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34a4068c MC |
1 | /* |
2 | * Copyright 2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. | |
3 | * | |
4 | * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use | |
5 | * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy | |
6 | * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at | |
7 | * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html | |
8 | */ | |
9 | ||
1d367677 | 10 | #include <assert.h> |
34a4068c MC |
11 | #include <openssl/bio.h> |
12 | #include <openssl/ssl.h> | |
e2d5742b MC |
13 | #include <openssl/err.h> |
14 | #include <openssl/core_names.h> | |
15 | #include "internal/e_os.h" | |
4030869d | 16 | #include "internal/packet.h" |
4840c2a5 MC |
17 | #include "../../ssl_local.h" |
18 | #include "../record_local.h" | |
50023e9b | 19 | #include "recmethod_local.h" |
e2d5742b | 20 | |
359affde MC |
21 | static void tls_int_free(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl); |
22 | ||
50023e9b MC |
23 | void ossl_rlayer_fatal(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, int al, int reason, |
24 | const char *fmt, ...) | |
e2d5742b MC |
25 | { |
26 | va_list args; | |
27 | ||
28 | va_start(args, fmt); | |
29 | ERR_vset_error(ERR_LIB_SSL, reason, fmt, args); | |
30 | va_end(args); | |
31 | ||
32 | rl->alert = al; | |
33 | } | |
34 | ||
50023e9b MC |
35 | int ossl_set_tls_provider_parameters(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, |
36 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, | |
37 | const EVP_CIPHER *ciph, | |
7f2f0ac7 | 38 | const EVP_MD *md) |
aedbb71b MC |
39 | { |
40 | /* | |
41 | * Provided cipher, the TLS padding/MAC removal is performed provider | |
42 | * side so we need to tell the ctx about our TLS version and mac size | |
43 | */ | |
44 | OSSL_PARAM params[3], *pprm = params; | |
45 | size_t macsize = 0; | |
46 | int imacsize = -1; | |
47 | ||
48 | if ((EVP_CIPHER_get_flags(ciph) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) == 0 | |
7f2f0ac7 | 49 | && !rl->use_etm) |
aedbb71b MC |
50 | imacsize = EVP_MD_get_size(md); |
51 | if (imacsize >= 0) | |
52 | macsize = (size_t)imacsize; | |
53 | ||
54 | *pprm++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_VERSION, | |
55 | &rl->version); | |
56 | *pprm++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_MAC_SIZE, | |
57 | &macsize); | |
58 | *pprm = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end(); | |
59 | ||
60 | if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_params(ctx, params)) { | |
7c293999 | 61 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
aedbb71b MC |
62 | return 0; |
63 | } | |
64 | ||
65 | return 1; | |
66 | } | |
67 | ||
50023e9b MC |
68 | /* |
69 | * ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported returns 1 iff |ctx| uses a hash function | |
70 | * which ssl3_cbc_digest_record supports. | |
aedbb71b | 71 | */ |
50023e9b | 72 | char ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) |
2b891e30 | 73 | { |
50023e9b MC |
74 | switch (EVP_MD_CTX_get_type(ctx)) { |
75 | case NID_md5: | |
76 | case NID_sha1: | |
77 | case NID_sha224: | |
78 | case NID_sha256: | |
79 | case NID_sha384: | |
80 | case NID_sha512: | |
2b891e30 | 81 | return 1; |
50023e9b | 82 | default: |
aedbb71b | 83 | return 0; |
aedbb71b | 84 | } |
aedbb71b MC |
85 | } |
86 | ||
976b263d | 87 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP |
9b7fb65e | 88 | static int tls_allow_compression(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl) |
e2d5742b MC |
89 | { |
90 | if (rl->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) | |
91 | return 0; | |
ed0e298f | 92 | |
b85ebc4b MC |
93 | return rl->security == NULL |
94 | || rl->security(rl->cbarg, SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION, 0, 0, NULL); | |
e2d5742b | 95 | } |
976b263d | 96 | #endif |
e2d5742b | 97 | |
151f313e MC |
98 | static int tls_setup_write_buffer(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, size_t numwpipes, |
99 | size_t len) | |
100 | { | |
101 | unsigned char *p; | |
102 | size_t align = 0, headerlen; | |
103 | SSL3_BUFFER *wb; | |
104 | size_t currpipe; | |
105 | SSL_CONNECTION *s = (SSL_CONNECTION *)rl->cbarg; | |
106 | ||
e7694c69 | 107 | rl->numwpipes = numwpipes; |
151f313e MC |
108 | |
109 | if (len == 0) { | |
110 | if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) | |
111 | headerlen = DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + 1; | |
112 | else | |
113 | headerlen = SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
114 | ||
115 | #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0 | |
116 | align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1; | |
117 | #endif | |
118 | ||
119 | len = ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s) | |
120 | + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD + headerlen + align; | |
121 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP | |
122 | if (ssl_allow_compression(s)) | |
123 | len += SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD; | |
124 | #endif | |
125 | if (!(rl->options & SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS)) | |
126 | len += headerlen + align + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD; | |
127 | } | |
128 | ||
129 | wb = rl->wbuf; | |
130 | for (currpipe = 0; currpipe < numwpipes; currpipe++) { | |
131 | SSL3_BUFFER *thiswb = &wb[currpipe]; | |
132 | ||
133 | if (thiswb->len != len) { | |
134 | OPENSSL_free(thiswb->buf); | |
135 | thiswb->buf = NULL; /* force reallocation */ | |
136 | } | |
137 | ||
138 | if (thiswb->buf == NULL) { | |
139 | if (s->wbio == NULL || !BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio)) { | |
140 | p = OPENSSL_malloc(len); | |
141 | if (p == NULL) { | |
e7694c69 | 142 | rl->numwpipes = currpipe; |
151f313e MC |
143 | /* |
144 | * We've got a malloc failure, and we're still initialising | |
145 | * buffers. We assume we're so doomed that we won't even be able | |
146 | * to send an alert. | |
147 | */ | |
148 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
149 | return 0; | |
150 | } | |
151 | } else { | |
152 | p = NULL; | |
153 | } | |
154 | memset(thiswb, 0, sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER)); | |
155 | thiswb->buf = p; | |
156 | thiswb->len = len; | |
157 | } | |
158 | } | |
159 | ||
160 | return 1; | |
161 | } | |
162 | ||
163 | static void tls_release_write_buffer(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl) | |
164 | { | |
165 | SSL3_BUFFER *wb; | |
166 | size_t pipes; | |
151f313e | 167 | |
e7694c69 | 168 | pipes = rl->numwpipes; |
151f313e MC |
169 | |
170 | while (pipes > 0) { | |
171 | wb = &rl->wbuf[pipes - 1]; | |
172 | ||
173 | if (SSL3_BUFFER_is_app_buffer(wb)) | |
174 | SSL3_BUFFER_set_app_buffer(wb, 0); | |
175 | else | |
176 | OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); | |
177 | wb->buf = NULL; | |
178 | pipes--; | |
179 | } | |
e7694c69 MC |
180 | |
181 | rl->numwpipes = 0; | |
151f313e MC |
182 | } |
183 | ||
9b7fb65e | 184 | int tls_setup_read_buffer(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl) |
e2d5742b MC |
185 | { |
186 | unsigned char *p; | |
187 | size_t len, align = 0, headerlen; | |
188 | SSL3_BUFFER *b; | |
189 | ||
190 | b = &rl->rbuf; | |
191 | ||
192 | if (rl->isdtls) | |
193 | headerlen = DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
194 | else | |
195 | headerlen = SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
196 | ||
1704961c | 197 | #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD != 0 |
e2d5742b MC |
198 | align = (-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1); |
199 | #endif | |
200 | ||
201 | if (b->buf == NULL) { | |
202 | len = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH | |
203 | + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD + headerlen + align; | |
204 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP | |
9b7fb65e | 205 | if (tls_allow_compression(rl)) |
e2d5742b MC |
206 | len += SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD; |
207 | #endif | |
208 | if (b->default_len > len) | |
209 | len = b->default_len; | |
210 | if ((p = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) { | |
211 | /* | |
212 | * We've got a malloc failure, and we're still initialising buffers. | |
213 | * We assume we're so doomed that we won't even be able to send an | |
214 | * alert. | |
215 | */ | |
216 | RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
217 | return 0; | |
218 | } | |
219 | b->buf = p; | |
220 | b->len = len; | |
221 | } | |
222 | ||
223 | return 1; | |
224 | } | |
225 | ||
9b7fb65e | 226 | static int tls_release_read_buffer(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl) |
e2d5742b MC |
227 | { |
228 | SSL3_BUFFER *b; | |
229 | ||
230 | b = &rl->rbuf; | |
1704961c | 231 | if ((rl->options & SSL_OP_CLEANSE_PLAINTEXT) != 0) |
e2d5742b MC |
232 | OPENSSL_cleanse(b->buf, b->len); |
233 | OPENSSL_free(b->buf); | |
234 | b->buf = NULL; | |
235 | return 1; | |
236 | } | |
237 | ||
238 | /* | |
239 | * Return values are as per SSL_read() | |
240 | */ | |
1853d20a MC |
241 | int tls_default_read_n(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, size_t n, size_t max, int extend, |
242 | int clearold, size_t *readbytes) | |
e2d5742b MC |
243 | { |
244 | /* | |
245 | * If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase | |
246 | * packet by another n bytes. The packet will be in the sub-array of | |
b0a9042e MC |
247 | * rl->rbuf.buf specified by rl->packet and rl->packet_length. (If |
248 | * rl->read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf [plus | |
249 | * rl->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].) if clearold == 1, move the | |
250 | * packet to the start of the buffer; if clearold == 0 then leave any old | |
251 | * packets where they were | |
e2d5742b MC |
252 | */ |
253 | size_t len, left, align = 0; | |
254 | unsigned char *pkt; | |
255 | SSL3_BUFFER *rb; | |
256 | ||
257 | if (n == 0) | |
258 | return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_NON_FATAL_ERR; | |
259 | ||
260 | rb = &rl->rbuf; | |
e2d5742b MC |
261 | left = rb->left; |
262 | #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD != 0 | |
263 | align = (size_t)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
264 | align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD); | |
265 | #endif | |
266 | ||
267 | if (!extend) { | |
268 | /* start with empty packet ... */ | |
269 | if (left == 0) { | |
270 | rb->offset = align; | |
271 | } else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { | |
272 | /* | |
273 | * check if next packet length is large enough to justify payload | |
274 | * alignment... | |
275 | */ | |
276 | pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset; | |
277 | if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA | |
278 | && (pkt[3] << 8 | pkt[4]) >= 128) { | |
279 | /* | |
280 | * Note that even if packet is corrupted and its length field | |
281 | * is insane, we can only be led to wrong decision about | |
282 | * whether memmove will occur or not. Header values has no | |
283 | * effect on memmove arguments and therefore no buffer | |
284 | * overrun can be triggered. | |
285 | */ | |
286 | memmove(rb->buf + align, pkt, left); | |
287 | rb->offset = align; | |
288 | } | |
289 | } | |
290 | rl->packet = rb->buf + rb->offset; | |
291 | rl->packet_length = 0; | |
292 | /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */ | |
293 | } | |
294 | ||
295 | len = rl->packet_length; | |
296 | pkt = rb->buf + align; | |
297 | /* | |
298 | * Move any available bytes to front of buffer: 'len' bytes already | |
299 | * pointed to by 'packet', 'left' extra ones at the end | |
300 | */ | |
301 | if (rl->packet != pkt && clearold == 1) { | |
302 | memmove(pkt, rl->packet, len + left); | |
303 | rl->packet = pkt; | |
304 | rb->offset = len + align; | |
305 | } | |
306 | ||
307 | /* | |
308 | * For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets because the read | |
309 | * operation returns the whole packet at once (as long as it fits into | |
310 | * the buffer). | |
311 | */ | |
312 | if (rl->isdtls) { | |
313 | if (left == 0 && extend) | |
314 | return 0; | |
315 | if (left > 0 && n > left) | |
316 | n = left; | |
317 | } | |
318 | ||
319 | /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */ | |
320 | if (left >= n) { | |
321 | rl->packet_length += n; | |
322 | rb->left = left - n; | |
323 | rb->offset += n; | |
324 | *readbytes = n; | |
325 | return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_SUCCESS; | |
326 | } | |
327 | ||
328 | /* else we need to read more data */ | |
329 | ||
330 | if (n > rb->len - rb->offset) { | |
331 | /* does not happen */ | |
332 | RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
333 | return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL; | |
334 | } | |
335 | ||
1853d20a MC |
336 | /* We always act like read_ahead is set for DTLS */ |
337 | if (!rl->read_ahead && !rl->isdtls) { | |
e2d5742b MC |
338 | /* ignore max parameter */ |
339 | max = n; | |
340 | } else { | |
341 | if (max < n) | |
342 | max = n; | |
343 | if (max > rb->len - rb->offset) | |
344 | max = rb->len - rb->offset; | |
345 | } | |
346 | ||
347 | while (left < n) { | |
348 | size_t bioread = 0; | |
349 | int ret; | |
359affde | 350 | BIO *bio = rl->prev != NULL ? rl->prev : rl->bio; |
e2d5742b MC |
351 | |
352 | /* | |
1704961c MC |
353 | * Now we have len+left bytes at the front of rl->rbuf.buf and |
354 | * need to read in more until we have len + n (up to len + max if | |
e2d5742b MC |
355 | * possible) |
356 | */ | |
357 | ||
358 | clear_sys_error(); | |
359affde MC |
359 | if (bio != NULL) { |
360 | ret = BIO_read(bio, pkt + len + left, max - left); | |
e2d5742b MC |
361 | if (ret > 0) { |
362 | bioread = ret; | |
363 | ret = OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_SUCCESS; | |
359affde MC |
364 | } else if (BIO_should_retry(bio)) { |
365 | if (rl->prev != NULL) { | |
366 | /* | |
367 | * We were reading from the previous epoch. Now there is no | |
368 | * more data, so swap to the actual transport BIO | |
369 | */ | |
370 | BIO_free(rl->prev); | |
371 | rl->prev = NULL; | |
372 | continue; | |
373 | } | |
e2d5742b | 374 | ret = OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_RETRY; |
359affde | 375 | } else if (BIO_eof(bio)) { |
e2d5742b MC |
376 | ret = OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_EOF; |
377 | } else { | |
378 | ret = OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL; | |
379 | } | |
380 | } else { | |
381 | RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET); | |
382 | ret = OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL; | |
383 | } | |
384 | ||
385 | if (ret <= OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_RETRY) { | |
386 | rb->left = left; | |
3de76959 | 387 | if ((rl->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS) != 0 && !rl->isdtls) |
e2d5742b | 388 | if (len + left == 0) |
9b7fb65e | 389 | tls_release_read_buffer(rl); |
e2d5742b MC |
390 | return ret; |
391 | } | |
392 | left += bioread; | |
393 | /* | |
394 | * reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because the | |
395 | * underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed to | |
396 | * byte oriented as in the TLS case. | |
397 | */ | |
398 | if (rl->isdtls) { | |
399 | if (n > left) | |
400 | n = left; /* makes the while condition false */ | |
401 | } | |
402 | } | |
403 | ||
404 | /* done reading, now the book-keeping */ | |
405 | rb->offset += n; | |
406 | rb->left = left - n; | |
407 | rl->packet_length += n; | |
408 | *readbytes = n; | |
409 | return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_SUCCESS; | |
410 | } | |
411 | ||
4030869d MC |
412 | /* |
413 | * Peeks ahead into "read_ahead" data to see if we have a whole record waiting | |
414 | * for us in the buffer. | |
415 | */ | |
416 | static int tls_record_app_data_waiting(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl) | |
417 | { | |
418 | SSL3_BUFFER *rbuf; | |
419 | size_t left, len; | |
420 | unsigned char *p; | |
421 | ||
422 | rbuf = &rl->rbuf; | |
423 | ||
424 | p = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(rbuf); | |
425 | if (p == NULL) | |
426 | return 0; | |
427 | ||
428 | left = SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf); | |
429 | ||
430 | if (left < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) | |
431 | return 0; | |
432 | ||
433 | p += SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(rbuf); | |
434 | ||
435 | /* | |
436 | * We only check the type and record length, we will sanity check version | |
437 | * etc later | |
438 | */ | |
439 | if (*p != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) | |
440 | return 0; | |
441 | ||
442 | p += 3; | |
443 | n2s(p, len); | |
444 | ||
445 | if (left < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + len) | |
446 | return 0; | |
447 | ||
448 | return 1; | |
449 | } | |
450 | ||
9dd90232 MC |
451 | static int rlayer_early_data_count_ok(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, size_t length, |
452 | size_t overhead, int send) | |
453 | { | |
454 | uint32_t max_early_data = rl->max_early_data; | |
455 | ||
456 | if (max_early_data == 0) { | |
457 | RLAYERfatal(rl, send ? SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR : SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, | |
1704961c | 458 | SSL_R_TOO_MUCH_EARLY_DATA); |
9dd90232 MC |
459 | return 0; |
460 | } | |
461 | ||
462 | /* If we are dealing with ciphertext we need to allow for the overhead */ | |
463 | max_early_data += overhead; | |
464 | ||
465 | if (rl->early_data_count + length > max_early_data) { | |
466 | RLAYERfatal(rl, send ? SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR : SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, | |
1704961c | 467 | SSL_R_TOO_MUCH_EARLY_DATA); |
9dd90232 MC |
468 | return 0; |
469 | } | |
470 | rl->early_data_count += length; | |
471 | ||
472 | return 1; | |
473 | } | |
474 | ||
4030869d MC |
475 | /* |
476 | * MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS defines the number of consecutive, empty records that | |
1704961c | 477 | * will be processed per call to tls_get_more_records. Without this limit an |
4030869d | 478 | * attacker could send empty records at a faster rate than we can process and |
1704961c | 479 | * cause tls_get_more_records to loop forever. |
4030869d MC |
480 | */ |
481 | #define MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS 32 | |
482 | ||
483 | #define SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH 2 | |
484 | ||
485 | /*- | |
486 | * Call this to buffer new input records in rl->rrec. | |
487 | * It will return a OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_* value. | |
488 | * When it finishes successfully (OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_SUCCESS), |rl->num_recs| | |
489 | * records have been decoded. For each record 'i': | |
490 | * rrec[i].type - is the type of record | |
491 | * rrec[i].data, - data | |
492 | * rrec[i].length, - number of bytes | |
493 | * Multiple records will only be returned if the record types are all | |
494 | * SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA. The number of records returned will always be <= | |
495 | * |max_pipelines| | |
496 | */ | |
eddb067e | 497 | int tls_get_more_records(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl) |
4030869d MC |
498 | { |
499 | int enc_err, rret; | |
500 | int i; | |
501 | size_t more, n; | |
502 | SSL3_RECORD *rr, *thisrr; | |
503 | SSL3_BUFFER *rbuf; | |
4030869d MC |
504 | unsigned char *p; |
505 | unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; | |
506 | unsigned int version; | |
507 | size_t mac_size = 0; | |
508 | int imac_size; | |
509 | size_t num_recs = 0, max_recs, j; | |
510 | PACKET pkt, sslv2pkt; | |
4030869d MC |
511 | SSL_MAC_BUF *macbufs = NULL; |
512 | int ret = OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL; | |
4030869d MC |
513 | |
514 | rr = rl->rrec; | |
515 | rbuf = &rl->rbuf; | |
cc110a0a | 516 | if (rbuf->buf == NULL) { |
9b7fb65e | 517 | if (!tls_setup_read_buffer(rl)) { |
cc110a0a MC |
518 | /* RLAYERfatal() already called */ |
519 | return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL; | |
520 | } | |
521 | } | |
4030869d | 522 | |
8124ab56 MC |
523 | max_recs = rl->max_pipelines; |
524 | ||
4030869d MC |
525 | if (max_recs == 0) |
526 | max_recs = 1; | |
4030869d | 527 | |
4030869d MC |
528 | do { |
529 | thisrr = &rr[num_recs]; | |
530 | ||
531 | /* check if we have the header */ | |
532 | if ((rl->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) || | |
533 | (rl->packet_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) { | |
534 | size_t sslv2len; | |
535 | unsigned int type; | |
536 | ||
1853d20a MC |
537 | rret = rl->funcs->read_n(rl, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, |
538 | SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(rbuf), 0, | |
539 | num_recs == 0 ? 1 : 0, &n); | |
540 | ||
541 | if (rret < OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_SUCCESS) | |
542 | return rret; /* error or non-blocking */ | |
543 | ||
4030869d MC |
544 | rl->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_BODY; |
545 | ||
546 | p = rl->packet; | |
547 | if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, p, rl->packet_length)) { | |
548 | RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
549 | return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL; | |
550 | } | |
551 | sslv2pkt = pkt; | |
552 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2_len(&sslv2pkt, &sslv2len) | |
553 | || !PACKET_get_1(&sslv2pkt, &type)) { | |
554 | RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
555 | return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL; | |
556 | } | |
557 | /* | |
558 | * The first record received by the server may be a V2ClientHello. | |
559 | */ | |
560 | if (rl->role == OSSL_RECORD_ROLE_SERVER | |
561 | && rl->is_first_record | |
562 | && (sslv2len & 0x8000) != 0 | |
563 | && (type == SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)) { | |
564 | /* | |
565 | * SSLv2 style record | |
566 | * | |
567 | * |num_recs| here will actually always be 0 because | |
568 | * |num_recs > 0| only ever occurs when we are processing | |
569 | * multiple app data records - which we know isn't the case here | |
570 | * because it is an SSLv2ClientHello. We keep it using | |
571 | * |num_recs| for the sake of consistency | |
572 | */ | |
573 | thisrr->type = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE; | |
574 | thisrr->rec_version = SSL2_VERSION; | |
575 | ||
576 | thisrr->length = sslv2len & 0x7fff; | |
577 | ||
578 | if (thisrr->length > SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(rbuf) | |
1704961c | 579 | - SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { |
4030869d MC |
580 | RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW, |
581 | SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); | |
582 | return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL; | |
583 | } | |
4030869d MC |
584 | } else { |
585 | /* SSLv3+ style record */ | |
586 | ||
587 | /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */ | |
588 | if (!PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &type) | |
589 | || !PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &version) | |
590 | || !PACKET_get_net_2_len(&pkt, &thisrr->length)) { | |
b85ebc4b MC |
591 | if (rl->msg_callback != NULL) |
592 | rl->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, p, 5, rl->cbarg); | |
4030869d MC |
593 | RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
594 | return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL; | |
595 | } | |
596 | thisrr->type = type; | |
597 | thisrr->rec_version = version; | |
598 | ||
014baa8a MC |
599 | /* |
600 | * When we call validate_record_header() only records actually | |
601 | * received in SSLv2 format should have the record version set | |
602 | * to SSL2_VERSION. This way validate_record_header() can know | |
603 | * what format the record was in based on the version. | |
604 | */ | |
605 | if (thisrr->rec_version == SSL2_VERSION) { | |
606 | RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, | |
607 | SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); | |
608 | return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL; | |
609 | } | |
610 | ||
b85ebc4b MC |
611 | if (rl->msg_callback != NULL) |
612 | rl->msg_callback(0, version, SSL3_RT_HEADER, p, 5, rl->cbarg); | |
4030869d | 613 | |
4030869d MC |
614 | if (thisrr->length > |
615 | SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(rbuf) - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { | |
616 | RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW, | |
617 | SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); | |
618 | return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL; | |
619 | } | |
620 | } | |
621 | ||
1853d20a MC |
622 | if (!rl->funcs->validate_record_header(rl, thisrr)) { |
623 | /* RLAYERfatal already called */ | |
4030869d MC |
624 | return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL; |
625 | } | |
4030869d | 626 | |
1853d20a | 627 | /* now rl->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */ |
4030869d MC |
628 | } |
629 | ||
630 | /* | |
631 | * rl->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data. Calculate | |
632 | * how much more data we need to read for the rest of the record | |
633 | */ | |
634 | if (thisrr->rec_version == SSL2_VERSION) { | |
635 | more = thisrr->length + SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH | |
1704961c | 636 | - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; |
4030869d MC |
637 | } else { |
638 | more = thisrr->length; | |
639 | } | |
640 | ||
641 | if (more > 0) { | |
642 | /* now rl->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */ | |
643 | ||
1853d20a | 644 | rret = rl->funcs->read_n(rl, more, more, 1, 0, &n); |
4030869d MC |
645 | if (rret < OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_SUCCESS) |
646 | return rret; /* error or non-blocking io */ | |
647 | } | |
648 | ||
649 | /* set state for later operations */ | |
650 | rl->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; | |
651 | ||
652 | /* | |
653 | * At this point, rl->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH | |
654 | * + thisrr->length, or rl->packet_length == SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH | |
655 | * + thisrr->length and we have that many bytes in rl->packet | |
656 | */ | |
657 | if (thisrr->rec_version == SSL2_VERSION) | |
658 | thisrr->input = &(rl->packet[SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]); | |
659 | else | |
660 | thisrr->input = &(rl->packet[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]); | |
661 | ||
662 | /* | |
663 | * ok, we can now read from 'rl->packet' data into 'thisrr'. | |
664 | * thisrr->input points at thisrr->length bytes, which need to be copied | |
665 | * into thisrr->data by either the decryption or by the decompression. | |
666 | * When the data is 'copied' into the thisrr->data buffer, | |
667 | * thisrr->input will be updated to point at the new buffer | |
668 | */ | |
669 | ||
670 | /* | |
671 | * We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ] | |
672 | * thisrr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. | |
673 | */ | |
674 | ||
675 | /* decrypt in place in 'thisrr->input' */ | |
676 | thisrr->data = thisrr->input; | |
677 | thisrr->orig_len = thisrr->length; | |
678 | ||
4030869d MC |
679 | num_recs++; |
680 | ||
681 | /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */ | |
81c9ebd9 | 682 | rl->packet_length = 0; |
4030869d MC |
683 | rl->is_first_record = 0; |
684 | } while (num_recs < max_recs | |
685 | && thisrr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA | |
88d61680 | 686 | && RLAYER_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(rl) |
6366bdd9 MC |
687 | && rl->enc_ctx != NULL |
688 | && (EVP_CIPHER_get_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(rl->enc_ctx)) | |
4030869d MC |
689 | & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE) != 0 |
690 | && tls_record_app_data_waiting(rl)); | |
691 | ||
692 | if (num_recs == 1 | |
693 | && thisrr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC | |
9cd9e097 MC |
694 | /* The following can happen in tlsany_meth after HRR */ |
695 | && rl->version == TLS1_3_VERSION | |
1853d20a | 696 | && rl->is_first_handshake) { |
4030869d MC |
697 | /* |
698 | * CCS messages must be exactly 1 byte long, containing the value 0x01 | |
699 | */ | |
700 | if (thisrr->length != 1 || thisrr->data[0] != 0x01) { | |
701 | RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, | |
702 | SSL_R_INVALID_CCS_MESSAGE); | |
703 | return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL; | |
704 | } | |
705 | /* | |
706 | * CCS messages are ignored in TLSv1.3. We treat it like an empty | |
707 | * handshake record | |
708 | */ | |
709 | thisrr->type = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE; | |
aedbb71b | 710 | if (++(rl->empty_record_count) > MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS) { |
4030869d MC |
711 | RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, |
712 | SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_CCS_MESSAGE); | |
713 | return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL; | |
714 | } | |
4030869d MC |
715 | rl->num_recs = 0; |
716 | rl->curr_rec = 0; | |
717 | rl->num_released = 0; | |
718 | ||
719 | return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_SUCCESS; | |
720 | } | |
721 | ||
6366bdd9 MC |
722 | if (rl->md_ctx != NULL) { |
723 | const EVP_MD *tmpmd = EVP_MD_CTX_get0_md(rl->md_ctx); | |
4030869d MC |
724 | |
725 | if (tmpmd != NULL) { | |
726 | imac_size = EVP_MD_get_size(tmpmd); | |
727 | if (!ossl_assert(imac_size >= 0 && imac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) { | |
1704961c MC |
728 | RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
729 | return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL; | |
4030869d MC |
730 | } |
731 | mac_size = (size_t)imac_size; | |
732 | } | |
733 | } | |
734 | ||
735 | /* | |
736 | * If in encrypt-then-mac mode calculate mac from encrypted record. All | |
737 | * the details below are public so no timing details can leak. | |
738 | */ | |
6366bdd9 | 739 | if (rl->use_etm && rl->md_ctx) { |
4030869d MC |
740 | unsigned char *mac; |
741 | ||
742 | for (j = 0; j < num_recs; j++) { | |
743 | thisrr = &rr[j]; | |
744 | ||
745 | if (thisrr->length < mac_size) { | |
746 | RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); | |
747 | return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL; | |
748 | } | |
749 | thisrr->length -= mac_size; | |
750 | mac = thisrr->data + thisrr->length; | |
8124ab56 | 751 | i = rl->funcs->mac(rl, thisrr, md, 0 /* not send */); |
4030869d MC |
752 | if (i == 0 || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, mac_size) != 0) { |
753 | RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC, | |
754 | SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC); | |
755 | return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL; | |
756 | } | |
757 | } | |
758 | /* | |
759 | * We've handled the mac now - there is no MAC inside the encrypted | |
760 | * record | |
761 | */ | |
762 | mac_size = 0; | |
763 | } | |
764 | ||
765 | if (mac_size > 0) { | |
766 | macbufs = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*macbufs) * num_recs); | |
767 | if (macbufs == NULL) { | |
768 | RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
769 | return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL; | |
770 | } | |
771 | } | |
772 | ||
8124ab56 | 773 | enc_err = rl->funcs->cipher(rl, rr, num_recs, 0, macbufs, mac_size); |
4030869d MC |
774 | |
775 | /*- | |
776 | * enc_err is: | |
777 | * 0: if the record is publicly invalid, or an internal error, or AEAD | |
778 | * decryption failed, or ETM decryption failed. | |
779 | * 1: Success or MTE decryption failed (MAC will be randomised) | |
780 | */ | |
781 | if (enc_err == 0) { | |
d3192c26 | 782 | if (rl->alert != SSL_AD_NO_ALERT) { |
651216dd | 783 | /* RLAYERfatal() already got called */ |
4030869d MC |
784 | goto end; |
785 | } | |
b85ebc4b MC |
786 | if (num_recs == 1 |
787 | && rl->skip_early_data != NULL | |
788 | && rl->skip_early_data(rl->cbarg)) { | |
4030869d MC |
789 | /* |
790 | * Valid early_data that we cannot decrypt will fail here. We treat | |
791 | * it like an empty record. | |
792 | */ | |
793 | ||
794 | thisrr = &rr[0]; | |
795 | ||
9dd90232 MC |
796 | if (!rlayer_early_data_count_ok(rl, thisrr->length, |
797 | EARLY_DATA_CIPHERTEXT_OVERHEAD, 0)) { | |
798 | /* RLAYERfatal() already called */ | |
4030869d MC |
799 | goto end; |
800 | } | |
801 | ||
802 | thisrr->length = 0; | |
4030869d MC |
803 | rl->num_recs = 0; |
804 | rl->curr_rec = 0; | |
805 | rl->num_released = 0; | |
0755722c MC |
806 | /* Reset the read sequence */ |
807 | memset(rl->sequence, 0, sizeof(rl->sequence)); | |
4030869d MC |
808 | ret = 1; |
809 | goto end; | |
810 | } | |
811 | RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC, | |
812 | SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC); | |
813 | goto end; | |
814 | } | |
815 | OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS) { | |
816 | BIO_printf(trc_out, "dec %lu\n", (unsigned long)rr[0].length); | |
817 | BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, rr[0].data, rr[0].length, 4); | |
818 | } OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS); | |
819 | ||
820 | /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */ | |
6366bdd9 | 821 | if (rl->enc_ctx != NULL |
ffbd6e67 | 822 | && !rl->use_etm |
6366bdd9 MC |
823 | && EVP_MD_CTX_get0_md(rl->md_ctx) != NULL) { |
824 | /* rl->md_ctx != NULL => mac_size != -1 */ | |
4030869d MC |
825 | |
826 | for (j = 0; j < num_recs; j++) { | |
827 | SSL_MAC_BUF *thismb = &macbufs[j]; | |
1704961c | 828 | |
4030869d MC |
829 | thisrr = &rr[j]; |
830 | ||
8124ab56 | 831 | i = rl->funcs->mac(rl, thisrr, md, 0 /* not send */); |
4030869d MC |
832 | if (i == 0 || thismb == NULL || thismb->mac == NULL |
833 | || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, thismb->mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0) | |
834 | enc_err = 0; | |
835 | if (thisrr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + mac_size) | |
836 | enc_err = 0; | |
837 | } | |
838 | } | |
839 | ||
840 | if (enc_err == 0) { | |
d3192c26 | 841 | if (rl->alert != SSL_AD_NO_ALERT) { |
651216dd | 842 | /* We already called RLAYERfatal() */ |
4030869d MC |
843 | goto end; |
844 | } | |
845 | /* | |
846 | * A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0, | |
847 | * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption | |
848 | * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway, we should | |
849 | * not reveal which kind of error occurred -- this might become | |
850 | * visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile) | |
851 | */ | |
852 | RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC, | |
853 | SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC); | |
854 | goto end; | |
855 | } | |
856 | ||
4030869d MC |
857 | for (j = 0; j < num_recs; j++) { |
858 | thisrr = &rr[j]; | |
859 | ||
8124ab56 | 860 | if (!rl->funcs->post_process_record(rl, thisrr)) { |
1853d20a | 861 | /* RLAYERfatal already called */ |
4030869d MC |
862 | goto end; |
863 | } | |
864 | ||
865 | /* | |
866 | * Check if the received packet overflows the current | |
867 | * Max Fragment Length setting. | |
ffbd6e67 | 868 | * Note: rl->max_frag_len > 0 and KTLS are mutually exclusive. |
4030869d | 869 | */ |
ffbd6e67 | 870 | if (rl->max_frag_len > 0 && thisrr->length > rl->max_frag_len) { |
4030869d MC |
871 | RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); |
872 | goto end; | |
873 | } | |
874 | ||
875 | thisrr->off = 0; | |
876 | /*- | |
877 | * So at this point the following is true | |
878 | * thisrr->type is the type of record | |
879 | * thisrr->length == number of bytes in record | |
880 | * thisrr->off == offset to first valid byte | |
881 | * thisrr->data == where to take bytes from, increment after use :-). | |
882 | */ | |
883 | ||
884 | /* just read a 0 length packet */ | |
885 | if (thisrr->length == 0) { | |
aedbb71b | 886 | if (++(rl->empty_record_count) > MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS) { |
1704961c MC |
887 | RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, |
888 | SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL); | |
4030869d MC |
889 | goto end; |
890 | } | |
891 | } else { | |
aedbb71b | 892 | rl->empty_record_count = 0; |
4030869d MC |
893 | } |
894 | } | |
895 | ||
9dd90232 | 896 | if (rl->level == OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_EARLY) { |
4030869d MC |
897 | thisrr = &rr[0]; |
898 | if (thisrr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA | |
9dd90232 MC |
899 | && !rlayer_early_data_count_ok(rl, thisrr->length, 0, 0)) { |
900 | /* RLAYERfatal already called */ | |
4030869d MC |
901 | goto end; |
902 | } | |
903 | } | |
904 | ||
905 | rl->num_recs = num_recs; | |
906 | rl->curr_rec = 0; | |
907 | rl->num_released = 0; | |
908 | ret = OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_SUCCESS; | |
909 | end: | |
910 | if (macbufs != NULL) { | |
911 | for (j = 0; j < num_recs; j++) { | |
912 | if (macbufs[j].alloced) | |
913 | OPENSSL_free(macbufs[j].mac); | |
914 | } | |
915 | OPENSSL_free(macbufs); | |
916 | } | |
917 | return ret; | |
918 | } | |
919 | ||
1853d20a MC |
920 | /* Shared by ssl3_meth and tls1_meth */ |
921 | int tls_default_validate_record_header(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL3_RECORD *rec) | |
922 | { | |
923 | size_t len = SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH; | |
924 | ||
925 | if (rec->rec_version != rl->version) { | |
926 | RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); | |
927 | return 0; | |
928 | } | |
929 | ||
930 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP | |
931 | /* | |
1704961c MC |
932 | * If OPENSSL_NO_COMP is defined then SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH |
933 | * does not include the compression overhead anyway. | |
934 | */ | |
1853d20a MC |
935 | if (rl->expand == NULL) |
936 | len -= SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD; | |
937 | #endif | |
938 | ||
939 | if (rec->length > len) { | |
940 | RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW, | |
941 | SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); | |
942 | return 0; | |
943 | } | |
944 | ||
945 | return 1; | |
946 | } | |
947 | ||
222cf410 | 948 | int tls_do_uncompress(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL3_RECORD *rec) |
1853d20a MC |
949 | { |
950 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP | |
951 | int i; | |
952 | ||
953 | if (rec->comp == NULL) { | |
954 | rec->comp = (unsigned char *) | |
955 | OPENSSL_malloc(SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH); | |
956 | } | |
957 | if (rec->comp == NULL) | |
958 | return 0; | |
959 | ||
1704961c MC |
960 | i = COMP_expand_block(rl->expand, rec->comp, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, |
961 | rec->data, (int)rec->length); | |
1853d20a MC |
962 | if (i < 0) |
963 | return 0; | |
964 | else | |
965 | rec->length = i; | |
966 | rec->data = rec->comp; | |
967 | return 1; | |
968 | #else | |
969 | return 0; | |
970 | #endif | |
971 | } | |
972 | ||
973 | /* Shared by tlsany_meth, ssl3_meth and tls1_meth */ | |
8124ab56 | 974 | int tls_default_post_process_record(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL3_RECORD *rec) |
1853d20a MC |
975 | { |
976 | if (rl->expand != NULL) { | |
977 | if (rec->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH) { | |
978 | RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW, | |
979 | SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); | |
980 | return 0; | |
981 | } | |
982 | if (!tls_do_uncompress(rl, rec)) { | |
983 | RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE, | |
984 | SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION); | |
985 | return 0; | |
986 | } | |
987 | } | |
988 | ||
989 | if (rec->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) { | |
990 | RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); | |
991 | return 0; | |
992 | } | |
993 | ||
994 | return 1; | |
995 | } | |
996 | ||
997 | /* Shared by tls13_meth and ktls_meth */ | |
8124ab56 | 998 | int tls13_common_post_process_record(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL3_RECORD *rec) |
1853d20a | 999 | { |
1853d20a MC |
1000 | if (rec->type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA |
1001 | && rec->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT | |
1002 | && rec->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { | |
1003 | RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_BAD_RECORD_TYPE); | |
1004 | return 0; | |
1005 | } | |
1006 | ||
b85ebc4b MC |
1007 | if (rl->msg_callback != NULL) |
1008 | rl->msg_callback(0, rl->version, SSL3_RT_INNER_CONTENT_TYPE, &rec->type, | |
1009 | 1, rl->cbarg); | |
1853d20a MC |
1010 | |
1011 | /* | |
1012 | * TLSv1.3 alert and handshake records are required to be non-zero in | |
1013 | * length. | |
1014 | */ | |
1704961c | 1015 | if ((rec->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE || rec->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) |
1853d20a MC |
1016 | && rec->length == 0) { |
1017 | RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); | |
1018 | return 0; | |
1019 | } | |
1020 | ||
1021 | return 1; | |
1022 | } | |
1023 | ||
1704961c | 1024 | int tls_read_record(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, void **rechandle, int *rversion, |
1853d20a | 1025 | int *type, unsigned char **data, size_t *datalen, |
8124ab56 | 1026 | uint16_t *epoch, unsigned char *seq_num) |
4030869d MC |
1027 | { |
1028 | SSL3_RECORD *rec; | |
1029 | ||
1030 | /* | |
1031 | * tls_get_more_records() can return success without actually reading | |
1032 | * anything useful (i.e. if empty records are read). We loop here until | |
1033 | * we have something useful. tls_get_more_records() will eventually fail if | |
1034 | * too many sequential empty records are read. | |
1035 | */ | |
1036 | while (rl->curr_rec >= rl->num_recs) { | |
1037 | int ret; | |
1038 | ||
1039 | if (rl->num_released != rl->num_recs) { | |
1040 | RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_RECORDS_NOT_RELEASED); | |
1041 | return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL; | |
1042 | } | |
1043 | ||
eddb067e | 1044 | ret = rl->funcs->get_more_records(rl); |
4030869d MC |
1045 | |
1046 | if (ret != OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_SUCCESS) | |
1047 | return ret; | |
1048 | } | |
1049 | ||
1050 | /* | |
1051 | * We have now got rl->num_recs records buffered in rl->rrec. rl->curr_rec | |
1052 | * points to the next one to read. | |
1053 | */ | |
1054 | rec = &rl->rrec[rl->curr_rec++]; | |
1055 | ||
1056 | *rechandle = rec; | |
1057 | *rversion = rec->rec_version; | |
1058 | *type = rec->type; | |
eddb067e | 1059 | *data = rec->data + rec->off; |
4030869d | 1060 | *datalen = rec->length; |
eddb067e | 1061 | if (rl->isdtls) { |
279754d4 | 1062 | *epoch = rec->epoch; |
eddb067e MC |
1063 | memcpy(seq_num, rec->seq_num, sizeof(rec->seq_num)); |
1064 | } | |
4030869d MC |
1065 | |
1066 | return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_SUCCESS; | |
1067 | } | |
1068 | ||
1853d20a | 1069 | int tls_release_record(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, void *rechandle) |
4030869d MC |
1070 | { |
1071 | if (!ossl_assert(rl->num_released < rl->curr_rec) | |
1072 | || !ossl_assert(rechandle == &rl->rrec[rl->num_released])) { | |
1073 | /* Should not happen */ | |
1074 | RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_INVALID_RECORD); | |
1075 | return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL; | |
1076 | } | |
1077 | ||
1078 | rl->num_released++; | |
1079 | ||
3de76959 MC |
1080 | if (rl->curr_rec == rl->num_released |
1081 | && (rl->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS) != 0 | |
1082 | && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl->rbuf) == 0) | |
9b7fb65e | 1083 | tls_release_read_buffer(rl); |
3de76959 | 1084 | |
4030869d MC |
1085 | return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_SUCCESS; |
1086 | } | |
1087 | ||
4566dae7 MC |
1088 | int tls_set_options(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, const OSSL_PARAM *options) |
1089 | { | |
1090 | const OSSL_PARAM *p; | |
1091 | ||
1092 | p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(options, OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_OPTIONS); | |
1093 | if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_get_uint64(p, &rl->options)) { | |
1094 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_FAILED_TO_GET_PARAMETER); | |
1095 | return 0; | |
1096 | } | |
1097 | ||
1098 | p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(options, OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_MODE); | |
1099 | if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_get_uint32(p, &rl->mode)) { | |
1100 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_FAILED_TO_GET_PARAMETER); | |
1101 | return 0; | |
1102 | } | |
1103 | ||
1104 | p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(options, | |
1105 | OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_READ_BUFFER_LEN); | |
1106 | if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_get_size_t(p, &rl->rbuf.default_len)) { | |
1107 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_FAILED_TO_GET_PARAMETER); | |
1108 | return 0; | |
1109 | } | |
1110 | ||
1111 | if (rl->level == OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_APPLICATION) { | |
1112 | /* | |
1113 | * We ignore any read_ahead setting prior to the application protection | |
1114 | * level. Otherwise we may read ahead data in a lower protection level | |
1115 | * that is destined for a higher protection level. To simplify the logic | |
1116 | * we don't support that at this stage. | |
1117 | */ | |
1118 | p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(options, | |
1119 | OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_READ_AHEAD); | |
1120 | if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &rl->read_ahead)) { | |
1121 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_FAILED_TO_GET_PARAMETER); | |
1122 | return 0; | |
1123 | } | |
1124 | } | |
1125 | ||
1126 | return 1; | |
1127 | } | |
1128 | ||
1853d20a | 1129 | int |
cc110a0a MC |
1130 | tls_int_new_record_layer(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, const char *propq, int vers, |
1131 | int role, int direction, int level, unsigned char *key, | |
1132 | size_t keylen, unsigned char *iv, size_t ivlen, | |
1133 | unsigned char *mackey, size_t mackeylen, | |
1134 | const EVP_CIPHER *ciph, size_t taglen, | |
cc110a0a | 1135 | int mactype, |
359affde MC |
1136 | const EVP_MD *md, const SSL_COMP *comp, BIO *prev, |
1137 | BIO *transport, BIO *next, BIO_ADDR *local, | |
1138 | BIO_ADDR *peer, const OSSL_PARAM *settings, | |
9dd90232 MC |
1139 | const OSSL_PARAM *options, |
1140 | const OSSL_DISPATCH *fns, void *cbarg, | |
8124ab56 | 1141 | OSSL_RECORD_LAYER **retrl) |
34a4068c MC |
1142 | { |
1143 | OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*rl)); | |
e2d5742b MC |
1144 | const OSSL_PARAM *p; |
1145 | ||
7c293999 MC |
1146 | *retrl = NULL; |
1147 | ||
e2d5742b | 1148 | if (rl == NULL) { |
7b7ad9e5 | 1149 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
7c293999 | 1150 | return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL; |
e2d5742b MC |
1151 | } |
1152 | ||
7f2f0ac7 | 1153 | /* Loop through all the settings since they must all be understood */ |
a16f9d33 MC |
1154 | if (settings != NULL) { |
1155 | for (p = settings; p->key != NULL; p++) { | |
1156 | if (strcmp(p->key, OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_USE_ETM) == 0) { | |
1157 | if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &rl->use_etm)) { | |
7b7ad9e5 | 1158 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_FAILED_TO_GET_PARAMETER); |
a16f9d33 MC |
1159 | goto err; |
1160 | } | |
1161 | } else if (strcmp(p->key, | |
1162 | OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_MAX_FRAG_LEN) == 0) { | |
1163 | if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p, &rl->max_frag_len)) { | |
7b7ad9e5 | 1164 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_FAILED_TO_GET_PARAMETER); |
a16f9d33 MC |
1165 | goto err; |
1166 | } | |
1167 | } else if (strcmp(p->key, | |
1168 | OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_MAX_EARLY_DATA) == 0) { | |
1169 | if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_uint32(p, &rl->max_early_data)) { | |
7b7ad9e5 | 1170 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_FAILED_TO_GET_PARAMETER); |
a16f9d33 MC |
1171 | goto err; |
1172 | } | |
1173 | } else if (strcmp(p->key, | |
1174 | OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_STREAM_MAC) == 0) { | |
1175 | if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &rl->stream_mac)) { | |
7b7ad9e5 | 1176 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_FAILED_TO_GET_PARAMETER); |
a16f9d33 MC |
1177 | goto err; |
1178 | } | |
1704961c MC |
1179 | } else if (strcmp(p->key, |
1180 | OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_TLSTREE) == 0) { | |
a16f9d33 | 1181 | if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &rl->tlstree)) { |
7b7ad9e5 | 1182 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_FAILED_TO_GET_PARAMETER); |
a16f9d33 MC |
1183 | goto err; |
1184 | } | |
1185 | } else { | |
7b7ad9e5 | 1186 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_MANDATORY_PARAMETER); |
8124ab56 MC |
1187 | goto err; |
1188 | } | |
7f2f0ac7 MC |
1189 | } |
1190 | } | |
1191 | ||
aedbb71b MC |
1192 | rl->libctx = libctx; |
1193 | rl->propq = propq; | |
1194 | ||
e2d5742b MC |
1195 | rl->version = vers; |
1196 | rl->role = role; | |
1197 | rl->direction = direction; | |
9dd90232 | 1198 | rl->level = level; |
4030869d | 1199 | |
d3192c26 MC |
1200 | rl->alert = SSL_AD_NO_ALERT; |
1201 | ||
1853d20a | 1202 | if (level == OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_NONE) |
4030869d MC |
1203 | rl->is_first_record = 1; |
1204 | ||
e2d5742b MC |
1205 | if (!tls_set1_bio(rl, transport)) |
1206 | goto err; | |
1207 | ||
359affde MC |
1208 | if (prev != NULL && !BIO_up_ref(prev)) |
1209 | goto err; | |
1210 | rl->prev = prev; | |
1211 | ||
1212 | if (next != NULL && !BIO_up_ref(next)) | |
1213 | goto err; | |
1214 | rl->next = next; | |
1215 | ||
9dd90232 | 1216 | rl->cbarg = cbarg; |
a16f9d33 MC |
1217 | if (fns != NULL) { |
1218 | for (; fns->function_id != 0; fns++) { | |
1219 | switch (fns->function_id) { | |
1220 | case OSSL_FUNC_RLAYER_SKIP_EARLY_DATA: | |
1221 | rl->skip_early_data = OSSL_FUNC_rlayer_skip_early_data(fns); | |
1222 | break; | |
1223 | case OSSL_FUNC_RLAYER_MSG_CALLBACK: | |
1224 | rl->msg_callback = OSSL_FUNC_rlayer_msg_callback(fns); | |
1225 | break; | |
1226 | case OSSL_FUNC_RLAYER_SECURITY: | |
1227 | rl->security = OSSL_FUNC_rlayer_security(fns); | |
1228 | break; | |
5f95eb77 MC |
1229 | case OSSL_FUNC_RLAYER_PADDING: |
1230 | rl->padding = OSSL_FUNC_rlayer_padding(fns); | |
a16f9d33 MC |
1231 | default: |
1232 | /* Just ignore anything we don't understand */ | |
1233 | break; | |
1234 | } | |
9dd90232 MC |
1235 | } |
1236 | } | |
1237 | ||
4566dae7 | 1238 | if (!tls_set_options(rl, options)) { |
7b7ad9e5 | 1239 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_FAILED_TO_GET_PARAMETER); |
4566dae7 MC |
1240 | goto err; |
1241 | } | |
1242 | ||
b9e4e783 MC |
1243 | if ((rl->options & SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS) == 0 |
1244 | && rl->version <= TLS1_VERSION | |
1245 | && !EVP_CIPHER_is_a(ciph, "NULL") | |
1246 | && !EVP_CIPHER_is_a(ciph, "RC4")) { | |
1247 | /* | |
1248 | * Enable vulnerability countermeasure for CBC ciphers with known-IV | |
1249 | * problem (http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) | |
1250 | */ | |
1251 | rl->need_empty_fragments = 1; | |
1252 | } | |
1253 | ||
7c293999 MC |
1254 | *retrl = rl; |
1255 | return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_SUCCESS; | |
cc110a0a | 1256 | err: |
359affde | 1257 | tls_int_free(rl); |
7c293999 | 1258 | return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL; |
cc110a0a MC |
1259 | } |
1260 | ||
7c293999 | 1261 | static int |
cc110a0a | 1262 | tls_new_record_layer(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, const char *propq, int vers, |
279754d4 | 1263 | int role, int direction, int level, uint16_t epoch, |
222cf410 MC |
1264 | unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, unsigned char *iv, |
1265 | size_t ivlen, unsigned char *mackey, size_t mackeylen, | |
cc110a0a | 1266 | const EVP_CIPHER *ciph, size_t taglen, |
cc110a0a | 1267 | int mactype, |
1704961c | 1268 | const EVP_MD *md, const SSL_COMP *comp, BIO *prev, |
359affde | 1269 | BIO *transport, BIO *next, BIO_ADDR *local, BIO_ADDR *peer, |
cc110a0a | 1270 | const OSSL_PARAM *settings, const OSSL_PARAM *options, |
9dd90232 | 1271 | const OSSL_DISPATCH *fns, void *cbarg, |
8124ab56 | 1272 | OSSL_RECORD_LAYER **retrl) |
cc110a0a | 1273 | { |
7c293999 | 1274 | int ret; |
1704961c | 1275 | |
7c293999 MC |
1276 | ret = tls_int_new_record_layer(libctx, propq, vers, role, direction, level, |
1277 | key, keylen, iv, ivlen, mackey, mackeylen, | |
359affde MC |
1278 | ciph, taglen, mactype, md, comp, prev, |
1279 | transport, next, local, peer, settings, | |
8124ab56 | 1280 | options, fns, cbarg, retrl); |
cc110a0a | 1281 | |
7c293999 MC |
1282 | if (ret != OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_SUCCESS) |
1283 | return ret; | |
cc110a0a | 1284 | |
aedbb71b MC |
1285 | switch (vers) { |
1286 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
7c293999 | 1287 | (*retrl)->funcs = &tls_any_funcs; |
aedbb71b MC |
1288 | break; |
1289 | case TLS1_3_VERSION: | |
7c293999 | 1290 | (*retrl)->funcs = &tls_1_3_funcs; |
aedbb71b MC |
1291 | break; |
1292 | case TLS1_2_VERSION: | |
aedbb71b | 1293 | case TLS1_1_VERSION: |
aedbb71b | 1294 | case TLS1_VERSION: |
7c293999 | 1295 | (*retrl)->funcs = &tls_1_funcs; |
aedbb71b MC |
1296 | break; |
1297 | case SSL3_VERSION: | |
7c293999 | 1298 | (*retrl)->funcs = &ssl_3_0_funcs; |
aedbb71b MC |
1299 | break; |
1300 | default: | |
1301 | /* Should not happen */ | |
7c293999 MC |
1302 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
1303 | ret = OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL; | |
aedbb71b MC |
1304 | goto err; |
1305 | } | |
1306 | ||
7c293999 | 1307 | ret = (*retrl)->funcs->set_crypto_state(*retrl, level, key, keylen, iv, |
1704961c MC |
1308 | ivlen, mackey, mackeylen, ciph, |
1309 | taglen, mactype, md, comp); | |
aedbb71b | 1310 | |
e2d5742b | 1311 | err: |
7c293999 MC |
1312 | if (ret != OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_SUCCESS) { |
1313 | OPENSSL_free(*retrl); | |
1314 | *retrl = NULL; | |
1315 | } | |
1316 | return ret; | |
e2d5742b MC |
1317 | } |
1318 | ||
359affde | 1319 | static void tls_int_free(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl) |
34a4068c | 1320 | { |
359affde | 1321 | BIO_free(rl->prev); |
e2d5742b | 1322 | BIO_free(rl->bio); |
359affde MC |
1323 | BIO_free(rl->next); |
1324 | SSL3_BUFFER_release(&rl->rbuf); | |
1325 | ||
151f313e MC |
1326 | tls_release_write_buffer(rl); |
1327 | ||
6366bdd9 MC |
1328 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(rl->enc_ctx); |
1329 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(rl->md_ctx); | |
976b263d | 1330 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP |
359affde | 1331 | COMP_CTX_free(rl->expand); |
976b263d | 1332 | #endif |
359affde | 1333 | |
c77d4556 MC |
1334 | if (rl->version == SSL3_VERSION) |
1335 | OPENSSL_cleanse(rl->mac_secret, sizeof(rl->mac_secret)); | |
1336 | ||
6b5c7ef7 JC |
1337 | SSL3_RECORD_release(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES); |
1338 | ||
34a4068c MC |
1339 | OPENSSL_free(rl); |
1340 | } | |
1341 | ||
359affde MC |
1342 | int tls_free(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl) |
1343 | { | |
1344 | SSL3_BUFFER *rbuf; | |
1345 | size_t left, written; | |
1346 | int ret = 1; | |
1347 | ||
1348 | rbuf = &rl->rbuf; | |
1349 | ||
1350 | left = SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf); | |
1351 | if (left > 0) { | |
1352 | /* | |
1353 | * This record layer is closing but we still have data left in our | |
1354 | * buffer. It must be destined for the next epoch - so push it there. | |
1355 | */ | |
1356 | ret = BIO_write_ex(rl->next, rbuf->buf + rbuf->offset, left, &written); | |
1357 | } | |
1358 | tls_int_free(rl); | |
1359 | ||
1360 | return ret; | |
1361 | } | |
1362 | ||
1853d20a | 1363 | int tls_reset(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl) |
34a4068c MC |
1364 | { |
1365 | memset(rl, 0, sizeof(*rl)); | |
1366 | return 1; | |
1367 | } | |
1368 | ||
1853d20a | 1369 | int tls_unprocessed_read_pending(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl) |
34a4068c | 1370 | { |
0755722c | 1371 | return SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl->rbuf) != 0; |
34a4068c MC |
1372 | } |
1373 | ||
1853d20a | 1374 | int tls_processed_read_pending(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl) |
34a4068c | 1375 | { |
4030869d | 1376 | return rl->curr_rec < rl->num_recs; |
34a4068c MC |
1377 | } |
1378 | ||
1853d20a | 1379 | size_t tls_app_data_pending(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl) |
34a4068c | 1380 | { |
8bbf7ef6 MC |
1381 | size_t i; |
1382 | size_t num = 0; | |
1383 | ||
1704961c | 1384 | for (i = rl->curr_rec; i < rl->num_recs; i++) { |
8bbf7ef6 MC |
1385 | if (rl->rrec[i].type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) |
1386 | return num; | |
1387 | num += rl->rrec[i].length; | |
1388 | } | |
1389 | return num; | |
34a4068c MC |
1390 | } |
1391 | ||
1853d20a | 1392 | int tls_write_pending(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl) |
34a4068c MC |
1393 | { |
1394 | return 0; | |
1395 | } | |
1396 | ||
1853d20a | 1397 | size_t tls_get_max_record_len(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl) |
34a4068c MC |
1398 | { |
1399 | return 0; | |
1400 | } | |
1401 | ||
1853d20a | 1402 | size_t tls_get_max_records(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl) |
34a4068c MC |
1403 | { |
1404 | return 0; | |
1405 | } | |
1406 | ||
2b71b042 MC |
1407 | int tls_write_records(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, OSSL_RECORD_TEMPLATE *templates, |
1408 | size_t numtempl) | |
34a4068c | 1409 | { |
2b71b042 MC |
1410 | WPACKET pkt[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES + 1]; |
1411 | SSL3_RECORD wr[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES + 1]; | |
1412 | WPACKET *thispkt; | |
1413 | SSL3_RECORD *thiswr; | |
1414 | unsigned char *recordstart; | |
3eaead71 | 1415 | int mac_size, clear = 0; |
2b71b042 MC |
1416 | int eivlen = 0; |
1417 | size_t align = 0; | |
1418 | SSL3_BUFFER *wb; | |
1419 | SSL_SESSION *sess; | |
1420 | size_t totlen = 0, len, wpinited = 0; | |
1421 | size_t j, prefix = 0; | |
1422 | int using_ktls; | |
1423 | /* TODO(RECLAYER): REMOVE ME */ | |
1424 | SSL_CONNECTION *s = rl->cbarg; | |
1425 | SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s); | |
1426 | OSSL_RECORD_TEMPLATE prefixtempl; | |
1427 | OSSL_RECORD_TEMPLATE *thistempl; | |
1428 | ||
151f313e | 1429 | /* Check we don't have pending data waiting to write */ |
e7694c69 | 1430 | if (!ossl_assert(rl->nextwbuf >= rl->numwpipes |
151f313e | 1431 | || SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl->wbuf[rl->nextwbuf]) == 0)) { |
2b71b042 MC |
1432 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); |
1433 | goto err; | |
1434 | } | |
1435 | ||
2b71b042 MC |
1436 | sess = s->session; |
1437 | ||
1438 | if ((sess == NULL) | |
1439 | || (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) | |
1440 | || (EVP_MD_CTX_get0_md(s->write_hash) == NULL)) { | |
1441 | clear = s->enc_write_ctx ? 0 : 1; /* must be AEAD cipher */ | |
1442 | mac_size = 0; | |
1443 | } else { | |
1444 | mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_get_size(s->write_hash); | |
1445 | if (mac_size < 0) { | |
1446 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1447 | goto err; | |
1448 | } | |
1449 | } | |
1450 | ||
1451 | /* | |
1452 | * 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when we have recursively called | |
1453 | * ourselves. | |
1454 | * Do we need to do that recursion in order to add an empty record prefix? | |
1455 | */ | |
b9e4e783 | 1456 | prefix = rl->need_empty_fragments |
2b71b042 | 1457 | && !clear |
2b71b042 MC |
1458 | && templates[0].type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA; |
1459 | ||
e7694c69 | 1460 | if (rl->numwpipes < numtempl + prefix) { |
2b71b042 MC |
1461 | /* |
1462 | * TODO(RECLAYER): In the prefix case the first buffer can be a lot | |
1463 | * smaller. It is wasteful to allocate a full sized buffer here | |
1464 | */ | |
151f313e | 1465 | if (!tls_setup_write_buffer(rl, numtempl + prefix, 0)) { |
2b71b042 MC |
1466 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
1467 | return -1; | |
1468 | } | |
1469 | } | |
1470 | ||
b5cf81f7 | 1471 | using_ktls = BIO_get_ktls_send(rl->bio); |
2b71b042 MC |
1472 | if (!ossl_assert(!using_ktls || !prefix)) { |
1473 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1474 | goto err; | |
1475 | } | |
1476 | ||
1477 | if (prefix) { | |
1478 | /* | |
1479 | * countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites (see | |
1480 | * http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) | |
1481 | */ | |
1482 | prefixtempl.buf = NULL; | |
1d367677 | 1483 | prefixtempl.version = templates[0].version; |
2b71b042 MC |
1484 | prefixtempl.buflen = 0; |
1485 | prefixtempl.type = SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA; | |
1486 | wpinited = 1; | |
1487 | ||
151f313e | 1488 | wb = &rl->wbuf[0]; |
2b71b042 MC |
1489 | /* TODO(RECLAYER): This alignment calculation no longer seems right */ |
1490 | #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0 | |
1491 | /* | |
1492 | * extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks, which would be | |
1493 | * multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so if we want to align the real | |
1494 | * payload, then we can just pretend we simply have two headers. | |
1495 | */ | |
1496 | align = (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + 2 * SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
1497 | align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD); | |
1498 | #endif | |
1499 | SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, align); | |
1500 | if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt[0], SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb), | |
1501 | SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb), 0) | |
1502 | || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt[0], align, NULL)) { | |
1503 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1504 | goto err; | |
1505 | } | |
1506 | wpinited = 1; | |
1507 | } | |
1508 | for (j = 0; j < numtempl; j++) { | |
1509 | thispkt = &pkt[prefix + j]; | |
1510 | ||
151f313e | 1511 | wb = &rl->wbuf[prefix + j]; |
2b71b042 MC |
1512 | wb->type = templates[j].type; |
1513 | ||
1514 | if (using_ktls) { | |
1515 | /* | |
1516 | * ktls doesn't modify the buffer, but to avoid a warning we need | |
1517 | * to discard the const qualifier. | |
1518 | * This doesn't leak memory because the buffers have been | |
1519 | * released when switching to ktls. | |
1520 | */ | |
1521 | SSL3_BUFFER_set_buf(wb, (unsigned char *)templates[j].buf); | |
1522 | SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, 0); | |
1523 | SSL3_BUFFER_set_app_buffer(wb, 1); | |
1524 | } else { | |
1525 | #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD != 0 | |
1526 | align = (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
1527 | align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 | |
1528 | - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD); | |
1529 | #endif | |
1530 | /* TODO(RECLAYER): Is this alignment actually used somewhere? */ | |
1531 | SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, align); | |
1532 | if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(thispkt, SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb), | |
1533 | SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb), 0) | |
1534 | || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, align, NULL)) { | |
1535 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1536 | goto err; | |
1537 | } | |
1538 | wpinited++; | |
1539 | } | |
1540 | } | |
1541 | ||
1542 | if (!using_ktls) { | |
1543 | /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */ | |
f2892e21 MC |
1544 | if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL && RLAYER_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(rl) |
1545 | && rl->version != TLS1_3_VERSION) { | |
2b71b042 MC |
1546 | int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_mode(s->enc_write_ctx); |
1547 | if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) { | |
1548 | eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx); | |
1549 | if (eivlen < 0) { | |
1550 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG); | |
1551 | goto err; | |
1552 | } | |
1553 | if (eivlen <= 1) | |
1554 | eivlen = 0; | |
1555 | } else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) { | |
1556 | /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */ | |
1557 | eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; | |
1558 | } else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) { | |
1559 | eivlen = EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; | |
1560 | } | |
1561 | } | |
1562 | } | |
1563 | ||
1564 | totlen = 0; | |
1565 | /* Clear our SSL3_RECORD structures */ | |
1566 | memset(wr, 0, sizeof(wr)); | |
1567 | for (j = 0; j < numtempl + prefix; j++) { | |
2b71b042 MC |
1568 | unsigned char *compressdata = NULL; |
1569 | size_t maxcomplen; | |
1570 | unsigned int rectype; | |
1571 | ||
1572 | thispkt = &pkt[j]; | |
1573 | thiswr = &wr[j]; | |
1574 | thistempl = (j == 0 && prefix == 1) ? &prefixtempl : | |
1575 | &templates[j - prefix]; | |
1576 | ||
1577 | /* | |
1578 | * In TLSv1.3, once encrypting, we always use application data for the | |
1579 | * record type | |
1580 | */ | |
f2892e21 | 1581 | if (rl->version == TLS1_3_VERSION |
2b71b042 MC |
1582 | && s->enc_write_ctx != NULL |
1583 | && (s->statem.enc_write_state != ENC_WRITE_STATE_WRITE_PLAIN_ALERTS | |
1584 | || thistempl->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT)) | |
1585 | rectype = SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA; | |
1586 | else | |
1587 | rectype = thistempl->type; | |
1588 | ||
1589 | SSL3_RECORD_set_type(thiswr, rectype); | |
1d367677 | 1590 | SSL3_RECORD_set_rec_version(thiswr, thistempl->version); |
2b71b042 MC |
1591 | |
1592 | maxcomplen = thistempl->buflen; | |
1593 | if (s->compress != NULL) | |
1594 | maxcomplen += SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD; | |
1595 | ||
1596 | /* | |
1597 | * When using offload kernel will write the header. | |
1598 | * Otherwise write the header now | |
1599 | */ | |
1600 | if (!using_ktls | |
1601 | && (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(thispkt, rectype) | |
1d367677 | 1602 | || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(thispkt, thistempl->version) |
2b71b042 MC |
1603 | || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(thispkt) |
1604 | || (eivlen > 0 | |
1605 | && !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, eivlen, NULL)) | |
1606 | || (maxcomplen > 0 | |
1607 | && !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(thispkt, maxcomplen, | |
1608 | &compressdata)))) { | |
1609 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1610 | goto err; | |
1611 | } | |
1612 | ||
1613 | /* lets setup the record stuff. */ | |
1614 | SSL3_RECORD_set_data(thiswr, compressdata); | |
1615 | SSL3_RECORD_set_length(thiswr, thistempl->buflen); | |
1616 | /* | |
1617 | * TODO(RECLAYER): Cast away the const. Should be safe - by why is this | |
1618 | * necessary? | |
1619 | */ | |
1620 | SSL3_RECORD_set_input(thiswr, (unsigned char *)thistempl->buf); | |
1621 | totlen += thistempl->buflen; | |
1622 | ||
1623 | /* | |
1624 | * we now 'read' from thiswr->input, thiswr->length bytes into | |
1625 | * thiswr->data | |
1626 | */ | |
1627 | ||
1628 | /* first we compress */ | |
1629 | if (s->compress != NULL) { | |
1630 | if (!ssl3_do_compress(s, thiswr) | |
1631 | || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, thiswr->length, NULL)) { | |
1632 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE); | |
1633 | goto err; | |
1634 | } | |
1635 | } else { | |
1636 | if (using_ktls) { | |
1637 | SSL3_RECORD_reset_data(&wr[j]); | |
1638 | } else { | |
1639 | if (!WPACKET_memcpy(thispkt, thiswr->input, thiswr->length)) { | |
1640 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1641 | goto err; | |
1642 | } | |
1643 | SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(&wr[j]); | |
1644 | } | |
1645 | } | |
1646 | ||
f2892e21 | 1647 | if (rl->version == TLS1_3_VERSION |
2b71b042 MC |
1648 | && !using_ktls |
1649 | && s->enc_write_ctx != NULL | |
1650 | && (s->statem.enc_write_state != ENC_WRITE_STATE_WRITE_PLAIN_ALERTS | |
1651 | || thistempl->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT)) { | |
1652 | size_t rlen, max_send_fragment; | |
1653 | ||
1654 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(thispkt, thistempl->type)) { | |
1655 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1656 | goto err; | |
1657 | } | |
1658 | SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, 1); | |
1659 | ||
1660 | /* Add TLS1.3 padding */ | |
1661 | max_send_fragment = ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s); | |
1662 | rlen = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr); | |
1663 | if (rlen < max_send_fragment) { | |
1664 | size_t padding = 0; | |
1665 | size_t max_padding = max_send_fragment - rlen; | |
5f95eb77 MC |
1666 | |
1667 | if (rl->padding != NULL) { | |
1668 | padding = rl->padding(rl->cbarg, thistempl->type, rlen); | |
2b71b042 MC |
1669 | } else if (s->block_padding > 0) { |
1670 | size_t mask = s->block_padding - 1; | |
1671 | size_t remainder; | |
1672 | ||
1673 | /* optimize for power of 2 */ | |
1674 | if ((s->block_padding & mask) == 0) | |
1675 | remainder = rlen & mask; | |
1676 | else | |
1677 | remainder = rlen % s->block_padding; | |
1678 | /* don't want to add a block of padding if we don't have to */ | |
1679 | if (remainder == 0) | |
1680 | padding = 0; | |
1681 | else | |
1682 | padding = s->block_padding - remainder; | |
1683 | } | |
1684 | if (padding > 0) { | |
1685 | /* do not allow the record to exceed max plaintext length */ | |
1686 | if (padding > max_padding) | |
1687 | padding = max_padding; | |
1688 | if (!WPACKET_memset(thispkt, 0, padding)) { | |
1689 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, | |
1690 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1691 | goto err; | |
1692 | } | |
1693 | SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, padding); | |
1694 | } | |
1695 | } | |
1696 | } | |
1697 | ||
1698 | /* | |
1699 | * we should still have the output to thiswr->data and the input from | |
1700 | * wr->input. Length should be thiswr->length. thiswr->data still points | |
1701 | * in the wb->buf | |
1702 | */ | |
1703 | ||
1704 | if (!using_ktls && !SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) { | |
1705 | unsigned char *mac; | |
1706 | ||
1707 | if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, mac_size, &mac) | |
1708 | || !ssl->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, thiswr, mac, 1)) { | |
1709 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1710 | goto err; | |
1711 | } | |
1712 | } | |
1713 | ||
1714 | /* | |
1715 | * Reserve some bytes for any growth that may occur during encryption. | |
1716 | * This will be at most one cipher block or the tag length if using | |
1717 | * AEAD. SSL_RT_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE covers either case. | |
1718 | */ | |
1719 | if (!using_ktls) { | |
1720 | if (!WPACKET_reserve_bytes(thispkt, | |
1721 | SSL_RT_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE, | |
1722 | NULL) | |
1723 | /* | |
1724 | * We also need next the amount of bytes written to this | |
1725 | * sub-packet | |
1726 | */ | |
1727 | || !WPACKET_get_length(thispkt, &len)) { | |
1728 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1729 | goto err; | |
1730 | } | |
1731 | ||
1732 | /* Get a pointer to the start of this record excluding header */ | |
1733 | recordstart = WPACKET_get_curr(thispkt) - len; | |
1734 | SSL3_RECORD_set_data(thiswr, recordstart); | |
1735 | SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(thiswr); | |
1736 | SSL3_RECORD_set_length(thiswr, len); | |
1737 | } | |
1738 | } | |
1739 | ||
1740 | if (s->statem.enc_write_state == ENC_WRITE_STATE_WRITE_PLAIN_ALERTS) { | |
1741 | /* | |
1742 | * We haven't actually negotiated the version yet, but we're trying to | |
1743 | * send early data - so we need to use the tls13enc function. | |
1744 | */ | |
1745 | if (tls13_enc(s, wr, numtempl, 1, NULL, mac_size) < 1) { | |
1746 | if (!ossl_statem_in_error(s)) { | |
1747 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1748 | } | |
1749 | goto err; | |
1750 | } | |
1751 | } else { | |
1752 | if (!using_ktls) { | |
1753 | if (prefix) { | |
1754 | if (ssl->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, wr, 1, 1, NULL, mac_size) < 1) { | |
1755 | if (!ossl_statem_in_error(s)) { | |
1756 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1757 | } | |
1758 | goto err; | |
1759 | } | |
1760 | } | |
1761 | if (ssl->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, wr + prefix, numtempl, 1, NULL, | |
1762 | mac_size) < 1) { | |
1763 | if (!ossl_statem_in_error(s)) { | |
1764 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1765 | } | |
1766 | goto err; | |
1767 | } | |
1768 | } | |
1769 | } | |
1770 | ||
1771 | for (j = 0; j < prefix + numtempl; j++) { | |
1772 | size_t origlen; | |
1773 | ||
1774 | thispkt = &pkt[j]; | |
1775 | thiswr = &wr[j]; | |
1776 | thistempl = (prefix == 1 && j == 0) ? &prefixtempl | |
1777 | : &templates[j - prefix]; | |
1778 | ||
1779 | if (using_ktls) | |
1780 | goto mac_done; | |
1781 | ||
1782 | /* Allocate bytes for the encryption overhead */ | |
1783 | if (!WPACKET_get_length(thispkt, &origlen) | |
1784 | /* Encryption should never shrink the data! */ | |
1785 | || origlen > thiswr->length | |
1786 | || (thiswr->length > origlen | |
1787 | && !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, | |
1788 | thiswr->length - origlen, | |
1789 | NULL))) { | |
1790 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1791 | goto err; | |
1792 | } | |
1793 | if (SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) { | |
1794 | unsigned char *mac; | |
1795 | ||
1796 | if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, mac_size, &mac) | |
1797 | || !ssl->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, thiswr, mac, 1)) { | |
1798 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1799 | goto err; | |
1800 | } | |
1801 | SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, mac_size); | |
1802 | } | |
1803 | ||
1804 | if (!WPACKET_get_length(thispkt, &len) | |
1805 | || !WPACKET_close(thispkt)) { | |
1806 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1807 | goto err; | |
1808 | } | |
1809 | ||
31059013 | 1810 | if (rl->msg_callback) { |
2b71b042 MC |
1811 | recordstart = WPACKET_get_curr(thispkt) - len |
1812 | - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
31059013 MC |
1813 | rl->msg_callback(1, thiswr->rec_version, SSL3_RT_HEADER, recordstart, |
1814 | SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, rl->cbarg); | |
2b71b042 | 1815 | |
f2892e21 | 1816 | if (rl->version == TLS1_3_VERSION && s->enc_write_ctx != NULL) { |
2b71b042 MC |
1817 | unsigned char ctype = thistempl->type; |
1818 | ||
31059013 MC |
1819 | rl->msg_callback(1, thiswr->rec_version, SSL3_RT_INNER_CONTENT_TYPE, |
1820 | &ctype, 1, rl->cbarg); | |
2b71b042 MC |
1821 | } |
1822 | } | |
1823 | ||
1824 | if (!WPACKET_finish(thispkt)) { | |
1825 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1826 | goto err; | |
1827 | } | |
1828 | ||
1829 | /* header is added by the kernel when using offload */ | |
1830 | SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH); | |
1831 | ||
1832 | mac_done: | |
1833 | /* | |
1834 | * we should now have thiswr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which | |
1835 | * is thiswr->length long. | |
1836 | * Setting the type is not needed but helps for debugging | |
1837 | */ | |
1838 | SSL3_RECORD_set_type(thiswr, thistempl->type); | |
1839 | ||
1840 | /* now let's set up wb */ | |
151f313e | 1841 | SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&rl->wbuf[j], SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr)); |
2b71b042 MC |
1842 | } |
1843 | ||
151f313e | 1844 | rl->nextwbuf = 0; |
2b71b042 MC |
1845 | /* we now just need to write the buffers */ |
1846 | return tls_retry_write_records(rl); | |
1847 | err: | |
1848 | for (j = 0; j < wpinited; j++) | |
1849 | WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt[j]); | |
1850 | return -1; | |
34a4068c MC |
1851 | } |
1852 | ||
2b71b042 MC |
1853 | /* if SSL3_BUFFER_get_left() != 0, we need to call this |
1854 | * | |
1855 | * Return values are as per SSL_write() | |
1856 | */ | |
1857 | int tls_retry_write_records(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl) | |
34a4068c | 1858 | { |
2b71b042 MC |
1859 | int i; |
1860 | SSL3_BUFFER *thiswb; | |
2b71b042 MC |
1861 | size_t tmpwrit = 0; |
1862 | SSL_CONNECTION *s = rl->cbarg; | |
1863 | ||
e7694c69 | 1864 | if (rl->nextwbuf >= rl->numwpipes) |
151f313e MC |
1865 | return 1; |
1866 | ||
2b71b042 | 1867 | for (;;) { |
151f313e MC |
1868 | thiswb = &rl->wbuf[rl->nextwbuf]; |
1869 | ||
2b71b042 | 1870 | clear_sys_error(); |
b5cf81f7 | 1871 | if (rl->bio != NULL) { |
2b71b042 MC |
1872 | s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING; |
1873 | ||
1874 | /* | |
1875 | * To prevent coalescing of control and data messages, | |
1876 | * such as in buffer_write, we flush the BIO | |
1877 | */ | |
b5cf81f7 | 1878 | if (BIO_get_ktls_send(rl->bio) |
2b71b042 | 1879 | && thiswb->type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) { |
b5cf81f7 | 1880 | i = BIO_flush(rl->bio); |
2b71b042 MC |
1881 | if (i <= 0) |
1882 | return i; | |
b5cf81f7 | 1883 | BIO_set_ktls_ctrl_msg(rl->bio, thiswb->type); |
2b71b042 | 1884 | } |
b5cf81f7 | 1885 | i = BIO_write(rl->bio, (char *) |
2b71b042 MC |
1886 | &(SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(thiswb) |
1887 | [SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(thiswb)]), | |
1888 | (unsigned int)SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(thiswb)); | |
1889 | if (i >= 0) | |
1890 | tmpwrit = i; | |
1891 | } else { | |
1892 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET); | |
1893 | i = -1; | |
1894 | } | |
1895 | ||
1896 | /* | |
1897 | * When an empty fragment is sent on a connection using KTLS, | |
1898 | * it is sent as a write of zero bytes. If this zero byte | |
1899 | * write succeeds, i will be 0 rather than a non-zero value. | |
1900 | * Treat i == 0 as success rather than an error for zero byte | |
1901 | * writes to permit this case. | |
1902 | */ | |
1903 | if (i >= 0 && tmpwrit == SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(thiswb)) { | |
1904 | SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(thiswb, 0); | |
1905 | SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(thiswb, tmpwrit); | |
e7694c69 | 1906 | if (++(rl->nextwbuf) < rl->numwpipes) |
2b71b042 MC |
1907 | continue; |
1908 | s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; | |
151f313e | 1909 | |
e7694c69 | 1910 | if (rl->nextwbuf == rl->numwpipes |
151f313e MC |
1911 | && (rl->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS) != 0) |
1912 | tls_release_write_buffer(rl); | |
2b71b042 MC |
1913 | return 1; |
1914 | } else if (i <= 0) { | |
1915 | if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
1916 | /* | |
1917 | * For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole point in | |
1918 | * using a datagram service | |
1919 | */ | |
1920 | SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(thiswb, 0); | |
e7694c69 | 1921 | if (++(rl->nextwbuf) == rl->numwpipes |
151f313e MC |
1922 | && (rl->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS) != 0) |
1923 | tls_release_write_buffer(rl); | |
1924 | ||
2b71b042 MC |
1925 | } |
1926 | return i; | |
1927 | } | |
1928 | SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(thiswb, tmpwrit); | |
1929 | SSL3_BUFFER_sub_left(thiswb, tmpwrit); | |
1930 | } | |
34a4068c MC |
1931 | } |
1932 | ||
1853d20a | 1933 | int tls_get_alert_code(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl) |
e2d5742b MC |
1934 | { |
1935 | return rl->alert; | |
1936 | } | |
1937 | ||
1853d20a | 1938 | int tls_set1_bio(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, BIO *bio) |
e2d5742b MC |
1939 | { |
1940 | if (bio != NULL && !BIO_up_ref(bio)) | |
1941 | return 0; | |
1942 | BIO_free(rl->bio); | |
1943 | rl->bio = bio; | |
1944 | ||
1945 | return 1; | |
1946 | } | |
1947 | ||
1853d20a MC |
1948 | /* Shared by most methods except tlsany_meth */ |
1949 | int tls_default_set_protocol_version(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, int version) | |
1950 | { | |
1951 | if (rl->version != version) | |
1952 | return 0; | |
1953 | ||
1954 | return 1; | |
1955 | } | |
1956 | ||
1957 | int tls_set_protocol_version(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, int version) | |
1958 | { | |
1959 | return rl->funcs->set_protocol_version(rl, version); | |
1960 | } | |
1961 | ||
1962 | void tls_set_plain_alerts(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, int allow) | |
1963 | { | |
1964 | rl->allow_plain_alerts = allow; | |
1965 | } | |
1966 | ||
1967 | void tls_set_first_handshake(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, int first) | |
1968 | { | |
1969 | rl->is_first_handshake = first; | |
1970 | } | |
1971 | ||
8124ab56 MC |
1972 | void tls_set_max_pipelines(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, size_t max_pipelines) |
1973 | { | |
1974 | rl->max_pipelines = max_pipelines; | |
1975 | if (max_pipelines > 1) | |
1976 | rl->read_ahead = 1; | |
1977 | } | |
1978 | ||
d0b17ea0 MC |
1979 | void tls_get_state(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, const char **shortstr, |
1980 | const char **longstr) | |
1981 | { | |
1982 | const char *shrt, *lng; | |
1704961c | 1983 | |
d0b17ea0 MC |
1984 | switch (rl->rstate) { |
1985 | case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER: | |
1986 | shrt = "RH"; | |
1987 | lng = "read header"; | |
1988 | break; | |
1989 | case SSL_ST_READ_BODY: | |
1990 | shrt = "RB"; | |
1991 | lng = "read body"; | |
1992 | break; | |
1993 | default: | |
1994 | shrt = lng = "unknown"; | |
1995 | break; | |
1996 | } | |
1997 | if (shortstr != NULL) | |
1998 | *shortstr = shrt; | |
1999 | if (longstr != NULL) | |
2000 | *longstr = lng; | |
2001 | } | |
2002 | ||
34a4068c MC |
2003 | const OSSL_RECORD_METHOD ossl_tls_record_method = { |
2004 | tls_new_record_layer, | |
2005 | tls_free, | |
2006 | tls_reset, | |
2007 | tls_unprocessed_read_pending, | |
2008 | tls_processed_read_pending, | |
2009 | tls_app_data_pending, | |
2010 | tls_write_pending, | |
2011 | tls_get_max_record_len, | |
2012 | tls_get_max_records, | |
2b71b042 MC |
2013 | tls_write_records, |
2014 | tls_retry_write_records, | |
34a4068c | 2015 | tls_read_record, |
e2d5742b MC |
2016 | tls_release_record, |
2017 | tls_get_alert_code, | |
2018 | tls_set1_bio, | |
1853d20a MC |
2019 | tls_set_protocol_version, |
2020 | tls_set_plain_alerts, | |
2021 | tls_set_first_handshake, | |
8124ab56 | 2022 | tls_set_max_pipelines, |
d0b17ea0 | 2023 | NULL, |
4566dae7 MC |
2024 | tls_get_state, |
2025 | tls_set_options | |
cc110a0a | 2026 | }; |