | break; | |
306 | case -2: | |
307 | X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE); | |
308 | } | |
0f113f3e MC |
309 | if (ret > 0) |
310 | return 1; | |
311 | return 0; | |
312 | } | |
313 | ||
314 | /* | |
315 | * Check a suite B algorithm is permitted: pass in a public key and the NID | |
316 | * of its signature (or 0 if no signature). The pflags is a pointer to a | |
317 | * flags field which must contain the suite B verification flags. | |
3ad344a5 DSH |
318 | */ |
319 | ||
14536c8c DSH |
320 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
321 | ||
3ad344a5 | 322 | static int check_suite_b(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int sign_nid, unsigned long *pflags) |
0f113f3e MC |
323 | { |
324 | const EC_GROUP *grp = NULL; | |
325 | int curve_nid; | |
3aeb9348 DSH |
326 | if (pkey && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC) |
327 | grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey)); | |
0f113f3e MC |
328 | if (!grp) |
329 | return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_ALGORITHM; | |
330 | curve_nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp); | |
331 | /* Check curve is consistent with LOS */ | |
332 | if (curve_nid == NID_secp384r1) { /* P-384 */ | |
333 | /* | |
334 | * Check signature algorithm is consistent with curve. | |
335 | */ | |
336 | if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384) | |
337 | return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM; | |
338 | if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS)) | |
339 | return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED; | |
340 | /* If we encounter P-384 we cannot use P-256 later */ | |
341 | *pflags &= ~X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY; | |
342 | } else if (curve_nid == NID_X9_62_prime256v1) { /* P-256 */ | |
343 | if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256) | |
344 | return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM; | |
345 | if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY)) | |
346 | return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED; | |
347 | } else | |
348 | return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_CURVE; | |
349 | ||
350 | return X509_V_OK; | |
351 | } | |
3ad344a5 | 352 | |
3b0648eb | 353 | int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, |
0f113f3e MC |
354 | unsigned long flags) |
355 | { | |
356 | int rv, i, sign_nid; | |
6e328256 VD |
357 | EVP_PKEY *pk; |
358 | unsigned long tflags = flags; | |
359 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
360 | if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS)) |
361 | return X509_V_OK; | |
6e328256 | 362 | |
0f113f3e MC |
363 | /* If no EE certificate passed in must be first in chain */ |
364 | if (x == NULL) { | |
365 | x = sk_X509_value(chain, 0); | |
366 | i = 1; | |
367 | } else | |
368 | i = 0; | |
369 | ||
6e328256 VD |
370 | pk = X509_get0_pubkey(x); |
371 | ||
372 | /* | |
373 | * With DANE-EE(3) success, or DANE-EE(3)/PKIX-EE(1) failure we don't build | |
374 | * a chain all, just report trust success or failure, but must also report | |
375 | * Suite-B errors if applicable. This is indicated via a NULL chain | |
376 | * pointer. All we need to do is check the leaf key algorithm. | |
377 | */ | |
378 | if (chain == NULL) | |
379 | return check_suite_b(pk, -1, &tflags); | |
380 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
381 | if (X509_get_version(x) != 2) { |
382 | rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION; | |
383 | /* Correct error depth */ | |
384 | i = 0; | |
385 | goto end; | |
386 | } | |
387 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
388 | /* Check EE key only */ |
389 | rv = check_suite_b(pk, -1, &tflags); | |
390 | if (rv != X509_V_OK) { | |
391 | /* Correct error depth */ | |
392 | i = 0; | |
393 | goto end; | |
394 | } | |
395 | for (; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) { | |
396 | sign_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x); | |
397 | x = sk_X509_value(chain, i); | |
398 | if (X509_get_version(x) != 2) { | |
399 | rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION; | |
400 | goto end; | |
401 | } | |
8382fd3a | 402 | pk = X509_get0_pubkey(x); |
0f113f3e MC |
403 | rv = check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &tflags); |
404 | if (rv != X509_V_OK) | |
405 | goto end; | |
406 | } | |
407 | ||
408 | /* Final check: root CA signature */ | |
409 | rv = check_suite_b(pk, X509_get_signature_nid(x), &tflags); | |
410 | end: | |
0f113f3e MC |
411 | if (rv != X509_V_OK) { |
412 | /* Invalid signature or LOS errors are for previous cert */ | |
413 | if ((rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM | |
414 | || rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED) && i) | |
415 | i--; | |
416 | /* | |
417 | * If we have LOS error and flags changed then we are signing P-384 | |
0d4fb843 | 418 | * with P-256. Use more meaningful error. |
0f113f3e MC |
419 | */ |
420 | if (rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED && flags != tflags) | |
421 | rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_CANNOT_SIGN_P_384_WITH_P_256; | |
422 | if (perror_depth) | |
423 | *perror_depth = i; | |
424 | } | |
425 | return rv; | |
426 | } | |
3ad344a5 | 427 | |
3b0648eb | 428 | int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned long flags) |
0f113f3e MC |
429 | { |
430 | int sign_nid; | |
431 | if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS)) | |
432 | return X509_V_OK; | |
6e63c142 | 433 | sign_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(crl->crl.sig_alg.algorithm); |
0f113f3e MC |
434 | return check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &flags); |
435 | } | |
14536c8c DSH |
436 | |
437 | #else | |
438 | int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, | |
0f113f3e MC |
439 | unsigned long flags) |
440 | { | |
441 | return 0; | |
442 | } | |
14536c8c DSH |
443 | |
444 | int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned long flags) | |
0f113f3e MC |
445 | { |
446 | return 0; | |
447 | } | |
14536c8c DSH |
448 | |
449 | #endif | |
0f113f3e MC |
450 | /* |
451 | * Not strictly speaking an "up_ref" as a STACK doesn't have a reference | |
452 | * count but it has the same effect by duping the STACK and upping the ref of | |
453 | * each X509 structure. | |
3b0648eb DSH |
454 | */ |
455 | STACK_OF(X509) *X509_chain_up_ref(STACK_OF(X509) *chain) | |
0f113f3e MC |
456 | { |
457 | STACK_OF(X509) *ret; | |
458 | int i; | |
459 | ret = sk_X509_dup(chain); | |
cae665df BE |
460 | if (ret == NULL) |
461 | return NULL; | |
0f113f3e MC |
462 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ret); i++) { |
463 | X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ret, i); | |
cae665df BE |
464 | if (!X509_up_ref(x)) |
465 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e MC |
466 | } |
467 | return ret; | |
cae665df BE |
468 | err: |
469 | while (i-- > 0) | |
470 | X509_free (sk_X509_value(ret, i)); | |
471 | sk_X509_free(ret); | |
472 | return NULL; | |
0f113f3e | 473 | } |