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846e33c7 | 1 | /* |
cf72c757 | 2 | * Copyright 1995-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. |
258f8721 | 3 | * |
846e33c7 RS |
4 | * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use |
5 | * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy | |
6 | * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at | |
7 | * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html | |
258f8721 MC |
8 | */ |
9 | ||
10 | #include "../ssl_locl.h" | |
68570797 | 11 | #include "internal/constant_time_locl.h" |
02a36fda | 12 | #include <openssl/rand.h> |
c99c4c11 | 13 | #include "record_locl.h" |
67dc995e | 14 | #include "internal/cryptlib.h" |
02a36fda MC |
15 | |
16 | static const unsigned char ssl3_pad_1[48] = { | |
17 | 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, | |
18 | 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, | |
19 | 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, | |
20 | 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, | |
21 | 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, | |
22 | 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36 | |
23 | }; | |
24 | ||
25 | static const unsigned char ssl3_pad_2[48] = { | |
26 | 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, | |
27 | 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, | |
28 | 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, | |
29 | 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, | |
30 | 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, | |
31 | 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c | |
32 | }; | |
258f8721 | 33 | |
6b41b3f5 MC |
34 | /* |
35 | * Clear the contents of an SSL3_RECORD but retain any memory allocated | |
36 | */ | |
5607b275 | 37 | void SSL3_RECORD_clear(SSL3_RECORD *r, size_t num_recs) |
258f8721 | 38 | { |
94777c9c | 39 | unsigned char *comp; |
5607b275 | 40 | size_t i; |
6b41b3f5 | 41 | |
94777c9c MC |
42 | for (i = 0; i < num_recs; i++) { |
43 | comp = r[i].comp; | |
44 | ||
45 | memset(&r[i], 0, sizeof(*r)); | |
46 | r[i].comp = comp; | |
47 | } | |
258f8721 MC |
48 | } |
49 | ||
5607b275 | 50 | void SSL3_RECORD_release(SSL3_RECORD *r, size_t num_recs) |
258f8721 | 51 | { |
5607b275 | 52 | size_t i; |
94777c9c MC |
53 | |
54 | for (i = 0; i < num_recs; i++) { | |
55 | OPENSSL_free(r[i].comp); | |
56 | r[i].comp = NULL; | |
57 | } | |
258f8721 MC |
58 | } |
59 | ||
258f8721 MC |
60 | void SSL3_RECORD_set_seq_num(SSL3_RECORD *r, const unsigned char *seq_num) |
61 | { | |
e5bf62f7 | 62 | memcpy(r->seq_num, seq_num, SEQ_NUM_SIZE); |
258f8721 | 63 | } |
fe589e61 | 64 | |
94777c9c MC |
65 | /* |
66 | * Peeks ahead into "read_ahead" data to see if we have a whole record waiting | |
67 | * for us in the buffer. | |
68 | */ | |
ea71906e | 69 | static int ssl3_record_app_data_waiting(SSL *s) |
94777c9c MC |
70 | { |
71 | SSL3_BUFFER *rbuf; | |
8e6d03ca | 72 | size_t left, len; |
94777c9c MC |
73 | unsigned char *p; |
74 | ||
75 | rbuf = RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer); | |
76 | ||
77 | p = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(rbuf); | |
78 | if (p == NULL) | |
79 | return 0; | |
80 | ||
81 | left = SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf); | |
82 | ||
83 | if (left < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) | |
84 | return 0; | |
85 | ||
86 | p += SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(rbuf); | |
87 | ||
88 | /* | |
89 | * We only check the type and record length, we will sanity check version | |
90 | * etc later | |
91 | */ | |
92 | if (*p != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) | |
93 | return 0; | |
94 | ||
95 | p += 3; | |
96 | n2s(p, len); | |
97 | ||
98 | if (left < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + len) | |
99 | return 0; | |
100 | ||
101 | return 1; | |
102 | } | |
103 | ||
196f2cbb | 104 | int early_data_count_ok(SSL *s, size_t length, size_t overhead, int send) |
70ef40a0 MC |
105 | { |
106 | uint32_t max_early_data = s->max_early_data; | |
add8d0e9 | 107 | SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session; |
70ef40a0 MC |
108 | |
109 | /* | |
7daf7156 | 110 | * If we are a client then we always use the max_early_data from the |
add8d0e9 MC |
111 | * session/psksession. Otherwise we go with the lowest out of the max early |
112 | * data set in the session and the configured max_early_data. | |
70ef40a0 | 113 | */ |
add8d0e9 MC |
114 | if (!s->server && sess->ext.max_early_data == 0) { |
115 | if (!ossl_assert(s->psksession != NULL | |
116 | && s->psksession->ext.max_early_data > 0)) { | |
196f2cbb MC |
117 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_EARLY_DATA_COUNT_OK, |
118 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
add8d0e9 MC |
119 | return 0; |
120 | } | |
121 | sess = s->psksession; | |
122 | } | |
123 | if (!s->server | |
124 | || (s->hit && sess->ext.max_early_data < s->max_early_data)) | |
125 | max_early_data = sess->ext.max_early_data; | |
70ef40a0 MC |
126 | |
127 | if (max_early_data == 0) { | |
196f2cbb MC |
128 | SSLfatal(s, send ? SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR : SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, |
129 | SSL_F_EARLY_DATA_COUNT_OK, SSL_R_TOO_MUCH_EARLY_DATA); | |
70ef40a0 MC |
130 | return 0; |
131 | } | |
132 | ||
133 | /* If we are dealing with ciphertext we need to allow for the overhead */ | |
134 | max_early_data += overhead; | |
135 | ||
7daf7156 | 136 | if (s->early_data_count + length > max_early_data) { |
196f2cbb MC |
137 | SSLfatal(s, send ? SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR : SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, |
138 | SSL_F_EARLY_DATA_COUNT_OK, SSL_R_TOO_MUCH_EARLY_DATA); | |
70ef40a0 MC |
139 | return 0; |
140 | } | |
7daf7156 | 141 | s->early_data_count += length; |
70ef40a0 MC |
142 | |
143 | return 1; | |
144 | } | |
145 | ||
fe589e61 MC |
146 | /* |
147 | * MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS defines the number of consecutive, empty records that | |
148 | * will be processed per call to ssl3_get_record. Without this limit an | |
149 | * attacker could send empty records at a faster rate than we can process and | |
150 | * cause ssl3_get_record to loop forever. | |
151 | */ | |
152 | #define MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS 32 | |
153 | ||
32ec4153 | 154 | #define SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH 2 |
fe589e61 | 155 | /*- |
94777c9c | 156 | * Call this to get new input records. |
fe589e61 MC |
157 | * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error |
158 | * or non-blocking IO. | |
94777c9c MC |
159 | * When it finishes, |numrpipes| records have been decoded. For each record 'i': |
160 | * rr[i].type - is the type of record | |
161 | * rr[i].data, - data | |
162 | * rr[i].length, - number of bytes | |
163 | * Multiple records will only be returned if the record types are all | |
164 | * SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA. The number of records returned will always be <= | |
165 | * |max_pipelines| | |
fe589e61 MC |
166 | */ |
167 | /* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */ | |
168 | int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s) | |
169 | { | |
196f2cbb | 170 | int enc_err, rret; |
8e6d03ca MC |
171 | int i; |
172 | size_t more, n; | |
88858868 | 173 | SSL3_RECORD *rr, *thisrr; |
94777c9c | 174 | SSL3_BUFFER *rbuf; |
fe589e61 MC |
175 | SSL_SESSION *sess; |
176 | unsigned char *p; | |
177 | unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; | |
6a149cee | 178 | unsigned int version; |
72716e79 MC |
179 | size_t mac_size; |
180 | int imac_size; | |
181 | size_t num_recs = 0, max_recs, j; | |
6a149cee | 182 | PACKET pkt, sslv2pkt; |
70ef40a0 | 183 | size_t first_rec_len; |
fe589e61 MC |
184 | |
185 | rr = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer); | |
94777c9c MC |
186 | rbuf = RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer); |
187 | max_recs = s->max_pipelines; | |
188 | if (max_recs == 0) | |
189 | max_recs = 1; | |
fe589e61 MC |
190 | sess = s->session; |
191 | ||
94777c9c | 192 | do { |
88858868 MC |
193 | thisrr = &rr[num_recs]; |
194 | ||
94777c9c MC |
195 | /* check if we have the header */ |
196 | if ((RECORD_LAYER_get_rstate(&s->rlayer) != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) || | |
197 | (RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer) | |
198 | < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) { | |
6a149cee MC |
199 | size_t sslv2len; |
200 | unsigned int type; | |
201 | ||
8e6d03ca MC |
202 | rret = ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, |
203 | SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(rbuf), 0, | |
204 | num_recs == 0 ? 1 : 0, &n); | |
205 | if (rret <= 0) | |
206 | return rret; /* error or non-blocking */ | |
94777c9c MC |
207 | RECORD_LAYER_set_rstate(&s->rlayer, SSL_ST_READ_BODY); |
208 | ||
209 | p = RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer); | |
6a149cee MC |
210 | if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer), |
211 | RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer))) { | |
196f2cbb MC |
212 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, |
213 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
214 | return -1; | |
6a149cee MC |
215 | } |
216 | sslv2pkt = pkt; | |
217 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2_len(&sslv2pkt, &sslv2len) | |
218 | || !PACKET_get_1(&sslv2pkt, &type)) { | |
196f2cbb MC |
219 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, |
220 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
221 | return -1; | |
6a149cee | 222 | } |
94777c9c | 223 | /* |
78fcddbb | 224 | * The first record received by the server may be a V2ClientHello. |
94777c9c | 225 | */ |
78fcddbb | 226 | if (s->server && RECORD_LAYER_is_first_record(&s->rlayer) |
6a149cee MC |
227 | && (sslv2len & 0x8000) != 0 |
228 | && (type == SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)) { | |
be9c8deb MC |
229 | /* |
230 | * SSLv2 style record | |
231 | * | |
232 | * |num_recs| here will actually always be 0 because | |
233 | * |num_recs > 0| only ever occurs when we are processing | |
234 | * multiple app data records - which we know isn't the case here | |
235 | * because it is an SSLv2ClientHello. We keep it using | |
236 | * |num_recs| for the sake of consistency | |
237 | */ | |
88858868 MC |
238 | thisrr->type = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE; |
239 | thisrr->rec_version = SSL2_VERSION; | |
94777c9c | 240 | |
88858868 | 241 | thisrr->length = sslv2len & 0x7fff; |
94777c9c | 242 | |
88858868 | 243 | if (thisrr->length > SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(rbuf) |
a230b26e | 244 | - SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { |
196f2cbb MC |
245 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, |
246 | SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); | |
247 | return -1; | |
94777c9c | 248 | } |
fe589e61 | 249 | |
88858868 | 250 | if (thisrr->length < MIN_SSL2_RECORD_LEN) { |
196f2cbb MC |
251 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, |
252 | SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); | |
253 | return -1; | |
94777c9c MC |
254 | } |
255 | } else { | |
256 | /* SSLv3+ style record */ | |
257 | if (s->msg_callback) | |
258 | s->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, p, 5, s, | |
259 | s->msg_callback_arg); | |
260 | ||
261 | /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */ | |
6a149cee MC |
262 | if (!PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &type) |
263 | || !PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &version) | |
88858868 | 264 | || !PACKET_get_net_2_len(&pkt, &thisrr->length)) { |
196f2cbb MC |
265 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, |
266 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
267 | return -1; | |
6a149cee | 268 | } |
88858868 MC |
269 | thisrr->type = type; |
270 | thisrr->rec_version = version; | |
94777c9c | 271 | |
a2b97bdf | 272 | /* |
beb30941 MC |
273 | * Lets check version. In TLSv1.3 we ignore this field. For the |
274 | * ServerHello after an HRR we haven't actually selected TLSv1.3 | |
275 | * yet, but we still treat it as TLSv1.3, so we must check for | |
276 | * that explicitly | |
a2b97bdf | 277 | */ |
657a43f6 | 278 | if (!s->first_packet && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s) |
a2b97bdf | 279 | && !s->hello_retry_request |
6a149cee | 280 | && version != (unsigned int)s->version) { |
94777c9c MC |
281 | if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00) |
282 | && !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash) { | |
88858868 | 283 | if (thisrr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) { |
94777c9c MC |
284 | /* |
285 | * The record is using an incorrect version number, | |
286 | * but what we've got appears to be an alert. We | |
287 | * haven't read the body yet to check whether its a | |
288 | * fatal or not - but chances are it is. We probably | |
289 | * shouldn't send a fatal alert back. We'll just | |
290 | * end. | |
291 | */ | |
196f2cbb MC |
292 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, |
293 | SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); | |
294 | return -1; | |
94777c9c | 295 | } |
02db21df | 296 | /* |
94777c9c | 297 | * Send back error using their minor version number :-) |
02db21df | 298 | */ |
94777c9c | 299 | s->version = (unsigned short)version; |
02db21df | 300 | } |
196f2cbb MC |
301 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, |
302 | SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); | |
303 | return -1; | |
02db21df | 304 | } |
32ec4153 | 305 | |
94777c9c | 306 | if ((version >> 8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) { |
a01c86a2 | 307 | if (RECORD_LAYER_is_first_record(&s->rlayer)) { |
94777c9c MC |
308 | /* Go back to start of packet, look at the five bytes |
309 | * that we have. */ | |
310 | p = RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer); | |
311 | if (strncmp((char *)p, "GET ", 4) == 0 || | |
312 | strncmp((char *)p, "POST ", 5) == 0 || | |
313 | strncmp((char *)p, "HEAD ", 5) == 0 || | |
314 | strncmp((char *)p, "PUT ", 4) == 0) { | |
196f2cbb MC |
315 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, |
316 | SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST); | |
317 | return -1; | |
94777c9c | 318 | } else if (strncmp((char *)p, "CONNE", 5) == 0) { |
196f2cbb MC |
319 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, |
320 | SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST); | |
321 | return -1; | |
94777c9c | 322 | } |
a01c86a2 MC |
323 | |
324 | /* Doesn't look like TLS - don't send an alert */ | |
196f2cbb MC |
325 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, |
326 | SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); | |
327 | return -1; | |
a01c86a2 | 328 | } else { |
196f2cbb MC |
329 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, |
330 | SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, | |
331 | SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); | |
332 | return -1; | |
124f6ff4 RJ |
333 | } |
334 | } | |
32ec4153 | 335 | |
e60ce9c4 | 336 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->enc_read_ctx != NULL |
88858868 | 337 | && thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) { |
196f2cbb MC |
338 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, |
339 | SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BAD_RECORD_TYPE); | |
340 | return -1; | |
e60ce9c4 MC |
341 | } |
342 | ||
88858868 | 343 | if (thisrr->length > |
a230b26e | 344 | SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(rbuf) - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { |
196f2cbb MC |
345 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, |
346 | SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); | |
347 | return -1; | |
94777c9c | 348 | } |
32ec4153 | 349 | } |
94777c9c MC |
350 | |
351 | /* now s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */ | |
fe589e61 MC |
352 | } |
353 | ||
43219695 MC |
354 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
355 | if (thisrr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_TLS13_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH) { | |
196f2cbb MC |
356 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, |
357 | SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); | |
358 | return -1; | |
43219695 MC |
359 | } |
360 | } else { | |
361 | size_t len = SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH; | |
362 | ||
4f7b76bf MC |
363 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP |
364 | /* | |
365 | * If OPENSSL_NO_COMP is defined then SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH | |
366 | * does not include the compression overhead anyway. | |
367 | */ | |
43219695 MC |
368 | if (s->expand == NULL) |
369 | len -= SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD; | |
4f7b76bf | 370 | #endif |
43219695 MC |
371 | |
372 | if (thisrr->length > len) { | |
196f2cbb MC |
373 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, |
374 | SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); | |
375 | return -1; | |
43219695 MC |
376 | } |
377 | } | |
378 | ||
94777c9c MC |
379 | /* |
380 | * s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data. | |
381 | * Calculate how much more data we need to read for the rest of the | |
382 | * record | |
383 | */ | |
88858868 MC |
384 | if (thisrr->rec_version == SSL2_VERSION) { |
385 | more = thisrr->length + SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH | |
94777c9c MC |
386 | - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; |
387 | } else { | |
88858868 | 388 | more = thisrr->length; |
94777c9c | 389 | } |
8e6d03ca | 390 | if (more > 0) { |
94777c9c | 391 | /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */ |
fe589e61 | 392 | |
8e6d03ca MC |
393 | rret = ssl3_read_n(s, more, more, 1, 0, &n); |
394 | if (rret <= 0) | |
395 | return rret; /* error or non-blocking io */ | |
94777c9c | 396 | } |
32ec4153 | 397 | |
94777c9c MC |
398 | /* set state for later operations */ |
399 | RECORD_LAYER_set_rstate(&s->rlayer, SSL_ST_READ_HEADER); | |
fe589e61 | 400 | |
94777c9c | 401 | /* |
88858868 MC |
402 | * At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH |
403 | * + thisrr->length, or s->packet_length == SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH | |
404 | * + thisrr->length and we have that many bytes in s->packet | |
94777c9c | 405 | */ |
88858868 MC |
406 | if (thisrr->rec_version == SSL2_VERSION) { |
407 | thisrr->input = | |
94777c9c MC |
408 | &(RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer)[SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]); |
409 | } else { | |
88858868 | 410 | thisrr->input = |
94777c9c MC |
411 | &(RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer)[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]); |
412 | } | |
fe589e61 | 413 | |
94777c9c | 414 | /* |
88858868 MC |
415 | * ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'thisrr' thisrr->input |
416 | * points at thisrr->length bytes, which need to be copied into | |
417 | * thisrr->data by either the decryption or by the decompression When | |
418 | * the data is 'copied' into the thisrr->data buffer, thisrr->input will | |
419 | * be pointed at the new buffer | |
94777c9c | 420 | */ |
fe589e61 | 421 | |
94777c9c | 422 | /* |
88858868 MC |
423 | * We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ] |
424 | * thisrr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. | |
94777c9c | 425 | */ |
fe589e61 | 426 | |
88858868 MC |
427 | /* decrypt in place in 'thisrr->input' */ |
428 | thisrr->data = thisrr->input; | |
429 | thisrr->orig_len = thisrr->length; | |
255cfeac MC |
430 | |
431 | /* Mark this record as not read by upper layers yet */ | |
88858868 | 432 | thisrr->read = 0; |
255cfeac | 433 | |
94777c9c MC |
434 | num_recs++; |
435 | ||
436 | /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */ | |
437 | RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); | |
78fcddbb | 438 | RECORD_LAYER_clear_first_record(&s->rlayer); |
de0717eb | 439 | } while (num_recs < max_recs |
88858868 | 440 | && thisrr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA |
94777c9c MC |
441 | && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) |
442 | && s->enc_read_ctx != NULL | |
443 | && (EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx)) | |
a230b26e | 444 | & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE) |
ea71906e | 445 | && ssl3_record_app_data_waiting(s)); |
fe589e61 | 446 | |
fe589e61 MC |
447 | /* |
448 | * If in encrypt-then-mac mode calculate mac from encrypted record. All | |
449 | * the details below are public so no timing details can leak. | |
450 | */ | |
28a31a0a | 451 | if (SSL_READ_ETM(s) && s->read_hash) { |
fe589e61 | 452 | unsigned char *mac; |
72716e79 MC |
453 | /* TODO(size_t): convert this to do size_t properly */ |
454 | imac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); | |
b77f3ed1 | 455 | if (!ossl_assert(imac_size >= 0 && imac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) { |
196f2cbb MC |
456 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, |
457 | ERR_LIB_EVP); | |
458 | return -1; | |
72716e79 MC |
459 | } |
460 | mac_size = (size_t)imac_size; | |
94777c9c | 461 | for (j = 0; j < num_recs; j++) { |
88858868 MC |
462 | thisrr = &rr[j]; |
463 | ||
464 | if (thisrr->length < mac_size) { | |
196f2cbb MC |
465 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, |
466 | SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); | |
467 | return -1; | |
94777c9c | 468 | } |
88858868 MC |
469 | thisrr->length -= mac_size; |
470 | mac = thisrr->data + thisrr->length; | |
471 | i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, thisrr, md, 0 /* not send */ ); | |
a14aa99b | 472 | if (i == 0 || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, mac_size) != 0) { |
196f2cbb | 473 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, |
94777c9c | 474 | SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC); |
196f2cbb | 475 | return -1; |
94777c9c | 476 | } |
fe589e61 MC |
477 | } |
478 | } | |
479 | ||
70ef40a0 MC |
480 | first_rec_len = rr[0].length; |
481 | ||
94777c9c | 482 | enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, rr, num_recs, 0); |
e60ce9c4 | 483 | |
fe589e61 MC |
484 | /*- |
485 | * enc_err is: | |
d781d247 | 486 | * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publicly invalid. |
fe589e61 MC |
487 | * 1: if the padding is valid |
488 | * -1: if the padding is invalid | |
489 | */ | |
490 | if (enc_err == 0) { | |
921d84a0 MC |
491 | if (ossl_statem_in_error(s)) { |
492 | /* SSLfatal() already got called */ | |
493 | return -1; | |
494 | } | |
0a87d0ac MC |
495 | if (num_recs == 1 && ossl_statem_skip_early_data(s)) { |
496 | /* | |
d781d247 MC |
497 | * Valid early_data that we cannot decrypt might fail here as |
498 | * publicly invalid. We treat it like an empty record. | |
0a87d0ac | 499 | */ |
70ef40a0 | 500 | |
0a87d0ac | 501 | thisrr = &rr[0]; |
70ef40a0 MC |
502 | |
503 | if (!early_data_count_ok(s, thisrr->length, | |
196f2cbb MC |
504 | EARLY_DATA_CIPHERTEXT_OVERHEAD, 0)) { |
505 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
506 | return -1; | |
507 | } | |
70ef40a0 | 508 | |
0a87d0ac MC |
509 | thisrr->length = 0; |
510 | thisrr->read = 1; | |
511 | RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s->rlayer, 1); | |
67f78ead | 512 | RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(&s->rlayer); |
0a87d0ac MC |
513 | return 1; |
514 | } | |
196f2cbb MC |
515 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, |
516 | SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG); | |
517 | return -1; | |
fe589e61 | 518 | } |
d63a5e5e | 519 | #ifdef SSL_DEBUG |
88858868 | 520 | printf("dec %"OSSLzu"\n", rr[0].length); |
fe589e61 | 521 | { |
eda75751 | 522 | size_t z; |
88858868 MC |
523 | for (z = 0; z < rr[0].length; z++) |
524 | printf("%02X%c", rr[0].data[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n'); | |
fe589e61 MC |
525 | } |
526 | printf("\n"); | |
527 | #endif | |
528 | ||
529 | /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */ | |
530 | if ((sess != NULL) && | |
531 | (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) && | |
28a31a0a | 532 | (!SSL_READ_ETM(s) && EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)) { |
fe589e61 MC |
533 | /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */ |
534 | unsigned char *mac = NULL; | |
535 | unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; | |
94777c9c | 536 | |
fe589e61 | 537 | mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); |
380a522f | 538 | if (!ossl_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) { |
196f2cbb MC |
539 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, |
540 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
541 | return -1; | |
380a522f | 542 | } |
fe589e61 | 543 | |
a230b26e | 544 | for (j = 0; j < num_recs; j++) { |
88858868 | 545 | thisrr = &rr[j]; |
fe589e61 | 546 | /* |
94777c9c MC |
547 | * orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was |
548 | * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use, | |
549 | * therefore we can safely process the record in a different amount | |
550 | * of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC. | |
fe589e61 | 551 | */ |
88858868 | 552 | if (thisrr->orig_len < mac_size || |
94777c9c MC |
553 | /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */ |
554 | (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE && | |
88858868 | 555 | thisrr->orig_len < mac_size + 1)) { |
196f2cbb MC |
556 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, |
557 | SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); | |
558 | return -1; | |
94777c9c | 559 | } |
fe589e61 | 560 | |
94777c9c MC |
561 | if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) { |
562 | /* | |
563 | * We update the length so that the TLS header bytes can be | |
564 | * constructed correctly but we need to extract the MAC in | |
565 | * constant time from within the record, without leaking the | |
566 | * contents of the padding bytes. | |
567 | */ | |
568 | mac = mac_tmp; | |
380a522f | 569 | if (!ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, thisrr, mac_size)) { |
196f2cbb MC |
570 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, |
571 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
572 | return -1; | |
380a522f | 573 | } |
88858868 | 574 | thisrr->length -= mac_size; |
94777c9c MC |
575 | } else { |
576 | /* | |
577 | * In this case there's no padding, so |rec->orig_len| equals | |
578 | * |rec->length| and we checked that there's enough bytes for | |
579 | * |mac_size| above. | |
580 | */ | |
88858868 MC |
581 | thisrr->length -= mac_size; |
582 | mac = &thisrr->data[thisrr->length]; | |
94777c9c MC |
583 | } |
584 | ||
88858868 | 585 | i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, thisrr, md, 0 /* not send */ ); |
a14aa99b | 586 | if (i == 0 || mac == NULL |
94777c9c MC |
587 | || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0) |
588 | enc_err = -1; | |
88858868 | 589 | if (thisrr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + mac_size) |
94777c9c MC |
590 | enc_err = -1; |
591 | } | |
fe589e61 MC |
592 | } |
593 | ||
594 | if (enc_err < 0) { | |
921d84a0 MC |
595 | if (ossl_statem_in_error(s)) { |
596 | /* We already called SSLfatal() */ | |
597 | return -1; | |
598 | } | |
d781d247 MC |
599 | if (num_recs == 1 && ossl_statem_skip_early_data(s)) { |
600 | /* | |
601 | * We assume this is unreadable early_data - we treat it like an | |
602 | * empty record | |
603 | */ | |
70ef40a0 MC |
604 | |
605 | /* | |
606 | * The record length may have been modified by the mac check above | |
607 | * so we use the previously saved value | |
608 | */ | |
609 | if (!early_data_count_ok(s, first_rec_len, | |
196f2cbb MC |
610 | EARLY_DATA_CIPHERTEXT_OVERHEAD, 0)) { |
611 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
612 | return -1; | |
613 | } | |
70ef40a0 | 614 | |
d781d247 MC |
615 | thisrr = &rr[0]; |
616 | thisrr->length = 0; | |
617 | thisrr->read = 1; | |
618 | RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s->rlayer, 1); | |
67f78ead | 619 | RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(&s->rlayer); |
d781d247 MC |
620 | return 1; |
621 | } | |
fe589e61 MC |
622 | /* |
623 | * A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0, | |
624 | * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption | |
625 | * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway, we should | |
626 | * not reveal which kind of error occurred -- this might become | |
627 | * visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile) | |
628 | */ | |
196f2cbb MC |
629 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, |
630 | SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC); | |
631 | return -1; | |
fe589e61 MC |
632 | } |
633 | ||
94777c9c | 634 | for (j = 0; j < num_recs; j++) { |
88858868 MC |
635 | thisrr = &rr[j]; |
636 | ||
637 | /* thisrr->length is now just compressed */ | |
94777c9c | 638 | if (s->expand != NULL) { |
88858868 | 639 | if (thisrr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH) { |
196f2cbb MC |
640 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, |
641 | SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); | |
642 | return -1; | |
94777c9c | 643 | } |
88858868 | 644 | if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s, thisrr)) { |
196f2cbb MC |
645 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, |
646 | SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION); | |
647 | return -1; | |
94777c9c | 648 | } |
fe589e61 | 649 | } |
94777c9c | 650 | |
e60ce9c4 MC |
651 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) { |
652 | size_t end; | |
653 | ||
3c544acc MC |
654 | if (thisrr->length == 0 |
655 | || thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) { | |
196f2cbb MC |
656 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, |
657 | SSL_R_BAD_RECORD_TYPE); | |
658 | return -1; | |
e60ce9c4 MC |
659 | } |
660 | ||
661 | /* Strip trailing padding */ | |
88858868 MC |
662 | for (end = thisrr->length - 1; end > 0 && thisrr->data[end] == 0; |
663 | end--) | |
e60ce9c4 MC |
664 | continue; |
665 | ||
88858868 MC |
666 | thisrr->length = end; |
667 | thisrr->type = thisrr->data[end]; | |
668 | if (thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA | |
669 | && thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT | |
670 | && thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { | |
196f2cbb MC |
671 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, |
672 | SSL_R_BAD_RECORD_TYPE); | |
673 | return -1; | |
e60ce9c4 | 674 | } |
ad5100bc MC |
675 | if (s->msg_callback) |
676 | s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_INNER_CONTENT_TYPE, | |
677 | &thisrr->data[end], 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg); | |
e60ce9c4 MC |
678 | } |
679 | ||
9010b7bc MC |
680 | /* |
681 | * TLSv1.3 alert and handshake records are required to be non-zero in | |
682 | * length. | |
683 | */ | |
fc4c15fa MC |
684 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) |
685 | && (thisrr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE | |
686 | || thisrr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) | |
687 | && thisrr->length == 0) { | |
196f2cbb MC |
688 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, |
689 | SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); | |
690 | return -1; | |
fc4c15fa MC |
691 | } |
692 | ||
88858868 | 693 | if (thisrr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) { |
196f2cbb MC |
694 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, |
695 | SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); | |
696 | return -1; | |
fe589e61 | 697 | } |
fe589e61 | 698 | |
cf72c757 F |
699 | /* If received packet overflows current Max Fragment Length setting */ |
700 | if (s->session != NULL && USE_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT(s->session) | |
701 | && thisrr->length > GET_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH(s->session)) { | |
196f2cbb MC |
702 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, |
703 | SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); | |
704 | return -1; | |
cf72c757 F |
705 | } |
706 | ||
88858868 | 707 | thisrr->off = 0; |
94777c9c MC |
708 | /*- |
709 | * So at this point the following is true | |
88858868 MC |
710 | * thisrr->type is the type of record |
711 | * thisrr->length == number of bytes in record | |
712 | * thisrr->off == offset to first valid byte | |
713 | * thisrr->data == where to take bytes from, increment after use :-). | |
94777c9c | 714 | */ |
fe589e61 | 715 | |
94777c9c | 716 | /* just read a 0 length packet */ |
88858868 | 717 | if (thisrr->length == 0) { |
255cfeac MC |
718 | RECORD_LAYER_inc_empty_record_count(&s->rlayer); |
719 | if (RECORD_LAYER_get_empty_record_count(&s->rlayer) | |
a230b26e | 720 | > MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS) { |
196f2cbb MC |
721 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, |
722 | SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL); | |
723 | return -1; | |
94777c9c | 724 | } |
255cfeac MC |
725 | } else { |
726 | RECORD_LAYER_reset_empty_record_count(&s->rlayer); | |
fe589e61 | 727 | } |
94777c9c | 728 | } |
fe589e61 | 729 | |
70ef40a0 MC |
730 | if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING) { |
731 | thisrr = &rr[0]; | |
732 | if (thisrr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA | |
196f2cbb MC |
733 | && !early_data_count_ok(s, thisrr->length, 0, 0)) { |
734 | /* SSLfatal already called */ | |
735 | return -1; | |
736 | } | |
70ef40a0 MC |
737 | } |
738 | ||
94777c9c MC |
739 | RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s->rlayer, num_recs); |
740 | return 1; | |
fe589e61 MC |
741 | } |
742 | ||
94777c9c | 743 | int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rr) |
fe589e61 MC |
744 | { |
745 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP | |
746 | int i; | |
fe589e61 | 747 | |
0220fee4 MC |
748 | if (rr->comp == NULL) { |
749 | rr->comp = (unsigned char *) | |
750 | OPENSSL_malloc(SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH); | |
751 | } | |
752 | if (rr->comp == NULL) | |
753 | return 0; | |
754 | ||
eda75751 | 755 | /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */ |
fe589e61 | 756 | i = COMP_expand_block(ssl->expand, rr->comp, |
a230b26e | 757 | SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, rr->data, (int)rr->length); |
fe589e61 | 758 | if (i < 0) |
0220fee4 | 759 | return 0; |
fe589e61 MC |
760 | else |
761 | rr->length = i; | |
762 | rr->data = rr->comp; | |
763 | #endif | |
0220fee4 | 764 | return 1; |
fe589e61 MC |
765 | } |
766 | ||
d102d9df | 767 | int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *wr) |
fe589e61 MC |
768 | { |
769 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP | |
770 | int i; | |
fe589e61 | 771 | |
eda75751 | 772 | /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */ |
fe589e61 | 773 | i = COMP_compress_block(ssl->compress, wr->data, |
c7c42022 | 774 | (int)(wr->length + SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD), |
fe589e61 MC |
775 | wr->input, (int)wr->length); |
776 | if (i < 0) | |
26a7d938 | 777 | return 0; |
fe589e61 MC |
778 | else |
779 | wr->length = i; | |
780 | ||
781 | wr->input = wr->data; | |
782 | #endif | |
208fb891 | 783 | return 1; |
fe589e61 MC |
784 | } |
785 | ||
02a36fda | 786 | /*- |
921d84a0 MC |
787 | * ssl3_enc encrypts/decrypts |n_recs| records in |inrecs|. Will call |
788 | * SSLfatal() for internal errors, but not otherwise. | |
02a36fda MC |
789 | * |
790 | * Returns: | |
791 | * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too | |
792 | * short etc). | |
793 | * 1: if the record's padding is valid / the encryption was successful. | |
794 | * -1: if the record's padding is invalid or, if sending, an internal error | |
795 | * occurred. | |
796 | */ | |
aebe9e39 | 797 | int ssl3_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *inrecs, size_t n_recs, int sending) |
02a36fda MC |
798 | { |
799 | SSL3_RECORD *rec; | |
800 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds; | |
eda75751 | 801 | size_t l, i; |
72716e79 MC |
802 | size_t bs, mac_size = 0; |
803 | int imac_size; | |
02a36fda MC |
804 | const EVP_CIPHER *enc; |
805 | ||
d102d9df | 806 | rec = inrecs; |
37205971 MC |
807 | /* |
808 | * We shouldn't ever be called with more than one record in the SSLv3 case | |
809 | */ | |
810 | if (n_recs != 1) | |
811 | return 0; | |
aebe9e39 | 812 | if (sending) { |
02a36fda | 813 | ds = s->enc_write_ctx; |
02a36fda MC |
814 | if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) |
815 | enc = NULL; | |
816 | else | |
817 | enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx); | |
818 | } else { | |
819 | ds = s->enc_read_ctx; | |
02a36fda MC |
820 | if (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) |
821 | enc = NULL; | |
822 | else | |
823 | enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx); | |
824 | } | |
825 | ||
826 | if ((s->session == NULL) || (ds == NULL) || (enc == NULL)) { | |
827 | memmove(rec->data, rec->input, rec->length); | |
828 | rec->input = rec->data; | |
829 | } else { | |
830 | l = rec->length; | |
eda75751 | 831 | /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */ |
846ec07d | 832 | bs = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(ds); |
02a36fda MC |
833 | |
834 | /* COMPRESS */ | |
835 | ||
aebe9e39 | 836 | if ((bs != 1) && sending) { |
c08d12ca | 837 | i = bs - (l % bs); |
02a36fda MC |
838 | |
839 | /* we need to add 'i-1' padding bytes */ | |
840 | l += i; | |
841 | /* | |
842 | * the last of these zero bytes will be overwritten with the | |
843 | * padding length. | |
844 | */ | |
845 | memset(&rec->input[rec->length], 0, i); | |
846 | rec->length += i; | |
c08d12ca | 847 | rec->input[l - 1] = (unsigned char)(i - 1); |
02a36fda MC |
848 | } |
849 | ||
aebe9e39 | 850 | if (!sending) { |
02a36fda MC |
851 | if (l == 0 || l % bs != 0) |
852 | return 0; | |
853 | /* otherwise, rec->length >= bs */ | |
854 | } | |
855 | ||
eda75751 | 856 | /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */ |
c08d12ca | 857 | if (EVP_Cipher(ds, rec->data, rec->input, (unsigned int)l) < 1) |
02a36fda MC |
858 | return -1; |
859 | ||
72716e79 MC |
860 | if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL) { |
861 | /* TODO(size_t): convert me */ | |
862 | imac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); | |
921d84a0 MC |
863 | if (imac_size < 0) { |
864 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_ENC, | |
865 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
72716e79 | 866 | return -1; |
921d84a0 | 867 | } |
72716e79 MC |
868 | mac_size = (size_t)imac_size; |
869 | } | |
aebe9e39 | 870 | if ((bs != 1) && !sending) |
a773b52a | 871 | return ssl3_cbc_remove_padding(rec, bs, mac_size); |
02a36fda | 872 | } |
208fb891 | 873 | return 1; |
02a36fda MC |
874 | } |
875 | ||
72716e79 | 876 | #define MAX_PADDING 256 |
02a36fda | 877 | /*- |
921d84a0 MC |
878 | * tls1_enc encrypts/decrypts |n_recs| in |recs|. Will call SSLfatal() for |
879 | * internal errors, but not otherwise. | |
02a36fda MC |
880 | * |
881 | * Returns: | |
882 | * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too | |
883 | * short etc). | |
884 | * 1: if the record's padding is valid / the encryption was successful. | |
885 | * -1: if the record's padding/AEAD-authenticator is invalid or, if sending, | |
886 | * an internal error occurred. | |
887 | */ | |
aebe9e39 | 888 | int tls1_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *recs, size_t n_recs, int sending) |
02a36fda | 889 | { |
02a36fda | 890 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds; |
d102d9df MC |
891 | size_t reclen[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES]; |
892 | unsigned char buf[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES][EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN]; | |
72716e79 MC |
893 | int i, pad = 0, ret, tmpr; |
894 | size_t bs, mac_size = 0, ctr, padnum, loop; | |
895 | unsigned char padval; | |
896 | int imac_size; | |
02a36fda MC |
897 | const EVP_CIPHER *enc; |
898 | ||
921d84a0 MC |
899 | if (n_recs == 0) { |
900 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_ENC, | |
901 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
a3004c82 | 902 | return 0; |
921d84a0 | 903 | } |
a3004c82 | 904 | |
aebe9e39 | 905 | if (sending) { |
02a36fda MC |
906 | if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash)) { |
907 | int n = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash); | |
380a522f | 908 | if (!ossl_assert(n >= 0)) { |
921d84a0 MC |
909 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_ENC, |
910 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
380a522f MC |
911 | return -1; |
912 | } | |
02a36fda MC |
913 | } |
914 | ds = s->enc_write_ctx; | |
02a36fda MC |
915 | if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) |
916 | enc = NULL; | |
917 | else { | |
918 | int ivlen; | |
919 | enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx); | |
920 | /* For TLSv1.1 and later explicit IV */ | |
921 | if (SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) | |
922 | && EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) | |
923 | ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(enc); | |
924 | else | |
925 | ivlen = 0; | |
926 | if (ivlen > 1) { | |
37205971 | 927 | for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) { |
d102d9df MC |
928 | if (recs[ctr].data != recs[ctr].input) { |
929 | /* | |
930 | * we can't write into the input stream: Can this ever | |
931 | * happen?? (steve) | |
932 | */ | |
921d84a0 MC |
933 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_ENC, |
934 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
d102d9df | 935 | return -1; |
ae3947de | 936 | } else if (ssl_randbytes(s, recs[ctr].input, ivlen) <= 0) { |
921d84a0 MC |
937 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_ENC, |
938 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
d102d9df MC |
939 | return -1; |
940 | } | |
941 | } | |
02a36fda MC |
942 | } |
943 | } | |
944 | } else { | |
945 | if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash)) { | |
946 | int n = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); | |
380a522f | 947 | if (!ossl_assert(n >= 0)) { |
921d84a0 MC |
948 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_ENC, |
949 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
380a522f MC |
950 | return -1; |
951 | } | |
02a36fda MC |
952 | } |
953 | ds = s->enc_read_ctx; | |
02a36fda MC |
954 | if (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) |
955 | enc = NULL; | |
956 | else | |
957 | enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx); | |
958 | } | |
959 | ||
02a36fda | 960 | if ((s->session == NULL) || (ds == NULL) || (enc == NULL)) { |
37205971 | 961 | for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) { |
d102d9df MC |
962 | memmove(recs[ctr].data, recs[ctr].input, recs[ctr].length); |
963 | recs[ctr].input = recs[ctr].data; | |
964 | } | |
02a36fda MC |
965 | ret = 1; |
966 | } else { | |
d102d9df MC |
967 | bs = EVP_CIPHER_block_size(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ds)); |
968 | ||
37205971 | 969 | if (n_recs > 1) { |
e8aa8b6c | 970 | if (!(EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ds)) |
a230b26e | 971 | & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE)) { |
d102d9df MC |
972 | /* |
973 | * We shouldn't have been called with pipeline data if the | |
974 | * cipher doesn't support pipelining | |
975 | */ | |
921d84a0 MC |
976 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_ENC, |
977 | SSL_R_PIPELINE_FAILURE); | |
d102d9df MC |
978 | return -1; |
979 | } | |
980 | } | |
37205971 | 981 | for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) { |
d102d9df MC |
982 | reclen[ctr] = recs[ctr].length; |
983 | ||
984 | if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ds)) | |
a230b26e | 985 | & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) { |
d102d9df MC |
986 | unsigned char *seq; |
987 | ||
aebe9e39 | 988 | seq = sending ? RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&s->rlayer) |
d102d9df MC |
989 | : RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&s->rlayer); |
990 | ||
991 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
992 | /* DTLS does not support pipelining */ | |
993 | unsigned char dtlsseq[9], *p = dtlsseq; | |
994 | ||
aebe9e39 | 995 | s2n(sending ? DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_w_epoch(&s->rlayer) : |
d102d9df MC |
996 | DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_r_epoch(&s->rlayer), p); |
997 | memcpy(p, &seq[2], 6); | |
998 | memcpy(buf[ctr], dtlsseq, 8); | |
999 | } else { | |
1000 | memcpy(buf[ctr], seq, 8); | |
1001 | for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) { /* increment */ | |
1002 | ++seq[i]; | |
1003 | if (seq[i] != 0) | |
1004 | break; | |
1005 | } | |
1006 | } | |
02a36fda | 1007 | |
d102d9df MC |
1008 | buf[ctr][8] = recs[ctr].type; |
1009 | buf[ctr][9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8); | |
1010 | buf[ctr][10] = (unsigned char)(s->version); | |
c08d12ca MC |
1011 | buf[ctr][11] = (unsigned char)(recs[ctr].length >> 8); |
1012 | buf[ctr][12] = (unsigned char)(recs[ctr].length & 0xff); | |
d102d9df MC |
1013 | pad = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD, |
1014 | EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN, buf[ctr]); | |
921d84a0 MC |
1015 | if (pad <= 0) { |
1016 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_ENC, | |
1017 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
d102d9df | 1018 | return -1; |
921d84a0 | 1019 | } |
d102d9df | 1020 | |
aebe9e39 | 1021 | if (sending) { |
d102d9df MC |
1022 | reclen[ctr] += pad; |
1023 | recs[ctr].length += pad; | |
02a36fda | 1024 | } |
02a36fda | 1025 | |
aebe9e39 | 1026 | } else if ((bs != 1) && sending) { |
c08d12ca | 1027 | padnum = bs - (reclen[ctr] % bs); |
02a36fda | 1028 | |
d102d9df | 1029 | /* Add weird padding of upto 256 bytes */ |
02a36fda | 1030 | |
921d84a0 MC |
1031 | if (padnum > MAX_PADDING) { |
1032 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_ENC, | |
1033 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
72716e79 | 1034 | return -1; |
921d84a0 | 1035 | } |
72716e79 | 1036 | /* we need to add 'padnum' padding bytes of value padval */ |
c08d12ca | 1037 | padval = (unsigned char)(padnum - 1); |
72716e79 MC |
1038 | for (loop = reclen[ctr]; loop < reclen[ctr] + padnum; loop++) |
1039 | recs[ctr].input[loop] = padval; | |
1040 | reclen[ctr] += padnum; | |
1041 | recs[ctr].length += padnum; | |
d102d9df MC |
1042 | } |
1043 | ||
aebe9e39 | 1044 | if (!sending) { |
d102d9df MC |
1045 | if (reclen[ctr] == 0 || reclen[ctr] % bs != 0) |
1046 | return 0; | |
1047 | } | |
02a36fda | 1048 | } |
37205971 | 1049 | if (n_recs > 1) { |
d102d9df | 1050 | unsigned char *data[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES]; |
02a36fda | 1051 | |
d102d9df | 1052 | /* Set the output buffers */ |
e8aa8b6c | 1053 | for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) { |
d102d9df MC |
1054 | data[ctr] = recs[ctr].data; |
1055 | } | |
1056 | if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_SET_PIPELINE_OUTPUT_BUFS, | |
c08d12ca | 1057 | (int)n_recs, data) <= 0) { |
921d84a0 MC |
1058 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_ENC, |
1059 | SSL_R_PIPELINE_FAILURE); | |
1060 | return -1; | |
d102d9df MC |
1061 | } |
1062 | /* Set the input buffers */ | |
e8aa8b6c | 1063 | for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) { |
d102d9df MC |
1064 | data[ctr] = recs[ctr].input; |
1065 | } | |
1066 | if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_SET_PIPELINE_INPUT_BUFS, | |
c08d12ca | 1067 | (int)n_recs, data) <= 0 |
d102d9df | 1068 | || EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_SET_PIPELINE_INPUT_LENS, |
c08d12ca | 1069 | (int)n_recs, reclen) <= 0) { |
921d84a0 MC |
1070 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_ENC, |
1071 | SSL_R_PIPELINE_FAILURE); | |
d102d9df MC |
1072 | return -1; |
1073 | } | |
02a36fda MC |
1074 | } |
1075 | ||
c08d12ca MC |
1076 | /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */ |
1077 | tmpr = EVP_Cipher(ds, recs[0].data, recs[0].input, | |
1078 | (unsigned int)reclen[0]); | |
d102d9df | 1079 | if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ds)) |
a230b26e | 1080 | & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER) |
72716e79 MC |
1081 | ? (tmpr < 0) |
1082 | : (tmpr == 0)) | |
02a36fda | 1083 | return -1; /* AEAD can fail to verify MAC */ |
921d84a0 | 1084 | |
aebe9e39 | 1085 | if (sending == 0) { |
e75c5a79 | 1086 | if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) { |
37205971 | 1087 | for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) { |
d102d9df MC |
1088 | recs[ctr].data += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; |
1089 | recs[ctr].input += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; | |
1090 | recs[ctr].length -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; | |
1091 | } | |
e75c5a79 | 1092 | } else if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) { |
37205971 | 1093 | for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) { |
d102d9df MC |
1094 | recs[ctr].data += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; |
1095 | recs[ctr].input += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; | |
1096 | recs[ctr].length -= EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; | |
1097 | } | |
e75c5a79 | 1098 | } |
02a36fda | 1099 | } |
02a36fda MC |
1100 | |
1101 | ret = 1; | |
28a31a0a | 1102 | if (!SSL_READ_ETM(s) && EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL) { |
72716e79 | 1103 | imac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); |
921d84a0 MC |
1104 | if (imac_size < 0) { |
1105 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_ENC, | |
1106 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
72716e79 | 1107 | return -1; |
921d84a0 | 1108 | } |
72716e79 MC |
1109 | mac_size = (size_t)imac_size; |
1110 | } | |
aebe9e39 | 1111 | if ((bs != 1) && !sending) { |
94777c9c | 1112 | int tmpret; |
37205971 | 1113 | for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) { |
94777c9c | 1114 | tmpret = tls1_cbc_remove_padding(s, &recs[ctr], bs, mac_size); |
f9cf774c MC |
1115 | /* |
1116 | * If tmpret == 0 then this means publicly invalid so we can | |
1117 | * short circuit things here. Otherwise we must respect constant | |
1118 | * time behaviour. | |
1119 | */ | |
1120 | if (tmpret == 0) | |
1121 | return 0; | |
1122 | ret = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_eq_int(tmpret, 1), | |
1123 | ret, -1); | |
94777c9c MC |
1124 | } |
1125 | } | |
aebe9e39 | 1126 | if (pad && !sending) { |
37205971 | 1127 | for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) { |
94777c9c MC |
1128 | recs[ctr].length -= pad; |
1129 | } | |
d102d9df | 1130 | } |
02a36fda MC |
1131 | } |
1132 | return ret; | |
1133 | } | |
1134 | ||
aebe9e39 | 1135 | int n_ssl3_mac(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md, int sending) |
02a36fda | 1136 | { |
02a36fda | 1137 | unsigned char *mac_sec, *seq; |
02a36fda MC |
1138 | const EVP_MD_CTX *hash; |
1139 | unsigned char *p, rec_char; | |
1140 | size_t md_size; | |
c08d12ca | 1141 | size_t npad; |
02a36fda MC |
1142 | int t; |
1143 | ||
aebe9e39 | 1144 | if (sending) { |
02a36fda | 1145 | mac_sec = &(ssl->s3->write_mac_secret[0]); |
de07f311 | 1146 | seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&ssl->rlayer); |
02a36fda MC |
1147 | hash = ssl->write_hash; |
1148 | } else { | |
02a36fda | 1149 | mac_sec = &(ssl->s3->read_mac_secret[0]); |
de07f311 | 1150 | seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&ssl->rlayer); |
02a36fda MC |
1151 | hash = ssl->read_hash; |
1152 | } | |
1153 | ||
1154 | t = EVP_MD_CTX_size(hash); | |
1155 | if (t < 0) | |
a14aa99b | 1156 | return 0; |
02a36fda MC |
1157 | md_size = t; |
1158 | npad = (48 / md_size) * md_size; | |
1159 | ||
aebe9e39 | 1160 | if (!sending && |
02a36fda MC |
1161 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ssl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE && |
1162 | ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(hash)) { | |
1163 | /* | |
1164 | * This is a CBC-encrypted record. We must avoid leaking any | |
1165 | * timing-side channel information about how many blocks of data we | |
1166 | * are hashing because that gives an attacker a timing-oracle. | |
1167 | */ | |
1168 | ||
1169 | /*- | |
1170 | * npad is, at most, 48 bytes and that's with MD5: | |
1171 | * 16 + 48 + 8 (sequence bytes) + 1 + 2 = 75. | |
1172 | * | |
1173 | * With SHA-1 (the largest hash speced for SSLv3) the hash size | |
1174 | * goes up 4, but npad goes down by 8, resulting in a smaller | |
1175 | * total size. | |
1176 | */ | |
1177 | unsigned char header[75]; | |
c08d12ca | 1178 | size_t j = 0; |
02a36fda MC |
1179 | memcpy(header + j, mac_sec, md_size); |
1180 | j += md_size; | |
1181 | memcpy(header + j, ssl3_pad_1, npad); | |
1182 | j += npad; | |
1183 | memcpy(header + j, seq, 8); | |
1184 | j += 8; | |
1185 | header[j++] = rec->type; | |
c08d12ca MC |
1186 | header[j++] = (unsigned char)(rec->length >> 8); |
1187 | header[j++] = (unsigned char)(rec->length & 0xff); | |
02a36fda MC |
1188 | |
1189 | /* Final param == is SSLv3 */ | |
5f3d93e4 MC |
1190 | if (ssl3_cbc_digest_record(hash, |
1191 | md, &md_size, | |
1192 | header, rec->input, | |
1193 | rec->length + md_size, rec->orig_len, | |
1194 | mac_sec, md_size, 1) <= 0) | |
a14aa99b | 1195 | return 0; |
02a36fda MC |
1196 | } else { |
1197 | unsigned int md_size_u; | |
1198 | /* Chop the digest off the end :-) */ | |
bfb0641f | 1199 | EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); |
6e59a892 RL |
1200 | |
1201 | if (md_ctx == NULL) | |
a14aa99b | 1202 | return 0; |
02a36fda | 1203 | |
02a36fda | 1204 | rec_char = rec->type; |
02a36fda MC |
1205 | p = md; |
1206 | s2n(rec->length, p); | |
6e59a892 | 1207 | if (EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(md_ctx, hash) <= 0 |
a230b26e EK |
1208 | || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, mac_sec, md_size) <= 0 |
1209 | || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, ssl3_pad_1, npad) <= 0 | |
1210 | || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, seq, 8) <= 0 | |
1211 | || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, &rec_char, 1) <= 0 | |
1212 | || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, md, 2) <= 0 | |
1213 | || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, rec->input, rec->length) <= 0 | |
1214 | || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0 | |
1215 | || EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(md_ctx, hash) <= 0 | |
1216 | || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, mac_sec, md_size) <= 0 | |
1217 | || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, ssl3_pad_2, npad) <= 0 | |
1218 | || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, md, md_size) <= 0 | |
1219 | || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md_ctx, md, &md_size_u) <= 0) { | |
bfb0641f | 1220 | EVP_MD_CTX_reset(md_ctx); |
a14aa99b | 1221 | return 0; |
5f3d93e4 | 1222 | } |
02a36fda | 1223 | |
bfb0641f | 1224 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); |
02a36fda MC |
1225 | } |
1226 | ||
1227 | ssl3_record_sequence_update(seq); | |
a14aa99b | 1228 | return 1; |
02a36fda MC |
1229 | } |
1230 | ||
aebe9e39 | 1231 | int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md, int sending) |
02a36fda | 1232 | { |
02a36fda MC |
1233 | unsigned char *seq; |
1234 | EVP_MD_CTX *hash; | |
1235 | size_t md_size; | |
1236 | int i; | |
6e59a892 | 1237 | EVP_MD_CTX *hmac = NULL, *mac_ctx; |
02a36fda | 1238 | unsigned char header[13]; |
aebe9e39 | 1239 | int stream_mac = (sending ? (ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM) |
02a36fda MC |
1240 | : (ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM)); |
1241 | int t; | |
1242 | ||
aebe9e39 | 1243 | if (sending) { |
de07f311 | 1244 | seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&ssl->rlayer); |
02a36fda MC |
1245 | hash = ssl->write_hash; |
1246 | } else { | |
de07f311 | 1247 | seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&ssl->rlayer); |
02a36fda MC |
1248 | hash = ssl->read_hash; |
1249 | } | |
1250 | ||
1251 | t = EVP_MD_CTX_size(hash); | |
380a522f MC |
1252 | if (!ossl_assert(t >= 0)) |
1253 | return 0; | |
02a36fda MC |
1254 | md_size = t; |
1255 | ||
1256 | /* I should fix this up TLS TLS TLS TLS TLS XXXXXXXX */ | |
1257 | if (stream_mac) { | |
1258 | mac_ctx = hash; | |
1259 | } else { | |
bfb0641f | 1260 | hmac = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); |
a230b26e | 1261 | if (hmac == NULL || !EVP_MD_CTX_copy(hmac, hash)) |
a14aa99b | 1262 | return 0; |
6e59a892 | 1263 | mac_ctx = hmac; |
02a36fda MC |
1264 | } |
1265 | ||
1266 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) { | |
1267 | unsigned char dtlsseq[8], *p = dtlsseq; | |
1268 | ||
aebe9e39 | 1269 | s2n(sending ? DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_w_epoch(&ssl->rlayer) : |
78a39fe7 | 1270 | DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_r_epoch(&ssl->rlayer), p); |
02a36fda MC |
1271 | memcpy(p, &seq[2], 6); |
1272 | ||
1273 | memcpy(header, dtlsseq, 8); | |
1274 | } else | |
1275 | memcpy(header, seq, 8); | |
1276 | ||
1277 | header[8] = rec->type; | |
1278 | header[9] = (unsigned char)(ssl->version >> 8); | |
1279 | header[10] = (unsigned char)(ssl->version); | |
348240c6 MC |
1280 | header[11] = (unsigned char)(rec->length >> 8); |
1281 | header[12] = (unsigned char)(rec->length & 0xff); | |
02a36fda | 1282 | |
aebe9e39 | 1283 | if (!sending && !SSL_READ_ETM(ssl) && |
02a36fda MC |
1284 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ssl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE && |
1285 | ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(mac_ctx)) { | |
1286 | /* | |
1287 | * This is a CBC-encrypted record. We must avoid leaking any | |
1288 | * timing-side channel information about how many blocks of data we | |
1289 | * are hashing because that gives an attacker a timing-oracle. | |
1290 | */ | |
1291 | /* Final param == not SSLv3 */ | |
5f3d93e4 MC |
1292 | if (ssl3_cbc_digest_record(mac_ctx, |
1293 | md, &md_size, | |
1294 | header, rec->input, | |
1295 | rec->length + md_size, rec->orig_len, | |
1296 | ssl->s3->read_mac_secret, | |
1297 | ssl->s3->read_mac_secret_size, 0) <= 0) { | |
bfb0641f | 1298 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(hmac); |
aabe3a35 | 1299 | return 0; |
5f3d93e4 | 1300 | } |
02a36fda | 1301 | } else { |
eda75751 | 1302 | /* TODO(size_t): Convert these calls */ |
5f3d93e4 | 1303 | if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, header, sizeof(header)) <= 0 |
a230b26e EK |
1304 | || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, rec->input, rec->length) <= 0 |
1305 | || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx, md, &md_size) <= 0) { | |
bfb0641f | 1306 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(hmac); |
a14aa99b | 1307 | return 0; |
5f3d93e4 | 1308 | } |
02a36fda MC |
1309 | } |
1310 | ||
bfb0641f | 1311 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(hmac); |
5f3d93e4 | 1312 | |
d63a5e5e | 1313 | #ifdef SSL_DEBUG |
02a36fda MC |
1314 | fprintf(stderr, "seq="); |
1315 | { | |
1316 | int z; | |
1317 | for (z = 0; z < 8; z++) | |
1318 | fprintf(stderr, "%02X ", seq[z]); | |
1319 | fprintf(stderr, "\n"); | |
1320 | } | |
1321 | fprintf(stderr, "rec="); | |
1322 | { | |
eda75751 | 1323 | size_t z; |
02a36fda MC |
1324 | for (z = 0; z < rec->length; z++) |
1325 | fprintf(stderr, "%02X ", rec->data[z]); | |
1326 | fprintf(stderr, "\n"); | |
1327 | } | |
1328 | #endif | |
1329 | ||
1330 | if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) { | |
1331 | for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) { | |
1332 | ++seq[i]; | |
1333 | if (seq[i] != 0) | |
1334 | break; | |
1335 | } | |
1336 | } | |
d63a5e5e | 1337 | #ifdef SSL_DEBUG |
02a36fda MC |
1338 | { |
1339 | unsigned int z; | |
1340 | for (z = 0; z < md_size; z++) | |
1341 | fprintf(stderr, "%02X ", md[z]); | |
1342 | fprintf(stderr, "\n"); | |
1343 | } | |
1344 | #endif | |
a14aa99b | 1345 | return 1; |
02a36fda MC |
1346 | } |
1347 | ||
1348 | /*- | |
1349 | * ssl3_cbc_remove_padding removes padding from the decrypted, SSLv3, CBC | |
1350 | * record in |rec| by updating |rec->length| in constant time. | |
1351 | * | |
1352 | * block_size: the block size of the cipher used to encrypt the record. | |
1353 | * returns: | |
1354 | * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publicly invalid. | |
1355 | * 1: if the padding was valid | |
1356 | * -1: otherwise. | |
1357 | */ | |
a773b52a | 1358 | int ssl3_cbc_remove_padding(SSL3_RECORD *rec, |
72716e79 | 1359 | size_t block_size, size_t mac_size) |
02a36fda | 1360 | { |
72716e79 | 1361 | size_t padding_length; |
2688e7a0 | 1362 | size_t good; |
72716e79 | 1363 | const size_t overhead = 1 /* padding length byte */ + mac_size; |
02a36fda MC |
1364 | |
1365 | /* | |
1366 | * These lengths are all public so we can test them in non-constant time. | |
1367 | */ | |
1368 | if (overhead > rec->length) | |
1369 | return 0; | |
1370 | ||
1371 | padding_length = rec->data[rec->length - 1]; | |
2688e7a0 | 1372 | good = constant_time_ge_s(rec->length, padding_length + overhead); |
02a36fda | 1373 | /* SSLv3 requires that the padding is minimal. */ |
2688e7a0 | 1374 | good &= constant_time_ge_s(block_size, padding_length + 1); |
02a36fda | 1375 | rec->length -= good & (padding_length + 1); |
2688e7a0 | 1376 | return constant_time_select_int_s(good, 1, -1); |
02a36fda MC |
1377 | } |
1378 | ||
1379 | /*- | |
1380 | * tls1_cbc_remove_padding removes the CBC padding from the decrypted, TLS, CBC | |
1381 | * record in |rec| in constant time and returns 1 if the padding is valid and | |
1382 | * -1 otherwise. It also removes any explicit IV from the start of the record | |
1383 | * without leaking any timing about whether there was enough space after the | |
1384 | * padding was removed. | |
1385 | * | |
1386 | * block_size: the block size of the cipher used to encrypt the record. | |
1387 | * returns: | |
1388 | * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publicly invalid. | |
1389 | * 1: if the padding was valid | |
1390 | * -1: otherwise. | |
1391 | */ | |
1392 | int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL *s, | |
1393 | SSL3_RECORD *rec, | |
72716e79 | 1394 | size_t block_size, size_t mac_size) |
02a36fda | 1395 | { |
2688e7a0 | 1396 | size_t good; |
72716e79 MC |
1397 | size_t padding_length, to_check, i; |
1398 | const size_t overhead = 1 /* padding length byte */ + mac_size; | |
02a36fda MC |
1399 | /* Check if version requires explicit IV */ |
1400 | if (SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)) { | |
1401 | /* | |
1402 | * These lengths are all public so we can test them in non-constant | |
1403 | * time. | |
1404 | */ | |
1405 | if (overhead + block_size > rec->length) | |
1406 | return 0; | |
1407 | /* We can now safely skip explicit IV */ | |
1408 | rec->data += block_size; | |
1409 | rec->input += block_size; | |
1410 | rec->length -= block_size; | |
1411 | rec->orig_len -= block_size; | |
1412 | } else if (overhead > rec->length) | |
1413 | return 0; | |
1414 | ||
1415 | padding_length = rec->data[rec->length - 1]; | |
1416 | ||
a230b26e EK |
1417 | if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx)) & |
1418 | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) { | |
02a36fda MC |
1419 | /* padding is already verified */ |
1420 | rec->length -= padding_length + 1; | |
1421 | return 1; | |
1422 | } | |
1423 | ||
2688e7a0 | 1424 | good = constant_time_ge_s(rec->length, overhead + padding_length); |
02a36fda MC |
1425 | /* |
1426 | * The padding consists of a length byte at the end of the record and | |
1427 | * then that many bytes of padding, all with the same value as the length | |
1428 | * byte. Thus, with the length byte included, there are i+1 bytes of | |
1429 | * padding. We can't check just |padding_length+1| bytes because that | |
1430 | * leaks decrypted information. Therefore we always have to check the | |
1431 | * maximum amount of padding possible. (Again, the length of the record | |
1432 | * is public information so we can use it.) | |
1433 | */ | |
eea8723c AL |
1434 | to_check = 256; /* maximum amount of padding, inc length byte. */ |
1435 | if (to_check > rec->length) | |
1436 | to_check = rec->length; | |
02a36fda MC |
1437 | |
1438 | for (i = 0; i < to_check; i++) { | |
2688e7a0 | 1439 | unsigned char mask = constant_time_ge_8_s(padding_length, i); |
02a36fda MC |
1440 | unsigned char b = rec->data[rec->length - 1 - i]; |
1441 | /* | |
1442 | * The final |padding_length+1| bytes should all have the value | |
1443 | * |padding_length|. Therefore the XOR should be zero. | |
1444 | */ | |
1445 | good &= ~(mask & (padding_length ^ b)); | |
1446 | } | |
1447 | ||
1448 | /* | |
1449 | * If any of the final |padding_length+1| bytes had the wrong value, one | |
1450 | * or more of the lower eight bits of |good| will be cleared. | |
1451 | */ | |
2688e7a0 | 1452 | good = constant_time_eq_s(0xff, good & 0xff); |
02a36fda MC |
1453 | rec->length -= good & (padding_length + 1); |
1454 | ||
2688e7a0 | 1455 | return constant_time_select_int_s(good, 1, -1); |
02a36fda MC |
1456 | } |
1457 | ||
1458 | /*- | |
1459 | * ssl3_cbc_copy_mac copies |md_size| bytes from the end of |rec| to |out| in | |
1460 | * constant time (independent of the concrete value of rec->length, which may | |
1461 | * vary within a 256-byte window). | |
1462 | * | |
1463 | * ssl3_cbc_remove_padding or tls1_cbc_remove_padding must be called prior to | |
1464 | * this function. | |
1465 | * | |
1466 | * On entry: | |
1467 | * rec->orig_len >= md_size | |
1468 | * md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE | |
1469 | * | |
1470 | * If CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE is defined then the rotation is performed with | |
1471 | * variable accesses in a 64-byte-aligned buffer. Assuming that this fits into | |
1472 | * a single or pair of cache-lines, then the variable memory accesses don't | |
1473 | * actually affect the timing. CPUs with smaller cache-lines [if any] are | |
1474 | * not multi-core and are not considered vulnerable to cache-timing attacks. | |
1475 | */ | |
1476 | #define CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE | |
1477 | ||
380a522f | 1478 | int ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(unsigned char *out, |
72716e79 | 1479 | const SSL3_RECORD *rec, size_t md_size) |
02a36fda MC |
1480 | { |
1481 | #if defined(CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE) | |
1482 | unsigned char rotated_mac_buf[64 + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; | |
1483 | unsigned char *rotated_mac; | |
1484 | #else | |
1485 | unsigned char rotated_mac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; | |
1486 | #endif | |
1487 | ||
1488 | /* | |
1489 | * mac_end is the index of |rec->data| just after the end of the MAC. | |
1490 | */ | |
72716e79 MC |
1491 | size_t mac_end = rec->length; |
1492 | size_t mac_start = mac_end - md_size; | |
8f77fab8 | 1493 | size_t in_mac; |
02a36fda MC |
1494 | /* |
1495 | * scan_start contains the number of bytes that we can ignore because the | |
1496 | * MAC's position can only vary by 255 bytes. | |
1497 | */ | |
72716e79 | 1498 | size_t scan_start = 0; |
2688e7a0 | 1499 | size_t i, j; |
2688e7a0 | 1500 | size_t rotate_offset; |
02a36fda | 1501 | |
380a522f MC |
1502 | if (!ossl_assert(rec->orig_len >= md_size |
1503 | && md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) | |
1504 | return 0; | |
02a36fda MC |
1505 | |
1506 | #if defined(CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE) | |
1507 | rotated_mac = rotated_mac_buf + ((0 - (size_t)rotated_mac_buf) & 63); | |
1508 | #endif | |
1509 | ||
1510 | /* This information is public so it's safe to branch based on it. */ | |
1511 | if (rec->orig_len > md_size + 255 + 1) | |
1512 | scan_start = rec->orig_len - (md_size + 255 + 1); | |
02a36fda | 1513 | |
8f77fab8 AP |
1514 | in_mac = 0; |
1515 | rotate_offset = 0; | |
02a36fda MC |
1516 | memset(rotated_mac, 0, md_size); |
1517 | for (i = scan_start, j = 0; i < rec->orig_len; i++) { | |
8f77fab8 AP |
1518 | size_t mac_started = constant_time_eq_s(i, mac_start); |
1519 | size_t mac_ended = constant_time_lt_s(i, mac_end); | |
02a36fda | 1520 | unsigned char b = rec->data[i]; |
8f77fab8 AP |
1521 | |
1522 | in_mac |= mac_started; | |
1523 | in_mac &= mac_ended; | |
1524 | rotate_offset |= j & mac_started; | |
1525 | rotated_mac[j++] |= b & in_mac; | |
2688e7a0 | 1526 | j &= constant_time_lt_s(j, md_size); |
02a36fda MC |
1527 | } |
1528 | ||
1529 | /* Now rotate the MAC */ | |
1530 | #if defined(CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE) | |
1531 | j = 0; | |
1532 | for (i = 0; i < md_size; i++) { | |
1533 | /* in case cache-line is 32 bytes, touch second line */ | |
1534 | ((volatile unsigned char *)rotated_mac)[rotate_offset ^ 32]; | |
1535 | out[j++] = rotated_mac[rotate_offset++]; | |
2688e7a0 | 1536 | rotate_offset &= constant_time_lt_s(rotate_offset, md_size); |
02a36fda MC |
1537 | } |
1538 | #else | |
1539 | memset(out, 0, md_size); | |
1540 | rotate_offset = md_size - rotate_offset; | |
2688e7a0 | 1541 | rotate_offset &= constant_time_lt_s(rotate_offset, md_size); |
02a36fda MC |
1542 | for (i = 0; i < md_size; i++) { |
1543 | for (j = 0; j < md_size; j++) | |
2688e7a0 | 1544 | out[j] |= rotated_mac[i] & constant_time_eq_8_s(j, rotate_offset); |
02a36fda | 1545 | rotate_offset++; |
2688e7a0 | 1546 | rotate_offset &= constant_time_lt_s(rotate_offset, md_size); |
02a36fda MC |
1547 | } |
1548 | #endif | |
380a522f MC |
1549 | |
1550 | return 1; | |
02a36fda MC |
1551 | } |
1552 | ||
1fb9fdc3 | 1553 | int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap) |
fe589e61 | 1554 | { |
c2853382 | 1555 | int i; |
fe589e61 MC |
1556 | int enc_err; |
1557 | SSL_SESSION *sess; | |
1558 | SSL3_RECORD *rr; | |
72716e79 MC |
1559 | int imac_size; |
1560 | size_t mac_size; | |
fe589e61 MC |
1561 | unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
1562 | ||
1563 | rr = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer); | |
1564 | sess = s->session; | |
1565 | ||
1566 | /* | |
1567 | * At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length, | |
1568 | * and we have that many bytes in s->packet | |
1569 | */ | |
7a7048af | 1570 | rr->input = &(RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer)[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]); |
fe589e61 MC |
1571 | |
1572 | /* | |
1573 | * ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr' rr->input points | |
1574 | * at rr->length bytes, which need to be copied into rr->data by either | |
1575 | * the decryption or by the decompression When the data is 'copied' into | |
1576 | * the rr->data buffer, rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer | |
1577 | */ | |
1578 | ||
1579 | /* | |
1580 | * We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ] rr->length | |
1581 | * bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. | |
1582 | */ | |
1583 | ||
1584 | /* check is not needed I believe */ | |
1585 | if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH) { | |
c2853382 MC |
1586 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW, SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, |
1587 | SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); | |
1588 | return 0; | |
fe589e61 MC |
1589 | } |
1590 | ||
1591 | /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */ | |
1592 | rr->data = rr->input; | |
1593 | rr->orig_len = rr->length; | |
1594 | ||
28a31a0a | 1595 | if (SSL_READ_ETM(s) && s->read_hash) { |
e23d5071 DW |
1596 | unsigned char *mac; |
1597 | mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); | |
380a522f | 1598 | if (!ossl_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) { |
c2853382 MC |
1599 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, |
1600 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1601 | return 0; | |
380a522f | 1602 | } |
e23d5071 | 1603 | if (rr->orig_len < mac_size) { |
c2853382 MC |
1604 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, |
1605 | SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); | |
1606 | return 0; | |
e23d5071 DW |
1607 | } |
1608 | rr->length -= mac_size; | |
1609 | mac = rr->data + rr->length; | |
1610 | i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, rr, md, 0 /* not send */ ); | |
a14aa99b | 1611 | if (i == 0 || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0) { |
c2853382 | 1612 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC, SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, |
e23d5071 | 1613 | SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC); |
c2853382 | 1614 | return 0; |
e23d5071 DW |
1615 | } |
1616 | } | |
1617 | ||
d102d9df | 1618 | enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, rr, 1, 0); |
fe589e61 MC |
1619 | /*- |
1620 | * enc_err is: | |
1621 | * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid. | |
1622 | * 1: if the padding is valid | |
1623 | * -1: if the padding is invalid | |
1624 | */ | |
1625 | if (enc_err == 0) { | |
921d84a0 MC |
1626 | if (ossl_statem_in_error(s)) { |
1627 | /* SSLfatal() got called */ | |
1628 | return 0; | |
1629 | } | |
fe589e61 MC |
1630 | /* For DTLS we simply ignore bad packets. */ |
1631 | rr->length = 0; | |
7a7048af | 1632 | RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); |
c2853382 | 1633 | return 0; |
fe589e61 | 1634 | } |
d63a5e5e | 1635 | #ifdef SSL_DEBUG |
eda75751 | 1636 | printf("dec %ld\n", rr->length); |
fe589e61 | 1637 | { |
eda75751 | 1638 | size_t z; |
fe589e61 MC |
1639 | for (z = 0; z < rr->length; z++) |
1640 | printf("%02X%c", rr->data[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n'); | |
1641 | } | |
1642 | printf("\n"); | |
1643 | #endif | |
1644 | ||
1645 | /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */ | |
28a31a0a | 1646 | if ((sess != NULL) && !SSL_READ_ETM(s) && |
fe589e61 MC |
1647 | (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) && (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)) { |
1648 | /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */ | |
1649 | unsigned char *mac = NULL; | |
1650 | unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; | |
72716e79 MC |
1651 | |
1652 | /* TODO(size_t): Convert this to do size_t properly */ | |
1653 | imac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); | |
1654 | if (imac_size < 0) { | |
c2853382 MC |
1655 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, |
1656 | ERR_LIB_EVP); | |
1657 | return 0; | |
72716e79 MC |
1658 | } |
1659 | mac_size = (size_t)imac_size; | |
380a522f | 1660 | if (!ossl_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) { |
c2853382 MC |
1661 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, |
1662 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1663 | return 0; | |
380a522f | 1664 | } |
fe589e61 MC |
1665 | |
1666 | /* | |
1667 | * orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was | |
1668 | * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use, | |
1669 | * therefore we can safely process the record in a different amount | |
1670 | * of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC. | |
1671 | */ | |
1672 | if (rr->orig_len < mac_size || | |
1673 | /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */ | |
1674 | (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE && | |
1675 | rr->orig_len < mac_size + 1)) { | |
c2853382 MC |
1676 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, |
1677 | SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); | |
1678 | return 0; | |
fe589e61 MC |
1679 | } |
1680 | ||
1681 | if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) { | |
1682 | /* | |
1683 | * We update the length so that the TLS header bytes can be | |
1684 | * constructed correctly but we need to extract the MAC in | |
1685 | * constant time from within the record, without leaking the | |
1686 | * contents of the padding bytes. | |
1687 | */ | |
1688 | mac = mac_tmp; | |
380a522f | 1689 | if (!ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size)) { |
c2853382 MC |
1690 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, |
1691 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1692 | return 0; | |
380a522f | 1693 | } |
fe589e61 MC |
1694 | rr->length -= mac_size; |
1695 | } else { | |
1696 | /* | |
1697 | * In this case there's no padding, so |rec->orig_len| equals | |
1698 | * |rec->length| and we checked that there's enough bytes for | |
1699 | * |mac_size| above. | |
1700 | */ | |
1701 | rr->length -= mac_size; | |
1702 | mac = &rr->data[rr->length]; | |
1703 | } | |
1704 | ||
d102d9df | 1705 | i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, rr, md, 0 /* not send */ ); |
a14aa99b | 1706 | if (i == 0 || mac == NULL |
72716e79 | 1707 | || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, mac_size) != 0) |
fe589e61 MC |
1708 | enc_err = -1; |
1709 | if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + mac_size) | |
1710 | enc_err = -1; | |
1711 | } | |
1712 | ||
1713 | if (enc_err < 0) { | |
1714 | /* decryption failed, silently discard message */ | |
1715 | rr->length = 0; | |
7a7048af | 1716 | RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); |
c2853382 | 1717 | return 0; |
fe589e61 MC |
1718 | } |
1719 | ||
1720 | /* r->length is now just compressed */ | |
1721 | if (s->expand != NULL) { | |
1722 | if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH) { | |
c2853382 MC |
1723 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW, SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, |
1724 | SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); | |
1725 | return 0; | |
fe589e61 | 1726 | } |
94777c9c | 1727 | if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s, rr)) { |
c2853382 MC |
1728 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE, |
1729 | SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION); | |
1730 | return 0; | |
fe589e61 MC |
1731 | } |
1732 | } | |
1733 | ||
1734 | if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) { | |
c2853382 MC |
1735 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW, SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, |
1736 | SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); | |
1737 | return 0; | |
fe589e61 MC |
1738 | } |
1739 | ||
1740 | rr->off = 0; | |
1741 | /*- | |
1742 | * So at this point the following is true | |
1743 | * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record | |
1744 | * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record | |
1745 | * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte | |
1746 | * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment | |
1747 | * after use :-). | |
1748 | */ | |
1749 | ||
1750 | /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */ | |
7a7048af | 1751 | RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); |
1fb9fdc3 MC |
1752 | |
1753 | /* Mark receipt of record. */ | |
1754 | dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, bitmap); | |
1755 | ||
208fb891 | 1756 | return 1; |
fe589e61 MC |
1757 | } |
1758 | ||
fe589e61 | 1759 | /* |
69687aa8 | 1760 | * Retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the current epoch, i.e. processed |
fe589e61 MC |
1761 | */ |
1762 | #define dtls1_get_processed_record(s) \ | |
1763 | dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \ | |
cb2ce7ab | 1764 | &(DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_processed_rcds(&s->rlayer))) |
fe589e61 MC |
1765 | |
1766 | /*- | |
1767 | * Call this to get a new input record. | |
1768 | * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error | |
1769 | * or non-blocking IO. | |
1770 | * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in | |
1771 | * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record | |
1772 | * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data | |
1773 | * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes | |
1774 | */ | |
1775 | /* used only by dtls1_read_bytes */ | |
1776 | int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s) | |
1777 | { | |
1778 | int ssl_major, ssl_minor; | |
8e6d03ca MC |
1779 | int rret; |
1780 | size_t more, n; | |
fe589e61 MC |
1781 | SSL3_RECORD *rr; |
1782 | unsigned char *p = NULL; | |
1783 | unsigned short version; | |
1784 | DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap; | |
1785 | unsigned int is_next_epoch; | |
1786 | ||
1787 | rr = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer); | |
1788 | ||
738ad946 | 1789 | again: |
fe589e61 MC |
1790 | /* |
1791 | * The epoch may have changed. If so, process all the pending records. | |
1792 | * This is a non-blocking operation. | |
1793 | */ | |
c2853382 MC |
1794 | if (!dtls1_process_buffered_records(s)) { |
1795 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
fe589e61 | 1796 | return -1; |
c2853382 | 1797 | } |
fe589e61 MC |
1798 | |
1799 | /* if we're renegotiating, then there may be buffered records */ | |
1800 | if (dtls1_get_processed_record(s)) | |
1801 | return 1; | |
1802 | ||
1803 | /* get something from the wire */ | |
738ad946 | 1804 | |
fe589e61 | 1805 | /* check if we have the header */ |
295c3f41 | 1806 | if ((RECORD_LAYER_get_rstate(&s->rlayer) != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) || |
7a7048af | 1807 | (RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer) < DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) { |
8e6d03ca MC |
1808 | rret = ssl3_read_n(s, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, |
1809 | SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(&s->rlayer.rbuf), 0, 1, &n); | |
fe589e61 | 1810 | /* read timeout is handled by dtls1_read_bytes */ |
c2853382 MC |
1811 | if (rret <= 0) { |
1812 | /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */ | |
8e6d03ca | 1813 | return rret; /* error or non-blocking */ |
c2853382 | 1814 | } |
fe589e61 MC |
1815 | |
1816 | /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */ | |
a230b26e EK |
1817 | if (RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer) != |
1818 | DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { | |
7a7048af | 1819 | RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); |
fe589e61 MC |
1820 | goto again; |
1821 | } | |
1822 | ||
295c3f41 | 1823 | RECORD_LAYER_set_rstate(&s->rlayer, SSL_ST_READ_BODY); |
fe589e61 | 1824 | |
7a7048af | 1825 | p = RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer); |
fe589e61 MC |
1826 | |
1827 | if (s->msg_callback) | |
1828 | s->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, p, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, | |
1829 | s, s->msg_callback_arg); | |
1830 | ||
1831 | /* Pull apart the header into the DTLS1_RECORD */ | |
1832 | rr->type = *(p++); | |
1833 | ssl_major = *(p++); | |
1834 | ssl_minor = *(p++); | |
1835 | version = (ssl_major << 8) | ssl_minor; | |
1836 | ||
1837 | /* sequence number is 64 bits, with top 2 bytes = epoch */ | |
1838 | n2s(p, rr->epoch); | |
1839 | ||
de07f311 | 1840 | memcpy(&(RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&s->rlayer)[2]), p, 6); |
fe589e61 MC |
1841 | p += 6; |
1842 | ||
1843 | n2s(p, rr->length); | |
1844 | ||
1845 | /* Lets check version */ | |
1846 | if (!s->first_packet) { | |
1847 | if (version != s->version) { | |
1848 | /* unexpected version, silently discard */ | |
1849 | rr->length = 0; | |
7a7048af | 1850 | RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); |
fe589e61 MC |
1851 | goto again; |
1852 | } | |
1853 | } | |
1854 | ||
1855 | if ((version & 0xff00) != (s->version & 0xff00)) { | |
1856 | /* wrong version, silently discard record */ | |
1857 | rr->length = 0; | |
7a7048af | 1858 | RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); |
fe589e61 MC |
1859 | goto again; |
1860 | } | |
1861 | ||
1862 | if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH) { | |
1863 | /* record too long, silently discard it */ | |
1864 | rr->length = 0; | |
7a7048af | 1865 | RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); |
fe589e61 MC |
1866 | goto again; |
1867 | } | |
1868 | ||
cf72c757 F |
1869 | /* If received packet overflows own-client Max Fragment Length setting */ |
1870 | if (s->session != NULL && USE_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT(s->session) | |
1871 | && rr->length > GET_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH(s->session)) { | |
1872 | /* record too long, silently discard it */ | |
1873 | rr->length = 0; | |
1874 | RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); | |
1875 | goto again; | |
1876 | } | |
1877 | ||
295c3f41 | 1878 | /* now s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */ |
fe589e61 MC |
1879 | } |
1880 | ||
295c3f41 | 1881 | /* s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */ |
fe589e61 | 1882 | |
7a7048af MC |
1883 | if (rr->length > |
1884 | RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer) - DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { | |
fe589e61 | 1885 | /* now s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */ |
8e6d03ca MC |
1886 | more = rr->length; |
1887 | rret = ssl3_read_n(s, more, more, 1, 1, &n); | |
fe589e61 | 1888 | /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */ |
8e6d03ca | 1889 | if (rret <= 0 || n != more) { |
c2853382 MC |
1890 | if (ossl_statem_in_error(s)) { |
1891 | /* ssl3_read_n() called SSLfatal() */ | |
1892 | return -1; | |
1893 | } | |
fe589e61 | 1894 | rr->length = 0; |
7a7048af | 1895 | RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); |
fe589e61 MC |
1896 | goto again; |
1897 | } | |
1898 | ||
1899 | /* | |
1900 | * now n == rr->length, and s->packet_length == | |
1901 | * DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length | |
1902 | */ | |
1903 | } | |
295c3f41 MC |
1904 | /* set state for later operations */ |
1905 | RECORD_LAYER_set_rstate(&s->rlayer, SSL_ST_READ_HEADER); | |
fe589e61 MC |
1906 | |
1907 | /* match epochs. NULL means the packet is dropped on the floor */ | |
1908 | bitmap = dtls1_get_bitmap(s, rr, &is_next_epoch); | |
1909 | if (bitmap == NULL) { | |
1910 | rr->length = 0; | |
a230b26e | 1911 | RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); /* dump this record */ |
fe589e61 MC |
1912 | goto again; /* get another record */ |
1913 | } | |
1914 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
1915 | /* Only do replay check if no SCTP bio */ | |
1916 | if (!BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s))) { | |
1917 | #endif | |
912c89c5 | 1918 | /* Check whether this is a repeat, or aged record. */ |
1fb9fdc3 MC |
1919 | /* |
1920 | * TODO: Does it make sense to have replay protection in epoch 0 where | |
1921 | * we have no integrity negotiated yet? | |
1922 | */ | |
912c89c5 | 1923 | if (!dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap)) { |
fe589e61 | 1924 | rr->length = 0; |
7a7048af | 1925 | RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); /* dump this record */ |
fe589e61 MC |
1926 | goto again; /* get another record */ |
1927 | } | |
1928 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
1929 | } | |
1930 | #endif | |
1931 | ||
1932 | /* just read a 0 length packet */ | |
1933 | if (rr->length == 0) | |
1934 | goto again; | |
1935 | ||
1936 | /* | |
1937 | * If this record is from the next epoch (either HM or ALERT), and a | |
1938 | * handshake is currently in progress, buffer it since it cannot be | |
912c89c5 | 1939 | * processed at this time. |
fe589e61 MC |
1940 | */ |
1941 | if (is_next_epoch) { | |
024f543c | 1942 | if ((SSL_in_init(s) || ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s))) { |
c2853382 MC |
1943 | if (dtls1_buffer_record (s, |
1944 | &(DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_unprocessed_rcds(&s->rlayer)), | |
1945 | rr->seq_num) < 0) { | |
1946 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
fe589e61 | 1947 | return -1; |
c2853382 | 1948 | } |
fe589e61 MC |
1949 | } |
1950 | rr->length = 0; | |
7a7048af | 1951 | RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); |
fe589e61 MC |
1952 | goto again; |
1953 | } | |
1954 | ||
1fb9fdc3 | 1955 | if (!dtls1_process_record(s, bitmap)) { |
c2853382 MC |
1956 | if (ossl_statem_in_error(s)) { |
1957 | /* dtls1_process_record() called SSLfatal */ | |
1958 | return -1; | |
1959 | } | |
fe589e61 | 1960 | rr->length = 0; |
a230b26e | 1961 | RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); /* dump this record */ |
fe589e61 MC |
1962 | goto again; /* get another record */ |
1963 | } | |
fe589e61 | 1964 | |
208fb891 | 1965 | return 1; |
fe589e61 MC |
1966 | |
1967 | } |