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d02b48c6 | 1 | /* crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c */ |
58964a49 | 2 | /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) |
d02b48c6 RE |
3 | * All rights reserved. |
4 | * | |
5 | * This package is an SSL implementation written | |
6 | * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). | |
7 | * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. | |
8 | * | |
9 | * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as | |
10 | * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions | |
11 | * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, | |
12 | * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation | |
13 | * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms | |
14 | * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). | |
15 | * | |
16 | * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in | |
17 | * the code are not to be removed. | |
18 | * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution | |
19 | * as the author of the parts of the library used. | |
20 | * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or | |
21 | * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. | |
22 | * | |
23 | * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without | |
24 | * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | |
25 | * are met: | |
26 | * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright | |
27 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. | |
28 | * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | |
29 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the | |
30 | * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. | |
31 | * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software | |
32 | * must display the following acknowledgement: | |
33 | * "This product includes cryptographic software written by | |
34 | * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" | |
35 | * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library | |
36 | * being used are not cryptographic related :-). | |
37 | * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from | |
38 | * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: | |
39 | * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" | |
40 | * | |
41 | * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND | |
42 | * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE | |
43 | * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE | |
44 | * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE | |
45 | * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL | |
46 | * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS | |
47 | * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) | |
48 | * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT | |
49 | * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY | |
50 | * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF | |
51 | * SUCH DAMAGE. | |
52 | * | |
53 | * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or | |
54 | * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be | |
55 | * copied and put under another distribution licence | |
56 | * [including the GNU Public Licence.] | |
57 | */ | |
58 | ||
59 | #include <stdio.h> | |
60 | #include <time.h> | |
61 | #include <errno.h> | |
d02b48c6 RE |
62 | |
63 | #include "cryptlib.h" | |
17f389bb | 64 | #include <openssl/crypto.h> |
ec577822 BM |
65 | #include <openssl/lhash.h> |
66 | #include <openssl/buffer.h> | |
67 | #include <openssl/evp.h> | |
68 | #include <openssl/asn1.h> | |
69 | #include <openssl/x509.h> | |
11262391 | 70 | #include <openssl/x509v3.h> |
ec577822 | 71 | #include <openssl/objects.h> |
d02b48c6 | 72 | |
d02b48c6 | 73 | static int null_callback(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *e); |
2f043896 DSH |
74 | static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer); |
75 | static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x); | |
30b415b0 | 76 | static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
e9746e03 | 77 | static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
51630a37 | 78 | static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
b545dc67 DSH |
79 | static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
80 | static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); | |
5d7c222d | 81 | static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
4b96839f DSH |
82 | |
83 | static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer, | |
84 | unsigned int *preasons, | |
85 | X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x); | |
86 | static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, | |
87 | X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score); | |
88 | static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score, | |
89 | unsigned int *preasons); | |
9d84d4ed DSH |
90 | static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x); |
91 | static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, | |
92 | STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path, | |
93 | STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path); | |
4b96839f | 94 | |
d02b48c6 | 95 | static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
560b79cb | 96 | const char X509_version[]="X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT; |
b4cadc6e | 97 | |
d02b48c6 | 98 | |
6b691a5c | 99 | static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e) |
d02b48c6 | 100 | { |
f684090c | 101 | return ok; |
d02b48c6 RE |
102 | } |
103 | ||
104 | #if 0 | |
6b691a5c | 105 | static int x509_subject_cmp(X509 **a, X509 **b) |
d02b48c6 | 106 | { |
f684090c | 107 | return X509_subject_name_cmp(*a,*b); |
d02b48c6 RE |
108 | } |
109 | #endif | |
110 | ||
6b691a5c | 111 | int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
d02b48c6 RE |
112 | { |
113 | X509 *x,*xtmp,*chain_ss=NULL; | |
114 | X509_NAME *xn; | |
5d7c222d DSH |
115 | int bad_chain = 0; |
116 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param; | |
d02b48c6 RE |
117 | int depth,i,ok=0; |
118 | int num; | |
2c45bf2b | 119 | int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); |
f73e07cf | 120 | STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp=NULL; |
d02b48c6 RE |
121 | if (ctx->cert == NULL) |
122 | { | |
123 | X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY); | |
f684090c | 124 | return -1; |
d02b48c6 RE |
125 | } |
126 | ||
2f043896 | 127 | cb=ctx->verify_cb; |
d02b48c6 RE |
128 | |
129 | /* first we make sure the chain we are going to build is | |
130 | * present and that the first entry is in place */ | |
131 | if (ctx->chain == NULL) | |
132 | { | |
7e258a56 BL |
133 | if ( ((ctx->chain=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) || |
134 | (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,ctx->cert))) | |
d02b48c6 RE |
135 | { |
136 | X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
137 | goto end; | |
138 | } | |
139 | CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); | |
140 | ctx->last_untrusted=1; | |
141 | } | |
142 | ||
f76d8c47 | 143 | /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */ |
f73e07cf BL |
144 | if (ctx->untrusted != NULL |
145 | && (sktmp=sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL) | |
d02b48c6 RE |
146 | { |
147 | X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
148 | goto end; | |
149 | } | |
150 | ||
7e258a56 BL |
151 | num=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); |
152 | x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1); | |
5d7c222d | 153 | depth=param->depth; |
d02b48c6 RE |
154 | |
155 | ||
156 | for (;;) | |
157 | { | |
158 | /* If we have enough, we break */ | |
d797727b | 159 | if (depth < num) break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take |
a9642be6 BM |
160 | * note of it and, if appropriate, use the |
161 | * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error | |
162 | * code later. | |
163 | */ | |
d02b48c6 RE |
164 | |
165 | /* If we are self signed, we break */ | |
166 | xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x); | |
2f043896 | 167 | if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x,x)) break; |
d02b48c6 RE |
168 | |
169 | /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */ | |
170 | if (ctx->untrusted != NULL) | |
171 | { | |
2f043896 | 172 | xtmp=find_issuer(ctx, sktmp,x); |
d02b48c6 RE |
173 | if (xtmp != NULL) |
174 | { | |
7e258a56 | 175 | if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,xtmp)) |
d02b48c6 RE |
176 | { |
177 | X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
178 | goto end; | |
179 | } | |
180 | CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); | |
a6fbcb42 | 181 | (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp,xtmp); |
d02b48c6 RE |
182 | ctx->last_untrusted++; |
183 | x=xtmp; | |
184 | num++; | |
185 | /* reparse the full chain for | |
186 | * the next one */ | |
187 | continue; | |
188 | } | |
189 | } | |
190 | break; | |
191 | } | |
192 | ||
193 | /* at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted | |
194 | * certificates. We now need to add at least one trusted one, | |
195 | * if possible, otherwise we complain. */ | |
196 | ||
2f043896 DSH |
197 | /* Examine last certificate in chain and see if it |
198 | * is self signed. | |
199 | */ | |
200 | ||
7e258a56 BL |
201 | i=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); |
202 | x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,i-1); | |
f76d8c47 | 203 | xn = X509_get_subject_name(x); |
2f043896 | 204 | if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x)) |
d02b48c6 RE |
205 | { |
206 | /* we have a self signed certificate */ | |
7e258a56 | 207 | if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1) |
d02b48c6 | 208 | { |
f76d8c47 DSH |
209 | /* We have a single self signed certificate: see if |
210 | * we can find it in the store. We must have an exact | |
211 | * match to avoid possible impersonation. | |
212 | */ | |
2f043896 DSH |
213 | ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x); |
214 | if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp)) | |
f76d8c47 DSH |
215 | { |
216 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT; | |
217 | ctx->current_cert=x; | |
218 | ctx->error_depth=i-1; | |
b7c190d9 | 219 | if (ok == 1) X509_free(xtmp); |
5d7c222d | 220 | bad_chain = 1; |
f76d8c47 DSH |
221 | ok=cb(0,ctx); |
222 | if (!ok) goto end; | |
223 | } | |
224 | else | |
225 | { | |
226 | /* We have a match: replace certificate with store version | |
227 | * so we get any trust settings. | |
228 | */ | |
229 | X509_free(x); | |
2f043896 | 230 | x = xtmp; |
56c7754c | 231 | (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x); |
f76d8c47 DSH |
232 | ctx->last_untrusted=0; |
233 | } | |
d02b48c6 RE |
234 | } |
235 | else | |
236 | { | |
2f043896 | 237 | /* extract and save self signed certificate for later use */ |
7e258a56 | 238 | chain_ss=sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain); |
d02b48c6 RE |
239 | ctx->last_untrusted--; |
240 | num--; | |
7e258a56 | 241 | x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1); |
d02b48c6 RE |
242 | } |
243 | } | |
244 | ||
245 | /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */ | |
246 | for (;;) | |
247 | { | |
248 | /* If we have enough, we break */ | |
7f89714e | 249 | if (depth < num) break; |
d02b48c6 RE |
250 | |
251 | /* If we are self signed, we break */ | |
252 | xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x); | |
2f043896 | 253 | if (ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x)) break; |
d02b48c6 | 254 | |
2f043896 DSH |
255 | ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x); |
256 | ||
257 | if (ok < 0) return ok; | |
b7c190d9 | 258 | if (ok == 0) break; |
2f043896 DSH |
259 | |
260 | x = xtmp; | |
261 | if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,x)) | |
d02b48c6 | 262 | { |
2f043896 | 263 | X509_free(xtmp); |
d02b48c6 | 264 | X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
f684090c | 265 | return 0; |
d02b48c6 RE |
266 | } |
267 | num++; | |
268 | } | |
269 | ||
270 | /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */ | |
271 | xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x); | |
2f043896 DSH |
272 | |
273 | /* Is last certificate looked up self signed? */ | |
274 | if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x)) | |
d02b48c6 | 275 | { |
2f043896 | 276 | if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss)) |
d02b48c6 RE |
277 | { |
278 | if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num) | |
279 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY; | |
280 | else | |
281 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT; | |
282 | ctx->current_cert=x; | |
283 | } | |
284 | else | |
285 | { | |
286 | ||
7e258a56 | 287 | sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,chain_ss); |
d02b48c6 RE |
288 | num++; |
289 | ctx->last_untrusted=num; | |
290 | ctx->current_cert=chain_ss; | |
291 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN; | |
292 | chain_ss=NULL; | |
293 | } | |
294 | ||
295 | ctx->error_depth=num-1; | |
5d7c222d | 296 | bad_chain = 1; |
d02b48c6 RE |
297 | ok=cb(0,ctx); |
298 | if (!ok) goto end; | |
299 | } | |
300 | ||
11262391 | 301 | /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */ |
30b415b0 | 302 | ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx); |
11262391 | 303 | |
b7c190d9 | 304 | if (!ok) goto end; |
11262391 | 305 | |
e9746e03 DSH |
306 | /* Check name constraints */ |
307 | ||
308 | ok = check_name_constraints(ctx); | |
309 | ||
310 | if (!ok) goto end; | |
311 | ||
51630a37 DSH |
312 | /* The chain extensions are OK: check trust */ |
313 | ||
5d7c222d | 314 | if (param->trust > 0) ok = check_trust(ctx); |
51630a37 | 315 | |
b7c190d9 | 316 | if (!ok) goto end; |
51630a37 | 317 | |
d02b48c6 RE |
318 | /* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */ |
319 | X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain); | |
320 | ||
b545dc67 DSH |
321 | /* Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters |
322 | * because they may be needed for CRL signature verification. | |
323 | */ | |
324 | ||
325 | ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx); | |
326 | if(!ok) goto end; | |
327 | ||
5d7c222d | 328 | /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */ |
2f043896 DSH |
329 | if (ctx->verify != NULL) |
330 | ok=ctx->verify(ctx); | |
d02b48c6 RE |
331 | else |
332 | ok=internal_verify(ctx); | |
5d7c222d DSH |
333 | if(!ok) goto end; |
334 | ||
10ca15f3 | 335 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 |
96ea4ae9 BL |
336 | /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */ |
337 | ok = v3_asid_validate_path(ctx); | |
338 | if (!ok) goto end; | |
339 | ok = v3_addr_validate_path(ctx); | |
340 | if (!ok) goto end; | |
341 | #endif | |
342 | ||
5d7c222d DSH |
343 | /* If we get this far evaluate policies */ |
344 | if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK)) | |
345 | ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx); | |
346 | if(!ok) goto end; | |
dfeab068 RE |
347 | if (0) |
348 | { | |
d02b48c6 | 349 | end: |
dfeab068 RE |
350 | X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain); |
351 | } | |
f73e07cf | 352 | if (sktmp != NULL) sk_X509_free(sktmp); |
d02b48c6 | 353 | if (chain_ss != NULL) X509_free(chain_ss); |
f684090c | 354 | return ok; |
d02b48c6 RE |
355 | } |
356 | ||
2f043896 DSH |
357 | |
358 | /* Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any) | |
359 | */ | |
360 | ||
361 | static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x) | |
362 | { | |
363 | int i; | |
364 | X509 *issuer; | |
b7c190d9 | 365 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) |
82aec1cc | 366 | { |
2f043896 | 367 | issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i); |
b7c190d9 | 368 | if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer)) |
82aec1cc BM |
369 | return issuer; |
370 | } | |
2f043896 DSH |
371 | return NULL; |
372 | } | |
373 | ||
374 | /* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */ | |
375 | ||
376 | static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer) | |
377 | { | |
378 | int ret; | |
379 | ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x); | |
82aec1cc BM |
380 | if (ret == X509_V_OK) |
381 | return 1; | |
dbba890c | 382 | /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */ |
5d7c222d | 383 | if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK)) |
dbba890c DSH |
384 | return 0; |
385 | ||
386 | ctx->error = ret; | |
387 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
388 | ctx->current_issuer = issuer; | |
bdee69f7 | 389 | return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); |
2f043896 DSH |
390 | return 0; |
391 | } | |
392 | ||
393 | /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */ | |
394 | ||
395 | static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) | |
396 | { | |
397 | *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x); | |
82aec1cc BM |
398 | if (*issuer) |
399 | { | |
2f043896 DSH |
400 | CRYPTO_add(&(*issuer)->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); |
401 | return 1; | |
82aec1cc BM |
402 | } |
403 | else | |
404 | return 0; | |
2f043896 DSH |
405 | } |
406 | ||
407 | ||
11262391 DSH |
408 | /* Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency |
409 | * with the supplied purpose | |
410 | */ | |
411 | ||
30b415b0 | 412 | static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
11262391 | 413 | { |
cf1b7d96 | 414 | #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY |
11262391 DSH |
415 | return 1; |
416 | #else | |
db50661f | 417 | int i, ok=0, must_be_ca, plen = 0; |
11262391 | 418 | X509 *x; |
2c45bf2b | 419 | int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); |
6951c23a | 420 | int proxy_path_length = 0; |
9d84d4ed DSH |
421 | int purpose; |
422 | int allow_proxy_certs; | |
b392e520 | 423 | cb=ctx->verify_cb; |
30b415b0 RL |
424 | |
425 | /* must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values: | |
426 | -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct | |
427 | use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA). | |
428 | 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not | |
429 | used, but the possibility is present for future extensions. | |
430 | 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for | |
431 | all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate. | |
432 | */ | |
433 | must_be_ca = -1; | |
d9bfe4f9 | 434 | |
9d84d4ed DSH |
435 | /* CRL path validation */ |
436 | if (ctx->parent) | |
437 | { | |
438 | allow_proxy_certs = 0; | |
439 | purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN; | |
440 | } | |
441 | else | |
442 | { | |
443 | allow_proxy_certs = | |
444 | !!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS); | |
445 | /* A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their | |
446 | software happy */ | |
447 | if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS")) | |
448 | allow_proxy_certs = 1; | |
449 | purpose = ctx->param->purpose; | |
450 | } | |
d9bfe4f9 | 451 | |
11262391 | 452 | /* Check all untrusted certificates */ |
b7c190d9 | 453 | for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++) |
82aec1cc | 454 | { |
bc501570 | 455 | int ret; |
11262391 | 456 | x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); |
5d7c222d | 457 | if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL) |
f1558bb4 DSH |
458 | && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) |
459 | { | |
460 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION; | |
461 | ctx->error_depth = i; | |
462 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
463 | ok=cb(0,ctx); | |
464 | if (!ok) goto end; | |
465 | } | |
d9bfe4f9 RL |
466 | if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)) |
467 | { | |
468 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED; | |
469 | ctx->error_depth = i; | |
470 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
471 | ok=cb(0,ctx); | |
472 | if (!ok) goto end; | |
473 | } | |
30b415b0 RL |
474 | ret = X509_check_ca(x); |
475 | switch(must_be_ca) | |
82aec1cc | 476 | { |
30b415b0 RL |
477 | case -1: |
478 | if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) | |
479 | && (ret != 1) && (ret != 0)) | |
480 | { | |
481 | ret = 0; | |
82aec1cc | 482 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA; |
30b415b0 | 483 | } |
82aec1cc | 484 | else |
30b415b0 RL |
485 | ret = 1; |
486 | break; | |
487 | case 0: | |
488 | if (ret != 0) | |
489 | { | |
490 | ret = 0; | |
491 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA; | |
492 | } | |
493 | else | |
494 | ret = 1; | |
495 | break; | |
496 | default: | |
497 | if ((ret == 0) | |
498 | || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) | |
499 | && (ret != 1))) | |
500 | { | |
501 | ret = 0; | |
502 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA; | |
503 | } | |
504 | else | |
505 | ret = 1; | |
506 | break; | |
507 | } | |
508 | if (ret == 0) | |
509 | { | |
11262391 DSH |
510 | ctx->error_depth = i; |
511 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
512 | ok=cb(0,ctx); | |
82aec1cc BM |
513 | if (!ok) goto end; |
514 | } | |
30b415b0 RL |
515 | if (ctx->param->purpose > 0) |
516 | { | |
9d84d4ed | 517 | ret = X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca > 0); |
30b415b0 RL |
518 | if ((ret == 0) |
519 | || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) | |
520 | && (ret != 1))) | |
521 | { | |
522 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE; | |
523 | ctx->error_depth = i; | |
524 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
525 | ok=cb(0,ctx); | |
526 | if (!ok) goto end; | |
527 | } | |
528 | } | |
db50661f DSH |
529 | /* Check pathlen if not self issued */ |
530 | if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) | |
531 | && (x->ex_pathlen != -1) | |
532 | && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1))) | |
82aec1cc | 533 | { |
11262391 DSH |
534 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED; |
535 | ctx->error_depth = i; | |
536 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
537 | ok=cb(0,ctx); | |
82aec1cc BM |
538 | if (!ok) goto end; |
539 | } | |
db50661f DSH |
540 | /* Increment path length if not self issued */ |
541 | if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)) | |
542 | plen++; | |
6951c23a RL |
543 | /* If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next |
544 | certificate must be another proxy certificate or a EE | |
545 | certificate. If not, the next certificate must be a | |
546 | CA certificate. */ | |
547 | if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) | |
548 | { | |
549 | if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1 && i > x->ex_pcpathlen) | |
550 | { | |
551 | ctx->error = | |
552 | X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED; | |
553 | ctx->error_depth = i; | |
554 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
555 | ok=cb(0,ctx); | |
556 | if (!ok) goto end; | |
557 | } | |
558 | proxy_path_length++; | |
559 | must_be_ca = 0; | |
560 | } | |
561 | else | |
562 | must_be_ca = 1; | |
11262391 | 563 | } |
11262391 | 564 | ok = 1; |
82aec1cc | 565 | end: |
f684090c | 566 | return ok; |
11262391 DSH |
567 | #endif |
568 | } | |
569 | ||
e9746e03 DSH |
570 | static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
571 | { | |
572 | X509 *x; | |
573 | int i, j, rv; | |
574 | /* Check name constraints for all certificates */ | |
575 | for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--) | |
576 | { | |
577 | x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); | |
578 | /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */ | |
579 | if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)) | |
580 | continue; | |
581 | /* Check against constraints for all certificates higher in | |
582 | * chain including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly | |
583 | * speaking needed but if it includes constraints it is to be | |
584 | * assumed it expects them to be obeyed. | |
585 | */ | |
586 | for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--) | |
587 | { | |
588 | NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc; | |
589 | if (nc) | |
590 | { | |
591 | rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc); | |
592 | if (rv != X509_V_OK) | |
593 | { | |
594 | ctx->error = rv; | |
595 | ctx->error_depth = i; | |
596 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
597 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(0,ctx)) | |
598 | return 0; | |
599 | } | |
600 | } | |
601 | } | |
602 | } | |
603 | return 1; | |
604 | } | |
605 | ||
51630a37 DSH |
606 | static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
607 | { | |
cf1b7d96 | 608 | #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY |
51630a37 DSH |
609 | return 1; |
610 | #else | |
611 | int i, ok; | |
612 | X509 *x; | |
2c45bf2b | 613 | int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); |
2f043896 | 614 | cb=ctx->verify_cb; |
51630a37 DSH |
615 | /* For now just check the last certificate in the chain */ |
616 | i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; | |
617 | x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); | |
5d7c222d | 618 | ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0); |
82aec1cc BM |
619 | if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED) |
620 | return 1; | |
b545dc67 | 621 | ctx->error_depth = i; |
51630a37 | 622 | ctx->current_cert = x; |
82aec1cc BM |
623 | if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) |
624 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED; | |
625 | else | |
626 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED; | |
51630a37 | 627 | ok = cb(0, ctx); |
f684090c | 628 | return ok; |
51630a37 DSH |
629 | #endif |
630 | } | |
631 | ||
b545dc67 DSH |
632 | static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
633 | { | |
634 | int i, last, ok; | |
5d7c222d | 635 | if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK)) |
b545dc67 | 636 | return 1; |
5d7c222d | 637 | if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL) |
b545dc67 | 638 | last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; |
50078051 DSH |
639 | else |
640 | last = 0; | |
b545dc67 DSH |
641 | for(i = 0; i <= last; i++) |
642 | { | |
643 | ctx->error_depth = i; | |
644 | ok = check_cert(ctx); | |
645 | if (!ok) return ok; | |
646 | } | |
647 | return 1; | |
648 | } | |
649 | ||
650 | static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
651 | { | |
652 | X509_CRL *crl = NULL; | |
653 | X509 *x; | |
654 | int ok, cnum; | |
655 | cnum = ctx->error_depth; | |
656 | x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum); | |
657 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
5cbd2033 | 658 | ctx->current_issuer = NULL; |
4b96839f DSH |
659 | ctx->current_reasons = 0; |
660 | while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS) | |
b545dc67 | 661 | { |
4b96839f DSH |
662 | /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */ |
663 | ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x); | |
664 | /* If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except | |
665 | * notify callback | |
666 | */ | |
667 | if(!ok) | |
668 | { | |
669 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL; | |
670 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
671 | goto err; | |
672 | } | |
673 | ctx->current_crl = crl; | |
674 | ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl); | |
675 | if (!ok) | |
676 | goto err; | |
677 | ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x); | |
678 | if (!ok) | |
679 | goto err; | |
680 | X509_CRL_free(crl); | |
681 | crl = NULL; | |
b545dc67 | 682 | } |
b545dc67 | 683 | err: |
b545dc67 | 684 | X509_CRL_free(crl); |
4b96839f | 685 | ctx->current_crl = NULL; |
b545dc67 DSH |
686 | return ok; |
687 | ||
688 | } | |
689 | ||
e1a27eb3 DSH |
690 | /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */ |
691 | ||
692 | static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify) | |
693 | { | |
694 | time_t *ptime; | |
695 | int i; | |
4b96839f DSH |
696 | if (notify) |
697 | ctx->current_crl = crl; | |
5d7c222d DSH |
698 | if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME) |
699 | ptime = &ctx->param->check_time; | |
e1a27eb3 DSH |
700 | else |
701 | ptime = NULL; | |
702 | ||
703 | i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime); | |
704 | if (i == 0) | |
705 | { | |
4b96839f DSH |
706 | if (!notify) |
707 | return 0; | |
e1a27eb3 | 708 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD; |
4b96839f | 709 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) |
e1a27eb3 DSH |
710 | return 0; |
711 | } | |
712 | ||
713 | if (i > 0) | |
714 | { | |
4b96839f DSH |
715 | if (!notify) |
716 | return 0; | |
e1a27eb3 | 717 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID; |
4b96839f | 718 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) |
e1a27eb3 DSH |
719 | return 0; |
720 | } | |
721 | ||
722 | if(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl)) | |
723 | { | |
724 | i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime); | |
725 | ||
726 | if (i == 0) | |
727 | { | |
4b96839f DSH |
728 | if (!notify) |
729 | return 0; | |
e1a27eb3 | 730 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD; |
4b96839f | 731 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) |
e1a27eb3 DSH |
732 | return 0; |
733 | } | |
734 | ||
735 | if (i < 0) | |
736 | { | |
4b96839f DSH |
737 | if (!notify) |
738 | return 0; | |
e1a27eb3 | 739 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED; |
4b96839f | 740 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) |
e1a27eb3 DSH |
741 | return 0; |
742 | } | |
743 | } | |
744 | ||
4b96839f DSH |
745 | if (notify) |
746 | ctx->current_crl = NULL; | |
e1a27eb3 DSH |
747 | |
748 | return 1; | |
749 | } | |
750 | ||
4b96839f DSH |
751 | /* CRL score values */ |
752 | ||
753 | /* No unhandled critical extensions */ | |
754 | ||
755 | #define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100 | |
756 | ||
757 | /* certificate is within CRL scope */ | |
758 | ||
759 | #define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080 | |
760 | ||
761 | /* CRL times valid */ | |
762 | ||
763 | #define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040 | |
764 | ||
765 | /* Issuer name matches certificate */ | |
766 | ||
767 | #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020 | |
768 | ||
769 | /* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */ | |
e1a27eb3 | 770 | |
4b96839f | 771 | #define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE) |
bc7535bc | 772 | |
4b96839f | 773 | /* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */ |
bc7535bc | 774 | |
4b96839f | 775 | #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018 |
bc7535bc | 776 | |
4b96839f | 777 | /* CRL issuer is on certificate path */ |
bc7535bc | 778 | |
4b96839f DSH |
779 | #define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008 |
780 | ||
781 | /* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */ | |
782 | ||
783 | #define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004 | |
784 | ||
785 | /* CRL is complete, not delta */ | |
786 | ||
787 | #define CRL_SCORE_COMPLETE 0x002 | |
788 | ||
789 | static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509 **pissuer, | |
790 | int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons, | |
791 | STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls) | |
e1a27eb3 | 792 | { |
4b96839f DSH |
793 | int i, crl_score, best_score = *pscore; |
794 | unsigned int reasons, best_reasons; | |
795 | X509 *x = ctx->current_cert; | |
e1a27eb3 | 796 | X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL; |
5cbd2033 | 797 | X509 *crl_issuer, *best_crl_issuer = NULL; |
e1a27eb3 DSH |
798 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) |
799 | { | |
800 | crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i); | |
4b96839f DSH |
801 | reasons = *preasons; |
802 | crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x); | |
bc7535bc DSH |
803 | |
804 | if (crl_score > best_score) | |
805 | { | |
806 | best_crl = crl; | |
5cbd2033 | 807 | best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer; |
bc7535bc | 808 | best_score = crl_score; |
4b96839f | 809 | best_reasons = reasons; |
bc7535bc | 810 | } |
e1a27eb3 | 811 | } |
4b96839f | 812 | |
e1a27eb3 DSH |
813 | if (best_crl) |
814 | { | |
4b96839f DSH |
815 | if (*pcrl) |
816 | X509_CRL_free(*pcrl); | |
e1a27eb3 | 817 | *pcrl = best_crl; |
4b96839f DSH |
818 | *pissuer = best_crl_issuer; |
819 | *pscore = best_score; | |
820 | *preasons = best_reasons; | |
e1a27eb3 DSH |
821 | CRYPTO_add(&best_crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); |
822 | } | |
5cbd2033 | 823 | |
4b96839f DSH |
824 | |
825 | if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID) | |
826 | return 1; | |
827 | ||
e1a27eb3 DSH |
828 | return 0; |
829 | } | |
830 | ||
4b96839f DSH |
831 | /* For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate 'x'. |
832 | * The return value is a mask of several criteria. | |
833 | * If the issuer is not the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer. | |
834 | * The reasons mask is also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if | |
835 | * no new reasons the CRL is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated. | |
836 | */ | |
837 | ||
838 | static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer, | |
839 | unsigned int *preasons, | |
840 | X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x) | |
841 | { | |
842 | ||
843 | int crl_score = 0; | |
844 | unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons; | |
845 | ||
846 | /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */ | |
847 | ||
848 | /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */ | |
849 | if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) | |
850 | return 0; | |
851 | /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */ | |
852 | if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) | |
853 | { | |
854 | if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS)) | |
855 | return 0; | |
856 | } | |
857 | else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS) | |
858 | { | |
859 | /* If no new reasons reject */ | |
860 | if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons)) | |
861 | return 0; | |
862 | } | |
863 | /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */ | |
864 | if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl))) | |
865 | { | |
866 | if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT)) | |
867 | return 0; | |
868 | } | |
869 | else | |
870 | crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME; | |
871 | ||
872 | if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) | |
873 | crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL; | |
874 | ||
875 | /* Check expiry */ | |
876 | if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0)) | |
877 | crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME; | |
878 | ||
879 | /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */ | |
880 | crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score); | |
881 | ||
882 | /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */ | |
883 | ||
884 | if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID)) | |
885 | return 0; | |
886 | ||
887 | /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */ | |
888 | ||
889 | if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons)) | |
890 | { | |
891 | /* If no new reasons reject */ | |
892 | if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons)) | |
893 | return 0; | |
894 | tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons; | |
895 | crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE; | |
896 | } | |
897 | ||
898 | *preasons = tmp_reasons; | |
899 | ||
900 | return crl_score; | |
901 | ||
902 | } | |
903 | ||
904 | static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, | |
905 | X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score) | |
bc7535bc | 906 | { |
4b96839f | 907 | X509 *crl_issuer = NULL; |
d0fff69d | 908 | X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl); |
bc7535bc | 909 | int cidx = ctx->error_depth; |
2e0c7db9 | 910 | int i; |
4b96839f | 911 | |
bc7535bc DSH |
912 | if (cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1) |
913 | cidx++; | |
4b96839f | 914 | |
5cbd2033 | 915 | crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx); |
4b96839f | 916 | |
5cbd2033 | 917 | if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) |
4b96839f DSH |
918 | { |
919 | if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME) | |
920 | { | |
921 | *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID|CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT; | |
922 | *pissuer = crl_issuer; | |
923 | return; | |
924 | } | |
925 | } | |
926 | ||
d0fff69d | 927 | for (cidx++; cidx < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++) |
5cbd2033 | 928 | { |
d0fff69d DSH |
929 | crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx); |
930 | if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm)) | |
931 | continue; | |
932 | if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) | |
5cbd2033 | 933 | { |
4b96839f | 934 | *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID|CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH; |
d0fff69d | 935 | *pissuer = crl_issuer; |
4b96839f | 936 | return; |
5cbd2033 DSH |
937 | } |
938 | } | |
2e0c7db9 | 939 | |
9d84d4ed DSH |
940 | /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */ |
941 | ||
942 | if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) | |
4b96839f | 943 | return; |
9d84d4ed | 944 | |
2e0c7db9 DSH |
945 | /* Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the |
946 | * set of untrusted certificates. | |
947 | */ | |
2e0c7db9 DSH |
948 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++) |
949 | { | |
950 | crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i); | |
4b96839f | 951 | if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm)) |
2e0c7db9 DSH |
952 | continue; |
953 | if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) | |
954 | { | |
4b96839f DSH |
955 | *pissuer = crl_issuer; |
956 | *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID; | |
957 | return; | |
2e0c7db9 DSH |
958 | } |
959 | } | |
bc7535bc DSH |
960 | } |
961 | ||
9d84d4ed DSH |
962 | /* Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new |
963 | * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the | |
964 | * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking | |
965 | * will be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in | |
966 | * practice. | |
967 | */ | |
968 | ||
969 | static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) | |
970 | { | |
971 | X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx; | |
972 | int ret; | |
4b96839f | 973 | /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */ |
9d84d4ed DSH |
974 | if (ctx->parent) |
975 | return 0; | |
976 | if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->ctx, x, ctx->untrusted)) | |
977 | return -1; | |
978 | ||
979 | crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls; | |
980 | /* Copy verify params across */ | |
981 | X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param); | |
982 | ||
983 | crl_ctx.parent = ctx; | |
984 | crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb; | |
985 | ||
986 | /* Verify CRL issuer */ | |
987 | ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx); | |
988 | ||
9d84d4ed DSH |
989 | if (!ret) |
990 | goto err; | |
991 | ||
992 | /* Check chain is acceptable */ | |
993 | ||
994 | ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain); | |
9d84d4ed DSH |
995 | err: |
996 | X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx); | |
997 | return ret; | |
998 | } | |
999 | ||
1000 | /* RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path | |
1001 | * and certificate path, which could lead to situations where a | |
1002 | * certificate could be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised | |
1003 | * to do so. RFC5280 is more strict and states that the two paths must | |
1004 | * end in the same trust anchor, though some discussions remain... | |
1005 | * until this is resolved we use the RFC5280 version | |
1006 | */ | |
1007 | ||
1008 | static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, | |
1009 | STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path, | |
1010 | STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path) | |
1011 | { | |
1012 | X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta; | |
1013 | cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1); | |
1014 | crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1); | |
1015 | if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta)) | |
1016 | return 1; | |
1017 | return 0; | |
1018 | } | |
1019 | ||
3e727a3b DSH |
1020 | /* Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases. |
1021 | * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types. | |
1022 | * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES. | |
1023 | * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES. | |
d0fff69d | 1024 | * 4. One is NULL: automatic match. |
3e727a3b DSH |
1025 | */ |
1026 | ||
1027 | ||
1028 | static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b) | |
1029 | { | |
1030 | X509_NAME *nm = NULL; | |
1031 | GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL; | |
1032 | GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb; | |
1033 | int i, j; | |
d0fff69d DSH |
1034 | if (!a || !b) |
1035 | return 1; | |
3e727a3b DSH |
1036 | if (a->type == 1) |
1037 | { | |
1038 | if (!a->dpname) | |
1039 | return 0; | |
1040 | /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */ | |
1041 | if (b->type == 1) | |
1042 | { | |
1043 | if (!b->dpname) | |
1044 | return 0; | |
1045 | if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname)) | |
1046 | return 1; | |
1047 | else | |
1048 | return 0; | |
1049 | } | |
1050 | /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */ | |
1051 | nm = a->dpname; | |
1052 | gens = b->name.fullname; | |
1053 | } | |
1054 | else if (b->type == 1) | |
1055 | { | |
1056 | if (!b->dpname) | |
1057 | return 0; | |
1058 | /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */ | |
1059 | gens = a->name.fullname; | |
1060 | nm = b->dpname; | |
1061 | } | |
1062 | ||
1063 | /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */ | |
1064 | if (nm) | |
1065 | { | |
1066 | for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) | |
1067 | { | |
1068 | gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i); | |
1069 | if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME) | |
1070 | continue; | |
1071 | if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName)) | |
1072 | return 1; | |
1073 | } | |
1074 | return 0; | |
1075 | } | |
1076 | ||
1077 | /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */ | |
1078 | ||
1079 | for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++) | |
1080 | { | |
1081 | gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i); | |
1082 | for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++) | |
1083 | { | |
1084 | genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j); | |
1085 | if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb)) | |
1086 | return 1; | |
1087 | } | |
1088 | } | |
1089 | ||
1090 | return 0; | |
1091 | ||
1092 | } | |
bc7535bc | 1093 | |
4b96839f | 1094 | static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score) |
d0fff69d DSH |
1095 | { |
1096 | int i; | |
1097 | X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl); | |
1098 | /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */ | |
1099 | if (!dp->CRLissuer) | |
4b96839f | 1100 | return !!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME); |
d0fff69d DSH |
1101 | for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) |
1102 | { | |
1103 | GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i); | |
1104 | if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME) | |
1105 | continue; | |
1106 | if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm)) | |
d0fff69d | 1107 | return 1; |
d0fff69d DSH |
1108 | } |
1109 | return 0; | |
1110 | } | |
1111 | ||
4b96839f | 1112 | /* Check CRLDP and IDP */ |
bc7535bc | 1113 | |
4b96839f DSH |
1114 | static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score, |
1115 | unsigned int *preasons) | |
bc7535bc | 1116 | { |
3e727a3b | 1117 | int i; |
bc7535bc DSH |
1118 | if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR) |
1119 | return 0; | |
1120 | if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) | |
1121 | { | |
1122 | if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER) | |
1123 | return 0; | |
1124 | } | |
1125 | else | |
1126 | { | |
1127 | if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA) | |
1128 | return 0; | |
1129 | } | |
4b96839f | 1130 | *preasons = crl->idp_reasons; |
3e727a3b | 1131 | for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++) |
bc7535bc | 1132 | { |
3e727a3b | 1133 | DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i); |
4b96839f | 1134 | if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score)) |
d0fff69d | 1135 | { |
4b96839f DSH |
1136 | if (!crl->idp || |
1137 | idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint)) | |
1138 | { | |
1139 | *preasons &= dp->dp_reasons; | |
d0fff69d | 1140 | return 1; |
4b96839f | 1141 | } |
d0fff69d | 1142 | } |
bc7535bc | 1143 | } |
4b96839f DSH |
1144 | if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint) && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME)) |
1145 | return 1; | |
bc7535bc DSH |
1146 | return 0; |
1147 | } | |
1148 | ||
1149 | /* Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate. Currently only | |
1150 | * one CRL is retrieved. Multiple CRLs may be needed if we handle | |
1151 | * CRLs partitioned on reason code later. | |
b545dc67 | 1152 | */ |
bc7535bc | 1153 | |
e1a27eb3 | 1154 | static int get_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509 *x) |
b545dc67 DSH |
1155 | { |
1156 | int ok; | |
4b96839f DSH |
1157 | X509 *issuer = NULL; |
1158 | int crl_score = 0; | |
1159 | unsigned int reasons; | |
e1a27eb3 | 1160 | X509_CRL *crl = NULL; |
016bc5ce | 1161 | STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl; |
4b96839f DSH |
1162 | X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x); |
1163 | reasons = ctx->current_reasons; | |
1164 | ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls); | |
e1a27eb3 | 1165 | if (ok) |
4b96839f | 1166 | goto done; |
e1a27eb3 | 1167 | |
016bc5ce | 1168 | /* Lookup CRLs from store */ |
e1a27eb3 | 1169 | |
016bc5ce DSH |
1170 | skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm); |
1171 | ||
1172 | /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */ | |
4b96839f DSH |
1173 | if (!skcrl && crl) |
1174 | goto done; | |
e1a27eb3 | 1175 | |
4b96839f | 1176 | get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl); |
016bc5ce DSH |
1177 | |
1178 | sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free); | |
1179 | ||
4b96839f DSH |
1180 | done: |
1181 | ||
016bc5ce DSH |
1182 | /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */ |
1183 | if (crl) | |
f6e7d014 | 1184 | { |
4b96839f DSH |
1185 | ctx->current_issuer = issuer; |
1186 | ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score; | |
1187 | ctx->current_reasons = reasons; | |
016bc5ce DSH |
1188 | *pcrl = crl; |
1189 | return 1; | |
f6e7d014 | 1190 | } |
016bc5ce DSH |
1191 | |
1192 | return 0; | |
b545dc67 DSH |
1193 | } |
1194 | ||
1195 | /* Check CRL validity */ | |
1196 | static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl) | |
1197 | { | |
1198 | X509 *issuer = NULL; | |
1199 | EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL; | |
e1a27eb3 | 1200 | int ok = 0, chnum, cnum; |
b545dc67 DSH |
1201 | cnum = ctx->error_depth; |
1202 | chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; | |
5cbd2033 DSH |
1203 | /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */ |
1204 | if (ctx->current_issuer) | |
1205 | issuer = ctx->current_issuer; | |
1206 | /* Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer | |
b545dc67 DSH |
1207 | * is next certificate in chain. |
1208 | */ | |
5cbd2033 | 1209 | else if (cnum < chnum) |
b545dc67 DSH |
1210 | issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1); |
1211 | else | |
1212 | { | |
1213 | issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum); | |
1214 | /* If not self signed, can't check signature */ | |
1215 | if(!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer)) | |
1216 | { | |
1217 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER; | |
bdee69f7 | 1218 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); |
b545dc67 DSH |
1219 | if(!ok) goto err; |
1220 | } | |
1221 | } | |
1222 | ||
1223 | if(issuer) | |
1224 | { | |
bc501570 DSH |
1225 | /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */ |
1226 | if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && | |
1227 | !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN)) | |
1228 | { | |
1229 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN; | |
1230 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
1231 | if(!ok) goto err; | |
1232 | } | |
b545dc67 | 1233 | |
4b96839f DSH |
1234 | if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)) |
1235 | { | |
1236 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE; | |
1237 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
1238 | if(!ok) goto err; | |
1239 | } | |
1240 | ||
1241 | if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME)) | |
1242 | { | |
1243 | ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1); | |
1244 | if (!ok) | |
1245 | goto err; | |
1246 | } | |
1247 | ||
1248 | if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH)) | |
1249 | { | |
1250 | if (!check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer)) | |
bc7535bc | 1251 | { |
4b96839f DSH |
1252 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR; |
1253 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
1254 | if(!ok) goto err; | |
1255 | } | |
1256 | } | |
1257 | ||
1258 | if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) | |
1259 | { | |
1260 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION; | |
1261 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
1262 | if(!ok) goto err; | |
bc7535bc DSH |
1263 | } |
1264 | ||
b545dc67 DSH |
1265 | /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */ |
1266 | ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer); | |
1267 | ||
1268 | if(!ikey) | |
1269 | { | |
1270 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY; | |
bdee69f7 | 1271 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); |
b545dc67 DSH |
1272 | if (!ok) goto err; |
1273 | } | |
1274 | else | |
1275 | { | |
1276 | /* Verify CRL signature */ | |
1277 | if(X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0) | |
1278 | { | |
1279 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE; | |
bdee69f7 | 1280 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); |
b545dc67 DSH |
1281 | if (!ok) goto err; |
1282 | } | |
1283 | } | |
1284 | } | |
1285 | ||
b545dc67 DSH |
1286 | ok = 1; |
1287 | ||
1288 | err: | |
1289 | EVP_PKEY_free(ikey); | |
1290 | return ok; | |
1291 | } | |
1292 | ||
1293 | /* Check certificate against CRL */ | |
1294 | static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x) | |
1295 | { | |
010fa0b3 DSH |
1296 | int ok; |
1297 | /* Look for serial number of certificate in CRL | |
1298 | * If found assume revoked: want something cleverer than | |
b545dc67 DSH |
1299 | * this to handle entry extensions in V2 CRLs. |
1300 | */ | |
d0fff69d | 1301 | if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, NULL, x) > 0) |
bc501570 DSH |
1302 | { |
1303 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED; | |
1304 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
010fa0b3 DSH |
1305 | if (!ok) |
1306 | return 0; | |
bc501570 DSH |
1307 | } |
1308 | ||
010fa0b3 | 1309 | if (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL) |
bc501570 | 1310 | { |
010fa0b3 DSH |
1311 | if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL) |
1312 | return 1; | |
1313 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION; | |
1314 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
1315 | if(!ok) | |
1316 | return 0; | |
bc501570 | 1317 | } |
010fa0b3 | 1318 | |
bc501570 | 1319 | return 1; |
b545dc67 DSH |
1320 | } |
1321 | ||
5d7c222d DSH |
1322 | static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
1323 | { | |
1324 | int ret; | |
9d84d4ed DSH |
1325 | if (ctx->parent) |
1326 | return 1; | |
175ac681 | 1327 | ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain, |
5d7c222d DSH |
1328 | ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags); |
1329 | if (ret == 0) | |
1330 | { | |
8afca8d9 | 1331 | X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
5d7c222d DSH |
1332 | return 0; |
1333 | } | |
1334 | /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */ | |
1335 | if (ret == -1) | |
1336 | { | |
1337 | /* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify | |
1338 | * callback. | |
1339 | */ | |
1340 | X509 *x; | |
1341 | int i; | |
1342 | for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) | |
1343 | { | |
1344 | x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); | |
1345 | if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY)) | |
1346 | continue; | |
1347 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
1348 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION; | |
002e66c0 DSH |
1349 | if(!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) |
1350 | return 0; | |
5d7c222d DSH |
1351 | } |
1352 | return 1; | |
1353 | } | |
1354 | if (ret == -2) | |
1355 | { | |
1356 | ctx->current_cert = NULL; | |
1357 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY; | |
1358 | return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
1359 | } | |
1360 | ||
1361 | if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY) | |
1362 | { | |
1363 | ctx->current_cert = NULL; | |
1364 | ctx->error = X509_V_OK; | |
1365 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx)) | |
1366 | return 0; | |
1367 | } | |
1368 | ||
1369 | return 1; | |
1370 | } | |
1371 | ||
e1a27eb3 DSH |
1372 | static int check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) |
1373 | { | |
1374 | time_t *ptime; | |
1375 | int i; | |
1376 | ||
5d7c222d DSH |
1377 | if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME) |
1378 | ptime = &ctx->param->check_time; | |
e1a27eb3 DSH |
1379 | else |
1380 | ptime = NULL; | |
1381 | ||
1382 | i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime); | |
1383 | if (i == 0) | |
1384 | { | |
1385 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD; | |
1386 | ctx->current_cert=x; | |
1387 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) | |
1388 | return 0; | |
1389 | } | |
1390 | ||
1391 | if (i > 0) | |
1392 | { | |
1393 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID; | |
1394 | ctx->current_cert=x; | |
1395 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) | |
1396 | return 0; | |
1397 | } | |
1398 | ||
1399 | i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime); | |
1400 | if (i == 0) | |
1401 | { | |
1402 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD; | |
1403 | ctx->current_cert=x; | |
1404 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) | |
1405 | return 0; | |
1406 | } | |
1407 | ||
1408 | if (i < 0) | |
1409 | { | |
1410 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED; | |
1411 | ctx->current_cert=x; | |
1412 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) | |
1413 | return 0; | |
1414 | } | |
1415 | ||
1416 | return 1; | |
1417 | } | |
1418 | ||
6b691a5c | 1419 | static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
d02b48c6 | 1420 | { |
e1a27eb3 | 1421 | int ok=0,n; |
d02b48c6 RE |
1422 | X509 *xs,*xi; |
1423 | EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL; | |
2c45bf2b | 1424 | int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); |
d02b48c6 | 1425 | |
2f043896 | 1426 | cb=ctx->verify_cb; |
d02b48c6 | 1427 | |
7e258a56 | 1428 | n=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); |
d02b48c6 RE |
1429 | ctx->error_depth=n-1; |
1430 | n--; | |
7e258a56 | 1431 | xi=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n); |
e1a27eb3 | 1432 | |
bbb72003 | 1433 | if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi)) |
d02b48c6 RE |
1434 | xs=xi; |
1435 | else | |
1436 | { | |
1437 | if (n <= 0) | |
1438 | { | |
1439 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE; | |
1440 | ctx->current_cert=xi; | |
1441 | ok=cb(0,ctx); | |
1442 | goto end; | |
1443 | } | |
1444 | else | |
1445 | { | |
1446 | n--; | |
1447 | ctx->error_depth=n; | |
7e258a56 | 1448 | xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n); |
d02b48c6 RE |
1449 | } |
1450 | } | |
1451 | ||
1452 | /* ctx->error=0; not needed */ | |
1453 | while (n >= 0) | |
1454 | { | |
1455 | ctx->error_depth=n; | |
1456 | if (!xs->valid) | |
1457 | { | |
1458 | if ((pkey=X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL) | |
1459 | { | |
1460 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY; | |
1461 | ctx->current_cert=xi; | |
1462 | ok=(*cb)(0,ctx); | |
1463 | if (!ok) goto end; | |
1464 | } | |
29902449 | 1465 | else if (X509_verify(xs,pkey) <= 0) |
78f3a2aa BM |
1466 | /* XXX For the final trusted self-signed cert, |
1467 | * this is a waste of time. That check should | |
1468 | * optional so that e.g. 'openssl x509' can be | |
1469 | * used to detect invalid self-signatures, but | |
1470 | * we don't verify again and again in SSL | |
1471 | * handshakes and the like once the cert has | |
1472 | * been declared trusted. */ | |
d02b48c6 RE |
1473 | { |
1474 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE; | |
1475 | ctx->current_cert=xs; | |
1476 | ok=(*cb)(0,ctx); | |
582e5929 DSH |
1477 | if (!ok) |
1478 | { | |
1479 | EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); | |
1480 | goto end; | |
1481 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 1482 | } |
cfcf6453 | 1483 | EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); |
d02b48c6 | 1484 | pkey=NULL; |
d02b48c6 RE |
1485 | } |
1486 | ||
e1a27eb3 | 1487 | xs->valid = 1; |
d02b48c6 | 1488 | |
3f791ca8 DSH |
1489 | ok = check_cert_time(ctx, xs); |
1490 | if (!ok) | |
e1a27eb3 | 1491 | goto end; |
d02b48c6 | 1492 | |
d02b48c6 | 1493 | /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */ |
a7201e9a | 1494 | ctx->current_issuer=xi; |
d02b48c6 RE |
1495 | ctx->current_cert=xs; |
1496 | ok=(*cb)(1,ctx); | |
1497 | if (!ok) goto end; | |
1498 | ||
1499 | n--; | |
1500 | if (n >= 0) | |
1501 | { | |
1502 | xi=xs; | |
7e258a56 | 1503 | xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n); |
d02b48c6 RE |
1504 | } |
1505 | } | |
1506 | ok=1; | |
1507 | end: | |
f684090c | 1508 | return ok; |
d02b48c6 RE |
1509 | } |
1510 | ||
91b73acb | 1511 | int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm) |
bbb72003 DSH |
1512 | { |
1513 | return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL); | |
1514 | } | |
1515 | ||
91b73acb | 1516 | int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time) |
d02b48c6 RE |
1517 | { |
1518 | char *str; | |
284ef5f3 | 1519 | ASN1_TIME atm; |
527497a7 | 1520 | long offset; |
d02b48c6 RE |
1521 | char buff1[24],buff2[24],*p; |
1522 | int i,j; | |
1523 | ||
1524 | p=buff1; | |
1525 | i=ctm->length; | |
1526 | str=(char *)ctm->data; | |
82aec1cc BM |
1527 | if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) |
1528 | { | |
f684090c | 1529 | if ((i < 11) || (i > 17)) return 0; |
284ef5f3 DSH |
1530 | memcpy(p,str,10); |
1531 | p+=10; | |
1532 | str+=10; | |
82aec1cc BM |
1533 | } |
1534 | else | |
1535 | { | |
1536 | if (i < 13) return 0; | |
284ef5f3 DSH |
1537 | memcpy(p,str,12); |
1538 | p+=12; | |
1539 | str+=12; | |
82aec1cc | 1540 | } |
d02b48c6 RE |
1541 | |
1542 | if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+')) | |
1543 | { *(p++)='0'; *(p++)='0'; } | |
284ef5f3 DSH |
1544 | else |
1545 | { | |
1546 | *(p++)= *(str++); | |
1547 | *(p++)= *(str++); | |
1548 | /* Skip any fractional seconds... */ | |
82aec1cc | 1549 | if (*str == '.') |
284ef5f3 DSH |
1550 | { |
1551 | str++; | |
b7c190d9 | 1552 | while ((*str >= '0') && (*str <= '9')) str++; |
284ef5f3 | 1553 | } |
82aec1cc BM |
1554 | |
1555 | } | |
d02b48c6 RE |
1556 | *(p++)='Z'; |
1557 | *(p++)='\0'; | |
1558 | ||
1559 | if (*str == 'Z') | |
1560 | offset=0; | |
1561 | else | |
1562 | { | |
0b0a60d8 | 1563 | if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-')) |
f684090c | 1564 | return 0; |
d02b48c6 RE |
1565 | offset=((str[1]-'0')*10+(str[2]-'0'))*60; |
1566 | offset+=(str[3]-'0')*10+(str[4]-'0'); | |
1567 | if (*str == '-') | |
dfeab068 | 1568 | offset= -offset; |
d02b48c6 | 1569 | } |
284ef5f3 | 1570 | atm.type=ctm->type; |
d02b48c6 RE |
1571 | atm.length=sizeof(buff2); |
1572 | atm.data=(unsigned char *)buff2; | |
1573 | ||
a0e7c8ee DSH |
1574 | if (X509_time_adj(&atm,-offset*60, cmp_time) == NULL) |
1575 | return 0; | |
d02b48c6 | 1576 | |
b7c190d9 | 1577 | if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) |
284ef5f3 DSH |
1578 | { |
1579 | i=(buff1[0]-'0')*10+(buff1[1]-'0'); | |
1580 | if (i < 50) i+=100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */ | |
1581 | j=(buff2[0]-'0')*10+(buff2[1]-'0'); | |
1582 | if (j < 50) j+=100; | |
d02b48c6 | 1583 | |
f684090c BM |
1584 | if (i < j) return -1; |
1585 | if (i > j) return 1; | |
284ef5f3 | 1586 | } |
d02b48c6 RE |
1587 | i=strcmp(buff1,buff2); |
1588 | if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */ | |
f684090c | 1589 | return -1; |
d02b48c6 | 1590 | else |
f684090c | 1591 | return i; |
d02b48c6 RE |
1592 | } |
1593 | ||
284ef5f3 | 1594 | ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj) |
bbb72003 DSH |
1595 | { |
1596 | return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL); | |
1597 | } | |
1598 | ||
1599 | ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj, time_t *in_tm) | |
d02b48c6 RE |
1600 | { |
1601 | time_t t; | |
ba8e2824 | 1602 | int type = -1; |
d02b48c6 | 1603 | |
b7c190d9 | 1604 | if (in_tm) t = *in_tm; |
bbb72003 DSH |
1605 | else time(&t); |
1606 | ||
d02b48c6 | 1607 | t+=adj; |
ba8e2824 DSH |
1608 | if (s) type = s->type; |
1609 | if (type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) return ASN1_UTCTIME_set(s,t); | |
1610 | if (type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME) return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_set(s, t); | |
1611 | return ASN1_TIME_set(s, t); | |
d02b48c6 RE |
1612 | } |
1613 | ||
7e258a56 | 1614 | int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) |
d02b48c6 RE |
1615 | { |
1616 | EVP_PKEY *ktmp=NULL,*ktmp2; | |
1617 | int i,j; | |
1618 | ||
f684090c | 1619 | if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) return 1; |
d02b48c6 | 1620 | |
7e258a56 | 1621 | for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(chain); i++) |
d02b48c6 | 1622 | { |
7e258a56 | 1623 | ktmp=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,i)); |
d02b48c6 RE |
1624 | if (ktmp == NULL) |
1625 | { | |
1626 | X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY); | |
f684090c | 1627 | return 0; |
d02b48c6 RE |
1628 | } |
1629 | if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp)) | |
1630 | break; | |
1631 | else | |
1632 | { | |
cfcf6453 | 1633 | EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp); |
d02b48c6 RE |
1634 | ktmp=NULL; |
1635 | } | |
1636 | } | |
1637 | if (ktmp == NULL) | |
1638 | { | |
1639 | X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN); | |
f684090c | 1640 | return 0; |
d02b48c6 RE |
1641 | } |
1642 | ||
1643 | /* first, populate the other certs */ | |
1644 | for (j=i-1; j >= 0; j--) | |
1645 | { | |
7e258a56 | 1646 | ktmp2=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,j)); |
d02b48c6 | 1647 | EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2,ktmp); |
cfcf6453 | 1648 | EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp2); |
d02b48c6 RE |
1649 | } |
1650 | ||
cfcf6453 DSH |
1651 | if (pkey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey,ktmp); |
1652 | EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp); | |
f684090c | 1653 | return 1; |
d02b48c6 RE |
1654 | } |
1655 | ||
dd9d233e DSH |
1656 | int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, |
1657 | CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) | |
3ac82faa BM |
1658 | { |
1659 | /* This function is (usually) called only once, by | |
79aa04ef GT |
1660 | * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c). */ |
1661 | return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, argl, argp, | |
1662 | new_func, dup_func, free_func); | |
3ac82faa | 1663 | } |
58964a49 | 1664 | |
6b691a5c | 1665 | int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data) |
58964a49 | 1666 | { |
f684090c | 1667 | return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx,data); |
58964a49 RE |
1668 | } |
1669 | ||
6b691a5c | 1670 | void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx) |
58964a49 | 1671 | { |
f684090c | 1672 | return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx); |
58964a49 RE |
1673 | } |
1674 | ||
6b691a5c | 1675 | int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
58964a49 | 1676 | { |
f684090c | 1677 | return ctx->error; |
58964a49 RE |
1678 | } |
1679 | ||
6b691a5c | 1680 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err) |
58964a49 RE |
1681 | { |
1682 | ctx->error=err; | |
1683 | } | |
1684 | ||
6b691a5c | 1685 | int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
58964a49 | 1686 | { |
f684090c | 1687 | return ctx->error_depth; |
58964a49 RE |
1688 | } |
1689 | ||
6b691a5c | 1690 | X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
58964a49 | 1691 | { |
f684090c | 1692 | return ctx->current_cert; |
58964a49 RE |
1693 | } |
1694 | ||
7e258a56 | 1695 | STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
58964a49 | 1696 | { |
f684090c | 1697 | return ctx->chain; |
58964a49 RE |
1698 | } |
1699 | ||
c7cb16a8 | 1700 | STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
25f923dd DSH |
1701 | { |
1702 | int i; | |
1703 | X509 *x; | |
1704 | STACK_OF(X509) *chain; | |
b7c190d9 BM |
1705 | if (!ctx->chain || !(chain = sk_X509_dup(ctx->chain))) return NULL; |
1706 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) | |
82aec1cc | 1707 | { |
25f923dd DSH |
1708 | x = sk_X509_value(chain, i); |
1709 | CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); | |
82aec1cc | 1710 | } |
f684090c | 1711 | return chain; |
25f923dd DSH |
1712 | } |
1713 | ||
6b691a5c | 1714 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) |
58964a49 RE |
1715 | { |
1716 | ctx->cert=x; | |
1717 | } | |
1718 | ||
6b691a5c | 1719 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) |
58964a49 RE |
1720 | { |
1721 | ctx->untrusted=sk; | |
1722 | } | |
1723 | ||
e1a27eb3 DSH |
1724 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk) |
1725 | { | |
1726 | ctx->crls=sk; | |
1727 | } | |
1728 | ||
13938ace | 1729 | int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose) |
11262391 | 1730 | { |
13938ace | 1731 | return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0); |
11262391 DSH |
1732 | } |
1733 | ||
bb7cd4e3 | 1734 | int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust) |
11262391 | 1735 | { |
bb7cd4e3 | 1736 | return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust); |
11262391 DSH |
1737 | } |
1738 | ||
13938ace DSH |
1739 | /* This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust |
1740 | * values. This is intended to be used when another structure has its | |
1741 | * own trust and purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by | |
1742 | * the ctx. If they aren't set then we will usually have a default | |
1743 | * purpose in mind which should then be used to set the trust value. | |
1744 | * An example of this is SSL use: an SSL structure will have its own | |
1745 | * purpose and trust settings which the application can set: if they | |
1746 | * aren't set then we use the default of SSL client/server. | |
1747 | */ | |
1748 | ||
1749 | int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose, | |
1750 | int purpose, int trust) | |
51630a37 | 1751 | { |
51630a37 | 1752 | int idx; |
13938ace | 1753 | /* If purpose not set use default */ |
82aec1cc | 1754 | if (!purpose) purpose = def_purpose; |
13938ace | 1755 | /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */ |
82aec1cc BM |
1756 | if (purpose) |
1757 | { | |
068fdce8 | 1758 | X509_PURPOSE *ptmp; |
13938ace | 1759 | idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose); |
b7c190d9 | 1760 | if (idx == -1) |
82aec1cc | 1761 | { |
13938ace DSH |
1762 | X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT, |
1763 | X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID); | |
1764 | return 0; | |
82aec1cc | 1765 | } |
068fdce8 | 1766 | ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); |
b7c190d9 | 1767 | if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) |
82aec1cc | 1768 | { |
068fdce8 | 1769 | idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose); |
b7c190d9 | 1770 | if (idx == -1) |
82aec1cc | 1771 | { |
068fdce8 DSH |
1772 | X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT, |
1773 | X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID); | |
1774 | return 0; | |
82aec1cc | 1775 | } |
6d0d5431 | 1776 | ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); |
82aec1cc | 1777 | } |
068fdce8 | 1778 | /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */ |
b7c190d9 | 1779 | if (!trust) trust = ptmp->trust; |
82aec1cc | 1780 | } |
b7c190d9 | 1781 | if (trust) |
82aec1cc | 1782 | { |
13938ace | 1783 | idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust); |
b7c190d9 | 1784 | if (idx == -1) |
82aec1cc | 1785 | { |
13938ace DSH |
1786 | X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT, |
1787 | X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID); | |
1788 | return 0; | |
82aec1cc | 1789 | } |
13938ace | 1790 | } |
13938ace | 1791 | |
5d7c222d DSH |
1792 | if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose) ctx->param->purpose = purpose; |
1793 | if (trust && !ctx->param->trust) ctx->param->trust = trust; | |
51630a37 DSH |
1794 | return 1; |
1795 | } | |
1796 | ||
2f043896 DSH |
1797 | X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void) |
1798 | { | |
1799 | X509_STORE_CTX *ctx; | |
1800 | ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX)); | |
79aa04ef GT |
1801 | if (!ctx) |
1802 | { | |
1803 | X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
1804 | return NULL; | |
1805 | } | |
1806 | memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX)); | |
2f043896 DSH |
1807 | return ctx; |
1808 | } | |
1809 | ||
1810 | void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
1811 | { | |
1812 | X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx); | |
1813 | OPENSSL_free(ctx); | |
1814 | } | |
1815 | ||
79aa04ef | 1816 | int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509, |
2f043896 DSH |
1817 | STACK_OF(X509) *chain) |
1818 | { | |
5d7c222d | 1819 | int ret = 1; |
2f043896 DSH |
1820 | ctx->ctx=store; |
1821 | ctx->current_method=0; | |
1822 | ctx->cert=x509; | |
1823 | ctx->untrusted=chain; | |
5d7c222d | 1824 | ctx->crls = NULL; |
2f043896 | 1825 | ctx->last_untrusted=0; |
82aec1cc | 1826 | ctx->other_ctx=NULL; |
2f043896 DSH |
1827 | ctx->valid=0; |
1828 | ctx->chain=NULL; | |
2f043896 | 1829 | ctx->error=0; |
175ac681 | 1830 | ctx->explicit_policy=0; |
82aec1cc | 1831 | ctx->error_depth=0; |
2f043896 DSH |
1832 | ctx->current_cert=NULL; |
1833 | ctx->current_issuer=NULL; | |
5d7c222d | 1834 | ctx->tree = NULL; |
9d84d4ed | 1835 | ctx->parent = NULL; |
5d7c222d DSH |
1836 | |
1837 | ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(); | |
1838 | ||
1839 | if (!ctx->param) | |
1840 | { | |
1841 | X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
1842 | return 0; | |
1843 | } | |
bdee69f7 DSH |
1844 | |
1845 | /* Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set | |
1846 | * use defaults. | |
1847 | */ | |
1848 | ||
bdee69f7 | 1849 | |
5d7c222d DSH |
1850 | if (store) |
1851 | ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param); | |
1852 | else | |
1853 | ctx->param->flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT|X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE; | |
1854 | ||
a3829cb7 DSH |
1855 | if (store) |
1856 | { | |
5d7c222d | 1857 | ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb; |
a3829cb7 DSH |
1858 | ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup; |
1859 | } | |
1860 | else | |
a3829cb7 | 1861 | ctx->cleanup = 0; |
5d7c222d DSH |
1862 | |
1863 | if (ret) | |
1864 | ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, | |
1865 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default")); | |
1866 | ||
1867 | if (ret == 0) | |
1868 | { | |
1869 | X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
1870 | return 0; | |
a3829cb7 DSH |
1871 | } |
1872 | ||
1873 | if (store && store->check_issued) | |
bdee69f7 DSH |
1874 | ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued; |
1875 | else | |
1876 | ctx->check_issued = check_issued; | |
1877 | ||
a3829cb7 | 1878 | if (store && store->get_issuer) |
bdee69f7 DSH |
1879 | ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer; |
1880 | else | |
1881 | ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer; | |
1882 | ||
a3829cb7 | 1883 | if (store && store->verify_cb) |
bdee69f7 DSH |
1884 | ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb; |
1885 | else | |
1886 | ctx->verify_cb = null_callback; | |
1887 | ||
a3829cb7 | 1888 | if (store && store->verify) |
bdee69f7 DSH |
1889 | ctx->verify = store->verify; |
1890 | else | |
1891 | ctx->verify = internal_verify; | |
1892 | ||
a3829cb7 | 1893 | if (store && store->check_revocation) |
bdee69f7 DSH |
1894 | ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation; |
1895 | else | |
1896 | ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation; | |
1897 | ||
a3829cb7 | 1898 | if (store && store->get_crl) |
bdee69f7 DSH |
1899 | ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl; |
1900 | else | |
1901 | ctx->get_crl = get_crl; | |
1902 | ||
a3829cb7 | 1903 | if (store && store->check_crl) |
bdee69f7 DSH |
1904 | ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl; |
1905 | else | |
1906 | ctx->check_crl = check_crl; | |
1907 | ||
a3829cb7 | 1908 | if (store && store->cert_crl) |
bdee69f7 DSH |
1909 | ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl; |
1910 | else | |
1911 | ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl; | |
1912 | ||
4d50a2b4 DSH |
1913 | if (store && store->lookup_certs) |
1914 | ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs; | |
1915 | else | |
016bc5ce | 1916 | ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_get1_certs; |
4d50a2b4 DSH |
1917 | |
1918 | if (store && store->lookup_crls) | |
1919 | ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls; | |
1920 | else | |
016bc5ce | 1921 | ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_get1_crls; |
4d50a2b4 | 1922 | |
5d7c222d DSH |
1923 | ctx->check_policy = check_policy; |
1924 | ||
bdee69f7 | 1925 | |
79aa04ef GT |
1926 | /* This memset() can't make any sense anyway, so it's removed. As |
1927 | * X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup does a proper "free" on the ex_data, we put a | |
1928 | * corresponding "new" here and remove this bogus initialisation. */ | |
1929 | /* memset(&(ctx->ex_data),0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); */ | |
1930 | if(!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, | |
1931 | &(ctx->ex_data))) | |
1932 | { | |
1933 | OPENSSL_free(ctx); | |
1934 | X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
1935 | return 0; | |
1936 | } | |
1937 | return 1; | |
2f043896 DSH |
1938 | } |
1939 | ||
1940 | /* Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates. | |
1941 | * This avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed. | |
1942 | */ | |
1943 | ||
1944 | void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) | |
1945 | { | |
1946 | ctx->other_ctx = sk; | |
1947 | ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk; | |
1948 | } | |
1949 | ||
1950 | void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
1951 | { | |
b7c190d9 | 1952 | if (ctx->cleanup) ctx->cleanup(ctx); |
82bf227e RL |
1953 | if (ctx->param != NULL) |
1954 | { | |
9d84d4ed DSH |
1955 | if (ctx->parent == NULL) |
1956 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param); | |
82bf227e RL |
1957 | ctx->param=NULL; |
1958 | } | |
1959 | if (ctx->tree != NULL) | |
1960 | { | |
5d7c222d | 1961 | X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree); |
82bf227e RL |
1962 | ctx->tree=NULL; |
1963 | } | |
2f043896 DSH |
1964 | if (ctx->chain != NULL) |
1965 | { | |
1966 | sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain,X509_free); | |
1967 | ctx->chain=NULL; | |
1968 | } | |
79aa04ef | 1969 | CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data)); |
c17810b0 | 1970 | memset(&ctx->ex_data,0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); |
2f043896 | 1971 | } |
13938ace | 1972 | |
5d7c222d | 1973 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth) |
bbb72003 | 1974 | { |
5d7c222d | 1975 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth); |
bbb72003 DSH |
1976 | } |
1977 | ||
5d7c222d | 1978 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags) |
bbb72003 | 1979 | { |
5d7c222d DSH |
1980 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags); |
1981 | } | |
1982 | ||
1983 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags, time_t t) | |
1984 | { | |
1985 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t); | |
bbb72003 DSH |
1986 | } |
1987 | ||
db089ad6 LJ |
1988 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, |
1989 | int (*verify_cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *)) | |
1990 | { | |
1991 | ctx->verify_cb=verify_cb; | |
1992 | } | |
1993 | ||
5d7c222d DSH |
1994 | X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
1995 | { | |
1996 | return ctx->tree; | |
1997 | } | |
1998 | ||
1999 | int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
2000 | { | |
175ac681 | 2001 | return ctx->explicit_policy; |
5d7c222d DSH |
2002 | } |
2003 | ||
2004 | int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name) | |
2005 | { | |
2006 | const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param; | |
2007 | param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name); | |
2008 | if (!param) | |
2009 | return 0; | |
2010 | return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param); | |
2011 | } | |
2012 | ||
2013 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
2014 | { | |
2015 | return ctx->param; | |
2016 | } | |
2017 | ||
2018 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) | |
2019 | { | |
2020 | if (ctx->param) | |
2021 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param); | |
2022 | ctx->param = param; | |
2023 | } | |
2024 | ||
f73e07cf BL |
2025 | IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509) |
2026 | IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509) | |
d500de16 | 2027 | |
f73e07cf | 2028 | IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_NAME) |
d500de16 | 2029 | |
f5fedc04 | 2030 | IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) |
d500de16 | 2031 | IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) |