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Commit | Line | Data |
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b1322259 | 1 | /* |
ba4356ae | 2 | * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. |
d02b48c6 | 3 | * |
b1322259 RS |
4 | * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use |
5 | * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy | |
6 | * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at | |
7 | * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html | |
d02b48c6 RE |
8 | */ |
9 | ||
10 | #include <stdio.h> | |
b39fc560 | 11 | #include "internal/cryptlib.h" |
ec577822 BM |
12 | #include <openssl/asn1.h> |
13 | #include <openssl/objects.h> | |
14 | #include <openssl/x509.h> | |
e947f396 | 15 | #include <openssl/x509v3.h> |
0c994d54 | 16 | #include "crypto/x509.h" |
d02b48c6 | 17 | |
ccd86b68 | 18 | int X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) |
0f113f3e MC |
19 | { |
20 | int i; | |
5cf6abd8 | 21 | const X509_CINF *ai, *bi; |
0f113f3e | 22 | |
5cf6abd8 DSH |
23 | ai = &a->cert_info; |
24 | bi = &b->cert_info; | |
81e49438 | 25 | i = ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(&ai->serialNumber, &bi->serialNumber); |
0f113f3e | 26 | if (i) |
26a7d938 K |
27 | return i; |
28 | return X509_NAME_cmp(ai->issuer, bi->issuer); | |
0f113f3e | 29 | } |
d02b48c6 | 30 | |
cf1b7d96 | 31 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 |
6b691a5c | 32 | unsigned long X509_issuer_and_serial_hash(X509 *a) |
0f113f3e MC |
33 | { |
34 | unsigned long ret = 0; | |
bfb0641f | 35 | EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); |
0f113f3e MC |
36 | unsigned char md[16]; |
37 | char *f; | |
38 | ||
6e59a892 RL |
39 | if (ctx == NULL) |
40 | goto err; | |
5cf6abd8 | 41 | f = X509_NAME_oneline(a->cert_info.issuer, NULL, 0); |
6e59a892 | 42 | if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL)) |
0f113f3e | 43 | goto err; |
6e59a892 | 44 | if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, (unsigned char *)f, strlen(f))) |
0f113f3e MC |
45 | goto err; |
46 | OPENSSL_free(f); | |
47 | if (!EVP_DigestUpdate | |
6e59a892 | 48 | (ctx, (unsigned char *)a->cert_info.serialNumber.data, |
81e49438 | 49 | (unsigned long)a->cert_info.serialNumber.length)) |
0f113f3e | 50 | goto err; |
6e59a892 | 51 | if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, &(md[0]), NULL)) |
0f113f3e MC |
52 | goto err; |
53 | ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) | | |
54 | ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L) | |
55 | ) & 0xffffffffL; | |
56 | err: | |
bfb0641f | 57 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx); |
26a7d938 | 58 | return ret; |
0f113f3e | 59 | } |
d02b48c6 | 60 | #endif |
0f113f3e | 61 | |
ccd86b68 | 62 | int X509_issuer_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) |
0f113f3e | 63 | { |
26a7d938 | 64 | return X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info.issuer, b->cert_info.issuer); |
0f113f3e | 65 | } |
d02b48c6 | 66 | |
ccd86b68 | 67 | int X509_subject_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) |
0f113f3e | 68 | { |
26a7d938 | 69 | return X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info.subject, b->cert_info.subject); |
0f113f3e | 70 | } |
d02b48c6 | 71 | |
ccd86b68 | 72 | int X509_CRL_cmp(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b) |
0f113f3e | 73 | { |
26a7d938 | 74 | return X509_NAME_cmp(a->crl.issuer, b->crl.issuer); |
0f113f3e | 75 | } |
d02b48c6 | 76 | |
edc54021 | 77 | int X509_CRL_match(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b) |
0f113f3e MC |
78 | { |
79 | return memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, 20); | |
80 | } | |
edc54021 | 81 | |
1421aead | 82 | X509_NAME *X509_get_issuer_name(const X509 *a) |
0f113f3e | 83 | { |
26a7d938 | 84 | return a->cert_info.issuer; |
0f113f3e | 85 | } |
d02b48c6 | 86 | |
6b691a5c | 87 | unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash(X509 *x) |
0f113f3e | 88 | { |
26a7d938 | 89 | return X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info.issuer); |
0f113f3e | 90 | } |
d02b48c6 | 91 | |
0e0c6821 DSH |
92 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 |
93 | unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash_old(X509 *x) | |
0f113f3e | 94 | { |
26a7d938 | 95 | return X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info.issuer); |
0f113f3e | 96 | } |
0e0c6821 DSH |
97 | #endif |
98 | ||
1421aead | 99 | X509_NAME *X509_get_subject_name(const X509 *a) |
0f113f3e | 100 | { |
26a7d938 | 101 | return a->cert_info.subject; |
0f113f3e | 102 | } |
d02b48c6 | 103 | |
22293ea1 | 104 | ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get_serialNumber(X509 *a) |
0f113f3e | 105 | { |
81e49438 | 106 | return &a->cert_info.serialNumber; |
0f113f3e | 107 | } |
d02b48c6 | 108 | |
68c12bfc DSH |
109 | const ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get0_serialNumber(const X509 *a) |
110 | { | |
111 | return &a->cert_info.serialNumber; | |
112 | } | |
113 | ||
6b691a5c | 114 | unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash(X509 *x) |
0f113f3e | 115 | { |
26a7d938 | 116 | return X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info.subject); |
0f113f3e | 117 | } |
731d9c5f | 118 | |
0e0c6821 DSH |
119 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 |
120 | unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash_old(X509 *x) | |
0f113f3e | 121 | { |
26a7d938 | 122 | return X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info.subject); |
0f113f3e | 123 | } |
0e0c6821 DSH |
124 | #endif |
125 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
126 | /* |
127 | * Compare two certificates: they must be identical for this to work. NB: | |
128 | * Although "cmp" operations are generally prototyped to take "const" | |
129 | * arguments (eg. for use in STACKs), the way X509 handling is - these | |
130 | * operations may involve ensuring the hashes are up-to-date and ensuring | |
131 | * certain cert information is cached. So this is the point where the | |
132 | * "depth-first" constification tree has to halt with an evil cast. | |
e947f396 | 133 | */ |
ccd86b68 | 134 | int X509_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) |
e947f396 | 135 | { |
0f113f3e | 136 | int rv; |
ba4356ae | 137 | |
0f113f3e | 138 | /* ensure hash is valid */ |
ba4356ae BE |
139 | if (X509_check_purpose((X509 *)a, -1, 0) != 1) |
140 | return -2; | |
141 | if (X509_check_purpose((X509 *)b, -1, 0) != 1) | |
142 | return -2; | |
0f113f3e MC |
143 | |
144 | rv = memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH); | |
145 | if (rv) | |
146 | return rv; | |
147 | /* Check for match against stored encoding too */ | |
5cf6abd8 | 148 | if (!a->cert_info.enc.modified && !b->cert_info.enc.modified) { |
87a8405b DB |
149 | if (a->cert_info.enc.len < b->cert_info.enc.len) |
150 | return -1; | |
151 | if (a->cert_info.enc.len > b->cert_info.enc.len) | |
152 | return 1; | |
5cf6abd8 DSH |
153 | return memcmp(a->cert_info.enc.enc, b->cert_info.enc.enc, |
154 | a->cert_info.enc.len); | |
0f113f3e MC |
155 | } |
156 | return rv; | |
e947f396 | 157 | } |
d02b48c6 | 158 | |
450ea834 | 159 | int X509_NAME_cmp(const X509_NAME *a, const X509_NAME *b) |
0f113f3e MC |
160 | { |
161 | int ret; | |
c81a1509 | 162 | |
0f113f3e | 163 | /* Ensure canonical encoding is present and up to date */ |
c81a1509 | 164 | |
0f113f3e MC |
165 | if (!a->canon_enc || a->modified) { |
166 | ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)a, NULL); | |
167 | if (ret < 0) | |
168 | return -2; | |
169 | } | |
1862dae8 | 170 | |
0f113f3e MC |
171 | if (!b->canon_enc || b->modified) { |
172 | ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)b, NULL); | |
173 | if (ret < 0) | |
174 | return -2; | |
175 | } | |
1862dae8 | 176 | |
0f113f3e | 177 | ret = a->canon_enclen - b->canon_enclen; |
d02b48c6 | 178 | |
511190b6 | 179 | if (ret != 0 || a->canon_enclen == 0) |
0f113f3e | 180 | return ret; |
1862dae8 | 181 | |
0f113f3e | 182 | return memcmp(a->canon_enc, b->canon_enc, a->canon_enclen); |
d02b48c6 | 183 | |
0f113f3e | 184 | } |
d02b48c6 | 185 | |
c2c99e28 | 186 | unsigned long X509_NAME_hash(X509_NAME *x) |
0f113f3e MC |
187 | { |
188 | unsigned long ret = 0; | |
189 | unsigned char md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; | |
190 | ||
191 | /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */ | |
192 | i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL); | |
193 | if (!EVP_Digest(x->canon_enc, x->canon_enclen, md, NULL, EVP_sha1(), | |
194 | NULL)) | |
195 | return 0; | |
196 | ||
197 | ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) | | |
198 | ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L) | |
199 | ) & 0xffffffffL; | |
26a7d938 | 200 | return ret; |
0f113f3e | 201 | } |
450ea834 | 202 | |
cf1b7d96 | 203 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 |
0f113f3e MC |
204 | /* |
205 | * I now DER encode the name and hash it. Since I cache the DER encoding, | |
206 | * this is reasonably efficient. | |
207 | */ | |
c2c99e28 DSH |
208 | |
209 | unsigned long X509_NAME_hash_old(X509_NAME *x) | |
0f113f3e | 210 | { |
bfb0641f | 211 | EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); |
0f113f3e MC |
212 | unsigned long ret = 0; |
213 | unsigned char md[16]; | |
214 | ||
6e59a892 RL |
215 | if (md_ctx == NULL) |
216 | return ret; | |
217 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
218 | /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */ |
219 | i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL); | |
6e59a892 RL |
220 | EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW); |
221 | if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(md_ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL) | |
222 | && EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, x->bytes->data, x->bytes->length) | |
223 | && EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL)) | |
0f113f3e MC |
224 | ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) | |
225 | ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L) | |
226 | ) & 0xffffffffL; | |
bfb0641f | 227 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); |
0f113f3e | 228 | |
26a7d938 | 229 | return ret; |
0f113f3e | 230 | } |
d02b48c6 RE |
231 | #endif |
232 | ||
233 | /* Search a stack of X509 for a match */ | |
6b691a5c | 234 | X509 *X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name, |
0f113f3e MC |
235 | ASN1_INTEGER *serial) |
236 | { | |
237 | int i; | |
0f113f3e MC |
238 | X509 x, *x509 = NULL; |
239 | ||
240 | if (!sk) | |
241 | return NULL; | |
242 | ||
81e49438 | 243 | x.cert_info.serialNumber = *serial; |
5cf6abd8 | 244 | x.cert_info.issuer = name; |
0f113f3e MC |
245 | |
246 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) { | |
247 | x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i); | |
248 | if (X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(x509, &x) == 0) | |
26a7d938 | 249 | return x509; |
0f113f3e | 250 | } |
26a7d938 | 251 | return NULL; |
0f113f3e | 252 | } |
d02b48c6 | 253 | |
6b691a5c | 254 | X509 *X509_find_by_subject(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name) |
0f113f3e MC |
255 | { |
256 | X509 *x509; | |
257 | int i; | |
258 | ||
259 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) { | |
260 | x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i); | |
261 | if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x509), name) == 0) | |
26a7d938 | 262 | return x509; |
0f113f3e | 263 | } |
26a7d938 | 264 | return NULL; |
0f113f3e | 265 | } |
d02b48c6 | 266 | |
fdaf7bee | 267 | EVP_PKEY *X509_get0_pubkey(const X509 *x) |
c01ff880 DSH |
268 | { |
269 | if (x == NULL) | |
270 | return NULL; | |
271 | return X509_PUBKEY_get0(x->cert_info.key); | |
272 | } | |
273 | ||
6b691a5c | 274 | EVP_PKEY *X509_get_pubkey(X509 *x) |
0f113f3e | 275 | { |
5cf6abd8 | 276 | if (x == NULL) |
c01ff880 DSH |
277 | return NULL; |
278 | return X509_PUBKEY_get(x->cert_info.key); | |
0f113f3e | 279 | } |
dfeab068 | 280 | |
fdaf7bee | 281 | int X509_check_private_key(const X509 *x, const EVP_PKEY *k) |
0f113f3e | 282 | { |
fdaf7bee | 283 | const EVP_PKEY *xk; |
0f113f3e MC |
284 | int ret; |
285 | ||
c01ff880 | 286 | xk = X509_get0_pubkey(x); |
0f113f3e MC |
287 | |
288 | if (xk) | |
289 | ret = EVP_PKEY_cmp(xk, k); | |
290 | else | |
291 | ret = -2; | |
292 | ||
293 | switch (ret) { | |
294 | case 1: | |
295 | break; | |
296 | case 0: | |
297 | X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_KEY_VALUES_MISMATCH); | |
298 | break; | |
299 | case -1: | |
300 | X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH); | |
301 | break; | |
302 | case -2: | |
303 | X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE); | |
304 | } | |
0f113f3e MC |
305 | if (ret > 0) |
306 | return 1; | |
307 | return 0; | |
308 | } | |
309 | ||
310 | /* | |
311 | * Check a suite B algorithm is permitted: pass in a public key and the NID | |
312 | * of its signature (or 0 if no signature). The pflags is a pointer to a | |
313 | * flags field which must contain the suite B verification flags. | |
3ad344a5 DSH |
314 | */ |
315 | ||
14536c8c DSH |
316 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
317 | ||
3ad344a5 | 318 | static int check_suite_b(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int sign_nid, unsigned long *pflags) |
0f113f3e MC |
319 | { |
320 | const EC_GROUP *grp = NULL; | |
321 | int curve_nid; | |
3aeb9348 DSH |
322 | if (pkey && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC) |
323 | grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey)); | |
0f113f3e MC |
324 | if (!grp) |
325 | return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_ALGORITHM; | |
326 | curve_nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp); | |
327 | /* Check curve is consistent with LOS */ | |
328 | if (curve_nid == NID_secp384r1) { /* P-384 */ | |
329 | /* | |
330 | * Check signature algorithm is consistent with curve. | |
331 | */ | |
332 | if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384) | |
333 | return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM; | |
334 | if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS)) | |
335 | return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED; | |
336 | /* If we encounter P-384 we cannot use P-256 later */ | |
337 | *pflags &= ~X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY; | |
338 | } else if (curve_nid == NID_X9_62_prime256v1) { /* P-256 */ | |
339 | if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256) | |
340 | return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM; | |
341 | if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY)) | |
342 | return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED; | |
343 | } else | |
344 | return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_CURVE; | |
345 | ||
346 | return X509_V_OK; | |
347 | } | |
3ad344a5 | 348 | |
3b0648eb | 349 | int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, |
0f113f3e MC |
350 | unsigned long flags) |
351 | { | |
352 | int rv, i, sign_nid; | |
6e328256 VD |
353 | EVP_PKEY *pk; |
354 | unsigned long tflags = flags; | |
355 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
356 | if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS)) |
357 | return X509_V_OK; | |
6e328256 | 358 | |
0f113f3e MC |
359 | /* If no EE certificate passed in must be first in chain */ |
360 | if (x == NULL) { | |
361 | x = sk_X509_value(chain, 0); | |
362 | i = 1; | |
363 | } else | |
364 | i = 0; | |
365 | ||
6e328256 VD |
366 | pk = X509_get0_pubkey(x); |
367 | ||
368 | /* | |
369 | * With DANE-EE(3) success, or DANE-EE(3)/PKIX-EE(1) failure we don't build | |
370 | * a chain all, just report trust success or failure, but must also report | |
371 | * Suite-B errors if applicable. This is indicated via a NULL chain | |
372 | * pointer. All we need to do is check the leaf key algorithm. | |
373 | */ | |
374 | if (chain == NULL) | |
375 | return check_suite_b(pk, -1, &tflags); | |
376 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
377 | if (X509_get_version(x) != 2) { |
378 | rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION; | |
379 | /* Correct error depth */ | |
380 | i = 0; | |
381 | goto end; | |
382 | } | |
383 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
384 | /* Check EE key only */ |
385 | rv = check_suite_b(pk, -1, &tflags); | |
386 | if (rv != X509_V_OK) { | |
387 | /* Correct error depth */ | |
388 | i = 0; | |
389 | goto end; | |
390 | } | |
391 | for (; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) { | |
392 | sign_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x); | |
393 | x = sk_X509_value(chain, i); | |
394 | if (X509_get_version(x) != 2) { | |
395 | rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION; | |
396 | goto end; | |
397 | } | |
8382fd3a | 398 | pk = X509_get0_pubkey(x); |
0f113f3e MC |
399 | rv = check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &tflags); |
400 | if (rv != X509_V_OK) | |
401 | goto end; | |
402 | } | |
403 | ||
404 | /* Final check: root CA signature */ | |
405 | rv = check_suite_b(pk, X509_get_signature_nid(x), &tflags); | |
406 | end: | |
0f113f3e MC |
407 | if (rv != X509_V_OK) { |
408 | /* Invalid signature or LOS errors are for previous cert */ | |
409 | if ((rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM | |
410 | || rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED) && i) | |
411 | i--; | |
412 | /* | |
413 | * If we have LOS error and flags changed then we are signing P-384 | |
0d4fb843 | 414 | * with P-256. Use more meaningful error. |
0f113f3e MC |
415 | */ |
416 | if (rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED && flags != tflags) | |
417 | rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_CANNOT_SIGN_P_384_WITH_P_256; | |
418 | if (perror_depth) | |
419 | *perror_depth = i; | |
420 | } | |
421 | return rv; | |
422 | } | |
3ad344a5 | 423 | |
3b0648eb | 424 | int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned long flags) |
0f113f3e MC |
425 | { |
426 | int sign_nid; | |
427 | if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS)) | |
428 | return X509_V_OK; | |
6e63c142 | 429 | sign_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(crl->crl.sig_alg.algorithm); |
0f113f3e MC |
430 | return check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &flags); |
431 | } | |
14536c8c DSH |
432 | |
433 | #else | |
434 | int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, | |
0f113f3e MC |
435 | unsigned long flags) |
436 | { | |
437 | return 0; | |
438 | } | |
14536c8c DSH |
439 | |
440 | int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned long flags) | |
0f113f3e MC |
441 | { |
442 | return 0; | |
443 | } | |
14536c8c DSH |
444 | |
445 | #endif | |
0f113f3e MC |
446 | /* |
447 | * Not strictly speaking an "up_ref" as a STACK doesn't have a reference | |
448 | * count but it has the same effect by duping the STACK and upping the ref of | |
449 | * each X509 structure. | |
3b0648eb DSH |
450 | */ |
451 | STACK_OF(X509) *X509_chain_up_ref(STACK_OF(X509) *chain) | |
0f113f3e MC |
452 | { |
453 | STACK_OF(X509) *ret; | |
454 | int i; | |
455 | ret = sk_X509_dup(chain); | |
2403153c BE |
456 | if (ret == NULL) |
457 | return NULL; | |
0f113f3e MC |
458 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ret); i++) { |
459 | X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ret, i); | |
2403153c BE |
460 | if (!X509_up_ref(x)) |
461 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e MC |
462 | } |
463 | return ret; | |
2403153c BE |
464 | err: |
465 | while (i-- > 0) | |
466 | X509_free (sk_X509_value(ret, i)); | |
467 | sk_X509_free(ret); | |
468 | return NULL; | |
0f113f3e | 469 | } |