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a672a02a SL |
1 | /* |
2 | * Copyright 2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. | |
3 | * | |
4 | * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use | |
5 | * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy | |
6 | * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at | |
7 | * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html | |
8 | */ | |
9 | ||
e1178600 SL |
10 | /* Dispatch functions for gcm mode */ |
11 | ||
12 | #include "cipher_locl.h" | |
4a42e264 SL |
13 | #include "internal/ciphers/cipher_gcm.h" |
14 | #include "internal/providercommonerr.h" | |
a672a02a | 15 | #include "internal/rand_int.h" |
a672a02a | 16 | #include "internal/provider_ctx.h" |
a672a02a SL |
17 | |
18 | static int gcm_tls_init(PROV_GCM_CTX *dat, unsigned char *aad, size_t aad_len); | |
19 | static int gcm_tls_iv_set_fixed(PROV_GCM_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *iv, | |
20 | size_t len); | |
21 | static int gcm_tls_cipher(PROV_GCM_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, size_t *padlen, | |
22 | const unsigned char *in, size_t len); | |
23 | static int gcm_cipher_internal(PROV_GCM_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, | |
24 | size_t *padlen, const unsigned char *in, | |
25 | size_t len); | |
26 | ||
e1178600 SL |
27 | void gcm_initctx(void *provctx, PROV_GCM_CTX *ctx, size_t keybits, |
28 | const PROV_GCM_HW *hw, size_t ivlen_min) | |
a672a02a SL |
29 | { |
30 | ctx->pad = 1; | |
31 | ctx->mode = EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE; | |
1c3ace68 SL |
32 | ctx->taglen = UNINITIALISED_SIZET; |
33 | ctx->tls_aad_len = UNINITIALISED_SIZET; | |
a672a02a SL |
34 | ctx->ivlen_min = ivlen_min; |
35 | ctx->ivlen = (EVP_GCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN + EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN); | |
36 | ctx->keylen = keybits / 8; | |
37 | ctx->hw = hw; | |
38 | ctx->libctx = PROV_LIBRARY_CONTEXT_OF(provctx); | |
39 | } | |
40 | ||
e1178600 | 41 | void gcm_deinitctx(PROV_GCM_CTX *ctx) |
a672a02a SL |
42 | { |
43 | OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx->iv, sizeof(ctx->iv)); | |
44 | } | |
45 | ||
46 | static int gcm_init(void *vctx, const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, | |
47 | const unsigned char *iv, size_t ivlen, int enc) | |
48 | { | |
49 | PROV_GCM_CTX *ctx = (PROV_GCM_CTX *)vctx; | |
50 | ||
51 | ctx->enc = enc; | |
52 | ||
53 | if (iv != NULL) { | |
54 | if (ivlen < ctx->ivlen_min || ivlen > sizeof(ctx->iv)) { | |
784883fc | 55 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_IV_LENGTH); |
a672a02a SL |
56 | return 0; |
57 | } | |
58 | ctx->ivlen = ivlen; | |
59 | memcpy(ctx->iv, iv, ctx->ivlen); | |
60 | ctx->iv_state = IV_STATE_BUFFERED; | |
61 | } | |
62 | ||
63 | if (key != NULL) { | |
64 | if (keylen != ctx->keylen) { | |
784883fc | 65 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH); |
a672a02a SL |
66 | return 0; |
67 | } | |
68 | return ctx->hw->setkey(ctx, key, ctx->keylen); | |
69 | } | |
70 | return 1; | |
71 | } | |
72 | ||
e1178600 SL |
73 | int gcm_einit(void *vctx, const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, |
74 | const unsigned char *iv, size_t ivlen) | |
a672a02a SL |
75 | { |
76 | return gcm_init(vctx, key, keylen, iv, ivlen, 1); | |
77 | } | |
78 | ||
e1178600 SL |
79 | int gcm_dinit(void *vctx, const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, |
80 | const unsigned char *iv, size_t ivlen) | |
a672a02a SL |
81 | { |
82 | return gcm_init(vctx, key, keylen, iv, ivlen, 0); | |
83 | } | |
84 | ||
e1178600 | 85 | int gcm_get_ctx_params(void *vctx, OSSL_PARAM params[]) |
a672a02a SL |
86 | { |
87 | PROV_GCM_CTX *ctx = (PROV_GCM_CTX *)vctx; | |
88 | OSSL_PARAM *p; | |
89 | size_t sz; | |
90 | ||
91 | p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_IVLEN); | |
1c3ace68 | 92 | if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, ctx->ivlen)) { |
3bfe9005 SL |
93 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_FAILED_TO_SET_PARAMETER); |
94 | return 0; | |
a672a02a SL |
95 | } |
96 | p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_KEYLEN); | |
1c3ace68 | 97 | if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, ctx->keylen)) { |
784883fc | 98 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_FAILED_TO_SET_PARAMETER); |
a672a02a SL |
99 | return 0; |
100 | } | |
101 | ||
102 | p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_IV); | |
103 | if (p != NULL) { | |
104 | if (ctx->iv_gen != 1 && ctx->iv_gen_rand != 1) | |
105 | return 0; | |
1c3ace68 | 106 | if (ctx->ivlen != p->data_size) { |
784883fc | 107 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_IV_LENGTH); |
a672a02a SL |
108 | return 0; |
109 | } | |
110 | if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_octet_string(p, ctx->iv, ctx->ivlen)) { | |
784883fc | 111 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_FAILED_TO_SET_PARAMETER); |
a672a02a SL |
112 | return 0; |
113 | } | |
114 | } | |
115 | ||
116 | p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_PAD); | |
117 | if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, ctx->tls_aad_pad_sz)) { | |
784883fc | 118 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_FAILED_TO_SET_PARAMETER); |
a672a02a SL |
119 | return 0; |
120 | } | |
121 | p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_AEAD_TAG); | |
122 | if (p != NULL) { | |
123 | sz = p->data_size; | |
1c3ace68 SL |
124 | if (sz == 0 |
125 | || sz > EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN | |
126 | || !ctx->enc | |
127 | || ctx->taglen == UNINITIALISED_SIZET) { | |
784883fc | 128 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_TAG); |
a672a02a SL |
129 | return 0; |
130 | } | |
131 | if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_octet_string(p, ctx->buf, sz)) { | |
784883fc | 132 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_FAILED_TO_SET_PARAMETER); |
a672a02a SL |
133 | return 0; |
134 | } | |
135 | } | |
136 | return 1; | |
137 | } | |
138 | ||
e1178600 | 139 | int gcm_set_ctx_params(void *vctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[]) |
a672a02a SL |
140 | { |
141 | PROV_GCM_CTX *ctx = (PROV_GCM_CTX *)vctx; | |
142 | const OSSL_PARAM *p; | |
143 | size_t sz; | |
144 | void *vp; | |
145 | ||
146 | p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_AEAD_TAG); | |
147 | if (p != NULL) { | |
148 | vp = ctx->buf; | |
149 | if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_octet_string(p, &vp, EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN, &sz)) { | |
784883fc | 150 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_FAILED_TO_GET_PARAMETER); |
a672a02a SL |
151 | return 0; |
152 | } | |
153 | if (sz == 0 || ctx->enc) { | |
784883fc | 154 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_TAG); |
a672a02a SL |
155 | return 0; |
156 | } | |
157 | ctx->taglen = sz; | |
158 | } | |
159 | ||
160 | p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_AEAD_IVLEN); | |
161 | if (p != NULL) { | |
162 | if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_size_t(p, &sz)) { | |
784883fc | 163 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_FAILED_TO_GET_PARAMETER); |
a672a02a SL |
164 | return 0; |
165 | } | |
166 | if (sz == 0 || sz > sizeof(ctx->iv)) { | |
784883fc | 167 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_IV_LENGTH); |
a672a02a SL |
168 | return 0; |
169 | } | |
170 | ctx->ivlen = sz; | |
171 | } | |
172 | ||
173 | p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_AEAD_TLS1_AAD); | |
174 | if (p != NULL) { | |
175 | if (p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_OCTET_STRING) { | |
784883fc | 176 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_FAILED_TO_GET_PARAMETER); |
a672a02a SL |
177 | return 0; |
178 | } | |
179 | sz = gcm_tls_init(ctx, p->data, p->data_size); | |
180 | if (sz == 0) { | |
784883fc | 181 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_AAD); |
a672a02a SL |
182 | return 0; |
183 | } | |
184 | ctx->tls_aad_pad_sz = sz; | |
185 | } | |
186 | ||
187 | p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_AEAD_TLS1_IV_FIXED); | |
188 | if (p != NULL) { | |
189 | if (p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_OCTET_STRING) { | |
784883fc | 190 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_FAILED_TO_GET_PARAMETER); |
a672a02a SL |
191 | return 0; |
192 | } | |
193 | if (gcm_tls_iv_set_fixed(ctx, p->data, p->data_size) == 0) { | |
784883fc | 194 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_FAILED_TO_GET_PARAMETER); |
a672a02a SL |
195 | return 0; |
196 | } | |
197 | } | |
198 | ||
e9c116eb SL |
199 | /* |
200 | * TODO(3.0) Temporary solution to address fuzz test crash, which will be | |
201 | * reworked once the discussion in PR #9510 is resolved. i.e- We need a | |
202 | * general solution for handling missing parameters inside set_params and | |
203 | * get_params methods. | |
204 | */ | |
205 | p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_KEYLEN); | |
206 | if (p != NULL) { | |
1c3ace68 | 207 | size_t keylen; |
e9c116eb | 208 | |
1c3ace68 | 209 | if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_size_t(p, &keylen)) { |
784883fc | 210 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_FAILED_TO_GET_PARAMETER); |
e9c116eb SL |
211 | return 0; |
212 | } | |
213 | /* The key length can not be modified for gcm mode */ | |
1c3ace68 | 214 | if (keylen != ctx->keylen) |
e9c116eb SL |
215 | return 0; |
216 | } | |
217 | ||
a672a02a SL |
218 | return 1; |
219 | } | |
220 | ||
e1178600 SL |
221 | int gcm_stream_update(void *vctx, unsigned char *out, size_t *outl, |
222 | size_t outsize, const unsigned char *in, size_t inl) | |
a672a02a SL |
223 | { |
224 | PROV_GCM_CTX *ctx = (PROV_GCM_CTX *)vctx; | |
225 | ||
226 | if (outsize < inl) { | |
784883fc | 227 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL); |
a672a02a SL |
228 | return -1; |
229 | } | |
230 | ||
231 | if (gcm_cipher_internal(ctx, out, outl, in, inl) <= 0) { | |
784883fc | 232 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_CIPHER_OPERATION_FAILED); |
a672a02a SL |
233 | return -1; |
234 | } | |
235 | return 1; | |
236 | } | |
237 | ||
e1178600 SL |
238 | int gcm_stream_final(void *vctx, unsigned char *out, size_t *outl, |
239 | size_t outsize) | |
a672a02a SL |
240 | { |
241 | PROV_GCM_CTX *ctx = (PROV_GCM_CTX *)vctx; | |
242 | int i; | |
243 | ||
244 | i = gcm_cipher_internal(ctx, out, outl, NULL, 0); | |
245 | if (i <= 0) | |
246 | return 0; | |
247 | ||
248 | *outl = 0; | |
249 | return 1; | |
250 | } | |
251 | ||
e1178600 SL |
252 | int gcm_cipher(void *vctx, |
253 | unsigned char *out, size_t *outl, size_t outsize, | |
254 | const unsigned char *in, size_t inl) | |
a672a02a SL |
255 | { |
256 | PROV_GCM_CTX *ctx = (PROV_GCM_CTX *)vctx; | |
257 | ||
258 | if (outsize < inl) { | |
784883fc | 259 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL); |
a672a02a SL |
260 | return -1; |
261 | } | |
262 | ||
263 | if (gcm_cipher_internal(ctx, out, outl, in, inl) <= 0) | |
264 | return -1; | |
265 | ||
266 | *outl = inl; | |
267 | return 1; | |
268 | } | |
269 | ||
270 | /* | |
271 | * See SP800-38D (GCM) Section 8 "Uniqueness requirement on IVS and keys" | |
272 | * | |
273 | * See also 8.2.2 RBG-based construction. | |
274 | * Random construction consists of a free field (which can be NULL) and a | |
275 | * random field which will use a DRBG that can return at least 96 bits of | |
276 | * entropy strength. (The DRBG must be seeded by the FIPS module). | |
277 | */ | |
278 | static int gcm_iv_generate(PROV_GCM_CTX *ctx, int offset) | |
279 | { | |
280 | int sz = ctx->ivlen - offset; | |
281 | ||
282 | /* Must be at least 96 bits */ | |
283 | if (sz <= 0 || ctx->ivlen < GCM_IV_DEFAULT_SIZE) | |
284 | return 0; | |
285 | ||
286 | /* Use DRBG to generate random iv */ | |
287 | if (rand_bytes_ex(ctx->libctx, ctx->iv + offset, sz) <= 0) | |
288 | return 0; | |
289 | ctx->iv_state = IV_STATE_BUFFERED; | |
290 | ctx->iv_gen_rand = 1; | |
291 | return 1; | |
292 | } | |
293 | ||
294 | static int gcm_cipher_internal(PROV_GCM_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, | |
295 | size_t *padlen, const unsigned char *in, | |
296 | size_t len) | |
297 | { | |
298 | size_t olen = 0; | |
299 | int rv = 0; | |
300 | const PROV_GCM_HW *hw = ctx->hw; | |
301 | ||
1c3ace68 | 302 | if (ctx->tls_aad_len != UNINITIALISED_SIZET) |
a672a02a SL |
303 | return gcm_tls_cipher(ctx, out, padlen, in, len); |
304 | ||
305 | if (!ctx->key_set || ctx->iv_state == IV_STATE_FINISHED) | |
306 | goto err; | |
307 | ||
308 | /* | |
309 | * FIPS requires generation of AES-GCM IV's inside the FIPS module. | |
310 | * The IV can still be set externally (the security policy will state that | |
311 | * this is not FIPS compliant). There are some applications | |
312 | * where setting the IV externally is the only option available. | |
313 | */ | |
314 | if (ctx->iv_state == IV_STATE_UNINITIALISED) { | |
315 | if (!ctx->enc || !gcm_iv_generate(ctx, 0)) | |
316 | goto err; | |
317 | } | |
318 | ||
319 | if (ctx->iv_state == IV_STATE_BUFFERED) { | |
320 | if (!hw->setiv(ctx, ctx->iv, ctx->ivlen)) | |
321 | goto err; | |
322 | ctx->iv_state = IV_STATE_COPIED; | |
323 | } | |
324 | ||
325 | if (in != NULL) { | |
326 | /* The input is AAD if out is NULL */ | |
327 | if (out == NULL) { | |
328 | if (!hw->aadupdate(ctx, in, len)) | |
329 | goto err; | |
330 | } else { | |
331 | /* The input is ciphertext OR plaintext */ | |
332 | if (!hw->cipherupdate(ctx, in, len, out)) | |
333 | goto err; | |
334 | } | |
335 | } else { | |
336 | /* Finished when in == NULL */ | |
337 | if (!hw->cipherfinal(ctx, ctx->buf)) | |
338 | goto err; | |
339 | ctx->iv_state = IV_STATE_FINISHED; /* Don't reuse the IV */ | |
340 | goto finish; | |
341 | } | |
342 | olen = len; | |
343 | finish: | |
344 | rv = 1; | |
345 | err: | |
346 | *padlen = olen; | |
347 | return rv; | |
348 | } | |
349 | ||
350 | static int gcm_tls_init(PROV_GCM_CTX *dat, unsigned char *aad, size_t aad_len) | |
351 | { | |
352 | unsigned char *buf; | |
353 | size_t len; | |
354 | ||
355 | if (aad_len != EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN) | |
356 | return 0; | |
357 | ||
358 | /* Save the aad for later use. */ | |
359 | buf = dat->buf; | |
360 | memcpy(buf, aad, aad_len); | |
361 | dat->tls_aad_len = aad_len; | |
362 | dat->tls_enc_records = 0; | |
363 | ||
364 | len = buf[aad_len - 2] << 8 | buf[aad_len - 1]; | |
365 | /* Correct length for explicit iv. */ | |
366 | if (len < EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN) | |
367 | return 0; | |
368 | len -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; | |
369 | ||
370 | /* If decrypting correct for tag too. */ | |
371 | if (!dat->enc) { | |
372 | if (len < EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN) | |
373 | return 0; | |
374 | len -= EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN; | |
375 | } | |
376 | buf[aad_len - 2] = (unsigned char)(len >> 8); | |
377 | buf[aad_len - 1] = (unsigned char)(len & 0xff); | |
378 | /* Extra padding: tag appended to record. */ | |
379 | return EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN; | |
380 | } | |
381 | ||
382 | static int gcm_tls_iv_set_fixed(PROV_GCM_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *iv, | |
383 | size_t len) | |
384 | { | |
385 | /* Special case: -1 length restores whole IV */ | |
386 | if (len == (size_t)-1) { | |
387 | memcpy(ctx->iv, iv, ctx->ivlen); | |
388 | ctx->iv_gen = 1; | |
389 | ctx->iv_state = IV_STATE_BUFFERED; | |
390 | return 1; | |
391 | } | |
392 | /* Fixed field must be at least 4 bytes and invocation field at least 8 */ | |
393 | if ((len < EVP_GCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN) | |
394 | || (ctx->ivlen - (int)len) < EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN) | |
395 | return 0; | |
396 | if (len > 0) | |
397 | memcpy(ctx->iv, iv, len); | |
398 | if (ctx->enc | |
399 | && rand_bytes_ex(ctx->libctx, ctx->iv + len, ctx->ivlen - len) <= 0) | |
400 | return 0; | |
401 | ctx->iv_gen = 1; | |
402 | ctx->iv_state = IV_STATE_BUFFERED; | |
403 | return 1; | |
404 | } | |
405 | ||
406 | /* increment counter (64-bit int) by 1 */ | |
407 | static void ctr64_inc(unsigned char *counter) | |
408 | { | |
409 | int n = 8; | |
410 | unsigned char c; | |
411 | ||
412 | do { | |
413 | --n; | |
414 | c = counter[n]; | |
415 | ++c; | |
416 | counter[n] = c; | |
417 | if (c > 0) | |
418 | return; | |
419 | } while (n > 0); | |
420 | } | |
421 | ||
422 | /* | |
423 | * Handle TLS GCM packet format. This consists of the last portion of the IV | |
424 | * followed by the payload and finally the tag. On encrypt generate IV, | |
425 | * encrypt payload and write the tag. On verify retrieve IV, decrypt payload | |
426 | * and verify tag. | |
427 | */ | |
428 | static int gcm_tls_cipher(PROV_GCM_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, size_t *padlen, | |
429 | const unsigned char *in, size_t len) | |
430 | { | |
1c3ace68 SL |
431 | int rv = 0; |
432 | size_t arg = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; | |
a672a02a SL |
433 | size_t plen = 0; |
434 | unsigned char *tag = NULL; | |
435 | ||
436 | if (!ctx->key_set) | |
437 | goto err; | |
438 | ||
439 | /* Encrypt/decrypt must be performed in place */ | |
440 | if (out != in || len < (EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN)) | |
441 | goto err; | |
442 | ||
443 | /* | |
444 | * Check for too many keys as per FIPS 140-2 IG A.5 "Key/IV Pair Uniqueness | |
445 | * Requirements from SP 800-38D". The requirements is for one party to the | |
446 | * communication to fail after 2^64 - 1 keys. We do this on the encrypting | |
447 | * side only. | |
448 | */ | |
449 | if (ctx->enc && ++ctx->tls_enc_records == 0) { | |
784883fc | 450 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, EVP_R_TOO_MANY_RECORDS); |
a672a02a SL |
451 | goto err; |
452 | } | |
453 | ||
454 | if (ctx->iv_gen == 0) | |
455 | goto err; | |
456 | /* | |
457 | * Set IV from start of buffer or generate IV and write to start of | |
458 | * buffer. | |
459 | */ | |
460 | if (ctx->enc) { | |
461 | if (!ctx->hw->setiv(ctx, ctx->iv, ctx->ivlen)) | |
462 | goto err; | |
463 | if (arg > ctx->ivlen) | |
464 | arg = ctx->ivlen; | |
465 | memcpy(out, ctx->iv + ctx->ivlen - arg, arg); | |
466 | /* | |
467 | * Invocation field will be at least 8 bytes in size and so no need | |
468 | * to check wrap around or increment more than last 8 bytes. | |
469 | */ | |
470 | ctr64_inc(ctx->iv + ctx->ivlen - 8); | |
471 | } else { | |
472 | memcpy(ctx->iv + ctx->ivlen - arg, out, arg); | |
473 | if (!ctx->hw->setiv(ctx, ctx->iv, ctx->ivlen)) | |
474 | goto err; | |
475 | } | |
476 | ctx->iv_state = IV_STATE_COPIED; | |
477 | ||
478 | /* Fix buffer and length to point to payload */ | |
479 | in += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; | |
480 | out += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; | |
481 | len -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN; | |
482 | ||
483 | tag = ctx->enc ? out + len : (unsigned char *)in + len; | |
484 | if (!ctx->hw->oneshot(ctx, ctx->buf, ctx->tls_aad_len, in, len, out, tag, | |
485 | EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN)) { | |
486 | if (!ctx->enc) | |
487 | OPENSSL_cleanse(out, len); | |
488 | goto err; | |
489 | } | |
490 | if (ctx->enc) | |
491 | plen = len + EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN; | |
492 | else | |
493 | plen = len; | |
494 | ||
495 | rv = 1; | |
496 | err: | |
497 | ctx->iv_state = IV_STATE_FINISHED; | |
1c3ace68 | 498 | ctx->tls_aad_len = UNINITIALISED_SIZET; |
a672a02a SL |
499 | *padlen = plen; |
500 | return rv; | |
501 | } |