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d02b48c6 | 1 | /* crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c */ |
58964a49 | 2 | /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) |
d02b48c6 RE |
3 | * All rights reserved. |
4 | * | |
5 | * This package is an SSL implementation written | |
6 | * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). | |
7 | * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. | |
0f113f3e | 8 | * |
d02b48c6 RE |
9 | * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as |
10 | * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions | |
11 | * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, | |
12 | * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation | |
13 | * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms | |
14 | * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). | |
0f113f3e | 15 | * |
d02b48c6 RE |
16 | * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in |
17 | * the code are not to be removed. | |
18 | * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution | |
19 | * as the author of the parts of the library used. | |
20 | * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or | |
21 | * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. | |
0f113f3e | 22 | * |
d02b48c6 RE |
23 | * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
24 | * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | |
25 | * are met: | |
26 | * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright | |
27 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. | |
28 | * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | |
29 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the | |
30 | * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. | |
31 | * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software | |
32 | * must display the following acknowledgement: | |
33 | * "This product includes cryptographic software written by | |
34 | * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" | |
35 | * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library | |
36 | * being used are not cryptographic related :-). | |
0f113f3e | 37 | * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from |
d02b48c6 RE |
38 | * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: |
39 | * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" | |
0f113f3e | 40 | * |
d02b48c6 RE |
41 | * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND |
42 | * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE | |
43 | * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE | |
44 | * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE | |
45 | * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL | |
46 | * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS | |
47 | * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) | |
48 | * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT | |
49 | * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY | |
50 | * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF | |
51 | * SUCH DAMAGE. | |
0f113f3e | 52 | * |
d02b48c6 RE |
53 | * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or |
54 | * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be | |
55 | * copied and put under another distribution licence | |
56 | * [including the GNU Public Licence.] | |
57 | */ | |
58 | ||
59 | #include <stdio.h> | |
60 | #include <time.h> | |
61 | #include <errno.h> | |
d9b8b89b | 62 | #include <limits.h> |
d02b48c6 | 63 | |
b39fc560 | 64 | #include "internal/cryptlib.h" |
17f389bb | 65 | #include <openssl/crypto.h> |
ec577822 BM |
66 | #include <openssl/lhash.h> |
67 | #include <openssl/buffer.h> | |
68 | #include <openssl/evp.h> | |
69 | #include <openssl/asn1.h> | |
70 | #include <openssl/x509.h> | |
11262391 | 71 | #include <openssl/x509v3.h> |
ec577822 | 72 | #include <openssl/objects.h> |
919ba009 | 73 | #include <internal/dane.h> |
d9b8b89b | 74 | #include <internal/x509_int.h> |
6c21b860 | 75 | #include "x509_lcl.h" |
d02b48c6 | 76 | |
d43c4497 DSH |
77 | /* CRL score values */ |
78 | ||
79 | /* No unhandled critical extensions */ | |
80 | ||
0f113f3e | 81 | #define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100 |
d43c4497 DSH |
82 | |
83 | /* certificate is within CRL scope */ | |
84 | ||
0f113f3e | 85 | #define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080 |
d43c4497 DSH |
86 | |
87 | /* CRL times valid */ | |
88 | ||
0f113f3e | 89 | #define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040 |
d43c4497 DSH |
90 | |
91 | /* Issuer name matches certificate */ | |
92 | ||
0f113f3e | 93 | #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020 |
d43c4497 DSH |
94 | |
95 | /* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */ | |
96 | ||
97 | #define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE) | |
98 | ||
99 | /* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */ | |
100 | ||
0f113f3e | 101 | #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018 |
d43c4497 DSH |
102 | |
103 | /* CRL issuer is on certificate path */ | |
104 | ||
0f113f3e | 105 | #define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008 |
d43c4497 DSH |
106 | |
107 | /* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */ | |
108 | ||
0f113f3e | 109 | #define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004 |
d43c4497 DSH |
110 | |
111 | /* Have a delta CRL with valid times */ | |
112 | ||
0f113f3e | 113 | #define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002 |
d43c4497 | 114 | |
d9b8b89b VD |
115 | static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
116 | static int verify_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); | |
0f113f3e | 117 | static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e); |
2f043896 DSH |
118 | static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer); |
119 | static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x); | |
30b415b0 | 120 | static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
e9746e03 | 121 | static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
3bf15e29 | 122 | static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
d9b8b89b | 123 | static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int num_untrusted); |
b545dc67 DSH |
124 | static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
125 | static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); | |
5d7c222d | 126 | static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
c9a81b30 | 127 | static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x); |
4b96839f DSH |
128 | |
129 | static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer, | |
0f113f3e | 130 | unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x); |
d43c4497 | 131 | static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, |
0f113f3e MC |
132 | X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x); |
133 | static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, | |
134 | int *pcrl_score, X509_CRL *base, | |
135 | STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls); | |
136 | static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 **pissuer, | |
137 | int *pcrl_score); | |
4b96839f | 138 | static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score, |
0f113f3e | 139 | unsigned int *preasons); |
9d84d4ed DSH |
140 | static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x); |
141 | static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, | |
0f113f3e MC |
142 | STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path, |
143 | STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path); | |
4b96839f | 144 | |
d02b48c6 | 145 | static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
d02b48c6 | 146 | |
6b691a5c | 147 | static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e) |
0f113f3e MC |
148 | { |
149 | return ok; | |
150 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 151 | |
2da2ff50 DSH |
152 | /* Return 1 is a certificate is self signed */ |
153 | static int cert_self_signed(X509 *x) | |
0f113f3e | 154 | { |
d9b8b89b VD |
155 | /* |
156 | * FIXME: x509v3_cache_extensions() needs to detect more failures and not | |
157 | * set EXFLAG_SET when that happens. Especially, if the failures are | |
158 | * parse errors, rather than memory pressure! | |
159 | */ | |
0f113f3e MC |
160 | X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0); |
161 | if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS) | |
162 | return 1; | |
163 | else | |
164 | return 0; | |
165 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 166 | |
2dabd822 DSH |
167 | /* Given a certificate try and find an exact match in the store */ |
168 | ||
169 | static X509 *lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) | |
0f113f3e MC |
170 | { |
171 | STACK_OF(X509) *certs; | |
172 | X509 *xtmp = NULL; | |
173 | int i; | |
174 | /* Lookup all certs with matching subject name */ | |
175 | certs = ctx->lookup_certs(ctx, X509_get_subject_name(x)); | |
176 | if (certs == NULL) | |
177 | return NULL; | |
178 | /* Look for exact match */ | |
179 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) { | |
180 | xtmp = sk_X509_value(certs, i); | |
181 | if (!X509_cmp(xtmp, x)) | |
182 | break; | |
183 | } | |
184 | if (i < sk_X509_num(certs)) | |
05f0fb9f | 185 | X509_up_ref(xtmp); |
0f113f3e MC |
186 | else |
187 | xtmp = NULL; | |
188 | sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free); | |
189 | return xtmp; | |
190 | } | |
2dabd822 | 191 | |
d9b8b89b VD |
192 | static int verify_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
193 | { | |
194 | int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx) = ctx->verify_cb; | |
195 | int err; | |
196 | int ok; | |
197 | ||
198 | /* | |
199 | * Before either returning with an error, or continuing with CRL checks, | |
200 | * instantiate chain public key parameters. | |
201 | */ | |
202 | if ((ok = build_chain(ctx)) == 0 || | |
203 | (ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx)) == 0 || | |
204 | (ok = check_name_constraints(ctx)) == 0 || | |
205 | (ok = check_id(ctx)) == 0 || 1) | |
206 | X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain); | |
207 | if (ok == 0 || (ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx)) == 0) | |
208 | return ok; | |
209 | ||
210 | err = X509_chain_check_suiteb(&ctx->error_depth, NULL, ctx->chain, | |
211 | ctx->param->flags); | |
212 | if (err != X509_V_OK) { | |
213 | ctx->error = err; | |
214 | ctx->current_cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, ctx->error_depth); | |
215 | if ((ok = cb(0, ctx)) == 0) | |
216 | return ok; | |
217 | } | |
218 | ||
219 | /* Verify chain signatures and expiration times */ | |
220 | ok = (ctx->verify != NULL) ? ctx->verify(ctx) : internal_verify(ctx); | |
221 | if (!ok) | |
222 | return ok; | |
223 | ||
224 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 | |
225 | /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */ | |
226 | if ((ok = v3_asid_validate_path(ctx)) == 0) | |
227 | return ok; | |
228 | if ((ok = v3_addr_validate_path(ctx)) == 0) | |
229 | return ok; | |
230 | #endif | |
231 | ||
232 | /* If we get this far evaluate policies */ | |
233 | if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK) | |
234 | ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx); | |
235 | return ok; | |
236 | } | |
237 | ||
6b691a5c | 238 | int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e | 239 | { |
d9b8b89b | 240 | |
0f113f3e MC |
241 | if (ctx->cert == NULL) { |
242 | X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY); | |
243 | return -1; | |
244 | } | |
d9b8b89b | 245 | |
aae41f8c MC |
246 | if (ctx->chain != NULL) { |
247 | /* | |
248 | * This X509_STORE_CTX has already been used to verify a cert. We | |
249 | * cannot do another one. | |
250 | */ | |
251 | X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); | |
252 | return -1; | |
253 | } | |
0f113f3e | 254 | |
0f113f3e MC |
255 | /* |
256 | * first we make sure the chain we are going to build is present and that | |
257 | * the first entry is in place | |
258 | */ | |
aae41f8c MC |
259 | if (((ctx->chain = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) || |
260 | (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, ctx->cert))) { | |
261 | X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
d9b8b89b | 262 | return -1; |
0f113f3e | 263 | } |
05f0fb9f | 264 | X509_up_ref(ctx->cert); |
d9b8b89b | 265 | ctx->num_untrusted = 1; |
5d7c222d | 266 | |
d9b8b89b | 267 | return verify_chain(ctx); |
0f113f3e MC |
268 | } |
269 | ||
270 | /* | |
271 | * Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any) | |
2f043896 DSH |
272 | */ |
273 | ||
274 | static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x) | |
275 | { | |
0f113f3e MC |
276 | int i; |
277 | X509 *issuer, *rv = NULL;; | |
278 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) { | |
279 | issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i); | |
280 | if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer)) { | |
281 | rv = issuer; | |
282 | if (x509_check_cert_time(ctx, rv, 1)) | |
283 | break; | |
284 | } | |
285 | } | |
286 | return rv; | |
2f043896 DSH |
287 | } |
288 | ||
289 | /* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */ | |
290 | ||
291 | static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer) | |
292 | { | |
0f113f3e MC |
293 | int ret; |
294 | if (x == issuer) | |
295 | return cert_self_signed(x); | |
296 | ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x); | |
297 | if (ret == X509_V_OK) { | |
298 | int i; | |
299 | X509 *ch; | |
300 | /* Special case: single self signed certificate */ | |
301 | if (cert_self_signed(x) && sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1) | |
302 | return 1; | |
303 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) { | |
304 | ch = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); | |
305 | if (ch == issuer || !X509_cmp(ch, issuer)) { | |
306 | ret = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LOOP; | |
307 | break; | |
308 | } | |
309 | } | |
310 | } | |
311 | ||
312 | if (ret == X509_V_OK) | |
313 | return 1; | |
314 | /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */ | |
315 | if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK)) | |
316 | return 0; | |
317 | ||
318 | ctx->error = ret; | |
319 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
320 | ctx->current_issuer = issuer; | |
321 | return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
2f043896 DSH |
322 | } |
323 | ||
324 | /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */ | |
325 | ||
326 | static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) | |
327 | { | |
0f113f3e MC |
328 | *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x); |
329 | if (*issuer) { | |
05f0fb9f | 330 | X509_up_ref(*issuer); |
0f113f3e MC |
331 | return 1; |
332 | } else | |
333 | return 0; | |
2f043896 | 334 | } |
2f043896 | 335 | |
0f113f3e MC |
336 | /* |
337 | * Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency with the supplied | |
338 | * purpose | |
11262391 DSH |
339 | */ |
340 | ||
30b415b0 | 341 | static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
11262391 | 342 | { |
0f113f3e MC |
343 | int i, ok = 0, must_be_ca, plen = 0; |
344 | X509 *x; | |
345 | int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); | |
346 | int proxy_path_length = 0; | |
347 | int purpose; | |
348 | int allow_proxy_certs; | |
349 | cb = ctx->verify_cb; | |
350 | ||
35a1cc90 MC |
351 | /*- |
352 | * must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values: | |
353 | * -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct | |
354 | * use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA). | |
355 | * 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not | |
356 | * used, but the possibility is present for future extensions. | |
357 | * 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for | |
358 | * all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate. | |
359 | */ | |
0f113f3e MC |
360 | must_be_ca = -1; |
361 | ||
362 | /* CRL path validation */ | |
363 | if (ctx->parent) { | |
364 | allow_proxy_certs = 0; | |
365 | purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN; | |
366 | } else { | |
367 | allow_proxy_certs = | |
368 | ! !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS); | |
369 | /* | |
370 | * A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their software | |
371 | * happy | |
372 | */ | |
373 | if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS")) | |
374 | allow_proxy_certs = 1; | |
375 | purpose = ctx->param->purpose; | |
376 | } | |
377 | ||
378 | /* Check all untrusted certificates */ | |
d9b8b89b | 379 | for (i = 0; i == 0 || i < ctx->num_untrusted; i++) { |
0f113f3e MC |
380 | int ret; |
381 | x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); | |
382 | if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL) | |
383 | && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) { | |
384 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION; | |
385 | ctx->error_depth = i; | |
386 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
387 | ok = cb(0, ctx); | |
388 | if (!ok) | |
389 | goto end; | |
390 | } | |
391 | if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)) { | |
392 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED; | |
393 | ctx->error_depth = i; | |
394 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
395 | ok = cb(0, ctx); | |
396 | if (!ok) | |
397 | goto end; | |
398 | } | |
399 | ret = X509_check_ca(x); | |
400 | switch (must_be_ca) { | |
401 | case -1: | |
402 | if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) | |
403 | && (ret != 1) && (ret != 0)) { | |
404 | ret = 0; | |
405 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA; | |
406 | } else | |
407 | ret = 1; | |
408 | break; | |
409 | case 0: | |
410 | if (ret != 0) { | |
411 | ret = 0; | |
412 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA; | |
413 | } else | |
414 | ret = 1; | |
415 | break; | |
416 | default: | |
417 | if ((ret == 0) | |
418 | || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) | |
419 | && (ret != 1))) { | |
420 | ret = 0; | |
421 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA; | |
422 | } else | |
423 | ret = 1; | |
424 | break; | |
425 | } | |
426 | if (ret == 0) { | |
427 | ctx->error_depth = i; | |
428 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
429 | ok = cb(0, ctx); | |
430 | if (!ok) | |
431 | goto end; | |
432 | } | |
433 | if (ctx->param->purpose > 0) { | |
434 | ret = X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca > 0); | |
435 | if ((ret == 0) | |
436 | || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) | |
437 | && (ret != 1))) { | |
438 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE; | |
439 | ctx->error_depth = i; | |
440 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
441 | ok = cb(0, ctx); | |
442 | if (!ok) | |
443 | goto end; | |
444 | } | |
445 | } | |
446 | /* Check pathlen if not self issued */ | |
447 | if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) | |
448 | && (x->ex_pathlen != -1) | |
449 | && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1))) { | |
450 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED; | |
451 | ctx->error_depth = i; | |
452 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
453 | ok = cb(0, ctx); | |
454 | if (!ok) | |
455 | goto end; | |
456 | } | |
457 | /* Increment path length if not self issued */ | |
458 | if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)) | |
459 | plen++; | |
460 | /* | |
461 | * If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next certificate | |
462 | * must be another proxy certificate or a EE certificate. If not, | |
463 | * the next certificate must be a CA certificate. | |
464 | */ | |
465 | if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) { | |
466 | if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1 && i > x->ex_pcpathlen) { | |
467 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED; | |
468 | ctx->error_depth = i; | |
469 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
470 | ok = cb(0, ctx); | |
471 | if (!ok) | |
472 | goto end; | |
473 | } | |
474 | proxy_path_length++; | |
475 | must_be_ca = 0; | |
476 | } else | |
477 | must_be_ca = 1; | |
478 | } | |
479 | ok = 1; | |
82aec1cc | 480 | end: |
0f113f3e | 481 | return ok; |
11262391 DSH |
482 | } |
483 | ||
e9746e03 | 484 | static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
485 | { |
486 | X509 *x; | |
487 | int i, j, rv; | |
488 | /* Check name constraints for all certificates */ | |
489 | for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--) { | |
490 | x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); | |
491 | /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */ | |
492 | if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)) | |
493 | continue; | |
494 | /* | |
495 | * Check against constraints for all certificates higher in chain | |
496 | * including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly speaking needed | |
497 | * but if it includes constraints it is to be assumed it expects them | |
498 | * to be obeyed. | |
499 | */ | |
500 | for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--) { | |
501 | NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc; | |
502 | if (nc) { | |
503 | rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc); | |
504 | if (rv != X509_V_OK) { | |
505 | ctx->error = rv; | |
506 | ctx->error_depth = i; | |
507 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
508 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) | |
509 | return 0; | |
510 | } | |
511 | } | |
512 | } | |
513 | } | |
514 | return 1; | |
515 | } | |
e9746e03 | 516 | |
3bf15e29 | 517 | static int check_id_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int errcode) |
0f113f3e MC |
518 | { |
519 | ctx->error = errcode; | |
520 | ctx->current_cert = ctx->cert; | |
521 | ctx->error_depth = 0; | |
522 | return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
523 | } | |
3bf15e29 | 524 | |
9689a6ae | 525 | static int check_hosts(X509 *x, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm) |
0f113f3e MC |
526 | { |
527 | int i; | |
9689a6ae | 528 | int n = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(vpm->hosts); |
0f113f3e MC |
529 | char *name; |
530 | ||
9689a6ae DSH |
531 | if (vpm->peername != NULL) { |
532 | OPENSSL_free(vpm->peername); | |
533 | vpm->peername = NULL; | |
a0724ef1 | 534 | } |
0f113f3e | 535 | for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) { |
9689a6ae DSH |
536 | name = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(vpm->hosts, i); |
537 | if (X509_check_host(x, name, 0, vpm->hostflags, &vpm->peername) > 0) | |
0f113f3e MC |
538 | return 1; |
539 | } | |
540 | return n == 0; | |
541 | } | |
8abffa4a | 542 | |
3bf15e29 | 543 | static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
544 | { |
545 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = ctx->param; | |
0f113f3e | 546 | X509 *x = ctx->cert; |
9689a6ae | 547 | if (vpm->hosts && check_hosts(x, vpm) <= 0) { |
0f113f3e MC |
548 | if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH)) |
549 | return 0; | |
550 | } | |
9689a6ae | 551 | if (vpm->email && X509_check_email(x, vpm->email, vpm->emaillen, 0) <= 0) { |
0f113f3e MC |
552 | if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH)) |
553 | return 0; | |
554 | } | |
9689a6ae | 555 | if (vpm->ip && X509_check_ip(x, vpm->ip, vpm->iplen, 0) <= 0) { |
0f113f3e MC |
556 | if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH)) |
557 | return 0; | |
558 | } | |
559 | return 1; | |
560 | } | |
3bf15e29 | 561 | |
d9b8b89b | 562 | static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int num_untrusted) |
51630a37 | 563 | { |
d9b8b89b | 564 | int i, ok = 0; |
0f113f3e | 565 | X509 *x = NULL; |
d9b8b89b VD |
566 | X509 *mx; |
567 | int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx) = ctx->verify_cb; | |
568 | int num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); | |
569 | int trust; | |
570 | ||
571 | /* | |
572 | * Check trusted certificates in chain at depth num_untrusted and up. | |
573 | * Note, that depths 0..num_untrusted-1 may also contain trusted | |
574 | * certificates, but the caller is expected to have already checked those, | |
575 | * and wants to incrementally check just any added since. | |
576 | */ | |
577 | for (i = num_untrusted; i < num; i++) { | |
0f113f3e | 578 | x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); |
d9b8b89b | 579 | trust = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0); |
0f113f3e | 580 | /* If explicitly trusted return trusted */ |
d9b8b89b VD |
581 | if (trust == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED) |
582 | goto trusted; | |
583 | if (trust == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) | |
584 | goto rejected; | |
0f113f3e | 585 | } |
d9b8b89b | 586 | |
0f113f3e | 587 | /* |
d9b8b89b VD |
588 | * If we are looking at a trusted certificate, and accept partial chains, |
589 | * the chain is PKIX trusted. | |
0f113f3e | 590 | */ |
d9b8b89b VD |
591 | if (num_untrusted < num) { |
592 | if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) | |
593 | goto trusted; | |
594 | return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; | |
595 | } | |
596 | ||
0f113f3e | 597 | if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) { |
d9b8b89b VD |
598 | /* |
599 | * Last-resort call with no new trusted certificates, check the leaf | |
600 | * for a direct trust store match. | |
601 | */ | |
0f113f3e MC |
602 | x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, 0); |
603 | mx = lookup_cert_match(ctx, x); | |
d9b8b89b VD |
604 | if (!mx) |
605 | return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; | |
606 | ||
607 | /* | |
608 | * Check explicit auxiliary trust/reject settings. If none are set, | |
609 | * we'll accept X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED when not self-signed. | |
610 | */ | |
611 | trust = X509_check_trust(mx, ctx->param->trust, 0); | |
612 | if (trust == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) { | |
613 | X509_free(mx); | |
614 | goto rejected; | |
0f113f3e | 615 | } |
d9b8b89b VD |
616 | |
617 | /* Replace leaf with trusted match */ | |
618 | (void) sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, 0, mx); | |
619 | X509_free(x); | |
620 | ctx->num_untrusted = 0; | |
621 | goto trusted; | |
0f113f3e MC |
622 | } |
623 | ||
624 | /* | |
625 | * If no trusted certs in chain at all return untrusted and allow | |
626 | * standard (no issuer cert) etc errors to be indicated. | |
627 | */ | |
628 | return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; | |
d9b8b89b VD |
629 | |
630 | rejected: | |
631 | ctx->error_depth = i; | |
632 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
633 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED; | |
634 | ok = cb(0, ctx); | |
635 | if (!ok) | |
636 | return X509_TRUST_REJECTED; | |
637 | return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; | |
638 | ||
639 | trusted: | |
640 | return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED; | |
51630a37 DSH |
641 | } |
642 | ||
b545dc67 | 643 | static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e | 644 | { |
4c9b0a03 | 645 | int i = 0, last = 0, ok = 0; |
0f113f3e MC |
646 | if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK)) |
647 | return 1; | |
648 | if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL) | |
649 | last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; | |
650 | else { | |
651 | /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */ | |
652 | if (ctx->parent) | |
653 | return 1; | |
654 | last = 0; | |
655 | } | |
656 | for (i = 0; i <= last; i++) { | |
657 | ctx->error_depth = i; | |
658 | ok = check_cert(ctx); | |
659 | if (!ok) | |
660 | return ok; | |
661 | } | |
662 | return 1; | |
663 | } | |
b545dc67 DSH |
664 | |
665 | static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
0f113f3e MC |
666 | { |
667 | X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL; | |
4c9b0a03 GK |
668 | X509 *x = NULL; |
669 | int ok = 0, cnum = 0; | |
670 | unsigned int last_reasons = 0; | |
0f113f3e MC |
671 | cnum = ctx->error_depth; |
672 | x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum); | |
673 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
674 | ctx->current_issuer = NULL; | |
675 | ctx->current_crl_score = 0; | |
676 | ctx->current_reasons = 0; | |
677 | while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS) { | |
678 | last_reasons = ctx->current_reasons; | |
679 | /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */ | |
680 | if (ctx->get_crl) | |
681 | ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x); | |
682 | else | |
683 | ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x); | |
684 | /* | |
685 | * If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except notify callback | |
686 | */ | |
687 | if (!ok) { | |
688 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL; | |
689 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
690 | goto err; | |
691 | } | |
692 | ctx->current_crl = crl; | |
693 | ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl); | |
694 | if (!ok) | |
695 | goto err; | |
696 | ||
697 | if (dcrl) { | |
698 | ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl); | |
699 | if (!ok) | |
700 | goto err; | |
701 | ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x); | |
702 | if (!ok) | |
703 | goto err; | |
704 | } else | |
705 | ok = 1; | |
706 | ||
707 | /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */ | |
708 | if (ok != 2) { | |
709 | ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x); | |
710 | if (!ok) | |
711 | goto err; | |
712 | } | |
713 | ||
714 | X509_CRL_free(crl); | |
715 | X509_CRL_free(dcrl); | |
716 | crl = NULL; | |
717 | dcrl = NULL; | |
718 | /* | |
719 | * If reasons not updated we wont get anywhere by another iteration, | |
720 | * so exit loop. | |
721 | */ | |
722 | if (last_reasons == ctx->current_reasons) { | |
723 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL; | |
724 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
725 | goto err; | |
726 | } | |
727 | } | |
728 | err: | |
729 | X509_CRL_free(crl); | |
730 | X509_CRL_free(dcrl); | |
731 | ||
732 | ctx->current_crl = NULL; | |
733 | return ok; | |
734 | ||
735 | } | |
b545dc67 | 736 | |
e1a27eb3 DSH |
737 | /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */ |
738 | ||
739 | static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify) | |
0f113f3e MC |
740 | { |
741 | time_t *ptime; | |
742 | int i; | |
743 | if (notify) | |
744 | ctx->current_crl = crl; | |
745 | if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME) | |
746 | ptime = &ctx->param->check_time; | |
d35ff2c0 DW |
747 | else if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME) |
748 | return 1; | |
0f113f3e MC |
749 | else |
750 | ptime = NULL; | |
751 | ||
752 | i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime); | |
753 | if (i == 0) { | |
754 | if (!notify) | |
755 | return 0; | |
756 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD; | |
757 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) | |
758 | return 0; | |
759 | } | |
760 | ||
761 | if (i > 0) { | |
762 | if (!notify) | |
763 | return 0; | |
764 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID; | |
765 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) | |
766 | return 0; | |
767 | } | |
768 | ||
769 | if (X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl)) { | |
770 | i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime); | |
771 | ||
772 | if (i == 0) { | |
773 | if (!notify) | |
774 | return 0; | |
775 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD; | |
776 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) | |
777 | return 0; | |
778 | } | |
779 | /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */ | |
780 | if ((i < 0) && !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA)) { | |
781 | if (!notify) | |
782 | return 0; | |
783 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED; | |
784 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) | |
785 | return 0; | |
786 | } | |
787 | } | |
788 | ||
789 | if (notify) | |
790 | ctx->current_crl = NULL; | |
791 | ||
792 | return 1; | |
793 | } | |
e1a27eb3 | 794 | |
d43c4497 | 795 | static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, |
0f113f3e MC |
796 | X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons, |
797 | STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls) | |
798 | { | |
799 | int i, crl_score, best_score = *pscore; | |
800 | unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0; | |
801 | X509 *x = ctx->current_cert; | |
802 | X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL; | |
803 | X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL; | |
804 | ||
805 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) { | |
806 | crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i); | |
807 | reasons = *preasons; | |
808 | crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x); | |
809 | ||
810 | if (crl_score > best_score) { | |
811 | best_crl = crl; | |
812 | best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer; | |
813 | best_score = crl_score; | |
814 | best_reasons = reasons; | |
815 | } | |
816 | } | |
817 | ||
818 | if (best_crl) { | |
222561fe | 819 | X509_CRL_free(*pcrl); |
0f113f3e MC |
820 | *pcrl = best_crl; |
821 | *pissuer = best_crl_issuer; | |
822 | *pscore = best_score; | |
823 | *preasons = best_reasons; | |
65cbf983 | 824 | X509_CRL_up_ref(best_crl); |
25aaa98a RS |
825 | X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl); |
826 | *pdcrl = NULL; | |
0f113f3e MC |
827 | get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls); |
828 | } | |
829 | ||
830 | if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID) | |
831 | return 1; | |
832 | ||
833 | return 0; | |
834 | } | |
835 | ||
836 | /* | |
837 | * Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be | |
d43c4497 DSH |
838 | * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical. |
839 | */ | |
840 | ||
841 | static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid) | |
0f113f3e MC |
842 | { |
843 | ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb; | |
844 | int i; | |
845 | i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, -1); | |
846 | if (i >= 0) { | |
847 | /* Can't have multiple occurrences */ | |
848 | if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1) | |
849 | return 0; | |
850 | exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i)); | |
851 | } else | |
852 | exta = NULL; | |
d43c4497 | 853 | |
0f113f3e | 854 | i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, -1); |
d43c4497 | 855 | |
0f113f3e | 856 | if (i >= 0) { |
d43c4497 | 857 | |
0f113f3e MC |
858 | if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1) |
859 | return 0; | |
860 | extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i)); | |
861 | } else | |
862 | extb = NULL; | |
d43c4497 | 863 | |
0f113f3e MC |
864 | if (!exta && !extb) |
865 | return 1; | |
d43c4497 | 866 | |
0f113f3e MC |
867 | if (!exta || !extb) |
868 | return 0; | |
d43c4497 | 869 | |
0f113f3e MC |
870 | if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb)) |
871 | return 0; | |
d43c4497 | 872 | |
0f113f3e MC |
873 | return 1; |
874 | } | |
d43c4497 DSH |
875 | |
876 | /* See if a base and delta are compatible */ | |
877 | ||
878 | static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base) | |
0f113f3e MC |
879 | { |
880 | /* Delta CRL must be a delta */ | |
881 | if (!delta->base_crl_number) | |
882 | return 0; | |
883 | /* Base must have a CRL number */ | |
884 | if (!base->crl_number) | |
885 | return 0; | |
886 | /* Issuer names must match */ | |
887 | if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta))) | |
888 | return 0; | |
889 | /* AKID and IDP must match */ | |
890 | if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier)) | |
891 | return 0; | |
892 | if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point)) | |
893 | return 0; | |
894 | /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */ | |
895 | if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0) | |
896 | return 0; | |
897 | /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */ | |
898 | if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0) | |
899 | return 1; | |
900 | return 0; | |
901 | } | |
902 | ||
903 | /* | |
904 | * For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring or | |
905 | * retrieve a chain of deltas... | |
d43c4497 DSH |
906 | */ |
907 | ||
908 | static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore, | |
0f113f3e MC |
909 | X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls) |
910 | { | |
911 | X509_CRL *delta; | |
912 | int i; | |
913 | if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS)) | |
914 | return; | |
915 | if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST)) | |
916 | return; | |
917 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) { | |
918 | delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i); | |
919 | if (check_delta_base(delta, base)) { | |
920 | if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0)) | |
921 | *pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA; | |
65cbf983 | 922 | X509_CRL_up_ref(delta); |
0f113f3e MC |
923 | *dcrl = delta; |
924 | return; | |
925 | } | |
926 | } | |
927 | *dcrl = NULL; | |
928 | } | |
929 | ||
930 | /* | |
931 | * For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate | |
932 | * 'x'. The return value is a mask of several criteria. If the issuer is not | |
933 | * the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer. The reasons mask is | |
934 | * also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if no new reasons the CRL | |
935 | * is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated. | |
4b96839f DSH |
936 | */ |
937 | ||
938 | static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer, | |
0f113f3e MC |
939 | unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x) |
940 | { | |
941 | ||
942 | int crl_score = 0; | |
943 | unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons; | |
944 | ||
945 | /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */ | |
946 | ||
947 | /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */ | |
948 | if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) | |
949 | return 0; | |
950 | /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */ | |
951 | if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) { | |
952 | if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS)) | |
953 | return 0; | |
954 | } else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS) { | |
955 | /* If no new reasons reject */ | |
956 | if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons)) | |
957 | return 0; | |
958 | } | |
959 | /* Don't process deltas at this stage */ | |
960 | else if (crl->base_crl_number) | |
961 | return 0; | |
962 | /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */ | |
963 | if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl))) { | |
964 | if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT)) | |
965 | return 0; | |
966 | } else | |
967 | crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME; | |
968 | ||
969 | if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) | |
970 | crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL; | |
971 | ||
972 | /* Check expiry */ | |
973 | if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0)) | |
974 | crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME; | |
975 | ||
976 | /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */ | |
977 | crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score); | |
978 | ||
979 | /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */ | |
980 | ||
981 | if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID)) | |
982 | return 0; | |
983 | ||
984 | /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */ | |
985 | ||
986 | if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons)) { | |
987 | /* If no new reasons reject */ | |
988 | if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons)) | |
989 | return 0; | |
990 | tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons; | |
991 | crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE; | |
992 | } | |
993 | ||
994 | *preasons = tmp_reasons; | |
995 | ||
996 | return crl_score; | |
997 | ||
998 | } | |
4b96839f DSH |
999 | |
1000 | static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, | |
0f113f3e MC |
1001 | X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score) |
1002 | { | |
1003 | X509 *crl_issuer = NULL; | |
1004 | X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl); | |
1005 | int cidx = ctx->error_depth; | |
1006 | int i; | |
1007 | ||
1008 | if (cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1) | |
1009 | cidx++; | |
1010 | ||
1011 | crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx); | |
1012 | ||
1013 | if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) { | |
1014 | if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME) { | |
1015 | *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT; | |
1016 | *pissuer = crl_issuer; | |
1017 | return; | |
1018 | } | |
1019 | } | |
1020 | ||
1021 | for (cidx++; cidx < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++) { | |
1022 | crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx); | |
1023 | if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm)) | |
1024 | continue; | |
1025 | if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) { | |
1026 | *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH; | |
1027 | *pissuer = crl_issuer; | |
1028 | return; | |
1029 | } | |
1030 | } | |
1031 | ||
1032 | /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */ | |
1033 | ||
1034 | if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) | |
1035 | return; | |
1036 | ||
1037 | /* | |
1038 | * Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the set of | |
1039 | * untrusted certificates. | |
1040 | */ | |
1041 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++) { | |
1042 | crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i); | |
1043 | if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm)) | |
1044 | continue; | |
1045 | if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) { | |
1046 | *pissuer = crl_issuer; | |
1047 | *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID; | |
1048 | return; | |
1049 | } | |
1050 | } | |
1051 | } | |
1052 | ||
1053 | /* | |
1054 | * Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new | |
9d84d4ed | 1055 | * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the |
0f113f3e MC |
1056 | * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking will |
1057 | * be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in practice. | |
9d84d4ed DSH |
1058 | */ |
1059 | ||
1060 | static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) | |
0f113f3e MC |
1061 | { |
1062 | X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx; | |
1063 | int ret; | |
1064 | /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */ | |
1065 | if (ctx->parent) | |
1066 | return 0; | |
1067 | if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->ctx, x, ctx->untrusted)) | |
1068 | return -1; | |
1069 | ||
1070 | crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls; | |
1071 | /* Copy verify params across */ | |
1072 | X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param); | |
1073 | ||
1074 | crl_ctx.parent = ctx; | |
1075 | crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb; | |
1076 | ||
1077 | /* Verify CRL issuer */ | |
1078 | ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx); | |
1079 | ||
1080 | if (ret <= 0) | |
1081 | goto err; | |
1082 | ||
1083 | /* Check chain is acceptable */ | |
1084 | ||
1085 | ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain); | |
1086 | err: | |
1087 | X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx); | |
1088 | return ret; | |
1089 | } | |
1090 | ||
1091 | /* | |
1092 | * RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path and | |
1093 | * certificate path, which could lead to situations where a certificate could | |
1094 | * be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised to do so. RFC5280 is more | |
1095 | * strict and states that the two paths must end in the same trust anchor, | |
1096 | * though some discussions remain... until this is resolved we use the | |
1097 | * RFC5280 version | |
9d84d4ed DSH |
1098 | */ |
1099 | ||
1100 | static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, | |
0f113f3e MC |
1101 | STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path, |
1102 | STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path) | |
1103 | { | |
1104 | X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta; | |
1105 | cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1); | |
1106 | crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1); | |
1107 | if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta)) | |
1108 | return 1; | |
1109 | return 0; | |
1110 | } | |
9d84d4ed | 1111 | |
3a83462d MC |
1112 | /*- |
1113 | * Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases. | |
3e727a3b DSH |
1114 | * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types. |
1115 | * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES. | |
1116 | * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES. | |
d0fff69d | 1117 | * 4. One is NULL: automatic match. |
3e727a3b DSH |
1118 | */ |
1119 | ||
3e727a3b | 1120 | static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b) |
0f113f3e MC |
1121 | { |
1122 | X509_NAME *nm = NULL; | |
1123 | GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL; | |
1124 | GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb; | |
1125 | int i, j; | |
1126 | if (!a || !b) | |
1127 | return 1; | |
1128 | if (a->type == 1) { | |
1129 | if (!a->dpname) | |
1130 | return 0; | |
1131 | /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */ | |
1132 | if (b->type == 1) { | |
1133 | if (!b->dpname) | |
1134 | return 0; | |
1135 | if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname)) | |
1136 | return 1; | |
1137 | else | |
1138 | return 0; | |
1139 | } | |
1140 | /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */ | |
1141 | nm = a->dpname; | |
1142 | gens = b->name.fullname; | |
1143 | } else if (b->type == 1) { | |
1144 | if (!b->dpname) | |
1145 | return 0; | |
1146 | /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */ | |
1147 | gens = a->name.fullname; | |
1148 | nm = b->dpname; | |
1149 | } | |
1150 | ||
1151 | /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */ | |
1152 | if (nm) { | |
1153 | for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) { | |
1154 | gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i); | |
1155 | if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME) | |
1156 | continue; | |
1157 | if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName)) | |
1158 | return 1; | |
1159 | } | |
1160 | return 0; | |
1161 | } | |
1162 | ||
1163 | /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */ | |
1164 | ||
1165 | for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++) { | |
1166 | gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i); | |
1167 | for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++) { | |
1168 | genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j); | |
1169 | if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb)) | |
1170 | return 1; | |
1171 | } | |
1172 | } | |
1173 | ||
1174 | return 0; | |
1175 | ||
1176 | } | |
bc7535bc | 1177 | |
4b96839f | 1178 | static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score) |
0f113f3e MC |
1179 | { |
1180 | int i; | |
1181 | X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl); | |
1182 | /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */ | |
1183 | if (!dp->CRLissuer) | |
1184 | return ! !(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME); | |
1185 | for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) { | |
1186 | GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i); | |
1187 | if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME) | |
1188 | continue; | |
1189 | if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm)) | |
1190 | return 1; | |
1191 | } | |
1192 | return 0; | |
1193 | } | |
d0fff69d | 1194 | |
4b96839f | 1195 | /* Check CRLDP and IDP */ |
bc7535bc | 1196 | |
4b96839f | 1197 | static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score, |
0f113f3e MC |
1198 | unsigned int *preasons) |
1199 | { | |
1200 | int i; | |
1201 | if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR) | |
1202 | return 0; | |
1203 | if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) { | |
1204 | if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER) | |
1205 | return 0; | |
1206 | } else { | |
1207 | if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA) | |
1208 | return 0; | |
1209 | } | |
1210 | *preasons = crl->idp_reasons; | |
1211 | for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++) { | |
1212 | DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i); | |
1213 | if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score)) { | |
1214 | if (!crl->idp || idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint)) { | |
1215 | *preasons &= dp->dp_reasons; | |
1216 | return 1; | |
1217 | } | |
1218 | } | |
1219 | } | |
1220 | if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint) | |
1221 | && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME)) | |
1222 | return 1; | |
1223 | return 0; | |
1224 | } | |
1225 | ||
1226 | /* | |
1227 | * Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate. If deltas enabled try | |
1228 | * to find a delta CRL too | |
b545dc67 | 1229 | */ |
0f113f3e | 1230 | |
d43c4497 | 1231 | static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, |
0f113f3e MC |
1232 | X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x) |
1233 | { | |
1234 | int ok; | |
1235 | X509 *issuer = NULL; | |
1236 | int crl_score = 0; | |
1237 | unsigned int reasons; | |
1238 | X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL; | |
1239 | STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl; | |
1240 | X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x); | |
1241 | reasons = ctx->current_reasons; | |
1242 | ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, | |
1243 | &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls); | |
1244 | ||
1245 | if (ok) | |
1246 | goto done; | |
1247 | ||
1248 | /* Lookup CRLs from store */ | |
1249 | ||
1250 | skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm); | |
1251 | ||
1252 | /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */ | |
1253 | if (!skcrl && crl) | |
1254 | goto done; | |
1255 | ||
1256 | get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl); | |
1257 | ||
1258 | sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free); | |
1259 | ||
1260 | done: | |
1261 | ||
1262 | /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */ | |
1263 | if (crl) { | |
1264 | ctx->current_issuer = issuer; | |
1265 | ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score; | |
1266 | ctx->current_reasons = reasons; | |
1267 | *pcrl = crl; | |
1268 | *pdcrl = dcrl; | |
1269 | return 1; | |
1270 | } | |
1271 | ||
1272 | return 0; | |
1273 | } | |
b545dc67 DSH |
1274 | |
1275 | /* Check CRL validity */ | |
1276 | static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl) | |
0f113f3e MC |
1277 | { |
1278 | X509 *issuer = NULL; | |
1279 | EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL; | |
1280 | int ok = 0, chnum, cnum; | |
1281 | cnum = ctx->error_depth; | |
1282 | chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; | |
1283 | /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */ | |
1284 | if (ctx->current_issuer) | |
1285 | issuer = ctx->current_issuer; | |
1286 | ||
1287 | /* | |
1288 | * Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer is next | |
1289 | * certificate in chain. | |
1290 | */ | |
1291 | else if (cnum < chnum) | |
1292 | issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1); | |
1293 | else { | |
1294 | issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum); | |
1295 | /* If not self signed, can't check signature */ | |
1296 | if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer)) { | |
1297 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER; | |
1298 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
1299 | if (!ok) | |
1300 | goto err; | |
1301 | } | |
1302 | } | |
1303 | ||
1304 | if (issuer) { | |
1305 | /* | |
1306 | * Skip most tests for deltas because they have already been done | |
1307 | */ | |
1308 | if (!crl->base_crl_number) { | |
1309 | /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */ | |
1310 | if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && | |
1311 | !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN)) { | |
1312 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN; | |
1313 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
1314 | if (!ok) | |
1315 | goto err; | |
1316 | } | |
1317 | ||
1318 | if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)) { | |
1319 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE; | |
1320 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
1321 | if (!ok) | |
1322 | goto err; | |
1323 | } | |
1324 | ||
1325 | if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH)) { | |
1326 | if (check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0) { | |
1327 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR; | |
1328 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
1329 | if (!ok) | |
1330 | goto err; | |
1331 | } | |
1332 | } | |
1333 | ||
1334 | if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) { | |
1335 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION; | |
1336 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
1337 | if (!ok) | |
1338 | goto err; | |
1339 | } | |
1340 | ||
1341 | } | |
1342 | ||
1343 | if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME)) { | |
1344 | ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1); | |
1345 | if (!ok) | |
1346 | goto err; | |
1347 | } | |
1348 | ||
1349 | /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */ | |
c01ff880 | 1350 | ikey = X509_get0_pubkey(issuer); |
0f113f3e MC |
1351 | |
1352 | if (!ikey) { | |
1353 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY; | |
1354 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
1355 | if (!ok) | |
1356 | goto err; | |
1357 | } else { | |
1358 | int rv; | |
1359 | rv = X509_CRL_check_suiteb(crl, ikey, ctx->param->flags); | |
1360 | if (rv != X509_V_OK) { | |
1361 | ctx->error = rv; | |
1362 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
1363 | if (!ok) | |
1364 | goto err; | |
1365 | } | |
1366 | /* Verify CRL signature */ | |
1367 | if (X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0) { | |
1368 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE; | |
1369 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
1370 | if (!ok) | |
1371 | goto err; | |
1372 | } | |
1373 | } | |
1374 | } | |
1375 | ||
1376 | ok = 1; | |
1377 | ||
1378 | err: | |
0f113f3e MC |
1379 | return ok; |
1380 | } | |
b545dc67 DSH |
1381 | |
1382 | /* Check certificate against CRL */ | |
1383 | static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x) | |
0f113f3e MC |
1384 | { |
1385 | int ok; | |
1386 | X509_REVOKED *rev; | |
1387 | /* | |
1388 | * The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained unhandled | |
1389 | * critical extensions it could still be used to indicate a certificate | |
1390 | * was revoked. This has since been changed since critical extension can | |
1391 | * change the meaning of CRL entries. | |
1392 | */ | |
1393 | if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL) | |
1394 | && (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) { | |
1395 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION; | |
1396 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
1397 | if (!ok) | |
1398 | return 0; | |
1399 | } | |
1400 | /* | |
1401 | * Look for serial number of certificate in CRL If found make sure reason | |
1402 | * is not removeFromCRL. | |
1403 | */ | |
1404 | if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x)) { | |
1405 | if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL) | |
1406 | return 2; | |
1407 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED; | |
1408 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
1409 | if (!ok) | |
1410 | return 0; | |
1411 | } | |
1412 | ||
1413 | return 1; | |
1414 | } | |
b545dc67 | 1415 | |
5d7c222d | 1416 | static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
1417 | { |
1418 | int ret; | |
1419 | if (ctx->parent) | |
1420 | return 1; | |
1421 | ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain, | |
1422 | ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags); | |
1423 | if (ret == 0) { | |
1424 | X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
1425 | return 0; | |
1426 | } | |
1427 | /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */ | |
1428 | if (ret == -1) { | |
1429 | /* | |
1430 | * Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify callback. | |
1431 | */ | |
1432 | X509 *x; | |
1433 | int i; | |
1434 | for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) { | |
1435 | x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); | |
1436 | if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY)) | |
1437 | continue; | |
1438 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
1439 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION; | |
1440 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) | |
1441 | return 0; | |
1442 | } | |
1443 | return 1; | |
1444 | } | |
1445 | if (ret == -2) { | |
1446 | ctx->current_cert = NULL; | |
1447 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY; | |
1448 | return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
1449 | } | |
1450 | ||
1451 | if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY) { | |
1452 | ctx->current_cert = NULL; | |
1453 | ctx->error = X509_V_OK; | |
1454 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx)) | |
1455 | return 0; | |
1456 | } | |
1457 | ||
1458 | return 1; | |
1459 | } | |
5d7c222d | 1460 | |
0930251d | 1461 | int x509_check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int quiet) |
0f113f3e MC |
1462 | { |
1463 | time_t *ptime; | |
1464 | int i; | |
1465 | ||
1466 | if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME) | |
1467 | ptime = &ctx->param->check_time; | |
d35ff2c0 DW |
1468 | else if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME) |
1469 | return 1; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1470 | else |
1471 | ptime = NULL; | |
1472 | ||
1473 | i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime); | |
1474 | if (i == 0) { | |
1475 | if (quiet) | |
1476 | return 0; | |
1477 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD; | |
1478 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
1479 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) | |
1480 | return 0; | |
1481 | } | |
1482 | ||
1483 | if (i > 0) { | |
1484 | if (quiet) | |
1485 | return 0; | |
1486 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID; | |
1487 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
1488 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) | |
1489 | return 0; | |
1490 | } | |
1491 | ||
1492 | i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime); | |
1493 | if (i == 0) { | |
1494 | if (quiet) | |
1495 | return 0; | |
1496 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD; | |
1497 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
1498 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) | |
1499 | return 0; | |
1500 | } | |
1501 | ||
1502 | if (i < 0) { | |
1503 | if (quiet) | |
1504 | return 0; | |
1505 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED; | |
1506 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
1507 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) | |
1508 | return 0; | |
1509 | } | |
1510 | ||
1511 | return 1; | |
1512 | } | |
e1a27eb3 | 1513 | |
6b691a5c | 1514 | static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
1515 | { |
1516 | int ok = 0, n; | |
1517 | X509 *xs, *xi; | |
1518 | EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; | |
1519 | int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); | |
1520 | ||
1521 | cb = ctx->verify_cb; | |
1522 | ||
d9b8b89b VD |
1523 | n = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; |
1524 | ctx->error_depth = n; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1525 | xi = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n); |
1526 | ||
1527 | if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi)) | |
1528 | xs = xi; | |
1529 | else { | |
1530 | if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) { | |
1531 | xs = xi; | |
1532 | goto check_cert; | |
1533 | } | |
1534 | if (n <= 0) { | |
1535 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE; | |
1536 | ctx->current_cert = xi; | |
1537 | ok = cb(0, ctx); | |
1538 | goto end; | |
1539 | } else { | |
1540 | n--; | |
1541 | ctx->error_depth = n; | |
1542 | xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n); | |
1543 | } | |
1544 | } | |
1545 | ||
d9b8b89b VD |
1546 | /* |
1547 | * Do not clear ctx->error=0, it must be "sticky", only the user's callback | |
1548 | * is allowed to reset errors (at its own peril). | |
1549 | */ | |
0f113f3e MC |
1550 | while (n >= 0) { |
1551 | ctx->error_depth = n; | |
1552 | ||
1553 | /* | |
1554 | * Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless | |
1555 | * explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any security and just wastes | |
1556 | * time. | |
1557 | */ | |
1558 | if (!xs->valid | |
1559 | && (xs != xi | |
1560 | || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE))) { | |
c01ff880 | 1561 | if ((pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(xi)) == NULL) { |
0f113f3e MC |
1562 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY; |
1563 | ctx->current_cert = xi; | |
1564 | ok = (*cb) (0, ctx); | |
1565 | if (!ok) | |
1566 | goto end; | |
1567 | } else if (X509_verify(xs, pkey) <= 0) { | |
1568 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE; | |
1569 | ctx->current_cert = xs; | |
1570 | ok = (*cb) (0, ctx); | |
c01ff880 | 1571 | if (!ok) |
0f113f3e | 1572 | goto end; |
0f113f3e | 1573 | } |
0f113f3e MC |
1574 | } |
1575 | ||
1576 | xs->valid = 1; | |
1577 | ||
1578 | check_cert: | |
1579 | ok = x509_check_cert_time(ctx, xs, 0); | |
1580 | if (!ok) | |
1581 | goto end; | |
1582 | ||
1583 | /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */ | |
1584 | ctx->current_issuer = xi; | |
1585 | ctx->current_cert = xs; | |
1586 | ok = (*cb) (1, ctx); | |
1587 | if (!ok) | |
1588 | goto end; | |
1589 | ||
1590 | n--; | |
1591 | if (n >= 0) { | |
1592 | xi = xs; | |
1593 | xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n); | |
1594 | } | |
1595 | } | |
1596 | ok = 1; | |
1597 | end: | |
1598 | return ok; | |
1599 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 1600 | |
91b73acb | 1601 | int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm) |
bbb72003 | 1602 | { |
0f113f3e | 1603 | return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL); |
bbb72003 DSH |
1604 | } |
1605 | ||
91b73acb | 1606 | int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time) |
0f113f3e MC |
1607 | { |
1608 | char *str; | |
1609 | ASN1_TIME atm; | |
1610 | long offset; | |
1611 | char buff1[24], buff2[24], *p; | |
f48b83b4 | 1612 | int i, j, remaining; |
0f113f3e MC |
1613 | |
1614 | p = buff1; | |
f48b83b4 | 1615 | remaining = ctm->length; |
0f113f3e | 1616 | str = (char *)ctm->data; |
f48b83b4 EK |
1617 | /* |
1618 | * Note that the following (historical) code allows much more slack in the | |
1619 | * time format than RFC5280. In RFC5280, the representation is fixed: | |
1620 | * UTCTime: YYMMDDHHMMSSZ | |
1621 | * GeneralizedTime: YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ | |
1622 | */ | |
0f113f3e | 1623 | if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) { |
f48b83b4 EK |
1624 | /* YYMMDDHHMM[SS]Z or YYMMDDHHMM[SS](+-)hhmm */ |
1625 | int min_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1; | |
1626 | int max_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMSS+hhmm") - 1; | |
1627 | if (remaining < min_length || remaining > max_length) | |
0f113f3e MC |
1628 | return 0; |
1629 | memcpy(p, str, 10); | |
1630 | p += 10; | |
1631 | str += 10; | |
f48b83b4 | 1632 | remaining -= 10; |
0f113f3e | 1633 | } else { |
f48b83b4 EK |
1634 | /* YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.fff]]Z or YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.f[f[f]]]](+-)hhmm */ |
1635 | int min_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1; | |
1636 | int max_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMSS.fff+hhmm") - 1; | |
1637 | if (remaining < min_length || remaining > max_length) | |
0f113f3e MC |
1638 | return 0; |
1639 | memcpy(p, str, 12); | |
1640 | p += 12; | |
1641 | str += 12; | |
f48b83b4 | 1642 | remaining -= 12; |
0f113f3e MC |
1643 | } |
1644 | ||
1645 | if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+')) { | |
1646 | *(p++) = '0'; | |
1647 | *(p++) = '0'; | |
1648 | } else { | |
f48b83b4 EK |
1649 | /* SS (seconds) */ |
1650 | if (remaining < 2) | |
1651 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1652 | *(p++) = *(str++); |
1653 | *(p++) = *(str++); | |
f48b83b4 EK |
1654 | remaining -= 2; |
1655 | /* | |
1656 | * Skip any (up to three) fractional seconds... | |
1657 | * TODO(emilia): in RFC5280, fractional seconds are forbidden. | |
1658 | * Can we just kill them altogether? | |
1659 | */ | |
1660 | if (remaining && *str == '.') { | |
0f113f3e | 1661 | str++; |
f48b83b4 EK |
1662 | remaining--; |
1663 | for (i = 0; i < 3 && remaining; i++, str++, remaining--) { | |
1664 | if (*str < '0' || *str > '9') | |
1665 | break; | |
1666 | } | |
0f113f3e MC |
1667 | } |
1668 | ||
1669 | } | |
1670 | *(p++) = 'Z'; | |
1671 | *(p++) = '\0'; | |
1672 | ||
f48b83b4 EK |
1673 | /* We now need either a terminating 'Z' or an offset. */ |
1674 | if (!remaining) | |
1675 | return 0; | |
1676 | if (*str == 'Z') { | |
1677 | if (remaining != 1) | |
1678 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e | 1679 | offset = 0; |
f48b83b4 EK |
1680 | } else { |
1681 | /* (+-)HHMM */ | |
0f113f3e MC |
1682 | if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-')) |
1683 | return 0; | |
f48b83b4 EK |
1684 | /* Historical behaviour: the (+-)hhmm offset is forbidden in RFC5280. */ |
1685 | if (remaining != 5) | |
1686 | return 0; | |
1687 | if (str[1] < '0' || str[1] > '9' || str[2] < '0' || str[2] > '9' || | |
1688 | str[3] < '0' || str[3] > '9' || str[4] < '0' || str[4] > '9') | |
1689 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1690 | offset = ((str[1] - '0') * 10 + (str[2] - '0')) * 60; |
1691 | offset += (str[3] - '0') * 10 + (str[4] - '0'); | |
1692 | if (*str == '-') | |
1693 | offset = -offset; | |
1694 | } | |
1695 | atm.type = ctm->type; | |
1696 | atm.flags = 0; | |
1697 | atm.length = sizeof(buff2); | |
1698 | atm.data = (unsigned char *)buff2; | |
1699 | ||
1700 | if (X509_time_adj(&atm, offset * 60, cmp_time) == NULL) | |
1701 | return 0; | |
1702 | ||
1703 | if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) { | |
1704 | i = (buff1[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff1[1] - '0'); | |
1705 | if (i < 50) | |
1706 | i += 100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */ | |
1707 | j = (buff2[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff2[1] - '0'); | |
1708 | if (j < 50) | |
1709 | j += 100; | |
1710 | ||
1711 | if (i < j) | |
1712 | return -1; | |
1713 | if (i > j) | |
1714 | return 1; | |
1715 | } | |
1716 | i = strcmp(buff1, buff2); | |
1717 | if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */ | |
1718 | return -1; | |
1719 | else | |
1720 | return i; | |
1721 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 1722 | |
284ef5f3 | 1723 | ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj) |
bbb72003 | 1724 | { |
0f113f3e | 1725 | return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL); |
bbb72003 DSH |
1726 | } |
1727 | ||
87d3a0cd | 1728 | ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm) |
0f113f3e MC |
1729 | { |
1730 | return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm); | |
1731 | } | |
87d3a0cd DSH |
1732 | |
1733 | ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s, | |
0f113f3e MC |
1734 | int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm) |
1735 | { | |
1736 | time_t t; | |
1737 | ||
1738 | if (in_tm) | |
1739 | t = *in_tm; | |
1740 | else | |
1741 | time(&t); | |
1742 | ||
1743 | if (s && !(s->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING)) { | |
1744 | if (s->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) | |
1745 | return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec); | |
1746 | if (s->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME) | |
1747 | return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec); | |
1748 | } | |
1749 | return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec); | |
1750 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 1751 | |
7e258a56 | 1752 | int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) |
0f113f3e MC |
1753 | { |
1754 | EVP_PKEY *ktmp = NULL, *ktmp2; | |
1755 | int i, j; | |
1756 | ||
1757 | if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) | |
1758 | return 1; | |
1759 | ||
1760 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) { | |
c01ff880 | 1761 | ktmp = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, i)); |
0f113f3e MC |
1762 | if (ktmp == NULL) { |
1763 | X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS, | |
1764 | X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY); | |
1765 | return 0; | |
1766 | } | |
1767 | if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp)) | |
1768 | break; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1769 | } |
1770 | if (ktmp == NULL) { | |
1771 | X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS, | |
1772 | X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN); | |
1773 | return 0; | |
1774 | } | |
1775 | ||
1776 | /* first, populate the other certs */ | |
1777 | for (j = i - 1; j >= 0; j--) { | |
c01ff880 | 1778 | ktmp2 = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, j)); |
0f113f3e | 1779 | EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2, ktmp); |
0f113f3e MC |
1780 | } |
1781 | ||
1782 | if (pkey != NULL) | |
1783 | EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey, ktmp); | |
0f113f3e MC |
1784 | return 1; |
1785 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 1786 | |
2e8cb108 DSH |
1787 | /* Make a delta CRL as the diff between two full CRLs */ |
1788 | ||
1789 | X509_CRL *X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL *base, X509_CRL *newer, | |
0f113f3e MC |
1790 | EVP_PKEY *skey, const EVP_MD *md, unsigned int flags) |
1791 | { | |
1792 | X509_CRL *crl = NULL; | |
1793 | int i; | |
1794 | STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED) *revs = NULL; | |
1795 | /* CRLs can't be delta already */ | |
1796 | if (base->base_crl_number || newer->base_crl_number) { | |
1797 | X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_CRL_ALREADY_DELTA); | |
1798 | return NULL; | |
1799 | } | |
1800 | /* Base and new CRL must have a CRL number */ | |
1801 | if (!base->crl_number || !newer->crl_number) { | |
1802 | X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_NO_CRL_NUMBER); | |
1803 | return NULL; | |
1804 | } | |
1805 | /* Issuer names must match */ | |
1806 | if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer))) { | |
1807 | X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_ISSUER_MISMATCH); | |
1808 | return NULL; | |
1809 | } | |
1810 | /* AKID and IDP must match */ | |
1811 | if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_authority_key_identifier)) { | |
1812 | X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_AKID_MISMATCH); | |
1813 | return NULL; | |
1814 | } | |
1815 | if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_issuing_distribution_point)) { | |
1816 | X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_IDP_MISMATCH); | |
1817 | return NULL; | |
1818 | } | |
1819 | /* Newer CRL number must exceed full CRL number */ | |
1820 | if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(newer->crl_number, base->crl_number) <= 0) { | |
1821 | X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_NEWER_CRL_NOT_NEWER); | |
1822 | return NULL; | |
1823 | } | |
1824 | /* CRLs must verify */ | |
1825 | if (skey && (X509_CRL_verify(base, skey) <= 0 || | |
1826 | X509_CRL_verify(newer, skey) <= 0)) { | |
1827 | X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_CRL_VERIFY_FAILURE); | |
1828 | return NULL; | |
1829 | } | |
1830 | /* Create new CRL */ | |
1831 | crl = X509_CRL_new(); | |
90945fa3 | 1832 | if (crl == NULL || !X509_CRL_set_version(crl, 1)) |
0f113f3e MC |
1833 | goto memerr; |
1834 | /* Set issuer name */ | |
1835 | if (!X509_CRL_set_issuer_name(crl, X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer))) | |
1836 | goto memerr; | |
1837 | ||
1838 | if (!X509_CRL_set_lastUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(newer))) | |
1839 | goto memerr; | |
1840 | if (!X509_CRL_set_nextUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(newer))) | |
1841 | goto memerr; | |
1842 | ||
1843 | /* Set base CRL number: must be critical */ | |
1844 | ||
1845 | if (!X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d(crl, NID_delta_crl, base->crl_number, 1, 0)) | |
1846 | goto memerr; | |
1847 | ||
1848 | /* | |
1849 | * Copy extensions across from newest CRL to delta: this will set CRL | |
1850 | * number to correct value too. | |
1851 | */ | |
1852 | ||
1853 | for (i = 0; i < X509_CRL_get_ext_count(newer); i++) { | |
1854 | X509_EXTENSION *ext; | |
1855 | ext = X509_CRL_get_ext(newer, i); | |
1856 | if (!X509_CRL_add_ext(crl, ext, -1)) | |
1857 | goto memerr; | |
1858 | } | |
1859 | ||
1860 | /* Go through revoked entries, copying as needed */ | |
1861 | ||
1862 | revs = X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(newer); | |
1863 | ||
1864 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_REVOKED_num(revs); i++) { | |
1865 | X509_REVOKED *rvn, *rvtmp; | |
1866 | rvn = sk_X509_REVOKED_value(revs, i); | |
1867 | /* | |
1868 | * Add only if not also in base. TODO: need something cleverer here | |
1869 | * for some more complex CRLs covering multiple CAs. | |
1870 | */ | |
34a42e14 | 1871 | if (!X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(base, &rvtmp, &rvn->serialNumber)) { |
0f113f3e MC |
1872 | rvtmp = X509_REVOKED_dup(rvn); |
1873 | if (!rvtmp) | |
1874 | goto memerr; | |
1875 | if (!X509_CRL_add0_revoked(crl, rvtmp)) { | |
1876 | X509_REVOKED_free(rvtmp); | |
1877 | goto memerr; | |
1878 | } | |
1879 | } | |
1880 | } | |
1881 | /* TODO: optionally prune deleted entries */ | |
1882 | ||
1883 | if (skey && md && !X509_CRL_sign(crl, skey, md)) | |
1884 | goto memerr; | |
1885 | ||
1886 | return crl; | |
1887 | ||
1888 | memerr: | |
1889 | X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
222561fe | 1890 | X509_CRL_free(crl); |
0f113f3e MC |
1891 | return NULL; |
1892 | } | |
1893 | ||
6b691a5c | 1894 | int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data) |
0f113f3e MC |
1895 | { |
1896 | return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx, data); | |
1897 | } | |
58964a49 | 1898 | |
6b691a5c | 1899 | void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx) |
0f113f3e MC |
1900 | { |
1901 | return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx); | |
1902 | } | |
58964a49 | 1903 | |
6b691a5c | 1904 | int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
1905 | { |
1906 | return ctx->error; | |
1907 | } | |
58964a49 | 1908 | |
6b691a5c | 1909 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err) |
0f113f3e MC |
1910 | { |
1911 | ctx->error = err; | |
1912 | } | |
58964a49 | 1913 | |
6b691a5c | 1914 | int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
1915 | { |
1916 | return ctx->error_depth; | |
1917 | } | |
58964a49 | 1918 | |
6b691a5c | 1919 | X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
1920 | { |
1921 | return ctx->current_cert; | |
1922 | } | |
58964a49 | 1923 | |
7e258a56 | 1924 | STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
1925 | { |
1926 | return ctx->chain; | |
1927 | } | |
58964a49 | 1928 | |
c7cb16a8 | 1929 | STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
1930 | { |
1931 | if (!ctx->chain) | |
1932 | return NULL; | |
1933 | return X509_chain_up_ref(ctx->chain); | |
1934 | } | |
25f923dd | 1935 | |
2008e714 | 1936 | X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
1937 | { |
1938 | return ctx->current_issuer; | |
1939 | } | |
2008e714 DSH |
1940 | |
1941 | X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
0f113f3e MC |
1942 | { |
1943 | return ctx->current_crl; | |
1944 | } | |
2008e714 DSH |
1945 | |
1946 | X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
0f113f3e MC |
1947 | { |
1948 | return ctx->parent; | |
1949 | } | |
2008e714 | 1950 | |
6b691a5c | 1951 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) |
0f113f3e MC |
1952 | { |
1953 | ctx->cert = x; | |
1954 | } | |
58964a49 | 1955 | |
6b691a5c | 1956 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) |
0f113f3e MC |
1957 | { |
1958 | ctx->untrusted = sk; | |
1959 | } | |
58964a49 | 1960 | |
e1a27eb3 | 1961 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk) |
0f113f3e MC |
1962 | { |
1963 | ctx->crls = sk; | |
1964 | } | |
e1a27eb3 | 1965 | |
13938ace | 1966 | int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose) |
0f113f3e MC |
1967 | { |
1968 | return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0); | |
1969 | } | |
11262391 | 1970 | |
bb7cd4e3 | 1971 | int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust) |
0f113f3e MC |
1972 | { |
1973 | return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust); | |
1974 | } | |
1975 | ||
1976 | /* | |
1977 | * This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust values. | |
1978 | * This is intended to be used when another structure has its own trust and | |
1979 | * purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by the ctx. If they aren't | |
1980 | * set then we will usually have a default purpose in mind which should then | |
1981 | * be used to set the trust value. An example of this is SSL use: an SSL | |
1982 | * structure will have its own purpose and trust settings which the | |
1983 | * application can set: if they aren't set then we use the default of SSL | |
1984 | * client/server. | |
13938ace DSH |
1985 | */ |
1986 | ||
1987 | int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose, | |
0f113f3e MC |
1988 | int purpose, int trust) |
1989 | { | |
1990 | int idx; | |
1991 | /* If purpose not set use default */ | |
1992 | if (!purpose) | |
1993 | purpose = def_purpose; | |
1994 | /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */ | |
1995 | if (purpose) { | |
1996 | X509_PURPOSE *ptmp; | |
1997 | idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose); | |
1998 | if (idx == -1) { | |
1999 | X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT, | |
2000 | X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID); | |
2001 | return 0; | |
2002 | } | |
2003 | ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); | |
2004 | if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) { | |
2005 | idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose); | |
2006 | if (idx == -1) { | |
2007 | X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT, | |
2008 | X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID); | |
2009 | return 0; | |
2010 | } | |
2011 | ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); | |
2012 | } | |
2013 | /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */ | |
2014 | if (!trust) | |
2015 | trust = ptmp->trust; | |
2016 | } | |
2017 | if (trust) { | |
2018 | idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust); | |
2019 | if (idx == -1) { | |
2020 | X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT, | |
2021 | X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID); | |
2022 | return 0; | |
2023 | } | |
2024 | } | |
2025 | ||
2026 | if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose) | |
2027 | ctx->param->purpose = purpose; | |
2028 | if (trust && !ctx->param->trust) | |
2029 | ctx->param->trust = trust; | |
2030 | return 1; | |
51630a37 DSH |
2031 | } |
2032 | ||
2f043896 DSH |
2033 | X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void) |
2034 | { | |
b51bce94 | 2035 | X509_STORE_CTX *ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx)); |
b196e7d9 | 2036 | |
90945fa3 | 2037 | if (ctx == NULL) { |
0f113f3e MC |
2038 | X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
2039 | return NULL; | |
2040 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2041 | return ctx; |
2f043896 DSH |
2042 | } |
2043 | ||
2044 | void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
2045 | { | |
222561fe RS |
2046 | if (!ctx) |
2047 | return; | |
0f113f3e MC |
2048 | X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx); |
2049 | OPENSSL_free(ctx); | |
2f043896 DSH |
2050 | } |
2051 | ||
79aa04ef | 2052 | int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509, |
0f113f3e MC |
2053 | STACK_OF(X509) *chain) |
2054 | { | |
2055 | int ret = 1; | |
ecdaa1ae | 2056 | |
0f113f3e MC |
2057 | ctx->ctx = store; |
2058 | ctx->current_method = 0; | |
2059 | ctx->cert = x509; | |
2060 | ctx->untrusted = chain; | |
2061 | ctx->crls = NULL; | |
d9b8b89b | 2062 | ctx->num_untrusted = 0; |
0f113f3e MC |
2063 | ctx->other_ctx = NULL; |
2064 | ctx->valid = 0; | |
2065 | ctx->chain = NULL; | |
2066 | ctx->error = 0; | |
2067 | ctx->explicit_policy = 0; | |
2068 | ctx->error_depth = 0; | |
2069 | ctx->current_cert = NULL; | |
2070 | ctx->current_issuer = NULL; | |
2071 | ctx->current_crl = NULL; | |
2072 | ctx->current_crl_score = 0; | |
2073 | ctx->current_reasons = 0; | |
2074 | ctx->tree = NULL; | |
2075 | ctx->parent = NULL; | |
919ba009 | 2076 | ctx->dane = NULL; |
e29c73c9 VD |
2077 | /* Zero ex_data to make sure we're cleanup-safe */ |
2078 | memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(ctx->ex_data)); | |
0f113f3e | 2079 | |
0f113f3e MC |
2080 | if (store) { |
2081 | ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb; | |
e29c73c9 | 2082 | /* Seems to always be 0 in OpenSSL, else must be idempotent */ |
0f113f3e MC |
2083 | ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup; |
2084 | } else | |
2085 | ctx->cleanup = 0; | |
2086 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
2087 | if (store && store->check_issued) |
2088 | ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued; | |
2089 | else | |
2090 | ctx->check_issued = check_issued; | |
2091 | ||
2092 | if (store && store->get_issuer) | |
2093 | ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer; | |
2094 | else | |
2095 | ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer; | |
2096 | ||
2097 | if (store && store->verify_cb) | |
2098 | ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb; | |
2099 | else | |
2100 | ctx->verify_cb = null_callback; | |
2101 | ||
2102 | if (store && store->verify) | |
2103 | ctx->verify = store->verify; | |
2104 | else | |
2105 | ctx->verify = internal_verify; | |
2106 | ||
2107 | if (store && store->check_revocation) | |
2108 | ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation; | |
2109 | else | |
2110 | ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation; | |
2111 | ||
2112 | if (store && store->get_crl) | |
2113 | ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl; | |
0f113f3e MC |
2114 | |
2115 | if (store && store->check_crl) | |
2116 | ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl; | |
2117 | else | |
2118 | ctx->check_crl = check_crl; | |
2119 | ||
2120 | if (store && store->cert_crl) | |
2121 | ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl; | |
2122 | else | |
2123 | ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl; | |
2124 | ||
2125 | if (store && store->lookup_certs) | |
2126 | ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs; | |
2127 | else | |
2128 | ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_get1_certs; | |
2129 | ||
2130 | if (store && store->lookup_crls) | |
2131 | ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls; | |
2132 | else | |
2133 | ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_get1_crls; | |
2134 | ||
2135 | ctx->check_policy = check_policy; | |
2136 | ||
ecdaa1ae | 2137 | ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(); |
2138 | if (ctx->param == NULL) { | |
2139 | X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
2140 | goto err; | |
2141 | } | |
2142 | ||
2143 | /* | |
2144 | * Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set use defaults. | |
2145 | */ | |
2146 | if (store) | |
2147 | ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param); | |
2148 | else | |
2149 | ctx->param->inh_flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT | X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE; | |
2150 | ||
2151 | if (ret) | |
2152 | ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, | |
2153 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default")); | |
2154 | ||
2155 | if (ret == 0) { | |
2156 | X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
2157 | goto err; | |
2158 | } | |
2159 | ||
e29c73c9 VD |
2160 | if (CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, |
2161 | &ctx->ex_data)) | |
2162 | return 1; | |
2163 | X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
ecdaa1ae | 2164 | |
d9b8b89b | 2165 | err: |
e29c73c9 VD |
2166 | /* |
2167 | * On error clean up allocated storage, if the store context was not | |
2168 | * allocated with X509_STORE_CTX_new() this is our last chance to do so. | |
2169 | */ | |
ecdaa1ae | 2170 | X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx); |
2171 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e MC |
2172 | } |
2173 | ||
2174 | /* | |
2175 | * Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates. This | |
2176 | * avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed. | |
2f043896 DSH |
2177 | */ |
2178 | ||
2179 | void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) | |
2180 | { | |
0f113f3e MC |
2181 | ctx->other_ctx = sk; |
2182 | ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk; | |
2f043896 DSH |
2183 | } |
2184 | ||
2185 | void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
0f113f3e | 2186 | { |
e29c73c9 VD |
2187 | /* |
2188 | * We need to be idempotent because, unfortunately, free() also calls | |
2189 | * cleanup(), so the natural call sequence new(), init(), cleanup(), free() | |
2190 | * calls cleanup() for the same object twice! Thus we must zero the | |
2191 | * pointers below after they're freed! | |
2192 | */ | |
2193 | /* Seems to always be 0 in OpenSSL, do this at most once. */ | |
2194 | if (ctx->cleanup != NULL) { | |
0f113f3e | 2195 | ctx->cleanup(ctx); |
e29c73c9 VD |
2196 | ctx->cleanup = NULL; |
2197 | } | |
0f113f3e MC |
2198 | if (ctx->param != NULL) { |
2199 | if (ctx->parent == NULL) | |
2200 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param); | |
2201 | ctx->param = NULL; | |
2202 | } | |
222561fe RS |
2203 | X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree); |
2204 | ctx->tree = NULL; | |
2205 | sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain, X509_free); | |
2206 | ctx->chain = NULL; | |
0f113f3e | 2207 | CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data)); |
16f8d4eb | 2208 | memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(ctx->ex_data)); |
0f113f3e | 2209 | } |
13938ace | 2210 | |
5d7c222d | 2211 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth) |
0f113f3e MC |
2212 | { |
2213 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth); | |
2214 | } | |
bbb72003 | 2215 | |
5d7c222d | 2216 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags) |
0f113f3e MC |
2217 | { |
2218 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags); | |
2219 | } | |
5d7c222d | 2220 | |
0f113f3e MC |
2221 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags, |
2222 | time_t t) | |
2223 | { | |
2224 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t); | |
2225 | } | |
bbb72003 | 2226 | |
db089ad6 | 2227 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, |
0f113f3e MC |
2228 | int (*verify_cb) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *)) |
2229 | { | |
2230 | ctx->verify_cb = verify_cb; | |
2231 | } | |
db089ad6 | 2232 | |
5d7c222d | 2233 | X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
2234 | { |
2235 | return ctx->tree; | |
2236 | } | |
5d7c222d DSH |
2237 | |
2238 | int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
0f113f3e MC |
2239 | { |
2240 | return ctx->explicit_policy; | |
2241 | } | |
5d7c222d | 2242 | |
7f3f41d8 MC |
2243 | int X509_STORE_CTX_get_num_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
2244 | { | |
d9b8b89b | 2245 | return ctx->num_untrusted; |
7f3f41d8 MC |
2246 | } |
2247 | ||
5d7c222d | 2248 | int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name) |
0f113f3e MC |
2249 | { |
2250 | const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param; | |
2251 | param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name); | |
2252 | if (!param) | |
2253 | return 0; | |
2254 | return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param); | |
2255 | } | |
5d7c222d DSH |
2256 | |
2257 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
0f113f3e MC |
2258 | { |
2259 | return ctx->param; | |
2260 | } | |
5d7c222d DSH |
2261 | |
2262 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) | |
0f113f3e | 2263 | { |
222561fe | 2264 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param); |
0f113f3e MC |
2265 | ctx->param = param; |
2266 | } | |
d9b8b89b | 2267 | |
919ba009 VD |
2268 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_dane(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, struct dane_st *dane) |
2269 | { | |
2270 | ctx->dane = dane; | |
2271 | } | |
2272 | ||
d9b8b89b VD |
2273 | static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
2274 | { | |
2275 | int (*cb) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *) = ctx->verify_cb; | |
2276 | int num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); | |
2277 | X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1); | |
2278 | int ss = cert_self_signed(cert); | |
2279 | STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp = NULL; | |
2280 | unsigned int search; | |
2281 | int may_trusted = 1; | |
2282 | int may_alternate = 0; | |
2283 | int trust = X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; | |
2284 | int alt_untrusted = 0; | |
2285 | int depth; | |
2286 | int ok = 0; | |
2287 | int i; | |
2288 | ||
2289 | /* Our chain starts with a single untrusted element. */ | |
2290 | OPENSSL_assert(num == 1 && ctx->num_untrusted == num); | |
2291 | ||
2292 | #define S_DOUNTRUSTED (1 << 0) /* Search untrusted chain */ | |
2293 | #define S_DOTRUSTED (1 << 1) /* Search trusted store */ | |
2294 | #define S_DOALTERNATE (1 << 2) /* Retry with pruned alternate chain */ | |
2295 | /* | |
2296 | * Set up search policy, untrusted if possible, trusted-first if enabled. | |
2297 | * If not trusted-first, and alternate chains are not disabled, try | |
2298 | * building an alternate chain if no luck with untrusted first. | |
2299 | */ | |
2300 | search = (ctx->untrusted != NULL) ? S_DOUNTRUSTED : 0; | |
2301 | if (search == 0 || ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST) | |
2302 | search |= S_DOTRUSTED; | |
2303 | else if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS)) | |
2304 | may_alternate = 1; | |
2305 | ||
2306 | /* | |
2307 | * Shallow-copy the stack of untrusted certificates (with TLS, this is | |
2308 | * typically the content of the peer's certificate message) so can make | |
2309 | * multiple passes over it, while free to remove elements as we go. | |
2310 | */ | |
2311 | if (ctx->untrusted && (sktmp = sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL) { | |
2312 | X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
2313 | return 0; | |
2314 | } | |
2315 | ||
2316 | /* | |
2317 | * Still absurdly large, but arithmetically safe, a lower hard upper bound | |
2318 | * might be reasonable. | |
2319 | */ | |
2320 | if (ctx->param->depth > INT_MAX/2) | |
2321 | ctx->param->depth = INT_MAX/2; | |
2322 | ||
2323 | /* | |
2324 | * Try to Extend the chain until we reach an ultimately trusted issuer. | |
2325 | * Build chains up to one longer the limit, later fail if we hit the limit, | |
2326 | * with an X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error code. | |
2327 | */ | |
2328 | depth = ctx->param->depth + 1; | |
2329 | ||
2330 | while (search != 0) { | |
2331 | X509 *x; | |
2332 | X509 *xtmp = NULL; | |
2333 | ||
2334 | /* | |
2335 | * Look in the trust store if enabled for first lookup, or we've run | |
2336 | * out of untrusted issuers and search here is not disabled. When | |
2337 | * we exceed the depth limit, we simulate absence of a match. | |
2338 | */ | |
2339 | if ((search & S_DOTRUSTED) != 0) { | |
2340 | STACK_OF(X509) *hide = ctx->chain; | |
2341 | ||
2342 | i = num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); | |
2343 | if ((search & S_DOALTERNATE) != 0) { | |
2344 | /* | |
2345 | * As high up the chain as we can, look for an alternative | |
2346 | * trusted issuer of an untrusted certificate that currently | |
2347 | * has an untrusted issuer. We use the alt_untrusted variable | |
2348 | * to track how far up the chain we find the first match. It | |
2349 | * is only if and when we find a match, that we prune the chain | |
2350 | * and reset ctx->num_untrusted to the reduced count of | |
2351 | * untrusted certificates. While we're searching for such a | |
2352 | * match (which may never be found), it is neither safe nor | |
2353 | * wise to preemptively modify either the chain or | |
2354 | * ctx->num_untrusted. | |
2355 | * | |
2356 | * Note, like ctx->num_untrusted, alt_untrusted is a count of | |
2357 | * untrusted certificates, not a "depth". | |
2358 | */ | |
2359 | i = alt_untrusted; | |
2360 | } | |
2361 | x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i-1); | |
2362 | ||
2363 | /* Suppress duplicate suppression */ | |
2364 | ctx->chain = NULL; | |
2365 | ok = (depth < num) ? 0 : ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x); | |
2366 | ctx->chain = hide; | |
2367 | ||
2368 | if (ok < 0) { | |
2369 | trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED; | |
2370 | search = 0; | |
2371 | continue; | |
2372 | } | |
2373 | ||
2374 | if (ok > 0) { | |
2375 | /* | |
2376 | * Alternative trusted issuer for a mid-chain untrusted cert? | |
2377 | * Pop the untrusted cert's successors and retry. We might now | |
2378 | * be able to complete a valid chain via the trust store. Note | |
2379 | * that despite the current trust-store match we might still | |
2380 | * fail complete the chain to a suitable trust-anchor, in which | |
2381 | * case we may prune some more untrusted certificates and try | |
2382 | * again. Thus the S_DOALTERNATE bit may yet be turned on | |
2383 | * again with an even shorter untrusted chain! | |
2384 | */ | |
2385 | if ((search & S_DOALTERNATE) != 0) { | |
2386 | OPENSSL_assert(num > i && i > 0 && ss == 0); | |
2387 | search &= ~S_DOALTERNATE; | |
2388 | for (; num > i; --num) | |
2389 | X509_free(sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain)); | |
2390 | ctx->num_untrusted = num; | |
2391 | } | |
2392 | ||
2393 | /* | |
2394 | * Self-signed untrusted certificates get replaced by their | |
2395 | * trusted matching issuer. Otherwise, grow the chain. | |
2396 | */ | |
2397 | if (ss == 0) { | |
2398 | if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, x = xtmp)) { | |
2399 | X509_free(xtmp); | |
2400 | X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
2401 | trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED; | |
2402 | search = 0; | |
2403 | continue; | |
2404 | } | |
2405 | ss = cert_self_signed(x); | |
2406 | } else if (num == ctx->num_untrusted) { | |
2407 | /* | |
2408 | * We have a self-signed certificate that has the same | |
2409 | * subject name (and perhaps keyid and/or serial number) as | |
2410 | * a trust-anchor. We must have an exact match to avoid | |
2411 | * possible impersonation via key substitution etc. | |
2412 | */ | |
2413 | if (X509_cmp(x, xtmp) != 0) { | |
2414 | /* Self-signed untrusted mimic. */ | |
2415 | X509_free(xtmp); | |
2416 | ok = 0; | |
2417 | } else { | |
2418 | X509_free(x); | |
2419 | ctx->num_untrusted = --num; | |
2420 | (void) sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, num, x = xtmp); | |
2421 | } | |
2422 | } | |
2423 | ||
2424 | /* | |
2425 | * We've added a new trusted certificate to the chain, recheck | |
2426 | * trust. If not done, and not self-signed look deeper. | |
2427 | * Whether or not we're doing "trusted first", we no longer | |
2428 | * look for untrusted certificates from the peer's chain. | |
2429 | */ | |
2430 | if (ok) { | |
2431 | OPENSSL_assert(ctx->num_untrusted <= num); | |
2432 | search &= ~S_DOUNTRUSTED; | |
2433 | switch (trust = check_trust(ctx, num)) { | |
2434 | case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED: | |
2435 | case X509_TRUST_REJECTED: | |
2436 | search = 0; | |
2437 | continue; | |
2438 | } | |
2439 | if (ss == 0) | |
2440 | continue; | |
2441 | } | |
2442 | } | |
2443 | ||
2444 | /* | |
2445 | * No dispositive decision, and either self-signed or no match, if | |
2446 | * we were doing untrusted-first, and alt-chains are not disabled, | |
2447 | * do that, by repeatedly losing one untrusted element at a time, | |
2448 | * and trying to extend the shorted chain. | |
2449 | */ | |
2450 | if ((search & S_DOUNTRUSTED) == 0) { | |
2451 | /* Continue search for a trusted issuer of a shorter chain? */ | |
2452 | if ((search & S_DOALTERNATE) != 0 && --alt_untrusted > 0) | |
2453 | continue; | |
2454 | /* Still no luck and no fallbacks left? */ | |
2455 | if (!may_alternate || (search & S_DOALTERNATE) != 0 || | |
2456 | ctx->num_untrusted < 2) | |
2457 | break; | |
2458 | /* Search for a trusted issuer of a shorter chain */ | |
2459 | search |= S_DOALTERNATE; | |
2460 | alt_untrusted = ctx->num_untrusted - 1; | |
2461 | ss = 0; | |
2462 | } | |
2463 | } | |
2464 | ||
2465 | /* | |
2466 | * Extend chain with peer-provided certificates | |
2467 | */ | |
2468 | if ((search & S_DOUNTRUSTED) != 0) { | |
2469 | num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); | |
2470 | OPENSSL_assert(num == ctx->num_untrusted); | |
2471 | x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num-1); | |
2472 | xtmp = (depth < num) ? NULL : find_issuer(ctx, sktmp, x); | |
2473 | ||
2474 | /* | |
2475 | * Once we run out of untrusted issuers, we stop looking for more | |
2476 | * and start looking only in the trust store if enabled. | |
2477 | */ | |
2478 | if (xtmp == NULL) { | |
2479 | search &= ~S_DOUNTRUSTED; | |
2480 | if (may_trusted) | |
2481 | search |= S_DOTRUSTED; | |
2482 | continue; | |
2483 | } | |
2484 | ||
2485 | if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, x = xtmp)) { | |
2486 | X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
2487 | trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED; | |
2488 | search = 0; | |
2489 | continue; | |
2490 | } | |
2491 | X509_up_ref(x); | |
2492 | ++ctx->num_untrusted; | |
2493 | ss = cert_self_signed(xtmp); | |
2494 | ||
2495 | /* | |
2496 | * Not strictly necessary, but saves cycles looking at the same | |
2497 | * certificates over and over. | |
2498 | */ | |
2499 | (void) sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp, x); | |
2500 | } | |
2501 | } | |
2502 | sk_X509_free(sktmp); | |
2503 | ||
2504 | /* | |
2505 | * Last chance to make a trusted chain, check for direct leaf PKIX trust. | |
2506 | */ | |
2507 | if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) <= depth) { | |
2508 | if (trust == X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED && | |
2509 | sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == ctx->num_untrusted) | |
2510 | trust = check_trust(ctx, 1); | |
2511 | } | |
2512 | ||
2513 | switch (trust) { | |
2514 | case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED: | |
2515 | return 1; | |
2516 | case X509_TRUST_REJECTED: | |
2517 | return 0; | |
2518 | case X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED: | |
2519 | default: | |
2520 | num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); | |
2521 | ctx->current_cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1); | |
2522 | ctx->error_depth = num-1; | |
2523 | if (num > depth) | |
2524 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG; | |
2525 | else if (ss && sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1) | |
2526 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT; | |
2527 | else if (ss) | |
2528 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN; | |
2529 | else if (ctx->num_untrusted == num) | |
2530 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY; | |
2531 | else | |
2532 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT; | |
2533 | return cb(0, ctx); | |
2534 | } | |
2535 | } |