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d02b48c6 | 1 | /* crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c */ |
58964a49 | 2 | /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) |
d02b48c6 RE |
3 | * All rights reserved. |
4 | * | |
5 | * This package is an SSL implementation written | |
6 | * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). | |
7 | * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. | |
10621efd | 8 | * |
d02b48c6 RE |
9 | * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as |
10 | * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions | |
11 | * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, | |
12 | * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation | |
13 | * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms | |
14 | * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). | |
10621efd | 15 | * |
d02b48c6 RE |
16 | * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in |
17 | * the code are not to be removed. | |
18 | * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution | |
19 | * as the author of the parts of the library used. | |
20 | * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or | |
21 | * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. | |
10621efd | 22 | * |
d02b48c6 RE |
23 | * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
24 | * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | |
25 | * are met: | |
26 | * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright | |
27 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. | |
28 | * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | |
29 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the | |
30 | * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. | |
31 | * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software | |
32 | * must display the following acknowledgement: | |
33 | * "This product includes cryptographic software written by | |
34 | * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" | |
35 | * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library | |
36 | * being used are not cryptographic related :-). | |
10621efd | 37 | * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from |
d02b48c6 RE |
38 | * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: |
39 | * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" | |
10621efd | 40 | * |
d02b48c6 RE |
41 | * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND |
42 | * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE | |
43 | * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE | |
44 | * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE | |
45 | * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL | |
46 | * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS | |
47 | * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) | |
48 | * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT | |
49 | * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY | |
50 | * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF | |
51 | * SUCH DAMAGE. | |
10621efd | 52 | * |
d02b48c6 RE |
53 | * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or |
54 | * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be | |
55 | * copied and put under another distribution licence | |
56 | * [including the GNU Public Licence.] | |
57 | */ | |
58 | ||
59 | #include <stdio.h> | |
60 | #include <time.h> | |
61 | #include <errno.h> | |
d02b48c6 RE |
62 | |
63 | #include "cryptlib.h" | |
17f389bb | 64 | #include <openssl/crypto.h> |
ec577822 BM |
65 | #include <openssl/lhash.h> |
66 | #include <openssl/buffer.h> | |
67 | #include <openssl/evp.h> | |
68 | #include <openssl/asn1.h> | |
69 | #include <openssl/x509.h> | |
11262391 | 70 | #include <openssl/x509v3.h> |
ec577822 | 71 | #include <openssl/objects.h> |
d02b48c6 | 72 | |
d43c4497 DSH |
73 | /* CRL score values */ |
74 | ||
75 | /* No unhandled critical extensions */ | |
76 | ||
10621efd | 77 | #define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100 |
d43c4497 DSH |
78 | |
79 | /* certificate is within CRL scope */ | |
80 | ||
10621efd | 81 | #define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080 |
d43c4497 DSH |
82 | |
83 | /* CRL times valid */ | |
84 | ||
10621efd | 85 | #define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040 |
d43c4497 DSH |
86 | |
87 | /* Issuer name matches certificate */ | |
88 | ||
10621efd | 89 | #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020 |
d43c4497 DSH |
90 | |
91 | /* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */ | |
92 | ||
93 | #define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE) | |
94 | ||
95 | /* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */ | |
96 | ||
10621efd | 97 | #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018 |
d43c4497 DSH |
98 | |
99 | /* CRL issuer is on certificate path */ | |
100 | ||
10621efd | 101 | #define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008 |
d43c4497 DSH |
102 | |
103 | /* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */ | |
104 | ||
10621efd | 105 | #define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004 |
d43c4497 DSH |
106 | |
107 | /* Have a delta CRL with valid times */ | |
108 | ||
10621efd | 109 | #define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002 |
d43c4497 | 110 | |
10621efd | 111 | static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e); |
2f043896 DSH |
112 | static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer); |
113 | static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x); | |
30b415b0 | 114 | static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
e9746e03 | 115 | static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
51630a37 | 116 | static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
b545dc67 DSH |
117 | static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
118 | static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); | |
5d7c222d | 119 | static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
4b96839f DSH |
120 | |
121 | static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer, | |
10621efd | 122 | unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x); |
d43c4497 | 123 | static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, |
10621efd MC |
124 | X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x); |
125 | static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, | |
126 | int *pcrl_score, X509_CRL *base, | |
127 | STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls); | |
128 | static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 **pissuer, | |
129 | int *pcrl_score); | |
4b96839f | 130 | static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score, |
10621efd | 131 | unsigned int *preasons); |
9d84d4ed DSH |
132 | static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x); |
133 | static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, | |
10621efd MC |
134 | STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path, |
135 | STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path); | |
4b96839f | 136 | |
d02b48c6 | 137 | static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
10621efd | 138 | const char X509_version[] = "X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT; |
d02b48c6 | 139 | |
6b691a5c | 140 | static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e) |
10621efd MC |
141 | { |
142 | return ok; | |
143 | } | |
d02b48c6 RE |
144 | |
145 | #if 0 | |
6b691a5c | 146 | static int x509_subject_cmp(X509 **a, X509 **b) |
10621efd MC |
147 | { |
148 | return X509_subject_name_cmp(*a, *b); | |
149 | } | |
d02b48c6 RE |
150 | #endif |
151 | ||
6b691a5c | 152 | int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
10621efd | 153 | { |
f7bf8e02 | 154 | X509 *x, *xtmp, *xtmp2, *chain_ss = NULL; |
10621efd MC |
155 | int bad_chain = 0; |
156 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param; | |
157 | int depth, i, ok = 0; | |
f7bf8e02 | 158 | int num, j, retry; |
10621efd MC |
159 | int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); |
160 | STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp = NULL; | |
161 | if (ctx->cert == NULL) { | |
162 | X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY); | |
163 | return -1; | |
164 | } | |
b3b1eb57 MC |
165 | if (ctx->chain != NULL) { |
166 | /* | |
167 | * This X509_STORE_CTX has already been used to verify a cert. We | |
168 | * cannot do another one. | |
169 | */ | |
170 | X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); | |
171 | return -1; | |
172 | } | |
10621efd MC |
173 | |
174 | cb = ctx->verify_cb; | |
175 | ||
176 | /* | |
177 | * first we make sure the chain we are going to build is present and that | |
178 | * the first entry is in place | |
179 | */ | |
b3b1eb57 MC |
180 | if (((ctx->chain = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) || |
181 | (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, ctx->cert))) { | |
182 | X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
183 | goto end; | |
10621efd | 184 | } |
b3b1eb57 MC |
185 | CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); |
186 | ctx->last_untrusted = 1; | |
10621efd MC |
187 | |
188 | /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */ | |
189 | if (ctx->untrusted != NULL | |
190 | && (sktmp = sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL) { | |
191 | X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
192 | goto end; | |
193 | } | |
194 | ||
195 | num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); | |
196 | x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1); | |
197 | depth = param->depth; | |
198 | ||
199 | for (;;) { | |
200 | /* If we have enough, we break */ | |
201 | if (depth < num) | |
202 | break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take | |
203 | * note of it and, if appropriate, use the | |
204 | * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error code | |
205 | * later. */ | |
206 | ||
207 | /* If we are self signed, we break */ | |
208 | if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x)) | |
209 | break; | |
210 | ||
211 | /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */ | |
212 | if (ctx->untrusted != NULL) { | |
213 | xtmp = find_issuer(ctx, sktmp, x); | |
214 | if (xtmp != NULL) { | |
215 | if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, xtmp)) { | |
216 | X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
217 | goto end; | |
218 | } | |
219 | CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); | |
220 | (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp, xtmp); | |
221 | ctx->last_untrusted++; | |
222 | x = xtmp; | |
223 | num++; | |
224 | /* | |
225 | * reparse the full chain for the next one | |
226 | */ | |
227 | continue; | |
228 | } | |
229 | } | |
230 | break; | |
231 | } | |
232 | ||
f7bf8e02 MC |
233 | /* Remember how many untrusted certs we have */ |
234 | j = num; | |
10621efd MC |
235 | /* |
236 | * at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted certificates. | |
237 | * We now need to add at least one trusted one, if possible, otherwise we | |
238 | * complain. | |
239 | */ | |
240 | ||
f7bf8e02 MC |
241 | do { |
242 | /* | |
243 | * Examine last certificate in chain and see if it is self signed. | |
244 | */ | |
245 | i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); | |
246 | x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i - 1); | |
247 | if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x)) { | |
248 | /* we have a self signed certificate */ | |
249 | if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1) { | |
250 | /* | |
251 | * We have a single self signed certificate: see if we can | |
252 | * find it in the store. We must have an exact match to avoid | |
253 | * possible impersonation. | |
254 | */ | |
255 | ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x); | |
256 | if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp)) { | |
257 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT; | |
258 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
259 | ctx->error_depth = i - 1; | |
260 | if (ok == 1) | |
261 | X509_free(xtmp); | |
262 | bad_chain = 1; | |
263 | ok = cb(0, ctx); | |
264 | if (!ok) | |
265 | goto end; | |
266 | } else { | |
267 | /* | |
268 | * We have a match: replace certificate with store | |
269 | * version so we get any trust settings. | |
270 | */ | |
271 | X509_free(x); | |
272 | x = xtmp; | |
273 | (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x); | |
274 | ctx->last_untrusted = 0; | |
275 | } | |
10621efd MC |
276 | } else { |
277 | /* | |
f7bf8e02 | 278 | * extract and save self signed certificate for later use |
10621efd | 279 | */ |
f7bf8e02 MC |
280 | chain_ss = sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain); |
281 | ctx->last_untrusted--; | |
282 | num--; | |
283 | j--; | |
284 | x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1); | |
10621efd | 285 | } |
10621efd | 286 | } |
f7bf8e02 MC |
287 | /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */ |
288 | for (;;) { | |
289 | /* If we have enough, we break */ | |
290 | if (depth < num) | |
291 | break; | |
292 | /* If we are self signed, we break */ | |
293 | if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x)) | |
294 | break; | |
295 | ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x); | |
296 | if (ok < 0) | |
297 | return ok; | |
298 | if (ok == 0) | |
299 | break; | |
300 | x = xtmp; | |
301 | if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, x)) { | |
302 | X509_free(xtmp); | |
303 | X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
304 | return 0; | |
305 | } | |
306 | num++; | |
307 | } | |
10621efd | 308 | |
f7bf8e02 MC |
309 | /* |
310 | * If we haven't got a least one certificate from our store then check | |
cf1bf3f0 MC |
311 | * if there is an alternative chain that could be used. We only do this |
312 | * if the user hasn't switched off alternate chain checking | |
f7bf8e02 MC |
313 | */ |
314 | retry = 0; | |
cb22d2ae | 315 | if (num == ctx->last_untrusted && |
cf1bf3f0 | 316 | !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS)) { |
f7bf8e02 MC |
317 | while (j-- > 1) { |
318 | xtmp2 = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j - 1); | |
319 | ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, xtmp2); | |
320 | if (ok < 0) | |
321 | goto end; | |
322 | /* Check if we found an alternate chain */ | |
323 | if (ok > 0) { | |
324 | /* | |
325 | * Free up the found cert we'll add it again later | |
326 | */ | |
327 | X509_free(xtmp); | |
10621efd | 328 | |
f7bf8e02 MC |
329 | /* |
330 | * Dump all the certs above this point - we've found an | |
331 | * alternate chain | |
332 | */ | |
333 | while (num > j) { | |
334 | xtmp = sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain); | |
335 | X509_free(xtmp); | |
336 | num--; | |
f7bf8e02 | 337 | } |
9a0db453 | 338 | ctx->last_untrusted = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); |
f7bf8e02 MC |
339 | retry = 1; |
340 | break; | |
341 | } | |
342 | } | |
10621efd | 343 | } |
f7bf8e02 | 344 | } while (retry); |
10621efd MC |
345 | |
346 | /* Is last certificate looked up self signed? */ | |
347 | if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x)) { | |
348 | if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss)) { | |
349 | if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num) | |
350 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY; | |
351 | else | |
352 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT; | |
353 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
354 | } else { | |
355 | ||
356 | sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, chain_ss); | |
357 | num++; | |
358 | ctx->last_untrusted = num; | |
359 | ctx->current_cert = chain_ss; | |
360 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN; | |
361 | chain_ss = NULL; | |
362 | } | |
363 | ||
364 | ctx->error_depth = num - 1; | |
365 | bad_chain = 1; | |
366 | ok = cb(0, ctx); | |
367 | if (!ok) | |
368 | goto end; | |
369 | } | |
370 | ||
371 | /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */ | |
372 | ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx); | |
373 | ||
374 | if (!ok) | |
375 | goto end; | |
376 | ||
377 | /* Check name constraints */ | |
378 | ||
379 | ok = check_name_constraints(ctx); | |
380 | ||
381 | if (!ok) | |
382 | goto end; | |
383 | ||
384 | /* The chain extensions are OK: check trust */ | |
385 | ||
386 | if (param->trust > 0) | |
387 | ok = check_trust(ctx); | |
388 | ||
389 | if (!ok) | |
390 | goto end; | |
391 | ||
392 | /* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */ | |
393 | X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain); | |
394 | ||
395 | /* | |
396 | * Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters because | |
397 | * they may be needed for CRL signature verification. | |
398 | */ | |
399 | ||
400 | ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx); | |
401 | if (!ok) | |
402 | goto end; | |
403 | ||
404 | /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */ | |
405 | if (ctx->verify != NULL) | |
406 | ok = ctx->verify(ctx); | |
407 | else | |
408 | ok = internal_verify(ctx); | |
409 | if (!ok) | |
410 | goto end; | |
5d7c222d | 411 | |
10ca15f3 | 412 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 |
10621efd MC |
413 | /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */ |
414 | ok = v3_asid_validate_path(ctx); | |
415 | if (!ok) | |
416 | goto end; | |
417 | ok = v3_addr_validate_path(ctx); | |
418 | if (!ok) | |
419 | goto end; | |
96ea4ae9 BL |
420 | #endif |
421 | ||
10621efd MC |
422 | /* If we get this far evaluate policies */ |
423 | if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK)) | |
424 | ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx); | |
425 | if (!ok) | |
426 | goto end; | |
427 | if (0) { | |
428 | end: | |
429 | X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain); | |
430 | } | |
431 | if (sktmp != NULL) | |
432 | sk_X509_free(sktmp); | |
433 | if (chain_ss != NULL) | |
434 | X509_free(chain_ss); | |
435 | return ok; | |
436 | } | |
437 | ||
438 | /* | |
439 | * Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any) | |
2f043896 DSH |
440 | */ |
441 | ||
442 | static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x) | |
443 | { | |
10621efd MC |
444 | int i; |
445 | X509 *issuer; | |
446 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) { | |
447 | issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i); | |
448 | if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer)) | |
449 | return issuer; | |
450 | } | |
451 | return NULL; | |
2f043896 DSH |
452 | } |
453 | ||
454 | /* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */ | |
455 | ||
456 | static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer) | |
457 | { | |
10621efd MC |
458 | int ret; |
459 | ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x); | |
460 | if (ret == X509_V_OK) | |
461 | return 1; | |
462 | /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */ | |
463 | if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK)) | |
464 | return 0; | |
465 | ||
466 | ctx->error = ret; | |
467 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
468 | ctx->current_issuer = issuer; | |
469 | return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
470 | return 0; | |
2f043896 DSH |
471 | } |
472 | ||
473 | /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */ | |
474 | ||
475 | static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) | |
476 | { | |
10621efd MC |
477 | *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x); |
478 | if (*issuer) { | |
479 | CRYPTO_add(&(*issuer)->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); | |
480 | return 1; | |
481 | } else | |
482 | return 0; | |
2f043896 | 483 | } |
2f043896 | 484 | |
10621efd MC |
485 | /* |
486 | * Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency with the supplied | |
487 | * purpose | |
11262391 DSH |
488 | */ |
489 | ||
30b415b0 | 490 | static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
11262391 | 491 | { |
cf1b7d96 | 492 | #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY |
10621efd | 493 | return 1; |
11262391 | 494 | #else |
10621efd MC |
495 | int i, ok = 0, must_be_ca, plen = 0; |
496 | X509 *x; | |
497 | int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); | |
498 | int proxy_path_length = 0; | |
499 | int purpose; | |
500 | int allow_proxy_certs; | |
501 | cb = ctx->verify_cb; | |
502 | ||
cda8845d MC |
503 | /*- |
504 | * must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values: | |
505 | * -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct | |
506 | * use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA). | |
507 | * 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not | |
508 | * used, but the possibility is present for future extensions. | |
509 | * 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for | |
510 | * all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate. | |
511 | */ | |
10621efd MC |
512 | must_be_ca = -1; |
513 | ||
514 | /* CRL path validation */ | |
515 | if (ctx->parent) { | |
516 | allow_proxy_certs = 0; | |
517 | purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN; | |
518 | } else { | |
519 | allow_proxy_certs = | |
520 | ! !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS); | |
521 | /* | |
522 | * A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their software | |
523 | * happy | |
524 | */ | |
525 | if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS")) | |
526 | allow_proxy_certs = 1; | |
527 | purpose = ctx->param->purpose; | |
528 | } | |
529 | ||
530 | /* Check all untrusted certificates */ | |
531 | for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++) { | |
532 | int ret; | |
533 | x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); | |
534 | if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL) | |
535 | && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) { | |
536 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION; | |
537 | ctx->error_depth = i; | |
538 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
539 | ok = cb(0, ctx); | |
540 | if (!ok) | |
541 | goto end; | |
542 | } | |
543 | if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)) { | |
544 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED; | |
545 | ctx->error_depth = i; | |
546 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
547 | ok = cb(0, ctx); | |
548 | if (!ok) | |
549 | goto end; | |
550 | } | |
551 | ret = X509_check_ca(x); | |
552 | switch (must_be_ca) { | |
553 | case -1: | |
554 | if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) | |
555 | && (ret != 1) && (ret != 0)) { | |
556 | ret = 0; | |
557 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA; | |
558 | } else | |
559 | ret = 1; | |
560 | break; | |
561 | case 0: | |
562 | if (ret != 0) { | |
563 | ret = 0; | |
564 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA; | |
565 | } else | |
566 | ret = 1; | |
567 | break; | |
568 | default: | |
569 | if ((ret == 0) | |
570 | || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) | |
571 | && (ret != 1))) { | |
572 | ret = 0; | |
573 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA; | |
574 | } else | |
575 | ret = 1; | |
576 | break; | |
577 | } | |
578 | if (ret == 0) { | |
579 | ctx->error_depth = i; | |
580 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
581 | ok = cb(0, ctx); | |
582 | if (!ok) | |
583 | goto end; | |
584 | } | |
585 | if (ctx->param->purpose > 0) { | |
586 | ret = X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca > 0); | |
587 | if ((ret == 0) | |
588 | || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) | |
589 | && (ret != 1))) { | |
590 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE; | |
591 | ctx->error_depth = i; | |
592 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
593 | ok = cb(0, ctx); | |
594 | if (!ok) | |
595 | goto end; | |
596 | } | |
597 | } | |
598 | /* Check pathlen if not self issued */ | |
599 | if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) | |
600 | && (x->ex_pathlen != -1) | |
601 | && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1))) { | |
602 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED; | |
603 | ctx->error_depth = i; | |
604 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
605 | ok = cb(0, ctx); | |
606 | if (!ok) | |
607 | goto end; | |
608 | } | |
609 | /* Increment path length if not self issued */ | |
610 | if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)) | |
611 | plen++; | |
612 | /* | |
613 | * If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next certificate | |
614 | * must be another proxy certificate or a EE certificate. If not, | |
615 | * the next certificate must be a CA certificate. | |
616 | */ | |
617 | if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) { | |
618 | if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1 && i > x->ex_pcpathlen) { | |
619 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED; | |
620 | ctx->error_depth = i; | |
621 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
622 | ok = cb(0, ctx); | |
623 | if (!ok) | |
624 | goto end; | |
625 | } | |
626 | proxy_path_length++; | |
627 | must_be_ca = 0; | |
628 | } else | |
629 | must_be_ca = 1; | |
630 | } | |
631 | ok = 1; | |
82aec1cc | 632 | end: |
10621efd | 633 | return ok; |
11262391 DSH |
634 | #endif |
635 | } | |
636 | ||
e9746e03 | 637 | static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
10621efd MC |
638 | { |
639 | X509 *x; | |
640 | int i, j, rv; | |
641 | /* Check name constraints for all certificates */ | |
642 | for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--) { | |
643 | x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); | |
644 | /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */ | |
645 | if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)) | |
646 | continue; | |
647 | /* | |
648 | * Check against constraints for all certificates higher in chain | |
649 | * including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly speaking needed | |
650 | * but if it includes constraints it is to be assumed it expects them | |
651 | * to be obeyed. | |
652 | */ | |
653 | for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--) { | |
654 | NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc; | |
655 | if (nc) { | |
656 | rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc); | |
657 | if (rv != X509_V_OK) { | |
658 | ctx->error = rv; | |
659 | ctx->error_depth = i; | |
660 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
661 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) | |
662 | return 0; | |
663 | } | |
664 | } | |
665 | } | |
666 | } | |
667 | return 1; | |
668 | } | |
e9746e03 | 669 | |
51630a37 DSH |
670 | static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
671 | { | |
cf1b7d96 | 672 | #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY |
10621efd | 673 | return 1; |
51630a37 | 674 | #else |
10621efd MC |
675 | int i, ok; |
676 | X509 *x; | |
677 | int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); | |
678 | cb = ctx->verify_cb; | |
51630a37 | 679 | /* For now just check the last certificate in the chain */ |
10621efd MC |
680 | i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; |
681 | x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); | |
682 | ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0); | |
683 | if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED) | |
684 | return 1; | |
685 | ctx->error_depth = i; | |
686 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
687 | if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) | |
688 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED; | |
689 | else | |
690 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED; | |
691 | ok = cb(0, ctx); | |
692 | return ok; | |
51630a37 DSH |
693 | #endif |
694 | } | |
695 | ||
b545dc67 | 696 | static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
10621efd MC |
697 | { |
698 | int i, last, ok; | |
699 | if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK)) | |
700 | return 1; | |
701 | if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL) | |
702 | last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; | |
703 | else { | |
704 | /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */ | |
705 | if (ctx->parent) | |
706 | return 1; | |
707 | last = 0; | |
708 | } | |
709 | for (i = 0; i <= last; i++) { | |
710 | ctx->error_depth = i; | |
711 | ok = check_cert(ctx); | |
712 | if (!ok) | |
713 | return ok; | |
714 | } | |
715 | return 1; | |
716 | } | |
b545dc67 DSH |
717 | |
718 | static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
10621efd MC |
719 | { |
720 | X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL; | |
721 | X509 *x; | |
722 | int ok, cnum; | |
723 | unsigned int last_reasons; | |
724 | cnum = ctx->error_depth; | |
725 | x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum); | |
726 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
727 | ctx->current_issuer = NULL; | |
728 | ctx->current_crl_score = 0; | |
729 | ctx->current_reasons = 0; | |
730 | while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS) { | |
731 | last_reasons = ctx->current_reasons; | |
732 | /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */ | |
733 | if (ctx->get_crl) | |
734 | ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x); | |
735 | else | |
736 | ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x); | |
737 | /* | |
738 | * If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except notify callback | |
739 | */ | |
740 | if (!ok) { | |
741 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL; | |
742 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
743 | goto err; | |
744 | } | |
745 | ctx->current_crl = crl; | |
746 | ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl); | |
747 | if (!ok) | |
748 | goto err; | |
749 | ||
750 | if (dcrl) { | |
751 | ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl); | |
752 | if (!ok) | |
753 | goto err; | |
754 | ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x); | |
755 | if (!ok) | |
756 | goto err; | |
757 | } else | |
758 | ok = 1; | |
759 | ||
760 | /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */ | |
761 | if (ok != 2) { | |
762 | ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x); | |
763 | if (!ok) | |
764 | goto err; | |
765 | } | |
766 | ||
767 | X509_CRL_free(crl); | |
768 | X509_CRL_free(dcrl); | |
769 | crl = NULL; | |
770 | dcrl = NULL; | |
771 | /* | |
772 | * If reasons not updated we wont get anywhere by another iteration, | |
773 | * so exit loop. | |
774 | */ | |
775 | if (last_reasons == ctx->current_reasons) { | |
776 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL; | |
777 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
778 | goto err; | |
779 | } | |
780 | } | |
781 | err: | |
782 | X509_CRL_free(crl); | |
783 | X509_CRL_free(dcrl); | |
784 | ||
785 | ctx->current_crl = NULL; | |
786 | return ok; | |
787 | ||
788 | } | |
b545dc67 | 789 | |
e1a27eb3 DSH |
790 | /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */ |
791 | ||
792 | static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify) | |
10621efd MC |
793 | { |
794 | time_t *ptime; | |
795 | int i; | |
796 | if (notify) | |
797 | ctx->current_crl = crl; | |
798 | if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME) | |
799 | ptime = &ctx->param->check_time; | |
800 | else | |
801 | ptime = NULL; | |
802 | ||
803 | i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime); | |
804 | if (i == 0) { | |
805 | if (!notify) | |
806 | return 0; | |
807 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD; | |
808 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) | |
809 | return 0; | |
810 | } | |
811 | ||
812 | if (i > 0) { | |
813 | if (!notify) | |
814 | return 0; | |
815 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID; | |
816 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) | |
817 | return 0; | |
818 | } | |
819 | ||
820 | if (X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl)) { | |
821 | i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime); | |
822 | ||
823 | if (i == 0) { | |
824 | if (!notify) | |
825 | return 0; | |
826 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD; | |
827 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) | |
828 | return 0; | |
829 | } | |
830 | /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */ | |
831 | if ((i < 0) && !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA)) { | |
832 | if (!notify) | |
833 | return 0; | |
834 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED; | |
835 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) | |
836 | return 0; | |
837 | } | |
838 | } | |
839 | ||
840 | if (notify) | |
841 | ctx->current_crl = NULL; | |
842 | ||
843 | return 1; | |
844 | } | |
e1a27eb3 | 845 | |
d43c4497 | 846 | static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, |
10621efd MC |
847 | X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons, |
848 | STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls) | |
849 | { | |
850 | int i, crl_score, best_score = *pscore; | |
851 | unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0; | |
852 | X509 *x = ctx->current_cert; | |
853 | X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL; | |
854 | X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL; | |
855 | ||
856 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) { | |
857 | crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i); | |
858 | reasons = *preasons; | |
859 | crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x); | |
860 | ||
861 | if (crl_score > best_score) { | |
862 | best_crl = crl; | |
863 | best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer; | |
864 | best_score = crl_score; | |
865 | best_reasons = reasons; | |
866 | } | |
867 | } | |
868 | ||
869 | if (best_crl) { | |
870 | if (*pcrl) | |
871 | X509_CRL_free(*pcrl); | |
872 | *pcrl = best_crl; | |
873 | *pissuer = best_crl_issuer; | |
874 | *pscore = best_score; | |
875 | *preasons = best_reasons; | |
876 | CRYPTO_add(&best_crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL); | |
877 | if (*pdcrl) { | |
878 | X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl); | |
879 | *pdcrl = NULL; | |
880 | } | |
881 | get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls); | |
882 | } | |
883 | ||
884 | if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID) | |
885 | return 1; | |
886 | ||
887 | return 0; | |
888 | } | |
889 | ||
890 | /* | |
891 | * Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be | |
d43c4497 DSH |
892 | * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical. |
893 | */ | |
894 | ||
895 | static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid) | |
10621efd MC |
896 | { |
897 | ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb; | |
898 | int i; | |
899 | i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, -1); | |
900 | if (i >= 0) { | |
901 | /* Can't have multiple occurrences */ | |
902 | if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1) | |
903 | return 0; | |
904 | exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i)); | |
905 | } else | |
906 | exta = NULL; | |
d43c4497 | 907 | |
10621efd | 908 | i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, -1); |
d43c4497 | 909 | |
10621efd | 910 | if (i >= 0) { |
d43c4497 | 911 | |
10621efd MC |
912 | if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1) |
913 | return 0; | |
914 | extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i)); | |
915 | } else | |
916 | extb = NULL; | |
d43c4497 | 917 | |
10621efd MC |
918 | if (!exta && !extb) |
919 | return 1; | |
d43c4497 | 920 | |
10621efd MC |
921 | if (!exta || !extb) |
922 | return 0; | |
d43c4497 | 923 | |
10621efd MC |
924 | if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb)) |
925 | return 0; | |
d43c4497 | 926 | |
10621efd MC |
927 | return 1; |
928 | } | |
d43c4497 DSH |
929 | |
930 | /* See if a base and delta are compatible */ | |
931 | ||
932 | static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base) | |
10621efd MC |
933 | { |
934 | /* Delta CRL must be a delta */ | |
935 | if (!delta->base_crl_number) | |
936 | return 0; | |
937 | /* Base must have a CRL number */ | |
938 | if (!base->crl_number) | |
939 | return 0; | |
940 | /* Issuer names must match */ | |
941 | if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta))) | |
942 | return 0; | |
943 | /* AKID and IDP must match */ | |
944 | if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier)) | |
945 | return 0; | |
946 | if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point)) | |
947 | return 0; | |
948 | /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */ | |
949 | if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0) | |
950 | return 0; | |
951 | /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */ | |
952 | if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0) | |
953 | return 1; | |
954 | return 0; | |
955 | } | |
956 | ||
957 | /* | |
958 | * For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring or | |
959 | * retrieve a chain of deltas... | |
d43c4497 DSH |
960 | */ |
961 | ||
962 | static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore, | |
10621efd MC |
963 | X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls) |
964 | { | |
965 | X509_CRL *delta; | |
966 | int i; | |
967 | if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS)) | |
968 | return; | |
969 | if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST)) | |
970 | return; | |
971 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) { | |
972 | delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i); | |
973 | if (check_delta_base(delta, base)) { | |
974 | if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0)) | |
975 | *pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA; | |
976 | CRYPTO_add(&delta->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL); | |
977 | *dcrl = delta; | |
978 | return; | |
979 | } | |
980 | } | |
981 | *dcrl = NULL; | |
982 | } | |
983 | ||
984 | /* | |
985 | * For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate | |
986 | * 'x'. The return value is a mask of several criteria. If the issuer is not | |
987 | * the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer. The reasons mask is | |
988 | * also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if no new reasons the CRL | |
989 | * is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated. | |
4b96839f DSH |
990 | */ |
991 | ||
992 | static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer, | |
10621efd MC |
993 | unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x) |
994 | { | |
995 | ||
996 | int crl_score = 0; | |
997 | unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons; | |
998 | ||
999 | /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */ | |
1000 | ||
1001 | /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */ | |
1002 | if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) | |
1003 | return 0; | |
1004 | /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */ | |
1005 | if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) { | |
1006 | if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS)) | |
1007 | return 0; | |
1008 | } else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS) { | |
1009 | /* If no new reasons reject */ | |
1010 | if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons)) | |
1011 | return 0; | |
1012 | } | |
1013 | /* Don't process deltas at this stage */ | |
1014 | else if (crl->base_crl_number) | |
1015 | return 0; | |
1016 | /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */ | |
1017 | if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl))) { | |
1018 | if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT)) | |
1019 | return 0; | |
1020 | } else | |
1021 | crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME; | |
1022 | ||
1023 | if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) | |
1024 | crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL; | |
1025 | ||
1026 | /* Check expiry */ | |
1027 | if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0)) | |
1028 | crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME; | |
1029 | ||
1030 | /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */ | |
1031 | crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score); | |
1032 | ||
1033 | /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */ | |
1034 | ||
1035 | if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID)) | |
1036 | return 0; | |
1037 | ||
1038 | /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */ | |
1039 | ||
1040 | if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons)) { | |
1041 | /* If no new reasons reject */ | |
1042 | if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons)) | |
1043 | return 0; | |
1044 | tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons; | |
1045 | crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE; | |
1046 | } | |
1047 | ||
1048 | *preasons = tmp_reasons; | |
1049 | ||
1050 | return crl_score; | |
1051 | ||
1052 | } | |
4b96839f DSH |
1053 | |
1054 | static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, | |
10621efd MC |
1055 | X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score) |
1056 | { | |
1057 | X509 *crl_issuer = NULL; | |
1058 | X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl); | |
1059 | int cidx = ctx->error_depth; | |
1060 | int i; | |
1061 | ||
1062 | if (cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1) | |
1063 | cidx++; | |
1064 | ||
1065 | crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx); | |
1066 | ||
1067 | if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) { | |
1068 | if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME) { | |
1069 | *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT; | |
1070 | *pissuer = crl_issuer; | |
1071 | return; | |
1072 | } | |
1073 | } | |
1074 | ||
1075 | for (cidx++; cidx < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++) { | |
1076 | crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx); | |
1077 | if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm)) | |
1078 | continue; | |
1079 | if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) { | |
1080 | *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH; | |
1081 | *pissuer = crl_issuer; | |
1082 | return; | |
1083 | } | |
1084 | } | |
1085 | ||
1086 | /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */ | |
1087 | ||
1088 | if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) | |
1089 | return; | |
1090 | ||
1091 | /* | |
1092 | * Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the set of | |
1093 | * untrusted certificates. | |
1094 | */ | |
1095 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++) { | |
1096 | crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i); | |
1097 | if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm)) | |
1098 | continue; | |
1099 | if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) { | |
1100 | *pissuer = crl_issuer; | |
1101 | *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID; | |
1102 | return; | |
1103 | } | |
1104 | } | |
1105 | } | |
1106 | ||
1107 | /* | |
1108 | * Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new | |
9d84d4ed | 1109 | * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the |
10621efd MC |
1110 | * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking will |
1111 | * be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in practice. | |
9d84d4ed DSH |
1112 | */ |
1113 | ||
1114 | static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) | |
10621efd MC |
1115 | { |
1116 | X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx; | |
1117 | int ret; | |
1118 | /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */ | |
1119 | if (ctx->parent) | |
1120 | return 0; | |
1121 | if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->ctx, x, ctx->untrusted)) | |
1122 | return -1; | |
1123 | ||
1124 | crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls; | |
1125 | /* Copy verify params across */ | |
1126 | X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param); | |
1127 | ||
1128 | crl_ctx.parent = ctx; | |
1129 | crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb; | |
1130 | ||
1131 | /* Verify CRL issuer */ | |
1132 | ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx); | |
1133 | ||
1134 | if (ret <= 0) | |
1135 | goto err; | |
1136 | ||
1137 | /* Check chain is acceptable */ | |
1138 | ||
1139 | ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain); | |
1140 | err: | |
1141 | X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx); | |
1142 | return ret; | |
1143 | } | |
1144 | ||
1145 | /* | |
1146 | * RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path and | |
1147 | * certificate path, which could lead to situations where a certificate could | |
1148 | * be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised to do so. RFC5280 is more | |
1149 | * strict and states that the two paths must end in the same trust anchor, | |
1150 | * though some discussions remain... until this is resolved we use the | |
1151 | * RFC5280 version | |
9d84d4ed DSH |
1152 | */ |
1153 | ||
1154 | static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, | |
10621efd MC |
1155 | STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path, |
1156 | STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path) | |
1157 | { | |
1158 | X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta; | |
1159 | cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1); | |
1160 | crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1); | |
1161 | if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta)) | |
1162 | return 1; | |
1163 | return 0; | |
1164 | } | |
9d84d4ed | 1165 | |
3e9a08ec TH |
1166 | /*- |
1167 | * Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases. | |
3e727a3b DSH |
1168 | * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types. |
1169 | * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES. | |
1170 | * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES. | |
d0fff69d | 1171 | * 4. One is NULL: automatic match. |
3e727a3b DSH |
1172 | */ |
1173 | ||
3e727a3b | 1174 | static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b) |
10621efd MC |
1175 | { |
1176 | X509_NAME *nm = NULL; | |
1177 | GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL; | |
1178 | GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb; | |
1179 | int i, j; | |
1180 | if (!a || !b) | |
1181 | return 1; | |
1182 | if (a->type == 1) { | |
1183 | if (!a->dpname) | |
1184 | return 0; | |
1185 | /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */ | |
1186 | if (b->type == 1) { | |
1187 | if (!b->dpname) | |
1188 | return 0; | |
1189 | if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname)) | |
1190 | return 1; | |
1191 | else | |
1192 | return 0; | |
1193 | } | |
1194 | /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */ | |
1195 | nm = a->dpname; | |
1196 | gens = b->name.fullname; | |
1197 | } else if (b->type == 1) { | |
1198 | if (!b->dpname) | |
1199 | return 0; | |
1200 | /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */ | |
1201 | gens = a->name.fullname; | |
1202 | nm = b->dpname; | |
1203 | } | |
1204 | ||
1205 | /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */ | |
1206 | if (nm) { | |
1207 | for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) { | |
1208 | gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i); | |
1209 | if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME) | |
1210 | continue; | |
1211 | if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName)) | |
1212 | return 1; | |
1213 | } | |
1214 | return 0; | |
1215 | } | |
1216 | ||
1217 | /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */ | |
1218 | ||
1219 | for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++) { | |
1220 | gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i); | |
1221 | for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++) { | |
1222 | genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j); | |
1223 | if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb)) | |
1224 | return 1; | |
1225 | } | |
1226 | } | |
1227 | ||
1228 | return 0; | |
1229 | ||
1230 | } | |
bc7535bc | 1231 | |
4b96839f | 1232 | static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score) |
10621efd MC |
1233 | { |
1234 | int i; | |
1235 | X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl); | |
1236 | /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */ | |
1237 | if (!dp->CRLissuer) | |
1238 | return ! !(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME); | |
1239 | for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) { | |
1240 | GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i); | |
1241 | if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME) | |
1242 | continue; | |
1243 | if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm)) | |
1244 | return 1; | |
1245 | } | |
1246 | return 0; | |
1247 | } | |
d0fff69d | 1248 | |
4b96839f | 1249 | /* Check CRLDP and IDP */ |
bc7535bc | 1250 | |
4b96839f | 1251 | static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score, |
10621efd MC |
1252 | unsigned int *preasons) |
1253 | { | |
1254 | int i; | |
1255 | if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR) | |
1256 | return 0; | |
1257 | if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) { | |
1258 | if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER) | |
1259 | return 0; | |
1260 | } else { | |
1261 | if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA) | |
1262 | return 0; | |
1263 | } | |
1264 | *preasons = crl->idp_reasons; | |
1265 | for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++) { | |
1266 | DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i); | |
1267 | if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score)) { | |
1268 | if (!crl->idp || idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint)) { | |
1269 | *preasons &= dp->dp_reasons; | |
1270 | return 1; | |
1271 | } | |
1272 | } | |
1273 | } | |
1274 | if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint) | |
1275 | && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME)) | |
1276 | return 1; | |
1277 | return 0; | |
1278 | } | |
1279 | ||
1280 | /* | |
1281 | * Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate. If deltas enabled try | |
1282 | * to find a delta CRL too | |
b545dc67 | 1283 | */ |
10621efd | 1284 | |
d43c4497 | 1285 | static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, |
10621efd MC |
1286 | X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x) |
1287 | { | |
1288 | int ok; | |
1289 | X509 *issuer = NULL; | |
1290 | int crl_score = 0; | |
1291 | unsigned int reasons; | |
1292 | X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL; | |
1293 | STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl; | |
1294 | X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x); | |
1295 | reasons = ctx->current_reasons; | |
1296 | ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, | |
1297 | &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls); | |
1298 | ||
1299 | if (ok) | |
1300 | goto done; | |
1301 | ||
1302 | /* Lookup CRLs from store */ | |
1303 | ||
1304 | skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm); | |
1305 | ||
1306 | /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */ | |
1307 | if (!skcrl && crl) | |
1308 | goto done; | |
1309 | ||
1310 | get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl); | |
1311 | ||
1312 | sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free); | |
1313 | ||
1314 | done: | |
1315 | ||
1316 | /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */ | |
1317 | if (crl) { | |
1318 | ctx->current_issuer = issuer; | |
1319 | ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score; | |
1320 | ctx->current_reasons = reasons; | |
1321 | *pcrl = crl; | |
1322 | *pdcrl = dcrl; | |
1323 | return 1; | |
1324 | } | |
1325 | ||
1326 | return 0; | |
1327 | } | |
b545dc67 DSH |
1328 | |
1329 | /* Check CRL validity */ | |
1330 | static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl) | |
10621efd MC |
1331 | { |
1332 | X509 *issuer = NULL; | |
1333 | EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL; | |
1334 | int ok = 0, chnum, cnum; | |
1335 | cnum = ctx->error_depth; | |
1336 | chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; | |
1337 | /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */ | |
1338 | if (ctx->current_issuer) | |
1339 | issuer = ctx->current_issuer; | |
1340 | ||
1341 | /* | |
1342 | * Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer is next | |
1343 | * certificate in chain. | |
1344 | */ | |
1345 | else if (cnum < chnum) | |
1346 | issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1); | |
1347 | else { | |
1348 | issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum); | |
1349 | /* If not self signed, can't check signature */ | |
1350 | if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer)) { | |
1351 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER; | |
1352 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
1353 | if (!ok) | |
1354 | goto err; | |
1355 | } | |
1356 | } | |
1357 | ||
1358 | if (issuer) { | |
1359 | /* | |
1360 | * Skip most tests for deltas because they have already been done | |
1361 | */ | |
1362 | if (!crl->base_crl_number) { | |
1363 | /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */ | |
1364 | if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && | |
1365 | !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN)) { | |
1366 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN; | |
1367 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
1368 | if (!ok) | |
1369 | goto err; | |
1370 | } | |
1371 | ||
1372 | if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)) { | |
1373 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE; | |
1374 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
1375 | if (!ok) | |
1376 | goto err; | |
1377 | } | |
1378 | ||
1379 | if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH)) { | |
1380 | if (check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0) { | |
1381 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR; | |
1382 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
1383 | if (!ok) | |
1384 | goto err; | |
1385 | } | |
1386 | } | |
1387 | ||
1388 | if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) { | |
1389 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION; | |
1390 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
1391 | if (!ok) | |
1392 | goto err; | |
1393 | } | |
1394 | ||
1395 | } | |
1396 | ||
1397 | if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME)) { | |
1398 | ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1); | |
1399 | if (!ok) | |
1400 | goto err; | |
1401 | } | |
1402 | ||
1403 | /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */ | |
1404 | ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer); | |
1405 | ||
1406 | if (!ikey) { | |
1407 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY; | |
1408 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
1409 | if (!ok) | |
1410 | goto err; | |
1411 | } else { | |
1412 | /* Verify CRL signature */ | |
1413 | if (X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0) { | |
1414 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE; | |
1415 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
1416 | if (!ok) | |
1417 | goto err; | |
1418 | } | |
1419 | } | |
1420 | } | |
1421 | ||
1422 | ok = 1; | |
1423 | ||
1424 | err: | |
1425 | EVP_PKEY_free(ikey); | |
1426 | return ok; | |
1427 | } | |
b545dc67 DSH |
1428 | |
1429 | /* Check certificate against CRL */ | |
1430 | static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x) | |
10621efd MC |
1431 | { |
1432 | int ok; | |
1433 | X509_REVOKED *rev; | |
1434 | /* | |
1435 | * The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained unhandled | |
1436 | * critical extensions it could still be used to indicate a certificate | |
1437 | * was revoked. This has since been changed since critical extension can | |
1438 | * change the meaning of CRL entries. | |
1439 | */ | |
1440 | if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL) | |
1441 | && (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) { | |
1442 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION; | |
1443 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
1444 | if (!ok) | |
1445 | return 0; | |
1446 | } | |
1447 | /* | |
1448 | * Look for serial number of certificate in CRL If found make sure reason | |
1449 | * is not removeFromCRL. | |
1450 | */ | |
1451 | if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x)) { | |
1452 | if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL) | |
1453 | return 2; | |
1454 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED; | |
1455 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
1456 | if (!ok) | |
1457 | return 0; | |
1458 | } | |
1459 | ||
1460 | return 1; | |
1461 | } | |
b545dc67 | 1462 | |
5d7c222d | 1463 | static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
10621efd MC |
1464 | { |
1465 | int ret; | |
1466 | if (ctx->parent) | |
1467 | return 1; | |
1468 | ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain, | |
1469 | ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags); | |
1470 | if (ret == 0) { | |
1471 | X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
1472 | return 0; | |
1473 | } | |
1474 | /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */ | |
1475 | if (ret == -1) { | |
1476 | /* | |
1477 | * Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify callback. | |
1478 | */ | |
1479 | X509 *x; | |
1480 | int i; | |
1481 | for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) { | |
1482 | x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); | |
1483 | if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY)) | |
1484 | continue; | |
1485 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
1486 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION; | |
1487 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) | |
1488 | return 0; | |
1489 | } | |
1490 | return 1; | |
1491 | } | |
1492 | if (ret == -2) { | |
1493 | ctx->current_cert = NULL; | |
1494 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY; | |
1495 | return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
1496 | } | |
1497 | ||
1498 | if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY) { | |
1499 | ctx->current_cert = NULL; | |
1500 | ctx->error = X509_V_OK; | |
1501 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx)) | |
1502 | return 0; | |
1503 | } | |
1504 | ||
1505 | return 1; | |
1506 | } | |
5d7c222d | 1507 | |
e1a27eb3 | 1508 | static int check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) |
10621efd MC |
1509 | { |
1510 | time_t *ptime; | |
1511 | int i; | |
1512 | ||
1513 | if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME) | |
1514 | ptime = &ctx->param->check_time; | |
1515 | else | |
1516 | ptime = NULL; | |
1517 | ||
1518 | i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime); | |
1519 | if (i == 0) { | |
1520 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD; | |
1521 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
1522 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) | |
1523 | return 0; | |
1524 | } | |
1525 | ||
1526 | if (i > 0) { | |
1527 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID; | |
1528 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
1529 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) | |
1530 | return 0; | |
1531 | } | |
1532 | ||
1533 | i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime); | |
1534 | if (i == 0) { | |
1535 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD; | |
1536 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
1537 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) | |
1538 | return 0; | |
1539 | } | |
1540 | ||
1541 | if (i < 0) { | |
1542 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED; | |
1543 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
1544 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) | |
1545 | return 0; | |
1546 | } | |
1547 | ||
1548 | return 1; | |
1549 | } | |
e1a27eb3 | 1550 | |
6b691a5c | 1551 | static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
10621efd MC |
1552 | { |
1553 | int ok = 0, n; | |
1554 | X509 *xs, *xi; | |
1555 | EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; | |
1556 | int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); | |
1557 | ||
1558 | cb = ctx->verify_cb; | |
1559 | ||
1560 | n = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); | |
1561 | ctx->error_depth = n - 1; | |
1562 | n--; | |
1563 | xi = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n); | |
1564 | ||
1565 | if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi)) | |
1566 | xs = xi; | |
1567 | else { | |
1568 | if (n <= 0) { | |
1569 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE; | |
1570 | ctx->current_cert = xi; | |
1571 | ok = cb(0, ctx); | |
1572 | goto end; | |
1573 | } else { | |
1574 | n--; | |
1575 | ctx->error_depth = n; | |
1576 | xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n); | |
1577 | } | |
1578 | } | |
1579 | ||
1580 | /* ctx->error=0; not needed */ | |
1581 | while (n >= 0) { | |
1582 | ctx->error_depth = n; | |
1583 | ||
1584 | /* | |
1585 | * Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless | |
1586 | * explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any security and just wastes | |
1587 | * time. | |
1588 | */ | |
1589 | if (!xs->valid | |
1590 | && (xs != xi | |
1591 | || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE))) { | |
1592 | if ((pkey = X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL) { | |
1593 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY; | |
1594 | ctx->current_cert = xi; | |
1595 | ok = (*cb) (0, ctx); | |
1596 | if (!ok) | |
1597 | goto end; | |
1598 | } else if (X509_verify(xs, pkey) <= 0) { | |
1599 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE; | |
1600 | ctx->current_cert = xs; | |
1601 | ok = (*cb) (0, ctx); | |
1602 | if (!ok) { | |
1603 | EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); | |
1604 | goto end; | |
1605 | } | |
1606 | } | |
1607 | EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); | |
1608 | pkey = NULL; | |
1609 | } | |
1610 | ||
1611 | xs->valid = 1; | |
1612 | ||
1613 | ok = check_cert_time(ctx, xs); | |
1614 | if (!ok) | |
1615 | goto end; | |
1616 | ||
1617 | /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */ | |
1618 | ctx->current_issuer = xi; | |
1619 | ctx->current_cert = xs; | |
1620 | ok = (*cb) (1, ctx); | |
1621 | if (!ok) | |
1622 | goto end; | |
1623 | ||
1624 | n--; | |
1625 | if (n >= 0) { | |
1626 | xi = xs; | |
1627 | xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n); | |
1628 | } | |
1629 | } | |
1630 | ok = 1; | |
1631 | end: | |
1632 | return ok; | |
1633 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 1634 | |
91b73acb | 1635 | int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm) |
bbb72003 | 1636 | { |
10621efd | 1637 | return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL); |
bbb72003 DSH |
1638 | } |
1639 | ||
91b73acb | 1640 | int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time) |
10621efd MC |
1641 | { |
1642 | char *str; | |
1643 | ASN1_TIME atm; | |
1644 | long offset; | |
1645 | char buff1[24], buff2[24], *p; | |
370ac320 | 1646 | int i, j, remaining; |
10621efd MC |
1647 | |
1648 | p = buff1; | |
370ac320 | 1649 | remaining = ctm->length; |
10621efd | 1650 | str = (char *)ctm->data; |
370ac320 EK |
1651 | /* |
1652 | * Note that the following (historical) code allows much more slack in the | |
1653 | * time format than RFC5280. In RFC5280, the representation is fixed: | |
1654 | * UTCTime: YYMMDDHHMMSSZ | |
1655 | * GeneralizedTime: YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ | |
1656 | */ | |
10621efd | 1657 | if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) { |
370ac320 EK |
1658 | /* YYMMDDHHMM[SS]Z or YYMMDDHHMM[SS](+-)hhmm */ |
1659 | int min_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1; | |
1660 | int max_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMSS+hhmm") - 1; | |
1661 | if (remaining < min_length || remaining > max_length) | |
10621efd MC |
1662 | return 0; |
1663 | memcpy(p, str, 10); | |
1664 | p += 10; | |
1665 | str += 10; | |
370ac320 | 1666 | remaining -= 10; |
10621efd | 1667 | } else { |
370ac320 EK |
1668 | /* YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.fff]]Z or YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.f[f[f]]]](+-)hhmm */ |
1669 | int min_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1; | |
1670 | int max_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMSS.fff+hhmm") - 1; | |
1671 | if (remaining < min_length || remaining > max_length) | |
10621efd MC |
1672 | return 0; |
1673 | memcpy(p, str, 12); | |
1674 | p += 12; | |
1675 | str += 12; | |
370ac320 | 1676 | remaining -= 12; |
10621efd MC |
1677 | } |
1678 | ||
1679 | if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+')) { | |
1680 | *(p++) = '0'; | |
1681 | *(p++) = '0'; | |
1682 | } else { | |
370ac320 EK |
1683 | /* SS (seconds) */ |
1684 | if (remaining < 2) | |
1685 | return 0; | |
10621efd MC |
1686 | *(p++) = *(str++); |
1687 | *(p++) = *(str++); | |
370ac320 EK |
1688 | remaining -= 2; |
1689 | /* | |
1690 | * Skip any (up to three) fractional seconds... | |
1691 | * TODO(emilia): in RFC5280, fractional seconds are forbidden. | |
1692 | * Can we just kill them altogether? | |
1693 | */ | |
1694 | if (remaining && *str == '.') { | |
10621efd | 1695 | str++; |
370ac320 EK |
1696 | remaining--; |
1697 | for (i = 0; i < 3 && remaining; i++, str++, remaining--) { | |
1698 | if (*str < '0' || *str > '9') | |
1699 | break; | |
1700 | } | |
10621efd MC |
1701 | } |
1702 | ||
1703 | } | |
1704 | *(p++) = 'Z'; | |
1705 | *(p++) = '\0'; | |
1706 | ||
370ac320 EK |
1707 | /* We now need either a terminating 'Z' or an offset. */ |
1708 | if (!remaining) | |
1709 | return 0; | |
1710 | if (*str == 'Z') { | |
1711 | if (remaining != 1) | |
1712 | return 0; | |
10621efd | 1713 | offset = 0; |
370ac320 EK |
1714 | } else { |
1715 | /* (+-)HHMM */ | |
10621efd MC |
1716 | if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-')) |
1717 | return 0; | |
370ac320 EK |
1718 | /* Historical behaviour: the (+-)hhmm offset is forbidden in RFC5280. */ |
1719 | if (remaining != 5) | |
1720 | return 0; | |
1721 | if (str[1] < '0' || str[1] > '9' || str[2] < '0' || str[2] > '9' || | |
1722 | str[3] < '0' || str[3] > '9' || str[4] < '0' || str[4] > '9') | |
1723 | return 0; | |
10621efd MC |
1724 | offset = ((str[1] - '0') * 10 + (str[2] - '0')) * 60; |
1725 | offset += (str[3] - '0') * 10 + (str[4] - '0'); | |
1726 | if (*str == '-') | |
1727 | offset = -offset; | |
1728 | } | |
1729 | atm.type = ctm->type; | |
1730 | atm.flags = 0; | |
1731 | atm.length = sizeof(buff2); | |
1732 | atm.data = (unsigned char *)buff2; | |
1733 | ||
1734 | if (X509_time_adj(&atm, offset * 60, cmp_time) == NULL) | |
1735 | return 0; | |
1736 | ||
1737 | if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) { | |
1738 | i = (buff1[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff1[1] - '0'); | |
1739 | if (i < 50) | |
1740 | i += 100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */ | |
1741 | j = (buff2[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff2[1] - '0'); | |
1742 | if (j < 50) | |
1743 | j += 100; | |
1744 | ||
1745 | if (i < j) | |
1746 | return -1; | |
1747 | if (i > j) | |
1748 | return 1; | |
1749 | } | |
1750 | i = strcmp(buff1, buff2); | |
1751 | if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */ | |
1752 | return -1; | |
1753 | else | |
1754 | return i; | |
1755 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 1756 | |
284ef5f3 | 1757 | ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj) |
bbb72003 | 1758 | { |
10621efd | 1759 | return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL); |
bbb72003 DSH |
1760 | } |
1761 | ||
87d3a0cd | 1762 | ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm) |
10621efd MC |
1763 | { |
1764 | return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm); | |
1765 | } | |
87d3a0cd DSH |
1766 | |
1767 | ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s, | |
10621efd MC |
1768 | int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm) |
1769 | { | |
1770 | time_t t; | |
1771 | ||
1772 | if (in_tm) | |
1773 | t = *in_tm; | |
1774 | else | |
1775 | time(&t); | |
1776 | ||
1777 | if (s && !(s->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING)) { | |
1778 | if (s->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) | |
1779 | return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec); | |
1780 | if (s->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME) | |
1781 | return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec); | |
1782 | } | |
1783 | return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec); | |
1784 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 1785 | |
7e258a56 | 1786 | int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) |
10621efd MC |
1787 | { |
1788 | EVP_PKEY *ktmp = NULL, *ktmp2; | |
1789 | int i, j; | |
1790 | ||
1791 | if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) | |
1792 | return 1; | |
1793 | ||
1794 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) { | |
1795 | ktmp = X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, i)); | |
1796 | if (ktmp == NULL) { | |
1797 | X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS, | |
1798 | X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY); | |
1799 | return 0; | |
1800 | } | |
1801 | if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp)) | |
1802 | break; | |
1803 | else { | |
1804 | EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp); | |
1805 | ktmp = NULL; | |
1806 | } | |
1807 | } | |
1808 | if (ktmp == NULL) { | |
1809 | X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS, | |
1810 | X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN); | |
1811 | return 0; | |
1812 | } | |
1813 | ||
1814 | /* first, populate the other certs */ | |
1815 | for (j = i - 1; j >= 0; j--) { | |
1816 | ktmp2 = X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, j)); | |
1817 | EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2, ktmp); | |
1818 | EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp2); | |
1819 | } | |
1820 | ||
1821 | if (pkey != NULL) | |
1822 | EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey, ktmp); | |
1823 | EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp); | |
1824 | return 1; | |
1825 | } | |
1826 | ||
1827 | int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, | |
1828 | CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, | |
1829 | CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, | |
1830 | CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) | |
1831 | { | |
1832 | /* | |
1833 | * This function is (usually) called only once, by | |
1834 | * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c). | |
1835 | */ | |
1836 | return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, argl, argp, | |
1837 | new_func, dup_func, free_func); | |
1838 | } | |
58964a49 | 1839 | |
6b691a5c | 1840 | int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data) |
10621efd MC |
1841 | { |
1842 | return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx, data); | |
1843 | } | |
58964a49 | 1844 | |
6b691a5c | 1845 | void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx) |
10621efd MC |
1846 | { |
1847 | return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx); | |
1848 | } | |
58964a49 | 1849 | |
6b691a5c | 1850 | int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
10621efd MC |
1851 | { |
1852 | return ctx->error; | |
1853 | } | |
58964a49 | 1854 | |
6b691a5c | 1855 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err) |
10621efd MC |
1856 | { |
1857 | ctx->error = err; | |
1858 | } | |
58964a49 | 1859 | |
6b691a5c | 1860 | int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
10621efd MC |
1861 | { |
1862 | return ctx->error_depth; | |
1863 | } | |
58964a49 | 1864 | |
6b691a5c | 1865 | X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
10621efd MC |
1866 | { |
1867 | return ctx->current_cert; | |
1868 | } | |
58964a49 | 1869 | |
7e258a56 | 1870 | STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
10621efd MC |
1871 | { |
1872 | return ctx->chain; | |
1873 | } | |
58964a49 | 1874 | |
c7cb16a8 | 1875 | STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
10621efd MC |
1876 | { |
1877 | int i; | |
1878 | X509 *x; | |
1879 | STACK_OF(X509) *chain; | |
1880 | if (!ctx->chain || !(chain = sk_X509_dup(ctx->chain))) | |
1881 | return NULL; | |
1882 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) { | |
1883 | x = sk_X509_value(chain, i); | |
1884 | CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); | |
1885 | } | |
1886 | return chain; | |
1887 | } | |
25f923dd | 1888 | |
4a7f7171 | 1889 | X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
10621efd MC |
1890 | { |
1891 | return ctx->current_issuer; | |
1892 | } | |
4a7f7171 DSH |
1893 | |
1894 | X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
10621efd MC |
1895 | { |
1896 | return ctx->current_crl; | |
1897 | } | |
4a7f7171 DSH |
1898 | |
1899 | X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
10621efd MC |
1900 | { |
1901 | return ctx->parent; | |
1902 | } | |
4a7f7171 | 1903 | |
6b691a5c | 1904 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) |
10621efd MC |
1905 | { |
1906 | ctx->cert = x; | |
1907 | } | |
58964a49 | 1908 | |
6b691a5c | 1909 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) |
10621efd MC |
1910 | { |
1911 | ctx->untrusted = sk; | |
1912 | } | |
58964a49 | 1913 | |
e1a27eb3 | 1914 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk) |
10621efd MC |
1915 | { |
1916 | ctx->crls = sk; | |
1917 | } | |
e1a27eb3 | 1918 | |
13938ace | 1919 | int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose) |
10621efd MC |
1920 | { |
1921 | return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0); | |
1922 | } | |
11262391 | 1923 | |
bb7cd4e3 | 1924 | int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust) |
10621efd MC |
1925 | { |
1926 | return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust); | |
1927 | } | |
1928 | ||
1929 | /* | |
1930 | * This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust values. | |
1931 | * This is intended to be used when another structure has its own trust and | |
1932 | * purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by the ctx. If they aren't | |
1933 | * set then we will usually have a default purpose in mind which should then | |
1934 | * be used to set the trust value. An example of this is SSL use: an SSL | |
1935 | * structure will have its own purpose and trust settings which the | |
1936 | * application can set: if they aren't set then we use the default of SSL | |
1937 | * client/server. | |
13938ace DSH |
1938 | */ |
1939 | ||
1940 | int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose, | |
10621efd MC |
1941 | int purpose, int trust) |
1942 | { | |
1943 | int idx; | |
1944 | /* If purpose not set use default */ | |
1945 | if (!purpose) | |
1946 | purpose = def_purpose; | |
1947 | /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */ | |
1948 | if (purpose) { | |
1949 | X509_PURPOSE *ptmp; | |
1950 | idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose); | |
1951 | if (idx == -1) { | |
1952 | X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT, | |
1953 | X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID); | |
1954 | return 0; | |
1955 | } | |
1956 | ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); | |
1957 | if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) { | |
1958 | idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose); | |
1959 | if (idx == -1) { | |
1960 | X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT, | |
1961 | X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID); | |
1962 | return 0; | |
1963 | } | |
1964 | ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); | |
1965 | } | |
1966 | /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */ | |
1967 | if (!trust) | |
1968 | trust = ptmp->trust; | |
1969 | } | |
1970 | if (trust) { | |
1971 | idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust); | |
1972 | if (idx == -1) { | |
1973 | X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT, | |
1974 | X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID); | |
1975 | return 0; | |
1976 | } | |
1977 | } | |
1978 | ||
1979 | if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose) | |
1980 | ctx->param->purpose = purpose; | |
1981 | if (trust && !ctx->param->trust) | |
1982 | ctx->param->trust = trust; | |
1983 | return 1; | |
51630a37 DSH |
1984 | } |
1985 | ||
2f043896 DSH |
1986 | X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void) |
1987 | { | |
10621efd MC |
1988 | X509_STORE_CTX *ctx; |
1989 | ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX)); | |
1990 | if (!ctx) { | |
1991 | X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
1992 | return NULL; | |
1993 | } | |
1994 | memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX)); | |
1995 | return ctx; | |
2f043896 DSH |
1996 | } |
1997 | ||
1998 | void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
1999 | { | |
76b49a8a RS |
2000 | if (!ctx) |
2001 | return; | |
10621efd MC |
2002 | X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx); |
2003 | OPENSSL_free(ctx); | |
2f043896 DSH |
2004 | } |
2005 | ||
79aa04ef | 2006 | int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509, |
10621efd MC |
2007 | STACK_OF(X509) *chain) |
2008 | { | |
2009 | int ret = 1; | |
2010 | ctx->ctx = store; | |
2011 | ctx->current_method = 0; | |
2012 | ctx->cert = x509; | |
2013 | ctx->untrusted = chain; | |
2014 | ctx->crls = NULL; | |
2015 | ctx->last_untrusted = 0; | |
2016 | ctx->other_ctx = NULL; | |
2017 | ctx->valid = 0; | |
2018 | ctx->chain = NULL; | |
2019 | ctx->error = 0; | |
2020 | ctx->explicit_policy = 0; | |
2021 | ctx->error_depth = 0; | |
2022 | ctx->current_cert = NULL; | |
2023 | ctx->current_issuer = NULL; | |
2024 | ctx->current_crl = NULL; | |
2025 | ctx->current_crl_score = 0; | |
2026 | ctx->current_reasons = 0; | |
2027 | ctx->tree = NULL; | |
2028 | ctx->parent = NULL; | |
2029 | ||
2030 | ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(); | |
2031 | ||
2032 | if (!ctx->param) { | |
2033 | X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
2034 | return 0; | |
2035 | } | |
2036 | ||
2037 | /* | |
2038 | * Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set use defaults. | |
2039 | */ | |
2040 | ||
2041 | if (store) | |
2042 | ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param); | |
2043 | else | |
2044 | ctx->param->inh_flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT | X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE; | |
2045 | ||
2046 | if (store) { | |
2047 | ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb; | |
2048 | ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup; | |
2049 | } else | |
2050 | ctx->cleanup = 0; | |
2051 | ||
2052 | if (ret) | |
2053 | ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, | |
2054 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default")); | |
2055 | ||
2056 | if (ret == 0) { | |
2057 | X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
2058 | return 0; | |
2059 | } | |
2060 | ||
2061 | if (store && store->check_issued) | |
2062 | ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued; | |
2063 | else | |
2064 | ctx->check_issued = check_issued; | |
2065 | ||
2066 | if (store && store->get_issuer) | |
2067 | ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer; | |
2068 | else | |
2069 | ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer; | |
2070 | ||
2071 | if (store && store->verify_cb) | |
2072 | ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb; | |
2073 | else | |
2074 | ctx->verify_cb = null_callback; | |
2075 | ||
2076 | if (store && store->verify) | |
2077 | ctx->verify = store->verify; | |
2078 | else | |
2079 | ctx->verify = internal_verify; | |
2080 | ||
2081 | if (store && store->check_revocation) | |
2082 | ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation; | |
2083 | else | |
2084 | ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation; | |
2085 | ||
2086 | if (store && store->get_crl) | |
2087 | ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl; | |
2088 | else | |
2089 | ctx->get_crl = NULL; | |
2090 | ||
2091 | if (store && store->check_crl) | |
2092 | ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl; | |
2093 | else | |
2094 | ctx->check_crl = check_crl; | |
2095 | ||
2096 | if (store && store->cert_crl) | |
2097 | ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl; | |
2098 | else | |
2099 | ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl; | |
2100 | ||
2101 | if (store && store->lookup_certs) | |
2102 | ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs; | |
2103 | else | |
2104 | ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_get1_certs; | |
2105 | ||
2106 | if (store && store->lookup_crls) | |
2107 | ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls; | |
2108 | else | |
2109 | ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_get1_crls; | |
2110 | ||
2111 | ctx->check_policy = check_policy; | |
2112 | ||
2113 | /* | |
2114 | * This memset() can't make any sense anyway, so it's removed. As | |
2115 | * X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup does a proper "free" on the ex_data, we put a | |
2116 | * corresponding "new" here and remove this bogus initialisation. | |
2117 | */ | |
2118 | /* memset(&(ctx->ex_data),0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); */ | |
2119 | if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, | |
2120 | &(ctx->ex_data))) { | |
2121 | OPENSSL_free(ctx); | |
2122 | X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
2123 | return 0; | |
2124 | } | |
2125 | return 1; | |
2126 | } | |
2127 | ||
2128 | /* | |
2129 | * Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates. This | |
2130 | * avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed. | |
2f043896 DSH |
2131 | */ |
2132 | ||
2133 | void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) | |
2134 | { | |
10621efd MC |
2135 | ctx->other_ctx = sk; |
2136 | ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk; | |
2f043896 DSH |
2137 | } |
2138 | ||
2139 | void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
10621efd MC |
2140 | { |
2141 | if (ctx->cleanup) | |
2142 | ctx->cleanup(ctx); | |
2143 | if (ctx->param != NULL) { | |
2144 | if (ctx->parent == NULL) | |
2145 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param); | |
2146 | ctx->param = NULL; | |
2147 | } | |
2148 | if (ctx->tree != NULL) { | |
2149 | X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree); | |
2150 | ctx->tree = NULL; | |
2151 | } | |
2152 | if (ctx->chain != NULL) { | |
2153 | sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain, X509_free); | |
2154 | ctx->chain = NULL; | |
2155 | } | |
2156 | CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data)); | |
2157 | memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); | |
2158 | } | |
13938ace | 2159 | |
5d7c222d | 2160 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth) |
10621efd MC |
2161 | { |
2162 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth); | |
2163 | } | |
bbb72003 | 2164 | |
5d7c222d | 2165 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags) |
10621efd MC |
2166 | { |
2167 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags); | |
2168 | } | |
5d7c222d | 2169 | |
10621efd MC |
2170 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags, |
2171 | time_t t) | |
2172 | { | |
2173 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t); | |
2174 | } | |
bbb72003 | 2175 | |
db089ad6 | 2176 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, |
10621efd MC |
2177 | int (*verify_cb) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *)) |
2178 | { | |
2179 | ctx->verify_cb = verify_cb; | |
2180 | } | |
db089ad6 | 2181 | |
5d7c222d | 2182 | X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
10621efd MC |
2183 | { |
2184 | return ctx->tree; | |
2185 | } | |
5d7c222d DSH |
2186 | |
2187 | int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
10621efd MC |
2188 | { |
2189 | return ctx->explicit_policy; | |
2190 | } | |
5d7c222d DSH |
2191 | |
2192 | int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name) | |
10621efd MC |
2193 | { |
2194 | const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param; | |
2195 | param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name); | |
2196 | if (!param) | |
2197 | return 0; | |
2198 | return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param); | |
2199 | } | |
5d7c222d DSH |
2200 | |
2201 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
10621efd MC |
2202 | { |
2203 | return ctx->param; | |
2204 | } | |
5d7c222d DSH |
2205 | |
2206 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) | |
10621efd MC |
2207 | { |
2208 | if (ctx->param) | |
2209 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param); | |
2210 | ctx->param = param; | |
2211 | } | |
5d7c222d | 2212 | |
f73e07cf | 2213 | IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509) |
10621efd | 2214 | |
f73e07cf | 2215 | IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509) |
d500de16 | 2216 | |
f73e07cf | 2217 | IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_NAME) |
d500de16 | 2218 | |
f5fedc04 | 2219 | IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) |
10621efd | 2220 | |
d500de16 | 2221 | IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) |