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Commit | Line | Data |
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846e33c7 RS |
1 | /* |
2 | * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. | |
258f8721 | 3 | * |
846e33c7 RS |
4 | * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use |
5 | * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy | |
6 | * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at | |
7 | * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html | |
258f8721 MC |
8 | */ |
9 | ||
10 | #include "../ssl_locl.h" | |
68570797 | 11 | #include "internal/constant_time_locl.h" |
02a36fda | 12 | #include <openssl/rand.h> |
c99c4c11 | 13 | #include "record_locl.h" |
02a36fda MC |
14 | |
15 | static const unsigned char ssl3_pad_1[48] = { | |
16 | 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, | |
17 | 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, | |
18 | 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, | |
19 | 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, | |
20 | 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, | |
21 | 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36 | |
22 | }; | |
23 | ||
24 | static const unsigned char ssl3_pad_2[48] = { | |
25 | 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, | |
26 | 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, | |
27 | 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, | |
28 | 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, | |
29 | 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, | |
30 | 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c | |
31 | }; | |
258f8721 | 32 | |
6b41b3f5 MC |
33 | /* |
34 | * Clear the contents of an SSL3_RECORD but retain any memory allocated | |
35 | */ | |
94777c9c | 36 | void SSL3_RECORD_clear(SSL3_RECORD *r, unsigned int num_recs) |
258f8721 | 37 | { |
94777c9c MC |
38 | unsigned char *comp; |
39 | unsigned int i; | |
6b41b3f5 | 40 | |
94777c9c MC |
41 | for (i = 0; i < num_recs; i++) { |
42 | comp = r[i].comp; | |
43 | ||
44 | memset(&r[i], 0, sizeof(*r)); | |
45 | r[i].comp = comp; | |
46 | } | |
258f8721 MC |
47 | } |
48 | ||
94777c9c | 49 | void SSL3_RECORD_release(SSL3_RECORD *r, unsigned int num_recs) |
258f8721 | 50 | { |
94777c9c MC |
51 | unsigned int i; |
52 | ||
53 | for (i = 0; i < num_recs; i++) { | |
54 | OPENSSL_free(r[i].comp); | |
55 | r[i].comp = NULL; | |
56 | } | |
258f8721 MC |
57 | } |
58 | ||
258f8721 MC |
59 | void SSL3_RECORD_set_seq_num(SSL3_RECORD *r, const unsigned char *seq_num) |
60 | { | |
e5bf62f7 | 61 | memcpy(r->seq_num, seq_num, SEQ_NUM_SIZE); |
258f8721 | 62 | } |
fe589e61 | 63 | |
94777c9c MC |
64 | |
65 | /* | |
66 | * Peeks ahead into "read_ahead" data to see if we have a whole record waiting | |
67 | * for us in the buffer. | |
68 | */ | |
ea71906e | 69 | static int ssl3_record_app_data_waiting(SSL *s) |
94777c9c MC |
70 | { |
71 | SSL3_BUFFER *rbuf; | |
72 | int left, len; | |
73 | unsigned char *p; | |
74 | ||
75 | rbuf = RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer); | |
76 | ||
77 | p = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(rbuf); | |
78 | if (p == NULL) | |
79 | return 0; | |
80 | ||
81 | left = SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf); | |
82 | ||
83 | if (left < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) | |
84 | return 0; | |
85 | ||
86 | p += SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(rbuf); | |
87 | ||
88 | /* | |
89 | * We only check the type and record length, we will sanity check version | |
90 | * etc later | |
91 | */ | |
92 | if (*p != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) | |
93 | return 0; | |
94 | ||
95 | p += 3; | |
96 | n2s(p, len); | |
97 | ||
98 | if (left < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + len) | |
99 | return 0; | |
100 | ||
101 | return 1; | |
102 | } | |
103 | ||
fe589e61 MC |
104 | /* |
105 | * MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS defines the number of consecutive, empty records that | |
106 | * will be processed per call to ssl3_get_record. Without this limit an | |
107 | * attacker could send empty records at a faster rate than we can process and | |
108 | * cause ssl3_get_record to loop forever. | |
109 | */ | |
110 | #define MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS 32 | |
111 | ||
32ec4153 | 112 | #define SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH 2 |
fe589e61 | 113 | /*- |
94777c9c | 114 | * Call this to get new input records. |
fe589e61 MC |
115 | * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error |
116 | * or non-blocking IO. | |
94777c9c MC |
117 | * When it finishes, |numrpipes| records have been decoded. For each record 'i': |
118 | * rr[i].type - is the type of record | |
119 | * rr[i].data, - data | |
120 | * rr[i].length, - number of bytes | |
121 | * Multiple records will only be returned if the record types are all | |
122 | * SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA. The number of records returned will always be <= | |
123 | * |max_pipelines| | |
fe589e61 MC |
124 | */ |
125 | /* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */ | |
126 | int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s) | |
127 | { | |
128 | int ssl_major, ssl_minor, al; | |
129 | int enc_err, n, i, ret = -1; | |
130 | SSL3_RECORD *rr; | |
94777c9c | 131 | SSL3_BUFFER *rbuf; |
fe589e61 MC |
132 | SSL_SESSION *sess; |
133 | unsigned char *p; | |
134 | unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; | |
135 | short version; | |
136 | unsigned mac_size; | |
94777c9c MC |
137 | unsigned int num_recs = 0; |
138 | unsigned int max_recs; | |
139 | unsigned int j; | |
fe589e61 MC |
140 | |
141 | rr = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer); | |
94777c9c MC |
142 | rbuf = RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer); |
143 | max_recs = s->max_pipelines; | |
144 | if (max_recs == 0) | |
145 | max_recs = 1; | |
fe589e61 MC |
146 | sess = s->session; |
147 | ||
94777c9c MC |
148 | do { |
149 | /* check if we have the header */ | |
150 | if ((RECORD_LAYER_get_rstate(&s->rlayer) != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) || | |
151 | (RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer) | |
152 | < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) { | |
153 | n = ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, | |
154 | SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(rbuf), 0, num_recs == 0 ? 1 : 0); | |
155 | if (n <= 0) | |
156 | return (n); /* error or non-blocking */ | |
157 | RECORD_LAYER_set_rstate(&s->rlayer, SSL_ST_READ_BODY); | |
158 | ||
159 | p = RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer); | |
fe589e61 | 160 | |
94777c9c MC |
161 | /* |
162 | * Check whether this is a regular record or an SSLv2 style record. | |
163 | * The latter is only used in an initial ClientHello for old | |
164 | * clients. We check s->read_hash and s->enc_read_ctx to ensure this | |
165 | * does not apply during renegotiation | |
166 | */ | |
167 | if (s->first_packet && s->server && !s->read_hash | |
168 | && !s->enc_read_ctx | |
169 | && (p[0] & 0x80) && (p[2] == SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)) { | |
be9c8deb MC |
170 | /* |
171 | * SSLv2 style record | |
172 | * | |
173 | * |num_recs| here will actually always be 0 because | |
174 | * |num_recs > 0| only ever occurs when we are processing | |
175 | * multiple app data records - which we know isn't the case here | |
176 | * because it is an SSLv2ClientHello. We keep it using | |
177 | * |num_recs| for the sake of consistency | |
178 | */ | |
94777c9c MC |
179 | rr[num_recs].type = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE; |
180 | rr[num_recs].rec_version = SSL2_VERSION; | |
181 | ||
182 | rr[num_recs].length = ((p[0] & 0x7f) << 8) | p[1]; | |
183 | ||
6da57392 | 184 | if (rr[num_recs].length > SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(rbuf) |
94777c9c MC |
185 | - SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { |
186 | al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; | |
187 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); | |
188 | goto f_err; | |
189 | } | |
fe589e61 | 190 | |
94777c9c MC |
191 | if (rr[num_recs].length < MIN_SSL2_RECORD_LEN) { |
192 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
193 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); | |
194 | goto f_err; | |
195 | } | |
196 | } else { | |
197 | /* SSLv3+ style record */ | |
198 | if (s->msg_callback) | |
199 | s->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, p, 5, s, | |
200 | s->msg_callback_arg); | |
201 | ||
202 | /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */ | |
203 | rr[num_recs].type = *(p++); | |
204 | ssl_major = *(p++); | |
205 | ssl_minor = *(p++); | |
206 | version = (ssl_major << 8) | ssl_minor; | |
207 | rr[num_recs].rec_version = version; | |
208 | n2s(p, rr[num_recs].length); | |
209 | ||
210 | /* Lets check version */ | |
211 | if (!s->first_packet && version != s->version) { | |
212 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); | |
213 | if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00) | |
214 | && !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash) { | |
215 | if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) { | |
216 | /* | |
217 | * The record is using an incorrect version number, | |
218 | * but what we've got appears to be an alert. We | |
219 | * haven't read the body yet to check whether its a | |
220 | * fatal or not - but chances are it is. We probably | |
221 | * shouldn't send a fatal alert back. We'll just | |
222 | * end. | |
223 | */ | |
224 | goto err; | |
225 | } | |
02db21df | 226 | /* |
94777c9c | 227 | * Send back error using their minor version number :-) |
02db21df | 228 | */ |
94777c9c | 229 | s->version = (unsigned short)version; |
02db21df | 230 | } |
94777c9c MC |
231 | al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; |
232 | goto f_err; | |
02db21df | 233 | } |
32ec4153 | 234 | |
94777c9c MC |
235 | if ((version >> 8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) { |
236 | if (s->first_packet) { | |
237 | /* Go back to start of packet, look at the five bytes | |
238 | * that we have. */ | |
239 | p = RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer); | |
240 | if (strncmp((char *)p, "GET ", 4) == 0 || | |
241 | strncmp((char *)p, "POST ", 5) == 0 || | |
242 | strncmp((char *)p, "HEAD ", 5) == 0 || | |
243 | strncmp((char *)p, "PUT ", 4) == 0) { | |
244 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST); | |
245 | goto err; | |
246 | } else if (strncmp((char *)p, "CONNE", 5) == 0) { | |
247 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, | |
248 | SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST); | |
249 | goto err; | |
250 | } | |
124f6ff4 | 251 | } |
94777c9c MC |
252 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); |
253 | goto err; | |
124f6ff4 | 254 | } |
32ec4153 | 255 | |
94777c9c MC |
256 | if (rr[num_recs].length > |
257 | SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(rbuf) - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { | |
258 | al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; | |
259 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); | |
260 | goto f_err; | |
261 | } | |
32ec4153 | 262 | } |
94777c9c MC |
263 | |
264 | /* now s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */ | |
fe589e61 MC |
265 | } |
266 | ||
94777c9c MC |
267 | /* |
268 | * s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data. | |
269 | * Calculate how much more data we need to read for the rest of the | |
270 | * record | |
271 | */ | |
272 | if (rr[num_recs].rec_version == SSL2_VERSION) { | |
273 | i = rr[num_recs].length + SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH | |
274 | - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
275 | } else { | |
276 | i = rr[num_recs].length; | |
277 | } | |
278 | if (i > 0) { | |
279 | /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */ | |
fe589e61 | 280 | |
94777c9c MC |
281 | n = ssl3_read_n(s, i, i, 1, 0); |
282 | if (n <= 0) | |
283 | return (n); /* error or non-blocking io */ | |
284 | } | |
32ec4153 | 285 | |
94777c9c MC |
286 | /* set state for later operations */ |
287 | RECORD_LAYER_set_rstate(&s->rlayer, SSL_ST_READ_HEADER); | |
fe589e61 | 288 | |
94777c9c MC |
289 | /* |
290 | * At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length, | |
291 | * or s->packet_length == SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length | |
292 | * and we have that many bytes in s->packet | |
293 | */ | |
294 | if(rr[num_recs].rec_version == SSL2_VERSION) { | |
295 | rr[num_recs].input = | |
296 | &(RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer)[SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]); | |
297 | } else { | |
298 | rr[num_recs].input = | |
299 | &(RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer)[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]); | |
300 | } | |
fe589e61 | 301 | |
94777c9c MC |
302 | /* |
303 | * ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr' rr->input points | |
304 | * at rr->length bytes, which need to be copied into rr->data by either | |
305 | * the decryption or by the decompression When the data is 'copied' into | |
306 | * the rr->data buffer, rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer | |
307 | */ | |
fe589e61 | 308 | |
94777c9c MC |
309 | /* |
310 | * We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ] rr->length | |
311 | * bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. | |
312 | */ | |
fe589e61 | 313 | |
94777c9c MC |
314 | /* check is not needed I believe */ |
315 | if (rr[num_recs].length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH) { | |
316 | al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; | |
317 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); | |
318 | goto f_err; | |
319 | } | |
320 | ||
321 | /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */ | |
322 | rr[num_recs].data = rr[num_recs].input; | |
323 | rr[num_recs].orig_len = rr[num_recs].length; | |
255cfeac MC |
324 | |
325 | /* Mark this record as not read by upper layers yet */ | |
326 | rr[num_recs].read = 0; | |
327 | ||
94777c9c MC |
328 | num_recs++; |
329 | ||
330 | /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */ | |
331 | RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); | |
de0717eb MC |
332 | } while (num_recs < max_recs |
333 | && rr[num_recs-1].type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA | |
94777c9c MC |
334 | && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) |
335 | && s->enc_read_ctx != NULL | |
336 | && (EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx)) | |
337 | & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE) | |
ea71906e | 338 | && ssl3_record_app_data_waiting(s)); |
fe589e61 | 339 | |
fe589e61 | 340 | |
fe589e61 MC |
341 | /* |
342 | * If in encrypt-then-mac mode calculate mac from encrypted record. All | |
343 | * the details below are public so no timing details can leak. | |
344 | */ | |
345 | if (SSL_USE_ETM(s) && s->read_hash) { | |
346 | unsigned char *mac; | |
347 | mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); | |
348 | OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); | |
94777c9c MC |
349 | for (j = 0; j < num_recs; j++) { |
350 | if (rr[j].length < mac_size) { | |
351 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
352 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); | |
353 | goto f_err; | |
354 | } | |
355 | rr[j].length -= mac_size; | |
356 | mac = rr[j].data + rr[j].length; | |
357 | i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, &rr[j], md, 0 /* not send */ ); | |
358 | if (i < 0 || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0) { | |
359 | al = SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC; | |
360 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, | |
361 | SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC); | |
362 | goto f_err; | |
363 | } | |
fe589e61 MC |
364 | } |
365 | } | |
366 | ||
94777c9c | 367 | enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, rr, num_recs, 0); |
fe589e61 MC |
368 | /*- |
369 | * enc_err is: | |
370 | * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid. | |
371 | * 1: if the padding is valid | |
372 | * -1: if the padding is invalid | |
373 | */ | |
374 | if (enc_err == 0) { | |
375 | al = SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED; | |
376 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG); | |
377 | goto f_err; | |
378 | } | |
d63a5e5e | 379 | #ifdef SSL_DEBUG |
fe589e61 MC |
380 | printf("dec %d\n", rr->length); |
381 | { | |
382 | unsigned int z; | |
383 | for (z = 0; z < rr->length; z++) | |
384 | printf("%02X%c", rr->data[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n'); | |
385 | } | |
386 | printf("\n"); | |
387 | #endif | |
388 | ||
389 | /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */ | |
390 | if ((sess != NULL) && | |
391 | (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) && | |
392 | (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL) && !SSL_USE_ETM(s)) { | |
393 | /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */ | |
394 | unsigned char *mac = NULL; | |
395 | unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; | |
94777c9c | 396 | |
fe589e61 MC |
397 | mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); |
398 | OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); | |
399 | ||
94777c9c | 400 | for (j=0; j < num_recs; j++) { |
fe589e61 | 401 | /* |
94777c9c MC |
402 | * orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was |
403 | * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use, | |
404 | * therefore we can safely process the record in a different amount | |
405 | * of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC. | |
fe589e61 | 406 | */ |
94777c9c MC |
407 | if (rr[j].orig_len < mac_size || |
408 | /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */ | |
409 | (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE && | |
410 | rr[j].orig_len < mac_size + 1)) { | |
411 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
412 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); | |
413 | goto f_err; | |
414 | } | |
fe589e61 | 415 | |
94777c9c MC |
416 | if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) { |
417 | /* | |
418 | * We update the length so that the TLS header bytes can be | |
419 | * constructed correctly but we need to extract the MAC in | |
420 | * constant time from within the record, without leaking the | |
421 | * contents of the padding bytes. | |
422 | */ | |
423 | mac = mac_tmp; | |
424 | ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, &rr[j], mac_size); | |
425 | rr[j].length -= mac_size; | |
426 | } else { | |
427 | /* | |
428 | * In this case there's no padding, so |rec->orig_len| equals | |
429 | * |rec->length| and we checked that there's enough bytes for | |
430 | * |mac_size| above. | |
431 | */ | |
432 | rr[j].length -= mac_size; | |
433 | mac = &rr[j].data[rr[j].length]; | |
434 | } | |
435 | ||
436 | i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, &rr[j], md, 0 /* not send */ ); | |
437 | if (i < 0 || mac == NULL | |
438 | || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0) | |
439 | enc_err = -1; | |
440 | if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + mac_size) | |
441 | enc_err = -1; | |
442 | } | |
fe589e61 MC |
443 | } |
444 | ||
445 | if (enc_err < 0) { | |
446 | /* | |
447 | * A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0, | |
448 | * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption | |
449 | * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway, we should | |
450 | * not reveal which kind of error occurred -- this might become | |
451 | * visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile) | |
452 | */ | |
453 | al = SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC; | |
454 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, | |
455 | SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC); | |
456 | goto f_err; | |
457 | } | |
458 | ||
94777c9c MC |
459 | for (j = 0; j < num_recs; j++) { |
460 | /* rr[j].length is now just compressed */ | |
461 | if (s->expand != NULL) { | |
462 | if (rr[j].length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH) { | |
463 | al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; | |
464 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); | |
465 | goto f_err; | |
466 | } | |
467 | if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s, &rr[j])) { | |
468 | al = SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE; | |
469 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION); | |
470 | goto f_err; | |
471 | } | |
fe589e61 | 472 | } |
94777c9c MC |
473 | |
474 | if (rr[j].length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) { | |
475 | al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; | |
476 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); | |
fe589e61 MC |
477 | goto f_err; |
478 | } | |
fe589e61 | 479 | |
94777c9c MC |
480 | rr[j].off = 0; |
481 | /*- | |
482 | * So at this point the following is true | |
483 | * rr[j].type is the type of record | |
484 | * rr[j].length == number of bytes in record | |
485 | * rr[j].off == offset to first valid byte | |
486 | * rr[j].data == where to take bytes from, increment after use :-). | |
487 | */ | |
fe589e61 | 488 | |
94777c9c MC |
489 | /* just read a 0 length packet */ |
490 | if (rr[j].length == 0) { | |
255cfeac MC |
491 | RECORD_LAYER_inc_empty_record_count(&s->rlayer); |
492 | if (RECORD_LAYER_get_empty_record_count(&s->rlayer) | |
493 | > MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS) { | |
94777c9c MC |
494 | al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; |
495 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL); | |
496 | goto f_err; | |
497 | } | |
255cfeac MC |
498 | } else { |
499 | RECORD_LAYER_reset_empty_record_count(&s->rlayer); | |
fe589e61 | 500 | } |
94777c9c | 501 | } |
fe589e61 | 502 | |
94777c9c MC |
503 | RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s->rlayer, num_recs); |
504 | return 1; | |
fe589e61 MC |
505 | |
506 | f_err: | |
507 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
508 | err: | |
94777c9c | 509 | return ret; |
fe589e61 MC |
510 | } |
511 | ||
94777c9c | 512 | int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rr) |
fe589e61 MC |
513 | { |
514 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP | |
515 | int i; | |
fe589e61 | 516 | |
0220fee4 MC |
517 | if (rr->comp == NULL) { |
518 | rr->comp = (unsigned char *) | |
519 | OPENSSL_malloc(SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH); | |
520 | } | |
521 | if (rr->comp == NULL) | |
522 | return 0; | |
523 | ||
fe589e61 MC |
524 | i = COMP_expand_block(ssl->expand, rr->comp, |
525 | SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, rr->data, | |
526 | (int)rr->length); | |
527 | if (i < 0) | |
0220fee4 | 528 | return 0; |
fe589e61 MC |
529 | else |
530 | rr->length = i; | |
531 | rr->data = rr->comp; | |
532 | #endif | |
0220fee4 | 533 | return 1; |
fe589e61 MC |
534 | } |
535 | ||
d102d9df | 536 | int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *wr) |
fe589e61 MC |
537 | { |
538 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP | |
539 | int i; | |
fe589e61 | 540 | |
fe589e61 MC |
541 | i = COMP_compress_block(ssl->compress, wr->data, |
542 | SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH, | |
543 | wr->input, (int)wr->length); | |
544 | if (i < 0) | |
545 | return (0); | |
546 | else | |
547 | wr->length = i; | |
548 | ||
549 | wr->input = wr->data; | |
550 | #endif | |
551 | return (1); | |
552 | } | |
553 | ||
02a36fda | 554 | /*- |
37205971 | 555 | * ssl3_enc encrypts/decrypts |n_recs| records in |inrecs| |
02a36fda MC |
556 | * |
557 | * Returns: | |
558 | * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too | |
559 | * short etc). | |
560 | * 1: if the record's padding is valid / the encryption was successful. | |
561 | * -1: if the record's padding is invalid or, if sending, an internal error | |
562 | * occurred. | |
563 | */ | |
37205971 | 564 | int ssl3_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *inrecs, unsigned int n_recs, int send) |
02a36fda MC |
565 | { |
566 | SSL3_RECORD *rec; | |
567 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds; | |
568 | unsigned long l; | |
569 | int bs, i, mac_size = 0; | |
570 | const EVP_CIPHER *enc; | |
571 | ||
d102d9df | 572 | rec = inrecs; |
37205971 MC |
573 | /* |
574 | * We shouldn't ever be called with more than one record in the SSLv3 case | |
575 | */ | |
576 | if (n_recs != 1) | |
577 | return 0; | |
02a36fda MC |
578 | if (send) { |
579 | ds = s->enc_write_ctx; | |
02a36fda MC |
580 | if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) |
581 | enc = NULL; | |
582 | else | |
583 | enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx); | |
584 | } else { | |
585 | ds = s->enc_read_ctx; | |
02a36fda MC |
586 | if (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) |
587 | enc = NULL; | |
588 | else | |
589 | enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx); | |
590 | } | |
591 | ||
592 | if ((s->session == NULL) || (ds == NULL) || (enc == NULL)) { | |
593 | memmove(rec->data, rec->input, rec->length); | |
594 | rec->input = rec->data; | |
595 | } else { | |
596 | l = rec->length; | |
846ec07d | 597 | bs = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(ds); |
02a36fda MC |
598 | |
599 | /* COMPRESS */ | |
600 | ||
601 | if ((bs != 1) && send) { | |
602 | i = bs - ((int)l % bs); | |
603 | ||
604 | /* we need to add 'i-1' padding bytes */ | |
605 | l += i; | |
606 | /* | |
607 | * the last of these zero bytes will be overwritten with the | |
608 | * padding length. | |
609 | */ | |
610 | memset(&rec->input[rec->length], 0, i); | |
611 | rec->length += i; | |
612 | rec->input[l - 1] = (i - 1); | |
613 | } | |
614 | ||
615 | if (!send) { | |
616 | if (l == 0 || l % bs != 0) | |
617 | return 0; | |
618 | /* otherwise, rec->length >= bs */ | |
619 | } | |
620 | ||
621 | if (EVP_Cipher(ds, rec->data, rec->input, l) < 1) | |
622 | return -1; | |
623 | ||
624 | if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL) | |
625 | mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); | |
626 | if ((bs != 1) && !send) | |
a773b52a | 627 | return ssl3_cbc_remove_padding(rec, bs, mac_size); |
02a36fda MC |
628 | } |
629 | return (1); | |
630 | } | |
631 | ||
632 | /*- | |
37205971 | 633 | * tls1_enc encrypts/decrypts |n_recs| in |recs|. |
02a36fda MC |
634 | * |
635 | * Returns: | |
636 | * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too | |
637 | * short etc). | |
638 | * 1: if the record's padding is valid / the encryption was successful. | |
639 | * -1: if the record's padding/AEAD-authenticator is invalid or, if sending, | |
640 | * an internal error occurred. | |
641 | */ | |
37205971 | 642 | int tls1_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *recs, unsigned int n_recs, int send) |
02a36fda | 643 | { |
02a36fda | 644 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds; |
d102d9df MC |
645 | size_t reclen[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES]; |
646 | unsigned char buf[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES][EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN]; | |
02a36fda MC |
647 | int bs, i, j, k, pad = 0, ret, mac_size = 0; |
648 | const EVP_CIPHER *enc; | |
d102d9df | 649 | unsigned int ctr; |
02a36fda MC |
650 | |
651 | if (send) { | |
652 | if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash)) { | |
653 | int n = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash); | |
654 | OPENSSL_assert(n >= 0); | |
655 | } | |
656 | ds = s->enc_write_ctx; | |
02a36fda MC |
657 | if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) |
658 | enc = NULL; | |
659 | else { | |
660 | int ivlen; | |
661 | enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx); | |
662 | /* For TLSv1.1 and later explicit IV */ | |
663 | if (SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) | |
664 | && EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) | |
665 | ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(enc); | |
666 | else | |
667 | ivlen = 0; | |
668 | if (ivlen > 1) { | |
37205971 | 669 | for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) { |
d102d9df MC |
670 | if (recs[ctr].data != recs[ctr].input) { |
671 | /* | |
672 | * we can't write into the input stream: Can this ever | |
673 | * happen?? (steve) | |
674 | */ | |
675 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_ENC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
676 | return -1; | |
677 | } else if (RAND_bytes(recs[ctr].input, ivlen) <= 0) { | |
678 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_ENC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
679 | return -1; | |
680 | } | |
681 | } | |
02a36fda MC |
682 | } |
683 | } | |
684 | } else { | |
685 | if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash)) { | |
686 | int n = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); | |
687 | OPENSSL_assert(n >= 0); | |
688 | } | |
689 | ds = s->enc_read_ctx; | |
02a36fda MC |
690 | if (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) |
691 | enc = NULL; | |
692 | else | |
693 | enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx); | |
694 | } | |
695 | ||
02a36fda | 696 | if ((s->session == NULL) || (ds == NULL) || (enc == NULL)) { |
37205971 | 697 | for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) { |
d102d9df MC |
698 | memmove(recs[ctr].data, recs[ctr].input, recs[ctr].length); |
699 | recs[ctr].input = recs[ctr].data; | |
700 | } | |
02a36fda MC |
701 | ret = 1; |
702 | } else { | |
d102d9df MC |
703 | bs = EVP_CIPHER_block_size(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ds)); |
704 | ||
37205971 | 705 | if (n_recs > 1) { |
d102d9df MC |
706 | if(!(EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ds)) |
707 | & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE)) { | |
708 | /* | |
709 | * We shouldn't have been called with pipeline data if the | |
710 | * cipher doesn't support pipelining | |
711 | */ | |
712 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_ENC, SSL_R_PIPELINE_FAILURE); | |
713 | return -1; | |
714 | } | |
715 | } | |
37205971 | 716 | for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) { |
d102d9df MC |
717 | reclen[ctr] = recs[ctr].length; |
718 | ||
719 | if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ds)) | |
720 | & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) { | |
721 | unsigned char *seq; | |
722 | ||
723 | seq = send ? RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&s->rlayer) | |
724 | : RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&s->rlayer); | |
725 | ||
726 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
727 | /* DTLS does not support pipelining */ | |
728 | unsigned char dtlsseq[9], *p = dtlsseq; | |
729 | ||
730 | s2n(send ? DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_w_epoch(&s->rlayer) : | |
731 | DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_r_epoch(&s->rlayer), p); | |
732 | memcpy(p, &seq[2], 6); | |
733 | memcpy(buf[ctr], dtlsseq, 8); | |
734 | } else { | |
735 | memcpy(buf[ctr], seq, 8); | |
736 | for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) { /* increment */ | |
737 | ++seq[i]; | |
738 | if (seq[i] != 0) | |
739 | break; | |
740 | } | |
741 | } | |
02a36fda | 742 | |
d102d9df MC |
743 | buf[ctr][8] = recs[ctr].type; |
744 | buf[ctr][9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8); | |
745 | buf[ctr][10] = (unsigned char)(s->version); | |
746 | buf[ctr][11] = recs[ctr].length >> 8; | |
747 | buf[ctr][12] = recs[ctr].length & 0xff; | |
748 | pad = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD, | |
749 | EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN, buf[ctr]); | |
750 | if (pad <= 0) | |
751 | return -1; | |
752 | ||
753 | if (send) { | |
754 | reclen[ctr] += pad; | |
755 | recs[ctr].length += pad; | |
02a36fda | 756 | } |
02a36fda | 757 | |
d102d9df MC |
758 | } else if ((bs != 1) && send) { |
759 | i = bs - ((int)reclen[ctr] % bs); | |
02a36fda | 760 | |
d102d9df | 761 | /* Add weird padding of upto 256 bytes */ |
02a36fda | 762 | |
d102d9df MC |
763 | /* we need to add 'i' padding bytes of value j */ |
764 | j = i - 1; | |
765 | for (k = (int)reclen[ctr]; k < (int)(reclen[ctr] + i); k++) | |
766 | recs[ctr].input[k] = j; | |
767 | reclen[ctr] += i; | |
768 | recs[ctr].length += i; | |
769 | } | |
770 | ||
771 | if (!send) { | |
772 | if (reclen[ctr] == 0 || reclen[ctr] % bs != 0) | |
773 | return 0; | |
774 | } | |
02a36fda | 775 | } |
37205971 | 776 | if (n_recs > 1) { |
d102d9df | 777 | unsigned char *data[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES]; |
02a36fda | 778 | |
d102d9df | 779 | /* Set the output buffers */ |
37205971 | 780 | for(ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) { |
d102d9df MC |
781 | data[ctr] = recs[ctr].data; |
782 | } | |
783 | if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_SET_PIPELINE_OUTPUT_BUFS, | |
37205971 | 784 | n_recs, data) <= 0) { |
d102d9df MC |
785 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_ENC, SSL_R_PIPELINE_FAILURE); |
786 | } | |
787 | /* Set the input buffers */ | |
37205971 | 788 | for(ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) { |
d102d9df MC |
789 | data[ctr] = recs[ctr].input; |
790 | } | |
791 | if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_SET_PIPELINE_INPUT_BUFS, | |
37205971 | 792 | n_recs, data) <= 0 |
d102d9df | 793 | || EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_SET_PIPELINE_INPUT_LENS, |
37205971 | 794 | n_recs, reclen) <= 0) { |
d102d9df MC |
795 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_ENC, SSL_R_PIPELINE_FAILURE); |
796 | return -1; | |
797 | } | |
02a36fda MC |
798 | } |
799 | ||
d102d9df MC |
800 | i = EVP_Cipher(ds, recs[0].data, recs[0].input, reclen[0]); |
801 | if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ds)) | |
802 | & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER) | |
02a36fda MC |
803 | ? (i < 0) |
804 | : (i == 0)) | |
805 | return -1; /* AEAD can fail to verify MAC */ | |
e75c5a79 DSH |
806 | if (send == 0) { |
807 | if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) { | |
37205971 | 808 | for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) { |
d102d9df MC |
809 | recs[ctr].data += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; |
810 | recs[ctr].input += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; | |
811 | recs[ctr].length -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; | |
812 | } | |
e75c5a79 | 813 | } else if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) { |
37205971 | 814 | for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) { |
d102d9df MC |
815 | recs[ctr].data += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; |
816 | recs[ctr].input += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; | |
817 | recs[ctr].length -= EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; | |
818 | } | |
e75c5a79 | 819 | } |
02a36fda | 820 | } |
02a36fda MC |
821 | |
822 | ret = 1; | |
823 | if (!SSL_USE_ETM(s) && EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL) | |
824 | mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); | |
d102d9df | 825 | if ((bs != 1) && !send) { |
94777c9c | 826 | int tmpret; |
37205971 | 827 | for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) { |
94777c9c MC |
828 | tmpret = tls1_cbc_remove_padding(s, &recs[ctr], bs, mac_size); |
829 | if (tmpret == -1) | |
830 | return -1; | |
831 | ret &= tmpret; | |
832 | } | |
833 | } | |
834 | if (pad && !send) { | |
37205971 | 835 | for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) { |
94777c9c MC |
836 | recs[ctr].length -= pad; |
837 | } | |
d102d9df | 838 | } |
02a36fda MC |
839 | } |
840 | return ret; | |
841 | } | |
842 | ||
d102d9df | 843 | int n_ssl3_mac(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md, int send) |
02a36fda | 844 | { |
02a36fda | 845 | unsigned char *mac_sec, *seq; |
02a36fda MC |
846 | const EVP_MD_CTX *hash; |
847 | unsigned char *p, rec_char; | |
848 | size_t md_size; | |
849 | int npad; | |
850 | int t; | |
851 | ||
852 | if (send) { | |
02a36fda | 853 | mac_sec = &(ssl->s3->write_mac_secret[0]); |
de07f311 | 854 | seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&ssl->rlayer); |
02a36fda MC |
855 | hash = ssl->write_hash; |
856 | } else { | |
02a36fda | 857 | mac_sec = &(ssl->s3->read_mac_secret[0]); |
de07f311 | 858 | seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&ssl->rlayer); |
02a36fda MC |
859 | hash = ssl->read_hash; |
860 | } | |
861 | ||
862 | t = EVP_MD_CTX_size(hash); | |
863 | if (t < 0) | |
864 | return -1; | |
865 | md_size = t; | |
866 | npad = (48 / md_size) * md_size; | |
867 | ||
868 | if (!send && | |
869 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ssl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE && | |
870 | ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(hash)) { | |
871 | /* | |
872 | * This is a CBC-encrypted record. We must avoid leaking any | |
873 | * timing-side channel information about how many blocks of data we | |
874 | * are hashing because that gives an attacker a timing-oracle. | |
875 | */ | |
876 | ||
877 | /*- | |
878 | * npad is, at most, 48 bytes and that's with MD5: | |
879 | * 16 + 48 + 8 (sequence bytes) + 1 + 2 = 75. | |
880 | * | |
881 | * With SHA-1 (the largest hash speced for SSLv3) the hash size | |
882 | * goes up 4, but npad goes down by 8, resulting in a smaller | |
883 | * total size. | |
884 | */ | |
885 | unsigned char header[75]; | |
886 | unsigned j = 0; | |
887 | memcpy(header + j, mac_sec, md_size); | |
888 | j += md_size; | |
889 | memcpy(header + j, ssl3_pad_1, npad); | |
890 | j += npad; | |
891 | memcpy(header + j, seq, 8); | |
892 | j += 8; | |
893 | header[j++] = rec->type; | |
894 | header[j++] = rec->length >> 8; | |
895 | header[j++] = rec->length & 0xff; | |
896 | ||
897 | /* Final param == is SSLv3 */ | |
5f3d93e4 MC |
898 | if (ssl3_cbc_digest_record(hash, |
899 | md, &md_size, | |
900 | header, rec->input, | |
901 | rec->length + md_size, rec->orig_len, | |
902 | mac_sec, md_size, 1) <= 0) | |
903 | return -1; | |
02a36fda MC |
904 | } else { |
905 | unsigned int md_size_u; | |
906 | /* Chop the digest off the end :-) */ | |
bfb0641f | 907 | EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); |
6e59a892 RL |
908 | |
909 | if (md_ctx == NULL) | |
910 | return -1; | |
02a36fda | 911 | |
02a36fda | 912 | rec_char = rec->type; |
02a36fda MC |
913 | p = md; |
914 | s2n(rec->length, p); | |
6e59a892 RL |
915 | if (EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(md_ctx, hash) <= 0 |
916 | || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, mac_sec, md_size) <= 0 | |
917 | || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, ssl3_pad_1, npad) <= 0 | |
918 | || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, seq, 8) <= 0 | |
919 | || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, &rec_char, 1) <= 0 | |
920 | || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, md, 2) <= 0 | |
921 | || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, rec->input, rec->length) <= 0 | |
922 | || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0 | |
923 | || EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(md_ctx, hash) <= 0 | |
924 | || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, mac_sec, md_size) <= 0 | |
925 | || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, ssl3_pad_2, npad) <= 0 | |
926 | || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, md, md_size) <= 0 | |
927 | || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md_ctx, md, &md_size_u) <= 0) { | |
bfb0641f | 928 | EVP_MD_CTX_reset(md_ctx); |
5f3d93e4 MC |
929 | return -1; |
930 | } | |
02a36fda MC |
931 | md_size = md_size_u; |
932 | ||
bfb0641f | 933 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); |
02a36fda MC |
934 | } |
935 | ||
936 | ssl3_record_sequence_update(seq); | |
937 | return (md_size); | |
938 | } | |
939 | ||
d102d9df | 940 | int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md, int send) |
02a36fda | 941 | { |
02a36fda MC |
942 | unsigned char *seq; |
943 | EVP_MD_CTX *hash; | |
944 | size_t md_size; | |
945 | int i; | |
6e59a892 | 946 | EVP_MD_CTX *hmac = NULL, *mac_ctx; |
02a36fda MC |
947 | unsigned char header[13]; |
948 | int stream_mac = (send ? (ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM) | |
949 | : (ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM)); | |
950 | int t; | |
951 | ||
952 | if (send) { | |
de07f311 | 953 | seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&ssl->rlayer); |
02a36fda MC |
954 | hash = ssl->write_hash; |
955 | } else { | |
de07f311 | 956 | seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&ssl->rlayer); |
02a36fda MC |
957 | hash = ssl->read_hash; |
958 | } | |
959 | ||
960 | t = EVP_MD_CTX_size(hash); | |
961 | OPENSSL_assert(t >= 0); | |
962 | md_size = t; | |
963 | ||
964 | /* I should fix this up TLS TLS TLS TLS TLS XXXXXXXX */ | |
965 | if (stream_mac) { | |
966 | mac_ctx = hash; | |
967 | } else { | |
bfb0641f | 968 | hmac = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); |
6e59a892 RL |
969 | if (hmac == NULL |
970 | || !EVP_MD_CTX_copy(hmac, hash)) | |
02a36fda | 971 | return -1; |
6e59a892 | 972 | mac_ctx = hmac; |
02a36fda MC |
973 | } |
974 | ||
975 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) { | |
976 | unsigned char dtlsseq[8], *p = dtlsseq; | |
977 | ||
78a39fe7 MC |
978 | s2n(send ? DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_w_epoch(&ssl->rlayer) : |
979 | DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_r_epoch(&ssl->rlayer), p); | |
02a36fda MC |
980 | memcpy(p, &seq[2], 6); |
981 | ||
982 | memcpy(header, dtlsseq, 8); | |
983 | } else | |
984 | memcpy(header, seq, 8); | |
985 | ||
986 | header[8] = rec->type; | |
987 | header[9] = (unsigned char)(ssl->version >> 8); | |
988 | header[10] = (unsigned char)(ssl->version); | |
989 | header[11] = (rec->length) >> 8; | |
990 | header[12] = (rec->length) & 0xff; | |
991 | ||
992 | if (!send && !SSL_USE_ETM(ssl) && | |
993 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ssl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE && | |
994 | ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(mac_ctx)) { | |
995 | /* | |
996 | * This is a CBC-encrypted record. We must avoid leaking any | |
997 | * timing-side channel information about how many blocks of data we | |
998 | * are hashing because that gives an attacker a timing-oracle. | |
999 | */ | |
1000 | /* Final param == not SSLv3 */ | |
5f3d93e4 MC |
1001 | if (ssl3_cbc_digest_record(mac_ctx, |
1002 | md, &md_size, | |
1003 | header, rec->input, | |
1004 | rec->length + md_size, rec->orig_len, | |
1005 | ssl->s3->read_mac_secret, | |
1006 | ssl->s3->read_mac_secret_size, 0) <= 0) { | |
bfb0641f | 1007 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(hmac); |
5f3d93e4 MC |
1008 | return -1; |
1009 | } | |
02a36fda | 1010 | } else { |
5f3d93e4 MC |
1011 | if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, header, sizeof(header)) <= 0 |
1012 | || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, rec->input, rec->length) <= 0 | |
1013 | || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx, md, &md_size) <= 0) { | |
bfb0641f | 1014 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(hmac); |
6929b447 | 1015 | return -1; |
5f3d93e4 | 1016 | } |
02a36fda | 1017 | if (!send && !SSL_USE_ETM(ssl) && FIPS_mode()) |
d166ed8c DSH |
1018 | if (!tls_fips_digest_extra(ssl->enc_read_ctx, |
1019 | mac_ctx, rec->input, | |
1020 | rec->length, rec->orig_len)) { | |
1021 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(hmac); | |
1022 | return -1; | |
1023 | } | |
02a36fda MC |
1024 | } |
1025 | ||
bfb0641f | 1026 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(hmac); |
5f3d93e4 | 1027 | |
d63a5e5e | 1028 | #ifdef SSL_DEBUG |
02a36fda MC |
1029 | fprintf(stderr, "seq="); |
1030 | { | |
1031 | int z; | |
1032 | for (z = 0; z < 8; z++) | |
1033 | fprintf(stderr, "%02X ", seq[z]); | |
1034 | fprintf(stderr, "\n"); | |
1035 | } | |
1036 | fprintf(stderr, "rec="); | |
1037 | { | |
1038 | unsigned int z; | |
1039 | for (z = 0; z < rec->length; z++) | |
1040 | fprintf(stderr, "%02X ", rec->data[z]); | |
1041 | fprintf(stderr, "\n"); | |
1042 | } | |
1043 | #endif | |
1044 | ||
1045 | if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) { | |
1046 | for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) { | |
1047 | ++seq[i]; | |
1048 | if (seq[i] != 0) | |
1049 | break; | |
1050 | } | |
1051 | } | |
d63a5e5e | 1052 | #ifdef SSL_DEBUG |
02a36fda MC |
1053 | { |
1054 | unsigned int z; | |
1055 | for (z = 0; z < md_size; z++) | |
1056 | fprintf(stderr, "%02X ", md[z]); | |
1057 | fprintf(stderr, "\n"); | |
1058 | } | |
1059 | #endif | |
1060 | return (md_size); | |
1061 | } | |
1062 | ||
1063 | /*- | |
1064 | * ssl3_cbc_remove_padding removes padding from the decrypted, SSLv3, CBC | |
1065 | * record in |rec| by updating |rec->length| in constant time. | |
1066 | * | |
1067 | * block_size: the block size of the cipher used to encrypt the record. | |
1068 | * returns: | |
1069 | * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publicly invalid. | |
1070 | * 1: if the padding was valid | |
1071 | * -1: otherwise. | |
1072 | */ | |
a773b52a | 1073 | int ssl3_cbc_remove_padding(SSL3_RECORD *rec, |
02a36fda MC |
1074 | unsigned block_size, unsigned mac_size) |
1075 | { | |
1076 | unsigned padding_length, good; | |
1077 | const unsigned overhead = 1 /* padding length byte */ + mac_size; | |
1078 | ||
1079 | /* | |
1080 | * These lengths are all public so we can test them in non-constant time. | |
1081 | */ | |
1082 | if (overhead > rec->length) | |
1083 | return 0; | |
1084 | ||
1085 | padding_length = rec->data[rec->length - 1]; | |
1086 | good = constant_time_ge(rec->length, padding_length + overhead); | |
1087 | /* SSLv3 requires that the padding is minimal. */ | |
1088 | good &= constant_time_ge(block_size, padding_length + 1); | |
1089 | rec->length -= good & (padding_length + 1); | |
1090 | return constant_time_select_int(good, 1, -1); | |
1091 | } | |
1092 | ||
1093 | /*- | |
1094 | * tls1_cbc_remove_padding removes the CBC padding from the decrypted, TLS, CBC | |
1095 | * record in |rec| in constant time and returns 1 if the padding is valid and | |
1096 | * -1 otherwise. It also removes any explicit IV from the start of the record | |
1097 | * without leaking any timing about whether there was enough space after the | |
1098 | * padding was removed. | |
1099 | * | |
1100 | * block_size: the block size of the cipher used to encrypt the record. | |
1101 | * returns: | |
1102 | * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publicly invalid. | |
1103 | * 1: if the padding was valid | |
1104 | * -1: otherwise. | |
1105 | */ | |
1106 | int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL *s, | |
1107 | SSL3_RECORD *rec, | |
1108 | unsigned block_size, unsigned mac_size) | |
1109 | { | |
1110 | unsigned padding_length, good, to_check, i; | |
1111 | const unsigned overhead = 1 /* padding length byte */ + mac_size; | |
1112 | /* Check if version requires explicit IV */ | |
1113 | if (SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)) { | |
1114 | /* | |
1115 | * These lengths are all public so we can test them in non-constant | |
1116 | * time. | |
1117 | */ | |
1118 | if (overhead + block_size > rec->length) | |
1119 | return 0; | |
1120 | /* We can now safely skip explicit IV */ | |
1121 | rec->data += block_size; | |
1122 | rec->input += block_size; | |
1123 | rec->length -= block_size; | |
1124 | rec->orig_len -= block_size; | |
1125 | } else if (overhead > rec->length) | |
1126 | return 0; | |
1127 | ||
1128 | padding_length = rec->data[rec->length - 1]; | |
1129 | ||
846ec07d | 1130 | if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx)) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) { |
02a36fda MC |
1131 | /* padding is already verified */ |
1132 | rec->length -= padding_length + 1; | |
1133 | return 1; | |
1134 | } | |
1135 | ||
1136 | good = constant_time_ge(rec->length, overhead + padding_length); | |
1137 | /* | |
1138 | * The padding consists of a length byte at the end of the record and | |
1139 | * then that many bytes of padding, all with the same value as the length | |
1140 | * byte. Thus, with the length byte included, there are i+1 bytes of | |
1141 | * padding. We can't check just |padding_length+1| bytes because that | |
1142 | * leaks decrypted information. Therefore we always have to check the | |
1143 | * maximum amount of padding possible. (Again, the length of the record | |
1144 | * is public information so we can use it.) | |
1145 | */ | |
1146 | to_check = 255; /* maximum amount of padding. */ | |
1147 | if (to_check > rec->length - 1) | |
1148 | to_check = rec->length - 1; | |
1149 | ||
1150 | for (i = 0; i < to_check; i++) { | |
1151 | unsigned char mask = constant_time_ge_8(padding_length, i); | |
1152 | unsigned char b = rec->data[rec->length - 1 - i]; | |
1153 | /* | |
1154 | * The final |padding_length+1| bytes should all have the value | |
1155 | * |padding_length|. Therefore the XOR should be zero. | |
1156 | */ | |
1157 | good &= ~(mask & (padding_length ^ b)); | |
1158 | } | |
1159 | ||
1160 | /* | |
1161 | * If any of the final |padding_length+1| bytes had the wrong value, one | |
1162 | * or more of the lower eight bits of |good| will be cleared. | |
1163 | */ | |
1164 | good = constant_time_eq(0xff, good & 0xff); | |
1165 | rec->length -= good & (padding_length + 1); | |
1166 | ||
1167 | return constant_time_select_int(good, 1, -1); | |
1168 | } | |
1169 | ||
1170 | /*- | |
1171 | * ssl3_cbc_copy_mac copies |md_size| bytes from the end of |rec| to |out| in | |
1172 | * constant time (independent of the concrete value of rec->length, which may | |
1173 | * vary within a 256-byte window). | |
1174 | * | |
1175 | * ssl3_cbc_remove_padding or tls1_cbc_remove_padding must be called prior to | |
1176 | * this function. | |
1177 | * | |
1178 | * On entry: | |
1179 | * rec->orig_len >= md_size | |
1180 | * md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE | |
1181 | * | |
1182 | * If CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE is defined then the rotation is performed with | |
1183 | * variable accesses in a 64-byte-aligned buffer. Assuming that this fits into | |
1184 | * a single or pair of cache-lines, then the variable memory accesses don't | |
1185 | * actually affect the timing. CPUs with smaller cache-lines [if any] are | |
1186 | * not multi-core and are not considered vulnerable to cache-timing attacks. | |
1187 | */ | |
1188 | #define CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE | |
1189 | ||
1190 | void ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(unsigned char *out, | |
1191 | const SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned md_size) | |
1192 | { | |
1193 | #if defined(CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE) | |
1194 | unsigned char rotated_mac_buf[64 + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; | |
1195 | unsigned char *rotated_mac; | |
1196 | #else | |
1197 | unsigned char rotated_mac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; | |
1198 | #endif | |
1199 | ||
1200 | /* | |
1201 | * mac_end is the index of |rec->data| just after the end of the MAC. | |
1202 | */ | |
1203 | unsigned mac_end = rec->length; | |
1204 | unsigned mac_start = mac_end - md_size; | |
1205 | /* | |
1206 | * scan_start contains the number of bytes that we can ignore because the | |
1207 | * MAC's position can only vary by 255 bytes. | |
1208 | */ | |
1209 | unsigned scan_start = 0; | |
1210 | unsigned i, j; | |
1211 | unsigned div_spoiler; | |
1212 | unsigned rotate_offset; | |
1213 | ||
1214 | OPENSSL_assert(rec->orig_len >= md_size); | |
1215 | OPENSSL_assert(md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); | |
1216 | ||
1217 | #if defined(CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE) | |
1218 | rotated_mac = rotated_mac_buf + ((0 - (size_t)rotated_mac_buf) & 63); | |
1219 | #endif | |
1220 | ||
1221 | /* This information is public so it's safe to branch based on it. */ | |
1222 | if (rec->orig_len > md_size + 255 + 1) | |
1223 | scan_start = rec->orig_len - (md_size + 255 + 1); | |
1224 | /* | |
1225 | * div_spoiler contains a multiple of md_size that is used to cause the | |
1226 | * modulo operation to be constant time. Without this, the time varies | |
1227 | * based on the amount of padding when running on Intel chips at least. | |
1228 | * The aim of right-shifting md_size is so that the compiler doesn't | |
1229 | * figure out that it can remove div_spoiler as that would require it to | |
1230 | * prove that md_size is always even, which I hope is beyond it. | |
1231 | */ | |
1232 | div_spoiler = md_size >> 1; | |
1233 | div_spoiler <<= (sizeof(div_spoiler) - 1) * 8; | |
1234 | rotate_offset = (div_spoiler + mac_start - scan_start) % md_size; | |
1235 | ||
1236 | memset(rotated_mac, 0, md_size); | |
1237 | for (i = scan_start, j = 0; i < rec->orig_len; i++) { | |
1238 | unsigned char mac_started = constant_time_ge_8(i, mac_start); | |
1239 | unsigned char mac_ended = constant_time_ge_8(i, mac_end); | |
1240 | unsigned char b = rec->data[i]; | |
1241 | rotated_mac[j++] |= b & mac_started & ~mac_ended; | |
1242 | j &= constant_time_lt(j, md_size); | |
1243 | } | |
1244 | ||
1245 | /* Now rotate the MAC */ | |
1246 | #if defined(CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE) | |
1247 | j = 0; | |
1248 | for (i = 0; i < md_size; i++) { | |
1249 | /* in case cache-line is 32 bytes, touch second line */ | |
1250 | ((volatile unsigned char *)rotated_mac)[rotate_offset ^ 32]; | |
1251 | out[j++] = rotated_mac[rotate_offset++]; | |
1252 | rotate_offset &= constant_time_lt(rotate_offset, md_size); | |
1253 | } | |
1254 | #else | |
1255 | memset(out, 0, md_size); | |
1256 | rotate_offset = md_size - rotate_offset; | |
1257 | rotate_offset &= constant_time_lt(rotate_offset, md_size); | |
1258 | for (i = 0; i < md_size; i++) { | |
1259 | for (j = 0; j < md_size; j++) | |
1260 | out[j] |= rotated_mac[i] & constant_time_eq_8(j, rotate_offset); | |
1261 | rotate_offset++; | |
1262 | rotate_offset &= constant_time_lt(rotate_offset, md_size); | |
1263 | } | |
1264 | #endif | |
1265 | } | |
1266 | ||
fe589e61 MC |
1267 | int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s) |
1268 | { | |
1269 | int i, al; | |
1270 | int enc_err; | |
1271 | SSL_SESSION *sess; | |
1272 | SSL3_RECORD *rr; | |
1273 | unsigned int mac_size; | |
1274 | unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; | |
1275 | ||
1276 | rr = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer); | |
1277 | sess = s->session; | |
1278 | ||
1279 | /* | |
1280 | * At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length, | |
1281 | * and we have that many bytes in s->packet | |
1282 | */ | |
7a7048af | 1283 | rr->input = &(RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer)[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]); |
fe589e61 MC |
1284 | |
1285 | /* | |
1286 | * ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr' rr->input points | |
1287 | * at rr->length bytes, which need to be copied into rr->data by either | |
1288 | * the decryption or by the decompression When the data is 'copied' into | |
1289 | * the rr->data buffer, rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer | |
1290 | */ | |
1291 | ||
1292 | /* | |
1293 | * We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ] rr->length | |
1294 | * bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. | |
1295 | */ | |
1296 | ||
1297 | /* check is not needed I believe */ | |
1298 | if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH) { | |
1299 | al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; | |
1300 | SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); | |
1301 | goto f_err; | |
1302 | } | |
1303 | ||
1304 | /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */ | |
1305 | rr->data = rr->input; | |
1306 | rr->orig_len = rr->length; | |
1307 | ||
d102d9df | 1308 | enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, rr, 1, 0); |
fe589e61 MC |
1309 | /*- |
1310 | * enc_err is: | |
1311 | * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid. | |
1312 | * 1: if the padding is valid | |
1313 | * -1: if the padding is invalid | |
1314 | */ | |
1315 | if (enc_err == 0) { | |
1316 | /* For DTLS we simply ignore bad packets. */ | |
1317 | rr->length = 0; | |
7a7048af | 1318 | RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); |
fe589e61 MC |
1319 | goto err; |
1320 | } | |
d63a5e5e | 1321 | #ifdef SSL_DEBUG |
fe589e61 MC |
1322 | printf("dec %d\n", rr->length); |
1323 | { | |
1324 | unsigned int z; | |
1325 | for (z = 0; z < rr->length; z++) | |
1326 | printf("%02X%c", rr->data[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n'); | |
1327 | } | |
1328 | printf("\n"); | |
1329 | #endif | |
1330 | ||
1331 | /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */ | |
1332 | if ((sess != NULL) && | |
1333 | (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) && (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)) { | |
1334 | /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */ | |
1335 | unsigned char *mac = NULL; | |
1336 | unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; | |
1337 | mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); | |
1338 | OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); | |
1339 | ||
1340 | /* | |
1341 | * orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was | |
1342 | * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use, | |
1343 | * therefore we can safely process the record in a different amount | |
1344 | * of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC. | |
1345 | */ | |
1346 | if (rr->orig_len < mac_size || | |
1347 | /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */ | |
1348 | (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE && | |
1349 | rr->orig_len < mac_size + 1)) { | |
1350 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
1351 | SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); | |
1352 | goto f_err; | |
1353 | } | |
1354 | ||
1355 | if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) { | |
1356 | /* | |
1357 | * We update the length so that the TLS header bytes can be | |
1358 | * constructed correctly but we need to extract the MAC in | |
1359 | * constant time from within the record, without leaking the | |
1360 | * contents of the padding bytes. | |
1361 | */ | |
1362 | mac = mac_tmp; | |
1363 | ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size); | |
1364 | rr->length -= mac_size; | |
1365 | } else { | |
1366 | /* | |
1367 | * In this case there's no padding, so |rec->orig_len| equals | |
1368 | * |rec->length| and we checked that there's enough bytes for | |
1369 | * |mac_size| above. | |
1370 | */ | |
1371 | rr->length -= mac_size; | |
1372 | mac = &rr->data[rr->length]; | |
1373 | } | |
1374 | ||
d102d9df | 1375 | i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, rr, md, 0 /* not send */ ); |
fe589e61 MC |
1376 | if (i < 0 || mac == NULL |
1377 | || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0) | |
1378 | enc_err = -1; | |
1379 | if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + mac_size) | |
1380 | enc_err = -1; | |
1381 | } | |
1382 | ||
1383 | if (enc_err < 0) { | |
1384 | /* decryption failed, silently discard message */ | |
1385 | rr->length = 0; | |
7a7048af | 1386 | RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); |
fe589e61 MC |
1387 | goto err; |
1388 | } | |
1389 | ||
1390 | /* r->length is now just compressed */ | |
1391 | if (s->expand != NULL) { | |
1392 | if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH) { | |
1393 | al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; | |
1394 | SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, | |
1395 | SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); | |
1396 | goto f_err; | |
1397 | } | |
94777c9c | 1398 | if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s, rr)) { |
fe589e61 MC |
1399 | al = SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE; |
1400 | SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION); | |
1401 | goto f_err; | |
1402 | } | |
1403 | } | |
1404 | ||
1405 | if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) { | |
1406 | al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; | |
1407 | SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); | |
1408 | goto f_err; | |
1409 | } | |
1410 | ||
1411 | rr->off = 0; | |
1412 | /*- | |
1413 | * So at this point the following is true | |
1414 | * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record | |
1415 | * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record | |
1416 | * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte | |
1417 | * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment | |
1418 | * after use :-). | |
1419 | */ | |
1420 | ||
1421 | /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */ | |
7a7048af | 1422 | RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); |
fe589e61 MC |
1423 | return (1); |
1424 | ||
1425 | f_err: | |
1426 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
1427 | err: | |
1428 | return (0); | |
1429 | } | |
1430 | ||
1431 | ||
1432 | /* | |
1433 | * retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the current epoch, ie, | |
1434 | * processed | |
1435 | */ | |
1436 | #define dtls1_get_processed_record(s) \ | |
1437 | dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \ | |
cb2ce7ab | 1438 | &(DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_processed_rcds(&s->rlayer))) |
fe589e61 MC |
1439 | |
1440 | /*- | |
1441 | * Call this to get a new input record. | |
1442 | * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error | |
1443 | * or non-blocking IO. | |
1444 | * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in | |
1445 | * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record | |
1446 | * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data | |
1447 | * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes | |
1448 | */ | |
1449 | /* used only by dtls1_read_bytes */ | |
1450 | int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s) | |
1451 | { | |
1452 | int ssl_major, ssl_minor; | |
1453 | int i, n; | |
1454 | SSL3_RECORD *rr; | |
1455 | unsigned char *p = NULL; | |
1456 | unsigned short version; | |
1457 | DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap; | |
1458 | unsigned int is_next_epoch; | |
1459 | ||
1460 | rr = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer); | |
1461 | ||
1462 | /* | |
1463 | * The epoch may have changed. If so, process all the pending records. | |
1464 | * This is a non-blocking operation. | |
1465 | */ | |
1466 | if (dtls1_process_buffered_records(s) < 0) | |
1467 | return -1; | |
1468 | ||
1469 | /* if we're renegotiating, then there may be buffered records */ | |
1470 | if (dtls1_get_processed_record(s)) | |
1471 | return 1; | |
1472 | ||
1473 | /* get something from the wire */ | |
1474 | again: | |
1475 | /* check if we have the header */ | |
295c3f41 | 1476 | if ((RECORD_LAYER_get_rstate(&s->rlayer) != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) || |
7a7048af | 1477 | (RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer) < DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) { |
fe589e61 | 1478 | n = ssl3_read_n(s, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, |
94777c9c | 1479 | SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(&s->rlayer.rbuf), 0, 1); |
fe589e61 MC |
1480 | /* read timeout is handled by dtls1_read_bytes */ |
1481 | if (n <= 0) | |
1482 | return (n); /* error or non-blocking */ | |
1483 | ||
1484 | /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */ | |
7a7048af MC |
1485 | if (RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer) != DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { |
1486 | RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); | |
fe589e61 MC |
1487 | goto again; |
1488 | } | |
1489 | ||
295c3f41 | 1490 | RECORD_LAYER_set_rstate(&s->rlayer, SSL_ST_READ_BODY); |
fe589e61 | 1491 | |
7a7048af | 1492 | p = RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer); |
fe589e61 MC |
1493 | |
1494 | if (s->msg_callback) | |
1495 | s->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, p, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, | |
1496 | s, s->msg_callback_arg); | |
1497 | ||
1498 | /* Pull apart the header into the DTLS1_RECORD */ | |
1499 | rr->type = *(p++); | |
1500 | ssl_major = *(p++); | |
1501 | ssl_minor = *(p++); | |
1502 | version = (ssl_major << 8) | ssl_minor; | |
1503 | ||
1504 | /* sequence number is 64 bits, with top 2 bytes = epoch */ | |
1505 | n2s(p, rr->epoch); | |
1506 | ||
de07f311 | 1507 | memcpy(&(RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&s->rlayer)[2]), p, 6); |
fe589e61 MC |
1508 | p += 6; |
1509 | ||
1510 | n2s(p, rr->length); | |
1511 | ||
1512 | /* Lets check version */ | |
1513 | if (!s->first_packet) { | |
1514 | if (version != s->version) { | |
1515 | /* unexpected version, silently discard */ | |
1516 | rr->length = 0; | |
7a7048af | 1517 | RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); |
fe589e61 MC |
1518 | goto again; |
1519 | } | |
1520 | } | |
1521 | ||
1522 | if ((version & 0xff00) != (s->version & 0xff00)) { | |
1523 | /* wrong version, silently discard record */ | |
1524 | rr->length = 0; | |
7a7048af | 1525 | RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); |
fe589e61 MC |
1526 | goto again; |
1527 | } | |
1528 | ||
1529 | if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH) { | |
1530 | /* record too long, silently discard it */ | |
1531 | rr->length = 0; | |
7a7048af | 1532 | RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); |
fe589e61 MC |
1533 | goto again; |
1534 | } | |
1535 | ||
295c3f41 | 1536 | /* now s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */ |
fe589e61 MC |
1537 | } |
1538 | ||
295c3f41 | 1539 | /* s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */ |
fe589e61 | 1540 | |
7a7048af MC |
1541 | if (rr->length > |
1542 | RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer) - DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { | |
fe589e61 MC |
1543 | /* now s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */ |
1544 | i = rr->length; | |
94777c9c | 1545 | n = ssl3_read_n(s, i, i, 1, 1); |
fe589e61 MC |
1546 | /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */ |
1547 | if (n != i) { | |
1548 | rr->length = 0; | |
7a7048af | 1549 | RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); |
fe589e61 MC |
1550 | goto again; |
1551 | } | |
1552 | ||
1553 | /* | |
1554 | * now n == rr->length, and s->packet_length == | |
1555 | * DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length | |
1556 | */ | |
1557 | } | |
295c3f41 MC |
1558 | /* set state for later operations */ |
1559 | RECORD_LAYER_set_rstate(&s->rlayer, SSL_ST_READ_HEADER); | |
fe589e61 MC |
1560 | |
1561 | /* match epochs. NULL means the packet is dropped on the floor */ | |
1562 | bitmap = dtls1_get_bitmap(s, rr, &is_next_epoch); | |
1563 | if (bitmap == NULL) { | |
1564 | rr->length = 0; | |
7a7048af | 1565 | RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); /* dump this record */ |
fe589e61 MC |
1566 | goto again; /* get another record */ |
1567 | } | |
1568 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
1569 | /* Only do replay check if no SCTP bio */ | |
1570 | if (!BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s))) { | |
1571 | #endif | |
912c89c5 MC |
1572 | /* Check whether this is a repeat, or aged record. */ |
1573 | if (!dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap)) { | |
fe589e61 | 1574 | rr->length = 0; |
7a7048af | 1575 | RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); /* dump this record */ |
fe589e61 MC |
1576 | goto again; /* get another record */ |
1577 | } | |
1578 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
1579 | } | |
1580 | #endif | |
1581 | ||
1582 | /* just read a 0 length packet */ | |
1583 | if (rr->length == 0) | |
1584 | goto again; | |
1585 | ||
1586 | /* | |
1587 | * If this record is from the next epoch (either HM or ALERT), and a | |
1588 | * handshake is currently in progress, buffer it since it cannot be | |
912c89c5 | 1589 | * processed at this time. |
fe589e61 MC |
1590 | */ |
1591 | if (is_next_epoch) { | |
024f543c | 1592 | if ((SSL_in_init(s) || ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s))) { |
fe589e61 | 1593 | if (dtls1_buffer_record |
cb2ce7ab MC |
1594 | (s, &(DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_unprocessed_rcds(&s->rlayer)), |
1595 | rr->seq_num) < 0) | |
fe589e61 MC |
1596 | return -1; |
1597 | /* Mark receipt of record. */ | |
1598 | dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, bitmap); | |
1599 | } | |
1600 | rr->length = 0; | |
7a7048af | 1601 | RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); |
fe589e61 MC |
1602 | goto again; |
1603 | } | |
1604 | ||
1605 | if (!dtls1_process_record(s)) { | |
1606 | rr->length = 0; | |
7a7048af | 1607 | RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); /* dump this record */ |
fe589e61 MC |
1608 | goto again; /* get another record */ |
1609 | } | |
1610 | dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, bitmap); /* Mark receipt of record. */ | |
1611 | ||
1612 | return (1); | |
1613 | ||
1614 | } |