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Commit | Line | Data |
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846e33c7 RS |
1 | /* |
2 | * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. | |
258f8721 | 3 | * |
846e33c7 RS |
4 | * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use |
5 | * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy | |
6 | * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at | |
7 | * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html | |
258f8721 MC |
8 | */ |
9 | ||
10 | #include "../ssl_locl.h" | |
68570797 | 11 | #include "internal/constant_time_locl.h" |
02a36fda | 12 | #include <openssl/rand.h> |
c99c4c11 | 13 | #include "record_locl.h" |
67dc995e | 14 | #include "internal/cryptlib.h" |
02a36fda MC |
15 | |
16 | static const unsigned char ssl3_pad_1[48] = { | |
17 | 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, | |
18 | 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, | |
19 | 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, | |
20 | 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, | |
21 | 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, | |
22 | 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36 | |
23 | }; | |
24 | ||
25 | static const unsigned char ssl3_pad_2[48] = { | |
26 | 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, | |
27 | 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, | |
28 | 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, | |
29 | 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, | |
30 | 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, | |
31 | 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c | |
32 | }; | |
258f8721 | 33 | |
6b41b3f5 MC |
34 | /* |
35 | * Clear the contents of an SSL3_RECORD but retain any memory allocated | |
36 | */ | |
5607b275 | 37 | void SSL3_RECORD_clear(SSL3_RECORD *r, size_t num_recs) |
258f8721 | 38 | { |
94777c9c | 39 | unsigned char *comp; |
5607b275 | 40 | size_t i; |
6b41b3f5 | 41 | |
94777c9c MC |
42 | for (i = 0; i < num_recs; i++) { |
43 | comp = r[i].comp; | |
44 | ||
45 | memset(&r[i], 0, sizeof(*r)); | |
46 | r[i].comp = comp; | |
47 | } | |
258f8721 MC |
48 | } |
49 | ||
5607b275 | 50 | void SSL3_RECORD_release(SSL3_RECORD *r, size_t num_recs) |
258f8721 | 51 | { |
5607b275 | 52 | size_t i; |
94777c9c MC |
53 | |
54 | for (i = 0; i < num_recs; i++) { | |
55 | OPENSSL_free(r[i].comp); | |
56 | r[i].comp = NULL; | |
57 | } | |
258f8721 MC |
58 | } |
59 | ||
258f8721 MC |
60 | void SSL3_RECORD_set_seq_num(SSL3_RECORD *r, const unsigned char *seq_num) |
61 | { | |
e5bf62f7 | 62 | memcpy(r->seq_num, seq_num, SEQ_NUM_SIZE); |
258f8721 | 63 | } |
fe589e61 | 64 | |
94777c9c MC |
65 | /* |
66 | * Peeks ahead into "read_ahead" data to see if we have a whole record waiting | |
67 | * for us in the buffer. | |
68 | */ | |
ea71906e | 69 | static int ssl3_record_app_data_waiting(SSL *s) |
94777c9c MC |
70 | { |
71 | SSL3_BUFFER *rbuf; | |
8e6d03ca | 72 | size_t left, len; |
94777c9c MC |
73 | unsigned char *p; |
74 | ||
75 | rbuf = RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer); | |
76 | ||
77 | p = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(rbuf); | |
78 | if (p == NULL) | |
79 | return 0; | |
80 | ||
81 | left = SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf); | |
82 | ||
83 | if (left < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) | |
84 | return 0; | |
85 | ||
86 | p += SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(rbuf); | |
87 | ||
88 | /* | |
89 | * We only check the type and record length, we will sanity check version | |
90 | * etc later | |
91 | */ | |
92 | if (*p != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) | |
93 | return 0; | |
94 | ||
95 | p += 3; | |
96 | n2s(p, len); | |
97 | ||
98 | if (left < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + len) | |
99 | return 0; | |
100 | ||
101 | return 1; | |
102 | } | |
103 | ||
a832b5ef | 104 | int early_data_count_ok(SSL *s, size_t length, size_t overhead, int *al) |
70ef40a0 MC |
105 | { |
106 | uint32_t max_early_data = s->max_early_data; | |
add8d0e9 | 107 | SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session; |
70ef40a0 MC |
108 | |
109 | /* | |
7daf7156 | 110 | * If we are a client then we always use the max_early_data from the |
add8d0e9 MC |
111 | * session/psksession. Otherwise we go with the lowest out of the max early |
112 | * data set in the session and the configured max_early_data. | |
70ef40a0 | 113 | */ |
add8d0e9 MC |
114 | if (!s->server && sess->ext.max_early_data == 0) { |
115 | if (!ossl_assert(s->psksession != NULL | |
116 | && s->psksession->ext.max_early_data > 0)) { | |
117 | SSLerr(SSL_F_EARLY_DATA_COUNT_OK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
118 | return 0; | |
119 | } | |
120 | sess = s->psksession; | |
121 | } | |
122 | if (!s->server | |
123 | || (s->hit && sess->ext.max_early_data < s->max_early_data)) | |
124 | max_early_data = sess->ext.max_early_data; | |
70ef40a0 MC |
125 | |
126 | if (max_early_data == 0) { | |
7daf7156 MC |
127 | if (al != NULL) |
128 | *al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; | |
70ef40a0 MC |
129 | SSLerr(SSL_F_EARLY_DATA_COUNT_OK, SSL_R_TOO_MUCH_EARLY_DATA); |
130 | return 0; | |
131 | } | |
132 | ||
133 | /* If we are dealing with ciphertext we need to allow for the overhead */ | |
134 | max_early_data += overhead; | |
135 | ||
7daf7156 MC |
136 | if (s->early_data_count + length > max_early_data) { |
137 | if (al != NULL) | |
138 | *al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; | |
70ef40a0 MC |
139 | SSLerr(SSL_F_EARLY_DATA_COUNT_OK, SSL_R_TOO_MUCH_EARLY_DATA); |
140 | return 0; | |
141 | } | |
7daf7156 | 142 | s->early_data_count += length; |
70ef40a0 MC |
143 | |
144 | return 1; | |
145 | } | |
146 | ||
fe589e61 MC |
147 | /* |
148 | * MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS defines the number of consecutive, empty records that | |
149 | * will be processed per call to ssl3_get_record. Without this limit an | |
150 | * attacker could send empty records at a faster rate than we can process and | |
151 | * cause ssl3_get_record to loop forever. | |
152 | */ | |
153 | #define MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS 32 | |
154 | ||
32ec4153 | 155 | #define SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH 2 |
fe589e61 | 156 | /*- |
94777c9c | 157 | * Call this to get new input records. |
fe589e61 MC |
158 | * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error |
159 | * or non-blocking IO. | |
94777c9c MC |
160 | * When it finishes, |numrpipes| records have been decoded. For each record 'i': |
161 | * rr[i].type - is the type of record | |
162 | * rr[i].data, - data | |
163 | * rr[i].length, - number of bytes | |
164 | * Multiple records will only be returned if the record types are all | |
165 | * SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA. The number of records returned will always be <= | |
166 | * |max_pipelines| | |
fe589e61 MC |
167 | */ |
168 | /* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */ | |
169 | int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s) | |
170 | { | |
6a149cee | 171 | int al; |
8e6d03ca MC |
172 | int enc_err, rret, ret = -1; |
173 | int i; | |
174 | size_t more, n; | |
88858868 | 175 | SSL3_RECORD *rr, *thisrr; |
94777c9c | 176 | SSL3_BUFFER *rbuf; |
fe589e61 MC |
177 | SSL_SESSION *sess; |
178 | unsigned char *p; | |
179 | unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; | |
6a149cee | 180 | unsigned int version; |
72716e79 MC |
181 | size_t mac_size; |
182 | int imac_size; | |
183 | size_t num_recs = 0, max_recs, j; | |
6a149cee | 184 | PACKET pkt, sslv2pkt; |
70ef40a0 | 185 | size_t first_rec_len; |
fe589e61 MC |
186 | |
187 | rr = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer); | |
94777c9c MC |
188 | rbuf = RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer); |
189 | max_recs = s->max_pipelines; | |
190 | if (max_recs == 0) | |
191 | max_recs = 1; | |
fe589e61 MC |
192 | sess = s->session; |
193 | ||
94777c9c | 194 | do { |
88858868 MC |
195 | thisrr = &rr[num_recs]; |
196 | ||
94777c9c MC |
197 | /* check if we have the header */ |
198 | if ((RECORD_LAYER_get_rstate(&s->rlayer) != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) || | |
199 | (RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer) | |
200 | < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) { | |
6a149cee MC |
201 | size_t sslv2len; |
202 | unsigned int type; | |
203 | ||
8e6d03ca MC |
204 | rret = ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, |
205 | SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(rbuf), 0, | |
206 | num_recs == 0 ? 1 : 0, &n); | |
207 | if (rret <= 0) | |
208 | return rret; /* error or non-blocking */ | |
94777c9c MC |
209 | RECORD_LAYER_set_rstate(&s->rlayer, SSL_ST_READ_BODY); |
210 | ||
211 | p = RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer); | |
6a149cee MC |
212 | if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer), |
213 | RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer))) { | |
214 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
215 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
216 | goto f_err; | |
217 | } | |
218 | sslv2pkt = pkt; | |
219 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2_len(&sslv2pkt, &sslv2len) | |
220 | || !PACKET_get_1(&sslv2pkt, &type)) { | |
fb34a0f4 | 221 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
6a149cee MC |
222 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
223 | goto f_err; | |
224 | } | |
94777c9c | 225 | /* |
78fcddbb | 226 | * The first record received by the server may be a V2ClientHello. |
94777c9c | 227 | */ |
78fcddbb | 228 | if (s->server && RECORD_LAYER_is_first_record(&s->rlayer) |
6a149cee MC |
229 | && (sslv2len & 0x8000) != 0 |
230 | && (type == SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)) { | |
be9c8deb MC |
231 | /* |
232 | * SSLv2 style record | |
233 | * | |
234 | * |num_recs| here will actually always be 0 because | |
235 | * |num_recs > 0| only ever occurs when we are processing | |
236 | * multiple app data records - which we know isn't the case here | |
237 | * because it is an SSLv2ClientHello. We keep it using | |
238 | * |num_recs| for the sake of consistency | |
239 | */ | |
88858868 MC |
240 | thisrr->type = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE; |
241 | thisrr->rec_version = SSL2_VERSION; | |
94777c9c | 242 | |
88858868 | 243 | thisrr->length = sslv2len & 0x7fff; |
94777c9c | 244 | |
88858868 | 245 | if (thisrr->length > SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(rbuf) |
a230b26e | 246 | - SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { |
94777c9c MC |
247 | al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; |
248 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); | |
249 | goto f_err; | |
250 | } | |
fe589e61 | 251 | |
88858868 | 252 | if (thisrr->length < MIN_SSL2_RECORD_LEN) { |
fb34a0f4 | 253 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
94777c9c MC |
254 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); |
255 | goto f_err; | |
256 | } | |
257 | } else { | |
258 | /* SSLv3+ style record */ | |
259 | if (s->msg_callback) | |
260 | s->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, p, 5, s, | |
261 | s->msg_callback_arg); | |
262 | ||
263 | /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */ | |
6a149cee MC |
264 | if (!PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &type) |
265 | || !PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &version) | |
88858868 | 266 | || !PACKET_get_net_2_len(&pkt, &thisrr->length)) { |
fb34a0f4 | 267 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
6a149cee MC |
268 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
269 | goto f_err; | |
270 | } | |
88858868 MC |
271 | thisrr->type = type; |
272 | thisrr->rec_version = version; | |
94777c9c | 273 | |
a2b97bdf | 274 | /* |
beb30941 MC |
275 | * Lets check version. In TLSv1.3 we ignore this field. For the |
276 | * ServerHello after an HRR we haven't actually selected TLSv1.3 | |
277 | * yet, but we still treat it as TLSv1.3, so we must check for | |
278 | * that explicitly | |
a2b97bdf | 279 | */ |
657a43f6 | 280 | if (!s->first_packet && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s) |
a2b97bdf | 281 | && !s->hello_retry_request |
6a149cee | 282 | && version != (unsigned int)s->version) { |
94777c9c MC |
283 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); |
284 | if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00) | |
285 | && !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash) { | |
88858868 | 286 | if (thisrr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) { |
94777c9c MC |
287 | /* |
288 | * The record is using an incorrect version number, | |
289 | * but what we've got appears to be an alert. We | |
290 | * haven't read the body yet to check whether its a | |
291 | * fatal or not - but chances are it is. We probably | |
292 | * shouldn't send a fatal alert back. We'll just | |
293 | * end. | |
294 | */ | |
a230b26e | 295 | goto err; |
94777c9c | 296 | } |
02db21df | 297 | /* |
94777c9c | 298 | * Send back error using their minor version number :-) |
02db21df | 299 | */ |
94777c9c | 300 | s->version = (unsigned short)version; |
02db21df | 301 | } |
94777c9c MC |
302 | al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; |
303 | goto f_err; | |
02db21df | 304 | } |
32ec4153 | 305 | |
94777c9c | 306 | if ((version >> 8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) { |
a01c86a2 | 307 | if (RECORD_LAYER_is_first_record(&s->rlayer)) { |
94777c9c MC |
308 | /* Go back to start of packet, look at the five bytes |
309 | * that we have. */ | |
310 | p = RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer); | |
311 | if (strncmp((char *)p, "GET ", 4) == 0 || | |
312 | strncmp((char *)p, "POST ", 5) == 0 || | |
313 | strncmp((char *)p, "HEAD ", 5) == 0 || | |
314 | strncmp((char *)p, "PUT ", 4) == 0) { | |
315 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST); | |
316 | goto err; | |
317 | } else if (strncmp((char *)p, "CONNE", 5) == 0) { | |
318 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, | |
319 | SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST); | |
320 | goto err; | |
321 | } | |
a01c86a2 MC |
322 | |
323 | /* Doesn't look like TLS - don't send an alert */ | |
324 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, | |
325 | SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); | |
326 | goto err; | |
327 | } else { | |
328 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, | |
329 | SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); | |
330 | al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; | |
331 | goto f_err; | |
124f6ff4 RJ |
332 | } |
333 | } | |
32ec4153 | 334 | |
e60ce9c4 | 335 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->enc_read_ctx != NULL |
88858868 | 336 | && thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) { |
e60ce9c4 MC |
337 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BAD_RECORD_TYPE); |
338 | al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; | |
339 | goto f_err; | |
340 | } | |
341 | ||
88858868 | 342 | if (thisrr->length > |
a230b26e | 343 | SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(rbuf) - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { |
94777c9c MC |
344 | al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; |
345 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); | |
346 | goto f_err; | |
347 | } | |
32ec4153 | 348 | } |
94777c9c MC |
349 | |
350 | /* now s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */ | |
fe589e61 MC |
351 | } |
352 | ||
43219695 MC |
353 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
354 | if (thisrr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_TLS13_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH) { | |
355 | al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; | |
356 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); | |
357 | goto f_err; | |
358 | } | |
359 | } else { | |
360 | size_t len = SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH; | |
361 | ||
4f7b76bf MC |
362 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP |
363 | /* | |
364 | * If OPENSSL_NO_COMP is defined then SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH | |
365 | * does not include the compression overhead anyway. | |
366 | */ | |
43219695 MC |
367 | if (s->expand == NULL) |
368 | len -= SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD; | |
4f7b76bf | 369 | #endif |
43219695 MC |
370 | |
371 | if (thisrr->length > len) { | |
372 | al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; | |
373 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); | |
374 | goto f_err; | |
375 | } | |
376 | } | |
377 | ||
94777c9c MC |
378 | /* |
379 | * s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data. | |
380 | * Calculate how much more data we need to read for the rest of the | |
381 | * record | |
382 | */ | |
88858868 MC |
383 | if (thisrr->rec_version == SSL2_VERSION) { |
384 | more = thisrr->length + SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH | |
94777c9c MC |
385 | - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; |
386 | } else { | |
88858868 | 387 | more = thisrr->length; |
94777c9c | 388 | } |
8e6d03ca | 389 | if (more > 0) { |
94777c9c | 390 | /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */ |
fe589e61 | 391 | |
8e6d03ca MC |
392 | rret = ssl3_read_n(s, more, more, 1, 0, &n); |
393 | if (rret <= 0) | |
394 | return rret; /* error or non-blocking io */ | |
94777c9c | 395 | } |
32ec4153 | 396 | |
94777c9c MC |
397 | /* set state for later operations */ |
398 | RECORD_LAYER_set_rstate(&s->rlayer, SSL_ST_READ_HEADER); | |
fe589e61 | 399 | |
94777c9c | 400 | /* |
88858868 MC |
401 | * At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH |
402 | * + thisrr->length, or s->packet_length == SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH | |
403 | * + thisrr->length and we have that many bytes in s->packet | |
94777c9c | 404 | */ |
88858868 MC |
405 | if (thisrr->rec_version == SSL2_VERSION) { |
406 | thisrr->input = | |
94777c9c MC |
407 | &(RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer)[SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]); |
408 | } else { | |
88858868 | 409 | thisrr->input = |
94777c9c MC |
410 | &(RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer)[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]); |
411 | } | |
fe589e61 | 412 | |
94777c9c | 413 | /* |
88858868 MC |
414 | * ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'thisrr' thisrr->input |
415 | * points at thisrr->length bytes, which need to be copied into | |
416 | * thisrr->data by either the decryption or by the decompression When | |
417 | * the data is 'copied' into the thisrr->data buffer, thisrr->input will | |
418 | * be pointed at the new buffer | |
94777c9c | 419 | */ |
fe589e61 | 420 | |
94777c9c | 421 | /* |
88858868 MC |
422 | * We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ] |
423 | * thisrr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. | |
94777c9c | 424 | */ |
fe589e61 | 425 | |
88858868 MC |
426 | /* decrypt in place in 'thisrr->input' */ |
427 | thisrr->data = thisrr->input; | |
428 | thisrr->orig_len = thisrr->length; | |
255cfeac MC |
429 | |
430 | /* Mark this record as not read by upper layers yet */ | |
88858868 | 431 | thisrr->read = 0; |
255cfeac | 432 | |
94777c9c MC |
433 | num_recs++; |
434 | ||
435 | /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */ | |
436 | RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); | |
78fcddbb | 437 | RECORD_LAYER_clear_first_record(&s->rlayer); |
de0717eb | 438 | } while (num_recs < max_recs |
88858868 | 439 | && thisrr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA |
94777c9c MC |
440 | && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) |
441 | && s->enc_read_ctx != NULL | |
442 | && (EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx)) | |
a230b26e | 443 | & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE) |
ea71906e | 444 | && ssl3_record_app_data_waiting(s)); |
fe589e61 | 445 | |
fe589e61 MC |
446 | /* |
447 | * If in encrypt-then-mac mode calculate mac from encrypted record. All | |
448 | * the details below are public so no timing details can leak. | |
449 | */ | |
28a31a0a | 450 | if (SSL_READ_ETM(s) && s->read_hash) { |
fe589e61 | 451 | unsigned char *mac; |
72716e79 MC |
452 | /* TODO(size_t): convert this to do size_t properly */ |
453 | imac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); | |
b77f3ed1 | 454 | if (!ossl_assert(imac_size >= 0 && imac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) { |
72716e79 MC |
455 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
456 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_LIB_EVP); | |
457 | goto f_err; | |
458 | } | |
459 | mac_size = (size_t)imac_size; | |
94777c9c | 460 | for (j = 0; j < num_recs; j++) { |
88858868 MC |
461 | thisrr = &rr[j]; |
462 | ||
463 | if (thisrr->length < mac_size) { | |
94777c9c MC |
464 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
465 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); | |
466 | goto f_err; | |
467 | } | |
88858868 MC |
468 | thisrr->length -= mac_size; |
469 | mac = thisrr->data + thisrr->length; | |
470 | i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, thisrr, md, 0 /* not send */ ); | |
a14aa99b | 471 | if (i == 0 || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, mac_size) != 0) { |
94777c9c MC |
472 | al = SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC; |
473 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, | |
474 | SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC); | |
475 | goto f_err; | |
476 | } | |
fe589e61 MC |
477 | } |
478 | } | |
479 | ||
70ef40a0 MC |
480 | first_rec_len = rr[0].length; |
481 | ||
94777c9c | 482 | enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, rr, num_recs, 0); |
e60ce9c4 | 483 | |
fe589e61 MC |
484 | /*- |
485 | * enc_err is: | |
d781d247 | 486 | * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publicly invalid. |
fe589e61 MC |
487 | * 1: if the padding is valid |
488 | * -1: if the padding is invalid | |
489 | */ | |
490 | if (enc_err == 0) { | |
0a87d0ac MC |
491 | if (num_recs == 1 && ossl_statem_skip_early_data(s)) { |
492 | /* | |
d781d247 MC |
493 | * Valid early_data that we cannot decrypt might fail here as |
494 | * publicly invalid. We treat it like an empty record. | |
0a87d0ac | 495 | */ |
70ef40a0 | 496 | |
0a87d0ac | 497 | thisrr = &rr[0]; |
70ef40a0 MC |
498 | |
499 | if (!early_data_count_ok(s, thisrr->length, | |
500 | EARLY_DATA_CIPHERTEXT_OVERHEAD, &al)) | |
501 | goto f_err; | |
502 | ||
0a87d0ac MC |
503 | thisrr->length = 0; |
504 | thisrr->read = 1; | |
505 | RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s->rlayer, 1); | |
67f78ead | 506 | RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(&s->rlayer); |
0a87d0ac MC |
507 | return 1; |
508 | } | |
fe589e61 MC |
509 | al = SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED; |
510 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG); | |
511 | goto f_err; | |
512 | } | |
d63a5e5e | 513 | #ifdef SSL_DEBUG |
88858868 | 514 | printf("dec %"OSSLzu"\n", rr[0].length); |
fe589e61 | 515 | { |
eda75751 | 516 | size_t z; |
88858868 MC |
517 | for (z = 0; z < rr[0].length; z++) |
518 | printf("%02X%c", rr[0].data[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n'); | |
fe589e61 MC |
519 | } |
520 | printf("\n"); | |
521 | #endif | |
522 | ||
523 | /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */ | |
524 | if ((sess != NULL) && | |
525 | (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) && | |
28a31a0a | 526 | (!SSL_READ_ETM(s) && EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)) { |
fe589e61 MC |
527 | /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */ |
528 | unsigned char *mac = NULL; | |
529 | unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; | |
94777c9c | 530 | |
fe589e61 | 531 | mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); |
380a522f MC |
532 | if (!ossl_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) { |
533 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
534 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
535 | goto f_err; | |
536 | } | |
fe589e61 | 537 | |
a230b26e | 538 | for (j = 0; j < num_recs; j++) { |
88858868 | 539 | thisrr = &rr[j]; |
fe589e61 | 540 | /* |
94777c9c MC |
541 | * orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was |
542 | * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use, | |
543 | * therefore we can safely process the record in a different amount | |
544 | * of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC. | |
fe589e61 | 545 | */ |
88858868 | 546 | if (thisrr->orig_len < mac_size || |
94777c9c MC |
547 | /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */ |
548 | (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE && | |
88858868 | 549 | thisrr->orig_len < mac_size + 1)) { |
94777c9c MC |
550 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
551 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); | |
552 | goto f_err; | |
553 | } | |
fe589e61 | 554 | |
94777c9c MC |
555 | if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) { |
556 | /* | |
557 | * We update the length so that the TLS header bytes can be | |
558 | * constructed correctly but we need to extract the MAC in | |
559 | * constant time from within the record, without leaking the | |
560 | * contents of the padding bytes. | |
561 | */ | |
562 | mac = mac_tmp; | |
380a522f MC |
563 | if (!ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, thisrr, mac_size)) { |
564 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
565 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
566 | goto f_err; | |
567 | } | |
88858868 | 568 | thisrr->length -= mac_size; |
94777c9c MC |
569 | } else { |
570 | /* | |
571 | * In this case there's no padding, so |rec->orig_len| equals | |
572 | * |rec->length| and we checked that there's enough bytes for | |
573 | * |mac_size| above. | |
574 | */ | |
88858868 MC |
575 | thisrr->length -= mac_size; |
576 | mac = &thisrr->data[thisrr->length]; | |
94777c9c MC |
577 | } |
578 | ||
88858868 | 579 | i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, thisrr, md, 0 /* not send */ ); |
a14aa99b | 580 | if (i == 0 || mac == NULL |
94777c9c MC |
581 | || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0) |
582 | enc_err = -1; | |
88858868 | 583 | if (thisrr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + mac_size) |
94777c9c MC |
584 | enc_err = -1; |
585 | } | |
fe589e61 MC |
586 | } |
587 | ||
588 | if (enc_err < 0) { | |
d781d247 MC |
589 | if (num_recs == 1 && ossl_statem_skip_early_data(s)) { |
590 | /* | |
591 | * We assume this is unreadable early_data - we treat it like an | |
592 | * empty record | |
593 | */ | |
70ef40a0 MC |
594 | |
595 | /* | |
596 | * The record length may have been modified by the mac check above | |
597 | * so we use the previously saved value | |
598 | */ | |
599 | if (!early_data_count_ok(s, first_rec_len, | |
600 | EARLY_DATA_CIPHERTEXT_OVERHEAD, &al)) | |
601 | goto f_err; | |
602 | ||
d781d247 MC |
603 | thisrr = &rr[0]; |
604 | thisrr->length = 0; | |
605 | thisrr->read = 1; | |
606 | RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s->rlayer, 1); | |
67f78ead | 607 | RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(&s->rlayer); |
d781d247 MC |
608 | return 1; |
609 | } | |
fe589e61 MC |
610 | /* |
611 | * A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0, | |
612 | * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption | |
613 | * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway, we should | |
614 | * not reveal which kind of error occurred -- this might become | |
615 | * visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile) | |
616 | */ | |
617 | al = SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC; | |
618 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, | |
619 | SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC); | |
620 | goto f_err; | |
621 | } | |
622 | ||
94777c9c | 623 | for (j = 0; j < num_recs; j++) { |
88858868 MC |
624 | thisrr = &rr[j]; |
625 | ||
626 | /* thisrr->length is now just compressed */ | |
94777c9c | 627 | if (s->expand != NULL) { |
88858868 | 628 | if (thisrr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH) { |
94777c9c MC |
629 | al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; |
630 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); | |
631 | goto f_err; | |
632 | } | |
88858868 | 633 | if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s, thisrr)) { |
94777c9c MC |
634 | al = SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE; |
635 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION); | |
636 | goto f_err; | |
637 | } | |
fe589e61 | 638 | } |
94777c9c | 639 | |
e60ce9c4 MC |
640 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) { |
641 | size_t end; | |
642 | ||
3c544acc MC |
643 | if (thisrr->length == 0 |
644 | || thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) { | |
e60ce9c4 MC |
645 | al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; |
646 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BAD_RECORD_TYPE); | |
647 | goto f_err; | |
648 | } | |
649 | ||
650 | /* Strip trailing padding */ | |
88858868 MC |
651 | for (end = thisrr->length - 1; end > 0 && thisrr->data[end] == 0; |
652 | end--) | |
e60ce9c4 MC |
653 | continue; |
654 | ||
88858868 MC |
655 | thisrr->length = end; |
656 | thisrr->type = thisrr->data[end]; | |
657 | if (thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA | |
658 | && thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT | |
659 | && thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { | |
e60ce9c4 MC |
660 | al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; |
661 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BAD_RECORD_TYPE); | |
662 | goto f_err; | |
663 | } | |
ad5100bc MC |
664 | if (s->msg_callback) |
665 | s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_INNER_CONTENT_TYPE, | |
666 | &thisrr->data[end], 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg); | |
e60ce9c4 MC |
667 | } |
668 | ||
9010b7bc MC |
669 | /* |
670 | * TLSv1.3 alert and handshake records are required to be non-zero in | |
671 | * length. | |
672 | */ | |
fc4c15fa MC |
673 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) |
674 | && (thisrr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE | |
675 | || thisrr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) | |
676 | && thisrr->length == 0) { | |
677 | al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; | |
678 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); | |
679 | goto f_err; | |
680 | } | |
681 | ||
88858868 | 682 | if (thisrr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) { |
94777c9c MC |
683 | al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; |
684 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); | |
fe589e61 MC |
685 | goto f_err; |
686 | } | |
fe589e61 | 687 | |
88858868 | 688 | thisrr->off = 0; |
94777c9c MC |
689 | /*- |
690 | * So at this point the following is true | |
88858868 MC |
691 | * thisrr->type is the type of record |
692 | * thisrr->length == number of bytes in record | |
693 | * thisrr->off == offset to first valid byte | |
694 | * thisrr->data == where to take bytes from, increment after use :-). | |
94777c9c | 695 | */ |
fe589e61 | 696 | |
94777c9c | 697 | /* just read a 0 length packet */ |
88858868 | 698 | if (thisrr->length == 0) { |
255cfeac MC |
699 | RECORD_LAYER_inc_empty_record_count(&s->rlayer); |
700 | if (RECORD_LAYER_get_empty_record_count(&s->rlayer) | |
a230b26e | 701 | > MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS) { |
94777c9c MC |
702 | al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; |
703 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL); | |
704 | goto f_err; | |
705 | } | |
255cfeac MC |
706 | } else { |
707 | RECORD_LAYER_reset_empty_record_count(&s->rlayer); | |
fe589e61 | 708 | } |
94777c9c | 709 | } |
fe589e61 | 710 | |
70ef40a0 MC |
711 | if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING) { |
712 | thisrr = &rr[0]; | |
713 | if (thisrr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA | |
714 | && !early_data_count_ok(s, thisrr->length, 0, &al)) | |
715 | goto f_err; | |
716 | } | |
717 | ||
94777c9c MC |
718 | RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s->rlayer, num_recs); |
719 | return 1; | |
fe589e61 MC |
720 | |
721 | f_err: | |
722 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
723 | err: | |
94777c9c | 724 | return ret; |
fe589e61 MC |
725 | } |
726 | ||
94777c9c | 727 | int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rr) |
fe589e61 MC |
728 | { |
729 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP | |
730 | int i; | |
fe589e61 | 731 | |
0220fee4 MC |
732 | if (rr->comp == NULL) { |
733 | rr->comp = (unsigned char *) | |
734 | OPENSSL_malloc(SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH); | |
735 | } | |
736 | if (rr->comp == NULL) | |
737 | return 0; | |
738 | ||
eda75751 | 739 | /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */ |
fe589e61 | 740 | i = COMP_expand_block(ssl->expand, rr->comp, |
a230b26e | 741 | SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, rr->data, (int)rr->length); |
fe589e61 | 742 | if (i < 0) |
0220fee4 | 743 | return 0; |
fe589e61 MC |
744 | else |
745 | rr->length = i; | |
746 | rr->data = rr->comp; | |
747 | #endif | |
0220fee4 | 748 | return 1; |
fe589e61 MC |
749 | } |
750 | ||
d102d9df | 751 | int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *wr) |
fe589e61 MC |
752 | { |
753 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP | |
754 | int i; | |
fe589e61 | 755 | |
eda75751 | 756 | /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */ |
fe589e61 | 757 | i = COMP_compress_block(ssl->compress, wr->data, |
c7c42022 | 758 | (int)(wr->length + SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD), |
fe589e61 MC |
759 | wr->input, (int)wr->length); |
760 | if (i < 0) | |
26a7d938 | 761 | return 0; |
fe589e61 MC |
762 | else |
763 | wr->length = i; | |
764 | ||
765 | wr->input = wr->data; | |
766 | #endif | |
208fb891 | 767 | return 1; |
fe589e61 MC |
768 | } |
769 | ||
02a36fda | 770 | /*- |
37205971 | 771 | * ssl3_enc encrypts/decrypts |n_recs| records in |inrecs| |
02a36fda MC |
772 | * |
773 | * Returns: | |
774 | * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too | |
775 | * short etc). | |
776 | * 1: if the record's padding is valid / the encryption was successful. | |
777 | * -1: if the record's padding is invalid or, if sending, an internal error | |
778 | * occurred. | |
779 | */ | |
aebe9e39 | 780 | int ssl3_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *inrecs, size_t n_recs, int sending) |
02a36fda MC |
781 | { |
782 | SSL3_RECORD *rec; | |
783 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds; | |
eda75751 | 784 | size_t l, i; |
72716e79 MC |
785 | size_t bs, mac_size = 0; |
786 | int imac_size; | |
02a36fda MC |
787 | const EVP_CIPHER *enc; |
788 | ||
d102d9df | 789 | rec = inrecs; |
37205971 MC |
790 | /* |
791 | * We shouldn't ever be called with more than one record in the SSLv3 case | |
792 | */ | |
793 | if (n_recs != 1) | |
794 | return 0; | |
aebe9e39 | 795 | if (sending) { |
02a36fda | 796 | ds = s->enc_write_ctx; |
02a36fda MC |
797 | if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) |
798 | enc = NULL; | |
799 | else | |
800 | enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx); | |
801 | } else { | |
802 | ds = s->enc_read_ctx; | |
02a36fda MC |
803 | if (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) |
804 | enc = NULL; | |
805 | else | |
806 | enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx); | |
807 | } | |
808 | ||
809 | if ((s->session == NULL) || (ds == NULL) || (enc == NULL)) { | |
810 | memmove(rec->data, rec->input, rec->length); | |
811 | rec->input = rec->data; | |
812 | } else { | |
813 | l = rec->length; | |
eda75751 | 814 | /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */ |
846ec07d | 815 | bs = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(ds); |
02a36fda MC |
816 | |
817 | /* COMPRESS */ | |
818 | ||
aebe9e39 | 819 | if ((bs != 1) && sending) { |
c08d12ca | 820 | i = bs - (l % bs); |
02a36fda MC |
821 | |
822 | /* we need to add 'i-1' padding bytes */ | |
823 | l += i; | |
824 | /* | |
825 | * the last of these zero bytes will be overwritten with the | |
826 | * padding length. | |
827 | */ | |
828 | memset(&rec->input[rec->length], 0, i); | |
829 | rec->length += i; | |
c08d12ca | 830 | rec->input[l - 1] = (unsigned char)(i - 1); |
02a36fda MC |
831 | } |
832 | ||
aebe9e39 | 833 | if (!sending) { |
02a36fda MC |
834 | if (l == 0 || l % bs != 0) |
835 | return 0; | |
836 | /* otherwise, rec->length >= bs */ | |
837 | } | |
838 | ||
eda75751 | 839 | /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */ |
c08d12ca | 840 | if (EVP_Cipher(ds, rec->data, rec->input, (unsigned int)l) < 1) |
02a36fda MC |
841 | return -1; |
842 | ||
72716e79 MC |
843 | if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL) { |
844 | /* TODO(size_t): convert me */ | |
845 | imac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); | |
846 | if (imac_size < 0) | |
847 | return -1; | |
848 | mac_size = (size_t)imac_size; | |
849 | } | |
aebe9e39 | 850 | if ((bs != 1) && !sending) |
a773b52a | 851 | return ssl3_cbc_remove_padding(rec, bs, mac_size); |
02a36fda | 852 | } |
208fb891 | 853 | return 1; |
02a36fda MC |
854 | } |
855 | ||
72716e79 | 856 | #define MAX_PADDING 256 |
02a36fda | 857 | /*- |
37205971 | 858 | * tls1_enc encrypts/decrypts |n_recs| in |recs|. |
02a36fda MC |
859 | * |
860 | * Returns: | |
861 | * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too | |
862 | * short etc). | |
863 | * 1: if the record's padding is valid / the encryption was successful. | |
864 | * -1: if the record's padding/AEAD-authenticator is invalid or, if sending, | |
865 | * an internal error occurred. | |
866 | */ | |
aebe9e39 | 867 | int tls1_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *recs, size_t n_recs, int sending) |
02a36fda | 868 | { |
02a36fda | 869 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds; |
d102d9df MC |
870 | size_t reclen[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES]; |
871 | unsigned char buf[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES][EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN]; | |
72716e79 MC |
872 | int i, pad = 0, ret, tmpr; |
873 | size_t bs, mac_size = 0, ctr, padnum, loop; | |
874 | unsigned char padval; | |
875 | int imac_size; | |
02a36fda MC |
876 | const EVP_CIPHER *enc; |
877 | ||
a3004c82 JS |
878 | if (n_recs == 0) |
879 | return 0; | |
880 | ||
aebe9e39 | 881 | if (sending) { |
02a36fda MC |
882 | if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash)) { |
883 | int n = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash); | |
380a522f MC |
884 | if (!ossl_assert(n >= 0)) { |
885 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_ENC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
886 | return -1; | |
887 | } | |
02a36fda MC |
888 | } |
889 | ds = s->enc_write_ctx; | |
02a36fda MC |
890 | if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) |
891 | enc = NULL; | |
892 | else { | |
893 | int ivlen; | |
894 | enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx); | |
895 | /* For TLSv1.1 and later explicit IV */ | |
896 | if (SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) | |
897 | && EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) | |
898 | ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(enc); | |
899 | else | |
900 | ivlen = 0; | |
901 | if (ivlen > 1) { | |
37205971 | 902 | for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) { |
d102d9df MC |
903 | if (recs[ctr].data != recs[ctr].input) { |
904 | /* | |
905 | * we can't write into the input stream: Can this ever | |
906 | * happen?? (steve) | |
907 | */ | |
908 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_ENC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
909 | return -1; | |
ae3947de | 910 | } else if (ssl_randbytes(s, recs[ctr].input, ivlen) <= 0) { |
d102d9df MC |
911 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_ENC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
912 | return -1; | |
913 | } | |
914 | } | |
02a36fda MC |
915 | } |
916 | } | |
917 | } else { | |
918 | if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash)) { | |
919 | int n = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); | |
380a522f MC |
920 | if (!ossl_assert(n >= 0)) { |
921 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_ENC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
922 | return -1; | |
923 | } | |
02a36fda MC |
924 | } |
925 | ds = s->enc_read_ctx; | |
02a36fda MC |
926 | if (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) |
927 | enc = NULL; | |
928 | else | |
929 | enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx); | |
930 | } | |
931 | ||
02a36fda | 932 | if ((s->session == NULL) || (ds == NULL) || (enc == NULL)) { |
37205971 | 933 | for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) { |
d102d9df MC |
934 | memmove(recs[ctr].data, recs[ctr].input, recs[ctr].length); |
935 | recs[ctr].input = recs[ctr].data; | |
936 | } | |
02a36fda MC |
937 | ret = 1; |
938 | } else { | |
d102d9df MC |
939 | bs = EVP_CIPHER_block_size(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ds)); |
940 | ||
37205971 | 941 | if (n_recs > 1) { |
e8aa8b6c | 942 | if (!(EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ds)) |
a230b26e | 943 | & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE)) { |
d102d9df MC |
944 | /* |
945 | * We shouldn't have been called with pipeline data if the | |
946 | * cipher doesn't support pipelining | |
947 | */ | |
948 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_ENC, SSL_R_PIPELINE_FAILURE); | |
949 | return -1; | |
950 | } | |
951 | } | |
37205971 | 952 | for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) { |
d102d9df MC |
953 | reclen[ctr] = recs[ctr].length; |
954 | ||
955 | if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ds)) | |
a230b26e | 956 | & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) { |
d102d9df MC |
957 | unsigned char *seq; |
958 | ||
aebe9e39 | 959 | seq = sending ? RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&s->rlayer) |
d102d9df MC |
960 | : RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&s->rlayer); |
961 | ||
962 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
963 | /* DTLS does not support pipelining */ | |
964 | unsigned char dtlsseq[9], *p = dtlsseq; | |
965 | ||
aebe9e39 | 966 | s2n(sending ? DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_w_epoch(&s->rlayer) : |
d102d9df MC |
967 | DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_r_epoch(&s->rlayer), p); |
968 | memcpy(p, &seq[2], 6); | |
969 | memcpy(buf[ctr], dtlsseq, 8); | |
970 | } else { | |
971 | memcpy(buf[ctr], seq, 8); | |
972 | for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) { /* increment */ | |
973 | ++seq[i]; | |
974 | if (seq[i] != 0) | |
975 | break; | |
976 | } | |
977 | } | |
02a36fda | 978 | |
d102d9df MC |
979 | buf[ctr][8] = recs[ctr].type; |
980 | buf[ctr][9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8); | |
981 | buf[ctr][10] = (unsigned char)(s->version); | |
c08d12ca MC |
982 | buf[ctr][11] = (unsigned char)(recs[ctr].length >> 8); |
983 | buf[ctr][12] = (unsigned char)(recs[ctr].length & 0xff); | |
d102d9df MC |
984 | pad = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD, |
985 | EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN, buf[ctr]); | |
986 | if (pad <= 0) | |
987 | return -1; | |
988 | ||
aebe9e39 | 989 | if (sending) { |
d102d9df MC |
990 | reclen[ctr] += pad; |
991 | recs[ctr].length += pad; | |
02a36fda | 992 | } |
02a36fda | 993 | |
aebe9e39 | 994 | } else if ((bs != 1) && sending) { |
c08d12ca | 995 | padnum = bs - (reclen[ctr] % bs); |
02a36fda | 996 | |
d102d9df | 997 | /* Add weird padding of upto 256 bytes */ |
02a36fda | 998 | |
72716e79 MC |
999 | if (padnum > MAX_PADDING) |
1000 | return -1; | |
1001 | /* we need to add 'padnum' padding bytes of value padval */ | |
c08d12ca | 1002 | padval = (unsigned char)(padnum - 1); |
72716e79 MC |
1003 | for (loop = reclen[ctr]; loop < reclen[ctr] + padnum; loop++) |
1004 | recs[ctr].input[loop] = padval; | |
1005 | reclen[ctr] += padnum; | |
1006 | recs[ctr].length += padnum; | |
d102d9df MC |
1007 | } |
1008 | ||
aebe9e39 | 1009 | if (!sending) { |
d102d9df MC |
1010 | if (reclen[ctr] == 0 || reclen[ctr] % bs != 0) |
1011 | return 0; | |
1012 | } | |
02a36fda | 1013 | } |
37205971 | 1014 | if (n_recs > 1) { |
d102d9df | 1015 | unsigned char *data[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES]; |
02a36fda | 1016 | |
d102d9df | 1017 | /* Set the output buffers */ |
e8aa8b6c | 1018 | for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) { |
d102d9df MC |
1019 | data[ctr] = recs[ctr].data; |
1020 | } | |
1021 | if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_SET_PIPELINE_OUTPUT_BUFS, | |
c08d12ca | 1022 | (int)n_recs, data) <= 0) { |
d102d9df MC |
1023 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_ENC, SSL_R_PIPELINE_FAILURE); |
1024 | } | |
1025 | /* Set the input buffers */ | |
e8aa8b6c | 1026 | for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) { |
d102d9df MC |
1027 | data[ctr] = recs[ctr].input; |
1028 | } | |
1029 | if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_SET_PIPELINE_INPUT_BUFS, | |
c08d12ca | 1030 | (int)n_recs, data) <= 0 |
d102d9df | 1031 | || EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_SET_PIPELINE_INPUT_LENS, |
c08d12ca | 1032 | (int)n_recs, reclen) <= 0) { |
d102d9df MC |
1033 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_ENC, SSL_R_PIPELINE_FAILURE); |
1034 | return -1; | |
1035 | } | |
02a36fda MC |
1036 | } |
1037 | ||
c08d12ca MC |
1038 | /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */ |
1039 | tmpr = EVP_Cipher(ds, recs[0].data, recs[0].input, | |
1040 | (unsigned int)reclen[0]); | |
d102d9df | 1041 | if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ds)) |
a230b26e | 1042 | & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER) |
72716e79 MC |
1043 | ? (tmpr < 0) |
1044 | : (tmpr == 0)) | |
02a36fda | 1045 | return -1; /* AEAD can fail to verify MAC */ |
aebe9e39 | 1046 | if (sending == 0) { |
e75c5a79 | 1047 | if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) { |
37205971 | 1048 | for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) { |
d102d9df MC |
1049 | recs[ctr].data += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; |
1050 | recs[ctr].input += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; | |
1051 | recs[ctr].length -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; | |
1052 | } | |
e75c5a79 | 1053 | } else if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) { |
37205971 | 1054 | for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) { |
d102d9df MC |
1055 | recs[ctr].data += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; |
1056 | recs[ctr].input += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; | |
1057 | recs[ctr].length -= EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; | |
1058 | } | |
e75c5a79 | 1059 | } |
02a36fda | 1060 | } |
02a36fda MC |
1061 | |
1062 | ret = 1; | |
28a31a0a | 1063 | if (!SSL_READ_ETM(s) && EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL) { |
72716e79 MC |
1064 | imac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); |
1065 | if (imac_size < 0) | |
1066 | return -1; | |
1067 | mac_size = (size_t)imac_size; | |
1068 | } | |
aebe9e39 | 1069 | if ((bs != 1) && !sending) { |
94777c9c | 1070 | int tmpret; |
37205971 | 1071 | for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) { |
94777c9c | 1072 | tmpret = tls1_cbc_remove_padding(s, &recs[ctr], bs, mac_size); |
f9cf774c MC |
1073 | /* |
1074 | * If tmpret == 0 then this means publicly invalid so we can | |
1075 | * short circuit things here. Otherwise we must respect constant | |
1076 | * time behaviour. | |
1077 | */ | |
1078 | if (tmpret == 0) | |
1079 | return 0; | |
1080 | ret = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_eq_int(tmpret, 1), | |
1081 | ret, -1); | |
94777c9c MC |
1082 | } |
1083 | } | |
aebe9e39 | 1084 | if (pad && !sending) { |
37205971 | 1085 | for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) { |
94777c9c MC |
1086 | recs[ctr].length -= pad; |
1087 | } | |
d102d9df | 1088 | } |
02a36fda MC |
1089 | } |
1090 | return ret; | |
1091 | } | |
1092 | ||
aebe9e39 | 1093 | int n_ssl3_mac(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md, int sending) |
02a36fda | 1094 | { |
02a36fda | 1095 | unsigned char *mac_sec, *seq; |
02a36fda MC |
1096 | const EVP_MD_CTX *hash; |
1097 | unsigned char *p, rec_char; | |
1098 | size_t md_size; | |
c08d12ca | 1099 | size_t npad; |
02a36fda MC |
1100 | int t; |
1101 | ||
aebe9e39 | 1102 | if (sending) { |
02a36fda | 1103 | mac_sec = &(ssl->s3->write_mac_secret[0]); |
de07f311 | 1104 | seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&ssl->rlayer); |
02a36fda MC |
1105 | hash = ssl->write_hash; |
1106 | } else { | |
02a36fda | 1107 | mac_sec = &(ssl->s3->read_mac_secret[0]); |
de07f311 | 1108 | seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&ssl->rlayer); |
02a36fda MC |
1109 | hash = ssl->read_hash; |
1110 | } | |
1111 | ||
1112 | t = EVP_MD_CTX_size(hash); | |
1113 | if (t < 0) | |
a14aa99b | 1114 | return 0; |
02a36fda MC |
1115 | md_size = t; |
1116 | npad = (48 / md_size) * md_size; | |
1117 | ||
aebe9e39 | 1118 | if (!sending && |
02a36fda MC |
1119 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ssl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE && |
1120 | ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(hash)) { | |
1121 | /* | |
1122 | * This is a CBC-encrypted record. We must avoid leaking any | |
1123 | * timing-side channel information about how many blocks of data we | |
1124 | * are hashing because that gives an attacker a timing-oracle. | |
1125 | */ | |
1126 | ||
1127 | /*- | |
1128 | * npad is, at most, 48 bytes and that's with MD5: | |
1129 | * 16 + 48 + 8 (sequence bytes) + 1 + 2 = 75. | |
1130 | * | |
1131 | * With SHA-1 (the largest hash speced for SSLv3) the hash size | |
1132 | * goes up 4, but npad goes down by 8, resulting in a smaller | |
1133 | * total size. | |
1134 | */ | |
1135 | unsigned char header[75]; | |
c08d12ca | 1136 | size_t j = 0; |
02a36fda MC |
1137 | memcpy(header + j, mac_sec, md_size); |
1138 | j += md_size; | |
1139 | memcpy(header + j, ssl3_pad_1, npad); | |
1140 | j += npad; | |
1141 | memcpy(header + j, seq, 8); | |
1142 | j += 8; | |
1143 | header[j++] = rec->type; | |
c08d12ca MC |
1144 | header[j++] = (unsigned char)(rec->length >> 8); |
1145 | header[j++] = (unsigned char)(rec->length & 0xff); | |
02a36fda MC |
1146 | |
1147 | /* Final param == is SSLv3 */ | |
5f3d93e4 MC |
1148 | if (ssl3_cbc_digest_record(hash, |
1149 | md, &md_size, | |
1150 | header, rec->input, | |
1151 | rec->length + md_size, rec->orig_len, | |
1152 | mac_sec, md_size, 1) <= 0) | |
a14aa99b | 1153 | return 0; |
02a36fda MC |
1154 | } else { |
1155 | unsigned int md_size_u; | |
1156 | /* Chop the digest off the end :-) */ | |
bfb0641f | 1157 | EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); |
6e59a892 RL |
1158 | |
1159 | if (md_ctx == NULL) | |
a14aa99b | 1160 | return 0; |
02a36fda | 1161 | |
02a36fda | 1162 | rec_char = rec->type; |
02a36fda MC |
1163 | p = md; |
1164 | s2n(rec->length, p); | |
6e59a892 | 1165 | if (EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(md_ctx, hash) <= 0 |
a230b26e EK |
1166 | || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, mac_sec, md_size) <= 0 |
1167 | || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, ssl3_pad_1, npad) <= 0 | |
1168 | || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, seq, 8) <= 0 | |
1169 | || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, &rec_char, 1) <= 0 | |
1170 | || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, md, 2) <= 0 | |
1171 | || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, rec->input, rec->length) <= 0 | |
1172 | || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0 | |
1173 | || EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(md_ctx, hash) <= 0 | |
1174 | || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, mac_sec, md_size) <= 0 | |
1175 | || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, ssl3_pad_2, npad) <= 0 | |
1176 | || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, md, md_size) <= 0 | |
1177 | || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md_ctx, md, &md_size_u) <= 0) { | |
bfb0641f | 1178 | EVP_MD_CTX_reset(md_ctx); |
a14aa99b | 1179 | return 0; |
5f3d93e4 | 1180 | } |
02a36fda | 1181 | |
bfb0641f | 1182 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); |
02a36fda MC |
1183 | } |
1184 | ||
1185 | ssl3_record_sequence_update(seq); | |
a14aa99b | 1186 | return 1; |
02a36fda MC |
1187 | } |
1188 | ||
aebe9e39 | 1189 | int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md, int sending) |
02a36fda | 1190 | { |
02a36fda MC |
1191 | unsigned char *seq; |
1192 | EVP_MD_CTX *hash; | |
1193 | size_t md_size; | |
1194 | int i; | |
6e59a892 | 1195 | EVP_MD_CTX *hmac = NULL, *mac_ctx; |
02a36fda | 1196 | unsigned char header[13]; |
aebe9e39 | 1197 | int stream_mac = (sending ? (ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM) |
02a36fda MC |
1198 | : (ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM)); |
1199 | int t; | |
1200 | ||
aebe9e39 | 1201 | if (sending) { |
de07f311 | 1202 | seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&ssl->rlayer); |
02a36fda MC |
1203 | hash = ssl->write_hash; |
1204 | } else { | |
de07f311 | 1205 | seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&ssl->rlayer); |
02a36fda MC |
1206 | hash = ssl->read_hash; |
1207 | } | |
1208 | ||
1209 | t = EVP_MD_CTX_size(hash); | |
380a522f MC |
1210 | if (!ossl_assert(t >= 0)) |
1211 | return 0; | |
02a36fda MC |
1212 | md_size = t; |
1213 | ||
1214 | /* I should fix this up TLS TLS TLS TLS TLS XXXXXXXX */ | |
1215 | if (stream_mac) { | |
1216 | mac_ctx = hash; | |
1217 | } else { | |
bfb0641f | 1218 | hmac = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); |
a230b26e | 1219 | if (hmac == NULL || !EVP_MD_CTX_copy(hmac, hash)) |
a14aa99b | 1220 | return 0; |
6e59a892 | 1221 | mac_ctx = hmac; |
02a36fda MC |
1222 | } |
1223 | ||
1224 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) { | |
1225 | unsigned char dtlsseq[8], *p = dtlsseq; | |
1226 | ||
aebe9e39 | 1227 | s2n(sending ? DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_w_epoch(&ssl->rlayer) : |
78a39fe7 | 1228 | DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_r_epoch(&ssl->rlayer), p); |
02a36fda MC |
1229 | memcpy(p, &seq[2], 6); |
1230 | ||
1231 | memcpy(header, dtlsseq, 8); | |
1232 | } else | |
1233 | memcpy(header, seq, 8); | |
1234 | ||
1235 | header[8] = rec->type; | |
1236 | header[9] = (unsigned char)(ssl->version >> 8); | |
1237 | header[10] = (unsigned char)(ssl->version); | |
348240c6 MC |
1238 | header[11] = (unsigned char)(rec->length >> 8); |
1239 | header[12] = (unsigned char)(rec->length & 0xff); | |
02a36fda | 1240 | |
aebe9e39 | 1241 | if (!sending && !SSL_READ_ETM(ssl) && |
02a36fda MC |
1242 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ssl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE && |
1243 | ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(mac_ctx)) { | |
1244 | /* | |
1245 | * This is a CBC-encrypted record. We must avoid leaking any | |
1246 | * timing-side channel information about how many blocks of data we | |
1247 | * are hashing because that gives an attacker a timing-oracle. | |
1248 | */ | |
1249 | /* Final param == not SSLv3 */ | |
5f3d93e4 MC |
1250 | if (ssl3_cbc_digest_record(mac_ctx, |
1251 | md, &md_size, | |
1252 | header, rec->input, | |
1253 | rec->length + md_size, rec->orig_len, | |
1254 | ssl->s3->read_mac_secret, | |
1255 | ssl->s3->read_mac_secret_size, 0) <= 0) { | |
bfb0641f | 1256 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(hmac); |
aabe3a35 | 1257 | return 0; |
5f3d93e4 | 1258 | } |
02a36fda | 1259 | } else { |
eda75751 | 1260 | /* TODO(size_t): Convert these calls */ |
5f3d93e4 | 1261 | if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, header, sizeof(header)) <= 0 |
a230b26e EK |
1262 | || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, rec->input, rec->length) <= 0 |
1263 | || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx, md, &md_size) <= 0) { | |
bfb0641f | 1264 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(hmac); |
a14aa99b | 1265 | return 0; |
5f3d93e4 | 1266 | } |
02a36fda MC |
1267 | } |
1268 | ||
bfb0641f | 1269 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(hmac); |
5f3d93e4 | 1270 | |
d63a5e5e | 1271 | #ifdef SSL_DEBUG |
02a36fda MC |
1272 | fprintf(stderr, "seq="); |
1273 | { | |
1274 | int z; | |
1275 | for (z = 0; z < 8; z++) | |
1276 | fprintf(stderr, "%02X ", seq[z]); | |
1277 | fprintf(stderr, "\n"); | |
1278 | } | |
1279 | fprintf(stderr, "rec="); | |
1280 | { | |
eda75751 | 1281 | size_t z; |
02a36fda MC |
1282 | for (z = 0; z < rec->length; z++) |
1283 | fprintf(stderr, "%02X ", rec->data[z]); | |
1284 | fprintf(stderr, "\n"); | |
1285 | } | |
1286 | #endif | |
1287 | ||
1288 | if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) { | |
1289 | for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) { | |
1290 | ++seq[i]; | |
1291 | if (seq[i] != 0) | |
1292 | break; | |
1293 | } | |
1294 | } | |
d63a5e5e | 1295 | #ifdef SSL_DEBUG |
02a36fda MC |
1296 | { |
1297 | unsigned int z; | |
1298 | for (z = 0; z < md_size; z++) | |
1299 | fprintf(stderr, "%02X ", md[z]); | |
1300 | fprintf(stderr, "\n"); | |
1301 | } | |
1302 | #endif | |
a14aa99b | 1303 | return 1; |
02a36fda MC |
1304 | } |
1305 | ||
1306 | /*- | |
1307 | * ssl3_cbc_remove_padding removes padding from the decrypted, SSLv3, CBC | |
1308 | * record in |rec| by updating |rec->length| in constant time. | |
1309 | * | |
1310 | * block_size: the block size of the cipher used to encrypt the record. | |
1311 | * returns: | |
1312 | * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publicly invalid. | |
1313 | * 1: if the padding was valid | |
1314 | * -1: otherwise. | |
1315 | */ | |
a773b52a | 1316 | int ssl3_cbc_remove_padding(SSL3_RECORD *rec, |
72716e79 | 1317 | size_t block_size, size_t mac_size) |
02a36fda | 1318 | { |
72716e79 | 1319 | size_t padding_length; |
2688e7a0 | 1320 | size_t good; |
72716e79 | 1321 | const size_t overhead = 1 /* padding length byte */ + mac_size; |
02a36fda MC |
1322 | |
1323 | /* | |
1324 | * These lengths are all public so we can test them in non-constant time. | |
1325 | */ | |
1326 | if (overhead > rec->length) | |
1327 | return 0; | |
1328 | ||
1329 | padding_length = rec->data[rec->length - 1]; | |
2688e7a0 | 1330 | good = constant_time_ge_s(rec->length, padding_length + overhead); |
02a36fda | 1331 | /* SSLv3 requires that the padding is minimal. */ |
2688e7a0 | 1332 | good &= constant_time_ge_s(block_size, padding_length + 1); |
02a36fda | 1333 | rec->length -= good & (padding_length + 1); |
2688e7a0 | 1334 | return constant_time_select_int_s(good, 1, -1); |
02a36fda MC |
1335 | } |
1336 | ||
1337 | /*- | |
1338 | * tls1_cbc_remove_padding removes the CBC padding from the decrypted, TLS, CBC | |
1339 | * record in |rec| in constant time and returns 1 if the padding is valid and | |
1340 | * -1 otherwise. It also removes any explicit IV from the start of the record | |
1341 | * without leaking any timing about whether there was enough space after the | |
1342 | * padding was removed. | |
1343 | * | |
1344 | * block_size: the block size of the cipher used to encrypt the record. | |
1345 | * returns: | |
1346 | * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publicly invalid. | |
1347 | * 1: if the padding was valid | |
1348 | * -1: otherwise. | |
1349 | */ | |
1350 | int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL *s, | |
1351 | SSL3_RECORD *rec, | |
72716e79 | 1352 | size_t block_size, size_t mac_size) |
02a36fda | 1353 | { |
2688e7a0 | 1354 | size_t good; |
72716e79 MC |
1355 | size_t padding_length, to_check, i; |
1356 | const size_t overhead = 1 /* padding length byte */ + mac_size; | |
02a36fda MC |
1357 | /* Check if version requires explicit IV */ |
1358 | if (SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)) { | |
1359 | /* | |
1360 | * These lengths are all public so we can test them in non-constant | |
1361 | * time. | |
1362 | */ | |
1363 | if (overhead + block_size > rec->length) | |
1364 | return 0; | |
1365 | /* We can now safely skip explicit IV */ | |
1366 | rec->data += block_size; | |
1367 | rec->input += block_size; | |
1368 | rec->length -= block_size; | |
1369 | rec->orig_len -= block_size; | |
1370 | } else if (overhead > rec->length) | |
1371 | return 0; | |
1372 | ||
1373 | padding_length = rec->data[rec->length - 1]; | |
1374 | ||
a230b26e EK |
1375 | if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx)) & |
1376 | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) { | |
02a36fda MC |
1377 | /* padding is already verified */ |
1378 | rec->length -= padding_length + 1; | |
1379 | return 1; | |
1380 | } | |
1381 | ||
2688e7a0 | 1382 | good = constant_time_ge_s(rec->length, overhead + padding_length); |
02a36fda MC |
1383 | /* |
1384 | * The padding consists of a length byte at the end of the record and | |
1385 | * then that many bytes of padding, all with the same value as the length | |
1386 | * byte. Thus, with the length byte included, there are i+1 bytes of | |
1387 | * padding. We can't check just |padding_length+1| bytes because that | |
1388 | * leaks decrypted information. Therefore we always have to check the | |
1389 | * maximum amount of padding possible. (Again, the length of the record | |
1390 | * is public information so we can use it.) | |
1391 | */ | |
eea8723c AL |
1392 | to_check = 256; /* maximum amount of padding, inc length byte. */ |
1393 | if (to_check > rec->length) | |
1394 | to_check = rec->length; | |
02a36fda MC |
1395 | |
1396 | for (i = 0; i < to_check; i++) { | |
2688e7a0 | 1397 | unsigned char mask = constant_time_ge_8_s(padding_length, i); |
02a36fda MC |
1398 | unsigned char b = rec->data[rec->length - 1 - i]; |
1399 | /* | |
1400 | * The final |padding_length+1| bytes should all have the value | |
1401 | * |padding_length|. Therefore the XOR should be zero. | |
1402 | */ | |
1403 | good &= ~(mask & (padding_length ^ b)); | |
1404 | } | |
1405 | ||
1406 | /* | |
1407 | * If any of the final |padding_length+1| bytes had the wrong value, one | |
1408 | * or more of the lower eight bits of |good| will be cleared. | |
1409 | */ | |
2688e7a0 | 1410 | good = constant_time_eq_s(0xff, good & 0xff); |
02a36fda MC |
1411 | rec->length -= good & (padding_length + 1); |
1412 | ||
2688e7a0 | 1413 | return constant_time_select_int_s(good, 1, -1); |
02a36fda MC |
1414 | } |
1415 | ||
1416 | /*- | |
1417 | * ssl3_cbc_copy_mac copies |md_size| bytes from the end of |rec| to |out| in | |
1418 | * constant time (independent of the concrete value of rec->length, which may | |
1419 | * vary within a 256-byte window). | |
1420 | * | |
1421 | * ssl3_cbc_remove_padding or tls1_cbc_remove_padding must be called prior to | |
1422 | * this function. | |
1423 | * | |
1424 | * On entry: | |
1425 | * rec->orig_len >= md_size | |
1426 | * md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE | |
1427 | * | |
1428 | * If CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE is defined then the rotation is performed with | |
1429 | * variable accesses in a 64-byte-aligned buffer. Assuming that this fits into | |
1430 | * a single or pair of cache-lines, then the variable memory accesses don't | |
1431 | * actually affect the timing. CPUs with smaller cache-lines [if any] are | |
1432 | * not multi-core and are not considered vulnerable to cache-timing attacks. | |
1433 | */ | |
1434 | #define CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE | |
1435 | ||
380a522f | 1436 | int ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(unsigned char *out, |
72716e79 | 1437 | const SSL3_RECORD *rec, size_t md_size) |
02a36fda MC |
1438 | { |
1439 | #if defined(CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE) | |
1440 | unsigned char rotated_mac_buf[64 + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; | |
1441 | unsigned char *rotated_mac; | |
1442 | #else | |
1443 | unsigned char rotated_mac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; | |
1444 | #endif | |
1445 | ||
1446 | /* | |
1447 | * mac_end is the index of |rec->data| just after the end of the MAC. | |
1448 | */ | |
72716e79 MC |
1449 | size_t mac_end = rec->length; |
1450 | size_t mac_start = mac_end - md_size; | |
8f77fab8 | 1451 | size_t in_mac; |
02a36fda MC |
1452 | /* |
1453 | * scan_start contains the number of bytes that we can ignore because the | |
1454 | * MAC's position can only vary by 255 bytes. | |
1455 | */ | |
72716e79 | 1456 | size_t scan_start = 0; |
2688e7a0 | 1457 | size_t i, j; |
2688e7a0 | 1458 | size_t rotate_offset; |
02a36fda | 1459 | |
380a522f MC |
1460 | if (!ossl_assert(rec->orig_len >= md_size |
1461 | && md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) | |
1462 | return 0; | |
02a36fda MC |
1463 | |
1464 | #if defined(CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE) | |
1465 | rotated_mac = rotated_mac_buf + ((0 - (size_t)rotated_mac_buf) & 63); | |
1466 | #endif | |
1467 | ||
1468 | /* This information is public so it's safe to branch based on it. */ | |
1469 | if (rec->orig_len > md_size + 255 + 1) | |
1470 | scan_start = rec->orig_len - (md_size + 255 + 1); | |
02a36fda | 1471 | |
8f77fab8 AP |
1472 | in_mac = 0; |
1473 | rotate_offset = 0; | |
02a36fda MC |
1474 | memset(rotated_mac, 0, md_size); |
1475 | for (i = scan_start, j = 0; i < rec->orig_len; i++) { | |
8f77fab8 AP |
1476 | size_t mac_started = constant_time_eq_s(i, mac_start); |
1477 | size_t mac_ended = constant_time_lt_s(i, mac_end); | |
02a36fda | 1478 | unsigned char b = rec->data[i]; |
8f77fab8 AP |
1479 | |
1480 | in_mac |= mac_started; | |
1481 | in_mac &= mac_ended; | |
1482 | rotate_offset |= j & mac_started; | |
1483 | rotated_mac[j++] |= b & in_mac; | |
2688e7a0 | 1484 | j &= constant_time_lt_s(j, md_size); |
02a36fda MC |
1485 | } |
1486 | ||
1487 | /* Now rotate the MAC */ | |
1488 | #if defined(CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE) | |
1489 | j = 0; | |
1490 | for (i = 0; i < md_size; i++) { | |
1491 | /* in case cache-line is 32 bytes, touch second line */ | |
1492 | ((volatile unsigned char *)rotated_mac)[rotate_offset ^ 32]; | |
1493 | out[j++] = rotated_mac[rotate_offset++]; | |
2688e7a0 | 1494 | rotate_offset &= constant_time_lt_s(rotate_offset, md_size); |
02a36fda MC |
1495 | } |
1496 | #else | |
1497 | memset(out, 0, md_size); | |
1498 | rotate_offset = md_size - rotate_offset; | |
2688e7a0 | 1499 | rotate_offset &= constant_time_lt_s(rotate_offset, md_size); |
02a36fda MC |
1500 | for (i = 0; i < md_size; i++) { |
1501 | for (j = 0; j < md_size; j++) | |
2688e7a0 | 1502 | out[j] |= rotated_mac[i] & constant_time_eq_8_s(j, rotate_offset); |
02a36fda | 1503 | rotate_offset++; |
2688e7a0 | 1504 | rotate_offset &= constant_time_lt_s(rotate_offset, md_size); |
02a36fda MC |
1505 | } |
1506 | #endif | |
380a522f MC |
1507 | |
1508 | return 1; | |
02a36fda MC |
1509 | } |
1510 | ||
1fb9fdc3 | 1511 | int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap) |
fe589e61 MC |
1512 | { |
1513 | int i, al; | |
1514 | int enc_err; | |
1515 | SSL_SESSION *sess; | |
1516 | SSL3_RECORD *rr; | |
72716e79 MC |
1517 | int imac_size; |
1518 | size_t mac_size; | |
fe589e61 MC |
1519 | unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
1520 | ||
1521 | rr = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer); | |
1522 | sess = s->session; | |
1523 | ||
1524 | /* | |
1525 | * At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length, | |
1526 | * and we have that many bytes in s->packet | |
1527 | */ | |
7a7048af | 1528 | rr->input = &(RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer)[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]); |
fe589e61 MC |
1529 | |
1530 | /* | |
1531 | * ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr' rr->input points | |
1532 | * at rr->length bytes, which need to be copied into rr->data by either | |
1533 | * the decryption or by the decompression When the data is 'copied' into | |
1534 | * the rr->data buffer, rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer | |
1535 | */ | |
1536 | ||
1537 | /* | |
1538 | * We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ] rr->length | |
1539 | * bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. | |
1540 | */ | |
1541 | ||
1542 | /* check is not needed I believe */ | |
1543 | if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH) { | |
1544 | al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; | |
1545 | SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); | |
1546 | goto f_err; | |
1547 | } | |
1548 | ||
1549 | /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */ | |
1550 | rr->data = rr->input; | |
1551 | rr->orig_len = rr->length; | |
1552 | ||
28a31a0a | 1553 | if (SSL_READ_ETM(s) && s->read_hash) { |
e23d5071 DW |
1554 | unsigned char *mac; |
1555 | mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); | |
380a522f MC |
1556 | if (!ossl_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) { |
1557 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
1558 | SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1559 | goto f_err; | |
1560 | } | |
e23d5071 DW |
1561 | if (rr->orig_len < mac_size) { |
1562 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
1563 | SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); | |
1564 | goto f_err; | |
1565 | } | |
1566 | rr->length -= mac_size; | |
1567 | mac = rr->data + rr->length; | |
1568 | i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, rr, md, 0 /* not send */ ); | |
a14aa99b | 1569 | if (i == 0 || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0) { |
e23d5071 DW |
1570 | al = SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC; |
1571 | SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, | |
1572 | SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC); | |
1573 | goto f_err; | |
1574 | } | |
1575 | } | |
1576 | ||
d102d9df | 1577 | enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, rr, 1, 0); |
fe589e61 MC |
1578 | /*- |
1579 | * enc_err is: | |
1580 | * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid. | |
1581 | * 1: if the padding is valid | |
1582 | * -1: if the padding is invalid | |
1583 | */ | |
1584 | if (enc_err == 0) { | |
1585 | /* For DTLS we simply ignore bad packets. */ | |
1586 | rr->length = 0; | |
7a7048af | 1587 | RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); |
fe589e61 MC |
1588 | goto err; |
1589 | } | |
d63a5e5e | 1590 | #ifdef SSL_DEBUG |
eda75751 | 1591 | printf("dec %ld\n", rr->length); |
fe589e61 | 1592 | { |
eda75751 | 1593 | size_t z; |
fe589e61 MC |
1594 | for (z = 0; z < rr->length; z++) |
1595 | printf("%02X%c", rr->data[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n'); | |
1596 | } | |
1597 | printf("\n"); | |
1598 | #endif | |
1599 | ||
1600 | /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */ | |
28a31a0a | 1601 | if ((sess != NULL) && !SSL_READ_ETM(s) && |
fe589e61 MC |
1602 | (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) && (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)) { |
1603 | /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */ | |
1604 | unsigned char *mac = NULL; | |
1605 | unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; | |
72716e79 MC |
1606 | |
1607 | /* TODO(size_t): Convert this to do size_t properly */ | |
1608 | imac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); | |
1609 | if (imac_size < 0) { | |
1610 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
1611 | SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, ERR_LIB_EVP); | |
1612 | goto f_err; | |
1613 | } | |
1614 | mac_size = (size_t)imac_size; | |
380a522f MC |
1615 | if (!ossl_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) { |
1616 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
1617 | SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1618 | goto f_err; | |
1619 | } | |
fe589e61 MC |
1620 | |
1621 | /* | |
1622 | * orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was | |
1623 | * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use, | |
1624 | * therefore we can safely process the record in a different amount | |
1625 | * of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC. | |
1626 | */ | |
1627 | if (rr->orig_len < mac_size || | |
1628 | /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */ | |
1629 | (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE && | |
1630 | rr->orig_len < mac_size + 1)) { | |
1631 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
1632 | SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); | |
1633 | goto f_err; | |
1634 | } | |
1635 | ||
1636 | if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) { | |
1637 | /* | |
1638 | * We update the length so that the TLS header bytes can be | |
1639 | * constructed correctly but we need to extract the MAC in | |
1640 | * constant time from within the record, without leaking the | |
1641 | * contents of the padding bytes. | |
1642 | */ | |
1643 | mac = mac_tmp; | |
380a522f MC |
1644 | if (!ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size)) { |
1645 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
1646 | SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1647 | goto f_err; | |
1648 | } | |
fe589e61 MC |
1649 | rr->length -= mac_size; |
1650 | } else { | |
1651 | /* | |
1652 | * In this case there's no padding, so |rec->orig_len| equals | |
1653 | * |rec->length| and we checked that there's enough bytes for | |
1654 | * |mac_size| above. | |
1655 | */ | |
1656 | rr->length -= mac_size; | |
1657 | mac = &rr->data[rr->length]; | |
1658 | } | |
1659 | ||
d102d9df | 1660 | i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, rr, md, 0 /* not send */ ); |
a14aa99b | 1661 | if (i == 0 || mac == NULL |
72716e79 | 1662 | || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, mac_size) != 0) |
fe589e61 MC |
1663 | enc_err = -1; |
1664 | if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + mac_size) | |
1665 | enc_err = -1; | |
1666 | } | |
1667 | ||
1668 | if (enc_err < 0) { | |
1669 | /* decryption failed, silently discard message */ | |
1670 | rr->length = 0; | |
7a7048af | 1671 | RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); |
fe589e61 MC |
1672 | goto err; |
1673 | } | |
1674 | ||
1675 | /* r->length is now just compressed */ | |
1676 | if (s->expand != NULL) { | |
1677 | if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH) { | |
1678 | al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; | |
1679 | SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, | |
1680 | SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); | |
1681 | goto f_err; | |
1682 | } | |
94777c9c | 1683 | if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s, rr)) { |
fe589e61 MC |
1684 | al = SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE; |
1685 | SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION); | |
1686 | goto f_err; | |
1687 | } | |
1688 | } | |
1689 | ||
1690 | if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) { | |
1691 | al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; | |
1692 | SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); | |
1693 | goto f_err; | |
1694 | } | |
1695 | ||
1696 | rr->off = 0; | |
1697 | /*- | |
1698 | * So at this point the following is true | |
1699 | * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record | |
1700 | * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record | |
1701 | * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte | |
1702 | * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment | |
1703 | * after use :-). | |
1704 | */ | |
1705 | ||
1706 | /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */ | |
7a7048af | 1707 | RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); |
1fb9fdc3 MC |
1708 | |
1709 | /* Mark receipt of record. */ | |
1710 | dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, bitmap); | |
1711 | ||
208fb891 | 1712 | return 1; |
fe589e61 MC |
1713 | |
1714 | f_err: | |
1715 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
1716 | err: | |
26a7d938 | 1717 | return 0; |
fe589e61 MC |
1718 | } |
1719 | ||
fe589e61 | 1720 | /* |
69687aa8 | 1721 | * Retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the current epoch, i.e. processed |
fe589e61 MC |
1722 | */ |
1723 | #define dtls1_get_processed_record(s) \ | |
1724 | dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \ | |
cb2ce7ab | 1725 | &(DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_processed_rcds(&s->rlayer))) |
fe589e61 MC |
1726 | |
1727 | /*- | |
1728 | * Call this to get a new input record. | |
1729 | * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error | |
1730 | * or non-blocking IO. | |
1731 | * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in | |
1732 | * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record | |
1733 | * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data | |
1734 | * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes | |
1735 | */ | |
1736 | /* used only by dtls1_read_bytes */ | |
1737 | int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s) | |
1738 | { | |
1739 | int ssl_major, ssl_minor; | |
8e6d03ca MC |
1740 | int rret; |
1741 | size_t more, n; | |
fe589e61 MC |
1742 | SSL3_RECORD *rr; |
1743 | unsigned char *p = NULL; | |
1744 | unsigned short version; | |
1745 | DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap; | |
1746 | unsigned int is_next_epoch; | |
1747 | ||
1748 | rr = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer); | |
1749 | ||
738ad946 | 1750 | again: |
fe589e61 MC |
1751 | /* |
1752 | * The epoch may have changed. If so, process all the pending records. | |
1753 | * This is a non-blocking operation. | |
1754 | */ | |
1fb9fdc3 | 1755 | if (!dtls1_process_buffered_records(s)) |
fe589e61 MC |
1756 | return -1; |
1757 | ||
1758 | /* if we're renegotiating, then there may be buffered records */ | |
1759 | if (dtls1_get_processed_record(s)) | |
1760 | return 1; | |
1761 | ||
1762 | /* get something from the wire */ | |
738ad946 | 1763 | |
fe589e61 | 1764 | /* check if we have the header */ |
295c3f41 | 1765 | if ((RECORD_LAYER_get_rstate(&s->rlayer) != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) || |
7a7048af | 1766 | (RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer) < DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) { |
8e6d03ca MC |
1767 | rret = ssl3_read_n(s, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, |
1768 | SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(&s->rlayer.rbuf), 0, 1, &n); | |
fe589e61 | 1769 | /* read timeout is handled by dtls1_read_bytes */ |
8e6d03ca MC |
1770 | if (rret <= 0) |
1771 | return rret; /* error or non-blocking */ | |
fe589e61 MC |
1772 | |
1773 | /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */ | |
a230b26e EK |
1774 | if (RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer) != |
1775 | DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { | |
7a7048af | 1776 | RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); |
fe589e61 MC |
1777 | goto again; |
1778 | } | |
1779 | ||
295c3f41 | 1780 | RECORD_LAYER_set_rstate(&s->rlayer, SSL_ST_READ_BODY); |
fe589e61 | 1781 | |
7a7048af | 1782 | p = RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer); |
fe589e61 MC |
1783 | |
1784 | if (s->msg_callback) | |
1785 | s->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, p, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, | |
1786 | s, s->msg_callback_arg); | |
1787 | ||
1788 | /* Pull apart the header into the DTLS1_RECORD */ | |
1789 | rr->type = *(p++); | |
1790 | ssl_major = *(p++); | |
1791 | ssl_minor = *(p++); | |
1792 | version = (ssl_major << 8) | ssl_minor; | |
1793 | ||
1794 | /* sequence number is 64 bits, with top 2 bytes = epoch */ | |
1795 | n2s(p, rr->epoch); | |
1796 | ||
de07f311 | 1797 | memcpy(&(RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&s->rlayer)[2]), p, 6); |
fe589e61 MC |
1798 | p += 6; |
1799 | ||
1800 | n2s(p, rr->length); | |
1801 | ||
1802 | /* Lets check version */ | |
1803 | if (!s->first_packet) { | |
1804 | if (version != s->version) { | |
1805 | /* unexpected version, silently discard */ | |
1806 | rr->length = 0; | |
7a7048af | 1807 | RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); |
fe589e61 MC |
1808 | goto again; |
1809 | } | |
1810 | } | |
1811 | ||
1812 | if ((version & 0xff00) != (s->version & 0xff00)) { | |
1813 | /* wrong version, silently discard record */ | |
1814 | rr->length = 0; | |
7a7048af | 1815 | RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); |
fe589e61 MC |
1816 | goto again; |
1817 | } | |
1818 | ||
1819 | if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH) { | |
1820 | /* record too long, silently discard it */ | |
1821 | rr->length = 0; | |
7a7048af | 1822 | RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); |
fe589e61 MC |
1823 | goto again; |
1824 | } | |
1825 | ||
295c3f41 | 1826 | /* now s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */ |
fe589e61 MC |
1827 | } |
1828 | ||
295c3f41 | 1829 | /* s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */ |
fe589e61 | 1830 | |
7a7048af MC |
1831 | if (rr->length > |
1832 | RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer) - DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { | |
fe589e61 | 1833 | /* now s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */ |
8e6d03ca MC |
1834 | more = rr->length; |
1835 | rret = ssl3_read_n(s, more, more, 1, 1, &n); | |
fe589e61 | 1836 | /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */ |
8e6d03ca | 1837 | if (rret <= 0 || n != more) { |
fe589e61 | 1838 | rr->length = 0; |
7a7048af | 1839 | RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); |
fe589e61 MC |
1840 | goto again; |
1841 | } | |
1842 | ||
1843 | /* | |
1844 | * now n == rr->length, and s->packet_length == | |
1845 | * DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length | |
1846 | */ | |
1847 | } | |
295c3f41 MC |
1848 | /* set state for later operations */ |
1849 | RECORD_LAYER_set_rstate(&s->rlayer, SSL_ST_READ_HEADER); | |
fe589e61 MC |
1850 | |
1851 | /* match epochs. NULL means the packet is dropped on the floor */ | |
1852 | bitmap = dtls1_get_bitmap(s, rr, &is_next_epoch); | |
1853 | if (bitmap == NULL) { | |
1854 | rr->length = 0; | |
a230b26e | 1855 | RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); /* dump this record */ |
fe589e61 MC |
1856 | goto again; /* get another record */ |
1857 | } | |
1858 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
1859 | /* Only do replay check if no SCTP bio */ | |
1860 | if (!BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s))) { | |
1861 | #endif | |
912c89c5 | 1862 | /* Check whether this is a repeat, or aged record. */ |
1fb9fdc3 MC |
1863 | /* |
1864 | * TODO: Does it make sense to have replay protection in epoch 0 where | |
1865 | * we have no integrity negotiated yet? | |
1866 | */ | |
912c89c5 | 1867 | if (!dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap)) { |
fe589e61 | 1868 | rr->length = 0; |
7a7048af | 1869 | RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); /* dump this record */ |
fe589e61 MC |
1870 | goto again; /* get another record */ |
1871 | } | |
1872 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
1873 | } | |
1874 | #endif | |
1875 | ||
1876 | /* just read a 0 length packet */ | |
1877 | if (rr->length == 0) | |
1878 | goto again; | |
1879 | ||
1880 | /* | |
1881 | * If this record is from the next epoch (either HM or ALERT), and a | |
1882 | * handshake is currently in progress, buffer it since it cannot be | |
912c89c5 | 1883 | * processed at this time. |
fe589e61 MC |
1884 | */ |
1885 | if (is_next_epoch) { | |
024f543c | 1886 | if ((SSL_in_init(s) || ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s))) { |
fe589e61 | 1887 | if (dtls1_buffer_record |
cb2ce7ab | 1888 | (s, &(DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_unprocessed_rcds(&s->rlayer)), |
a230b26e | 1889 | rr->seq_num) < 0) |
fe589e61 | 1890 | return -1; |
fe589e61 MC |
1891 | } |
1892 | rr->length = 0; | |
7a7048af | 1893 | RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); |
fe589e61 MC |
1894 | goto again; |
1895 | } | |
1896 | ||
1fb9fdc3 | 1897 | if (!dtls1_process_record(s, bitmap)) { |
fe589e61 | 1898 | rr->length = 0; |
a230b26e | 1899 | RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); /* dump this record */ |
fe589e61 MC |
1900 | goto again; /* get another record */ |
1901 | } | |
fe589e61 | 1902 | |
208fb891 | 1903 | return 1; |
fe589e61 MC |
1904 | |
1905 | } |