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d02b48c6 | 1 | /* ssl/s3_pkt.c */ |
58964a49 | 2 | /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) |
d02b48c6 RE |
3 | * All rights reserved. |
4 | * | |
5 | * This package is an SSL implementation written | |
6 | * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). | |
7 | * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. | |
10621efd | 8 | * |
d02b48c6 RE |
9 | * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as |
10 | * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions | |
11 | * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, | |
12 | * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation | |
13 | * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms | |
14 | * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). | |
10621efd | 15 | * |
d02b48c6 RE |
16 | * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in |
17 | * the code are not to be removed. | |
18 | * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution | |
19 | * as the author of the parts of the library used. | |
20 | * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or | |
21 | * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. | |
10621efd | 22 | * |
d02b48c6 RE |
23 | * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
24 | * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | |
25 | * are met: | |
26 | * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright | |
27 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. | |
28 | * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | |
29 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the | |
30 | * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. | |
31 | * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software | |
32 | * must display the following acknowledgement: | |
33 | * "This product includes cryptographic software written by | |
34 | * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" | |
35 | * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library | |
36 | * being used are not cryptographic related :-). | |
10621efd | 37 | * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from |
d02b48c6 RE |
38 | * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: |
39 | * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" | |
10621efd | 40 | * |
d02b48c6 RE |
41 | * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND |
42 | * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE | |
43 | * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE | |
44 | * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE | |
45 | * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL | |
46 | * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS | |
47 | * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) | |
48 | * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT | |
49 | * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY | |
50 | * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF | |
51 | * SUCH DAMAGE. | |
10621efd | 52 | * |
d02b48c6 RE |
53 | * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or |
54 | * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be | |
55 | * copied and put under another distribution licence | |
56 | * [including the GNU Public Licence.] | |
57 | */ | |
c51ae173 | 58 | /* ==================================================================== |
82b0bf0b | 59 | * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. |
c51ae173 BM |
60 | * |
61 | * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without | |
62 | * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | |
63 | * are met: | |
64 | * | |
65 | * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright | |
10621efd | 66 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
c51ae173 BM |
67 | * |
68 | * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | |
69 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in | |
70 | * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the | |
71 | * distribution. | |
72 | * | |
73 | * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this | |
74 | * software must display the following acknowledgment: | |
75 | * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project | |
76 | * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" | |
77 | * | |
78 | * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to | |
79 | * endorse or promote products derived from this software without | |
80 | * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact | |
81 | * openssl-core@openssl.org. | |
82 | * | |
83 | * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" | |
84 | * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written | |
85 | * permission of the OpenSSL Project. | |
86 | * | |
87 | * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following | |
88 | * acknowledgment: | |
89 | * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project | |
90 | * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" | |
91 | * | |
92 | * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY | |
93 | * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE | |
94 | * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR | |
95 | * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR | |
96 | * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, | |
97 | * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT | |
98 | * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; | |
99 | * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) | |
100 | * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, | |
101 | * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) | |
102 | * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED | |
103 | * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. | |
104 | * ==================================================================== | |
105 | * | |
106 | * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young | |
107 | * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim | |
108 | * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). | |
109 | * | |
110 | */ | |
d02b48c6 RE |
111 | |
112 | #include <stdio.h> | |
8ca7d124 | 113 | #include <limits.h> |
d02b48c6 RE |
114 | #include <errno.h> |
115 | #define USE_SOCKETS | |
7b63c0fa | 116 | #include "ssl_locl.h" |
ec577822 BM |
117 | #include <openssl/evp.h> |
118 | #include <openssl/buffer.h> | |
b4b15f68 | 119 | #include <openssl/rand.h> |
d02b48c6 | 120 | |
61f5b6f3 | 121 | static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, |
10621efd | 122 | unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment); |
d02b48c6 | 123 | static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s); |
c51ae173 | 124 | |
36d16f8e | 125 | int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend) |
10621efd MC |
126 | { |
127 | /* | |
128 | * If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase | |
129 | * packet by another n bytes. The packet will be in the sub-array of | |
130 | * s->s3->rbuf.buf specified by s->packet and s->packet_length. (If | |
131 | * s->read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf [plus | |
132 | * s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].) | |
133 | */ | |
134 | int i, len, left; | |
135 | long align = 0; | |
136 | unsigned char *pkt; | |
137 | SSL3_BUFFER *rb; | |
138 | ||
139 | if (n <= 0) | |
140 | return n; | |
141 | ||
142 | rb = &(s->s3->rbuf); | |
143 | if (rb->buf == NULL) | |
144 | if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s)) | |
145 | return -1; | |
146 | ||
147 | left = rb->left; | |
a4d64c7f | 148 | #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0 |
10621efd MC |
149 | align = (long)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; |
150 | align = (-align) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1); | |
a4d64c7f | 151 | #endif |
d02b48c6 | 152 | |
10621efd MC |
153 | if (!extend) { |
154 | /* start with empty packet ... */ | |
155 | if (left == 0) | |
156 | rb->offset = align; | |
157 | else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { | |
158 | /* | |
159 | * check if next packet length is large enough to justify payload | |
160 | * alignment... | |
161 | */ | |
162 | pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset; | |
163 | if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA | |
164 | && (pkt[3] << 8 | pkt[4]) >= 128) { | |
165 | /* | |
166 | * Note that even if packet is corrupted and its length field | |
167 | * is insane, we can only be led to wrong decision about | |
168 | * whether memmove will occur or not. Header values has no | |
169 | * effect on memmove arguments and therefore no buffer | |
170 | * overrun can be triggered. | |
171 | */ | |
172 | memmove(rb->buf + align, pkt, left); | |
173 | rb->offset = align; | |
174 | } | |
175 | } | |
176 | s->packet = rb->buf + rb->offset; | |
177 | s->packet_length = 0; | |
178 | /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */ | |
179 | } | |
180 | ||
181 | /* | |
182 | * For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets because the read | |
183 | * operation returns the whole packet at once (as long as it fits into | |
184 | * the buffer). | |
185 | */ | |
186 | if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER) { | |
187 | if (left == 0 && extend) | |
188 | return 0; | |
189 | if (left > 0 && n > left) | |
190 | n = left; | |
191 | } | |
192 | ||
193 | /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */ | |
194 | if (left >= n) { | |
195 | s->packet_length += n; | |
196 | rb->left = left - n; | |
197 | rb->offset += n; | |
198 | return (n); | |
199 | } | |
200 | ||
201 | /* else we need to read more data */ | |
202 | ||
203 | len = s->packet_length; | |
204 | pkt = rb->buf + align; | |
205 | /* | |
206 | * Move any available bytes to front of buffer: 'len' bytes already | |
207 | * pointed to by 'packet', 'left' extra ones at the end | |
208 | */ | |
209 | if (s->packet != pkt) { /* len > 0 */ | |
210 | memmove(pkt, s->packet, len + left); | |
211 | s->packet = pkt; | |
212 | rb->offset = len + align; | |
213 | } | |
214 | ||
215 | if (n > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset)) { /* does not happen */ | |
216 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
217 | return -1; | |
218 | } | |
219 | ||
18955838 MC |
220 | /* We always act like read_ahead is set for DTLS */ |
221 | if (!s->read_ahead && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) | |
10621efd MC |
222 | /* ignore max parameter */ |
223 | max = n; | |
224 | else { | |
225 | if (max < n) | |
226 | max = n; | |
227 | if (max > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset)) | |
228 | max = rb->len - rb->offset; | |
229 | } | |
230 | ||
231 | while (left < n) { | |
232 | /* | |
233 | * Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf and | |
234 | * need to read in more until we have len+n (up to len+max if | |
235 | * possible) | |
236 | */ | |
237 | ||
238 | clear_sys_error(); | |
239 | if (s->rbio != NULL) { | |
240 | s->rwstate = SSL_READING; | |
241 | i = BIO_read(s->rbio, pkt + len + left, max - left); | |
242 | } else { | |
243 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET); | |
244 | i = -1; | |
245 | } | |
246 | ||
247 | if (i <= 0) { | |
248 | rb->left = left; | |
249 | if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && | |
250 | SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION | |
251 | && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_BAD_VER) | |
252 | if (len + left == 0) | |
253 | ssl3_release_read_buffer(s); | |
254 | return (i); | |
255 | } | |
256 | left += i; | |
257 | /* | |
258 | * reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because the | |
259 | * underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed to | |
260 | * byte oriented as in the TLS case. | |
261 | */ | |
262 | if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION | |
263 | || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER) { | |
264 | if (n > left) | |
265 | n = left; /* makes the while condition false */ | |
266 | } | |
267 | } | |
268 | ||
269 | /* done reading, now the book-keeping */ | |
270 | rb->offset += n; | |
271 | rb->left = left - n; | |
272 | s->packet_length += n; | |
273 | s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; | |
274 | return (n); | |
275 | } | |
276 | ||
277 | /* | |
278 | * MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS defines the number of consecutive, empty records that | |
279 | * will be processed per call to ssl3_get_record. Without this limit an | |
280 | * attacker could send empty records at a faster rate than we can process and | |
281 | * cause ssl3_get_record to loop forever. | |
282 | */ | |
391f3b57 AL |
283 | #define MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS 32 |
284 | ||
3e9a08ec TH |
285 | /*- |
286 | * Call this to get a new input record. | |
d02b48c6 RE |
287 | * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error |
288 | * or non-blocking IO. | |
289 | * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in | |
c51ae173 | 290 | * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record |
10621efd | 291 | * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data |
d02b48c6 RE |
292 | * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes |
293 | */ | |
b35e9050 | 294 | /* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */ |
6b691a5c | 295 | static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s) |
10621efd MC |
296 | { |
297 | int ssl_major, ssl_minor, al; | |
298 | int enc_err, n, i, ret = -1; | |
299 | SSL3_RECORD *rr; | |
300 | SSL_SESSION *sess; | |
301 | unsigned char *p; | |
302 | unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; | |
303 | short version; | |
304 | unsigned mac_size, orig_len; | |
305 | size_t extra; | |
306 | unsigned empty_record_count = 0; | |
307 | ||
308 | rr = &(s->s3->rrec); | |
309 | sess = s->session; | |
310 | ||
311 | if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER) | |
312 | extra = SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA; | |
313 | else | |
314 | extra = 0; | |
315 | if (extra && !s->s3->init_extra) { | |
316 | /* | |
317 | * An application error: SLS_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER set after | |
318 | * ssl3_setup_buffers() was done | |
319 | */ | |
320 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
321 | return -1; | |
322 | } | |
323 | ||
324 | again: | |
325 | /* check if we have the header */ | |
326 | if ((s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) || | |
327 | (s->packet_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) { | |
328 | n = ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0); | |
329 | if (n <= 0) | |
330 | return (n); /* error or non-blocking */ | |
331 | s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_BODY; | |
332 | ||
333 | p = s->packet; | |
334 | ||
335 | /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */ | |
336 | rr->type = *(p++); | |
337 | ssl_major = *(p++); | |
338 | ssl_minor = *(p++); | |
339 | version = (ssl_major << 8) | ssl_minor; | |
340 | n2s(p, rr->length); | |
566dda07 | 341 | #if 0 |
10621efd | 342 | fprintf(stderr, "Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length); |
566dda07 | 343 | #endif |
d02b48c6 | 344 | |
10621efd MC |
345 | /* Lets check version */ |
346 | if (!s->first_packet) { | |
347 | if (version != s->version) { | |
348 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); | |
349 | if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00) | |
350 | && !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash) | |
351 | /* | |
352 | * Send back error using their minor version number :-) | |
353 | */ | |
354 | s->version = (unsigned short)version; | |
355 | al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; | |
356 | goto f_err; | |
357 | } | |
358 | } | |
359 | ||
360 | if ((version >> 8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) { | |
361 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); | |
362 | goto err; | |
363 | } | |
364 | ||
365 | if (rr->length > s->s3->rbuf.len - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { | |
366 | al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; | |
367 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); | |
368 | goto f_err; | |
369 | } | |
370 | ||
371 | /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */ | |
372 | } | |
373 | ||
374 | /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */ | |
375 | ||
376 | if (rr->length > s->packet_length - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { | |
377 | /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */ | |
378 | i = rr->length; | |
379 | n = ssl3_read_n(s, i, i, 1); | |
380 | if (n <= 0) | |
381 | return (n); /* error or non-blocking io */ | |
382 | /* | |
383 | * now n == rr->length, and s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH | |
384 | * + rr->length | |
385 | */ | |
386 | } | |
387 | ||
388 | s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */ | |
389 | ||
390 | /* | |
391 | * At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length, | |
392 | * and we have that many bytes in s->packet | |
393 | */ | |
394 | rr->input = &(s->packet[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]); | |
395 | ||
396 | /* | |
397 | * ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr' rr->input points | |
398 | * at rr->length bytes, which need to be copied into rr->data by either | |
399 | * the decryption or by the decompression When the data is 'copied' into | |
400 | * the rr->data buffer, rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer | |
401 | */ | |
402 | ||
403 | /* | |
404 | * We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ] rr->length | |
405 | * bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. | |
406 | */ | |
407 | ||
408 | /* check is not needed I believe */ | |
409 | if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH + extra) { | |
410 | al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; | |
411 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); | |
412 | goto f_err; | |
413 | } | |
414 | ||
415 | /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */ | |
416 | rr->data = rr->input; | |
417 | ||
418 | enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 0); | |
cda8845d MC |
419 | /*- |
420 | * enc_err is: | |
421 | * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid. | |
422 | * 1: if the padding is valid | |
423 | * -1: if the padding is invalid | |
424 | */ | |
10621efd MC |
425 | if (enc_err == 0) { |
426 | al = SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED; | |
427 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG); | |
428 | goto f_err; | |
429 | } | |
58964a49 | 430 | #ifdef TLS_DEBUG |
10621efd MC |
431 | printf("dec %d\n", rr->length); |
432 | { | |
433 | unsigned int z; | |
434 | for (z = 0; z < rr->length; z++) | |
435 | printf("%02X%c", rr->data[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n'); | |
436 | } | |
437 | printf("\n"); | |
58964a49 | 438 | #endif |
ee60d9fb | 439 | |
10621efd MC |
440 | /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */ |
441 | if ((sess != NULL) && | |
442 | (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) && (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)) { | |
443 | /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */ | |
444 | unsigned char *mac = NULL; | |
445 | unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; | |
446 | mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); | |
447 | OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); | |
448 | ||
449 | /* | |
450 | * kludge: *_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rr->type | |
451 | */ | |
452 | orig_len = rr->length + ((unsigned int)rr->type >> 8); | |
453 | ||
454 | /* | |
455 | * orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was | |
456 | * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use, | |
457 | * therefore we can safely process the record in a different amount | |
458 | * of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC. | |
459 | */ | |
460 | if (orig_len < mac_size || | |
461 | /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */ | |
462 | (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE && | |
463 | orig_len < mac_size + 1)) { | |
464 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
465 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); | |
466 | goto f_err; | |
467 | } | |
468 | ||
469 | if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) { | |
470 | /* | |
471 | * We update the length so that the TLS header bytes can be | |
472 | * constructed correctly but we need to extract the MAC in | |
473 | * constant time from within the record, without leaking the | |
474 | * contents of the padding bytes. | |
475 | */ | |
476 | mac = mac_tmp; | |
477 | ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size, orig_len); | |
478 | rr->length -= mac_size; | |
479 | } else { | |
480 | /* | |
481 | * In this case there's no padding, so |orig_len| equals | |
482 | * |rec->length| and we checked that there's enough bytes for | |
483 | * |mac_size| above. | |
484 | */ | |
485 | rr->length -= mac_size; | |
486 | mac = &rr->data[rr->length]; | |
487 | } | |
488 | ||
489 | i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, md, 0 /* not send */ ); | |
490 | if (i < 0 || mac == NULL | |
491 | || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0) | |
492 | enc_err = -1; | |
493 | if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + extra + mac_size) | |
494 | enc_err = -1; | |
495 | } | |
496 | ||
497 | if (enc_err < 0) { | |
498 | /* | |
499 | * A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0, | |
500 | * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption | |
501 | * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway, we should | |
502 | * not reveal which kind of error occured -- this might become | |
503 | * visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile) | |
504 | */ | |
505 | al = SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC; | |
506 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, | |
507 | SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC); | |
508 | goto f_err; | |
509 | } | |
510 | ||
511 | /* r->length is now just compressed */ | |
512 | if (s->expand != NULL) { | |
513 | if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + extra) { | |
514 | al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; | |
515 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); | |
516 | goto f_err; | |
517 | } | |
518 | if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s)) { | |
519 | al = SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE; | |
520 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION); | |
521 | goto f_err; | |
522 | } | |
523 | } | |
524 | ||
525 | if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH + extra) { | |
526 | al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; | |
527 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); | |
528 | goto f_err; | |
529 | } | |
530 | ||
531 | rr->off = 0; | |
cda8845d MC |
532 | /*- |
533 | * So at this point the following is true | |
534 | * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record | |
535 | * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record | |
536 | * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte | |
537 | * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment | |
538 | * after use :-). | |
539 | */ | |
10621efd MC |
540 | |
541 | /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */ | |
542 | s->packet_length = 0; | |
543 | ||
544 | /* just read a 0 length packet */ | |
545 | if (rr->length == 0) { | |
546 | empty_record_count++; | |
547 | if (empty_record_count > MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS) { | |
548 | al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; | |
549 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL); | |
550 | goto f_err; | |
551 | } | |
552 | goto again; | |
553 | } | |
566dda07 | 554 | #if 0 |
10621efd MC |
555 | fprintf(stderr, "Ultimate Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, |
556 | rr->length); | |
566dda07 DSH |
557 | #endif |
558 | ||
10621efd | 559 | return (1); |
ee60d9fb | 560 | |
10621efd MC |
561 | f_err: |
562 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
563 | err: | |
564 | return (ret); | |
565 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 566 | |
36d16f8e | 567 | int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl) |
10621efd | 568 | { |
09b6c2ef | 569 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP |
10621efd MC |
570 | int i; |
571 | SSL3_RECORD *rr; | |
572 | ||
573 | rr = &(ssl->s3->rrec); | |
574 | i = COMP_expand_block(ssl->expand, rr->comp, | |
575 | SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, rr->data, | |
576 | (int)rr->length); | |
577 | if (i < 0) | |
578 | return (0); | |
579 | else | |
580 | rr->length = i; | |
581 | rr->data = rr->comp; | |
09b6c2ef | 582 | #endif |
10621efd MC |
583 | return (1); |
584 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 585 | |
36d16f8e | 586 | int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl) |
10621efd | 587 | { |
09b6c2ef | 588 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP |
10621efd MC |
589 | int i; |
590 | SSL3_RECORD *wr; | |
591 | ||
592 | wr = &(ssl->s3->wrec); | |
593 | i = COMP_compress_block(ssl->compress, wr->data, | |
594 | SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH, | |
595 | wr->input, (int)wr->length); | |
596 | if (i < 0) | |
597 | return (0); | |
598 | else | |
599 | wr->length = i; | |
600 | ||
601 | wr->input = wr->data; | |
09b6c2ef | 602 | #endif |
10621efd MC |
603 | return (1); |
604 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 605 | |
10621efd MC |
606 | /* |
607 | * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if | |
608 | * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO. | |
d02b48c6 | 609 | */ |
52732b38 | 610 | int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len) |
10621efd MC |
611 | { |
612 | const unsigned char *buf = buf_; | |
613 | unsigned int n, nw; | |
614 | int i, tot; | |
615 | ||
616 | s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; | |
617 | OPENSSL_assert(s->s3->wnum <= INT_MAX); | |
618 | tot = s->s3->wnum; | |
619 | s->s3->wnum = 0; | |
620 | ||
621 | if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake) { | |
622 | i = s->handshake_func(s); | |
623 | if (i < 0) | |
624 | return (i); | |
625 | if (i == 0) { | |
626 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); | |
627 | return -1; | |
628 | } | |
629 | } | |
630 | ||
631 | /* | |
632 | * ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out | |
633 | * than the the original len from a write which didn't complete for | |
634 | * non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for | |
635 | * this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be | |
636 | * possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then | |
637 | * promptly send beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and | |
638 | * report the error in a way the user will notice | |
639 | */ | |
640 | if (len < tot) { | |
641 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); | |
642 | return (-1); | |
643 | } | |
644 | ||
645 | n = (len - tot); | |
646 | for (;;) { | |
647 | if (n > s->max_send_fragment) | |
648 | nw = s->max_send_fragment; | |
649 | else | |
650 | nw = n; | |
651 | ||
652 | i = do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, 0); | |
653 | if (i <= 0) { | |
654 | s->s3->wnum = tot; | |
655 | return i; | |
656 | } | |
657 | ||
658 | if ((i == (int)n) || | |
659 | (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && | |
660 | (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE))) { | |
661 | /* | |
662 | * next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment | |
663 | * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness: | |
664 | */ | |
665 | s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0; | |
666 | ||
667 | return tot + i; | |
668 | } | |
669 | ||
670 | n -= i; | |
671 | tot += i; | |
672 | } | |
673 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 674 | |
61f5b6f3 | 675 | static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, |
10621efd MC |
676 | unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment) |
677 | { | |
678 | unsigned char *p, *plen; | |
679 | int i, mac_size, clear = 0; | |
680 | int prefix_len = 0; | |
681 | int eivlen; | |
682 | long align = 0; | |
683 | SSL3_RECORD *wr; | |
684 | SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &(s->s3->wbuf); | |
685 | SSL_SESSION *sess; | |
686 | ||
687 | /* | |
688 | * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This | |
689 | * will happen with non blocking IO | |
690 | */ | |
691 | if (wb->left != 0) | |
692 | return (ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len)); | |
693 | ||
694 | /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */ | |
695 | if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) { | |
696 | i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s); | |
697 | if (i <= 0) | |
698 | return (i); | |
699 | /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */ | |
700 | } | |
701 | ||
702 | if (wb->buf == NULL) | |
703 | if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s)) | |
704 | return -1; | |
705 | ||
706 | if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment) | |
707 | return 0; | |
708 | ||
709 | wr = &(s->s3->wrec); | |
710 | sess = s->session; | |
711 | ||
712 | if ((sess == NULL) || | |
713 | (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) || | |
714 | (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL)) { | |
371056f2 | 715 | #if 1 |
10621efd | 716 | clear = s->enc_write_ctx ? 0 : 1; /* must be AEAD cipher */ |
371056f2 | 717 | #else |
10621efd | 718 | clear = 1; |
371056f2 | 719 | #endif |
10621efd MC |
720 | mac_size = 0; |
721 | } else { | |
722 | mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash); | |
723 | if (mac_size < 0) | |
724 | goto err; | |
725 | } | |
726 | ||
727 | /* | |
728 | * 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself | |
729 | */ | |
730 | if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done) { | |
731 | /* | |
732 | * countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites (see | |
733 | * http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) | |
734 | */ | |
735 | ||
736 | if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) { | |
737 | /* | |
738 | * recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; this | |
739 | * prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment (these | |
740 | * 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later together with the actual | |
741 | * payload) | |
742 | */ | |
743 | prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1); | |
744 | if (prefix_len <= 0) | |
745 | goto err; | |
746 | ||
747 | if (prefix_len > | |
748 | (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD)) | |
749 | { | |
750 | /* insufficient space */ | |
751 | SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
752 | goto err; | |
753 | } | |
754 | } | |
755 | ||
756 | s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1; | |
757 | } | |
758 | ||
759 | if (create_empty_fragment) { | |
a4d64c7f | 760 | #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0 |
10621efd MC |
761 | /* |
762 | * extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks, which would be | |
763 | * multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so if we want to align the real | |
764 | * payload, then we can just pretent we simply have two headers. | |
765 | */ | |
766 | align = (long)wb->buf + 2 * SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
767 | align = (-align) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1); | |
a4d64c7f | 768 | #endif |
10621efd MC |
769 | p = wb->buf + align; |
770 | wb->offset = align; | |
771 | } else if (prefix_len) { | |
772 | p = wb->buf + wb->offset + prefix_len; | |
773 | } else { | |
a4d64c7f | 774 | #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0 |
10621efd MC |
775 | align = (long)wb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; |
776 | align = (-align) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1); | |
a4d64c7f | 777 | #endif |
10621efd MC |
778 | p = wb->buf + align; |
779 | wb->offset = align; | |
780 | } | |
781 | ||
782 | /* write the header */ | |
783 | ||
784 | *(p++) = type & 0xff; | |
785 | wr->type = type; | |
786 | ||
787 | *(p++) = (s->version >> 8); | |
788 | /* | |
789 | * Some servers hang if iniatial client hello is larger than 256 bytes | |
790 | * and record version number > TLS 1.0 | |
791 | */ | |
792 | if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B | |
793 | && !s->renegotiate && TLS1_get_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION) | |
794 | *(p++) = 0x1; | |
795 | else | |
796 | *(p++) = s->version & 0xff; | |
797 | ||
798 | /* field where we are to write out packet length */ | |
799 | plen = p; | |
800 | p += 2; | |
801 | /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers and TLS version 1.1 or later */ | |
802 | if (s->enc_write_ctx && s->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION) { | |
803 | int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx); | |
804 | if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) { | |
805 | eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx); | |
806 | if (eivlen <= 1) | |
807 | eivlen = 0; | |
808 | } | |
809 | /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */ | |
810 | else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) | |
811 | eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; | |
812 | else | |
813 | eivlen = 0; | |
814 | } else | |
815 | eivlen = 0; | |
816 | ||
817 | /* lets setup the record stuff. */ | |
818 | wr->data = p + eivlen; | |
819 | wr->length = (int)len; | |
820 | wr->input = (unsigned char *)buf; | |
821 | ||
822 | /* | |
823 | * we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into wr->data | |
824 | */ | |
825 | ||
826 | /* first we compress */ | |
827 | if (s->compress != NULL) { | |
828 | if (!ssl3_do_compress(s)) { | |
829 | SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE); | |
830 | goto err; | |
831 | } | |
832 | } else { | |
833 | memcpy(wr->data, wr->input, wr->length); | |
834 | wr->input = wr->data; | |
835 | } | |
836 | ||
837 | /* | |
838 | * we should still have the output to wr->data and the input from | |
839 | * wr->input. Length should be wr->length. wr->data still points in the | |
840 | * wb->buf | |
841 | */ | |
842 | ||
843 | if (mac_size != 0) { | |
844 | if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, &(p[wr->length + eivlen]), 1) < 0) | |
845 | goto err; | |
846 | wr->length += mac_size; | |
847 | } | |
848 | ||
849 | wr->input = p; | |
850 | wr->data = p; | |
851 | ||
852 | if (eivlen) { | |
853 | /* | |
854 | * if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, eivlen) <= 0) goto err; | |
855 | */ | |
856 | wr->length += eivlen; | |
857 | } | |
858 | ||
859 | if (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 1) < 1) | |
860 | goto err; | |
861 | ||
862 | /* record length after mac and block padding */ | |
863 | s2n(wr->length, plen); | |
864 | ||
865 | /* | |
866 | * we should now have wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is | |
867 | * wr->length long | |
868 | */ | |
869 | wr->type = type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */ | |
870 | wr->length += SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
871 | ||
872 | if (create_empty_fragment) { | |
873 | /* | |
874 | * we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write | |
875 | * out anything here | |
876 | */ | |
877 | return wr->length; | |
878 | } | |
879 | ||
880 | /* now let's set up wb */ | |
881 | wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length; | |
882 | ||
883 | /* | |
884 | * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write | |
885 | * retries later | |
886 | */ | |
887 | s->s3->wpend_tot = len; | |
888 | s->s3->wpend_buf = buf; | |
889 | s->s3->wpend_type = type; | |
890 | s->s3->wpend_ret = len; | |
891 | ||
892 | /* we now just need to write the buffer */ | |
893 | return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len); | |
894 | err: | |
895 | return -1; | |
896 | } | |
d02b48c6 RE |
897 | |
898 | /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */ | |
36d16f8e | 899 | int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, |
10621efd MC |
900 | unsigned int len) |
901 | { | |
902 | int i; | |
903 | SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &(s->s3->wbuf); | |
d02b48c6 | 904 | |
58964a49 | 905 | /* XXXX */ |
10621efd MC |
906 | if ((s->s3->wpend_tot > (int)len) |
907 | || ((s->s3->wpend_buf != buf) && | |
908 | !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER)) | |
909 | || (s->s3->wpend_type != type)) { | |
910 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY); | |
911 | return (-1); | |
912 | } | |
913 | ||
914 | for (;;) { | |
915 | clear_sys_error(); | |
916 | if (s->wbio != NULL) { | |
917 | s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING; | |
918 | i = BIO_write(s->wbio, | |
919 | (char *)&(wb->buf[wb->offset]), | |
920 | (unsigned int)wb->left); | |
921 | } else { | |
922 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET); | |
923 | i = -1; | |
924 | } | |
925 | if (i == wb->left) { | |
926 | wb->left = 0; | |
927 | wb->offset += i; | |
928 | if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && | |
929 | SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION | |
930 | && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_BAD_VER) | |
931 | ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); | |
932 | s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; | |
933 | return (s->s3->wpend_ret); | |
934 | } else if (i <= 0) { | |
935 | if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) { | |
936 | /* | |
937 | * For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole point in | |
938 | * using a datagram service | |
939 | */ | |
940 | wb->left = 0; | |
941 | } | |
942 | return (i); | |
943 | } | |
944 | wb->offset += i; | |
945 | wb->left -= i; | |
946 | } | |
947 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 948 | |
3e9a08ec TH |
949 | /*- |
950 | * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records. | |
b35e9050 BM |
951 | * 'type' is one of the following: |
952 | * | |
953 | * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us) | |
954 | * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us) | |
955 | * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned) | |
956 | * | |
957 | * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first | |
958 | * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return). | |
959 | * | |
960 | * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as | |
961 | * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really | |
962 | * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests. | |
963 | * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store | |
964 | * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol | |
965 | * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving): | |
966 | * Change cipher spec protocol | |
967 | * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored | |
968 | * Alert protocol | |
969 | * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription) | |
970 | * Handshake protocol | |
971 | * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have | |
972 | * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages | |
973 | * here, anything else is handled by higher layers | |
974 | * Application data protocol | |
975 | * none of our business | |
976 | */ | |
5a4fbc69 | 977 | int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek) |
10621efd MC |
978 | { |
979 | int al, i, j, ret; | |
980 | unsigned int n; | |
981 | SSL3_RECORD *rr; | |
982 | void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL; | |
983 | ||
984 | if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */ | |
985 | if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s)) | |
986 | return (-1); | |
987 | ||
988 | if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) | |
989 | && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) || (peek | |
990 | && (type != | |
991 | SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) { | |
992 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
993 | return -1; | |
994 | } | |
995 | ||
996 | if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0)) | |
997 | /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */ | |
998 | { | |
999 | unsigned char *src = s->s3->handshake_fragment; | |
1000 | unsigned char *dst = buf; | |
1001 | unsigned int k; | |
1002 | ||
1003 | /* peek == 0 */ | |
1004 | n = 0; | |
1005 | while ((len > 0) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0)) { | |
1006 | *dst++ = *src++; | |
1007 | len--; | |
1008 | s->s3->handshake_fragment_len--; | |
1009 | n++; | |
1010 | } | |
1011 | /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */ | |
1012 | for (k = 0; k < s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; k++) | |
1013 | s->s3->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++; | |
1014 | return n; | |
1015 | } | |
1016 | ||
1017 | /* | |
1018 | * Now s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. | |
1019 | */ | |
1020 | ||
1021 | if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s)) { | |
1022 | /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */ | |
1023 | i = s->handshake_func(s); | |
1024 | if (i < 0) | |
1025 | return (i); | |
1026 | if (i == 0) { | |
1027 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); | |
1028 | return (-1); | |
1029 | } | |
1030 | } | |
1031 | start: | |
1032 | s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; | |
1033 | ||
cda8845d MC |
1034 | /*- |
1035 | * s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record | |
1036 | * s->s3->rrec.data, - data | |
1037 | * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read | |
1038 | * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes. | |
1039 | */ | |
10621efd MC |
1040 | rr = &(s->s3->rrec); |
1041 | ||
1042 | /* get new packet if necessary */ | |
1043 | if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)) { | |
1044 | ret = ssl3_get_record(s); | |
1045 | if (ret <= 0) | |
1046 | return (ret); | |
1047 | } | |
1048 | ||
1049 | /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */ | |
1050 | ||
1051 | if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec, | |
1052 | * reset by ssl3_get_finished */ | |
1053 | && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) { | |
1054 | al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; | |
1055 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED); | |
1056 | goto f_err; | |
1057 | } | |
1058 | ||
1059 | /* | |
1060 | * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in | |
1061 | * 'peek' mode) | |
1062 | */ | |
1063 | if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) { | |
1064 | rr->length = 0; | |
1065 | s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; | |
1066 | return (0); | |
1067 | } | |
1068 | ||
1069 | if (type == rr->type) { /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or | |
1070 | * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */ | |
1071 | /* | |
1072 | * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are | |
1073 | * doing a handshake for the first time | |
1074 | */ | |
1075 | if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && | |
1076 | (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) { | |
1077 | al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; | |
1078 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE); | |
1079 | goto f_err; | |
1080 | } | |
1081 | ||
1082 | if (len <= 0) | |
1083 | return (len); | |
1084 | ||
1085 | if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length) | |
1086 | n = rr->length; | |
1087 | else | |
1088 | n = (unsigned int)len; | |
1089 | ||
1090 | memcpy(buf, &(rr->data[rr->off]), n); | |
1091 | if (!peek) { | |
1092 | rr->length -= n; | |
1093 | rr->off += n; | |
1094 | if (rr->length == 0) { | |
1095 | s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; | |
1096 | rr->off = 0; | |
1097 | if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS | |
1098 | && s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) | |
1099 | ssl3_release_read_buffer(s); | |
1100 | } | |
1101 | } | |
1102 | return (n); | |
1103 | } | |
1104 | ||
1105 | /* | |
1106 | * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message, | |
1107 | * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). | |
1108 | */ | |
1109 | ||
1110 | /* | |
1111 | * In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage, fill | |
1112 | * that so that we can process the data at a fixed place. | |
1113 | */ | |
1114 | { | |
1115 | unsigned int dest_maxlen = 0; | |
1116 | unsigned char *dest = NULL; | |
1117 | unsigned int *dest_len = NULL; | |
1118 | ||
1119 | if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { | |
1120 | dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->handshake_fragment; | |
1121 | dest = s->s3->handshake_fragment; | |
1122 | dest_len = &s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; | |
1123 | } else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) { | |
1124 | dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->alert_fragment; | |
1125 | dest = s->s3->alert_fragment; | |
1126 | dest_len = &s->s3->alert_fragment_len; | |
1127 | } | |
bd6941cf | 1128 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS |
10621efd MC |
1129 | else if (rr->type == TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT) { |
1130 | tls1_process_heartbeat(s); | |
1131 | ||
1132 | /* Exit and notify application to read again */ | |
1133 | rr->length = 0; | |
1134 | s->rwstate = SSL_READING; | |
1135 | BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s)); | |
1136 | BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s)); | |
1137 | return (-1); | |
1138 | } | |
bd6941cf | 1139 | #endif |
b35e9050 | 1140 | |
10621efd MC |
1141 | if (dest_maxlen > 0) { |
1142 | n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */ | |
1143 | if (rr->length < n) | |
1144 | n = rr->length; /* available bytes */ | |
1145 | ||
1146 | /* now move 'n' bytes: */ | |
1147 | while (n-- > 0) { | |
1148 | dest[(*dest_len)++] = rr->data[rr->off++]; | |
1149 | rr->length--; | |
1150 | } | |
1151 | ||
1152 | if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen) | |
1153 | goto start; /* fragment was too small */ | |
1154 | } | |
1155 | } | |
1156 | ||
cda8845d MC |
1157 | /*- |
1158 | * s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE; | |
1159 | * s->s3->alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT. | |
1160 | * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) | |
1161 | */ | |
10621efd MC |
1162 | |
1163 | /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */ | |
1164 | if ((!s->server) && | |
1165 | (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && | |
1166 | (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) && | |
1167 | (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) { | |
1168 | s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0; | |
1169 | ||
1170 | if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) || | |
1171 | (s->s3->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) || | |
1172 | (s->s3->handshake_fragment[3] != 0)) { | |
1173 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
1174 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST); | |
1175 | goto f_err; | |
1176 | } | |
1177 | ||
1178 | if (s->msg_callback) | |
1179 | s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, | |
1180 | s->s3->handshake_fragment, 4, s, | |
1181 | s->msg_callback_arg); | |
1182 | ||
1183 | if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) && | |
1184 | !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) && | |
1185 | !s->s3->renegotiate) { | |
1186 | ssl3_renegotiate(s); | |
1187 | if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s)) { | |
1188 | i = s->handshake_func(s); | |
1189 | if (i < 0) | |
1190 | return (i); | |
1191 | if (i == 0) { | |
1192 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, | |
1193 | SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); | |
1194 | return (-1); | |
1195 | } | |
1196 | ||
1197 | if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) { | |
1198 | if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) { /* no read-ahead left? */ | |
1199 | BIO *bio; | |
1200 | /* | |
1201 | * In the case where we try to read application data, | |
1202 | * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with | |
1203 | * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may | |
1204 | * cause nasty problems in the blocking world | |
1205 | */ | |
1206 | s->rwstate = SSL_READING; | |
1207 | bio = SSL_get_rbio(s); | |
1208 | BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); | |
1209 | BIO_set_retry_read(bio); | |
1210 | return (-1); | |
1211 | } | |
1212 | } | |
1213 | } | |
1214 | } | |
1215 | /* | |
1216 | * we either finished a handshake or ignored the request, now try | |
1217 | * again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for | |
1218 | */ | |
1219 | goto start; | |
1220 | } | |
1221 | /* | |
1222 | * If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't | |
1223 | * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on. WARNING: | |
1224 | * experimental code, needs reviewing (steve) | |
1225 | */ | |
1226 | if (s->server && | |
1227 | SSL_is_init_finished(s) && | |
1228 | !s->s3->send_connection_binding && | |
1229 | (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && | |
1230 | (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && | |
1231 | (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) && | |
1232 | (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL) && | |
1233 | !(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) { | |
1234 | /* | |
1235 | * s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0; | |
1236 | */ | |
1237 | rr->length = 0; | |
1238 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION); | |
1239 | goto start; | |
1240 | } | |
1241 | if (s->s3->alert_fragment_len >= 2) { | |
1242 | int alert_level = s->s3->alert_fragment[0]; | |
1243 | int alert_descr = s->s3->alert_fragment[1]; | |
1244 | ||
1245 | s->s3->alert_fragment_len = 0; | |
1246 | ||
1247 | if (s->msg_callback) | |
1248 | s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, | |
1249 | s->s3->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg); | |
1250 | ||
1251 | if (s->info_callback != NULL) | |
1252 | cb = s->info_callback; | |
1253 | else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) | |
1254 | cb = s->ctx->info_callback; | |
1255 | ||
1256 | if (cb != NULL) { | |
1257 | j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr; | |
1258 | cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j); | |
1259 | } | |
1260 | ||
183db9af | 1261 | if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) { |
10621efd MC |
1262 | s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr; |
1263 | if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) { | |
1264 | s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; | |
1265 | return (0); | |
1266 | } | |
1267 | /* | |
1268 | * This is a warning but we receive it if we requested | |
1269 | * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal | |
1270 | * alert because if application tried to renegotiatie it | |
1271 | * presumably had a good reason and expects it to succeed. In | |
1272 | * future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if | |
1273 | * the peer refused it where we carry on. | |
1274 | */ | |
1275 | else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION) { | |
1276 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
1277 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION); | |
1278 | goto f_err; | |
1279 | } | |
a149b246 | 1280 | #ifdef SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME |
10621efd MC |
1281 | else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME) |
1282 | return (0); | |
a149b246 | 1283 | #endif |
183db9af | 1284 | } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL) { |
10621efd MC |
1285 | char tmp[16]; |
1286 | ||
1287 | s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; | |
1288 | s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr; | |
1289 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr); | |
1290 | BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%d", alert_descr); | |
1291 | ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp); | |
1292 | s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; | |
1293 | SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx, s->session); | |
1294 | return (0); | |
1295 | } else { | |
1296 | al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
1297 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE); | |
1298 | goto f_err; | |
1299 | } | |
1300 | ||
1301 | goto start; | |
1302 | } | |
1303 | ||
1304 | if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) { /* but we have not received a | |
1305 | * shutdown */ | |
1306 | s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; | |
1307 | rr->length = 0; | |
1308 | return (0); | |
1309 | } | |
1310 | ||
1311 | if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { | |
1312 | /* | |
1313 | * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know exactly | |
1314 | * what the record payload has to look like | |
1315 | */ | |
1316 | if ((rr->length != 1) || (rr->off != 0) || | |
1317 | (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS)) { | |
1318 | al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
1319 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); | |
1320 | goto f_err; | |
1321 | } | |
1322 | ||
1323 | /* Check we have a cipher to change to */ | |
1324 | if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) { | |
1325 | al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; | |
1326 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); | |
1327 | goto f_err; | |
1328 | } | |
1329 | ||
1330 | if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK)) { | |
1331 | al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; | |
1332 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); | |
1333 | goto f_err; | |
1334 | } | |
1335 | ||
1336 | s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; | |
1337 | ||
1338 | rr->length = 0; | |
1339 | ||
1340 | if (s->msg_callback) | |
1341 | s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, | |
1342 | rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg); | |
1343 | ||
1344 | s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 1; | |
1345 | if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) | |
1346 | goto err; | |
1347 | else | |
1348 | goto start; | |
1349 | } | |
1350 | ||
1351 | /* | |
1352 | * Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) | |
1353 | */ | |
1354 | if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && !s->in_handshake) { | |
1355 | if (((s->state & SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) && | |
1356 | !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS)) { | |
1357 | #if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences | |
1358 | * are not as expected (and because this is | |
1359 | * not really needed for clients except for | |
1360 | * detecting protocol violations): */ | |
1361 | s->state = SSL_ST_BEFORE | (s->server) | |
1362 | ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT; | |
a2a01589 | 1363 | #else |
10621efd | 1364 | s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT; |
a2a01589 | 1365 | #endif |
10621efd MC |
1366 | s->renegotiate = 1; |
1367 | s->new_session = 1; | |
1368 | } | |
1369 | i = s->handshake_func(s); | |
1370 | if (i < 0) | |
1371 | return (i); | |
1372 | if (i == 0) { | |
1373 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); | |
1374 | return (-1); | |
1375 | } | |
1376 | ||
1377 | if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) { | |
1378 | if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) { /* no read-ahead left? */ | |
1379 | BIO *bio; | |
1380 | /* | |
1381 | * In the case where we try to read application data, but we | |
1382 | * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry | |
1383 | * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty | |
1384 | * problems in the blocking world | |
1385 | */ | |
1386 | s->rwstate = SSL_READING; | |
1387 | bio = SSL_get_rbio(s); | |
1388 | BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); | |
1389 | BIO_set_retry_read(bio); | |
1390 | return (-1); | |
1391 | } | |
1392 | } | |
1393 | goto start; | |
1394 | } | |
1395 | ||
1396 | switch (rr->type) { | |
1397 | default: | |
bc36ee62 | 1398 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS |
10621efd MC |
1399 | /* |
1400 | * TLS up to v1.1 just ignores unknown message types: TLS v1.2 give | |
1401 | * an unexpected message alert. | |
1402 | */ | |
1403 | if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->version <= TLS1_1_VERSION) { | |
1404 | rr->length = 0; | |
1405 | goto start; | |
1406 | } | |
58964a49 | 1407 | #endif |
10621efd MC |
1408 | al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; |
1409 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); | |
1410 | goto f_err; | |
1411 | case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC: | |
1412 | case SSL3_RT_ALERT: | |
1413 | case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE: | |
1414 | /* | |
1415 | * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of | |
1416 | * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that should not | |
1417 | * happen when type != rr->type | |
1418 | */ | |
1419 | al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; | |
1420 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1421 | goto f_err; | |
1422 | case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA: | |
1423 | /* | |
1424 | * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have | |
1425 | * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read() | |
1426 | * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read | |
1427 | * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet | |
1428 | * started), we will indulge it. | |
1429 | */ | |
1430 | if (s->s3->in_read_app_data && | |
1431 | (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) && | |
1432 | (((s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) && | |
1433 | (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) && | |
1434 | (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A) | |
1435 | ) || ((s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) && | |
1436 | (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) && | |
1437 | (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) | |
1438 | ) | |
1439 | )) { | |
1440 | s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2; | |
1441 | return (-1); | |
1442 | } else { | |
1443 | al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; | |
1444 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); | |
1445 | goto f_err; | |
1446 | } | |
1447 | } | |
1448 | /* not reached */ | |
1449 | ||
1450 | f_err: | |
1451 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
1452 | err: | |
1453 | return (-1); | |
1454 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 1455 | |
36d16f8e | 1456 | int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s) |
10621efd MC |
1457 | { |
1458 | int i; | |
1459 | const char *sender; | |
1460 | int slen; | |
1461 | ||
1462 | if (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) | |
1463 | i = SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ; | |
1464 | else | |
1465 | i = SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ; | |
1466 | ||
1467 | if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL) { | |
1468 | if (s->session == NULL || s->session->master_key_length == 0) { | |
1469 | /* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */ | |
1470 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, | |
1471 | SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); | |
1472 | return (0); | |
1473 | } | |
1474 | ||
1475 | s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; | |
1476 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) | |
1477 | return (0); | |
1478 | } | |
1479 | ||
1480 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, i)) | |
1481 | return (0); | |
1482 | ||
1483 | /* | |
1484 | * we have to record the message digest at this point so we can get it | |
1485 | * before we read the finished message | |
1486 | */ | |
1487 | if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) { | |
1488 | sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label; | |
1489 | slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len; | |
1490 | } else { | |
1491 | sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label; | |
1492 | slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len; | |
1493 | } | |
1494 | ||
1495 | i = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, | |
1496 | sender, slen, | |
1497 | s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md); | |
1498 | if (i == 0) { | |
1499 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1500 | return 0; | |
1501 | } | |
1502 | s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = i; | |
1503 | ||
1504 | return (1); | |
1505 | } | |
58964a49 | 1506 | |
c184b140 | 1507 | int ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc) |
10621efd MC |
1508 | { |
1509 | /* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */ | |
1510 | desc = s->method->ssl3_enc->alert_value(desc); | |
1511 | if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && desc == SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION) | |
1512 | desc = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; /* SSL 3.0 does not have | |
1513 | * protocol_version alerts */ | |
1514 | if (desc < 0) | |
1515 | return -1; | |
1516 | /* If a fatal one, remove from cache */ | |
1517 | if ((level == 2) && (s->session != NULL)) | |
1518 | SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx, s->session); | |
1519 | ||
1520 | s->s3->alert_dispatch = 1; | |
1521 | s->s3->send_alert[0] = level; | |
1522 | s->s3->send_alert[1] = desc; | |
1523 | if (s->s3->wbuf.left == 0) /* data still being written out? */ | |
1524 | return s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s); | |
1525 | /* | |
1526 | * else data is still being written out, we will get written some time in | |
1527 | * the future | |
1528 | */ | |
1529 | return -1; | |
1530 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 1531 | |
6b691a5c | 1532 | int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s) |
10621efd MC |
1533 | { |
1534 | int i, j; | |
1535 | void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL; | |
1536 | ||
1537 | s->s3->alert_dispatch = 0; | |
1538 | i = do_ssl3_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &s->s3->send_alert[0], 2, 0); | |
1539 | if (i <= 0) { | |
1540 | s->s3->alert_dispatch = 1; | |
1541 | } else { | |
1542 | /* | |
1543 | * Alert sent to BIO. If it is important, flush it now. If the | |
1544 | * message does not get sent due to non-blocking IO, we will not | |
1545 | * worry too much. | |
1546 | */ | |
1547 | if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL) | |
1548 | (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio); | |
1549 | ||
1550 | if (s->msg_callback) | |
1551 | s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert, | |
1552 | 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg); | |
1553 | ||
1554 | if (s->info_callback != NULL) | |
1555 | cb = s->info_callback; | |
1556 | else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) | |
1557 | cb = s->ctx->info_callback; | |
1558 | ||
1559 | if (cb != NULL) { | |
1560 | j = (s->s3->send_alert[0] << 8) | s->s3->send_alert[1]; | |
1561 | cb(s, SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT, j); | |
1562 | } | |
1563 | } | |
1564 | return (i); | |
1565 | } |