sched.7: Clarify that autogroup defaults on in various distros

[thirdparty/man-pages.git] / man7 / capabilities.7

.\" Copyright (c) 2002 by Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
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.\" 6 Aug 2002 - Initial Creation
.\" Modified 2003-05-23, Michael Kerrisk, <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
.\" Modified 2004-05-27, Michael Kerrisk, <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
.\" 2004-12-08, mtk Added O_NOATIME for CAP_FOWNER
.\" 2005-08-16, mtk, Added CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL and CAP_AUDIT_WRITE
.\" 2008-07-15, Serge Hallyn <serue@us.bbm.com>
.\"     Document file capabilities, per-process capability
.\"     bounding set, changed semantics for CAP_SETPCAP,
.\"     and other changes in 2.6.2[45].
.\"     Add CAP_MAC_ADMIN, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE, CAP_SETFCAP.
.\" 2008-07-15, mtk
.\"     Add text describing circumstances in which CAP_SETPCAP
.\"     (theoretically) permits a thread to change the
.\"     capability sets of another thread.
.\"     Add section describing rules for programmatically
.\"     adjusting thread capability sets.
.\"     Describe rationale for capability bounding set.
.\"     Document "securebits" flags.
.\"     Add text noting that if we set the effective flag for one file
.\"     capability, then we must also set the effective flag for all
.\"     other capabilities where the permitted or inheritable bit is set.
.\" 2011-09-07, mtk/Serge hallyn: Add CAP_SYSLOG
.\"
.TH CAPABILITIES 7 2016-07-17 "Linux" "Linux Programmer's Manual"
.SH NAME
capabilities \- overview of Linux capabilities
.SH DESCRIPTION
For the purpose of performing permission checks,
traditional UNIX implementations distinguish two categories of processes:
.I privileged
processes (whose effective user ID is 0, referred to as superuser or root),
and
.I unprivileged
processes (whose effective UID is nonzero).
Privileged processes bypass all kernel permission checks,
while unprivileged processes are subject to full permission
checking based on the process's credentials
(usually: effective UID, effective GID, and supplementary group list).

Starting with kernel 2.2, Linux divides the privileges traditionally
associated with superuser into distinct units, known as
.IR capabilities ,
which can be independently enabled and disabled.
Capabilities are a per-thread attribute.
.\"
.SS Capabilities list
The following list shows the capabilities implemented on Linux,
and the operations or behaviors that each capability permits:
.TP
.BR CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL " (since Linux 2.6.11)"
Enable and disable kernel auditing; change auditing filter rules;
retrieve auditing status and filtering rules.
.TP
.BR CAP_AUDIT_READ " (since Linux 3.16)"
.\" commit a29b694aa1739f9d76538e34ae25524f9c549d59
.\" commit 3a101b8de0d39403b2c7e5c23fd0b005668acf48
Allow reading the audit log via a multicast netlink socket.
.TP
.BR CAP_AUDIT_WRITE " (since Linux 2.6.11)"
Write records to kernel auditing log.
.TP
.BR CAP_BLOCK_SUSPEND " (since Linux 3.5)"
Employ features that can block system suspend
.RB ( epoll (7)
.BR EPOLLWAKEUP ,
.IR /proc/sys/wake_lock ).
.TP
.B CAP_CHOWN
Make arbitrary changes to file UIDs and GIDs (see
.BR chown (2)).
.TP
.B CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE
Bypass file read, write, and execute permission checks.
(DAC is an abbreviation of "discretionary access control".)
.TP
.B CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH
.PD 0
.RS
.IP * 2
Bypass file read permission checks and
directory read and execute permission checks;
.IP *
invoke
.BR open_by_handle_at (2).
.RE
.PD
.TP
.B CAP_FOWNER
.PD 0
.RS
.IP * 2
Bypass permission checks on operations that normally
require the filesystem UID of the process to match the UID of
the file (e.g.,
.BR chmod (2),
.BR utime (2)),
excluding those operations covered by
.B CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE
and
.BR CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH ;
.IP *
set extended file attributes (see
.BR chattr (1))
on arbitrary files;
.IP *
set Access Control Lists (ACLs) on arbitrary files;
.IP *
ignore directory sticky bit on file deletion;
.IP *
specify
.B O_NOATIME
for arbitrary files in
.BR open (2)
and
.BR fcntl (2).
.RE
.PD
.TP
.B CAP_FSETID
.PD 0
.RS
.IP * 2
Don't clear set-user-ID and set-group-ID mode
bits when a file is modified;
.IP *
set the set-group-ID bit for a file whose GID does not match
the filesystem or any of the supplementary GIDs of the calling process.
.RE
.PD
.TP
.B CAP_IPC_LOCK
.\" FIXME . As at Linux 3.2, there are some strange uses of this capability
.\" in other places; they probably should be replaced with something else.
Lock memory
.RB ( mlock (2),
.BR mlockall (2),
.BR mmap (2),
.BR shmctl (2)).
.TP
.B CAP_IPC_OWNER
Bypass permission checks for operations on System V IPC objects.
.TP
.B CAP_KILL
Bypass permission checks for sending signals (see
.BR kill (2)).
This includes use of the
.BR ioctl (2)
.B KDSIGACCEPT
operation.
.\" FIXME . CAP_KILL also has an effect for threads + setting child
.\"       termination signal to other than SIGCHLD: without this
.\"       capability, the termination signal reverts to SIGCHLD
.\"       if the child does an exec().  What is the rationale
.\"       for this?
.TP
.BR CAP_LEASE " (since Linux 2.4)"
Establish leases on arbitrary files (see
.BR fcntl (2)).
.TP
.B CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE
Set the
.B FS_APPEND_FL
and
.B FS_IMMUTABLE_FL
.\" These attributes are now available on ext2, ext3, Reiserfs, XFS, JFS
inode flags (see
.BR chattr (1)).
.TP
.BR CAP_MAC_ADMIN " (since Linux 2.6.25)"
Override Mandatory Access Control (MAC).
Implemented for the Smack Linux Security Module (LSM).
.TP
.BR CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE " (since Linux 2.6.25)"
Allow MAC configuration or state changes.
Implemented for the Smack LSM.
.TP
.BR CAP_MKNOD " (since Linux 2.4)"
Create special files using
.BR mknod (2).
.TP
.B CAP_NET_ADMIN
Perform various network-related operations:
.PD 0
.RS
.IP * 2
interface configuration;
.IP *
administration of IP firewall, masquerading, and accounting;
.IP *
modify routing tables;
.IP *
bind to any address for transparent proxying;
.IP *
set type-of-service (TOS)
.IP *
clear driver statistics;
.IP *
set promiscuous mode;
.IP *
enabling multicasting;
.IP *
use
.BR setsockopt (2)
to set the following socket options:
.BR SO_DEBUG ,
.BR SO_MARK ,
.BR SO_PRIORITY
(for a priority outside the range 0 to 6),
.BR SO_RCVBUFFORCE ,
and
.BR SO_SNDBUFFORCE .
.RE
.PD
.TP
.B CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE
Bind a socket to Internet domain privileged ports
(port numbers less than 1024).
.TP
.B CAP_NET_BROADCAST
(Unused)  Make socket broadcasts, and listen to multicasts.
.TP
.B CAP_NET_RAW
.PD 0
.RS
.IP * 2
use RAW and PACKET sockets;
.IP *
bind to any address for transparent proxying.
.RE
.PD
.\" Also various IP options and setsockopt(SO_BINDTODEVICE)
.TP
.B CAP_SETGID
.RS
.PD 0
.IP * 2
Make arbitrary manipulations of process GIDs and supplementary GID list;
.IP *
forge GID when passing socket credentials via UNIX domain sockets;
.IP *
write a group ID mapping in a user namespace (see
.BR user_namespaces (7)).
.PD
.RE
.TP
.BR CAP_SETFCAP " (since Linux 2.6.24)"
Set file capabilities.
.TP
.B CAP_SETPCAP
If file capabilities are not supported:
grant or remove any capability in the
caller's permitted capability set to or from any other process.
(This property of
.B CAP_SETPCAP
is not available when the kernel is configured to support
file capabilities, since
.B CAP_SETPCAP
has entirely different semantics for such kernels.)

If file capabilities are supported:
add any capability from the calling thread's bounding set
to its inheritable set;
drop capabilities from the bounding set (via
.BR prctl (2)
.BR PR_CAPBSET_DROP );
make changes to the
.I securebits
flags.
.TP
.B CAP_SETUID
.RS
.PD 0
.IP * 2
Make arbitrary manipulations of process UIDs
.RB ( setuid (2),
.BR setreuid (2),
.BR setresuid (2),
.BR setfsuid (2));
.IP *
forge UID when passing socket credentials via UNIX domain sockets;
.IP *
write a user ID mapping in a user namespace (see
.BR user_namespaces (7)).
.PD
.RE
.\" FIXME CAP_SETUID also an effect in exec(); document this.
.TP
.B CAP_SYS_ADMIN
.PD 0
.RS
.IP * 2
Perform a range of system administration operations including:
.BR quotactl (2),
.BR mount (2),
.BR umount (2),
.BR swapon (2),
.BR swapoff (2),
.BR sethostname (2),
and
.BR setdomainname (2);
.IP *
perform privileged
.BR syslog (2)
operations (since Linux 2.6.37,
.BR CAP_SYSLOG
should be used to permit such operations);
.IP *
perform
.B VM86_REQUEST_IRQ
.BR vm86 (2)
command;
.IP *
perform
.B IPC_SET
and
.B IPC_RMID
operations on arbitrary System V IPC objects;
.IP *
override
.B RLIMIT_NPROC
resource limit;
.IP *
perform operations on
.I trusted
and
.I security
Extended Attributes (see
.BR xattr (7));
.IP *
use
.BR lookup_dcookie (2);
.IP *
use
.BR ioprio_set (2)
to assign
.B IOPRIO_CLASS_RT
and (before Linux 2.6.25)
.B IOPRIO_CLASS_IDLE
I/O scheduling classes;
.IP *
forge PID when passing socket credentials via UNIX domain sockets;
.IP *
exceed
.IR /proc/sys/fs/file-max ,
the system-wide limit on the number of open files,
in system calls that open files (e.g.,
.BR accept (2),
.BR execve (2),
.BR open (2),
.BR pipe (2));
.IP *
employ
.B CLONE_*
flags that create new namespaces with
.BR clone (2)
and
.BR unshare (2)
(but, since Linux 3.8,
creating user namespaces does not require any capability);
.IP *
call
.BR perf_event_open (2);
.IP *
access privileged
.I perf
event information;
.IP *
call
.BR setns (2)
(requires
.B CAP_SYS_ADMIN
in the
.I target
namespace);
.IP *
call
.BR fanotify_init (2);
.IP *
call
.BR bpf (2);
.IP *
perform privileged
.B KEYCTL_CHOWN
and
.B KEYCTL_SETPERM
.BR keyctl (2)
operations;
.IP *
use
.BR ptrace (2)
.B PTRACE_SECCOMP_GET_FILTER
to dump a tracees seccomp filters;
.IP *
perform
.BR madvise (2)
.B MADV_HWPOISON
operation;
.IP *
employ the
.B TIOCSTI
.BR ioctl (2)
to insert characters into the input queue of a terminal other than
the caller's controlling terminal;
.IP *
employ the obsolete
.BR nfsservctl (2)
system call;
.IP *
employ the obsolete
.BR bdflush (2)
system call;
.IP *
perform various privileged block-device
.BR ioctl (2)
operations;
.IP *
perform various privileged filesystem
.BR ioctl (2)
operations;
.IP *
perform privileged
.BR ioctl (2)
operations on the
.IR /dev/random
device (see
.BR random (4));
.IP *
perform administrative operations on many device drivers.
.RE
.PD
.TP
.B CAP_SYS_BOOT
Use
.BR reboot (2)
and
.BR kexec_load (2).
.TP
.B CAP_SYS_CHROOT
Use
.BR chroot (2).
.TP
.B CAP_SYS_MODULE
.RS
.PD 0
.IP * 2
Load and unload kernel modules
(see
.BR init_module (2)
and
.BR delete_module (2));
.IP *
in kernels before 2.6.25:
drop capabilities from the system-wide capability bounding set.
.PD
.RE
.TP
.B CAP_SYS_NICE
.PD 0
.RS
.IP * 2
Raise process nice value
.RB ( nice (2),
.BR setpriority (2))
and change the nice value for arbitrary processes;
.IP *
set real-time scheduling policies for calling process,
and set scheduling policies and priorities for arbitrary processes
.RB ( sched_setscheduler (2),
.BR sched_setparam (2),
.BR shed_setattr (2));
.IP *
set CPU affinity for arbitrary processes
.RB ( sched_setaffinity (2));
.IP *
set I/O scheduling class and priority for arbitrary processes
.RB ( ioprio_set (2));
.IP *
apply
.BR migrate_pages (2)
to arbitrary processes and allow processes
to be migrated to arbitrary nodes;
.\" FIXME CAP_SYS_NICE also has the following effect for
.\" migrate_pages(2):
.\"     do_migrate_pages(mm, &old, &new,
.\"         capable(CAP_SYS_NICE) ? MPOL_MF_MOVE_ALL : MPOL_MF_MOVE);
.\"
.\" Document this.
.IP *
apply
.BR move_pages (2)
to arbitrary processes;
.IP *
use the
.B MPOL_MF_MOVE_ALL
flag with
.BR mbind (2)
and
.BR move_pages (2).
.RE
.PD
.TP
.B CAP_SYS_PACCT
Use
.BR acct (2).
.TP
.B CAP_SYS_PTRACE
.PD 0
.RS
.IP * 2
Trace arbitrary processes using
.BR ptrace (2);
.IP *
apply
.BR get_robust_list (2)
to arbitrary processes;
.IP *
transfer data to or from the memory of arbitrary processes using
.BR process_vm_readv (2)
and
.BR process_vm_writev (2);
.IP *
inspect processes using
.BR kcmp (2).
.RE
.PD
.TP
.B CAP_SYS_RAWIO
.PD 0
.RS
.IP * 2
Perform I/O port operations
.RB ( iopl (2)
and
.BR ioperm (2));
.IP *
access
.IR /proc/kcore ;
.IP *
employ the
.B FIBMAP
.BR ioctl (2)
operation;
.IP *
open devices for accessing x86 model-specific registers (MSRs, see
.BR msr (4));
.IP *
update
.IR /proc/sys/vm/mmap_min_addr ;
.IP *
create memory mappings at addresses below the value specified by
.IR /proc/sys/vm/mmap_min_addr ;
.IP *
map files in
.IR /proc/bus/pci ;
.IP *
open
.IR /dev/mem
and
.IR /dev/kmem ;
.IP *
perform various SCSI device commands;
.IP *
perform certain operations on
.BR hpsa (4)
and
.BR cciss (4)
devices;
.IP *
perform a range of device-specific operations on other devices.
.RE
.PD
.TP
.B CAP_SYS_RESOURCE
.PD 0
.RS
.IP * 2
Use reserved space on ext2 filesystems;
.IP *
make
.BR ioctl (2)
calls controlling ext3 journaling;
.IP *
override disk quota limits;
.IP *
increase resource limits (see
.BR setrlimit (2));
.IP *
override
.B RLIMIT_NPROC
resource limit;
.IP *
override maximum number of consoles on console allocation;
.IP *
override maximum number of keymaps;
.IP *
allow more than 64hz interrupts from the real-time clock;
.IP *
raise
.I msg_qbytes
limit for a System V message queue above the limit in
.I /proc/sys/kernel/msgmnb
(see
.BR msgop (2)
and
.BR msgctl (2));
.IP *
override the
.I /proc/sys/fs/pipe-size-max
limit when setting the capacity of a pipe using the
.B F_SETPIPE_SZ
.BR fcntl (2)
command.
.IP *
use
.BR F_SETPIPE_SZ
to increase the capacity of a pipe above the limit specified by
.IR /proc/sys/fs/pipe-max-size ;
.IP *
override
.I /proc/sys/fs/mqueue/queues_max
limit when creating POSIX message queues (see
.BR mq_overview (7));
.IP *
employ the
.BR prctl (2)
.B PR_SET_MM
operation;
.IP *
set
.IR /proc/[pid]/oom_score_adj
to a value lower than the value last set by a process with
.BR CAP_SYS_RESOURCE .
.RE
.PD
.TP
.B CAP_SYS_TIME
Set system clock
.RB ( settimeofday (2),
.BR stime (2),
.BR adjtimex (2));
set real-time (hardware) clock.
.TP
.B CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG
Use
.BR vhangup (2);
employ various privileged
.BR ioctl (2)
operations on virtual terminals.
.TP
.BR CAP_SYSLOG " (since Linux 2.6.37)"
.RS
.PD 0
.IP * 2
Perform privileged
.BR syslog (2)
operations.
See
.BR syslog (2)
for information on which operations require privilege.
.IP *
View kernel addresses exposed via
.I /proc
and other interfaces when
.IR /proc/sys/kernel/kptr_restrict
has the value 1.
(See the discussion of the
.I kptr_restrict
in
.BR proc (5).)
.PD
.RE
.TP
.BR CAP_WAKE_ALARM " (since Linux 3.0)"
Trigger something that will wake up the system (set
.B CLOCK_REALTIME_ALARM
and
.B CLOCK_BOOTTIME_ALARM
timers).
.\"
.SS Past and current implementation
A full implementation of capabilities requires that:
.IP 1. 3
For all privileged operations,
the kernel must check whether the thread has the required
capability in its effective set.
.IP 2.
The kernel must provide system calls allowing a thread's capability sets to
be changed and retrieved.
.IP 3.
The filesystem must support attaching capabilities to an executable file,
so that a process gains those capabilities when the file is executed.
.PP
Before kernel 2.6.24, only the first two of these requirements are met;
since kernel 2.6.24, all three requirements are met.
.\"
.SS Thread capability sets
Each thread has three capability sets containing zero or more
of the above capabilities:
.TP
.IR Permitted :
This is a limiting superset for the effective
capabilities that the thread may assume.
It is also a limiting superset for the capabilities that
may be added to the inheritable set by a thread that does not have the
.B CAP_SETPCAP
capability in its effective set.

If a thread drops a capability from its permitted set,
it can never reacquire that capability (unless it
.BR execve (2)s
either a set-user-ID-root program, or
a program whose associated file capabilities grant that capability).
.TP
.IR Inheritable :
This is a set of capabilities preserved across an
.BR execve (2).
Inheritable capabilities remain inheritable when executing any program,
and inheritable capabilities are added to the permitted set when executing
a program that has the corresponding bits set in the file inheritable set.
.IP
Because inheritable capabilities are not generally preserved across
.BR execve (2)
when running as a non-root user, applications that wish to run helper
programs with elevated capabilities should consider using
ambient capabilities, described below.
.TP
.IR Effective :
This is the set of capabilities used by the kernel to
perform permission checks for the thread.
.TP
.IR Ambient " (since Linux 4.3):"
.\" commit 58319057b7847667f0c9585b9de0e8932b0fdb08
This is a set of capabilities that are preserved across an
.BR execve (2)
of a program that is not privileged.
The ambient capability set obeys the invariant that no capability
can ever be ambient if it is not both permitted and inheritable.

The ambient capability set can be directly modified using
.BR prctl (2).
Ambient capabilities are automatically lowered if either of
the corresponding permitted or inheritable capabilities is lowered.

Executing a program that changes UID or GID due to the
set-user-ID or set-group-ID bits or executing a program that has
any file capabilities set will clear the ambient set.
Ambient capabilities are added to the permitted set and
assigned to the effective set when
.BR execve (2)
is called.
.PP
A child created via
.BR fork (2)
inherits copies of its parent's capability sets.
See below for a discussion of the treatment of capabilities during
.BR execve (2).
.PP
Using
.BR capset (2),
a thread may manipulate its own capability sets (see below).
.PP
Since Linux 3.2, the file
.I /proc/sys/kernel/cap_last_cap
.\" commit 73efc0394e148d0e15583e13712637831f926720
exposes the numerical value of the highest capability
supported by the running kernel;
this can be used to determine the highest bit
that may be set in a capability set.
.\"
.SS File capabilities
Since kernel 2.6.24, the kernel supports
associating capability sets with an executable file using
.BR setcap (8).
The file capability sets are stored in an extended attribute (see
.BR setxattr (2))
named
.IR "security.capability" .
Writing to this extended attribute requires the
.BR CAP_SETFCAP
capability.
The file capability sets,
in conjunction with the capability sets of the thread,
determine the capabilities of a thread after an
.BR execve (2).

The three file capability sets are:
.TP
.IR Permitted " (formerly known as " forced ):
These capabilities are automatically permitted to the thread,
regardless of the thread's inheritable capabilities.
.TP
.IR Inheritable " (formerly known as " allowed ):
This set is ANDed with the thread's inheritable set to determine which
inheritable capabilities are enabled in the permitted set of
the thread after the
.BR execve (2).
.TP
.IR Effective :
This is not a set, but rather just a single bit.
If this bit is set, then during an
.BR execve (2)
all of the new permitted capabilities for the thread are
also raised in the effective set.
If this bit is not set, then after an
.BR execve (2),
none of the new permitted capabilities is in the new effective set.

Enabling the file effective capability bit implies
that any file permitted or inheritable capability that causes a
thread to acquire the corresponding permitted capability during an
.BR execve (2)
(see the transformation rules described below) will also acquire that
capability in its effective set.
Therefore, when assigning capabilities to a file
.RB ( setcap (8),
.BR cap_set_file (3),
.BR cap_set_fd (3)),
if we specify the effective flag as being enabled for any capability,
then the effective flag must also be specified as enabled
for all other capabilities for which the corresponding permitted or
inheritable flags is enabled.
.RE

File capability sets are ignored if the executable file
resides on a filesystem mounted with the
.B nosuid
option (see
.BR mount (2)
and
.BR mount (8)).
.\"
.SS Transformation of capabilities during execve()
.PP
During an
.BR execve (2),
the kernel calculates the new capabilities of
the process using the following algorithm:
.in +4n
.nf

P'(ambient) = (file is privileged) ? 0 : P(ambient)

P'(permitted) = (P(inheritable) & F(inheritable)) |
                (F(permitted) & cap_bset) | P'(ambient)

P'(effective) = F(effective) ? P'(permitted) : P'(ambient)

P'(inheritable) = P(inheritable)    [i.e., unchanged]

.fi
.in
where:
.RS 4
.IP P 10
denotes the value of a thread capability set before the
.BR execve (2)
.IP P'
denotes the value of a thread capability set after the
.BR execve (2)
.IP F
denotes a file capability set
.IP cap_bset
is the value of the capability bounding set (described below).
.RE
.PP
A privileged file is one that has capabilities or
has the set-user-ID or set-group-ID bit set.
.\"
.SS Safety checking for capability-dumb binaries
A capability-dumb binary is an application that has been
marked to have file capabilities, but has not been converted to use the
.BR libcap (3)
API to manipulate its capabilities.
(In other words, this is a traditional set-user-ID-root program
that has been switched to use file capabilities,
but whose code has not been modified to understand capabilities.)
For such applications,
the effective capability bit is set on the file,
so that the file permitted capabilities are automatically
enabled in the process effective set when executing the file.
The kernel recognizes a file which has the effective capability bit set
as capability-dumb for the purpose of the check described here.

When executing a capability-dumb binary,
the kernel checks if the process obtained all permitted capabilities
that were specified in the file permitted set,
after the capability transformations described above have been performed.
(The typical reason why this might
.I not
occur is that the capability bounding set masked out some
of the capabilities in the file permitted set.)
If the process did not obtain the full set of
file permitted capabilities, then
.BR execve (2)
fails with the error
.BR EPERM .
This prevents possible security risks that could arise when
a capability-dumb application is executed with less privilege that it needs.
Note that, by definition,
the application could not itself recognize this problem,
since it does not employ the
.BR libcap (3)
API.
.\"
.SS Capabilities and execution of programs by root
In order to provide an all-powerful
.I root
using capability sets, during an
.BR execve (2):
.IP 1. 3
If a set-user-ID-root program is being executed,
or the real user ID of the process is 0 (root)
then the file inheritable and permitted sets are defined to be all ones
(i.e., all capabilities enabled).
.IP 2.
If a set-user-ID-root program is being executed,
then the file effective bit is defined to be one (enabled).
.PP
The upshot of the above rules,
combined with the capabilities transformations described above,
is that when a process
.BR execve (2)s
a set-user-ID-root program, or when a process with an effective UID of 0
.BR execve (2)s
a program,
it gains all capabilities in its permitted and effective capability sets,
except those masked out by the capability bounding set.
.\" If a process with real UID 0, and nonzero effective UID does an
.\" exec(), then it gets all capabilities in its
.\" permitted set, and no effective capabilities
This provides semantics that are the same as those provided by
traditional UNIX systems.
.SS Capability bounding set
The capability bounding set is a security mechanism that can be used
to limit the capabilities that can be gained during an
.BR execve (2).
The bounding set is used in the following ways:
.IP * 2
During an
.BR execve (2),
the capability bounding set is ANDed with the file permitted
capability set, and the result of this operation is assigned to the
thread's permitted capability set.
The capability bounding set thus places a limit on the permitted
capabilities that may be granted by an executable file.
.IP *
(Since Linux 2.6.25)
The capability bounding set acts as a limiting superset for
the capabilities that a thread can add to its inheritable set using
.BR capset (2).