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b1322259 | 1 | /* |
4333b89f | 2 | * Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. |
d02b48c6 | 3 | * |
3e4b43b9 | 4 | * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use |
b1322259 RS |
5 | * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy |
6 | * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at | |
7 | * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html | |
d02b48c6 RE |
8 | */ |
9 | ||
5b5eea4b SL |
10 | #include "internal/deprecated.h" |
11 | ||
d02b48c6 RE |
12 | #include <stdio.h> |
13 | #include <time.h> | |
14 | #include <errno.h> | |
d9b8b89b | 15 | #include <limits.h> |
d02b48c6 | 16 | |
25f2138b | 17 | #include "crypto/ctype.h" |
b39fc560 | 18 | #include "internal/cryptlib.h" |
17f389bb | 19 | #include <openssl/crypto.h> |
ec577822 BM |
20 | #include <openssl/buffer.h> |
21 | #include <openssl/evp.h> | |
22 | #include <openssl/asn1.h> | |
23 | #include <openssl/x509.h> | |
11262391 | 24 | #include <openssl/x509v3.h> |
ec577822 | 25 | #include <openssl/objects.h> |
3bcc933e | 26 | #include <openssl/core_names.h> |
176db6dc | 27 | #include "internal/dane.h" |
25f2138b | 28 | #include "crypto/x509.h" |
706457b7 | 29 | #include "x509_local.h" |
d02b48c6 | 30 | |
d43c4497 DSH |
31 | /* CRL score values */ |
32 | ||
88444854 DDO |
33 | #define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100 /* No unhandled critical extensions */ |
34 | #define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080 /* certificate is within CRL scope */ | |
35 | #define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040 /* CRL times valid */ | |
36 | #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020 /* Issuer name matches certificate */ | |
37 | #define CRL_SCORE_VALID /* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */ \ | |
38 | (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL | CRL_SCORE_TIME | CRL_SCORE_SCOPE) | |
39 | #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018 /* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */ | |
40 | #define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008 /* CRL issuer is on certificate path */ | |
41 | #define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004 /* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */ | |
42 | #define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002 /* Have a delta CRL with valid times */ | |
d43c4497 | 43 | |
d9b8b89b VD |
44 | static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
45 | static int verify_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); | |
170b7358 | 46 | static int dane_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
0f113f3e | 47 | static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e); |
2f043896 DSH |
48 | static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer); |
49 | static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x); | |
4ef70dbc | 50 | static int check_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
e9746e03 | 51 | static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
3bf15e29 | 52 | static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
d9b8b89b | 53 | static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int num_untrusted); |
b545dc67 DSH |
54 | static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
55 | static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); | |
5d7c222d | 56 | static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
c9a81b30 | 57 | static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x); |
170b7358 | 58 | static int check_dane_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth); |
fbb82a60 VD |
59 | static int check_key_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert); |
60 | static int check_sig_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert); | |
cccf532f | 61 | static int check_curve(X509 *cert); |
4b96839f DSH |
62 | |
63 | static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer, | |
0f113f3e | 64 | unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x); |
d43c4497 | 65 | static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, |
0f113f3e MC |
66 | X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x); |
67 | static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, | |
68 | int *pcrl_score, X509_CRL *base, | |
69 | STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls); | |
70 | static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 **pissuer, | |
71 | int *pcrl_score); | |
4b96839f | 72 | static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score, |
0f113f3e | 73 | unsigned int *preasons); |
9d84d4ed DSH |
74 | static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x); |
75 | static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, | |
0f113f3e MC |
76 | STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path, |
77 | STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path); | |
4b96839f | 78 | |
d02b48c6 | 79 | static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
d02b48c6 | 80 | |
6b691a5c | 81 | static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e) |
0f113f3e MC |
82 | { |
83 | return ok; | |
84 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 85 | |
0d8dbb52 | 86 | /*- |
ade08735 | 87 | * Return 1 if given cert is considered self-signed, 0 if not, or -1 on error. |
0d8dbb52 | 88 | * This actually verifies self-signedness only if requested. |
4669015d | 89 | * It calls ossl_x509v3_cache_extensions() |
0d8dbb52 DDO |
90 | * to match issuer and subject names (i.e., the cert being self-issued) and any |
91 | * present authority key identifier to match the subject key identifier, etc. | |
ade08735 | 92 | */ |
6725682d | 93 | int X509_self_signed(X509 *cert, int verify_signature) |
0f113f3e | 94 | { |
0d8dbb52 | 95 | EVP_PKEY *pkey; |
0c56a648 | 96 | |
0d8dbb52 | 97 | if ((pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(cert)) == NULL) { /* handles cert == NULL */ |
9311d0c4 | 98 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY); |
0d8dbb52 DDO |
99 | return -1; |
100 | } | |
4669015d | 101 | if (!ossl_x509v3_cache_extensions(cert)) |
0d8dbb52 DDO |
102 | return -1; |
103 | if ((cert->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS) == 0) | |
0f113f3e | 104 | return 0; |
0d8dbb52 DDO |
105 | if (!verify_signature) |
106 | return 1; | |
6725682d | 107 | return X509_verify(cert, pkey); |
0d8dbb52 | 108 | } |
2dabd822 | 109 | |
7e365d51 DDO |
110 | /* |
111 | * Given a certificate, try and find an exact match in the store. | |
112 | * Returns 1 on success, 0 on not found, -1 on internal error. | |
113 | */ | |
114 | static int lookup_cert_match(X509 **result, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) | |
0f113f3e MC |
115 | { |
116 | STACK_OF(X509) *certs; | |
117 | X509 *xtmp = NULL; | |
7e365d51 | 118 | int i, ret; |
88444854 | 119 | |
7e365d51 | 120 | *result = NULL; |
0f113f3e | 121 | /* Lookup all certs with matching subject name */ |
bf973d06 | 122 | ERR_set_mark(); |
0f113f3e | 123 | certs = ctx->lookup_certs(ctx, X509_get_subject_name(x)); |
bf973d06 | 124 | ERR_pop_to_mark(); |
0f113f3e | 125 | if (certs == NULL) |
7e365d51 | 126 | return -1; |
0f113f3e MC |
127 | /* Look for exact match */ |
128 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) { | |
129 | xtmp = sk_X509_value(certs, i); | |
579262af | 130 | if (X509_cmp(xtmp, x) == 0) |
0f113f3e | 131 | break; |
e9e7b5df | 132 | xtmp = NULL; |
0f113f3e | 133 | } |
7e365d51 DDO |
134 | ret = xtmp != NULL; |
135 | if (ret) { | |
136 | if (!X509_up_ref(xtmp)) | |
137 | ret = -1; | |
138 | else | |
139 | *result = xtmp; | |
140 | } | |
0f113f3e | 141 | sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free); |
7e365d51 | 142 | return ret; |
0f113f3e | 143 | } |
2dabd822 | 144 | |
70dd3c65 VD |
145 | /*- |
146 | * Inform the verify callback of an error. | |
d1e85cdf DDO |
147 | * The error code is set to |err| if |err| is not X509_V_OK, else |
148 | * |ctx->error| is left unchanged (under the assumption it is set elsewhere). | |
149 | * The error depth is |depth| if >= 0, else it defaults to |ctx->error_depth|. | |
150 | * The error cert is |x| if not NULL, else defaults to the chain cert at depth. | |
70dd3c65 VD |
151 | * |
152 | * Returns 0 to abort verification with an error, non-zero to continue. | |
153 | */ | |
154 | static int verify_cb_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int depth, int err) | |
155 | { | |
d1e85cdf DDO |
156 | if (depth < 0) |
157 | depth = ctx->error_depth; | |
158 | else | |
159 | ctx->error_depth = depth; | |
70dd3c65 VD |
160 | ctx->current_cert = (x != NULL) ? x : sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, depth); |
161 | if (err != X509_V_OK) | |
162 | ctx->error = err; | |
163 | return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
164 | } | |
165 | ||
07b6068d DDO |
166 | #define CB_FAIL_IF(cond, ctx, cert, depth, err) \ |
167 | if ((cond) && verify_cb_cert(ctx, cert, depth, err) == 0) \ | |
6e5e118c DO |
168 | return 0 |
169 | ||
70dd3c65 VD |
170 | /*- |
171 | * Inform the verify callback of an error, CRL-specific variant. Here, the | |
172 | * error depth and certificate are already set, we just specify the error | |
173 | * number. | |
174 | * | |
175 | * Returns 0 to abort verification with an error, non-zero to continue. | |
176 | */ | |
177 | static int verify_cb_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err) | |
178 | { | |
179 | ctx->error = err; | |
180 | return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
181 | } | |
182 | ||
fbb82a60 VD |
183 | static int check_auth_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
184 | { | |
185 | int i; | |
186 | int num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); | |
187 | ||
188 | if (ctx->param->auth_level <= 0) | |
189 | return 1; | |
190 | ||
191 | for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) { | |
192 | X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); | |
193 | ||
194 | /* | |
195 | * We've already checked the security of the leaf key, so here we only | |
196 | * check the security of issuer keys. | |
197 | */ | |
07b6068d DDO |
198 | CB_FAIL_IF(i > 0 && !check_key_level(ctx, cert), |
199 | ctx, cert, i, X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL); | |
fbb82a60 VD |
200 | /* |
201 | * We also check the signature algorithm security of all certificates | |
202 | * except those of the trust anchor at index num-1. | |
203 | */ | |
07b6068d DDO |
204 | CB_FAIL_IF(i < num - 1 && !check_sig_level(ctx, cert), |
205 | ctx, cert, i, X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK); | |
fbb82a60 VD |
206 | } |
207 | return 1; | |
208 | } | |
209 | ||
7e365d51 | 210 | /* Returns -1 on internal error */ |
d9b8b89b VD |
211 | static int verify_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
212 | { | |
d9b8b89b VD |
213 | int err; |
214 | int ok; | |
215 | ||
364246a9 | 216 | if ((ok = build_chain(ctx)) <= 0 |
4ef70dbc | 217 | || (ok = check_extensions(ctx)) <= 0 |
364246a9 DDO |
218 | || (ok = check_auth_level(ctx)) <= 0 |
219 | || (ok = check_id(ctx)) <= 0 | |
220 | || (ok = X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain) ? 1 : -1) <= 0 | |
221 | || (ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx)) <= 0) | |
222 | return ok; | |
d9b8b89b VD |
223 | |
224 | err = X509_chain_check_suiteb(&ctx->error_depth, NULL, ctx->chain, | |
225 | ctx->param->flags); | |
07b6068d | 226 | CB_FAIL_IF(err != X509_V_OK, ctx, NULL, ctx->error_depth, err); |
d9b8b89b VD |
227 | |
228 | /* Verify chain signatures and expiration times */ | |
88444854 | 229 | ok = ctx->verify != NULL ? ctx->verify(ctx) : internal_verify(ctx); |
7e365d51 DDO |
230 | if (ok <= 0) |
231 | return ok; | |
d9b8b89b | 232 | |
7e365d51 DDO |
233 | if ((ok = check_name_constraints(ctx)) <= 0) |
234 | return ok; | |
8545051c | 235 | |
d9b8b89b VD |
236 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 |
237 | /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */ | |
7e365d51 DDO |
238 | if ((ok = X509v3_asid_validate_path(ctx)) <= 0) |
239 | return ok; | |
240 | if ((ok = X509v3_addr_validate_path(ctx)) <= 0) | |
241 | return ok; | |
d9b8b89b VD |
242 | #endif |
243 | ||
244 | /* If we get this far evaluate policies */ | |
579262af | 245 | if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK) != 0) |
d9b8b89b VD |
246 | ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx); |
247 | return ok; | |
248 | } | |
249 | ||
11ddbf84 DDO |
250 | int X509_STORE_CTX_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
251 | { | |
252 | if (ctx == NULL) { | |
253 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); | |
254 | return -1; | |
255 | } | |
256 | if (ctx->cert == NULL && sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted) >= 1) | |
257 | ctx->cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, 0); | |
258 | return X509_verify_cert(ctx); | |
259 | } | |
260 | ||
6b691a5c | 261 | int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e | 262 | { |
f3e235ed | 263 | int ret; |
d9b8b89b | 264 | |
11ddbf84 DDO |
265 | if (ctx == NULL) { |
266 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); | |
267 | return -1; | |
268 | } | |
0f113f3e | 269 | if (ctx->cert == NULL) { |
9311d0c4 | 270 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY); |
f3e235ed | 271 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL; |
0f113f3e MC |
272 | return -1; |
273 | } | |
d9b8b89b | 274 | |
aae41f8c MC |
275 | if (ctx->chain != NULL) { |
276 | /* | |
277 | * This X509_STORE_CTX has already been used to verify a cert. We | |
278 | * cannot do another one. | |
279 | */ | |
9311d0c4 | 280 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); |
f3e235ed | 281 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL; |
aae41f8c MC |
282 | return -1; |
283 | } | |
0f113f3e | 284 | |
c1be4d61 | 285 | if (!ossl_x509_add_cert_new(&ctx->chain, ctx->cert, X509_ADD_FLAG_UP_REF)) { |
f3e235ed | 286 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; |
d9b8b89b | 287 | return -1; |
0f113f3e | 288 | } |
d9b8b89b | 289 | ctx->num_untrusted = 1; |
5d7c222d | 290 | |
fbb82a60 | 291 | /* If the peer's public key is too weak, we can stop early. */ |
07b6068d DDO |
292 | CB_FAIL_IF(!check_key_level(ctx, ctx->cert), |
293 | ctx, ctx->cert, 0, X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL); | |
fbb82a60 | 294 | |
11ddbf84 | 295 | ret = DANETLS_ENABLED(ctx->dane) ? dane_verify(ctx) : verify_chain(ctx); |
f3e235ed | 296 | |
170b7358 | 297 | /* |
f3e235ed VD |
298 | * Safety-net. If we are returning an error, we must also set ctx->error, |
299 | * so that the chain is not considered verified should the error be ignored | |
300 | * (e.g. TLS with SSL_VERIFY_NONE). | |
170b7358 | 301 | */ |
f3e235ed VD |
302 | if (ret <= 0 && ctx->error == X509_V_OK) |
303 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED; | |
304 | return ret; | |
0f113f3e MC |
305 | } |
306 | ||
3bed88a3 DDO |
307 | static int sk_X509_contains(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *cert) |
308 | { | |
309 | int i, n = sk_X509_num(sk); | |
310 | ||
311 | for (i = 0; i < n; i++) | |
312 | if (X509_cmp(sk_X509_value(sk, i), cert) == 0) | |
313 | return 1; | |
314 | return 0; | |
315 | } | |
316 | ||
0f113f3e | 317 | /* |
c476c06f DDO |
318 | * Find in given STACK_OF(X509) |sk| an issuer cert (if any) of given cert |x|. |
319 | * The issuer must not yet be in |ctx->chain|, yet allowing the exception that | |
320 | * |x| is self-issued and |ctx->chain| has just one element. | |
321 | * Prefer the first non-expired one, else take the most recently expired one. | |
2f043896 | 322 | */ |
2f043896 DSH |
323 | static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x) |
324 | { | |
0f113f3e | 325 | int i; |
c53f7355 | 326 | X509 *issuer, *rv = NULL; |
fbb82a60 | 327 | |
0f113f3e | 328 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) { |
c53f7355 | 329 | issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i); |
4dd00918 | 330 | if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer) |
3bed88a3 DDO |
331 | && (((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) != 0 && sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1) |
332 | || !sk_X509_contains(ctx->chain, issuer))) { | |
4669015d | 333 | if (ossl_x509_check_cert_time(ctx, issuer, -1)) |
4dd00918 | 334 | return issuer; |
c476c06f DDO |
335 | if (rv == NULL || ASN1_TIME_compare(X509_get0_notAfter(issuer), |
336 | X509_get0_notAfter(rv)) > 0) | |
337 | rv = issuer; | |
c53f7355 | 338 | } |
0f113f3e | 339 | } |
c53f7355 | 340 | return rv; |
2f043896 DSH |
341 | } |
342 | ||
3bed88a3 DDO |
343 | /* Check that the given certificate 'x' is issued by the certificate 'issuer' */ |
344 | static int check_issued(ossl_unused X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer) | |
2f043896 | 345 | { |
4669015d | 346 | int err = ossl_x509_likely_issued(issuer, x); |
d1e85cdf DDO |
347 | |
348 | if (err == X509_V_OK) | |
349 | return 1; | |
350 | /* | |
351 | * SUBJECT_ISSUER_MISMATCH just means 'x' is clearly not issued by 'issuer'. | |
352 | * Every other error code likely indicates a real error. | |
353 | */ | |
354 | if (err != X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_ISSUER_MISMATCH) | |
355 | ctx->error = err; | |
0b3139e8 | 356 | return 0; |
2f043896 DSH |
357 | } |
358 | ||
7e365d51 DDO |
359 | /* |
360 | * Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx. | |
361 | * Returns -1 on internal error. | |
362 | */ | |
2f043896 DSH |
363 | static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) |
364 | { | |
0f113f3e | 365 | *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x); |
7e365d51 DDO |
366 | if (*issuer != NULL) |
367 | return X509_up_ref(*issuer) ? 1 : -1; | |
e9e7b5df | 368 | return 0; |
2f043896 | 369 | } |
2f043896 | 370 | |
7e365d51 | 371 | /* Returns NULL on internal error (such as out of memory) */ |
8cc86b81 DDO |
372 | static STACK_OF(X509) *lookup_certs_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, |
373 | const X509_NAME *nm) | |
c864e761 | 374 | { |
7e365d51 | 375 | STACK_OF(X509) *sk = sk_X509_new_null(); |
c864e761 DSH |
376 | X509 *x; |
377 | int i; | |
7fcdbd83 | 378 | |
7e365d51 DDO |
379 | if (sk == NULL) |
380 | return NULL; | |
c864e761 DSH |
381 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->other_ctx); i++) { |
382 | x = sk_X509_value(ctx->other_ctx, i); | |
383 | if (X509_NAME_cmp(nm, X509_get_subject_name(x)) == 0) { | |
7e365d51 | 384 | if (!X509_add_cert(sk, x, X509_ADD_FLAG_UP_REF)) { |
bbc3c22c | 385 | sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free); |
7fcdbd83 | 386 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; |
c864e761 DSH |
387 | return NULL; |
388 | } | |
c864e761 DSH |
389 | } |
390 | } | |
391 | return sk; | |
392 | } | |
393 | ||
0daccd4d VD |
394 | /* |
395 | * Check EE or CA certificate purpose. For trusted certificates explicit local | |
396 | * auxiliary trust can be used to override EKU-restrictions. | |
7e365d51 | 397 | * Sadly, returns 0 also on internal error. |
0daccd4d VD |
398 | */ |
399 | static int check_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int purpose, int depth, | |
400 | int must_be_ca) | |
401 | { | |
0daccd4d VD |
402 | int tr_ok = X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; |
403 | ||
404 | /* | |
405 | * For trusted certificates we want to see whether any auxiliary trust | |
33cc5dde | 406 | * settings trump the purpose constraints. |
0daccd4d VD |
407 | * |
408 | * This is complicated by the fact that the trust ordinals in | |
409 | * ctx->param->trust are entirely independent of the purpose ordinals in | |
410 | * ctx->param->purpose! | |
411 | * | |
412 | * What connects them is their mutual initialization via calls from | |
413 | * X509_STORE_CTX_set_default() into X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup() which sets | |
414 | * related values of both param->trust and param->purpose. It is however | |
415 | * typically possible to infer associated trust values from a purpose value | |
416 | * via the X509_PURPOSE API. | |
417 | * | |
418 | * Therefore, we can only check for trust overrides when the purpose we're | |
419 | * checking is the same as ctx->param->purpose and ctx->param->trust is | |
33cc5dde | 420 | * also set. |
0daccd4d VD |
421 | */ |
422 | if (depth >= ctx->num_untrusted && purpose == ctx->param->purpose) | |
423 | tr_ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, X509_TRUST_NO_SS_COMPAT); | |
424 | ||
33cc5dde VD |
425 | switch (tr_ok) { |
426 | case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED: | |
0daccd4d | 427 | return 1; |
33cc5dde VD |
428 | case X509_TRUST_REJECTED: |
429 | break; | |
430 | default: | |
431 | switch (X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca > 0)) { | |
432 | case 1: | |
433 | return 1; | |
434 | case 0: | |
435 | break; | |
436 | default: | |
437 | if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) == 0) | |
438 | return 1; | |
439 | } | |
440 | break; | |
441 | } | |
0daccd4d | 442 | |
70dd3c65 | 443 | return verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, depth, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE); |
0daccd4d VD |
444 | } |
445 | ||
7e365d51 DDO |
446 | /* |
447 | * Check extensions of a cert chain for consistency with the supplied purpose. | |
448 | * Sadly, returns 0 also on internal error. | |
449 | */ | |
4ef70dbc | 450 | static int check_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
11262391 | 451 | { |
0daccd4d | 452 | int i, must_be_ca, plen = 0; |
0f113f3e | 453 | X509 *x; |
88444854 DDO |
454 | int ret, proxy_path_length = 0; |
455 | int purpose, allow_proxy_certs, num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); | |
0f113f3e | 456 | |
35a1cc90 MC |
457 | /*- |
458 | * must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values: | |
459 | * -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct | |
460 | * use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA). | |
461 | * 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not | |
462 | * used, but the possibility is present for future extensions. | |
463 | * 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for | |
464 | * all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate. | |
465 | */ | |
0f113f3e MC |
466 | must_be_ca = -1; |
467 | ||
468 | /* CRL path validation */ | |
88444854 | 469 | if (ctx->parent != NULL) { |
0f113f3e MC |
470 | allow_proxy_certs = 0; |
471 | purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN; | |
472 | } else { | |
473 | allow_proxy_certs = | |
88444854 | 474 | (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS) != 0; |
0f113f3e MC |
475 | purpose = ctx->param->purpose; |
476 | } | |
477 | ||
0daccd4d | 478 | for (i = 0; i < num; i++) { |
0f113f3e | 479 | x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); |
07b6068d DDO |
480 | CB_FAIL_IF((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL) == 0 |
481 | && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL) != 0, | |
482 | ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION); | |
88444854 | 483 | CB_FAIL_IF(!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) != 0, |
07b6068d | 484 | ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED); |
0f113f3e MC |
485 | ret = X509_check_ca(x); |
486 | switch (must_be_ca) { | |
487 | case -1: | |
07b6068d DDO |
488 | CB_FAIL_IF((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) != 0 |
489 | && ret != 1 && ret != 0, | |
490 | ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA); | |
0f113f3e MC |
491 | break; |
492 | case 0: | |
07b6068d | 493 | CB_FAIL_IF(ret != 0, ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA); |
0f113f3e MC |
494 | break; |
495 | default: | |
4d9e33ac | 496 | /* X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT is implicit for intermediate CAs */ |
07b6068d DDO |
497 | CB_FAIL_IF(ret == 0 |
498 | || ((i + 1 < num | |
88444854 | 499 | || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) != 0) |
07b6068d | 500 | && ret != 1), ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA); |
0f113f3e MC |
501 | break; |
502 | } | |
cccf532f TM |
503 | if (num > 1) { |
504 | /* Check for presence of explicit elliptic curve parameters */ | |
505 | ret = check_curve(x); | |
07b6068d DDO |
506 | CB_FAIL_IF(ret < 0, ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED); |
507 | CB_FAIL_IF(ret == 0, ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_EC_KEY_EXPLICIT_PARAMS); | |
cccf532f | 508 | } |
d72c8b45 | 509 | /* |
e99505b4 | 510 | * Do the following set of checks only if strict checking is requested |
d72c8b45 DDO |
511 | * and not for self-issued (including self-signed) EE (non-CA) certs |
512 | * because RFC 5280 does not apply to them according RFC 6818 section 2. | |
513 | */ | |
514 | if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) != 0 | |
e41a2c4c DDO |
515 | && num > 1) { /* |
516 | * this should imply | |
517 | * !(i == 0 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) == 0 | |
518 | * && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) != 0) | |
519 | */ | |
1e41dadf DDO |
520 | /* Check Basic Constraints according to RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.9 */ |
521 | if (x->ex_pathlen != -1) { | |
07b6068d DDO |
522 | CB_FAIL_IF((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) == 0, |
523 | ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_PATHLEN_INVALID_FOR_NON_CA); | |
524 | CB_FAIL_IF((x->ex_kusage & KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN) == 0, ctx, | |
525 | x, i, X509_V_ERR_PATHLEN_WITHOUT_KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN); | |
1e41dadf | 526 | } |
07b6068d DDO |
527 | CB_FAIL_IF((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) != 0 |
528 | && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_BCONS) != 0 | |
529 | && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_BCONS_CRITICAL) == 0, | |
530 | ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_CA_BCONS_NOT_CRITICAL); | |
d72c8b45 | 531 | /* Check Key Usage according to RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.3 */ |
bb377c8d | 532 | if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) != 0) { |
07b6068d DDO |
533 | CB_FAIL_IF((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) == 0, |
534 | ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_CA_CERT_MISSING_KEY_USAGE); | |
bb377c8d | 535 | } else { |
07b6068d DDO |
536 | CB_FAIL_IF((x->ex_kusage & KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN) != 0, ctx, x, i, |
537 | X509_V_ERR_KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN_INVALID_FOR_NON_CA); | |
bb377c8d | 538 | } |
1e41dadf | 539 | /* Check issuer is non-empty acc. to RFC 5280 section 4.1.2.4 */ |
07b6068d DDO |
540 | CB_FAIL_IF(X509_NAME_entry_count(X509_get_issuer_name(x)) == 0, |
541 | ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_ISSUER_NAME_EMPTY); | |
1e41dadf | 542 | /* Check subject is non-empty acc. to RFC 5280 section 4.1.2.6 */ |
07b6068d DDO |
543 | CB_FAIL_IF(((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) != 0 |
544 | || (x->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN) != 0 | |
545 | || x->altname == NULL) | |
546 | && X509_NAME_entry_count(X509_get_subject_name(x)) == 0, | |
547 | ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_NAME_EMPTY); | |
548 | CB_FAIL_IF(X509_NAME_entry_count(X509_get_subject_name(x)) == 0 | |
549 | && x->altname != NULL | |
550 | && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SAN_CRITICAL) == 0, | |
551 | ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_EMPTY_SUBJECT_SAN_NOT_CRITICAL); | |
1e41dadf | 552 | /* Check SAN is non-empty according to RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.6 */ |
07b6068d DDO |
553 | CB_FAIL_IF(x->altname != NULL |
554 | && sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(x->altname) <= 0, | |
555 | ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_EMPTY_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME); | |
1e41dadf DDO |
556 | /* TODO add more checks on SAN entries */ |
557 | /* Check sig alg consistency acc. to RFC 5280 section 4.1.1.2 */ | |
07b6068d DDO |
558 | CB_FAIL_IF(X509_ALGOR_cmp(&x->sig_alg, &x->cert_info.signature) != 0, |
559 | ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_INCONSISTENCY); | |
560 | CB_FAIL_IF(x->akid != NULL | |
561 | && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_AKID_CRITICAL) != 0, | |
562 | ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER_CRITICAL); | |
563 | CB_FAIL_IF(x->skid != NULL | |
564 | && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SKID_CRITICAL) != 0, | |
565 | ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_CRITICAL); | |
cdf63a37 | 566 | if (X509_get_version(x) >= X509_VERSION_3) { |
1e41dadf | 567 | /* Check AKID presence acc. to RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.1 */ |
07b6068d DDO |
568 | CB_FAIL_IF(i + 1 < num /* |
569 | * this means not last cert in chain, | |
570 | * taken as "generated by conforming CAs" | |
571 | */ | |
572 | && (x->akid == NULL || x->akid->keyid == NULL), ctx, | |
573 | x, i, X509_V_ERR_MISSING_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER); | |
1e41dadf | 574 | /* Check SKID presence acc. to RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.2 */ |
07b6068d DDO |
575 | CB_FAIL_IF((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) != 0 && x->skid == NULL, |
576 | ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_MISSING_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER); | |
82bdd641 | 577 | } else { |
07b6068d DDO |
578 | CB_FAIL_IF(sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(X509_get0_extensions(x)) > 0, |
579 | ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_EXTENSIONS_REQUIRE_VERSION_3); | |
1e41dadf | 580 | } |
fa86e2ee | 581 | } |
6e5e118c | 582 | |
70dd3c65 VD |
583 | /* check_purpose() makes the callback as needed */ |
584 | if (purpose > 0 && !check_purpose(ctx, x, purpose, i, must_be_ca)) | |
585 | return 0; | |
e99505b4 | 586 | /* Check path length */ |
07b6068d DDO |
587 | CB_FAIL_IF(i > 1 && x->ex_pathlen != -1 |
588 | && plen > x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length, | |
589 | ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED); | |
ade08735 | 590 | /* Increment path length if not a self-issued intermediate CA */ |
dc5831da | 591 | if (i > 0 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) == 0) |
0f113f3e MC |
592 | plen++; |
593 | /* | |
594 | * If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next certificate | |
595 | * must be another proxy certificate or a EE certificate. If not, | |
596 | * the next certificate must be a CA certificate. | |
597 | */ | |
598 | if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) { | |
ed17c7c1 RL |
599 | /* |
600 | * RFC3820, 4.1.3 (b)(1) stipulates that if pCPathLengthConstraint | |
601 | * is less than max_path_length, the former should be copied to | |
602 | * the latter, and 4.1.4 (a) stipulates that max_path_length | |
603 | * should be verified to be larger than zero and decrement it. | |
604 | * | |
605 | * Because we're checking the certs in the reverse order, we start | |
606 | * with verifying that proxy_path_length isn't larger than pcPLC, | |
607 | * and copy the latter to the former if it is, and finally, | |
608 | * increment proxy_path_length. | |
609 | */ | |
610 | if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1) { | |
07b6068d DDO |
611 | CB_FAIL_IF(proxy_path_length > x->ex_pcpathlen, |
612 | ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED); | |
ed17c7c1 | 613 | proxy_path_length = x->ex_pcpathlen; |
0f113f3e MC |
614 | } |
615 | proxy_path_length++; | |
616 | must_be_ca = 0; | |
88444854 | 617 | } else { |
0f113f3e | 618 | must_be_ca = 1; |
88444854 | 619 | } |
0f113f3e | 620 | } |
0daccd4d | 621 | return 1; |
11262391 DSH |
622 | } |
623 | ||
55a6250f VD |
624 | static int has_san_id(X509 *x, int gtype) |
625 | { | |
626 | int i; | |
627 | int ret = 0; | |
628 | GENERAL_NAMES *gs = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL); | |
629 | ||
630 | if (gs == NULL) | |
7e365d51 | 631 | return -1; |
55a6250f VD |
632 | |
633 | for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gs); i++) { | |
634 | GENERAL_NAME *g = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gs, i); | |
635 | ||
636 | if (g->type == gtype) { | |
637 | ret = 1; | |
638 | break; | |
639 | } | |
640 | } | |
641 | GENERAL_NAMES_free(gs); | |
642 | return ret; | |
643 | } | |
644 | ||
7e365d51 | 645 | /* Returns -1 on internal error */ |
e9746e03 | 646 | static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e | 647 | { |
70dd3c65 VD |
648 | int i; |
649 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
650 | /* Check name constraints for all certificates */ |
651 | for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--) { | |
70dd3c65 VD |
652 | X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); |
653 | int j; | |
654 | ||
ade08735 | 655 | /* Ignore self-issued certs unless last in chain */ |
88444854 | 656 | if (i != 0 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) != 0) |
0f113f3e | 657 | continue; |
c8223538 RL |
658 | |
659 | /* | |
660 | * Proxy certificates policy has an extra constraint, where the | |
661 | * certificate subject MUST be the issuer with a single CN entry | |
662 | * added. | |
663 | * (RFC 3820: 3.4, 4.1.3 (a)(4)) | |
664 | */ | |
88444854 | 665 | if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) != 0) { |
c8223538 RL |
666 | X509_NAME *tmpsubject = X509_get_subject_name(x); |
667 | X509_NAME *tmpissuer = X509_get_issuer_name(x); | |
668 | X509_NAME_ENTRY *tmpentry = NULL; | |
88444854 | 669 | int last_nid = 0; |
c8223538 | 670 | int err = X509_V_OK; |
88444854 | 671 | int last_loc = X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpsubject) - 1; |
c8223538 RL |
672 | |
673 | /* Check that there are at least two RDNs */ | |
88444854 | 674 | if (last_loc < 1) { |
c8223538 RL |
675 | err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION; |
676 | goto proxy_name_done; | |
677 | } | |
678 | ||
679 | /* | |
680 | * Check that there is exactly one more RDN in subject as | |
681 | * there is in issuer. | |
682 | */ | |
683 | if (X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpsubject) | |
684 | != X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpissuer) + 1) { | |
685 | err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION; | |
686 | goto proxy_name_done; | |
687 | } | |
688 | ||
689 | /* | |
690 | * Check that the last subject component isn't part of a | |
e99505b4 | 691 | * multi-valued RDN |
c8223538 | 692 | */ |
88444854 | 693 | if (X509_NAME_ENTRY_set(X509_NAME_get_entry(tmpsubject, last_loc)) |
c8223538 | 694 | == X509_NAME_ENTRY_set(X509_NAME_get_entry(tmpsubject, |
88444854 | 695 | last_loc - 1))) { |
c8223538 RL |
696 | err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION; |
697 | goto proxy_name_done; | |
698 | } | |
699 | ||
700 | /* | |
701 | * Check that the last subject RDN is a commonName, and that | |
702 | * all the previous RDNs match the issuer exactly | |
703 | */ | |
704 | tmpsubject = X509_NAME_dup(tmpsubject); | |
705 | if (tmpsubject == NULL) { | |
9311d0c4 | 706 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
c8223538 | 707 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; |
7e365d51 | 708 | return -1; |
c8223538 RL |
709 | } |
710 | ||
88444854 DDO |
711 | tmpentry = X509_NAME_delete_entry(tmpsubject, last_loc); |
712 | last_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(tmpentry)); | |
c8223538 | 713 | |
88444854 | 714 | if (last_nid != NID_commonName |
c8223538 RL |
715 | || X509_NAME_cmp(tmpsubject, tmpissuer) != 0) { |
716 | err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION; | |
717 | } | |
718 | ||
719 | X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(tmpentry); | |
720 | X509_NAME_free(tmpsubject); | |
721 | ||
88444854 | 722 | proxy_name_done: |
07b6068d | 723 | CB_FAIL_IF(err != X509_V_OK, ctx, x, i, err); |
c8223538 RL |
724 | } |
725 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
726 | /* |
727 | * Check against constraints for all certificates higher in chain | |
728 | * including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly speaking needed | |
729 | * but if it includes constraints it is to be assumed it expects them | |
730 | * to be obeyed. | |
731 | */ | |
732 | for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--) { | |
733 | NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc; | |
70dd3c65 | 734 | |
0f113f3e | 735 | if (nc) { |
70dd3c65 | 736 | int rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc); |
7e365d51 | 737 | int ret = 1; |
70dd3c65 | 738 | |
5bd5dcd4 | 739 | /* If EE certificate check commonName too */ |
55a6250f VD |
740 | if (rv == X509_V_OK && i == 0 |
741 | && (ctx->param->hostflags | |
742 | & X509_CHECK_FLAG_NEVER_CHECK_SUBJECT) == 0 | |
743 | && ((ctx->param->hostflags | |
744 | & X509_CHECK_FLAG_ALWAYS_CHECK_SUBJECT) != 0 | |
7e365d51 | 745 | || (ret = has_san_id(x, GEN_DNS)) == 0)) |
5bd5dcd4 | 746 | rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check_CN(x, nc); |
7e365d51 DDO |
747 | if (ret < 0) |
748 | return ret; | |
5bd5dcd4 | 749 | |
f3e235ed VD |
750 | switch (rv) { |
751 | case X509_V_OK: | |
752 | break; | |
753 | case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM: | |
7e365d51 | 754 | return -1; |
f3e235ed | 755 | default: |
07b6068d | 756 | CB_FAIL_IF(1, ctx, x, i, rv); |
f3e235ed VD |
757 | break; |
758 | } | |
0f113f3e MC |
759 | } |
760 | } | |
761 | } | |
762 | return 1; | |
763 | } | |
e9746e03 | 764 | |
3bf15e29 | 765 | static int check_id_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int errcode) |
0f113f3e | 766 | { |
70dd3c65 | 767 | return verify_cb_cert(ctx, ctx->cert, 0, errcode); |
0f113f3e | 768 | } |
3bf15e29 | 769 | |
9689a6ae | 770 | static int check_hosts(X509 *x, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm) |
0f113f3e MC |
771 | { |
772 | int i; | |
9689a6ae | 773 | int n = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(vpm->hosts); |
0f113f3e MC |
774 | char *name; |
775 | ||
9689a6ae DSH |
776 | if (vpm->peername != NULL) { |
777 | OPENSSL_free(vpm->peername); | |
778 | vpm->peername = NULL; | |
a0724ef1 | 779 | } |
0f113f3e | 780 | for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) { |
9689a6ae DSH |
781 | name = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(vpm->hosts, i); |
782 | if (X509_check_host(x, name, 0, vpm->hostflags, &vpm->peername) > 0) | |
0f113f3e MC |
783 | return 1; |
784 | } | |
785 | return n == 0; | |
786 | } | |
8abffa4a | 787 | |
3bf15e29 | 788 | static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
789 | { |
790 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = ctx->param; | |
0f113f3e | 791 | X509 *x = ctx->cert; |
88444854 DDO |
792 | |
793 | if (vpm->hosts != NULL && check_hosts(x, vpm) <= 0) { | |
0f113f3e MC |
794 | if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH)) |
795 | return 0; | |
796 | } | |
88444854 DDO |
797 | if (vpm->email != NULL |
798 | && X509_check_email(x, vpm->email, vpm->emaillen, 0) <= 0) { | |
0f113f3e MC |
799 | if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH)) |
800 | return 0; | |
801 | } | |
88444854 | 802 | if (vpm->ip != NULL && X509_check_ip(x, vpm->ip, vpm->iplen, 0) <= 0) { |
0f113f3e MC |
803 | if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH)) |
804 | return 0; | |
805 | } | |
806 | return 1; | |
807 | } | |
3bf15e29 | 808 | |
7e365d51 | 809 | /* Returns -1 on internal error */ |
d9b8b89b | 810 | static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int num_untrusted) |
51630a37 | 811 | { |
7e365d51 | 812 | int i, res; |
0f113f3e | 813 | X509 *x = NULL; |
d9b8b89b | 814 | X509 *mx; |
b9aec69a | 815 | SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane; |
d9b8b89b VD |
816 | int num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); |
817 | int trust; | |
818 | ||
bdcadca2 VD |
819 | /* |
820 | * Check for a DANE issuer at depth 1 or greater, if it is a DANE-TA(2) | |
821 | * match, we're done, otherwise we'll merely record the match depth. | |
822 | */ | |
823 | if (DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane) && num_untrusted > 0 && num_untrusted < num) { | |
7e365d51 DDO |
824 | trust = check_dane_issuer(ctx, num_untrusted); |
825 | if (trust != X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED) | |
170b7358 | 826 | return trust; |
170b7358 VD |
827 | } |
828 | ||
d9b8b89b VD |
829 | /* |
830 | * Check trusted certificates in chain at depth num_untrusted and up. | |
831 | * Note, that depths 0..num_untrusted-1 may also contain trusted | |
832 | * certificates, but the caller is expected to have already checked those, | |
833 | * and wants to incrementally check just any added since. | |
834 | */ | |
835 | for (i = num_untrusted; i < num; i++) { | |
0f113f3e | 836 | x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); |
d9b8b89b | 837 | trust = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0); |
0f113f3e | 838 | /* If explicitly trusted return trusted */ |
d9b8b89b VD |
839 | if (trust == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED) |
840 | goto trusted; | |
841 | if (trust == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) | |
842 | goto rejected; | |
0f113f3e | 843 | } |
d9b8b89b | 844 | |
0f113f3e | 845 | /* |
d9b8b89b VD |
846 | * If we are looking at a trusted certificate, and accept partial chains, |
847 | * the chain is PKIX trusted. | |
0f113f3e | 848 | */ |
d9b8b89b | 849 | if (num_untrusted < num) { |
579262af | 850 | if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) != 0) |
d9b8b89b VD |
851 | goto trusted; |
852 | return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; | |
853 | } | |
854 | ||
579262af DDO |
855 | if (num_untrusted == num |
856 | && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) != 0) { | |
d9b8b89b VD |
857 | /* |
858 | * Last-resort call with no new trusted certificates, check the leaf | |
859 | * for a direct trust store match. | |
860 | */ | |
bdcadca2 VD |
861 | i = 0; |
862 | x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); | |
7e365d51 DDO |
863 | res = lookup_cert_match(&mx, ctx, x); |
864 | if (res < 0) | |
865 | return res; | |
88444854 | 866 | if (mx == NULL) |
d9b8b89b VD |
867 | return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; |
868 | ||
869 | /* | |
870 | * Check explicit auxiliary trust/reject settings. If none are set, | |
871 | * we'll accept X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED when not self-signed. | |
872 | */ | |
873 | trust = X509_check_trust(mx, ctx->param->trust, 0); | |
874 | if (trust == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) { | |
875 | X509_free(mx); | |
876 | goto rejected; | |
0f113f3e | 877 | } |
d9b8b89b VD |
878 | |
879 | /* Replace leaf with trusted match */ | |
88444854 | 880 | (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, 0, mx); |
d9b8b89b VD |
881 | X509_free(x); |
882 | ctx->num_untrusted = 0; | |
883 | goto trusted; | |
0f113f3e MC |
884 | } |
885 | ||
886 | /* | |
887 | * If no trusted certs in chain at all return untrusted and allow | |
888 | * standard (no issuer cert) etc errors to be indicated. | |
889 | */ | |
890 | return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; | |
d9b8b89b VD |
891 | |
892 | rejected: | |
6e5e118c DO |
893 | return verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED) == 0 |
894 | ? X509_TRUST_REJECTED : X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; | |
d9b8b89b VD |
895 | |
896 | trusted: | |
170b7358 VD |
897 | if (!DANETLS_ENABLED(dane)) |
898 | return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED; | |
899 | if (dane->pdpth < 0) | |
900 | dane->pdpth = num_untrusted; | |
901 | /* With DANE, PKIX alone is not trusted until we have both */ | |
902 | if (dane->mdpth >= 0) | |
903 | return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED; | |
904 | return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; | |
51630a37 DSH |
905 | } |
906 | ||
7e365d51 | 907 | /* Sadly, returns 0 also on internal error. */ |
b545dc67 | 908 | static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e | 909 | { |
4c9b0a03 | 910 | int i = 0, last = 0, ok = 0; |
88444854 DDO |
911 | |
912 | if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK) == 0) | |
0f113f3e | 913 | return 1; |
88444854 | 914 | if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL) != 0) { |
0f113f3e | 915 | last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; |
88444854 | 916 | } else { |
0f113f3e MC |
917 | /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */ |
918 | if (ctx->parent) | |
919 | return 1; | |
920 | last = 0; | |
921 | } | |
922 | for (i = 0; i <= last; i++) { | |
923 | ctx->error_depth = i; | |
924 | ok = check_cert(ctx); | |
925 | if (!ok) | |
926 | return ok; | |
927 | } | |
928 | return 1; | |
929 | } | |
b545dc67 | 930 | |
7e365d51 | 931 | /* Sadly, returns 0 also on internal error. */ |
b545dc67 | 932 | static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
933 | { |
934 | X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL; | |
70dd3c65 VD |
935 | int ok = 0; |
936 | int cnum = ctx->error_depth; | |
937 | X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum); | |
938 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
939 | ctx->current_cert = x; |
940 | ctx->current_issuer = NULL; | |
941 | ctx->current_crl_score = 0; | |
942 | ctx->current_reasons = 0; | |
70dd3c65 | 943 | |
88444854 | 944 | if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) != 0) |
790555d6 RL |
945 | return 1; |
946 | ||
0f113f3e | 947 | while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS) { |
70dd3c65 VD |
948 | unsigned int last_reasons = ctx->current_reasons; |
949 | ||
0f113f3e | 950 | /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */ |
88444854 | 951 | if (ctx->get_crl != NULL) |
0f113f3e MC |
952 | ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x); |
953 | else | |
954 | ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x); | |
07b6068d | 955 | /* If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except notify callback */ |
0f113f3e | 956 | if (!ok) { |
70dd3c65 VD |
957 | ok = verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL); |
958 | goto done; | |
0f113f3e MC |
959 | } |
960 | ctx->current_crl = crl; | |
961 | ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl); | |
962 | if (!ok) | |
70dd3c65 | 963 | goto done; |
0f113f3e | 964 | |
88444854 | 965 | if (dcrl != NULL) { |
0f113f3e MC |
966 | ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl); |
967 | if (!ok) | |
70dd3c65 | 968 | goto done; |
0f113f3e MC |
969 | ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x); |
970 | if (!ok) | |
70dd3c65 | 971 | goto done; |
88444854 | 972 | } else { |
0f113f3e | 973 | ok = 1; |
88444854 | 974 | } |
0f113f3e MC |
975 | |
976 | /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */ | |
977 | if (ok != 2) { | |
978 | ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x); | |
979 | if (!ok) | |
70dd3c65 | 980 | goto done; |
0f113f3e MC |
981 | } |
982 | ||
983 | X509_CRL_free(crl); | |
984 | X509_CRL_free(dcrl); | |
985 | crl = NULL; | |
986 | dcrl = NULL; | |
987 | /* | |
60250017 | 988 | * If reasons not updated we won't get anywhere by another iteration, |
0f113f3e MC |
989 | * so exit loop. |
990 | */ | |
991 | if (last_reasons == ctx->current_reasons) { | |
70dd3c65 VD |
992 | ok = verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL); |
993 | goto done; | |
0f113f3e MC |
994 | } |
995 | } | |
70dd3c65 | 996 | done: |
0f113f3e MC |
997 | X509_CRL_free(crl); |
998 | X509_CRL_free(dcrl); | |
999 | ||
1000 | ctx->current_crl = NULL; | |
1001 | return ok; | |
0f113f3e | 1002 | } |
b545dc67 | 1003 | |
e1a27eb3 | 1004 | /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */ |
e1a27eb3 | 1005 | static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify) |
0f113f3e MC |
1006 | { |
1007 | time_t *ptime; | |
1008 | int i; | |
70dd3c65 | 1009 | |
0f113f3e MC |
1010 | if (notify) |
1011 | ctx->current_crl = crl; | |
88444854 | 1012 | if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME) != 0) |
0f113f3e | 1013 | ptime = &ctx->param->check_time; |
88444854 | 1014 | else if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME) != 0) |
d35ff2c0 | 1015 | return 1; |
0f113f3e MC |
1016 | else |
1017 | ptime = NULL; | |
1018 | ||
568ce3a5 | 1019 | i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(crl), ptime); |
0f113f3e MC |
1020 | if (i == 0) { |
1021 | if (!notify) | |
1022 | return 0; | |
70dd3c65 | 1023 | if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD)) |
0f113f3e MC |
1024 | return 0; |
1025 | } | |
1026 | ||
1027 | if (i > 0) { | |
1028 | if (!notify) | |
1029 | return 0; | |
70dd3c65 | 1030 | if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID)) |
0f113f3e MC |
1031 | return 0; |
1032 | } | |
1033 | ||
568ce3a5 DSH |
1034 | if (X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(crl)) { |
1035 | i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(crl), ptime); | |
0f113f3e MC |
1036 | |
1037 | if (i == 0) { | |
1038 | if (!notify) | |
1039 | return 0; | |
70dd3c65 | 1040 | if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD)) |
0f113f3e MC |
1041 | return 0; |
1042 | } | |
e99505b4 | 1043 | /* Ignore expiration of base CRL is delta is valid */ |
88444854 DDO |
1044 | if (i < 0 && (ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA) == 0) { |
1045 | if (!notify || !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED)) | |
0f113f3e MC |
1046 | return 0; |
1047 | } | |
1048 | } | |
1049 | ||
1050 | if (notify) | |
1051 | ctx->current_crl = NULL; | |
1052 | ||
1053 | return 1; | |
1054 | } | |
e1a27eb3 | 1055 | |
d43c4497 | 1056 | static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, |
0f113f3e MC |
1057 | X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons, |
1058 | STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls) | |
1059 | { | |
1060 | int i, crl_score, best_score = *pscore; | |
1061 | unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0; | |
1062 | X509 *x = ctx->current_cert; | |
1063 | X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL; | |
1064 | X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL; | |
1065 | ||
1066 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) { | |
1067 | crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i); | |
1068 | reasons = *preasons; | |
1069 | crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x); | |
8b7c51a0 | 1070 | if (crl_score < best_score || crl_score == 0) |
626aa248 DSH |
1071 | continue; |
1072 | /* If current CRL is equivalent use it if it is newer */ | |
8b7c51a0 | 1073 | if (crl_score == best_score && best_crl != NULL) { |
626aa248 | 1074 | int day, sec; |
88444854 | 1075 | |
568ce3a5 DSH |
1076 | if (ASN1_TIME_diff(&day, &sec, X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(best_crl), |
1077 | X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(crl)) == 0) | |
626aa248 | 1078 | continue; |
e032117d DSH |
1079 | /* |
1080 | * ASN1_TIME_diff never returns inconsistent signs for |day| | |
1081 | * and |sec|. | |
1082 | */ | |
1083 | if (day <= 0 && sec <= 0) | |
626aa248 | 1084 | continue; |
0f113f3e | 1085 | } |
626aa248 DSH |
1086 | best_crl = crl; |
1087 | best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer; | |
1088 | best_score = crl_score; | |
1089 | best_reasons = reasons; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1090 | } |
1091 | ||
88444854 | 1092 | if (best_crl != NULL) { |
222561fe | 1093 | X509_CRL_free(*pcrl); |
0f113f3e MC |
1094 | *pcrl = best_crl; |
1095 | *pissuer = best_crl_issuer; | |
1096 | *pscore = best_score; | |
1097 | *preasons = best_reasons; | |
65cbf983 | 1098 | X509_CRL_up_ref(best_crl); |
25aaa98a RS |
1099 | X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl); |
1100 | *pdcrl = NULL; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1101 | get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls); |
1102 | } | |
1103 | ||
1104 | if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID) | |
1105 | return 1; | |
1106 | ||
1107 | return 0; | |
1108 | } | |
1109 | ||
1110 | /* | |
1111 | * Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be | |
d43c4497 DSH |
1112 | * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical. |
1113 | */ | |
d43c4497 | 1114 | static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid) |
0f113f3e | 1115 | { |
88444854 DDO |
1116 | ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta = NULL, *extb = NULL; |
1117 | int i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, -1); | |
1118 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
1119 | if (i >= 0) { |
1120 | /* Can't have multiple occurrences */ | |
1121 | if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1) | |
1122 | return 0; | |
1123 | exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i)); | |
88444854 | 1124 | } |
d43c4497 | 1125 | |
0f113f3e | 1126 | i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, -1); |
0f113f3e | 1127 | if (i >= 0) { |
0f113f3e MC |
1128 | if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1) |
1129 | return 0; | |
1130 | extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i)); | |
88444854 | 1131 | } |
d43c4497 | 1132 | |
88444854 | 1133 | if (exta == NULL && extb == NULL) |
0f113f3e | 1134 | return 1; |
d43c4497 | 1135 | |
88444854 | 1136 | if (exta == NULL || extb == NULL) |
0f113f3e | 1137 | return 0; |
d43c4497 | 1138 | |
88444854 | 1139 | return ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb) == 0; |
0f113f3e | 1140 | } |
d43c4497 DSH |
1141 | |
1142 | /* See if a base and delta are compatible */ | |
d43c4497 | 1143 | static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base) |
0f113f3e MC |
1144 | { |
1145 | /* Delta CRL must be a delta */ | |
88444854 | 1146 | if (delta->base_crl_number == NULL) |
0f113f3e MC |
1147 | return 0; |
1148 | /* Base must have a CRL number */ | |
88444854 | 1149 | if (base->crl_number == NULL) |
0f113f3e MC |
1150 | return 0; |
1151 | /* Issuer names must match */ | |
88444854 DDO |
1152 | if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), |
1153 | X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta)) != 0) | |
0f113f3e MC |
1154 | return 0; |
1155 | /* AKID and IDP must match */ | |
1156 | if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier)) | |
1157 | return 0; | |
1158 | if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point)) | |
1159 | return 0; | |
1160 | /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */ | |
1161 | if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0) | |
1162 | return 0; | |
1163 | /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */ | |
88444854 | 1164 | return ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0; |
0f113f3e MC |
1165 | } |
1166 | ||
1167 | /* | |
1168 | * For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring or | |
1169 | * retrieve a chain of deltas... | |
d43c4497 | 1170 | */ |
d43c4497 | 1171 | static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore, |
0f113f3e MC |
1172 | X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls) |
1173 | { | |
1174 | X509_CRL *delta; | |
1175 | int i; | |
88444854 DDO |
1176 | |
1177 | if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS) == 0) | |
0f113f3e | 1178 | return; |
88444854 | 1179 | if (((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST) == 0) |
0f113f3e MC |
1180 | return; |
1181 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) { | |
1182 | delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i); | |
1183 | if (check_delta_base(delta, base)) { | |
1184 | if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0)) | |
1185 | *pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA; | |
65cbf983 | 1186 | X509_CRL_up_ref(delta); |
0f113f3e MC |
1187 | *dcrl = delta; |
1188 | return; | |
1189 | } | |
1190 | } | |
1191 | *dcrl = NULL; | |
1192 | } | |
1193 | ||
1194 | /* | |
1195 | * For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate | |
1196 | * 'x'. The return value is a mask of several criteria. If the issuer is not | |
1197 | * the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer. The reasons mask is | |
1198 | * also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if no new reasons the CRL | |
1199 | * is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated. | |
4b96839f | 1200 | */ |
4b96839f | 1201 | static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer, |
0f113f3e MC |
1202 | unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x) |
1203 | { | |
0f113f3e MC |
1204 | int crl_score = 0; |
1205 | unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons; | |
1206 | ||
1207 | /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */ | |
1208 | ||
1209 | /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */ | |
88444854 | 1210 | if ((crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) != 0) |
0f113f3e MC |
1211 | return 0; |
1212 | /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */ | |
88444854 | 1213 | if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT) == 0) { |
0f113f3e MC |
1214 | if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS)) |
1215 | return 0; | |
88444854 | 1216 | } else if ((crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS) != 0) { |
0f113f3e | 1217 | /* If no new reasons reject */ |
88444854 | 1218 | if ((crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons) == 0) |
0f113f3e MC |
1219 | return 0; |
1220 | } | |
1221 | /* Don't process deltas at this stage */ | |
88444854 | 1222 | else if (crl->base_crl_number != NULL) |
0f113f3e MC |
1223 | return 0; |
1224 | /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */ | |
88444854 DDO |
1225 | if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl)) != 0) { |
1226 | if ((crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT) == 0) | |
0f113f3e | 1227 | return 0; |
88444854 | 1228 | } else { |
0f113f3e | 1229 | crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME; |
88444854 | 1230 | } |
0f113f3e | 1231 | |
88444854 | 1232 | if ((crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL) == 0) |
0f113f3e MC |
1233 | crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL; |
1234 | ||
e99505b4 | 1235 | /* Check expiration */ |
0f113f3e MC |
1236 | if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0)) |
1237 | crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME; | |
1238 | ||
1239 | /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */ | |
1240 | crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score); | |
1241 | ||
1242 | /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */ | |
88444854 | 1243 | if ((crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID) == 0) |
0f113f3e MC |
1244 | return 0; |
1245 | ||
1246 | /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */ | |
0f113f3e MC |
1247 | if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons)) { |
1248 | /* If no new reasons reject */ | |
88444854 | 1249 | if ((crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons) == 0) |
0f113f3e MC |
1250 | return 0; |
1251 | tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons; | |
1252 | crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE; | |
1253 | } | |
1254 | ||
1255 | *preasons = tmp_reasons; | |
1256 | ||
1257 | return crl_score; | |
1258 | ||
1259 | } | |
4b96839f DSH |
1260 | |
1261 | static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, | |
0f113f3e MC |
1262 | X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score) |
1263 | { | |
1264 | X509 *crl_issuer = NULL; | |
8cc86b81 | 1265 | const X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl); |
0f113f3e MC |
1266 | int cidx = ctx->error_depth; |
1267 | int i; | |
1268 | ||
1269 | if (cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1) | |
1270 | cidx++; | |
1271 | ||
1272 | crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx); | |
1273 | ||
1274 | if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) { | |
1275 | if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME) { | |
1276 | *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT; | |
1277 | *pissuer = crl_issuer; | |
1278 | return; | |
1279 | } | |
1280 | } | |
1281 | ||
1282 | for (cidx++; cidx < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++) { | |
1283 | crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx); | |
1284 | if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm)) | |
1285 | continue; | |
1286 | if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) { | |
1287 | *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH; | |
1288 | *pissuer = crl_issuer; | |
1289 | return; | |
1290 | } | |
1291 | } | |
1292 | ||
1293 | /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */ | |
88444854 | 1294 | if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT) == 0) |
0f113f3e MC |
1295 | return; |
1296 | ||
1297 | /* | |
1298 | * Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the set of | |
1299 | * untrusted certificates. | |
1300 | */ | |
1301 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++) { | |
1302 | crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i); | |
88444854 | 1303 | if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm) != 0) |
0f113f3e MC |
1304 | continue; |
1305 | if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) { | |
1306 | *pissuer = crl_issuer; | |
1307 | *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID; | |
1308 | return; | |
1309 | } | |
1310 | } | |
1311 | } | |
1312 | ||
1313 | /* | |
1314 | * Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new | |
9d84d4ed | 1315 | * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the |
0f113f3e MC |
1316 | * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking will |
1317 | * be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in practice. | |
9d84d4ed | 1318 | */ |
9d84d4ed | 1319 | static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) |
0f113f3e | 1320 | { |
c926a5ec | 1321 | X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx = {0}; |
0f113f3e | 1322 | int ret; |
70dd3c65 | 1323 | |
0f113f3e | 1324 | /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */ |
88444854 | 1325 | if (ctx->parent != NULL) |
0f113f3e | 1326 | return 0; |
faa9dcd4 | 1327 | if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->store, x, ctx->untrusted)) |
0f113f3e MC |
1328 | return -1; |
1329 | ||
1330 | crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls; | |
1331 | /* Copy verify params across */ | |
1332 | X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param); | |
1333 | ||
1334 | crl_ctx.parent = ctx; | |
1335 | crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb; | |
1336 | ||
1337 | /* Verify CRL issuer */ | |
1338 | ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx); | |
0f113f3e MC |
1339 | if (ret <= 0) |
1340 | goto err; | |
1341 | ||
1342 | /* Check chain is acceptable */ | |
0f113f3e MC |
1343 | ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain); |
1344 | err: | |
1345 | X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx); | |
1346 | return ret; | |
1347 | } | |
1348 | ||
1349 | /* | |
1350 | * RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path and | |
1351 | * certificate path, which could lead to situations where a certificate could | |
e99505b4 | 1352 | * be revoked or validated by a CA not authorized to do so. RFC5280 is more |
0f113f3e MC |
1353 | * strict and states that the two paths must end in the same trust anchor, |
1354 | * though some discussions remain... until this is resolved we use the | |
1355 | * RFC5280 version | |
9d84d4ed | 1356 | */ |
9d84d4ed | 1357 | static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, |
0f113f3e MC |
1358 | STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path, |
1359 | STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path) | |
1360 | { | |
88444854 DDO |
1361 | X509 *cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1); |
1362 | X509 *crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1); | |
1363 | ||
1364 | return X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta) == 0; | |
0f113f3e | 1365 | } |
9d84d4ed | 1366 | |
3a83462d MC |
1367 | /*- |
1368 | * Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases. | |
3e727a3b DSH |
1369 | * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types. |
1370 | * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES. | |
1371 | * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES. | |
d0fff69d | 1372 | * 4. One is NULL: automatic match. |
3e727a3b | 1373 | */ |
3e727a3b | 1374 | static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b) |
0f113f3e MC |
1375 | { |
1376 | X509_NAME *nm = NULL; | |
1377 | GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL; | |
1378 | GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb; | |
1379 | int i, j; | |
88444854 DDO |
1380 | |
1381 | if (a == NULL || b == NULL) | |
0f113f3e MC |
1382 | return 1; |
1383 | if (a->type == 1) { | |
88444854 | 1384 | if (a->dpname == NULL) |
0f113f3e MC |
1385 | return 0; |
1386 | /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */ | |
1387 | if (b->type == 1) { | |
88444854 | 1388 | if (b->dpname == NULL) |
0f113f3e | 1389 | return 0; |
88444854 | 1390 | return X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname) == 0; |
0f113f3e MC |
1391 | } |
1392 | /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */ | |
1393 | nm = a->dpname; | |
1394 | gens = b->name.fullname; | |
1395 | } else if (b->type == 1) { | |
88444854 | 1396 | if (b->dpname == NULL) |
0f113f3e MC |
1397 | return 0; |
1398 | /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */ | |
1399 | gens = a->name.fullname; | |
1400 | nm = b->dpname; | |
1401 | } | |
1402 | ||
1403 | /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */ | |
88444854 | 1404 | if (nm != NULL) { |
0f113f3e MC |
1405 | for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) { |
1406 | gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i); | |
1407 | if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME) | |
1408 | continue; | |
88444854 | 1409 | if (X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName) == 0) |
0f113f3e MC |
1410 | return 1; |
1411 | } | |
1412 | return 0; | |
1413 | } | |
1414 | ||
1415 | /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */ | |
1416 | ||
1417 | for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++) { | |
1418 | gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i); | |
1419 | for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++) { | |
1420 | genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j); | |
88444854 | 1421 | if (GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb) == 0) |
0f113f3e MC |
1422 | return 1; |
1423 | } | |
1424 | } | |
1425 | ||
1426 | return 0; | |
1427 | ||
1428 | } | |
bc7535bc | 1429 | |
4b96839f | 1430 | static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score) |
0f113f3e MC |
1431 | { |
1432 | int i; | |
8cc86b81 | 1433 | const X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl); |
88444854 | 1434 | |
0f113f3e | 1435 | /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */ |
88444854 DDO |
1436 | if (dp->CRLissuer == NULL) |
1437 | return (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME) != 0; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1438 | for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) { |
1439 | GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i); | |
88444854 | 1440 | |
0f113f3e MC |
1441 | if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME) |
1442 | continue; | |
88444854 | 1443 | if (X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm) == 0) |
0f113f3e MC |
1444 | return 1; |
1445 | } | |
1446 | return 0; | |
1447 | } | |
d0fff69d | 1448 | |
4b96839f | 1449 | /* Check CRLDP and IDP */ |
4b96839f | 1450 | static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score, |
0f113f3e MC |
1451 | unsigned int *preasons) |
1452 | { | |
1453 | int i; | |
88444854 DDO |
1454 | |
1455 | if ((crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR) != 0) | |
0f113f3e | 1456 | return 0; |
88444854 DDO |
1457 | if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) != 0) { |
1458 | if ((crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER) != 0) | |
0f113f3e MC |
1459 | return 0; |
1460 | } else { | |
88444854 | 1461 | if ((crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA) != 0) |
0f113f3e MC |
1462 | return 0; |
1463 | } | |
1464 | *preasons = crl->idp_reasons; | |
1465 | for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++) { | |
1466 | DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i); | |
88444854 | 1467 | |
0f113f3e | 1468 | if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score)) { |
88444854 DDO |
1469 | if (crl->idp == NULL |
1470 | || idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint)) { | |
0f113f3e MC |
1471 | *preasons &= dp->dp_reasons; |
1472 | return 1; | |
1473 | } | |
1474 | } | |
1475 | } | |
88444854 DDO |
1476 | return (crl->idp == NULL || crl->idp->distpoint == NULL) |
1477 | && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME) != 0; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1478 | } |
1479 | ||
1480 | /* | |
1481 | * Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate. If deltas enabled try | |
1482 | * to find a delta CRL too | |
b545dc67 | 1483 | */ |
d43c4497 | 1484 | static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, |
0f113f3e MC |
1485 | X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x) |
1486 | { | |
1487 | int ok; | |
1488 | X509 *issuer = NULL; | |
1489 | int crl_score = 0; | |
1490 | unsigned int reasons; | |
1491 | X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL; | |
1492 | STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl; | |
8cc86b81 | 1493 | const X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x); |
70dd3c65 | 1494 | |
0f113f3e MC |
1495 | reasons = ctx->current_reasons; |
1496 | ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, | |
1497 | &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls); | |
0f113f3e MC |
1498 | if (ok) |
1499 | goto done; | |
1500 | ||
1501 | /* Lookup CRLs from store */ | |
0f113f3e MC |
1502 | skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm); |
1503 | ||
1504 | /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */ | |
88444854 | 1505 | if (skcrl == NULL && crl != NULL) |
0f113f3e MC |
1506 | goto done; |
1507 | ||
1508 | get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl); | |
1509 | ||
1510 | sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free); | |
1511 | ||
1512 | done: | |
0f113f3e | 1513 | /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */ |
88444854 | 1514 | if (crl != NULL) { |
0f113f3e MC |
1515 | ctx->current_issuer = issuer; |
1516 | ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score; | |
1517 | ctx->current_reasons = reasons; | |
1518 | *pcrl = crl; | |
1519 | *pdcrl = dcrl; | |
1520 | return 1; | |
1521 | } | |
0f113f3e MC |
1522 | return 0; |
1523 | } | |
b545dc67 DSH |
1524 | |
1525 | /* Check CRL validity */ | |
1526 | static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl) | |
0f113f3e MC |
1527 | { |
1528 | X509 *issuer = NULL; | |
1529 | EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL; | |
70dd3c65 VD |
1530 | int cnum = ctx->error_depth; |
1531 | int chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; | |
1532 | ||
ade08735 | 1533 | /* If we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */ |
88444854 | 1534 | if (ctx->current_issuer != NULL) { |
0f113f3e | 1535 | issuer = ctx->current_issuer; |
0f113f3e MC |
1536 | /* |
1537 | * Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer is next | |
1538 | * certificate in chain. | |
1539 | */ | |
88444854 | 1540 | } else if (cnum < chnum) { |
0f113f3e | 1541 | issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1); |
88444854 | 1542 | } else { |
0f113f3e | 1543 | issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum); |
ade08735 | 1544 | /* If not self-issued, can't check signature */ |
70dd3c65 VD |
1545 | if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer) && |
1546 | !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER)) | |
1547 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1548 | } |
1549 | ||
70dd3c65 VD |
1550 | if (issuer == NULL) |
1551 | return 1; | |
0f113f3e | 1552 | |
70dd3c65 VD |
1553 | /* |
1554 | * Skip most tests for deltas because they have already been done | |
1555 | */ | |
88444854 | 1556 | if (crl->base_crl_number == NULL) { |
70dd3c65 | 1557 | /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */ |
88444854 DDO |
1558 | if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) != 0 && |
1559 | (issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN) == 0 && | |
70dd3c65 VD |
1560 | !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN)) |
1561 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e | 1562 | |
88444854 | 1563 | if ((ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE) == 0 && |
70dd3c65 VD |
1564 | !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE)) |
1565 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e | 1566 | |
88444854 | 1567 | if ((ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH) == 0 && |
70dd3c65 VD |
1568 | check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0 && |
1569 | !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR)) | |
1570 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e | 1571 | |
88444854 | 1572 | if ((crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) != 0 && |
70dd3c65 VD |
1573 | !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION)) |
1574 | return 0; | |
1575 | } | |
0f113f3e | 1576 | |
88444854 | 1577 | if ((ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME) == 0 && |
70dd3c65 VD |
1578 | !check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1)) |
1579 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e | 1580 | |
70dd3c65 VD |
1581 | /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */ |
1582 | ikey = X509_get0_pubkey(issuer); | |
88444854 | 1583 | if (ikey == NULL && |
70dd3c65 VD |
1584 | !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY)) |
1585 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e | 1586 | |
88444854 | 1587 | if (ikey != NULL) { |
70dd3c65 | 1588 | int rv = X509_CRL_check_suiteb(crl, ikey, ctx->param->flags); |
0f113f3e | 1589 | |
70dd3c65 VD |
1590 | if (rv != X509_V_OK && !verify_cb_crl(ctx, rv)) |
1591 | return 0; | |
1592 | /* Verify CRL signature */ | |
1593 | if (X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0 && | |
1594 | !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE)) | |
1595 | return 0; | |
1596 | } | |
1597 | return 1; | |
0f113f3e | 1598 | } |
b545dc67 DSH |
1599 | |
1600 | /* Check certificate against CRL */ | |
1601 | static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x) | |
0f113f3e | 1602 | { |
0f113f3e | 1603 | X509_REVOKED *rev; |
70dd3c65 | 1604 | |
0f113f3e MC |
1605 | /* |
1606 | * The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained unhandled | |
1607 | * critical extensions it could still be used to indicate a certificate | |
70dd3c65 | 1608 | * was revoked. This has since been changed since critical extensions can |
0f113f3e MC |
1609 | * change the meaning of CRL entries. |
1610 | */ | |
88444854 DDO |
1611 | if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL) == 0 |
1612 | && (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL) != 0 && | |
70dd3c65 VD |
1613 | !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION)) |
1614 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e | 1615 | /* |
70dd3c65 VD |
1616 | * Look for serial number of certificate in CRL. If found, make sure |
1617 | * reason is not removeFromCRL. | |
0f113f3e MC |
1618 | */ |
1619 | if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x)) { | |
1620 | if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL) | |
1621 | return 2; | |
70dd3c65 | 1622 | if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED)) |
0f113f3e MC |
1623 | return 0; |
1624 | } | |
1625 | ||
1626 | return 1; | |
1627 | } | |
b545dc67 | 1628 | |
5d7c222d | 1629 | static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
1630 | { |
1631 | int ret; | |
3921ded7 | 1632 | |
0f113f3e MC |
1633 | if (ctx->parent) |
1634 | return 1; | |
3921ded7 VD |
1635 | /* |
1636 | * With DANE, the trust anchor might be a bare public key, not a | |
1637 | * certificate! In that case our chain does not have the trust anchor | |
1638 | * certificate as a top-most element. This comports well with RFC5280 | |
1639 | * chain verification, since there too, the trust anchor is not part of the | |
1640 | * chain to be verified. In particular, X509_policy_check() does not look | |
1641 | * at the TA cert, but assumes that it is present as the top-most chain | |
1642 | * element. We therefore temporarily push a NULL cert onto the chain if it | |
1643 | * was verified via a bare public key, and pop it off right after the | |
1644 | * X509_policy_check() call. | |
1645 | */ | |
7e365d51 DDO |
1646 | if (ctx->bare_ta_signed && !sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, NULL)) |
1647 | goto memerr; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1648 | ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain, |
1649 | ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags); | |
3921ded7 | 1650 | if (ctx->bare_ta_signed) |
225c9660 | 1651 | (void)sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain); |
3921ded7 | 1652 | |
7e365d51 DDO |
1653 | if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL) |
1654 | goto memerr; | |
0f113f3e | 1655 | /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */ |
895c2f84 | 1656 | if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_INVALID) { |
0f113f3e | 1657 | int i; |
70dd3c65 VD |
1658 | |
1659 | /* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify callback. */ | |
0f113f3e | 1660 | for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) { |
70dd3c65 VD |
1661 | X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); |
1662 | ||
07b6068d DDO |
1663 | CB_FAIL_IF((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY) != 0, |
1664 | ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION); | |
0f113f3e MC |
1665 | } |
1666 | return 1; | |
1667 | } | |
895c2f84 | 1668 | if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_FAILURE) { |
0f113f3e MC |
1669 | ctx->current_cert = NULL; |
1670 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY; | |
1671 | return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
1672 | } | |
895c2f84 | 1673 | if (ret != X509_PCY_TREE_VALID) { |
9311d0c4 | 1674 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
895c2f84 VD |
1675 | return 0; |
1676 | } | |
0f113f3e | 1677 | |
88444854 | 1678 | if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY) != 0) { |
0f113f3e | 1679 | ctx->current_cert = NULL; |
f3e235ed VD |
1680 | /* |
1681 | * Verification errors need to be "sticky", a callback may have allowed | |
1682 | * an SSL handshake to continue despite an error, and we must then | |
1683 | * remain in an error state. Therefore, we MUST NOT clear earlier | |
1684 | * verification errors by setting the error to X509_V_OK. | |
1685 | */ | |
0f113f3e MC |
1686 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx)) |
1687 | return 0; | |
1688 | } | |
1689 | ||
1690 | return 1; | |
7e365d51 DDO |
1691 | |
1692 | memerr: | |
1693 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
1694 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; | |
1695 | return -1; | |
0f113f3e | 1696 | } |
5d7c222d | 1697 | |
70dd3c65 VD |
1698 | /*- |
1699 | * Check certificate validity times. | |
1700 | * If depth >= 0, invoke verification callbacks on error, otherwise just return | |
1701 | * the validation status. | |
1702 | * | |
1703 | * Return 1 on success, 0 otherwise. | |
1704 | */ | |
4669015d | 1705 | int ossl_x509_check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int depth) |
0f113f3e MC |
1706 | { |
1707 | time_t *ptime; | |
1708 | int i; | |
1709 | ||
88444854 | 1710 | if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME) != 0) |
0f113f3e | 1711 | ptime = &ctx->param->check_time; |
88444854 | 1712 | else if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME) != 0) |
d35ff2c0 | 1713 | return 1; |
0f113f3e MC |
1714 | else |
1715 | ptime = NULL; | |
1716 | ||
568ce3a5 | 1717 | i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get0_notBefore(x), ptime); |
70dd3c65 VD |
1718 | if (i >= 0 && depth < 0) |
1719 | return 0; | |
07b6068d DDO |
1720 | CB_FAIL_IF(i == 0, ctx, x, depth, X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD); |
1721 | CB_FAIL_IF(i > 0, ctx, x, depth, X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID); | |
0f113f3e | 1722 | |
568ce3a5 | 1723 | i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get0_notAfter(x), ptime); |
70dd3c65 VD |
1724 | if (i <= 0 && depth < 0) |
1725 | return 0; | |
07b6068d DDO |
1726 | CB_FAIL_IF(i == 0, ctx, x, depth, X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD); |
1727 | CB_FAIL_IF(i < 0, ctx, x, depth, X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED); | |
0f113f3e MC |
1728 | return 1; |
1729 | } | |
e1a27eb3 | 1730 | |
7e365d51 DDO |
1731 | /* |
1732 | * Verify the issuer signatures and cert times of ctx->chain. | |
1733 | * Sadly, returns 0 also on internal error. | |
1734 | */ | |
6b691a5c | 1735 | static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e | 1736 | { |
70dd3c65 VD |
1737 | int n = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; |
1738 | X509 *xi = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n); | |
88444854 | 1739 | X509 *xs = xi; |
0f113f3e | 1740 | |
88444854 | 1741 | ctx->error_depth = n; |
170b7358 | 1742 | if (ctx->bare_ta_signed) { |
88444854 DDO |
1743 | /* |
1744 | * With DANE-verified bare public key TA signatures, | |
1745 | * on the top certificate we check only the timestamps. | |
1746 | * We report the issuer as NULL because all we have is a bare key. | |
1747 | */ | |
170b7358 | 1748 | xi = NULL; |
4669015d | 1749 | } else if (ossl_x509_likely_issued(xi, xi) != X509_V_OK |
88444854 DDO |
1750 | /* exceptional case: last cert in the chain is not self-issued */ |
1751 | && ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) == 0)) { | |
1752 | if (n > 0) { | |
1753 | n--; | |
1754 | ctx->error_depth = n; | |
1755 | xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n); | |
1756 | } else { | |
1757 | CB_FAIL_IF(1, ctx, xi, 0, | |
1758 | X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE); | |
02a25671 | 1759 | } |
88444854 DDO |
1760 | /* |
1761 | * The below code will certainly not do a | |
1762 | * self-signature check on xi because it is not self-issued. | |
1763 | */ | |
0f113f3e MC |
1764 | } |
1765 | ||
d9b8b89b | 1766 | /* |
d1e85cdf | 1767 | * Do not clear error (by ctx->error = X509_V_OK), it must be "sticky", |
88444854 | 1768 | * only the user's callback is allowed to reset errors (at its own peril). |
d9b8b89b | 1769 | */ |
0f113f3e | 1770 | while (n >= 0) { |
07b6068d | 1771 | /*- |
0b670a21 DDO |
1772 | * For each iteration of this loop: |
1773 | * n is the subject depth | |
1774 | * xs is the subject cert, for which the signature is to be checked | |
88444854 DDO |
1775 | * xi is NULL for DANE-verified bare public key TA signatures |
1776 | * else the supposed issuer cert containing the public key to use | |
0b670a21 | 1777 | * Initially xs == xi if the last cert in the chain is self-issued. |
88444854 DDO |
1778 | */ |
1779 | /* | |
1780 | * Do signature check for self-signed certificates only if explicitly | |
ade08735 | 1781 | * asked for because it does not add any security and just wastes time. |
0f113f3e | 1782 | */ |
88444854 DDO |
1783 | if (xi != NULL |
1784 | && (xs != xi | |
579262af | 1785 | || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE) != 0 |
88444854 | 1786 | && (xi->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS) != 0))) { |
02369787 | 1787 | EVP_PKEY *pkey; |
0b670a21 DDO |
1788 | /* |
1789 | * If the issuer's public key is not available or its key usage | |
1790 | * does not support issuing the subject cert, report the issuer | |
1791 | * cert and its depth (rather than n, the depth of the subject). | |
1792 | */ | |
1793 | int issuer_depth = n + (xs == xi ? 0 : 1); | |
1794 | /* | |
1795 | * According to https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-6.1.4 | |
1796 | * step (n) we must check any given key usage extension in a CA cert | |
1797 | * when preparing the verification of a certificate issued by it. | |
1798 | * According to https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-4.2.1.3 | |
e99505b4 DDO |
1799 | * we must not verify a certificate signature if the key usage of |
1800 | * the CA certificate that issued the certificate prohibits signing. | |
0b670a21 DDO |
1801 | * In case the 'issuing' certificate is the last in the chain and is |
1802 | * not a CA certificate but a 'self-issued' end-entity cert (i.e., | |
1803 | * xs == xi && !(xi->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA)) RFC 5280 does not apply | |
1804 | * (see https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6818#section-2) and thus | |
1805 | * we are free to ignore any key usage restrictions on such certs. | |
1806 | */ | |
1807 | int ret = xs == xi && (xi->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) == 0 | |
4669015d | 1808 | ? X509_V_OK : ossl_x509_signing_allowed(xi, xs); |
02369787 | 1809 | |
07b6068d | 1810 | CB_FAIL_IF(ret != X509_V_OK, ctx, xi, issuer_depth, ret); |
c01ff880 | 1811 | if ((pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(xi)) == NULL) { |
07b6068d DDO |
1812 | CB_FAIL_IF(1, ctx, xi, issuer_depth, |
1813 | X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY); | |
6e5e118c | 1814 | } else { |
07b6068d DDO |
1815 | CB_FAIL_IF(X509_verify(xs, pkey) <= 0, |
1816 | ctx, xs, n, X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE); | |
0f113f3e | 1817 | } |
0f113f3e MC |
1818 | } |
1819 | ||
88444854 | 1820 | /* in addition to RFC 5280, do also for trusted (root) cert */ |
70dd3c65 | 1821 | /* Calls verify callback as needed */ |
4669015d | 1822 | if (!ossl_x509_check_cert_time(ctx, xs, n)) |
70dd3c65 | 1823 | return 0; |
0f113f3e | 1824 | |
70dd3c65 VD |
1825 | /* |
1826 | * Signal success at this depth. However, the previous error (if any) | |
1827 | * is retained. | |
1828 | */ | |
0f113f3e MC |
1829 | ctx->current_issuer = xi; |
1830 | ctx->current_cert = xs; | |
70dd3c65 VD |
1831 | ctx->error_depth = n; |
1832 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(1, ctx)) | |
1833 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e | 1834 | |
70dd3c65 | 1835 | if (--n >= 0) { |
0f113f3e MC |
1836 | xi = xs; |
1837 | xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n); | |
1838 | } | |
1839 | } | |
70dd3c65 | 1840 | return 1; |
0f113f3e | 1841 | } |
d02b48c6 | 1842 | |
91b73acb | 1843 | int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm) |
bbb72003 | 1844 | { |
0f113f3e | 1845 | return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL); |
bbb72003 DSH |
1846 | } |
1847 | ||
91b73acb | 1848 | int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time) |
0f113f3e | 1849 | { |
80770da3 EK |
1850 | static const size_t utctime_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMSSZ") - 1; |
1851 | static const size_t generalizedtime_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ") - 1; | |
1852 | ASN1_TIME *asn1_cmp_time = NULL; | |
1853 | int i, day, sec, ret = 0; | |
48102247 | 1854 | #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC |
1855 | const char upper_z = 0x5A; | |
1856 | #else | |
1857 | const char upper_z = 'Z'; | |
1858 | #endif | |
88444854 | 1859 | |
07b6068d | 1860 | /*- |
80770da3 EK |
1861 | * Note that ASN.1 allows much more slack in the time format than RFC5280. |
1862 | * In RFC5280, the representation is fixed: | |
f48b83b4 EK |
1863 | * UTCTime: YYMMDDHHMMSSZ |
1864 | * GeneralizedTime: YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ | |
80770da3 EK |
1865 | * |
1866 | * We do NOT currently enforce the following RFC 5280 requirement: | |
1867 | * "CAs conforming to this profile MUST always encode certificate | |
1868 | * validity dates through the year 2049 as UTCTime; certificate validity | |
1869 | * dates in 2050 or later MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime." | |
f48b83b4 | 1870 | */ |
80770da3 EK |
1871 | switch (ctm->type) { |
1872 | case V_ASN1_UTCTIME: | |
1873 | if (ctm->length != (int)(utctime_length)) | |
0f113f3e | 1874 | return 0; |
80770da3 EK |
1875 | break; |
1876 | case V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME: | |
1877 | if (ctm->length != (int)(generalizedtime_length)) | |
0f113f3e | 1878 | return 0; |
80770da3 EK |
1879 | break; |
1880 | default: | |
1881 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1882 | } |
1883 | ||
80770da3 EK |
1884 | /** |
1885 | * Verify the format: the ASN.1 functions we use below allow a more | |
1886 | * flexible format than what's mandated by RFC 5280. | |
1887 | * Digit and date ranges will be verified in the conversion methods. | |
1888 | */ | |
1889 | for (i = 0; i < ctm->length - 1; i++) { | |
adf7e6d1 | 1890 | if (!ossl_ascii_isdigit(ctm->data[i])) |
f48b83b4 | 1891 | return 0; |
0f113f3e | 1892 | } |
48102247 | 1893 | if (ctm->data[ctm->length - 1] != upper_z) |
f48b83b4 | 1894 | return 0; |
0f113f3e | 1895 | |
80770da3 EK |
1896 | /* |
1897 | * There is ASN1_UTCTIME_cmp_time_t but no | |
1898 | * ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_cmp_time_t or ASN1_TIME_cmp_time_t, | |
1899 | * so we go through ASN.1 | |
1900 | */ | |
1901 | asn1_cmp_time = X509_time_adj(NULL, 0, cmp_time); | |
1902 | if (asn1_cmp_time == NULL) | |
1903 | goto err; | |
88444854 | 1904 | if (ASN1_TIME_diff(&day, &sec, ctm, asn1_cmp_time) == 0) |
80770da3 | 1905 | goto err; |
0f113f3e | 1906 | |
80770da3 EK |
1907 | /* |
1908 | * X509_cmp_time comparison is <=. | |
1909 | * The return value 0 is reserved for errors. | |
1910 | */ | |
1911 | ret = (day >= 0 && sec >= 0) ? -1 : 1; | |
1912 | ||
1913 | err: | |
1914 | ASN1_TIME_free(asn1_cmp_time); | |
1915 | return ret; | |
0f113f3e | 1916 | } |
d02b48c6 | 1917 | |
25d7cd1d DDO |
1918 | /* |
1919 | * Return 0 if time should not be checked or reference time is in range, | |
1920 | * or else 1 if it is past the end, or -1 if it is before the start | |
1921 | */ | |
1922 | int X509_cmp_timeframe(const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm, | |
1923 | const ASN1_TIME *start, const ASN1_TIME *end) | |
1924 | { | |
1925 | time_t ref_time; | |
1926 | time_t *time = NULL; | |
1927 | unsigned long flags = vpm == NULL ? 0 : X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_flags(vpm); | |
1928 | ||
1929 | if ((flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME) != 0) { | |
1930 | ref_time = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_time(vpm); | |
1931 | time = &ref_time; | |
1932 | } else if ((flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME) != 0) { | |
1933 | return 0; /* this means ok */ | |
1934 | } /* else reference time is the current time */ | |
1935 | ||
1936 | if (end != NULL && X509_cmp_time(end, time) < 0) | |
1937 | return 1; | |
1938 | if (start != NULL && X509_cmp_time(start, time) > 0) | |
1939 | return -1; | |
1940 | return 0; | |
1941 | } | |
1942 | ||
284ef5f3 | 1943 | ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj) |
bbb72003 | 1944 | { |
0f113f3e | 1945 | return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL); |
bbb72003 DSH |
1946 | } |
1947 | ||
87d3a0cd | 1948 | ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm) |
0f113f3e MC |
1949 | { |
1950 | return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm); | |
1951 | } | |
87d3a0cd DSH |
1952 | |
1953 | ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s, | |
0f113f3e MC |
1954 | int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm) |
1955 | { | |
1956 | time_t t; | |
1957 | ||
1958 | if (in_tm) | |
1959 | t = *in_tm; | |
1960 | else | |
1961 | time(&t); | |
1962 | ||
88444854 | 1963 | if (s != NULL && (s->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING) == 0) { |
0f113f3e MC |
1964 | if (s->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) |
1965 | return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec); | |
1966 | if (s->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME) | |
1967 | return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec); | |
1968 | } | |
1969 | return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec); | |
1970 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 1971 | |
364246a9 | 1972 | /* Copy any missing public key parameters up the chain towards pkey */ |
7e258a56 | 1973 | int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) |
0f113f3e MC |
1974 | { |
1975 | EVP_PKEY *ktmp = NULL, *ktmp2; | |
1976 | int i, j; | |
1977 | ||
579262af | 1978 | if (pkey != NULL && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) |
0f113f3e MC |
1979 | return 1; |
1980 | ||
1981 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) { | |
c01ff880 | 1982 | ktmp = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, i)); |
0f113f3e | 1983 | if (ktmp == NULL) { |
9311d0c4 | 1984 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY); |
0f113f3e MC |
1985 | return 0; |
1986 | } | |
1987 | if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp)) | |
1988 | break; | |
364246a9 | 1989 | ktmp = NULL; |
0f113f3e MC |
1990 | } |
1991 | if (ktmp == NULL) { | |
9311d0c4 | 1992 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN); |
0f113f3e MC |
1993 | return 0; |
1994 | } | |
1995 | ||
1996 | /* first, populate the other certs */ | |
1997 | for (j = i - 1; j >= 0; j--) { | |
c01ff880 | 1998 | ktmp2 = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, j)); |
364246a9 DDO |
1999 | if (!EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2, ktmp)) |
2000 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e MC |
2001 | } |
2002 | ||
2003 | if (pkey != NULL) | |
364246a9 | 2004 | return EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey, ktmp); |
0f113f3e MC |
2005 | return 1; |
2006 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 2007 | |
7e365d51 DDO |
2008 | /* |
2009 | * Make a delta CRL as the difference between two full CRLs. | |
2010 | * Sadly, returns NULL also on internal error. | |
2011 | */ | |
2e8cb108 | 2012 | X509_CRL *X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL *base, X509_CRL *newer, |
0f113f3e MC |
2013 | EVP_PKEY *skey, const EVP_MD *md, unsigned int flags) |
2014 | { | |
2015 | X509_CRL *crl = NULL; | |
2016 | int i; | |
88444854 | 2017 | |
0f113f3e MC |
2018 | STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED) *revs = NULL; |
2019 | /* CRLs can't be delta already */ | |
88444854 | 2020 | if (base->base_crl_number != NULL || newer->base_crl_number != NULL) { |
9311d0c4 | 2021 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_CRL_ALREADY_DELTA); |
0f113f3e MC |
2022 | return NULL; |
2023 | } | |
2024 | /* Base and new CRL must have a CRL number */ | |
88444854 | 2025 | if (base->crl_number == NULL || newer->crl_number == NULL) { |
9311d0c4 | 2026 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_NO_CRL_NUMBER); |
0f113f3e MC |
2027 | return NULL; |
2028 | } | |
2029 | /* Issuer names must match */ | |
88444854 DDO |
2030 | if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), |
2031 | X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer)) != 0) { | |
9311d0c4 | 2032 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_ISSUER_MISMATCH); |
0f113f3e MC |
2033 | return NULL; |
2034 | } | |
2035 | /* AKID and IDP must match */ | |
2036 | if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_authority_key_identifier)) { | |
9311d0c4 | 2037 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_AKID_MISMATCH); |
0f113f3e MC |
2038 | return NULL; |
2039 | } | |
2040 | if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_issuing_distribution_point)) { | |
9311d0c4 | 2041 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_IDP_MISMATCH); |
0f113f3e MC |
2042 | return NULL; |
2043 | } | |
2044 | /* Newer CRL number must exceed full CRL number */ | |
2045 | if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(newer->crl_number, base->crl_number) <= 0) { | |
9311d0c4 | 2046 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_NEWER_CRL_NOT_NEWER); |
0f113f3e MC |
2047 | return NULL; |
2048 | } | |
2049 | /* CRLs must verify */ | |
88444854 DDO |
2050 | if (skey != NULL && (X509_CRL_verify(base, skey) <= 0 || |
2051 | X509_CRL_verify(newer, skey) <= 0)) { | |
9311d0c4 | 2052 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_CRL_VERIFY_FAILURE); |
0f113f3e MC |
2053 | return NULL; |
2054 | } | |
2055 | /* Create new CRL */ | |
e6c2f964 | 2056 | crl = X509_CRL_new_ex(base->libctx, base->propq); |
cdf63a37 | 2057 | if (crl == NULL || !X509_CRL_set_version(crl, X509_CRL_VERSION_2)) |
0f113f3e MC |
2058 | goto memerr; |
2059 | /* Set issuer name */ | |
2060 | if (!X509_CRL_set_issuer_name(crl, X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer))) | |
2061 | goto memerr; | |
2062 | ||
568ce3a5 | 2063 | if (!X509_CRL_set1_lastUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(newer))) |
0f113f3e | 2064 | goto memerr; |
568ce3a5 | 2065 | if (!X509_CRL_set1_nextUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(newer))) |
0f113f3e MC |
2066 | goto memerr; |
2067 | ||
2068 | /* Set base CRL number: must be critical */ | |
0f113f3e MC |
2069 | if (!X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d(crl, NID_delta_crl, base->crl_number, 1, 0)) |
2070 | goto memerr; | |
2071 | ||
2072 | /* | |
2073 | * Copy extensions across from newest CRL to delta: this will set CRL | |
2074 | * number to correct value too. | |
2075 | */ | |
0f113f3e | 2076 | for (i = 0; i < X509_CRL_get_ext_count(newer); i++) { |
88444854 DDO |
2077 | X509_EXTENSION *ext = X509_CRL_get_ext(newer, i); |
2078 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
2079 | if (!X509_CRL_add_ext(crl, ext, -1)) |
2080 | goto memerr; | |
2081 | } | |
2082 | ||
2083 | /* Go through revoked entries, copying as needed */ | |
0f113f3e MC |
2084 | revs = X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(newer); |
2085 | ||
2086 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_REVOKED_num(revs); i++) { | |
2087 | X509_REVOKED *rvn, *rvtmp; | |
88444854 | 2088 | |
0f113f3e MC |
2089 | rvn = sk_X509_REVOKED_value(revs, i); |
2090 | /* | |
2091 | * Add only if not also in base. TODO: need something cleverer here | |
2092 | * for some more complex CRLs covering multiple CAs. | |
2093 | */ | |
34a42e14 | 2094 | if (!X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(base, &rvtmp, &rvn->serialNumber)) { |
0f113f3e | 2095 | rvtmp = X509_REVOKED_dup(rvn); |
88444854 | 2096 | if (rvtmp == NULL) |
0f113f3e MC |
2097 | goto memerr; |
2098 | if (!X509_CRL_add0_revoked(crl, rvtmp)) { | |
2099 | X509_REVOKED_free(rvtmp); | |
2100 | goto memerr; | |
2101 | } | |
2102 | } | |
2103 | } | |
2104 | /* TODO: optionally prune deleted entries */ | |
2105 | ||
88444854 | 2106 | if (skey != NULL && md != NULL && !X509_CRL_sign(crl, skey, md)) |
0f113f3e MC |
2107 | goto memerr; |
2108 | ||
2109 | return crl; | |
2110 | ||
2111 | memerr: | |
9311d0c4 | 2112 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
222561fe | 2113 | X509_CRL_free(crl); |
0f113f3e MC |
2114 | return NULL; |
2115 | } | |
2116 | ||
6b691a5c | 2117 | int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data) |
0f113f3e MC |
2118 | { |
2119 | return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx, data); | |
2120 | } | |
58964a49 | 2121 | |
8cc86b81 | 2122 | void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx) |
0f113f3e MC |
2123 | { |
2124 | return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx); | |
2125 | } | |
58964a49 | 2126 | |
8cc86b81 | 2127 | int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
2128 | { |
2129 | return ctx->error; | |
2130 | } | |
58964a49 | 2131 | |
6b691a5c | 2132 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err) |
0f113f3e MC |
2133 | { |
2134 | ctx->error = err; | |
2135 | } | |
58964a49 | 2136 | |
8cc86b81 | 2137 | int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
2138 | { |
2139 | return ctx->error_depth; | |
2140 | } | |
58964a49 | 2141 | |
51227177 VD |
2142 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth) |
2143 | { | |
2144 | ctx->error_depth = depth; | |
2145 | } | |
2146 | ||
8cc86b81 | 2147 | X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
2148 | { |
2149 | return ctx->current_cert; | |
2150 | } | |
58964a49 | 2151 | |
c9654873 VD |
2152 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) |
2153 | { | |
2154 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
2155 | } | |
2156 | ||
8cc86b81 | 2157 | STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
2158 | { |
2159 | return ctx->chain; | |
2160 | } | |
58964a49 | 2161 | |
8cc86b81 | 2162 | STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e | 2163 | { |
88444854 | 2164 | if (ctx->chain == NULL) |
0f113f3e MC |
2165 | return NULL; |
2166 | return X509_chain_up_ref(ctx->chain); | |
2167 | } | |
25f923dd | 2168 | |
8cc86b81 | 2169 | X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
2170 | { |
2171 | return ctx->current_issuer; | |
2172 | } | |
2008e714 | 2173 | |
8cc86b81 | 2174 | X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
2175 | { |
2176 | return ctx->current_crl; | |
2177 | } | |
2008e714 | 2178 | |
8cc86b81 | 2179 | X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
2180 | { |
2181 | return ctx->parent; | |
2182 | } | |
2008e714 | 2183 | |
6b691a5c | 2184 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) |
0f113f3e MC |
2185 | { |
2186 | ctx->cert = x; | |
2187 | } | |
58964a49 | 2188 | |
e1a27eb3 | 2189 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk) |
0f113f3e MC |
2190 | { |
2191 | ctx->crls = sk; | |
2192 | } | |
e1a27eb3 | 2193 | |
13938ace | 2194 | int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose) |
0f113f3e | 2195 | { |
0daccd4d VD |
2196 | /* |
2197 | * XXX: Why isn't this function always used to set the associated trust? | |
2198 | * Should there even be a VPM->trust field at all? Or should the trust | |
2199 | * always be inferred from the purpose by X509_STORE_CTX_init(). | |
2200 | */ | |
0f113f3e MC |
2201 | return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0); |
2202 | } | |
11262391 | 2203 | |
bb7cd4e3 | 2204 | int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust) |
0f113f3e | 2205 | { |
0daccd4d VD |
2206 | /* |
2207 | * XXX: See above, this function would only be needed when the default | |
2208 | * trust for the purpose needs an override in a corner case. | |
2209 | */ | |
0f113f3e MC |
2210 | return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust); |
2211 | } | |
2212 | ||
2213 | /* | |
2214 | * This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust values. | |
2215 | * This is intended to be used when another structure has its own trust and | |
2216 | * purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by the ctx. If they aren't | |
2217 | * set then we will usually have a default purpose in mind which should then | |
2218 | * be used to set the trust value. An example of this is SSL use: an SSL | |
2219 | * structure will have its own purpose and trust settings which the | |
2220 | * application can set: if they aren't set then we use the default of SSL | |
2221 | * client/server. | |
13938ace | 2222 | */ |
13938ace | 2223 | int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose, |
0f113f3e MC |
2224 | int purpose, int trust) |
2225 | { | |
2226 | int idx; | |
88444854 | 2227 | |
0f113f3e | 2228 | /* If purpose not set use default */ |
12a765a5 | 2229 | if (purpose == 0) |
0f113f3e MC |
2230 | purpose = def_purpose; |
2231 | /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */ | |
12a765a5 | 2232 | if (purpose != 0) { |
0f113f3e | 2233 | X509_PURPOSE *ptmp; |
88444854 | 2234 | |
0f113f3e MC |
2235 | idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose); |
2236 | if (idx == -1) { | |
9311d0c4 | 2237 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID); |
0f113f3e MC |
2238 | return 0; |
2239 | } | |
2240 | ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); | |
2241 | if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) { | |
2242 | idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose); | |
0daccd4d VD |
2243 | /* |
2244 | * XXX: In the two callers above def_purpose is always 0, which is | |
2245 | * not a known value, so idx will always be -1. How is the | |
2246 | * X509_TRUST_DEFAULT case actually supposed to be handled? | |
2247 | */ | |
0f113f3e | 2248 | if (idx == -1) { |
9311d0c4 | 2249 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID); |
0f113f3e MC |
2250 | return 0; |
2251 | } | |
2252 | ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); | |
2253 | } | |
2254 | /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */ | |
88444854 | 2255 | if (trust == 0) |
0f113f3e MC |
2256 | trust = ptmp->trust; |
2257 | } | |
88444854 | 2258 | if (trust != 0) { |
0f113f3e MC |
2259 | idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust); |
2260 | if (idx == -1) { | |
9311d0c4 | 2261 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID); |
0f113f3e MC |
2262 | return 0; |
2263 | } | |
2264 | } | |
2265 | ||
88444854 | 2266 | if (ctx->param->purpose == 0 && purpose != 0) |
0f113f3e | 2267 | ctx->param->purpose = purpose; |
88444854 | 2268 | if (ctx->param->trust == 0 && trust != 0) |
0f113f3e MC |
2269 | ctx->param->trust = trust; |
2270 | return 1; | |
51630a37 DSH |
2271 | } |
2272 | ||
b4250010 | 2273 | X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new_ex(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, const char *propq) |
2f043896 | 2274 | { |
b51bce94 | 2275 | X509_STORE_CTX *ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx)); |
b196e7d9 | 2276 | |
90945fa3 | 2277 | if (ctx == NULL) { |
9311d0c4 | 2278 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
0f113f3e MC |
2279 | return NULL; |
2280 | } | |
1143c27b MC |
2281 | |
2282 | ctx->libctx = libctx; | |
2283 | if (propq != NULL) { | |
2284 | ctx->propq = OPENSSL_strdup(propq); | |
2285 | if (ctx->propq == NULL) { | |
2286 | OPENSSL_free(ctx); | |
9311d0c4 | 2287 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
1143c27b MC |
2288 | return NULL; |
2289 | } | |
2290 | } | |
2291 | ||
0f113f3e | 2292 | return ctx; |
2f043896 DSH |
2293 | } |
2294 | ||
1143c27b MC |
2295 | X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void) |
2296 | { | |
d8652be0 | 2297 | return X509_STORE_CTX_new_ex(NULL, NULL); |
1143c27b MC |
2298 | } |
2299 | ||
2f043896 DSH |
2300 | void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
2301 | { | |
c001ce33 | 2302 | if (ctx == NULL) |
222561fe | 2303 | return; |
c001ce33 | 2304 | |
0f113f3e | 2305 | X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx); |
1143c27b MC |
2306 | |
2307 | /* libctx and propq survive X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup() */ | |
2308 | OPENSSL_free(ctx->propq); | |
0f113f3e | 2309 | OPENSSL_free(ctx); |
2f043896 DSH |
2310 | } |
2311 | ||
79aa04ef | 2312 | int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509, |
0f113f3e MC |
2313 | STACK_OF(X509) *chain) |
2314 | { | |
2315 | int ret = 1; | |
ecdaa1ae | 2316 | |
c926a5ec DDO |
2317 | if (ctx == NULL) { |
2318 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); | |
2319 | return 0; | |
2320 | } | |
2321 | X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx); | |
2322 | ||
faa9dcd4 | 2323 | ctx->store = store; |
0f113f3e MC |
2324 | ctx->cert = x509; |
2325 | ctx->untrusted = chain; | |
2326 | ctx->crls = NULL; | |
d9b8b89b | 2327 | ctx->num_untrusted = 0; |
0f113f3e MC |
2328 | ctx->other_ctx = NULL; |
2329 | ctx->valid = 0; | |
2330 | ctx->chain = NULL; | |
d1e85cdf | 2331 | ctx->error = X509_V_OK; |
0f113f3e MC |
2332 | ctx->explicit_policy = 0; |
2333 | ctx->error_depth = 0; | |
2334 | ctx->current_cert = NULL; | |
2335 | ctx->current_issuer = NULL; | |
2336 | ctx->current_crl = NULL; | |
2337 | ctx->current_crl_score = 0; | |
2338 | ctx->current_reasons = 0; | |
2339 | ctx->tree = NULL; | |
2340 | ctx->parent = NULL; | |
919ba009 | 2341 | ctx->dane = NULL; |
170b7358 | 2342 | ctx->bare_ta_signed = 0; |
e29c73c9 VD |
2343 | /* Zero ex_data to make sure we're cleanup-safe */ |
2344 | memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(ctx->ex_data)); | |
0f113f3e | 2345 | |
7b7eb472 | 2346 | /* store->cleanup is always 0 in OpenSSL, if set must be idempotent */ |
88444854 | 2347 | if (store != NULL) |
0f113f3e | 2348 | ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup; |
7b7eb472 | 2349 | else |
c926a5ec | 2350 | ctx->cleanup = NULL; |
0f113f3e | 2351 | |
88444854 | 2352 | if (store != NULL && store->check_issued != NULL) |
0f113f3e MC |
2353 | ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued; |
2354 | else | |
2355 | ctx->check_issued = check_issued; | |
2356 | ||
88444854 | 2357 | if (store != NULL && store->get_issuer != NULL) |
0f113f3e MC |
2358 | ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer; |
2359 | else | |
2360 | ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer; | |
2361 | ||
88444854 | 2362 | if (store != NULL && store->verify_cb != NULL) |
0f113f3e MC |
2363 | ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb; |
2364 | else | |
2365 | ctx->verify_cb = null_callback; | |
2366 | ||
88444854 | 2367 | if (store != NULL && store->verify != NULL) |
0f113f3e MC |
2368 | ctx->verify = store->verify; |
2369 | else | |
2370 | ctx->verify = internal_verify; | |
2371 | ||
88444854 | 2372 | if (store != NULL && store->check_revocation != NULL) |
0f113f3e MC |
2373 | ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation; |
2374 | else | |
2375 | ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation; | |
2376 | ||
88444854 | 2377 | if (store != NULL && store->get_crl != NULL) |
0f113f3e | 2378 | ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl; |
311f2785 VD |
2379 | else |
2380 | ctx->get_crl = NULL; | |
0f113f3e | 2381 | |
88444854 | 2382 | if (store != NULL && store->check_crl != NULL) |
0f113f3e MC |
2383 | ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl; |
2384 | else | |
2385 | ctx->check_crl = check_crl; | |
2386 | ||
88444854 | 2387 | if (store != NULL && store->cert_crl != NULL) |
0f113f3e MC |
2388 | ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl; |
2389 | else | |
2390 | ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl; | |
2391 | ||
88444854 | 2392 | if (store != NULL && store->check_policy != NULL) |
0a5fe2eb RL |
2393 | ctx->check_policy = store->check_policy; |
2394 | else | |
2395 | ctx->check_policy = check_policy; | |
2396 | ||
88444854 | 2397 | if (store != NULL && store->lookup_certs != NULL) |
0f113f3e MC |
2398 | ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs; |
2399 | else | |
6ddbb4cd | 2400 | ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_certs; |
0f113f3e | 2401 | |
88444854 | 2402 | if (store != NULL && store->lookup_crls != NULL) |
0f113f3e MC |
2403 | ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls; |
2404 | else | |
6ddbb4cd | 2405 | ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_crls; |
0f113f3e | 2406 | |
ecdaa1ae | 2407 | ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(); |
2408 | if (ctx->param == NULL) { | |
9311d0c4 | 2409 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
ecdaa1ae | 2410 | goto err; |
2411 | } | |
2412 | ||
07b6068d | 2413 | /* Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set use defaults. */ |
88444854 | 2414 | if (store != NULL) |
ecdaa1ae | 2415 | ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param); |
2416 | else | |
2417 | ctx->param->inh_flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT | X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE; | |
2418 | ||
2419 | if (ret) | |
2420 | ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, | |
2421 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default")); | |
2422 | ||
2423 | if (ret == 0) { | |
9311d0c4 | 2424 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
ecdaa1ae | 2425 | goto err; |
2426 | } | |
2427 | ||
0daccd4d VD |
2428 | /* |
2429 | * XXX: For now, continue to inherit trust from VPM, but infer from the | |
2430 | * purpose if this still yields the default value. | |
2431 | */ | |
2432 | if (ctx->param->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) { | |
2433 | int idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(ctx->param->purpose); | |
2434 | X509_PURPOSE *xp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); | |
2435 | ||
2436 | if (xp != NULL) | |
2437 | ctx->param->trust = X509_PURPOSE_get_trust(xp); | |
2438 | } | |
2439 | ||
e29c73c9 VD |
2440 | if (CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, |
2441 | &ctx->ex_data)) | |
2442 | return 1; | |
9311d0c4 | 2443 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
ecdaa1ae | 2444 | |
d9b8b89b | 2445 | err: |
e29c73c9 VD |
2446 | /* |
2447 | * On error clean up allocated storage, if the store context was not | |
2448 | * allocated with X509_STORE_CTX_new() this is our last chance to do so. | |
2449 | */ | |
ecdaa1ae | 2450 | X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx); |
2451 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e MC |
2452 | } |
2453 | ||
2454 | /* | |
2455 | * Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates. This | |
2456 | * avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed. | |
2f043896 | 2457 | */ |
f0e0fd51 | 2458 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) |
2f043896 | 2459 | { |
0f113f3e MC |
2460 | ctx->other_ctx = sk; |
2461 | ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk; | |
c864e761 | 2462 | ctx->lookup_certs = lookup_certs_sk; |
2f043896 DSH |
2463 | } |
2464 | ||
2465 | void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
0f113f3e | 2466 | { |
e29c73c9 VD |
2467 | /* |
2468 | * We need to be idempotent because, unfortunately, free() also calls | |
2469 | * cleanup(), so the natural call sequence new(), init(), cleanup(), free() | |
2470 | * calls cleanup() for the same object twice! Thus we must zero the | |
2471 | * pointers below after they're freed! | |
2472 | */ | |
c926a5ec | 2473 | /* Seems to always be NULL in OpenSSL, do this at most once. */ |
e29c73c9 | 2474 | if (ctx->cleanup != NULL) { |
0f113f3e | 2475 | ctx->cleanup(ctx); |
e29c73c9 VD |
2476 | ctx->cleanup = NULL; |
2477 | } | |
0f113f3e MC |
2478 | if (ctx->param != NULL) { |
2479 | if (ctx->parent == NULL) | |
2480 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param); | |
2481 | ctx->param = NULL; | |
2482 | } | |
222561fe RS |
2483 | X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree); |
2484 | ctx->tree = NULL; | |
2485 | sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain, X509_free); | |
2486 | ctx->chain = NULL; | |
0f113f3e | 2487 | CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data)); |
16f8d4eb | 2488 | memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(ctx->ex_data)); |
0f113f3e | 2489 | } |
13938ace | 2490 | |
5d7c222d | 2491 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth) |
0f113f3e MC |
2492 | { |
2493 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth); | |
2494 | } | |
bbb72003 | 2495 | |
5d7c222d | 2496 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags) |
0f113f3e MC |
2497 | { |
2498 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags); | |
2499 | } | |
5d7c222d | 2500 | |
0f113f3e MC |
2501 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags, |
2502 | time_t t) | |
2503 | { | |
2504 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t); | |
2505 | } | |
bbb72003 | 2506 | |
8cc86b81 | 2507 | X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_cert(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
1060a50b RL |
2508 | { |
2509 | return ctx->cert; | |
2510 | } | |
2511 | ||
8cc86b81 | 2512 | STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_untrusted(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
1060a50b RL |
2513 | { |
2514 | return ctx->untrusted; | |
2515 | } | |
2516 | ||
2517 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) | |
2518 | { | |
2519 | ctx->untrusted = sk; | |
2520 | } | |
2521 | ||
2522 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_verified_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) | |
2523 | { | |
2524 | sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain, X509_free); | |
2525 | ctx->chain = sk; | |
2526 | } | |
2527 | ||
db089ad6 | 2528 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, |
f0e0fd51 | 2529 | X509_STORE_CTX_verify_cb verify_cb) |
0f113f3e MC |
2530 | { |
2531 | ctx->verify_cb = verify_cb; | |
2532 | } | |
db089ad6 | 2533 | |
8cc86b81 | 2534 | X509_STORE_CTX_verify_cb X509_STORE_CTX_get_verify_cb(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
f0e0fd51 RS |
2535 | { |
2536 | return ctx->verify_cb; | |
2537 | } | |
2538 | ||
4a7b3a7b VD |
2539 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, |
2540 | X509_STORE_CTX_verify_fn verify) | |
2541 | { | |
2542 | ctx->verify = verify; | |
2543 | } | |
2544 | ||
8cc86b81 | 2545 | X509_STORE_CTX_verify_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_verify(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
f0e0fd51 | 2546 | { |
1060a50b | 2547 | return ctx->verify; |
f0e0fd51 RS |
2548 | } |
2549 | ||
88444854 DDO |
2550 | X509_STORE_CTX_get_issuer_fn |
2551 | X509_STORE_CTX_get_get_issuer(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
f0e0fd51 | 2552 | { |
1060a50b | 2553 | return ctx->get_issuer; |
f0e0fd51 RS |
2554 | } |
2555 | ||
8cc86b81 | 2556 | X509_STORE_CTX_check_issued_fn |
88444854 | 2557 | X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_issued(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
4dba585f | 2558 | { |
1060a50b | 2559 | return ctx->check_issued; |
4dba585f DSH |
2560 | } |
2561 | ||
8cc86b81 | 2562 | X509_STORE_CTX_check_revocation_fn |
88444854 | 2563 | X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_revocation(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
f0e0fd51 | 2564 | { |
1060a50b | 2565 | return ctx->check_revocation; |
f0e0fd51 RS |
2566 | } |
2567 | ||
8cc86b81 | 2568 | X509_STORE_CTX_get_crl_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_get_crl(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
f0e0fd51 | 2569 | { |
1060a50b | 2570 | return ctx->get_crl; |
f0e0fd51 RS |
2571 | } |
2572 | ||
88444854 DDO |
2573 | X509_STORE_CTX_check_crl_fn |
2574 | X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_crl(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
f0e0fd51 | 2575 | { |
1060a50b RL |
2576 | return ctx->check_crl; |
2577 | } | |
2578 | ||
88444854 DDO |
2579 | X509_STORE_CTX_cert_crl_fn |
2580 | X509_STORE_CTX_get_cert_crl(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
1060a50b RL |
2581 | { |
2582 | return ctx->cert_crl; | |
2583 | } | |
2584 | ||
8cc86b81 | 2585 | X509_STORE_CTX_check_policy_fn |
88444854 | 2586 | X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_policy(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
1060a50b RL |
2587 | { |
2588 | return ctx->check_policy; | |
2589 | } | |
2590 | ||
8cc86b81 | 2591 | X509_STORE_CTX_lookup_certs_fn |
88444854 | 2592 | X509_STORE_CTX_get_lookup_certs(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
1060a50b RL |
2593 | { |
2594 | return ctx->lookup_certs; | |
2595 | } | |
2596 | ||
8cc86b81 | 2597 | X509_STORE_CTX_lookup_crls_fn |
88444854 | 2598 | X509_STORE_CTX_get_lookup_crls(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
1060a50b RL |
2599 | { |
2600 | return ctx->lookup_crls; | |
2601 | } | |
2602 | ||
8cc86b81 | 2603 | X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_cleanup(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
1060a50b RL |
2604 | { |
2605 | return ctx->cleanup; | |
f0e0fd51 RS |
2606 | } |
2607 | ||
8cc86b81 | 2608 | X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
2609 | { |
2610 | return ctx->tree; | |
2611 | } | |
5d7c222d | 2612 | |
8cc86b81 | 2613 | int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
2614 | { |
2615 | return ctx->explicit_policy; | |
2616 | } | |
5d7c222d | 2617 | |
8cc86b81 | 2618 | int X509_STORE_CTX_get_num_untrusted(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
7f3f41d8 | 2619 | { |
d9b8b89b | 2620 | return ctx->num_untrusted; |
7f3f41d8 MC |
2621 | } |
2622 | ||
5d7c222d | 2623 | int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name) |
0f113f3e MC |
2624 | { |
2625 | const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param; | |
12a765a5 | 2626 | |
0f113f3e | 2627 | param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name); |
12a765a5 | 2628 | if (param == NULL) |
0f113f3e MC |
2629 | return 0; |
2630 | return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param); | |
2631 | } | |
5d7c222d | 2632 | |
8cc86b81 | 2633 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
2634 | { |
2635 | return ctx->param; | |
2636 | } | |
5d7c222d DSH |
2637 | |
2638 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) | |
0f113f3e | 2639 | { |
222561fe | 2640 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param); |
0f113f3e MC |
2641 | ctx->param = param; |
2642 | } | |
d9b8b89b | 2643 | |
b9aec69a | 2644 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_dane(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, SSL_DANE *dane) |
919ba009 VD |
2645 | { |
2646 | ctx->dane = dane; | |
2647 | } | |
2648 | ||
88444854 DDO |
2649 | static unsigned char *dane_i2d(X509 *cert, uint8_t selector, |
2650 | unsigned int *i2dlen) | |
170b7358 VD |
2651 | { |
2652 | unsigned char *buf = NULL; | |
2653 | int len; | |
2654 | ||
2655 | /* | |
2656 | * Extract ASN.1 DER form of certificate or public key. | |
2657 | */ | |
2658 | switch (selector) { | |
2659 | case DANETLS_SELECTOR_CERT: | |
2660 | len = i2d_X509(cert, &buf); | |
2661 | break; | |
2662 | case DANETLS_SELECTOR_SPKI: | |
2663 | len = i2d_X509_PUBKEY(X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(cert), &buf); | |
2664 | break; | |
2665 | default: | |
9311d0c4 | 2666 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_BAD_SELECTOR); |
170b7358 VD |
2667 | return NULL; |
2668 | } | |
2669 | ||
2670 | if (len < 0 || buf == NULL) { | |
9311d0c4 | 2671 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
170b7358 VD |
2672 | return NULL; |
2673 | } | |
2674 | ||
2675 | *i2dlen = (unsigned int)len; | |
2676 | return buf; | |
2677 | } | |
2678 | ||
88444854 | 2679 | #define DANETLS_NONE 256 /* impossible uint8_t */ |
170b7358 | 2680 | |
7e365d51 | 2681 | /* Returns -1 on internal error */ |
170b7358 VD |
2682 | static int dane_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert, int depth) |
2683 | { | |
b9aec69a | 2684 | SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane; |
170b7358 VD |
2685 | unsigned usage = DANETLS_NONE; |
2686 | unsigned selector = DANETLS_NONE; | |
2687 | unsigned ordinal = DANETLS_NONE; | |
2688 | unsigned mtype = DANETLS_NONE; | |
2689 | unsigned char *i2dbuf = NULL; | |
2690 | unsigned int i2dlen = 0; | |
2691 | unsigned char mdbuf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; | |
2692 | unsigned char *cmpbuf = NULL; | |
2693 | unsigned int cmplen = 0; | |
2694 | int i; | |
2695 | int recnum; | |
2696 | int matched = 0; | |
2697 | danetls_record *t = NULL; | |
2698 | uint32_t mask; | |
2699 | ||
2700 | mask = (depth == 0) ? DANETLS_EE_MASK : DANETLS_TA_MASK; | |
2701 | ||
07b6068d | 2702 | /* The trust store is not applicable with DANE-TA(2) */ |
170b7358 VD |
2703 | if (depth >= ctx->num_untrusted) |
2704 | mask &= DANETLS_PKIX_MASK; | |
2705 | ||
2706 | /* | |
2707 | * If we've previously matched a PKIX-?? record, no need to test any | |
02e112a8 | 2708 | * further PKIX-?? records, it remains to just build the PKIX chain. |
170b7358 VD |
2709 | * Had the match been a DANE-?? record, we'd be done already. |
2710 | */ | |
2711 | if (dane->mdpth >= 0) | |
2712 | mask &= ~DANETLS_PKIX_MASK; | |
2713 | ||
2714 | /*- | |
2715 | * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.1 | |
2716 | * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.2 | |
2717 | * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.3 | |
2718 | * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.4 | |
2719 | * | |
2720 | * We handle DANE-EE(3) records first as they require no chain building | |
2721 | * and no expiration or hostname checks. We also process digests with | |
2722 | * higher ordinals first and ignore lower priorities except Full(0) which | |
2723 | * is always processed (last). If none match, we then process PKIX-EE(1). | |
2724 | * | |
2725 | * NOTE: This relies on DANE usages sorting before the corresponding PKIX | |
2726 | * usages in SSL_dane_tlsa_add(), and also on descending sorting of digest | |
2727 | * priorities. See twin comment in ssl/ssl_lib.c. | |
2728 | * | |
2729 | * We expect that most TLSA RRsets will have just a single usage, so we | |
2730 | * don't go out of our way to cache multiple selector-specific i2d buffers | |
2731 | * across usages, but if the selector happens to remain the same as switch | |
2732 | * usages, that's OK. Thus, a set of "3 1 1", "3 0 1", "1 1 1", "1 0 1", | |
2733 | * records would result in us generating each of the certificate and public | |
2734 | * key DER forms twice, but more typically we'd just see multiple "3 1 1" | |
2735 | * or multiple "3 0 1" records. | |
2736 | * | |
2737 | * As soon as we find a match at any given depth, we stop, because either | |
2738 | * we've matched a DANE-?? record and the peer is authenticated, or, after | |
0d4fb843 | 2739 | * exhausting all DANE-?? records, we've matched a PKIX-?? record, which is |
170b7358 VD |
2740 | * sufficient for DANE, and what remains to do is ordinary PKIX validation. |
2741 | */ | |
88444854 | 2742 | recnum = (dane->umask & mask) != 0 ? sk_danetls_record_num(dane->trecs) : 0; |
170b7358 VD |
2743 | for (i = 0; matched == 0 && i < recnum; ++i) { |
2744 | t = sk_danetls_record_value(dane->trecs, i); | |
2745 | if ((DANETLS_USAGE_BIT(t->usage) & mask) == 0) | |
2746 | continue; | |
2747 | if (t->usage != usage) { | |
2748 | usage = t->usage; | |
2749 | ||
2750 | /* Reset digest agility for each usage/selector pair */ | |
2751 | mtype = DANETLS_NONE; | |
2752 | ordinal = dane->dctx->mdord[t->mtype]; | |
2753 | } | |
2754 | if (t->selector != selector) { | |
2755 | selector = t->selector; | |
2756 | ||
2757 | /* Update per-selector state */ | |
2758 | OPENSSL_free(i2dbuf); | |
2759 | i2dbuf = dane_i2d(cert, selector, &i2dlen); | |
2760 | if (i2dbuf == NULL) | |
2761 | return -1; | |
2762 | ||
2763 | /* Reset digest agility for each usage/selector pair */ | |
2764 | mtype = DANETLS_NONE; | |
2765 | ordinal = dane->dctx->mdord[t->mtype]; | |
2766 | } else if (t->mtype != DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL) { | |
2767 | /*- | |
2768 | * Digest agility: | |
2769 | * | |
2770 | * <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-9> | |
2771 | * | |
2772 | * For a fixed selector, after processing all records with the | |
2773 | * highest mtype ordinal, ignore all mtypes with lower ordinals | |
2774 | * other than "Full". | |
2775 | */ | |
2776 | if (dane->dctx->mdord[t->mtype] < ordinal) | |
2777 | continue; | |
2778 | } | |
2779 | ||
2780 | /* | |
2781 | * Each time we hit a (new selector or) mtype, re-compute the relevant | |
2782 | * digest, more complex caching is not worth the code space. | |
2783 | */ | |
2784 | if (t->mtype != mtype) { | |
2785 | const EVP_MD *md = dane->dctx->mdevp[mtype = t->mtype]; | |
88444854 | 2786 | |
170b7358 VD |
2787 | cmpbuf = i2dbuf; |
2788 | cmplen = i2dlen; | |
2789 | ||
2790 | if (md != NULL) { | |
dccd20d1 F |
2791 | cmpbuf = mdbuf; |
2792 | if (!EVP_Digest(i2dbuf, i2dlen, cmpbuf, &cmplen, md, 0)) { | |
2793 | matched = -1; | |
170b7358 VD |
2794 | break; |
2795 | } | |
2796 | } | |
2797 | } | |
2798 | ||
2799 | /* | |
2800 | * Squirrel away the certificate and depth if we have a match. Any | |
2801 | * DANE match is dispositive, but with PKIX we still need to build a | |
2802 | * full chain. | |
2803 | */ | |
2804 | if (cmplen == t->dlen && | |
2805 | memcmp(cmpbuf, t->data, cmplen) == 0) { | |
2806 | if (DANETLS_USAGE_BIT(usage) & DANETLS_DANE_MASK) | |
2807 | matched = 1; | |
2808 | if (matched || dane->mdpth < 0) { | |
2809 | dane->mdpth = depth; | |
2810 | dane->mtlsa = t; | |
2811 | OPENSSL_free(dane->mcert); | |
2812 | dane->mcert = cert; | |
2813 | X509_up_ref(cert); | |
2814 | } | |
2815 | break; | |
2816 | } | |
2817 | } | |
2818 | ||
2819 | /* Clear the one-element DER cache */ | |
2820 | OPENSSL_free(i2dbuf); | |
2821 | return matched; | |
2822 | } | |
2823 | ||
7e365d51 | 2824 | /* Returns -1 on internal error */ |
170b7358 VD |
2825 | static int check_dane_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth) |
2826 | { | |
b9aec69a | 2827 | SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane; |
170b7358 VD |
2828 | int matched = 0; |
2829 | X509 *cert; | |
2830 | ||
2831 | if (!DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane) || depth == 0) | |
88444854 | 2832 | return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; |
170b7358 VD |
2833 | |
2834 | /* | |
ade08735 | 2835 | * Record any DANE trust anchor matches, for the first depth to test, if |
170b7358 VD |
2836 | * there's one at that depth. (This'll be false for length 1 chains looking |
2837 | * for an exact match for the leaf certificate). | |
2838 | */ | |
2839 | cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, depth); | |
2840 | if (cert != NULL && (matched = dane_match(ctx, cert, depth)) < 0) | |
7e365d51 | 2841 | return matched; |
170b7358 VD |
2842 | if (matched > 0) { |
2843 | ctx->num_untrusted = depth - 1; | |
88444854 | 2844 | return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED; |
170b7358 VD |
2845 | } |
2846 | ||
88444854 | 2847 | return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; |
170b7358 VD |
2848 | } |
2849 | ||
2850 | static int check_dane_pkeys(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
2851 | { | |
b9aec69a | 2852 | SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane; |
170b7358 VD |
2853 | danetls_record *t; |
2854 | int num = ctx->num_untrusted; | |
2855 | X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1); | |
2856 | int recnum = sk_danetls_record_num(dane->trecs); | |
2857 | int i; | |
2858 | ||
2859 | for (i = 0; i < recnum; ++i) { | |
2860 | t = sk_danetls_record_value(dane->trecs, i); | |
2861 | if (t->usage != DANETLS_USAGE_DANE_TA || | |
2862 | t->selector != DANETLS_SELECTOR_SPKI || | |
2863 | t->mtype != DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL || | |
6725682d | 2864 | X509_verify(cert, t->spki) <= 0) |
170b7358 VD |
2865 | continue; |
2866 | ||
c0a445a9 | 2867 | /* Clear any PKIX-?? matches that failed to extend to a full chain */ |
170b7358 VD |
2868 | X509_free(dane->mcert); |
2869 | dane->mcert = NULL; | |
2870 | ||
2871 | /* Record match via a bare TA public key */ | |
2872 | ctx->bare_ta_signed = 1; | |
2873 | dane->mdpth = num - 1; | |
2874 | dane->mtlsa = t; | |
2875 | ||
2876 | /* Prune any excess chain certificates */ | |
2877 | num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); | |
2878 | for (; num > ctx->num_untrusted; --num) | |
2879 | X509_free(sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain)); | |
2880 | ||
2881 | return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED; | |
2882 | } | |
2883 | ||
2884 | return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; | |
2885 | } | |
2886 | ||
b9aec69a | 2887 | static void dane_reset(SSL_DANE *dane) |
170b7358 | 2888 | { |
07b6068d | 2889 | /* Reset state to verify another chain, or clear after failure. */ |
170b7358 VD |
2890 | X509_free(dane->mcert); |
2891 | dane->mcert = NULL; | |
2892 | dane->mtlsa = NULL; | |
2893 | dane->mdpth = -1; | |
2894 | dane->pdpth = -1; | |
2895 | } | |
2896 | ||
6e328256 VD |
2897 | static int check_leaf_suiteb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert) |
2898 | { | |
2899 | int err = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, cert, NULL, ctx->param->flags); | |
2900 | ||
07b6068d | 2901 | CB_FAIL_IF(err != X509_V_OK, ctx, cert, 0, err); |
6e5e118c | 2902 | return 1; |
6e328256 VD |
2903 | } |
2904 | ||
7e365d51 | 2905 | /* Returns -1 on internal error */ |
170b7358 VD |
2906 | static int dane_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
2907 | { | |
2908 | X509 *cert = ctx->cert; | |
b9aec69a | 2909 | SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane; |
170b7358 VD |
2910 | int matched; |
2911 | int done; | |
2912 | ||
2913 | dane_reset(dane); | |
2914 | ||
89ff989d VD |
2915 | /*- |
2916 | * When testing the leaf certificate, if we match a DANE-EE(3) record, | |
2917 | * dane_match() returns 1 and we're done. If however we match a PKIX-EE(1) | |
2918 | * record, the match depth and matching TLSA record are recorded, but the | |
ade08735 | 2919 | * return value is 0, because we still need to find a PKIX trust anchor. |
89ff989d VD |
2920 | * Therefore, when DANE authentication is enabled (required), we're done |
2921 | * if: | |
2922 | * + matched < 0, internal error. | |
2923 | * + matched == 1, we matched a DANE-EE(3) record | |
2924 | * + matched == 0, mdepth < 0 (no PKIX-EE match) and there are no | |
2925 | * DANE-TA(2) or PKIX-TA(0) to test. | |
2926 | */ | |
170b7358 VD |
2927 | matched = dane_match(ctx, ctx->cert, 0); |
2928 | done = matched != 0 || (!DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane) && dane->mdpth < 0); | |
2929 | ||
7e365d51 DDO |
2930 | if (done && !X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain)) |
2931 | return -1; | |
170b7358 VD |
2932 | |
2933 | if (matched > 0) { | |
70dd3c65 | 2934 | /* Callback invoked as needed */ |
6e328256 VD |
2935 | if (!check_leaf_suiteb(ctx, cert)) |
2936 | return 0; | |
5ae4ceb9 VD |
2937 | /* Callback invoked as needed */ |
2938 | if ((dane->flags & DANE_FLAG_NO_DANE_EE_NAMECHECKS) == 0 && | |
2939 | !check_id(ctx)) | |
2940 | return 0; | |
70dd3c65 | 2941 | /* Bypass internal_verify(), issue depth 0 success callback */ |
170b7358 VD |
2942 | ctx->error_depth = 0; |
2943 | ctx->current_cert = cert; | |
6e328256 | 2944 | return ctx->verify_cb(1, ctx); |
170b7358 VD |
2945 | } |
2946 | ||
2947 | if (matched < 0) { | |
2948 | ctx->error_depth = 0; | |
2949 | ctx->current_cert = cert; | |
2950 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; | |
2951 | return -1; | |
2952 | } | |
2953 | ||
2954 | if (done) { | |
2955 | /* Fail early, TA-based success is not possible */ | |
6e328256 VD |
2956 | if (!check_leaf_suiteb(ctx, cert)) |
2957 | return 0; | |
70dd3c65 | 2958 | return verify_cb_cert(ctx, cert, 0, X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH); |
170b7358 VD |
2959 | } |
2960 | ||
2961 | /* | |
2962 | * Chain verification for usages 0/1/2. TLSA record matching of depth > 0 | |
2963 | * certificates happens in-line with building the rest of the chain. | |
2964 | */ | |
2965 | return verify_chain(ctx); | |
2966 | } | |
2967 | ||
7e365d51 | 2968 | /* |
558f2a01 | 2969 | * Get trusted issuer, without duplicate suppression |
7e365d51 DDO |
2970 | * Returns -1 on internal error. |
2971 | */ | |
558f2a01 | 2972 | static int get1_trusted_issuer(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert) |
fbb82a60 VD |
2973 | { |
2974 | STACK_OF(X509) *saved_chain = ctx->chain; | |
2975 | int ok; | |
2976 | ||
2977 | ctx->chain = NULL; | |
2978 | ok = ctx->get_issuer(issuer, ctx, cert); | |
2979 | ctx->chain = saved_chain; | |
2980 | ||
2981 | return ok; | |
2982 | } | |
2983 | ||
7e365d51 | 2984 | /* Returns -1 on internal error */ |
d9b8b89b VD |
2985 | static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
2986 | { | |
b9aec69a | 2987 | SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane; |
d9b8b89b | 2988 | int num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); |
88444854 | 2989 | STACK_OF(X509) *sk_untrusted = NULL; |
d9b8b89b | 2990 | unsigned int search; |
170b7358 | 2991 | int may_trusted = 0; |
d9b8b89b VD |
2992 | int may_alternate = 0; |
2993 | int trust = X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; | |
2994 | int alt_untrusted = 0; | |
e2abc685 | 2995 | int max_depth; |
d9b8b89b | 2996 | int ok = 0; |
d1e85cdf | 2997 | int prev_error = ctx->error; |
d9b8b89b VD |
2998 | int i; |
2999 | ||
3000 | /* Our chain starts with a single untrusted element. */ | |
88444854 DDO |
3001 | if (!ossl_assert(num == 1 && ctx->num_untrusted == num)) |
3002 | goto int_err; | |
88444854 DDO |
3003 | |
3004 | #define S_DOUNTRUSTED (1 << 0) /* Search untrusted chain */ | |
3005 | #define S_DOTRUSTED (1 << 1) /* Search trusted store */ | |
3006 | #define S_DOALTERNATE (1 << 2) /* Retry with pruned alternate chain */ | |
d9b8b89b VD |
3007 | /* |
3008 | * Set up search policy, untrusted if possible, trusted-first if enabled. | |
170b7358 VD |
3009 | * If we're doing DANE and not doing PKIX-TA/PKIX-EE, we never look in the |
3010 | * trust_store, otherwise we might look there first. If not trusted-first, | |
3011 | * and alternate chains are not disabled, try building an alternate chain | |
3012 | * if no luck with untrusted first. | |
d9b8b89b | 3013 | */ |
579262af | 3014 | search = ctx->untrusted != NULL ? S_DOUNTRUSTED : 0; |
170b7358 | 3015 | if (DANETLS_HAS_PKIX(dane) || !DANETLS_HAS_DANE(dane)) { |
88444854 | 3016 | if (search == 0 || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST) != 0) |
170b7358 VD |
3017 | search |= S_DOTRUSTED; |
3018 | else if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS)) | |
3019 | may_alternate = 1; | |
3020 | may_trusted = 1; | |
3021 | } | |
d9b8b89b VD |
3022 | |
3023 | /* | |
3024 | * Shallow-copy the stack of untrusted certificates (with TLS, this is | |
3025 | * typically the content of the peer's certificate message) so can make | |
3026 | * multiple passes over it, while free to remove elements as we go. | |
3027 | */ | |
7e365d51 DDO |
3028 | if ((sk_untrusted = sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL) |
3029 | goto memerr; | |
d9b8b89b | 3030 | |
69664d6a | 3031 | /* |
ade08735 | 3032 | * If we got any "DANE-TA(2) Cert(0) Full(0)" trust anchors from DNS, add |
63ae8476 | 3033 | * them to our working copy of the untrusted certificate stack. |
69664d6a | 3034 | */ |
adc11e1b DDO |
3035 | if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) && dane->certs != NULL |
3036 | && !X509_add_certs(sk_untrusted, dane->certs, X509_ADD_FLAG_DEFAULT)) | |
3037 | goto memerr; | |
170b7358 | 3038 | |
d9b8b89b VD |
3039 | /* |
3040 | * Still absurdly large, but arithmetically safe, a lower hard upper bound | |
3041 | * might be reasonable. | |
3042 | */ | |
88444854 DDO |
3043 | if (ctx->param->depth > INT_MAX / 2) |
3044 | ctx->param->depth = INT_MAX / 2; | |
d9b8b89b VD |
3045 | |
3046 | /* | |
ade08735 | 3047 | * Try to extend the chain until we reach an ultimately trusted issuer. |
d9b8b89b VD |
3048 | * Build chains up to one longer the limit, later fail if we hit the limit, |
3049 | * with an X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error code. | |
3050 | */ | |
e2abc685 | 3051 | max_depth = ctx->param->depth + 1; |
d9b8b89b VD |
3052 | |
3053 | while (search != 0) { | |
fc48b5c8 | 3054 | X509 *curr, *issuer = NULL; |
d9b8b89b | 3055 | |
d1e85cdf DDO |
3056 | num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); |
3057 | ctx->error_depth = num - 1; | |
d9b8b89b VD |
3058 | /* |
3059 | * Look in the trust store if enabled for first lookup, or we've run | |
fbb82a60 VD |
3060 | * out of untrusted issuers and search here is not disabled. When we |
3061 | * reach the depth limit, we stop extending the chain, if by that point | |
ade08735 | 3062 | * we've not found a trust anchor, any trusted chain would be too long. |
fbb82a60 VD |
3063 | * |
3064 | * The error reported to the application verify callback is at the | |
3065 | * maximal valid depth with the current certificate equal to the last | |
3066 | * not ultimately-trusted issuer. For example, with verify_depth = 0, | |
3067 | * the callback will report errors at depth=1 when the immediate issuer | |
3068 | * of the leaf certificate is not a trust anchor. No attempt will be | |
3069 | * made to locate an issuer for that certificate, since such a chain | |
3070 | * would be a-priori too long. | |
d9b8b89b VD |
3071 | */ |
3072 | if ((search & S_DOTRUSTED) != 0) { | |
d1e85cdf | 3073 | i = num; |
d9b8b89b VD |
3074 | if ((search & S_DOALTERNATE) != 0) { |
3075 | /* | |
3076 | * As high up the chain as we can, look for an alternative | |
3077 | * trusted issuer of an untrusted certificate that currently | |
3078 | * has an untrusted issuer. We use the alt_untrusted variable | |
3079 | * to track how far up the chain we find the first match. It | |
3080 | * is only if and when we find a match, that we prune the chain | |
3081 | * and reset ctx->num_untrusted to the reduced count of | |
3082 | * untrusted certificates. While we're searching for such a | |
3083 | * match (which may never be found), it is neither safe nor | |
3084 | * wise to preemptively modify either the chain or | |
3085 | * ctx->num_untrusted. | |
3086 | * | |
3087 | * Note, like ctx->num_untrusted, alt_untrusted is a count of | |
3088 | * untrusted certificates, not a "depth". | |
3089 | */ | |
3090 | i = alt_untrusted; | |
3091 | } | |
88444854 | 3092 | curr = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i - 1); |
d9b8b89b | 3093 | |
558f2a01 DDO |
3094 | /* Note: get1_trusted_issuer() must be used even if self-signed. */ |
3095 | ok = num > max_depth ? 0 : get1_trusted_issuer(&issuer, ctx, curr); | |
d9b8b89b VD |
3096 | |
3097 | if (ok < 0) { | |
7e365d51 | 3098 | trust = -1; |
f3e235ed | 3099 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP; |
88444854 | 3100 | break; |
d9b8b89b VD |
3101 | } |
3102 | ||
3103 | if (ok > 0) { | |
aaa584ce DDO |
3104 | int self_signed = X509_self_signed(curr, 0); |
3105 | ||
558f2a01 DDO |
3106 | if (self_signed < 0) { |
3107 | X509_free(issuer); | |
aaa584ce | 3108 | goto int_err; |
558f2a01 | 3109 | } |
d9b8b89b VD |
3110 | /* |
3111 | * Alternative trusted issuer for a mid-chain untrusted cert? | |
3112 | * Pop the untrusted cert's successors and retry. We might now | |
3113 | * be able to complete a valid chain via the trust store. Note | |
ade08735 DDO |
3114 | * that despite the current trust store match we might still |
3115 | * fail complete the chain to a suitable trust anchor, in which | |
d9b8b89b VD |
3116 | * case we may prune some more untrusted certificates and try |
3117 | * again. Thus the S_DOALTERNATE bit may yet be turned on | |
3118 | * again with an even shorter untrusted chain! | |
170b7358 VD |
3119 | * |
3120 | * If in the process we threw away our matching PKIX-TA trust | |
3121 | * anchor, reset DANE trust. We might find a suitable trusted | |
3122 | * certificate among the ones from the trust store. | |
d9b8b89b VD |
3123 | */ |
3124 | if ((search & S_DOALTERNATE) != 0) { | |
02369787 | 3125 | if (!ossl_assert(num > i && i > 0 && !self_signed)) { |
88444854 | 3126 | X509_free(issuer); |
7e365d51 | 3127 | goto int_err; |
24664a3b | 3128 | } |
d9b8b89b VD |
3129 | search &= ~S_DOALTERNATE; |
3130 | for (; num > i; --num) | |
3131 | X509_free(sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain)); | |
3132 | ctx->num_untrusted = num; | |
170b7358 VD |
3133 | |
3134 | if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) && | |
3135 | dane->mdpth >= ctx->num_untrusted) { | |
3136 | dane->mdpth = -1; | |
3137 | X509_free(dane->mcert); | |
3138 | dane->mcert = NULL; | |
3139 | } | |
3140 | if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) && | |
3141 | dane->pdpth >= ctx->num_untrusted) | |
3142 | dane->pdpth = -1; | |
d9b8b89b VD |
3143 | } |
3144 | ||
3145 | /* | |
3146 | * Self-signed untrusted certificates get replaced by their | |
3147 | * trusted matching issuer. Otherwise, grow the chain. | |
3148 | */ | |
02369787 | 3149 | if (!self_signed) { |
fc48b5c8 | 3150 | if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, issuer)) { |
88444854 | 3151 | X509_free(issuer); |
7e365d51 | 3152 | goto memerr; |
0c56a648 | 3153 | } |
aaa584ce DDO |
3154 | if ((self_signed = X509_self_signed(issuer, 0)) < 0) |
3155 | goto int_err; | |
558f2a01 | 3156 | } else { |
d9b8b89b VD |
3157 | /* |
3158 | * We have a self-signed certificate that has the same | |
3159 | * subject name (and perhaps keyid and/or serial number) as | |
ade08735 | 3160 | * a trust anchor. We must have an exact match to avoid |
d9b8b89b VD |
3161 | * possible impersonation via key substitution etc. |
3162 | */ | |
88444854 | 3163 | if (X509_cmp(curr, issuer) != 0) { |
d9b8b89b | 3164 | /* Self-signed untrusted mimic. */ |
88444854 | 3165 | X509_free(issuer); |
d9b8b89b | 3166 | ok = 0; |
88444854 DDO |
3167 | } else { /* curr "==" issuer */ |
3168 | X509_free(curr); | |
d9b8b89b | 3169 | ctx->num_untrusted = --num; |
88444854 | 3170 | (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, num, issuer); |
d9b8b89b VD |
3171 | } |
3172 | } | |
3173 | ||
3174 | /* | |
e99505b4 | 3175 | * We've added a new trusted certificate to the chain, re-check |
d9b8b89b VD |
3176 | * trust. If not done, and not self-signed look deeper. |
3177 | * Whether or not we're doing "trusted first", we no longer | |
3178 | * look for untrusted certificates from the peer's chain. | |
170b7358 VD |
3179 | * |
3180 | * At this point ctx->num_trusted and num must reflect the | |
3181 | * correct number of untrusted certificates, since the DANE | |
3182 | * logic in check_trust() depends on distinguishing CAs from | |
3183 | * "the wire" from CAs from the trust store. In particular, the | |
3184 | * certificate at depth "num" should be the new trusted | |
3185 | * certificate with ctx->num_untrusted <= num. | |
d9b8b89b VD |
3186 | */ |
3187 | if (ok) { | |
88444854 DDO |
3188 | if (!ossl_assert(ctx->num_untrusted <= num)) |
3189 | goto int_err; | |
d9b8b89b | 3190 | search &= ~S_DOUNTRUSTED; |
88444854 | 3191 | trust = check_trust(ctx, num); |
7e365d51 | 3192 | if (trust != X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED) |
88444854 | 3193 | break; |
02369787 | 3194 | if (!self_signed) |
d9b8b89b VD |
3195 | continue; |
3196 | } | |
3197 | } | |
3198 | ||
3199 | /* | |
3200 | * No dispositive decision, and either self-signed or no match, if | |
3201 | * we were doing untrusted-first, and alt-chains are not disabled, | |
3202 | * do that, by repeatedly losing one untrusted element at a time, | |
3203 | * and trying to extend the shorted chain. | |
3204 | */ | |
3205 | if ((search & S_DOUNTRUSTED) == 0) { | |
3206 | /* Continue search for a trusted issuer of a shorter chain? */ | |
3207 | if ((search & S_DOALTERNATE) != 0 && --alt_untrusted > 0) | |
3208 | continue; | |
3209 | /* Still no luck and no fallbacks left? */ | |
3210 | if (!may_alternate || (search & S_DOALTERNATE) != 0 || | |
3211 | ctx->num_untrusted < 2) | |
3212 | break; | |
3213 | /* Search for a trusted issuer of a shorter chain */ | |
3214 | search |= S_DOALTERNATE; | |
3215 | alt_untrusted = ctx->num_untrusted - 1; | |
d9b8b89b VD |
3216 | } |
3217 | } | |
3218 | ||
3219 | /* | |
88444854 | 3220 | * Extend chain with peer-provided untrusted certificates |
d9b8b89b VD |
3221 | */ |
3222 | if ((search & S_DOUNTRUSTED) != 0) { | |
3223 | num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); | |
88444854 DDO |
3224 | if (!ossl_assert(num == ctx->num_untrusted)) |
3225 | goto int_err; | |
3226 | curr = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1); | |
e2abc685 | 3227 | issuer = (X509_self_signed(curr, 0) || num > max_depth) ? |
88444854 DDO |
3228 | NULL : find_issuer(ctx, sk_untrusted, curr); |
3229 | if (issuer == NULL) { | |
3230 | /* | |
e2abc685 | 3231 | * Once we have reached a self-signed cert or num > max_depth |
88444854 DDO |
3232 | * or can't find an issuer in the untrusted list we stop looking |
3233 | * there and start looking only in the trust store if enabled. | |
3234 | */ | |
d9b8b89b VD |
3235 | search &= ~S_DOUNTRUSTED; |
3236 | if (may_trusted) | |
3237 | search |= S_DOTRUSTED; | |
3238 | continue; | |
3239 | } | |
3240 | ||
fbb82a60 | 3241 | /* Drop this issuer from future consideration */ |
88444854 | 3242 | (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sk_untrusted, issuer); |
fbb82a60 | 3243 | |
579262af | 3244 | if (!X509_add_cert(ctx->chain, issuer, X509_ADD_FLAG_UP_REF)) |
88444854 | 3245 | goto int_err; |
fbb82a60 | 3246 | |
d9b8b89b | 3247 | ++ctx->num_untrusted; |
d9b8b89b | 3248 | |
07b6068d | 3249 | /* Check for DANE-TA trust of the topmost untrusted certificate. */ |
88444854 DDO |
3250 | trust = check_dane_issuer(ctx, ctx->num_untrusted - 1); |
3251 | if (trust == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED || trust == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) | |
3252 | break; | |
d9b8b89b VD |
3253 | } |
3254 | } | |
88444854 | 3255 | sk_X509_free(sk_untrusted); |
d9b8b89b | 3256 | |
7e365d51 DDO |
3257 | if (trust < 0) /* internal error */ |
3258 | return trust; | |
3259 | ||
d9b8b89b | 3260 | /* |
170b7358 VD |
3261 | * Last chance to make a trusted chain, either bare DANE-TA public-key |
3262 | * signers, or else direct leaf PKIX trust. | |
d9b8b89b | 3263 | */ |
497ecc0d | 3264 | num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); |
e2abc685 | 3265 | if (num <= max_depth) { |
170b7358 VD |
3266 | if (trust == X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED && DANETLS_HAS_DANE_TA(dane)) |
3267 | trust = check_dane_pkeys(ctx); | |
497ecc0d VD |
3268 | if (trust == X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED && num == ctx->num_untrusted) |
3269 | trust = check_trust(ctx, num); | |
d9b8b89b VD |
3270 | } |
3271 | ||
3272 | switch (trust) { | |
3273 | case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED: | |
d1e85cdf DDO |
3274 | /* Must restore any previous error value for backward compatibility */ |
3275 | ctx->error = prev_error; | |
d9b8b89b VD |
3276 | return 1; |
3277 | case X509_TRUST_REJECTED: | |
70dd3c65 | 3278 | /* Callback already issued */ |
d9b8b89b VD |
3279 | return 0; |
3280 | case X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED: | |
3281 | default: | |
0b3139e8 DDO |
3282 | switch(ctx->error) { |
3283 | case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD: | |
3284 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID: | |
3285 | case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD: | |
3286 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED: | |
4669015d | 3287 | return 0; /* Callback already issued by ossl_x509_check_cert_time() */ |
0b3139e8 DDO |
3288 | default: /* A preliminary error has become final */ |
3289 | return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num - 1, ctx->error); | |
3290 | case X509_V_OK: | |
3291 | break; | |
3292 | } | |
e2abc685 | 3293 | CB_FAIL_IF(num > max_depth, |
88444854 | 3294 | ctx, NULL, num - 1, X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG); |
07b6068d DDO |
3295 | CB_FAIL_IF(DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) |
3296 | && (!DANETLS_HAS_PKIX(dane) || dane->pdpth >= 0), | |
88444854 | 3297 | ctx, NULL, num - 1, X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH); |
fc48b5c8 | 3298 | if (X509_self_signed(sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1), 0)) |
88444854 | 3299 | return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num - 1, |
fc48b5c8 | 3300 | num == 1 |
6e5e118c DO |
3301 | ? X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT |
3302 | : X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN); | |
88444854 | 3303 | return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num - 1, |
6e5e118c DO |
3304 | ctx->num_untrusted < num |
3305 | ? X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT | |
3306 | : X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY); | |
d9b8b89b | 3307 | } |
88444854 DDO |
3308 | |
3309 | int_err: | |
88444854 DDO |
3310 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
3311 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED; | |
adc11e1b | 3312 | sk_X509_free(sk_untrusted); |
7e365d51 DDO |
3313 | return -1; |
3314 | ||
3315 | memerr: | |
3316 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
3317 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; | |
adc11e1b | 3318 | sk_X509_free(sk_untrusted); |
7e365d51 | 3319 | return -1; |
d9b8b89b | 3320 | } |
fbb82a60 | 3321 | |
1c0eede9 DDO |
3322 | STACK_OF(X509) *X509_build_chain(X509 *target, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, |
3323 | X509_STORE *store, int with_self_signed, | |
3324 | OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, const char *propq) | |
3325 | { | |
3326 | int finish_chain = store != NULL; | |
3327 | X509_STORE_CTX *ctx; | |
3328 | int flags = X509_ADD_FLAG_UP_REF; | |
3329 | STACK_OF(X509) *result = NULL; | |
3330 | ||
3331 | if (target == NULL) { | |
3332 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); | |
3333 | return NULL; | |
3334 | } | |
3335 | ||
3336 | if ((ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new_ex(libctx, propq)) == NULL) | |
3337 | return NULL; | |
3338 | if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, store, target, finish_chain ? certs : NULL)) | |
3339 | goto err; | |
3340 | if (!finish_chain) | |
3341 | X509_STORE_CTX_set0_trusted_stack(ctx, certs); | |
3342 | if (!ossl_x509_add_cert_new(&ctx->chain, target, X509_ADD_FLAG_UP_REF)) { | |
3343 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; | |
3344 | goto err; | |
3345 | } | |
3346 | ctx->num_untrusted = 1; | |
3347 | ||
3348 | if (!build_chain(ctx) && finish_chain) | |
3349 | goto err; | |
3350 | ||
3351 | /* result list to store the up_ref'ed certificates */ | |
3352 | if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) > 1 && !with_self_signed) | |
3353 | flags |= X509_ADD_FLAG_NO_SS; | |
3354 | if (!ossl_x509_add_certs_new(&result, ctx->chain, flags)) { | |
3355 | sk_X509_free(result); | |
3356 | result = NULL; | |
3357 | } | |
3358 | ||
3359 | err: | |
3360 | X509_STORE_CTX_free(ctx); | |
3361 | return result; | |
3362 | } | |
3363 | ||
fbb82a60 VD |
3364 | static const int minbits_table[] = { 80, 112, 128, 192, 256 }; |
3365 | static const int NUM_AUTH_LEVELS = OSSL_NELEM(minbits_table); | |
3366 | ||
07b6068d DDO |
3367 | /*- |
3368 | * Check whether the public key of `cert` meets the security level of `ctx`. | |
fbb82a60 VD |
3369 | * Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise. |
3370 | */ | |
3371 | static int check_key_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert) | |
3372 | { | |
3373 | EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(cert); | |
3374 | int level = ctx->param->auth_level; | |
3375 | ||
baba1545 KG |
3376 | /* |
3377 | * At security level zero, return without checking for a supported public | |
3378 | * key type. Some engines support key types not understood outside the | |
3379 | * engine, and we only need to understand the key when enforcing a security | |
3380 | * floor. | |
3381 | */ | |
3382 | if (level <= 0) | |
3383 | return 1; | |
3384 | ||
fbb82a60 VD |
3385 | /* Unsupported or malformed keys are not secure */ |
3386 | if (pkey == NULL) | |
3387 | return 0; | |
3388 | ||
fbb82a60 VD |
3389 | if (level > NUM_AUTH_LEVELS) |
3390 | level = NUM_AUTH_LEVELS; | |
3391 | ||
ed576acd | 3392 | return EVP_PKEY_get_security_bits(pkey) >= minbits_table[level - 1]; |
fbb82a60 VD |
3393 | } |
3394 | ||
07b6068d | 3395 | /*- |
cccf532f TM |
3396 | * Check whether the public key of ``cert`` does not use explicit params |
3397 | * for an elliptic curve. | |
3398 | * | |
3399 | * Returns 1 on success, 0 if check fails, -1 for other errors. | |
3400 | */ | |
3401 | static int check_curve(X509 *cert) | |
3402 | { | |
cccf532f TM |
3403 | EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(cert); |
3404 | ||
3405 | /* Unsupported or malformed key */ | |
3406 | if (pkey == NULL) | |
3407 | return -1; | |
3408 | ||
ed576acd | 3409 | if (EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC) { |
3bcc933e | 3410 | int ret, val; |
cccf532f | 3411 | |
3bcc933e MC |
3412 | ret = EVP_PKEY_get_int_param(pkey, |
3413 | OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_EC_DECODED_FROM_EXPLICIT_PARAMS, | |
3414 | &val); | |
3415 | return ret < 0 ? ret : !val; | |
cccf532f | 3416 | } |
cccf532f TM |
3417 | |
3418 | return 1; | |
3419 | } | |
3420 | ||
07b6068d | 3421 | /*- |
fbb82a60 VD |
3422 | * Check whether the signature digest algorithm of ``cert`` meets the security |
3423 | * level of ``ctx``. Should not be checked for trust anchors (whether | |
3424 | * self-signed or otherwise). | |
3425 | * | |
3426 | * Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise. | |
3427 | */ | |
3428 | static int check_sig_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert) | |
3429 | { | |
fbb82a60 VD |
3430 | int secbits = -1; |
3431 | int level = ctx->param->auth_level; | |
3432 | ||
3433 | if (level <= 0) | |
3434 | return 1; | |
3435 | if (level > NUM_AUTH_LEVELS) | |
3436 | level = NUM_AUTH_LEVELS; | |
3437 | ||
c3c8823c DSH |
3438 | if (!X509_get_signature_info(cert, NULL, NULL, &secbits, NULL)) |
3439 | return 0; | |
fbb82a60 VD |
3440 | |
3441 | return secbits >= minbits_table[level - 1]; | |
3442 | } |