]>
Commit | Line | Data |
---|---|---|
6f4b7663 | 1 | /* |
33388b44 | 2 | * Copyright 2019-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. |
6f4b7663 RL |
3 | * |
4 | * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use | |
5 | * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy | |
6 | * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at | |
7 | * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html | |
8 | */ | |
9 | ||
10 | /* | |
11 | * RSA low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for | |
12 | * internal use. | |
13 | */ | |
14 | #include "internal/deprecated.h" | |
15 | ||
16 | #include <string.h> | |
17 | #include <openssl/crypto.h> | |
18 | #include <openssl/core_numbers.h> | |
19 | #include <openssl/core_names.h> | |
20 | #include <openssl/err.h> | |
21 | #include <openssl/rsa.h> | |
22 | #include <openssl/params.h> | |
23 | #include <openssl/evp.h> | |
24 | #include "internal/cryptlib.h" | |
25 | #include "internal/nelem.h" | |
26 | #include "internal/sizes.h" | |
27 | #include "crypto/rsa.h" | |
28 | #include "prov/providercommonerr.h" | |
29 | #include "prov/implementations.h" | |
30 | #include "prov/provider_ctx.h" | |
6f5837dc | 31 | #include "prov/der_rsa.h" |
6f4b7663 RL |
32 | |
33 | static OSSL_OP_signature_newctx_fn rsa_newctx; | |
34 | static OSSL_OP_signature_sign_init_fn rsa_signature_init; | |
35 | static OSSL_OP_signature_verify_init_fn rsa_signature_init; | |
36 | static OSSL_OP_signature_verify_recover_init_fn rsa_signature_init; | |
37 | static OSSL_OP_signature_sign_fn rsa_sign; | |
38 | static OSSL_OP_signature_verify_fn rsa_verify; | |
39 | static OSSL_OP_signature_verify_recover_fn rsa_verify_recover; | |
40 | static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_sign_init_fn rsa_digest_signverify_init; | |
41 | static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_sign_update_fn rsa_digest_signverify_update; | |
42 | static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_sign_final_fn rsa_digest_sign_final; | |
43 | static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_verify_init_fn rsa_digest_signverify_init; | |
44 | static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_verify_update_fn rsa_digest_signverify_update; | |
45 | static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_verify_final_fn rsa_digest_verify_final; | |
46 | static OSSL_OP_signature_freectx_fn rsa_freectx; | |
47 | static OSSL_OP_signature_dupctx_fn rsa_dupctx; | |
48 | static OSSL_OP_signature_get_ctx_params_fn rsa_get_ctx_params; | |
49 | static OSSL_OP_signature_gettable_ctx_params_fn rsa_gettable_ctx_params; | |
50 | static OSSL_OP_signature_set_ctx_params_fn rsa_set_ctx_params; | |
51 | static OSSL_OP_signature_settable_ctx_params_fn rsa_settable_ctx_params; | |
52 | static OSSL_OP_signature_get_ctx_md_params_fn rsa_get_ctx_md_params; | |
53 | static OSSL_OP_signature_gettable_ctx_md_params_fn rsa_gettable_ctx_md_params; | |
54 | static OSSL_OP_signature_set_ctx_md_params_fn rsa_set_ctx_md_params; | |
55 | static OSSL_OP_signature_settable_ctx_md_params_fn rsa_settable_ctx_md_params; | |
56 | ||
57 | static OSSL_ITEM padding_item[] = { | |
58 | { RSA_PKCS1_PADDING, "pkcs1" }, | |
59 | { RSA_SSLV23_PADDING, "sslv23" }, | |
60 | { RSA_NO_PADDING, "none" }, | |
61 | { RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING, "oaep" }, /* Correct spelling first */ | |
62 | { RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING, "oeap" }, | |
63 | { RSA_X931_PADDING, "x931" }, | |
64 | { RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING, "pss" }, | |
65 | { 0, NULL } | |
66 | }; | |
67 | ||
68 | /* | |
69 | * What's passed as an actual key is defined by the KEYMGMT interface. | |
70 | * We happen to know that our KEYMGMT simply passes RSA structures, so | |
71 | * we use that here too. | |
72 | */ | |
73 | ||
74 | typedef struct { | |
75 | OPENSSL_CTX *libctx; | |
76 | RSA *rsa; | |
77 | ||
78 | /* | |
79 | * Flag to determine if the hash function can be changed (1) or not (0) | |
80 | * Because it's dangerous to change during a DigestSign or DigestVerify | |
81 | * operation, this flag is cleared by their Init function, and set again | |
82 | * by their Final function. | |
83 | */ | |
84 | unsigned int flag_allow_md : 1; | |
85 | ||
86 | /* The Algorithm Identifier of the combined signature agorithm */ | |
6f5837dc RL |
87 | unsigned char aid_buf[128]; |
88 | unsigned char *aid; | |
6f4b7663 RL |
89 | size_t aid_len; |
90 | ||
91 | /* main digest */ | |
92 | EVP_MD *md; | |
93 | EVP_MD_CTX *mdctx; | |
94 | int mdnid; | |
95 | char mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE]; /* Purely informational */ | |
96 | ||
97 | /* RSA padding mode */ | |
98 | int pad_mode; | |
99 | /* message digest for MGF1 */ | |
100 | EVP_MD *mgf1_md; | |
101 | char mgf1_mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE]; /* Purely informational */ | |
102 | /* PSS salt length */ | |
103 | int saltlen; | |
104 | /* Minimum salt length or -1 if no PSS parameter restriction */ | |
105 | int min_saltlen; | |
106 | ||
107 | /* Temp buffer */ | |
108 | unsigned char *tbuf; | |
109 | ||
110 | } PROV_RSA_CTX; | |
111 | ||
112 | static size_t rsa_get_md_size(const PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx) | |
113 | { | |
114 | if (prsactx->md != NULL) | |
115 | return EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md); | |
116 | return 0; | |
117 | } | |
118 | ||
119 | static int rsa_get_md_nid(const EVP_MD *md) | |
120 | { | |
121 | /* | |
122 | * Because the RSA library deals with NIDs, we need to translate. | |
123 | * We do so using EVP_MD_is_a(), and therefore need a name to NID | |
124 | * map. | |
125 | */ | |
126 | static const OSSL_ITEM name_to_nid[] = { | |
127 | { NID_sha1, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA1 }, | |
128 | { NID_sha224, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_224 }, | |
129 | { NID_sha256, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_256 }, | |
130 | { NID_sha384, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_384 }, | |
131 | { NID_sha512, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_512 }, | |
132 | { NID_md5, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MD5 }, | |
133 | { NID_md5_sha1, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MD5_SHA1 }, | |
134 | { NID_md2, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MD2 }, | |
135 | { NID_md4, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MD4 }, | |
136 | { NID_mdc2, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MDC2 }, | |
137 | { NID_ripemd160, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_RIPEMD160 }, | |
138 | { NID_sha3_224, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA3_224 }, | |
139 | { NID_sha3_256, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA3_256 }, | |
140 | { NID_sha3_384, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA3_384 }, | |
141 | { NID_sha3_512, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA3_512 }, | |
142 | }; | |
143 | size_t i; | |
144 | int mdnid = NID_undef; | |
145 | ||
146 | if (md == NULL) | |
147 | goto end; | |
148 | ||
149 | for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(name_to_nid); i++) { | |
150 | if (EVP_MD_is_a(md, name_to_nid[i].ptr)) { | |
151 | mdnid = (int)name_to_nid[i].id; | |
152 | break; | |
153 | } | |
154 | } | |
155 | ||
156 | if (mdnid == NID_undef) | |
157 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST); | |
158 | ||
159 | end: | |
160 | return mdnid; | |
161 | } | |
162 | ||
163 | static int rsa_check_padding(int mdnid, int padding) | |
164 | { | |
165 | if (padding == RSA_NO_PADDING) { | |
166 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE); | |
167 | return 0; | |
168 | } | |
169 | ||
170 | if (padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) { | |
171 | if (RSA_X931_hash_id(mdnid) == -1) { | |
172 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_X931_DIGEST); | |
173 | return 0; | |
174 | } | |
175 | } | |
176 | ||
177 | return 1; | |
178 | } | |
179 | ||
180 | static void *rsa_newctx(void *provctx) | |
181 | { | |
182 | PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(PROV_RSA_CTX)); | |
183 | ||
184 | if (prsactx == NULL) | |
185 | return NULL; | |
186 | ||
187 | prsactx->libctx = PROV_LIBRARY_CONTEXT_OF(provctx); | |
188 | prsactx->flag_allow_md = 1; | |
189 | return prsactx; | |
190 | } | |
191 | ||
192 | /* True if PSS parameters are restricted */ | |
193 | #define rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx) (prsactx->min_saltlen != -1) | |
194 | ||
195 | static int rsa_signature_init(void *vprsactx, void *vrsa) | |
196 | { | |
197 | PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx; | |
198 | ||
199 | if (prsactx == NULL || vrsa == NULL || !RSA_up_ref(vrsa)) | |
200 | return 0; | |
201 | ||
202 | RSA_free(prsactx->rsa); | |
203 | prsactx->rsa = vrsa; | |
204 | if (RSA_get0_pss_params(prsactx->rsa) != NULL) | |
205 | prsactx->pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING; | |
206 | else | |
207 | prsactx->pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING; | |
208 | /* Maximum for sign, auto for verify */ | |
209 | prsactx->saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO; | |
210 | prsactx->min_saltlen = -1; | |
211 | ||
212 | return 1; | |
213 | } | |
214 | ||
215 | static int rsa_setup_md(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx, const char *mdname, | |
216 | const char *mdprops) | |
217 | { | |
218 | if (mdname != NULL) { | |
219 | EVP_MD *md = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx->libctx, mdname, mdprops); | |
220 | int md_nid = rsa_get_md_nid(md); | |
6f5837dc | 221 | WPACKET pkt; |
6f4b7663 | 222 | |
6f5837dc RL |
223 | if (md == NULL |
224 | || md_nid == NID_undef | |
225 | || !rsa_check_padding(md_nid, ctx->pad_mode)) { | |
6f4b7663 RL |
226 | EVP_MD_free(md); |
227 | return 0; | |
228 | } | |
229 | ||
230 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx->mdctx); | |
231 | EVP_MD_free(ctx->md); | |
6f4b7663 | 232 | |
6f5837dc RL |
233 | /* |
234 | * TODO(3.0) Should we care about DER writing errors? | |
235 | * All it really means is that for some reason, there's no | |
236 | * AlgorithmIdentifier to be had (consider RSA with MD5-SHA1), | |
237 | * but the operation itself is still valid, just as long as it's | |
238 | * not used to construct anything that needs an AlgorithmIdentifier. | |
239 | */ | |
240 | ctx->aid_len = 0; | |
241 | if (WPACKET_init_der(&pkt, ctx->aid_buf, sizeof(ctx->aid_buf)) | |
242 | && DER_w_algorithmIdentifier_RSA_with(&pkt, -1, ctx->rsa, md_nid) | |
243 | && WPACKET_finish(&pkt)) { | |
244 | WPACKET_get_total_written(&pkt, &ctx->aid_len); | |
245 | ctx->aid = WPACKET_get_curr(&pkt); | |
246 | } | |
247 | WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt); | |
6f4b7663 | 248 | |
6f5837dc | 249 | ctx->mdctx = NULL; |
6f4b7663 RL |
250 | ctx->md = md; |
251 | ctx->mdnid = md_nid; | |
252 | OPENSSL_strlcpy(ctx->mdname, mdname, sizeof(ctx->mdname)); | |
6f4b7663 RL |
253 | } |
254 | ||
255 | return 1; | |
256 | } | |
257 | ||
258 | static int rsa_setup_mgf1_md(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx, const char *mdname, | |
259 | const char *props) | |
260 | { | |
261 | if (ctx->mgf1_mdname[0] != '\0') | |
262 | EVP_MD_free(ctx->mgf1_md); | |
263 | ||
264 | if ((ctx->mgf1_md = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx->libctx, mdname, props)) == NULL) | |
265 | return 0; | |
266 | OPENSSL_strlcpy(ctx->mgf1_mdname, mdname, sizeof(ctx->mgf1_mdname)); | |
267 | ||
268 | return 1; | |
269 | } | |
270 | ||
271 | static int setup_tbuf(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx) | |
272 | { | |
273 | if (ctx->tbuf != NULL) | |
274 | return 1; | |
275 | if ((ctx->tbuf = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(ctx->rsa))) == NULL) { | |
276 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
277 | return 0; | |
278 | } | |
279 | return 1; | |
280 | } | |
281 | ||
282 | static void clean_tbuf(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx) | |
283 | { | |
284 | if (ctx->tbuf != NULL) | |
285 | OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx->tbuf, RSA_size(ctx->rsa)); | |
286 | } | |
287 | ||
288 | static void free_tbuf(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx) | |
289 | { | |
290 | OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->tbuf, RSA_size(ctx->rsa)); | |
291 | ctx->tbuf = NULL; | |
292 | } | |
293 | ||
294 | static int rsa_sign(void *vprsactx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen, | |
295 | size_t sigsize, const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen) | |
296 | { | |
297 | PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx; | |
298 | int ret; | |
299 | size_t rsasize = RSA_size(prsactx->rsa); | |
300 | size_t mdsize = rsa_get_md_size(prsactx); | |
301 | ||
302 | if (sig == NULL) { | |
303 | *siglen = rsasize; | |
304 | return 1; | |
305 | } | |
306 | ||
307 | if (sigsize < (size_t)rsasize) | |
308 | return 0; | |
309 | ||
310 | if (mdsize != 0) { | |
311 | if (tbslen != mdsize) { | |
312 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH); | |
313 | return 0; | |
314 | } | |
315 | ||
f844f9eb | 316 | #ifndef FIPS_MODULE |
6f4b7663 RL |
317 | if (EVP_MD_is_a(prsactx->md, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MDC2)) { |
318 | unsigned int sltmp; | |
319 | ||
320 | if (prsactx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) { | |
321 | ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE, | |
322 | "only PKCS#1 padding supported with MDC2"); | |
323 | return 0; | |
324 | } | |
325 | ret = RSA_sign_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(0, tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp, | |
326 | prsactx->rsa); | |
327 | ||
328 | if (ret <= 0) { | |
329 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA); | |
330 | return 0; | |
331 | } | |
332 | ret = sltmp; | |
333 | goto end; | |
334 | } | |
1b6ea308 | 335 | #endif |
6f4b7663 RL |
336 | switch (prsactx->pad_mode) { |
337 | case RSA_X931_PADDING: | |
338 | if ((size_t)RSA_size(prsactx->rsa) < tbslen + 1) { | |
339 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL); | |
340 | return 0; | |
341 | } | |
342 | if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx)) { | |
343 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
344 | return 0; | |
345 | } | |
346 | memcpy(prsactx->tbuf, tbs, tbslen); | |
347 | prsactx->tbuf[tbslen] = RSA_X931_hash_id(prsactx->mdnid); | |
348 | ret = RSA_private_encrypt(tbslen + 1, prsactx->tbuf, | |
349 | sig, prsactx->rsa, RSA_X931_PADDING); | |
350 | clean_tbuf(prsactx); | |
351 | break; | |
352 | ||
353 | case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: | |
354 | { | |
355 | unsigned int sltmp; | |
356 | ||
357 | ret = RSA_sign(prsactx->mdnid, tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp, | |
358 | prsactx->rsa); | |
359 | if (ret <= 0) { | |
360 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA); | |
361 | return 0; | |
362 | } | |
363 | ret = sltmp; | |
364 | } | |
365 | break; | |
366 | ||
367 | case RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING: | |
368 | /* Check PSS restrictions */ | |
369 | if (rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx)) { | |
370 | switch (prsactx->saltlen) { | |
371 | case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST: | |
372 | if (prsactx->min_saltlen > EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md)) { | |
373 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL); | |
374 | return 0; | |
375 | } | |
376 | /* FALLTHRU */ | |
377 | default: | |
378 | if (prsactx->saltlen >= 0 | |
379 | && prsactx->saltlen < prsactx->min_saltlen) { | |
380 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL); | |
381 | return 0; | |
382 | } | |
383 | break; | |
384 | } | |
385 | } | |
386 | if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx)) | |
387 | return 0; | |
388 | if (!RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(prsactx->rsa, | |
389 | prsactx->tbuf, tbs, | |
390 | prsactx->md, prsactx->mgf1_md, | |
391 | prsactx->saltlen)) { | |
392 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA); | |
393 | return 0; | |
394 | } | |
395 | ret = RSA_private_encrypt(RSA_size(prsactx->rsa), prsactx->tbuf, | |
396 | sig, prsactx->rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING); | |
397 | clean_tbuf(prsactx); | |
398 | break; | |
399 | ||
400 | default: | |
401 | ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE, | |
402 | "Only X.931, PKCS#1 v1.5 or PSS padding allowed"); | |
403 | return 0; | |
404 | } | |
405 | } else { | |
406 | ret = RSA_private_encrypt(tbslen, tbs, sig, prsactx->rsa, | |
407 | prsactx->pad_mode); | |
408 | } | |
409 | ||
f844f9eb | 410 | #ifndef FIPS_MODULE |
6f4b7663 RL |
411 | end: |
412 | #endif | |
413 | if (ret <= 0) { | |
414 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA); | |
415 | return 0; | |
416 | } | |
417 | ||
418 | *siglen = ret; | |
419 | return 1; | |
420 | } | |
421 | ||
422 | static int rsa_verify_recover(void *vprsactx, | |
423 | unsigned char *rout, | |
424 | size_t *routlen, | |
425 | size_t routsize, | |
426 | const unsigned char *sig, | |
427 | size_t siglen) | |
428 | { | |
429 | PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx; | |
430 | int ret; | |
431 | ||
432 | if (rout == NULL) { | |
433 | *routlen = RSA_size(prsactx->rsa); | |
434 | return 1; | |
435 | } | |
436 | ||
437 | if (prsactx->md != NULL) { | |
438 | switch (prsactx->pad_mode) { | |
439 | case RSA_X931_PADDING: | |
440 | if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx)) | |
441 | return 0; | |
442 | ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, prsactx->tbuf, prsactx->rsa, | |
443 | RSA_X931_PADDING); | |
444 | if (ret < 1) { | |
445 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA); | |
446 | return 0; | |
447 | } | |
448 | ret--; | |
449 | if (prsactx->tbuf[ret] != RSA_X931_hash_id(prsactx->mdnid)) { | |
450 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH); | |
451 | return 0; | |
452 | } | |
453 | if (ret != EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md)) { | |
454 | ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH, | |
455 | "Should be %d, but got %d", | |
456 | EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md), ret); | |
457 | return 0; | |
458 | } | |
459 | ||
460 | *routlen = ret; | |
461 | if (routsize < (size_t)ret) { | |
462 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL); | |
463 | return 0; | |
464 | } | |
465 | memcpy(rout, prsactx->tbuf, ret); | |
466 | break; | |
467 | ||
468 | case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: | |
469 | { | |
470 | size_t sltmp; | |
471 | ||
472 | ret = int_rsa_verify(prsactx->mdnid, NULL, 0, rout, &sltmp, | |
473 | sig, siglen, prsactx->rsa); | |
474 | if (ret <= 0) { | |
475 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA); | |
476 | return 0; | |
477 | } | |
478 | ret = sltmp; | |
479 | } | |
480 | break; | |
481 | ||
482 | default: | |
483 | ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE, | |
484 | "Only X.931 or PKCS#1 v1.5 padding allowed"); | |
485 | return 0; | |
486 | } | |
487 | } else { | |
488 | ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, rout, prsactx->rsa, | |
489 | prsactx->pad_mode); | |
490 | if (ret < 0) { | |
491 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA); | |
492 | return 0; | |
493 | } | |
494 | } | |
495 | *routlen = ret; | |
496 | return 1; | |
497 | } | |
498 | ||
499 | static int rsa_verify(void *vprsactx, const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen, | |
500 | const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen) | |
501 | { | |
502 | PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx; | |
503 | size_t rslen; | |
504 | ||
505 | if (prsactx->md != NULL) { | |
506 | switch (prsactx->pad_mode) { | |
507 | case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: | |
508 | if (!RSA_verify(prsactx->mdnid, tbs, tbslen, sig, siglen, | |
509 | prsactx->rsa)) { | |
510 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA); | |
511 | return 0; | |
512 | } | |
513 | return 1; | |
514 | case RSA_X931_PADDING: | |
515 | if (rsa_verify_recover(prsactx, NULL, &rslen, 0, sig, siglen) <= 0) | |
516 | return 0; | |
517 | break; | |
518 | case RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING: | |
519 | { | |
520 | int ret; | |
521 | size_t mdsize; | |
522 | ||
523 | /* Check PSS restrictions */ | |
524 | if (rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx)) { | |
525 | switch (prsactx->saltlen) { | |
526 | case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO: | |
527 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN); | |
528 | return 0; | |
529 | case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST: | |
530 | if (prsactx->min_saltlen > EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md)) { | |
531 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, | |
532 | PROV_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL); | |
533 | return 0; | |
534 | } | |
535 | /* FALLTHRU */ | |
536 | default: | |
537 | if (prsactx->saltlen >= 0 | |
538 | && prsactx->saltlen < prsactx->min_saltlen) { | |
539 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL); | |
540 | return 0; | |
541 | } | |
542 | break; | |
543 | } | |
544 | } | |
545 | ||
546 | /* | |
547 | * We need to check this for the RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1() | |
548 | * call | |
549 | */ | |
550 | mdsize = rsa_get_md_size(prsactx); | |
551 | if (tbslen != mdsize) { | |
552 | ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH, | |
553 | "Should be %d, but got %d", | |
554 | mdsize, tbslen); | |
555 | return 0; | |
556 | } | |
557 | ||
558 | if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx)) | |
559 | return 0; | |
560 | ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, prsactx->tbuf, | |
561 | prsactx->rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING); | |
562 | if (ret <= 0) { | |
563 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA); | |
564 | return 0; | |
565 | } | |
566 | ret = RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(prsactx->rsa, tbs, | |
567 | prsactx->md, prsactx->mgf1_md, | |
568 | prsactx->tbuf, | |
569 | prsactx->saltlen); | |
570 | if (ret <= 0) { | |
571 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA); | |
572 | return 0; | |
573 | } | |
574 | return 1; | |
575 | } | |
576 | default: | |
577 | ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE, | |
578 | "Only X.931, PKCS#1 v1.5 or PSS padding allowed"); | |
579 | return 0; | |
580 | } | |
581 | } else { | |
582 | if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx)) | |
583 | return 0; | |
584 | rslen = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, prsactx->tbuf, prsactx->rsa, | |
585 | prsactx->pad_mode); | |
586 | if (rslen == 0) { | |
587 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA); | |
588 | return 0; | |
589 | } | |
590 | } | |
591 | ||
592 | if ((rslen != tbslen) || memcmp(tbs, prsactx->tbuf, rslen)) | |
593 | return 0; | |
594 | ||
595 | return 1; | |
596 | } | |
597 | ||
598 | static int rsa_digest_signverify_init(void *vprsactx, const char *mdname, | |
599 | const char *props, void *vrsa) | |
600 | { | |
601 | PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx; | |
602 | ||
603 | prsactx->flag_allow_md = 0; | |
604 | if (!rsa_signature_init(vprsactx, vrsa) | |
605 | || !rsa_setup_md(prsactx, mdname, props)) | |
606 | return 0; | |
607 | ||
608 | prsactx->mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); | |
609 | if (prsactx->mdctx == NULL) | |
610 | goto error; | |
611 | ||
612 | if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(prsactx->mdctx, prsactx->md, NULL)) | |
613 | goto error; | |
614 | ||
615 | return 1; | |
616 | ||
617 | error: | |
618 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(prsactx->mdctx); | |
619 | EVP_MD_free(prsactx->md); | |
620 | prsactx->mdctx = NULL; | |
621 | prsactx->md = NULL; | |
622 | return 0; | |
623 | } | |
624 | ||
625 | int rsa_digest_signverify_update(void *vprsactx, const unsigned char *data, | |
626 | size_t datalen) | |
627 | { | |
628 | PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx; | |
629 | ||
630 | if (prsactx == NULL || prsactx->mdctx == NULL) | |
631 | return 0; | |
632 | ||
633 | return EVP_DigestUpdate(prsactx->mdctx, data, datalen); | |
634 | } | |
635 | ||
636 | int rsa_digest_sign_final(void *vprsactx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen, | |
637 | size_t sigsize) | |
638 | { | |
639 | PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx; | |
640 | unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; | |
641 | unsigned int dlen = 0; | |
642 | ||
643 | prsactx->flag_allow_md = 1; | |
644 | if (prsactx == NULL || prsactx->mdctx == NULL) | |
645 | return 0; | |
646 | ||
647 | /* | |
648 | * If sig is NULL then we're just finding out the sig size. Other fields | |
649 | * are ignored. Defer to rsa_sign. | |
650 | */ | |
651 | if (sig != NULL) { | |
652 | /* | |
653 | * TODO(3.0): There is the possibility that some externally provided | |
654 | * digests exceed EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE. We should probably handle that somehow - | |
655 | * but that problem is much larger than just in RSA. | |
656 | */ | |
657 | if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(prsactx->mdctx, digest, &dlen)) | |
658 | return 0; | |
659 | } | |
660 | ||
661 | return rsa_sign(vprsactx, sig, siglen, sigsize, digest, (size_t)dlen); | |
662 | } | |
663 | ||
664 | ||
665 | int rsa_digest_verify_final(void *vprsactx, const unsigned char *sig, | |
666 | size_t siglen) | |
667 | { | |
668 | PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx; | |
669 | unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; | |
670 | unsigned int dlen = 0; | |
671 | ||
672 | prsactx->flag_allow_md = 1; | |
673 | if (prsactx == NULL || prsactx->mdctx == NULL) | |
674 | return 0; | |
675 | ||
676 | /* | |
677 | * TODO(3.0): There is the possibility that some externally provided | |
678 | * digests exceed EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE. We should probably handle that somehow - | |
679 | * but that problem is much larger than just in RSA. | |
680 | */ | |
681 | if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(prsactx->mdctx, digest, &dlen)) | |
682 | return 0; | |
683 | ||
684 | return rsa_verify(vprsactx, sig, siglen, digest, (size_t)dlen); | |
685 | } | |
686 | ||
687 | static void rsa_freectx(void *vprsactx) | |
688 | { | |
689 | PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx; | |
690 | ||
691 | if (prsactx == NULL) | |
692 | return; | |
693 | ||
694 | RSA_free(prsactx->rsa); | |
695 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(prsactx->mdctx); | |
696 | EVP_MD_free(prsactx->md); | |
697 | EVP_MD_free(prsactx->mgf1_md); | |
698 | free_tbuf(prsactx); | |
699 | ||
700 | OPENSSL_clear_free(prsactx, sizeof(prsactx)); | |
701 | } | |
702 | ||
703 | static void *rsa_dupctx(void *vprsactx) | |
704 | { | |
705 | PROV_RSA_CTX *srcctx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx; | |
706 | PROV_RSA_CTX *dstctx; | |
707 | ||
708 | dstctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*srcctx)); | |
709 | if (dstctx == NULL) | |
710 | return NULL; | |
711 | ||
712 | *dstctx = *srcctx; | |
713 | dstctx->rsa = NULL; | |
714 | dstctx->md = NULL; | |
715 | dstctx->mdctx = NULL; | |
716 | dstctx->tbuf = NULL; | |
717 | ||
718 | if (srcctx->rsa != NULL && !RSA_up_ref(srcctx->rsa)) | |
719 | goto err; | |
720 | dstctx->rsa = srcctx->rsa; | |
721 | ||
722 | if (srcctx->md != NULL && !EVP_MD_up_ref(srcctx->md)) | |
723 | goto err; | |
724 | dstctx->md = srcctx->md; | |
725 | ||
726 | if (srcctx->mgf1_md != NULL && !EVP_MD_up_ref(srcctx->mgf1_md)) | |
727 | goto err; | |
728 | dstctx->mgf1_md = srcctx->mgf1_md; | |
729 | ||
730 | if (srcctx->mdctx != NULL) { | |
731 | dstctx->mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); | |
732 | if (dstctx->mdctx == NULL | |
733 | || !EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(dstctx->mdctx, srcctx->mdctx)) | |
734 | goto err; | |
735 | } | |
736 | ||
737 | return dstctx; | |
738 | err: | |
739 | rsa_freectx(dstctx); | |
740 | return NULL; | |
741 | } | |
742 | ||
743 | static int rsa_get_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, OSSL_PARAM *params) | |
744 | { | |
745 | PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx; | |
746 | OSSL_PARAM *p; | |
747 | ||
748 | if (prsactx == NULL || params == NULL) | |
749 | return 0; | |
750 | ||
751 | p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_ALGORITHM_ID); | |
752 | if (p != NULL | |
753 | && !OSSL_PARAM_set_octet_string(p, prsactx->aid, prsactx->aid_len)) | |
754 | return 0; | |
755 | ||
756 | p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PAD_MODE); | |
757 | if (p != NULL) | |
758 | switch (p->data_type) { | |
759 | case OSSL_PARAM_INTEGER: | |
760 | if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, prsactx->pad_mode)) | |
761 | return 0; | |
762 | break; | |
763 | case OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING: | |
764 | { | |
765 | int i; | |
766 | const char *word = NULL; | |
767 | ||
768 | for (i = 0; padding_item[i].id != 0; i++) { | |
769 | if (prsactx->pad_mode == (int)padding_item[i].id) { | |
770 | word = padding_item[i].ptr; | |
771 | break; | |
772 | } | |
773 | } | |
774 | ||
775 | if (word != NULL) { | |
776 | if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, word)) | |
777 | return 0; | |
778 | } else { | |
779 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
780 | } | |
781 | } | |
782 | break; | |
783 | default: | |
784 | return 0; | |
785 | } | |
786 | ||
787 | p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST); | |
788 | if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, prsactx->mdname)) | |
789 | return 0; | |
790 | ||
791 | p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST); | |
792 | if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, prsactx->mgf1_mdname)) | |
793 | return 0; | |
794 | ||
795 | p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN); | |
796 | if (p != NULL) { | |
797 | if (p->data_type == OSSL_PARAM_INTEGER) { | |
798 | if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, prsactx->saltlen)) | |
799 | return 0; | |
800 | } else if (p->data_type == OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) { | |
801 | switch (prsactx->saltlen) { | |
802 | case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST: | |
803 | if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, "digest")) | |
804 | return 0; | |
805 | break; | |
806 | case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX: | |
807 | if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, "max")) | |
808 | return 0; | |
809 | break; | |
810 | case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO: | |
811 | if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, "auto")) | |
812 | return 0; | |
813 | break; | |
814 | default: | |
815 | if (BIO_snprintf(p->data, p->data_size, "%d", prsactx->saltlen) | |
816 | <= 0) | |
817 | return 0; | |
818 | break; | |
819 | } | |
820 | } | |
821 | } | |
822 | ||
823 | return 1; | |
824 | } | |
825 | ||
826 | static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = { | |
827 | OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_ALGORITHM_ID, NULL, 0), | |
828 | OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PAD_MODE, NULL, 0), | |
829 | OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST, NULL, 0), | |
830 | OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST, NULL, 0), | |
831 | OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN, NULL, 0), | |
832 | OSSL_PARAM_END | |
833 | }; | |
834 | ||
835 | static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_gettable_ctx_params(void) | |
836 | { | |
837 | return known_gettable_ctx_params; | |
838 | } | |
839 | ||
840 | static int rsa_set_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, const OSSL_PARAM params[]) | |
841 | { | |
842 | PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx; | |
843 | const OSSL_PARAM *p; | |
844 | ||
845 | if (prsactx == NULL || params == NULL) | |
846 | return 0; | |
847 | ||
848 | p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST); | |
849 | /* Not allowed during certain operations */ | |
850 | if (p != NULL && !prsactx->flag_allow_md) | |
851 | return 0; | |
852 | if (p != NULL) { | |
853 | char mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE] = "", *pmdname = mdname; | |
854 | char mdprops[OSSL_MAX_PROPQUERY_SIZE] = "", *pmdprops = mdprops; | |
855 | const OSSL_PARAM *propsp = | |
856 | OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, | |
857 | OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PROPERTIES); | |
858 | ||
859 | if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(p, &pmdname, sizeof(mdname))) | |
860 | return 0; | |
861 | if (propsp != NULL | |
862 | && !OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(propsp, &pmdprops, sizeof(mdprops))) | |
863 | return 0; | |
864 | ||
865 | /* TODO(3.0) PSS check needs more work */ | |
866 | if (rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx)) { | |
867 | /* TODO(3.0) figure out what to do for prsactx->md == NULL */ | |
868 | if (prsactx->md == NULL || EVP_MD_is_a(prsactx->md, mdname)) | |
869 | return 1; | |
870 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED); | |
871 | return 0; | |
872 | } | |
873 | ||
874 | /* non-PSS code follows */ | |
875 | if (!rsa_setup_md(prsactx, mdname, mdprops)) | |
876 | return 0; | |
877 | } | |
878 | ||
879 | p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PAD_MODE); | |
880 | if (p != NULL) { | |
881 | int pad_mode = 0; | |
882 | ||
883 | switch (p->data_type) { | |
884 | case OSSL_PARAM_INTEGER: /* Support for legacy pad mode number */ | |
885 | if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &pad_mode)) | |
886 | return 0; | |
887 | break; | |
888 | case OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING: | |
889 | { | |
890 | int i; | |
891 | ||
892 | if (p->data == NULL) | |
893 | return 0; | |
894 | ||
895 | for (i = 0; padding_item[i].id != 0; i++) { | |
896 | if (strcmp(p->data, padding_item[i].ptr) == 0) { | |
897 | pad_mode = padding_item[i].id; | |
898 | break; | |
899 | } | |
900 | } | |
901 | } | |
902 | break; | |
903 | default: | |
904 | return 0; | |
905 | } | |
906 | ||
907 | switch (pad_mode) { | |
908 | case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING: | |
909 | /* | |
910 | * OAEP padding is for asymmetric cipher only so is not compatible | |
911 | * with signature use. | |
912 | */ | |
913 | ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, | |
914 | PROV_R_ILLEGAL_OR_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE, | |
915 | "OAEP padding not allowed for signing / verifying"); | |
916 | return 0; | |
917 | case RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING: | |
918 | if (prsactx->mdname[0] == '\0') | |
919 | rsa_setup_md(prsactx, "SHA1", ""); | |
920 | goto cont; | |
921 | case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: | |
922 | case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING: | |
923 | case RSA_NO_PADDING: | |
924 | case RSA_X931_PADDING: | |
925 | if (RSA_get0_pss_params(prsactx->rsa) != NULL) { | |
926 | ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, | |
927 | PROV_R_ILLEGAL_OR_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE, | |
928 | "X.931 padding not allowed with RSA-PSS"); | |
929 | return 0; | |
930 | } | |
931 | cont: | |
932 | if (!rsa_check_padding(prsactx->mdnid, pad_mode)) | |
933 | return 0; | |
934 | break; | |
935 | default: | |
936 | return 0; | |
937 | } | |
938 | prsactx->pad_mode = pad_mode; | |
939 | } | |
940 | ||
941 | p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN); | |
942 | if (p != NULL) { | |
943 | int saltlen; | |
944 | ||
945 | if (prsactx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) { | |
946 | ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_NOT_SUPPORTED, | |
947 | "PSS saltlen can only be specified if " | |
948 | "PSS padding has been specified first"); | |
949 | return 0; | |
950 | } | |
951 | ||
952 | switch (p->data_type) { | |
953 | case OSSL_PARAM_INTEGER: /* Support for legacy pad mode number */ | |
954 | if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &saltlen)) | |
955 | return 0; | |
956 | break; | |
957 | case OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING: | |
958 | if (strcmp(p->data, "digest") == 0) | |
959 | saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST; | |
960 | else if (strcmp(p->data, "max") == 0) | |
961 | saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX; | |
962 | else if (strcmp(p->data, "auto") == 0) | |
963 | saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO; | |
964 | else | |
965 | saltlen = atoi(p->data); | |
966 | break; | |
967 | default: | |
968 | return 0; | |
969 | } | |
970 | ||
971 | /* | |
972 | * RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX seems curiously named in this check. | |
973 | * Contrary to what it's name suggests, it's the currently | |
974 | * lowest saltlen number possible. | |
975 | */ | |
976 | if (saltlen < RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX) { | |
977 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN); | |
978 | return 0; | |
979 | } | |
980 | ||
981 | prsactx->saltlen = saltlen; | |
982 | } | |
983 | ||
984 | p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST); | |
985 | if (p != NULL) { | |
986 | char mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE] = "", *pmdname = mdname; | |
987 | char mdprops[OSSL_MAX_PROPQUERY_SIZE] = "", *pmdprops = mdprops; | |
988 | const OSSL_PARAM *propsp = | |
989 | OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, | |
990 | OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_PROPERTIES); | |
991 | ||
992 | if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(p, &pmdname, sizeof(mdname))) | |
993 | return 0; | |
994 | if (propsp != NULL | |
995 | && !OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(propsp, &pmdprops, sizeof(mdprops))) | |
996 | return 0; | |
997 | ||
998 | if (prsactx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) { | |
999 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_MGF1_MD); | |
1000 | return 0; | |
1001 | } | |
1002 | ||
1003 | /* TODO(3.0) PSS check needs more work */ | |
1004 | if (rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx)) { | |
1005 | /* TODO(3.0) figure out what to do for prsactx->md == NULL */ | |
1006 | if (prsactx->mgf1_md == NULL | |
1007 | || EVP_MD_is_a(prsactx->mgf1_md, mdname)) | |
1008 | return 1; | |
1009 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED); | |
1010 | return 0; | |
1011 | } | |
1012 | ||
1013 | /* non-PSS code follows */ | |
1014 | if (!rsa_setup_mgf1_md(prsactx, mdname, mdprops)) | |
1015 | return 0; | |
1016 | } | |
1017 | ||
1018 | return 1; | |
1019 | } | |
1020 | ||
1021 | static const OSSL_PARAM known_settable_ctx_params[] = { | |
1022 | OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PAD_MODE, NULL, 0), | |
1023 | OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST, NULL, 0), | |
1024 | OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PROPERTIES, NULL, 0), | |
1025 | OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST, NULL, 0), | |
1026 | OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_PROPERTIES, NULL, 0), | |
1027 | OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN, NULL, 0), | |
1028 | OSSL_PARAM_END | |
1029 | }; | |
1030 | ||
1031 | static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_settable_ctx_params(void) | |
1032 | { | |
1033 | /* | |
1034 | * TODO(3.0): Should this function return a different set of settable ctx | |
1035 | * params if the ctx is being used for a DigestSign/DigestVerify? In that | |
1036 | * case it is not allowed to set the digest size/digest name because the | |
1037 | * digest is explicitly set as part of the init. | |
1038 | */ | |
1039 | return known_settable_ctx_params; | |
1040 | } | |
1041 | ||
1042 | static int rsa_get_ctx_md_params(void *vprsactx, OSSL_PARAM *params) | |
1043 | { | |
1044 | PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx; | |
1045 | ||
1046 | if (prsactx->mdctx == NULL) | |
1047 | return 0; | |
1048 | ||
1049 | return EVP_MD_CTX_get_params(prsactx->mdctx, params); | |
1050 | } | |
1051 | ||
1052 | static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_gettable_ctx_md_params(void *vprsactx) | |
1053 | { | |
1054 | PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx; | |
1055 | ||
1056 | if (prsactx->md == NULL) | |
1057 | return 0; | |
1058 | ||
1059 | return EVP_MD_gettable_ctx_params(prsactx->md); | |
1060 | } | |
1061 | ||
1062 | static int rsa_set_ctx_md_params(void *vprsactx, const OSSL_PARAM params[]) | |
1063 | { | |
1064 | PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx; | |
1065 | ||
1066 | if (prsactx->mdctx == NULL) | |
1067 | return 0; | |
1068 | ||
1069 | return EVP_MD_CTX_set_params(prsactx->mdctx, params); | |
1070 | } | |
1071 | ||
1072 | static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_settable_ctx_md_params(void *vprsactx) | |
1073 | { | |
1074 | PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx; | |
1075 | ||
1076 | if (prsactx->md == NULL) | |
1077 | return 0; | |
1078 | ||
1079 | return EVP_MD_settable_ctx_params(prsactx->md); | |
1080 | } | |
1081 | ||
1082 | const OSSL_DISPATCH rsa_signature_functions[] = { | |
1083 | { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_NEWCTX, (void (*)(void))rsa_newctx }, | |
1084 | { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN_INIT, (void (*)(void))rsa_signature_init }, | |
1085 | { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN, (void (*)(void))rsa_sign }, | |
1086 | { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_INIT, (void (*)(void))rsa_signature_init }, | |
1087 | { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY, (void (*)(void))rsa_verify }, | |
1088 | { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_RECOVER_INIT, (void (*)(void))rsa_signature_init }, | |
1089 | { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_RECOVER, (void (*)(void))rsa_verify_recover }, | |
1090 | { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_INIT, | |
1091 | (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_signverify_init }, | |
1092 | { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_UPDATE, | |
1093 | (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_signverify_update }, | |
1094 | { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_FINAL, | |
1095 | (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_sign_final }, | |
1096 | { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_INIT, | |
1097 | (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_signverify_init }, | |
1098 | { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_UPDATE, | |
1099 | (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_signverify_update }, | |
1100 | { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_FINAL, | |
1101 | (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_verify_final }, | |
1102 | { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_FREECTX, (void (*)(void))rsa_freectx }, | |
1103 | { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DUPCTX, (void (*)(void))rsa_dupctx }, | |
1104 | { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GET_CTX_PARAMS, (void (*)(void))rsa_get_ctx_params }, | |
1105 | { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS, | |
1106 | (void (*)(void))rsa_gettable_ctx_params }, | |
1107 | { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SET_CTX_PARAMS, (void (*)(void))rsa_set_ctx_params }, | |
1108 | { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS, | |
1109 | (void (*)(void))rsa_settable_ctx_params }, | |
1110 | { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GET_CTX_MD_PARAMS, | |
1111 | (void (*)(void))rsa_get_ctx_md_params }, | |
1112 | { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GETTABLE_CTX_MD_PARAMS, | |
1113 | (void (*)(void))rsa_gettable_ctx_md_params }, | |
1114 | { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SET_CTX_MD_PARAMS, | |
1115 | (void (*)(void))rsa_set_ctx_md_params }, | |
1116 | { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SETTABLE_CTX_MD_PARAMS, | |
1117 | (void (*)(void))rsa_settable_ctx_md_params }, | |
1118 | { 0, NULL } | |
1119 | }; |