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6f4b7663 | 1 | /* |
33388b44 | 2 | * Copyright 2019-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. |
6f4b7663 RL |
3 | * |
4 | * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use | |
5 | * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy | |
6 | * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at | |
7 | * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html | |
8 | */ | |
9 | ||
10 | /* | |
11 | * RSA low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for | |
12 | * internal use. | |
13 | */ | |
14 | #include "internal/deprecated.h" | |
15 | ||
16 | #include <string.h> | |
17 | #include <openssl/crypto.h> | |
18 | #include <openssl/core_numbers.h> | |
19 | #include <openssl/core_names.h> | |
20 | #include <openssl/err.h> | |
21 | #include <openssl/rsa.h> | |
22 | #include <openssl/params.h> | |
23 | #include <openssl/evp.h> | |
24 | #include "internal/cryptlib.h" | |
25 | #include "internal/nelem.h" | |
26 | #include "internal/sizes.h" | |
27 | #include "crypto/rsa.h" | |
28 | #include "prov/providercommonerr.h" | |
29 | #include "prov/implementations.h" | |
30 | #include "prov/provider_ctx.h" | |
6f5837dc | 31 | #include "prov/der_rsa.h" |
6f4b7663 RL |
32 | |
33 | static OSSL_OP_signature_newctx_fn rsa_newctx; | |
0ec36bf1 RL |
34 | static OSSL_OP_signature_sign_init_fn rsa_sign_init; |
35 | static OSSL_OP_signature_verify_init_fn rsa_verify_init; | |
36 | static OSSL_OP_signature_verify_recover_init_fn rsa_verify_recover_init; | |
6f4b7663 RL |
37 | static OSSL_OP_signature_sign_fn rsa_sign; |
38 | static OSSL_OP_signature_verify_fn rsa_verify; | |
39 | static OSSL_OP_signature_verify_recover_fn rsa_verify_recover; | |
0ec36bf1 | 40 | static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_sign_init_fn rsa_digest_sign_init; |
6f4b7663 RL |
41 | static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_sign_update_fn rsa_digest_signverify_update; |
42 | static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_sign_final_fn rsa_digest_sign_final; | |
0ec36bf1 | 43 | static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_verify_init_fn rsa_digest_verify_init; |
6f4b7663 RL |
44 | static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_verify_update_fn rsa_digest_signverify_update; |
45 | static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_verify_final_fn rsa_digest_verify_final; | |
46 | static OSSL_OP_signature_freectx_fn rsa_freectx; | |
47 | static OSSL_OP_signature_dupctx_fn rsa_dupctx; | |
48 | static OSSL_OP_signature_get_ctx_params_fn rsa_get_ctx_params; | |
49 | static OSSL_OP_signature_gettable_ctx_params_fn rsa_gettable_ctx_params; | |
50 | static OSSL_OP_signature_set_ctx_params_fn rsa_set_ctx_params; | |
51 | static OSSL_OP_signature_settable_ctx_params_fn rsa_settable_ctx_params; | |
52 | static OSSL_OP_signature_get_ctx_md_params_fn rsa_get_ctx_md_params; | |
53 | static OSSL_OP_signature_gettable_ctx_md_params_fn rsa_gettable_ctx_md_params; | |
54 | static OSSL_OP_signature_set_ctx_md_params_fn rsa_set_ctx_md_params; | |
55 | static OSSL_OP_signature_settable_ctx_md_params_fn rsa_settable_ctx_md_params; | |
56 | ||
57 | static OSSL_ITEM padding_item[] = { | |
b8086652 SL |
58 | { RSA_PKCS1_PADDING, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_PKCSV15 }, |
59 | { RSA_SSLV23_PADDING, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_SSLV23 }, | |
60 | { RSA_NO_PADDING, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_NONE }, | |
61 | { RSA_X931_PADDING, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_X931 }, | |
62 | { RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_PSS }, | |
6f4b7663 RL |
63 | { 0, NULL } |
64 | }; | |
65 | ||
66 | /* | |
67 | * What's passed as an actual key is defined by the KEYMGMT interface. | |
68 | * We happen to know that our KEYMGMT simply passes RSA structures, so | |
69 | * we use that here too. | |
70 | */ | |
71 | ||
72 | typedef struct { | |
73 | OPENSSL_CTX *libctx; | |
2c6094ba | 74 | char *propq; |
6f4b7663 | 75 | RSA *rsa; |
0ec36bf1 | 76 | int operation; |
6f4b7663 RL |
77 | |
78 | /* | |
79 | * Flag to determine if the hash function can be changed (1) or not (0) | |
80 | * Because it's dangerous to change during a DigestSign or DigestVerify | |
81 | * operation, this flag is cleared by their Init function, and set again | |
82 | * by their Final function. | |
83 | */ | |
84 | unsigned int flag_allow_md : 1; | |
85 | ||
86 | /* The Algorithm Identifier of the combined signature agorithm */ | |
6f5837dc RL |
87 | unsigned char aid_buf[128]; |
88 | unsigned char *aid; | |
6f4b7663 RL |
89 | size_t aid_len; |
90 | ||
91 | /* main digest */ | |
92 | EVP_MD *md; | |
93 | EVP_MD_CTX *mdctx; | |
94 | int mdnid; | |
95 | char mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE]; /* Purely informational */ | |
96 | ||
97 | /* RSA padding mode */ | |
98 | int pad_mode; | |
99 | /* message digest for MGF1 */ | |
100 | EVP_MD *mgf1_md; | |
101 | char mgf1_mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE]; /* Purely informational */ | |
102 | /* PSS salt length */ | |
103 | int saltlen; | |
104 | /* Minimum salt length or -1 if no PSS parameter restriction */ | |
105 | int min_saltlen; | |
106 | ||
107 | /* Temp buffer */ | |
108 | unsigned char *tbuf; | |
109 | ||
110 | } PROV_RSA_CTX; | |
111 | ||
112 | static size_t rsa_get_md_size(const PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx) | |
113 | { | |
114 | if (prsactx->md != NULL) | |
115 | return EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md); | |
116 | return 0; | |
117 | } | |
118 | ||
119 | static int rsa_get_md_nid(const EVP_MD *md) | |
120 | { | |
121 | /* | |
122 | * Because the RSA library deals with NIDs, we need to translate. | |
123 | * We do so using EVP_MD_is_a(), and therefore need a name to NID | |
124 | * map. | |
125 | */ | |
126 | static const OSSL_ITEM name_to_nid[] = { | |
127 | { NID_sha1, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA1 }, | |
128 | { NID_sha224, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_224 }, | |
129 | { NID_sha256, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_256 }, | |
130 | { NID_sha384, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_384 }, | |
131 | { NID_sha512, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_512 }, | |
45c236ad SL |
132 | { NID_sha512_224, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_512_224 }, |
133 | { NID_sha512_256, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_512_256 }, | |
6f4b7663 RL |
134 | { NID_md5, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MD5 }, |
135 | { NID_md5_sha1, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MD5_SHA1 }, | |
136 | { NID_md2, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MD2 }, | |
137 | { NID_md4, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MD4 }, | |
138 | { NID_mdc2, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MDC2 }, | |
139 | { NID_ripemd160, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_RIPEMD160 }, | |
140 | { NID_sha3_224, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA3_224 }, | |
141 | { NID_sha3_256, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA3_256 }, | |
142 | { NID_sha3_384, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA3_384 }, | |
143 | { NID_sha3_512, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA3_512 }, | |
144 | }; | |
145 | size_t i; | |
146 | int mdnid = NID_undef; | |
147 | ||
148 | if (md == NULL) | |
149 | goto end; | |
150 | ||
151 | for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(name_to_nid); i++) { | |
152 | if (EVP_MD_is_a(md, name_to_nid[i].ptr)) { | |
153 | mdnid = (int)name_to_nid[i].id; | |
154 | break; | |
155 | } | |
156 | } | |
157 | ||
6f4b7663 RL |
158 | end: |
159 | return mdnid; | |
160 | } | |
161 | ||
162 | static int rsa_check_padding(int mdnid, int padding) | |
163 | { | |
164 | if (padding == RSA_NO_PADDING) { | |
165 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE); | |
166 | return 0; | |
167 | } | |
168 | ||
169 | if (padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) { | |
170 | if (RSA_X931_hash_id(mdnid) == -1) { | |
171 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_X931_DIGEST); | |
172 | return 0; | |
173 | } | |
174 | } | |
175 | ||
176 | return 1; | |
177 | } | |
178 | ||
2d553660 RL |
179 | static int rsa_check_parameters(EVP_MD *md, PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx) |
180 | { | |
181 | if (prsactx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) { | |
182 | int max_saltlen; | |
183 | ||
184 | /* See if minimum salt length exceeds maximum possible */ | |
185 | max_saltlen = RSA_size(prsactx->rsa) - EVP_MD_size(md); | |
186 | if ((RSA_bits(prsactx->rsa) & 0x7) == 1) | |
187 | max_saltlen--; | |
188 | if (prsactx->min_saltlen > max_saltlen) { | |
189 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_SALT_LENGTH); | |
190 | return 0; | |
191 | } | |
192 | } | |
193 | return 1; | |
194 | } | |
195 | ||
2c6094ba | 196 | static void *rsa_newctx(void *provctx, const char *propq) |
6f4b7663 | 197 | { |
2d553660 RL |
198 | PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = NULL; |
199 | char *propq_copy = NULL; | |
6f4b7663 | 200 | |
2d553660 RL |
201 | if ((prsactx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(PROV_RSA_CTX))) == NULL |
202 | || (propq != NULL | |
203 | && (propq_copy = OPENSSL_strdup(propq)) == NULL)) { | |
204 | OPENSSL_free(prsactx); | |
205 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
6f4b7663 | 206 | return NULL; |
2d553660 | 207 | } |
6f4b7663 RL |
208 | |
209 | prsactx->libctx = PROV_LIBRARY_CONTEXT_OF(provctx); | |
210 | prsactx->flag_allow_md = 1; | |
2d553660 | 211 | prsactx->propq = propq_copy; |
6f4b7663 RL |
212 | return prsactx; |
213 | } | |
214 | ||
215 | /* True if PSS parameters are restricted */ | |
216 | #define rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx) (prsactx->min_saltlen != -1) | |
217 | ||
6f4b7663 RL |
218 | static int rsa_setup_md(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx, const char *mdname, |
219 | const char *mdprops) | |
220 | { | |
2c6094ba RL |
221 | if (mdprops == NULL) |
222 | mdprops = ctx->propq; | |
223 | ||
6f4b7663 RL |
224 | if (mdname != NULL) { |
225 | EVP_MD *md = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx->libctx, mdname, mdprops); | |
226 | int md_nid = rsa_get_md_nid(md); | |
6f5837dc | 227 | WPACKET pkt; |
2de64666 | 228 | size_t mdname_len = strlen(mdname); |
6f4b7663 | 229 | |
6f5837dc RL |
230 | if (md == NULL |
231 | || md_nid == NID_undef | |
2d553660 | 232 | || !rsa_check_padding(md_nid, ctx->pad_mode) |
2de64666 NT |
233 | || !rsa_check_parameters(md, ctx) |
234 | || mdname_len >= sizeof(ctx->mdname)) { | |
2d553660 RL |
235 | if (md == NULL) |
236 | ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST, | |
237 | "%s could not be fetched", mdname); | |
238 | if (md_nid == NID_undef) | |
239 | ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED, | |
240 | "digest=%s", mdname); | |
2de64666 NT |
241 | if (mdname_len >= sizeof(ctx->mdname)) |
242 | ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST, | |
243 | "%s exceeds name buffer length", mdname); | |
6f4b7663 RL |
244 | EVP_MD_free(md); |
245 | return 0; | |
246 | } | |
247 | ||
248 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx->mdctx); | |
249 | EVP_MD_free(ctx->md); | |
6f4b7663 | 250 | |
6f5837dc RL |
251 | /* |
252 | * TODO(3.0) Should we care about DER writing errors? | |
253 | * All it really means is that for some reason, there's no | |
254 | * AlgorithmIdentifier to be had (consider RSA with MD5-SHA1), | |
255 | * but the operation itself is still valid, just as long as it's | |
256 | * not used to construct anything that needs an AlgorithmIdentifier. | |
257 | */ | |
258 | ctx->aid_len = 0; | |
259 | if (WPACKET_init_der(&pkt, ctx->aid_buf, sizeof(ctx->aid_buf)) | |
a30027b6 RL |
260 | && DER_w_algorithmIdentifier_MDWithRSAEncryption(&pkt, -1, ctx->rsa, |
261 | md_nid) | |
6f5837dc RL |
262 | && WPACKET_finish(&pkt)) { |
263 | WPACKET_get_total_written(&pkt, &ctx->aid_len); | |
264 | ctx->aid = WPACKET_get_curr(&pkt); | |
265 | } | |
266 | WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt); | |
6f4b7663 | 267 | |
6f5837dc | 268 | ctx->mdctx = NULL; |
6f4b7663 RL |
269 | ctx->md = md; |
270 | ctx->mdnid = md_nid; | |
271 | OPENSSL_strlcpy(ctx->mdname, mdname, sizeof(ctx->mdname)); | |
6f4b7663 RL |
272 | } |
273 | ||
274 | return 1; | |
275 | } | |
276 | ||
277 | static int rsa_setup_mgf1_md(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx, const char *mdname, | |
2c6094ba | 278 | const char *mdprops) |
6f4b7663 | 279 | { |
2de64666 NT |
280 | size_t len; |
281 | ||
2c6094ba RL |
282 | if (mdprops == NULL) |
283 | mdprops = ctx->propq; | |
284 | ||
6f4b7663 RL |
285 | if (ctx->mgf1_mdname[0] != '\0') |
286 | EVP_MD_free(ctx->mgf1_md); | |
287 | ||
2d553660 RL |
288 | if ((ctx->mgf1_md = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx->libctx, mdname, mdprops)) == NULL) { |
289 | ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST, | |
290 | "%s could not be fetched", mdname); | |
6f4b7663 | 291 | return 0; |
2d553660 | 292 | } |
2de64666 NT |
293 | len = OPENSSL_strlcpy(ctx->mgf1_mdname, mdname, sizeof(ctx->mgf1_mdname)); |
294 | if (len >= sizeof(ctx->mgf1_mdname)) { | |
295 | ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST, | |
296 | "%s exceeds name buffer length", mdname); | |
297 | return 0; | |
298 | } | |
6f4b7663 RL |
299 | |
300 | return 1; | |
301 | } | |
302 | ||
2d553660 RL |
303 | static int rsa_signature_init(void *vprsactx, void *vrsa, int operation) |
304 | { | |
305 | PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx; | |
306 | ||
307 | if (prsactx == NULL || vrsa == NULL || !RSA_up_ref(vrsa)) | |
308 | return 0; | |
309 | ||
310 | RSA_free(prsactx->rsa); | |
311 | prsactx->rsa = vrsa; | |
312 | prsactx->operation = operation; | |
313 | ||
314 | /* Maximum for sign, auto for verify */ | |
315 | prsactx->saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO; | |
316 | prsactx->min_saltlen = -1; | |
317 | ||
318 | switch (RSA_test_flags(prsactx->rsa, RSA_FLAG_TYPE_MASK)) { | |
319 | case RSA_FLAG_TYPE_RSA: | |
320 | prsactx->pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING; | |
321 | break; | |
322 | case RSA_FLAG_TYPE_RSASSAPSS: | |
323 | prsactx->pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING; | |
324 | ||
325 | { | |
326 | const RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 *pss = | |
327 | rsa_get0_pss_params_30(prsactx->rsa); | |
328 | ||
329 | if (!rsa_pss_params_30_is_unrestricted(pss)) { | |
330 | int md_nid = rsa_pss_params_30_hashalg(pss); | |
331 | int mgf1md_nid = rsa_pss_params_30_maskgenhashalg(pss); | |
332 | int min_saltlen = rsa_pss_params_30_saltlen(pss); | |
333 | const char *mdname, *mgf1mdname; | |
2de64666 | 334 | size_t len; |
2d553660 RL |
335 | |
336 | mdname = rsa_oaeppss_nid2name(md_nid); | |
337 | mgf1mdname = rsa_oaeppss_nid2name(mgf1md_nid); | |
338 | prsactx->min_saltlen = min_saltlen; | |
339 | ||
340 | if (mdname == NULL) { | |
341 | ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST, | |
342 | "PSS restrictions lack hash algorithm"); | |
343 | return 0; | |
344 | } | |
345 | if (mgf1mdname == NULL) { | |
346 | ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST, | |
347 | "PSS restrictions lack MGF1 hash algorithm"); | |
348 | return 0; | |
349 | } | |
350 | ||
2de64666 NT |
351 | len = OPENSSL_strlcpy(prsactx->mdname, mdname, |
352 | sizeof(prsactx->mdname)); | |
353 | if (len >= sizeof(prsactx->mdname)) { | |
354 | ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST, | |
355 | "hash algorithm name too long"); | |
356 | return 0; | |
357 | } | |
358 | len = OPENSSL_strlcpy(prsactx->mgf1_mdname, mgf1mdname, | |
359 | sizeof(prsactx->mgf1_mdname)); | |
360 | if (len >= sizeof(prsactx->mgf1_mdname)) { | |
361 | ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST, | |
362 | "MGF1 hash algorithm name too long"); | |
363 | return 0; | |
364 | } | |
2d553660 RL |
365 | prsactx->saltlen = min_saltlen; |
366 | ||
367 | return rsa_setup_md(prsactx, mdname, prsactx->propq) | |
368 | && rsa_setup_mgf1_md(prsactx, mgf1mdname, prsactx->propq); | |
369 | } | |
370 | } | |
371 | ||
372 | break; | |
373 | default: | |
374 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, PROV_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE); | |
375 | return 0; | |
376 | } | |
377 | ||
378 | return 1; | |
379 | } | |
380 | ||
6f4b7663 RL |
381 | static int setup_tbuf(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx) |
382 | { | |
383 | if (ctx->tbuf != NULL) | |
384 | return 1; | |
385 | if ((ctx->tbuf = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(ctx->rsa))) == NULL) { | |
386 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
387 | return 0; | |
388 | } | |
389 | return 1; | |
390 | } | |
391 | ||
392 | static void clean_tbuf(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx) | |
393 | { | |
394 | if (ctx->tbuf != NULL) | |
395 | OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx->tbuf, RSA_size(ctx->rsa)); | |
396 | } | |
397 | ||
398 | static void free_tbuf(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx) | |
399 | { | |
2d553660 RL |
400 | clean_tbuf(ctx); |
401 | OPENSSL_free(ctx->tbuf); | |
6f4b7663 RL |
402 | ctx->tbuf = NULL; |
403 | } | |
404 | ||
0ec36bf1 RL |
405 | static int rsa_sign_init(void *vprsactx, void *vrsa) |
406 | { | |
407 | return rsa_signature_init(vprsactx, vrsa, EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN); | |
408 | } | |
409 | ||
6f4b7663 RL |
410 | static int rsa_sign(void *vprsactx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen, |
411 | size_t sigsize, const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen) | |
412 | { | |
413 | PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx; | |
414 | int ret; | |
415 | size_t rsasize = RSA_size(prsactx->rsa); | |
416 | size_t mdsize = rsa_get_md_size(prsactx); | |
417 | ||
418 | if (sig == NULL) { | |
419 | *siglen = rsasize; | |
420 | return 1; | |
421 | } | |
422 | ||
2d553660 RL |
423 | if (sigsize < rsasize) { |
424 | ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_SIZE, | |
425 | "is %zu, should be at least %zu", sigsize, rsasize); | |
6f4b7663 | 426 | return 0; |
2d553660 | 427 | } |
6f4b7663 RL |
428 | |
429 | if (mdsize != 0) { | |
430 | if (tbslen != mdsize) { | |
431 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH); | |
432 | return 0; | |
433 | } | |
434 | ||
f844f9eb | 435 | #ifndef FIPS_MODULE |
6f4b7663 RL |
436 | if (EVP_MD_is_a(prsactx->md, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MDC2)) { |
437 | unsigned int sltmp; | |
438 | ||
439 | if (prsactx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) { | |
440 | ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE, | |
441 | "only PKCS#1 padding supported with MDC2"); | |
442 | return 0; | |
443 | } | |
444 | ret = RSA_sign_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(0, tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp, | |
445 | prsactx->rsa); | |
446 | ||
447 | if (ret <= 0) { | |
448 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA); | |
449 | return 0; | |
450 | } | |
451 | ret = sltmp; | |
452 | goto end; | |
453 | } | |
1b6ea308 | 454 | #endif |
6f4b7663 RL |
455 | switch (prsactx->pad_mode) { |
456 | case RSA_X931_PADDING: | |
457 | if ((size_t)RSA_size(prsactx->rsa) < tbslen + 1) { | |
2d553660 RL |
458 | ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL, |
459 | "RSA key size = %d, expected minimum = %d", | |
460 | RSA_size(prsactx->rsa), tbslen + 1); | |
6f4b7663 RL |
461 | return 0; |
462 | } | |
463 | if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx)) { | |
464 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
465 | return 0; | |
466 | } | |
467 | memcpy(prsactx->tbuf, tbs, tbslen); | |
468 | prsactx->tbuf[tbslen] = RSA_X931_hash_id(prsactx->mdnid); | |
469 | ret = RSA_private_encrypt(tbslen + 1, prsactx->tbuf, | |
470 | sig, prsactx->rsa, RSA_X931_PADDING); | |
471 | clean_tbuf(prsactx); | |
472 | break; | |
473 | ||
474 | case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: | |
475 | { | |
476 | unsigned int sltmp; | |
477 | ||
478 | ret = RSA_sign(prsactx->mdnid, tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp, | |
479 | prsactx->rsa); | |
480 | if (ret <= 0) { | |
481 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA); | |
482 | return 0; | |
483 | } | |
484 | ret = sltmp; | |
485 | } | |
486 | break; | |
487 | ||
488 | case RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING: | |
489 | /* Check PSS restrictions */ | |
490 | if (rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx)) { | |
491 | switch (prsactx->saltlen) { | |
492 | case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST: | |
493 | if (prsactx->min_saltlen > EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md)) { | |
2d553660 RL |
494 | ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, |
495 | PROV_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL, | |
496 | "minimum salt length set to %d, " | |
497 | "but the digest only gives %d", | |
498 | prsactx->min_saltlen, | |
499 | EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md)); | |
6f4b7663 RL |
500 | return 0; |
501 | } | |
502 | /* FALLTHRU */ | |
503 | default: | |
504 | if (prsactx->saltlen >= 0 | |
505 | && prsactx->saltlen < prsactx->min_saltlen) { | |
2d553660 RL |
506 | ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, |
507 | PROV_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL, | |
508 | "minimum salt length set to %d, but the" | |
509 | "actual salt length is only set to %d", | |
510 | prsactx->min_saltlen, | |
511 | prsactx->saltlen); | |
6f4b7663 RL |
512 | return 0; |
513 | } | |
514 | break; | |
515 | } | |
516 | } | |
517 | if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx)) | |
518 | return 0; | |
519 | if (!RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(prsactx->rsa, | |
520 | prsactx->tbuf, tbs, | |
521 | prsactx->md, prsactx->mgf1_md, | |
522 | prsactx->saltlen)) { | |
523 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA); | |
524 | return 0; | |
525 | } | |
526 | ret = RSA_private_encrypt(RSA_size(prsactx->rsa), prsactx->tbuf, | |
527 | sig, prsactx->rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING); | |
528 | clean_tbuf(prsactx); | |
529 | break; | |
530 | ||
531 | default: | |
532 | ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE, | |
533 | "Only X.931, PKCS#1 v1.5 or PSS padding allowed"); | |
534 | return 0; | |
535 | } | |
536 | } else { | |
537 | ret = RSA_private_encrypt(tbslen, tbs, sig, prsactx->rsa, | |
538 | prsactx->pad_mode); | |
539 | } | |
540 | ||
f844f9eb | 541 | #ifndef FIPS_MODULE |
6f4b7663 RL |
542 | end: |
543 | #endif | |
544 | if (ret <= 0) { | |
545 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA); | |
546 | return 0; | |
547 | } | |
548 | ||
549 | *siglen = ret; | |
550 | return 1; | |
551 | } | |
552 | ||
0ec36bf1 RL |
553 | static int rsa_verify_recover_init(void *vprsactx, void *vrsa) |
554 | { | |
555 | return rsa_signature_init(vprsactx, vrsa, EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFYRECOVER); | |
556 | } | |
557 | ||
6f4b7663 RL |
558 | static int rsa_verify_recover(void *vprsactx, |
559 | unsigned char *rout, | |
560 | size_t *routlen, | |
561 | size_t routsize, | |
562 | const unsigned char *sig, | |
563 | size_t siglen) | |
564 | { | |
565 | PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx; | |
566 | int ret; | |
567 | ||
568 | if (rout == NULL) { | |
569 | *routlen = RSA_size(prsactx->rsa); | |
570 | return 1; | |
571 | } | |
572 | ||
573 | if (prsactx->md != NULL) { | |
574 | switch (prsactx->pad_mode) { | |
575 | case RSA_X931_PADDING: | |
576 | if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx)) | |
577 | return 0; | |
578 | ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, prsactx->tbuf, prsactx->rsa, | |
579 | RSA_X931_PADDING); | |
580 | if (ret < 1) { | |
581 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA); | |
582 | return 0; | |
583 | } | |
584 | ret--; | |
585 | if (prsactx->tbuf[ret] != RSA_X931_hash_id(prsactx->mdnid)) { | |
586 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH); | |
587 | return 0; | |
588 | } | |
589 | if (ret != EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md)) { | |
590 | ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH, | |
591 | "Should be %d, but got %d", | |
592 | EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md), ret); | |
593 | return 0; | |
594 | } | |
595 | ||
596 | *routlen = ret; | |
4f2271d5 SL |
597 | if (rout != prsactx->tbuf) { |
598 | if (routsize < (size_t)ret) { | |
599 | ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, | |
600 | "buffer size is %d, should be %d", | |
601 | routsize, ret); | |
602 | return 0; | |
603 | } | |
604 | memcpy(rout, prsactx->tbuf, ret); | |
6f4b7663 | 605 | } |
6f4b7663 RL |
606 | break; |
607 | ||
608 | case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: | |
609 | { | |
610 | size_t sltmp; | |
611 | ||
612 | ret = int_rsa_verify(prsactx->mdnid, NULL, 0, rout, &sltmp, | |
613 | sig, siglen, prsactx->rsa); | |
614 | if (ret <= 0) { | |
615 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA); | |
616 | return 0; | |
617 | } | |
618 | ret = sltmp; | |
619 | } | |
620 | break; | |
621 | ||
622 | default: | |
623 | ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE, | |
624 | "Only X.931 or PKCS#1 v1.5 padding allowed"); | |
625 | return 0; | |
626 | } | |
627 | } else { | |
628 | ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, rout, prsactx->rsa, | |
629 | prsactx->pad_mode); | |
630 | if (ret < 0) { | |
631 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA); | |
632 | return 0; | |
633 | } | |
634 | } | |
635 | *routlen = ret; | |
636 | return 1; | |
637 | } | |
638 | ||
0ec36bf1 RL |
639 | static int rsa_verify_init(void *vprsactx, void *vrsa) |
640 | { | |
641 | return rsa_signature_init(vprsactx, vrsa, EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY); | |
642 | } | |
643 | ||
6f4b7663 RL |
644 | static int rsa_verify(void *vprsactx, const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen, |
645 | const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen) | |
646 | { | |
647 | PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx; | |
648 | size_t rslen; | |
649 | ||
650 | if (prsactx->md != NULL) { | |
651 | switch (prsactx->pad_mode) { | |
652 | case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: | |
653 | if (!RSA_verify(prsactx->mdnid, tbs, tbslen, sig, siglen, | |
654 | prsactx->rsa)) { | |
655 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA); | |
656 | return 0; | |
657 | } | |
658 | return 1; | |
659 | case RSA_X931_PADDING: | |
4f2271d5 SL |
660 | if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx)) |
661 | return 0; | |
662 | if (rsa_verify_recover(prsactx, prsactx->tbuf, &rslen, 0, | |
663 | sig, siglen) <= 0) | |
6f4b7663 RL |
664 | return 0; |
665 | break; | |
666 | case RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING: | |
667 | { | |
668 | int ret; | |
669 | size_t mdsize; | |
670 | ||
6f4b7663 RL |
671 | /* |
672 | * We need to check this for the RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1() | |
673 | * call | |
674 | */ | |
675 | mdsize = rsa_get_md_size(prsactx); | |
676 | if (tbslen != mdsize) { | |
677 | ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH, | |
678 | "Should be %d, but got %d", | |
679 | mdsize, tbslen); | |
680 | return 0; | |
681 | } | |
682 | ||
683 | if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx)) | |
684 | return 0; | |
685 | ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, prsactx->tbuf, | |
686 | prsactx->rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING); | |
687 | if (ret <= 0) { | |
688 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA); | |
689 | return 0; | |
690 | } | |
691 | ret = RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(prsactx->rsa, tbs, | |
692 | prsactx->md, prsactx->mgf1_md, | |
693 | prsactx->tbuf, | |
694 | prsactx->saltlen); | |
695 | if (ret <= 0) { | |
696 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA); | |
697 | return 0; | |
698 | } | |
699 | return 1; | |
700 | } | |
701 | default: | |
702 | ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE, | |
703 | "Only X.931, PKCS#1 v1.5 or PSS padding allowed"); | |
704 | return 0; | |
705 | } | |
706 | } else { | |
707 | if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx)) | |
708 | return 0; | |
709 | rslen = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, prsactx->tbuf, prsactx->rsa, | |
710 | prsactx->pad_mode); | |
711 | if (rslen == 0) { | |
712 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA); | |
713 | return 0; | |
714 | } | |
715 | } | |
716 | ||
717 | if ((rslen != tbslen) || memcmp(tbs, prsactx->tbuf, rslen)) | |
718 | return 0; | |
719 | ||
720 | return 1; | |
721 | } | |
722 | ||
723 | static int rsa_digest_signverify_init(void *vprsactx, const char *mdname, | |
2c6094ba | 724 | void *vrsa, int operation) |
6f4b7663 RL |
725 | { |
726 | PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx; | |
727 | ||
728 | prsactx->flag_allow_md = 0; | |
0ec36bf1 | 729 | if (!rsa_signature_init(vprsactx, vrsa, operation) |
2d553660 | 730 | || !rsa_setup_md(prsactx, mdname, NULL)) /* TODO RL */ |
6f4b7663 RL |
731 | return 0; |
732 | ||
733 | prsactx->mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); | |
2d553660 RL |
734 | if (prsactx->mdctx == NULL) { |
735 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
6f4b7663 | 736 | goto error; |
2d553660 | 737 | } |
6f4b7663 RL |
738 | |
739 | if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(prsactx->mdctx, prsactx->md, NULL)) | |
740 | goto error; | |
741 | ||
742 | return 1; | |
743 | ||
744 | error: | |
745 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(prsactx->mdctx); | |
746 | EVP_MD_free(prsactx->md); | |
747 | prsactx->mdctx = NULL; | |
748 | prsactx->md = NULL; | |
749 | return 0; | |
750 | } | |
751 | ||
0ec36bf1 RL |
752 | static int rsa_digest_signverify_update(void *vprsactx, |
753 | const unsigned char *data, | |
754 | size_t datalen) | |
6f4b7663 RL |
755 | { |
756 | PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx; | |
757 | ||
758 | if (prsactx == NULL || prsactx->mdctx == NULL) | |
759 | return 0; | |
760 | ||
761 | return EVP_DigestUpdate(prsactx->mdctx, data, datalen); | |
762 | } | |
763 | ||
0ec36bf1 | 764 | static int rsa_digest_sign_init(void *vprsactx, const char *mdname, |
2d553660 | 765 | void *vrsa) |
0ec36bf1 | 766 | { |
2d553660 | 767 | return rsa_digest_signverify_init(vprsactx, mdname, vrsa, |
0ec36bf1 RL |
768 | EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN); |
769 | } | |
770 | ||
771 | static int rsa_digest_sign_final(void *vprsactx, unsigned char *sig, | |
772 | size_t *siglen, size_t sigsize) | |
6f4b7663 RL |
773 | { |
774 | PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx; | |
775 | unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; | |
776 | unsigned int dlen = 0; | |
777 | ||
778 | prsactx->flag_allow_md = 1; | |
779 | if (prsactx == NULL || prsactx->mdctx == NULL) | |
780 | return 0; | |
781 | ||
782 | /* | |
783 | * If sig is NULL then we're just finding out the sig size. Other fields | |
784 | * are ignored. Defer to rsa_sign. | |
785 | */ | |
786 | if (sig != NULL) { | |
787 | /* | |
788 | * TODO(3.0): There is the possibility that some externally provided | |
789 | * digests exceed EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE. We should probably handle that somehow - | |
790 | * but that problem is much larger than just in RSA. | |
791 | */ | |
792 | if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(prsactx->mdctx, digest, &dlen)) | |
793 | return 0; | |
794 | } | |
795 | ||
796 | return rsa_sign(vprsactx, sig, siglen, sigsize, digest, (size_t)dlen); | |
797 | } | |
798 | ||
0ec36bf1 | 799 | static int rsa_digest_verify_init(void *vprsactx, const char *mdname, |
2d553660 | 800 | void *vrsa) |
0ec36bf1 | 801 | { |
2d553660 | 802 | return rsa_digest_signverify_init(vprsactx, mdname, vrsa, |
0ec36bf1 RL |
803 | EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY); |
804 | } | |
6f4b7663 RL |
805 | |
806 | int rsa_digest_verify_final(void *vprsactx, const unsigned char *sig, | |
807 | size_t siglen) | |
808 | { | |
809 | PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx; | |
810 | unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; | |
811 | unsigned int dlen = 0; | |
812 | ||
813 | prsactx->flag_allow_md = 1; | |
814 | if (prsactx == NULL || prsactx->mdctx == NULL) | |
815 | return 0; | |
816 | ||
817 | /* | |
818 | * TODO(3.0): There is the possibility that some externally provided | |
819 | * digests exceed EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE. We should probably handle that somehow - | |
820 | * but that problem is much larger than just in RSA. | |
821 | */ | |
822 | if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(prsactx->mdctx, digest, &dlen)) | |
823 | return 0; | |
824 | ||
825 | return rsa_verify(vprsactx, sig, siglen, digest, (size_t)dlen); | |
826 | } | |
827 | ||
828 | static void rsa_freectx(void *vprsactx) | |
829 | { | |
830 | PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx; | |
831 | ||
832 | if (prsactx == NULL) | |
833 | return; | |
834 | ||
835 | RSA_free(prsactx->rsa); | |
836 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(prsactx->mdctx); | |
837 | EVP_MD_free(prsactx->md); | |
838 | EVP_MD_free(prsactx->mgf1_md); | |
2c6094ba | 839 | OPENSSL_free(prsactx->propq); |
6f4b7663 RL |
840 | free_tbuf(prsactx); |
841 | ||
842 | OPENSSL_clear_free(prsactx, sizeof(prsactx)); | |
843 | } | |
844 | ||
845 | static void *rsa_dupctx(void *vprsactx) | |
846 | { | |
847 | PROV_RSA_CTX *srcctx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx; | |
848 | PROV_RSA_CTX *dstctx; | |
849 | ||
850 | dstctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*srcctx)); | |
2d553660 RL |
851 | if (dstctx == NULL) { |
852 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
6f4b7663 | 853 | return NULL; |
2d553660 | 854 | } |
6f4b7663 RL |
855 | |
856 | *dstctx = *srcctx; | |
857 | dstctx->rsa = NULL; | |
858 | dstctx->md = NULL; | |
859 | dstctx->mdctx = NULL; | |
860 | dstctx->tbuf = NULL; | |
861 | ||
862 | if (srcctx->rsa != NULL && !RSA_up_ref(srcctx->rsa)) | |
863 | goto err; | |
864 | dstctx->rsa = srcctx->rsa; | |
865 | ||
866 | if (srcctx->md != NULL && !EVP_MD_up_ref(srcctx->md)) | |
867 | goto err; | |
868 | dstctx->md = srcctx->md; | |
869 | ||
870 | if (srcctx->mgf1_md != NULL && !EVP_MD_up_ref(srcctx->mgf1_md)) | |
871 | goto err; | |
872 | dstctx->mgf1_md = srcctx->mgf1_md; | |
873 | ||
874 | if (srcctx->mdctx != NULL) { | |
875 | dstctx->mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); | |
876 | if (dstctx->mdctx == NULL | |
877 | || !EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(dstctx->mdctx, srcctx->mdctx)) | |
878 | goto err; | |
879 | } | |
880 | ||
881 | return dstctx; | |
882 | err: | |
883 | rsa_freectx(dstctx); | |
884 | return NULL; | |
885 | } | |
886 | ||
887 | static int rsa_get_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, OSSL_PARAM *params) | |
888 | { | |
889 | PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx; | |
890 | OSSL_PARAM *p; | |
891 | ||
892 | if (prsactx == NULL || params == NULL) | |
893 | return 0; | |
894 | ||
895 | p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_ALGORITHM_ID); | |
896 | if (p != NULL | |
897 | && !OSSL_PARAM_set_octet_string(p, prsactx->aid, prsactx->aid_len)) | |
898 | return 0; | |
899 | ||
900 | p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PAD_MODE); | |
901 | if (p != NULL) | |
902 | switch (p->data_type) { | |
903 | case OSSL_PARAM_INTEGER: | |
904 | if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, prsactx->pad_mode)) | |
905 | return 0; | |
906 | break; | |
907 | case OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING: | |
908 | { | |
909 | int i; | |
910 | const char *word = NULL; | |
911 | ||
912 | for (i = 0; padding_item[i].id != 0; i++) { | |
913 | if (prsactx->pad_mode == (int)padding_item[i].id) { | |
914 | word = padding_item[i].ptr; | |
915 | break; | |
916 | } | |
917 | } | |
918 | ||
919 | if (word != NULL) { | |
920 | if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, word)) | |
921 | return 0; | |
922 | } else { | |
923 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
924 | } | |
925 | } | |
926 | break; | |
927 | default: | |
928 | return 0; | |
929 | } | |
930 | ||
931 | p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST); | |
932 | if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, prsactx->mdname)) | |
933 | return 0; | |
934 | ||
935 | p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST); | |
936 | if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, prsactx->mgf1_mdname)) | |
937 | return 0; | |
938 | ||
939 | p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN); | |
940 | if (p != NULL) { | |
941 | if (p->data_type == OSSL_PARAM_INTEGER) { | |
942 | if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, prsactx->saltlen)) | |
943 | return 0; | |
944 | } else if (p->data_type == OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) { | |
b8086652 SL |
945 | const char *value = NULL; |
946 | ||
6f4b7663 RL |
947 | switch (prsactx->saltlen) { |
948 | case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST: | |
b8086652 | 949 | value = OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SALT_LEN_DIGEST; |
6f4b7663 RL |
950 | break; |
951 | case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX: | |
b8086652 | 952 | value = OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SALT_LEN_MAX; |
6f4b7663 RL |
953 | break; |
954 | case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO: | |
b8086652 | 955 | value = OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SALT_LEN_AUTO; |
6f4b7663 RL |
956 | break; |
957 | default: | |
b8086652 SL |
958 | { |
959 | int len = BIO_snprintf(p->data, p->data_size, "%d", | |
960 | prsactx->saltlen); | |
961 | ||
962 | if (len <= 0) | |
963 | return 0; | |
964 | p->return_size = len; | |
965 | break; | |
966 | } | |
6f4b7663 | 967 | } |
b8086652 SL |
968 | if (value != NULL |
969 | && !OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, value)) | |
970 | return 0; | |
6f4b7663 RL |
971 | } |
972 | } | |
973 | ||
974 | return 1; | |
975 | } | |
976 | ||
977 | static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = { | |
978 | OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_ALGORITHM_ID, NULL, 0), | |
979 | OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PAD_MODE, NULL, 0), | |
980 | OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST, NULL, 0), | |
981 | OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST, NULL, 0), | |
982 | OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN, NULL, 0), | |
983 | OSSL_PARAM_END | |
984 | }; | |
985 | ||
986 | static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_gettable_ctx_params(void) | |
987 | { | |
988 | return known_gettable_ctx_params; | |
989 | } | |
990 | ||
991 | static int rsa_set_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, const OSSL_PARAM params[]) | |
992 | { | |
993 | PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx; | |
994 | const OSSL_PARAM *p; | |
995 | ||
996 | if (prsactx == NULL || params == NULL) | |
997 | return 0; | |
998 | ||
999 | p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST); | |
1000 | /* Not allowed during certain operations */ | |
1001 | if (p != NULL && !prsactx->flag_allow_md) | |
1002 | return 0; | |
1003 | if (p != NULL) { | |
1004 | char mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE] = "", *pmdname = mdname; | |
1005 | char mdprops[OSSL_MAX_PROPQUERY_SIZE] = "", *pmdprops = mdprops; | |
1006 | const OSSL_PARAM *propsp = | |
1007 | OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, | |
1008 | OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PROPERTIES); | |
1009 | ||
1010 | if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(p, &pmdname, sizeof(mdname))) | |
1011 | return 0; | |
2c6094ba RL |
1012 | |
1013 | if (propsp == NULL) | |
1014 | pmdprops = NULL; | |
1015 | else if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(propsp, | |
1016 | &pmdprops, sizeof(mdprops))) | |
6f4b7663 RL |
1017 | return 0; |
1018 | ||
6f4b7663 RL |
1019 | if (rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx)) { |
1020 | /* TODO(3.0) figure out what to do for prsactx->md == NULL */ | |
1021 | if (prsactx->md == NULL || EVP_MD_is_a(prsactx->md, mdname)) | |
1022 | return 1; | |
1023 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED); | |
1024 | return 0; | |
1025 | } | |
1026 | ||
1027 | /* non-PSS code follows */ | |
2c6094ba | 1028 | if (!rsa_setup_md(prsactx, mdname, pmdprops)) |
6f4b7663 RL |
1029 | return 0; |
1030 | } | |
1031 | ||
1032 | p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PAD_MODE); | |
1033 | if (p != NULL) { | |
1034 | int pad_mode = 0; | |
0ec36bf1 | 1035 | const char *err_extra_text = NULL; |
6f4b7663 RL |
1036 | |
1037 | switch (p->data_type) { | |
1038 | case OSSL_PARAM_INTEGER: /* Support for legacy pad mode number */ | |
1039 | if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &pad_mode)) | |
1040 | return 0; | |
1041 | break; | |
1042 | case OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING: | |
1043 | { | |
1044 | int i; | |
1045 | ||
1046 | if (p->data == NULL) | |
1047 | return 0; | |
1048 | ||
1049 | for (i = 0; padding_item[i].id != 0; i++) { | |
1050 | if (strcmp(p->data, padding_item[i].ptr) == 0) { | |
1051 | pad_mode = padding_item[i].id; | |
1052 | break; | |
1053 | } | |
1054 | } | |
1055 | } | |
1056 | break; | |
1057 | default: | |
1058 | return 0; | |
1059 | } | |
1060 | ||
1061 | switch (pad_mode) { | |
1062 | case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING: | |
1063 | /* | |
1064 | * OAEP padding is for asymmetric cipher only so is not compatible | |
1065 | * with signature use. | |
1066 | */ | |
0ec36bf1 RL |
1067 | err_extra_text = "OAEP padding not allowed for signing / verifying"; |
1068 | goto bad_pad; | |
6f4b7663 | 1069 | case RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING: |
0ec36bf1 RL |
1070 | if ((prsactx->operation |
1071 | & (EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN | EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY)) == 0) { | |
1072 | err_extra_text = | |
1073 | "PSS padding only allowed for sign and verify operations"; | |
1074 | goto bad_pad; | |
1075 | } | |
1076 | if (prsactx->md == NULL | |
1077 | && !rsa_setup_md(prsactx, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA1, NULL)) { | |
0ec36bf1 RL |
1078 | return 0; |
1079 | } | |
1080 | break; | |
6f4b7663 | 1081 | case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: |
0ec36bf1 RL |
1082 | err_extra_text = "PKCS#1 padding not allowed with RSA-PSS"; |
1083 | goto cont; | |
6f4b7663 | 1084 | case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING: |
0ec36bf1 RL |
1085 | err_extra_text = "SSLv3 padding not allowed with RSA-PSS"; |
1086 | goto cont; | |
6f4b7663 | 1087 | case RSA_NO_PADDING: |
0ec36bf1 RL |
1088 | err_extra_text = "No padding not allowed with RSA-PSS"; |
1089 | goto cont; | |
6f4b7663 | 1090 | case RSA_X931_PADDING: |
0ec36bf1 | 1091 | err_extra_text = "X.931 padding not allowed with RSA-PSS"; |
6f4b7663 | 1092 | cont: |
2d553660 RL |
1093 | if (RSA_test_flags(prsactx->rsa, |
1094 | RSA_FLAG_TYPE_MASK) == RSA_FLAG_TYPE_RSA) | |
0ec36bf1 RL |
1095 | break; |
1096 | /* FALLTHRU */ | |
6f4b7663 | 1097 | default: |
0ec36bf1 RL |
1098 | bad_pad: |
1099 | if (err_extra_text == NULL) | |
1100 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, | |
1101 | PROV_R_ILLEGAL_OR_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE); | |
1102 | else | |
1103 | ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, | |
1104 | PROV_R_ILLEGAL_OR_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE, | |
1105 | err_extra_text); | |
6f4b7663 RL |
1106 | return 0; |
1107 | } | |
0ec36bf1 RL |
1108 | if (!rsa_check_padding(prsactx->mdnid, pad_mode)) |
1109 | return 0; | |
6f4b7663 RL |
1110 | prsactx->pad_mode = pad_mode; |
1111 | } | |
1112 | ||
1113 | p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN); | |
1114 | if (p != NULL) { | |
1115 | int saltlen; | |
1116 | ||
1117 | if (prsactx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) { | |
1118 | ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_NOT_SUPPORTED, | |
1119 | "PSS saltlen can only be specified if " | |
1120 | "PSS padding has been specified first"); | |
1121 | return 0; | |
1122 | } | |
1123 | ||
1124 | switch (p->data_type) { | |
1125 | case OSSL_PARAM_INTEGER: /* Support for legacy pad mode number */ | |
1126 | if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &saltlen)) | |
1127 | return 0; | |
1128 | break; | |
1129 | case OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING: | |
b8086652 | 1130 | if (strcmp(p->data, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SALT_LEN_DIGEST) == 0) |
6f4b7663 | 1131 | saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST; |
b8086652 | 1132 | else if (strcmp(p->data, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SALT_LEN_MAX) == 0) |
6f4b7663 | 1133 | saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX; |
b8086652 | 1134 | else if (strcmp(p->data, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SALT_LEN_AUTO) == 0) |
6f4b7663 RL |
1135 | saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO; |
1136 | else | |
1137 | saltlen = atoi(p->data); | |
1138 | break; | |
1139 | default: | |
1140 | return 0; | |
1141 | } | |
1142 | ||
1143 | /* | |
1144 | * RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX seems curiously named in this check. | |
1145 | * Contrary to what it's name suggests, it's the currently | |
1146 | * lowest saltlen number possible. | |
1147 | */ | |
1148 | if (saltlen < RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX) { | |
1149 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN); | |
1150 | return 0; | |
1151 | } | |
1152 | ||
0ec36bf1 RL |
1153 | if (rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx)) { |
1154 | switch (prsactx->saltlen) { | |
1155 | case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO: | |
1156 | if (prsactx->operation == EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY) { | |
1157 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN); | |
1158 | return 0; | |
1159 | } | |
1160 | break; | |
1161 | case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST: | |
1162 | if (prsactx->min_saltlen > EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md)) { | |
1163 | ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, | |
1164 | PROV_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL, | |
1165 | "Should be more than %d, but would be " | |
1166 | "set to match digest size (%d)", | |
1167 | prsactx->min_saltlen, | |
1168 | EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md)); | |
1169 | return 0; | |
1170 | } | |
1171 | /* FALLTHRU */ | |
1172 | default: | |
1173 | if (saltlen >= 0 && saltlen < prsactx->min_saltlen) { | |
1174 | ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, | |
1175 | PROV_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL, | |
1176 | "Should be more than %d, " | |
1177 | "but would be set to %d", | |
1178 | prsactx->min_saltlen, saltlen); | |
1179 | return 0; | |
1180 | } | |
1181 | } | |
1182 | } | |
1183 | ||
6f4b7663 RL |
1184 | prsactx->saltlen = saltlen; |
1185 | } | |
1186 | ||
1187 | p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST); | |
1188 | if (p != NULL) { | |
1189 | char mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE] = "", *pmdname = mdname; | |
1190 | char mdprops[OSSL_MAX_PROPQUERY_SIZE] = "", *pmdprops = mdprops; | |
1191 | const OSSL_PARAM *propsp = | |
1192 | OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, | |
1193 | OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_PROPERTIES); | |
1194 | ||
1195 | if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(p, &pmdname, sizeof(mdname))) | |
1196 | return 0; | |
2c6094ba RL |
1197 | |
1198 | if (propsp == NULL) | |
1199 | pmdprops = NULL; | |
1200 | else if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(propsp, | |
1201 | &pmdprops, sizeof(mdprops))) | |
6f4b7663 RL |
1202 | return 0; |
1203 | ||
1204 | if (prsactx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) { | |
1205 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_MGF1_MD); | |
1206 | return 0; | |
1207 | } | |
1208 | ||
6f4b7663 | 1209 | if (rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx)) { |
0ec36bf1 | 1210 | /* TODO(3.0) figure out what to do for prsactx->mgf1_md == NULL */ |
6f4b7663 RL |
1211 | if (prsactx->mgf1_md == NULL |
1212 | || EVP_MD_is_a(prsactx->mgf1_md, mdname)) | |
1213 | return 1; | |
1214 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED); | |
1215 | return 0; | |
1216 | } | |
1217 | ||
1218 | /* non-PSS code follows */ | |
2c6094ba | 1219 | if (!rsa_setup_mgf1_md(prsactx, mdname, pmdprops)) |
6f4b7663 RL |
1220 | return 0; |
1221 | } | |
1222 | ||
1223 | return 1; | |
1224 | } | |
1225 | ||
1226 | static const OSSL_PARAM known_settable_ctx_params[] = { | |
1227 | OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PAD_MODE, NULL, 0), | |
1228 | OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST, NULL, 0), | |
1229 | OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PROPERTIES, NULL, 0), | |
1230 | OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST, NULL, 0), | |
1231 | OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_PROPERTIES, NULL, 0), | |
1232 | OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN, NULL, 0), | |
1233 | OSSL_PARAM_END | |
1234 | }; | |
1235 | ||
1236 | static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_settable_ctx_params(void) | |
1237 | { | |
1238 | /* | |
1239 | * TODO(3.0): Should this function return a different set of settable ctx | |
1240 | * params if the ctx is being used for a DigestSign/DigestVerify? In that | |
1241 | * case it is not allowed to set the digest size/digest name because the | |
1242 | * digest is explicitly set as part of the init. | |
1243 | */ | |
1244 | return known_settable_ctx_params; | |
1245 | } | |
1246 | ||
1247 | static int rsa_get_ctx_md_params(void *vprsactx, OSSL_PARAM *params) | |
1248 | { | |
1249 | PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx; | |
1250 | ||
1251 | if (prsactx->mdctx == NULL) | |
1252 | return 0; | |
1253 | ||
1254 | return EVP_MD_CTX_get_params(prsactx->mdctx, params); | |
1255 | } | |
1256 | ||
1257 | static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_gettable_ctx_md_params(void *vprsactx) | |
1258 | { | |
1259 | PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx; | |
1260 | ||
1261 | if (prsactx->md == NULL) | |
1262 | return 0; | |
1263 | ||
1264 | return EVP_MD_gettable_ctx_params(prsactx->md); | |
1265 | } | |
1266 | ||
1267 | static int rsa_set_ctx_md_params(void *vprsactx, const OSSL_PARAM params[]) | |
1268 | { | |
1269 | PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx; | |
1270 | ||
1271 | if (prsactx->mdctx == NULL) | |
1272 | return 0; | |
1273 | ||
1274 | return EVP_MD_CTX_set_params(prsactx->mdctx, params); | |
1275 | } | |
1276 | ||
1277 | static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_settable_ctx_md_params(void *vprsactx) | |
1278 | { | |
1279 | PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx; | |
1280 | ||
1281 | if (prsactx->md == NULL) | |
1282 | return 0; | |
1283 | ||
1284 | return EVP_MD_settable_ctx_params(prsactx->md); | |
1285 | } | |
1286 | ||
1287 | const OSSL_DISPATCH rsa_signature_functions[] = { | |
1288 | { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_NEWCTX, (void (*)(void))rsa_newctx }, | |
0ec36bf1 | 1289 | { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN_INIT, (void (*)(void))rsa_sign_init }, |
6f4b7663 | 1290 | { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN, (void (*)(void))rsa_sign }, |
0ec36bf1 | 1291 | { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_INIT, (void (*)(void))rsa_verify_init }, |
6f4b7663 | 1292 | { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY, (void (*)(void))rsa_verify }, |
0ec36bf1 RL |
1293 | { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_RECOVER_INIT, |
1294 | (void (*)(void))rsa_verify_recover_init }, | |
1295 | { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_RECOVER, | |
1296 | (void (*)(void))rsa_verify_recover }, | |
6f4b7663 | 1297 | { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_INIT, |
0ec36bf1 | 1298 | (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_sign_init }, |
6f4b7663 RL |
1299 | { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_UPDATE, |
1300 | (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_signverify_update }, | |
1301 | { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_FINAL, | |
1302 | (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_sign_final }, | |
1303 | { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_INIT, | |
0ec36bf1 | 1304 | (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_verify_init }, |
6f4b7663 RL |
1305 | { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_UPDATE, |
1306 | (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_signverify_update }, | |
1307 | { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_FINAL, | |
1308 | (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_verify_final }, | |
1309 | { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_FREECTX, (void (*)(void))rsa_freectx }, | |
1310 | { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DUPCTX, (void (*)(void))rsa_dupctx }, | |
1311 | { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GET_CTX_PARAMS, (void (*)(void))rsa_get_ctx_params }, | |
1312 | { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS, | |
1313 | (void (*)(void))rsa_gettable_ctx_params }, | |
1314 | { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SET_CTX_PARAMS, (void (*)(void))rsa_set_ctx_params }, | |
1315 | { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS, | |
1316 | (void (*)(void))rsa_settable_ctx_params }, | |
1317 | { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GET_CTX_MD_PARAMS, | |
1318 | (void (*)(void))rsa_get_ctx_md_params }, | |
1319 | { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GETTABLE_CTX_MD_PARAMS, | |
1320 | (void (*)(void))rsa_gettable_ctx_md_params }, | |
1321 | { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SET_CTX_MD_PARAMS, | |
1322 | (void (*)(void))rsa_set_ctx_md_params }, | |
1323 | { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SETTABLE_CTX_MD_PARAMS, | |
1324 | (void (*)(void))rsa_settable_ctx_md_params }, | |
1325 | { 0, NULL } | |
1326 | }; |