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d02b48c6 | 1 | /* ssl/s3_pkt.c */ |
58964a49 | 2 | /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) |
d02b48c6 RE |
3 | * All rights reserved. |
4 | * | |
5 | * This package is an SSL implementation written | |
6 | * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). | |
7 | * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. | |
40720ce3 | 8 | * |
d02b48c6 RE |
9 | * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as |
10 | * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions | |
11 | * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, | |
12 | * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation | |
13 | * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms | |
14 | * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). | |
40720ce3 | 15 | * |
d02b48c6 RE |
16 | * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in |
17 | * the code are not to be removed. | |
18 | * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution | |
19 | * as the author of the parts of the library used. | |
20 | * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or | |
21 | * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. | |
40720ce3 | 22 | * |
d02b48c6 RE |
23 | * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
24 | * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | |
25 | * are met: | |
26 | * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright | |
27 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. | |
28 | * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | |
29 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the | |
30 | * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. | |
31 | * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software | |
32 | * must display the following acknowledgement: | |
33 | * "This product includes cryptographic software written by | |
34 | * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" | |
35 | * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library | |
36 | * being used are not cryptographic related :-). | |
40720ce3 | 37 | * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from |
d02b48c6 RE |
38 | * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: |
39 | * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" | |
40720ce3 | 40 | * |
d02b48c6 RE |
41 | * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND |
42 | * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE | |
43 | * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE | |
44 | * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE | |
45 | * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL | |
46 | * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS | |
47 | * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) | |
48 | * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT | |
49 | * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY | |
50 | * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF | |
51 | * SUCH DAMAGE. | |
40720ce3 | 52 | * |
d02b48c6 RE |
53 | * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or |
54 | * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be | |
55 | * copied and put under another distribution licence | |
56 | * [including the GNU Public Licence.] | |
57 | */ | |
c51ae173 | 58 | /* ==================================================================== |
82b0bf0b | 59 | * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. |
c51ae173 BM |
60 | * |
61 | * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without | |
62 | * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | |
63 | * are met: | |
64 | * | |
65 | * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright | |
40720ce3 | 66 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
c51ae173 BM |
67 | * |
68 | * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | |
69 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in | |
70 | * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the | |
71 | * distribution. | |
72 | * | |
73 | * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this | |
74 | * software must display the following acknowledgment: | |
75 | * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project | |
76 | * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" | |
77 | * | |
78 | * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to | |
79 | * endorse or promote products derived from this software without | |
80 | * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact | |
81 | * openssl-core@openssl.org. | |
82 | * | |
83 | * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" | |
84 | * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written | |
85 | * permission of the OpenSSL Project. | |
86 | * | |
87 | * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following | |
88 | * acknowledgment: | |
89 | * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project | |
90 | * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" | |
91 | * | |
92 | * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY | |
93 | * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE | |
94 | * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR | |
95 | * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR | |
96 | * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, | |
97 | * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT | |
98 | * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; | |
99 | * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) | |
100 | * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, | |
101 | * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) | |
102 | * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED | |
103 | * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. | |
104 | * ==================================================================== | |
105 | * | |
106 | * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young | |
107 | * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim | |
108 | * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). | |
109 | * | |
110 | */ | |
d02b48c6 RE |
111 | |
112 | #include <stdio.h> | |
bfce4e5d | 113 | #include <limits.h> |
d02b48c6 RE |
114 | #include <errno.h> |
115 | #define USE_SOCKETS | |
7b63c0fa | 116 | #include "ssl_locl.h" |
ec577822 BM |
117 | #include <openssl/evp.h> |
118 | #include <openssl/buffer.h> | |
d02b48c6 | 119 | |
61f5b6f3 | 120 | static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, |
40720ce3 | 121 | unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment); |
d02b48c6 | 122 | static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s); |
c51ae173 | 123 | |
36d16f8e | 124 | int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend) |
40720ce3 MC |
125 | { |
126 | /* | |
127 | * If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase | |
128 | * packet by another n bytes. The packet will be in the sub-array of | |
129 | * s->s3->rbuf.buf specified by s->packet and s->packet_length. (If | |
130 | * s->read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf [plus | |
131 | * s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].) | |
132 | */ | |
133 | int i, off, newb; | |
134 | ||
135 | if (!extend) { | |
136 | /* start with empty packet ... */ | |
137 | if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) | |
138 | s->s3->rbuf.offset = 0; | |
139 | s->packet = s->s3->rbuf.buf + s->s3->rbuf.offset; | |
140 | s->packet_length = 0; | |
141 | /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */ | |
142 | } | |
143 | ||
144 | /* | |
145 | * For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets because the read | |
146 | * operation returns the whole packet at once (as long as it fits into | |
147 | * the buffer). | |
148 | */ | |
149 | if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION) { | |
150 | if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0 && extend) | |
151 | return 0; | |
152 | if (s->s3->rbuf.left > 0 && n > s->s3->rbuf.left) | |
153 | n = s->s3->rbuf.left; | |
154 | } | |
155 | ||
156 | /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */ | |
157 | if (s->s3->rbuf.left >= (int)n) { | |
158 | s->packet_length += n; | |
159 | s->s3->rbuf.left -= n; | |
160 | s->s3->rbuf.offset += n; | |
161 | return (n); | |
162 | } | |
163 | ||
164 | /* else we need to read more data */ | |
165 | if (!s->read_ahead) | |
166 | max = n; | |
167 | ||
168 | { | |
169 | /* avoid buffer overflow */ | |
170 | int max_max = s->s3->rbuf.len - s->packet_length; | |
171 | if (max > max_max) | |
172 | max = max_max; | |
173 | } | |
174 | if (n > max) { /* does not happen */ | |
175 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
176 | return -1; | |
177 | } | |
178 | ||
179 | off = s->packet_length; | |
180 | newb = s->s3->rbuf.left; | |
181 | /* | |
182 | * Move any available bytes to front of buffer: 'off' bytes already | |
183 | * pointed to by 'packet', 'newb' extra ones at the end | |
184 | */ | |
185 | if (s->packet != s->s3->rbuf.buf) { | |
186 | /* off > 0 */ | |
187 | memmove(s->s3->rbuf.buf, s->packet, off + newb); | |
188 | s->packet = s->s3->rbuf.buf; | |
189 | } | |
190 | ||
191 | while (newb < n) { | |
192 | /* | |
193 | * Now we have off+newb bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf and | |
194 | * need to read in more until we have off+n (up to off+max if | |
195 | * possible) | |
196 | */ | |
197 | ||
198 | clear_sys_error(); | |
199 | if (s->rbio != NULL) { | |
200 | s->rwstate = SSL_READING; | |
201 | i = BIO_read(s->rbio, &(s->s3->rbuf.buf[off + newb]), max - newb); | |
202 | } else { | |
203 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET); | |
204 | i = -1; | |
205 | } | |
206 | ||
207 | if (i <= 0) { | |
208 | s->s3->rbuf.left = newb; | |
209 | return (i); | |
210 | } | |
211 | newb += i; | |
212 | /* | |
213 | * reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because the | |
214 | * underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed to | |
215 | * byte oriented as in the TLS case. | |
216 | */ | |
217 | if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION) { | |
218 | if (n > newb) | |
219 | n = newb; /* makes the while condition false */ | |
220 | } | |
221 | } | |
222 | ||
223 | /* done reading, now the book-keeping */ | |
224 | s->s3->rbuf.offset = off + n; | |
225 | s->s3->rbuf.left = newb - n; | |
226 | s->packet_length += n; | |
227 | s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; | |
228 | return (n); | |
229 | } | |
230 | ||
231 | /* | |
232 | * MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS defines the number of consecutive, empty records that | |
233 | * will be processed per call to ssl3_get_record. Without this limit an | |
234 | * attacker could send empty records at a faster rate than we can process and | |
235 | * cause ssl3_get_record to loop forever. | |
236 | */ | |
f54fab0f AL |
237 | #define MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS 32 |
238 | ||
b558c8d5 TH |
239 | /*- |
240 | * Call this to get a new input record. | |
d02b48c6 RE |
241 | * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error |
242 | * or non-blocking IO. | |
243 | * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in | |
c51ae173 | 244 | * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record |
40720ce3 | 245 | * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data |
d02b48c6 RE |
246 | * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes |
247 | */ | |
b35e9050 | 248 | /* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */ |
6b691a5c | 249 | static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s) |
40720ce3 MC |
250 | { |
251 | int ssl_major, ssl_minor, al; | |
252 | int enc_err, n, i, ret = -1; | |
253 | SSL3_RECORD *rr; | |
254 | SSL_SESSION *sess; | |
255 | unsigned char *p; | |
256 | unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; | |
257 | short version; | |
258 | unsigned mac_size, orig_len; | |
259 | size_t extra; | |
260 | unsigned empty_record_count = 0; | |
261 | ||
262 | rr = &(s->s3->rrec); | |
263 | sess = s->session; | |
264 | ||
265 | if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER) | |
266 | extra = SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA; | |
267 | else | |
268 | extra = 0; | |
269 | if (extra != s->s3->rbuf.len - SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE) { | |
270 | /* | |
271 | * actually likely an application error: | |
272 | * SLS_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER set after ssl3_setup_buffers() | |
273 | * was done | |
274 | */ | |
275 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
276 | return -1; | |
277 | } | |
278 | ||
279 | again: | |
280 | /* check if we have the header */ | |
281 | if ((s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) || | |
282 | (s->packet_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) { | |
283 | n = ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0); | |
284 | if (n <= 0) | |
285 | return (n); /* error or non-blocking */ | |
286 | s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_BODY; | |
287 | ||
288 | p = s->packet; | |
289 | ||
290 | /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */ | |
291 | rr->type = *(p++); | |
292 | ssl_major = *(p++); | |
293 | ssl_minor = *(p++); | |
294 | version = (ssl_major << 8) | ssl_minor; | |
295 | n2s(p, rr->length); | |
296 | ||
297 | /* Lets check version */ | |
298 | if (!s->first_packet) { | |
299 | if (version != s->version) { | |
300 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); | |
301 | if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00)) | |
302 | /* | |
303 | * Send back error using their minor version number :-) | |
304 | */ | |
305 | s->version = (unsigned short)version; | |
306 | al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; | |
307 | goto f_err; | |
308 | } | |
309 | } | |
310 | ||
311 | if ((version >> 8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) { | |
312 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); | |
313 | goto err; | |
314 | } | |
315 | ||
316 | if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH + extra) { | |
317 | al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; | |
318 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); | |
319 | goto f_err; | |
320 | } | |
321 | ||
322 | /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */ | |
323 | } | |
324 | ||
325 | /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */ | |
326 | ||
327 | if (rr->length > s->packet_length - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { | |
328 | /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */ | |
329 | i = rr->length; | |
330 | n = ssl3_read_n(s, i, i, 1); | |
331 | if (n <= 0) | |
332 | return (n); /* error or non-blocking io */ | |
333 | /* | |
334 | * now n == rr->length, and s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH | |
335 | * + rr->length | |
336 | */ | |
337 | } | |
338 | ||
339 | s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */ | |
340 | ||
341 | /* | |
342 | * At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length, | |
343 | * and we have that many bytes in s->packet | |
344 | */ | |
345 | rr->input = &(s->packet[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]); | |
346 | ||
347 | /* | |
348 | * ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr' rr->input points | |
349 | * at rr->length bytes, which need to be copied into rr->data by either | |
350 | * the decryption or by the decompression When the data is 'copied' into | |
351 | * the rr->data buffer, rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer | |
352 | */ | |
353 | ||
354 | /* | |
355 | * We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ] rr->length | |
356 | * bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. | |
357 | */ | |
358 | ||
359 | /* check is not needed I believe */ | |
360 | if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH + extra) { | |
361 | al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; | |
362 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); | |
363 | goto f_err; | |
364 | } | |
365 | ||
366 | /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */ | |
367 | rr->data = rr->input; | |
368 | ||
369 | enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 0); | |
02f0c26c MC |
370 | /*- |
371 | * enc_err is: | |
372 | * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid. | |
373 | * 1: if the padding is valid | |
374 | * -1: if the padding is invalid | |
375 | */ | |
40720ce3 MC |
376 | if (enc_err == 0) { |
377 | al = SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED; | |
378 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG); | |
379 | goto f_err; | |
380 | } | |
58964a49 | 381 | #ifdef TLS_DEBUG |
40720ce3 MC |
382 | printf("dec %d\n", rr->length); |
383 | { | |
384 | unsigned int z; | |
385 | for (z = 0; z < rr->length; z++) | |
386 | printf("%02X%c", rr->data[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n'); | |
387 | } | |
388 | printf("\n"); | |
58964a49 | 389 | #endif |
ee60d9fb | 390 | |
40720ce3 MC |
391 | /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */ |
392 | if ((sess != NULL) && (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) && (s->read_hash != NULL)) { | |
393 | /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */ | |
394 | unsigned char *mac = NULL; | |
395 | unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; | |
396 | mac_size = EVP_MD_size(s->read_hash); | |
397 | OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); | |
398 | ||
399 | /* | |
400 | * kludge: *_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rr->type | |
401 | */ | |
402 | orig_len = rr->length + ((unsigned int)rr->type >> 8); | |
403 | ||
404 | /* | |
405 | * orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was | |
406 | * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use, | |
407 | * therefore we can safely process the record in a different amount | |
408 | * of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC. | |
409 | */ | |
410 | if (orig_len < mac_size || | |
411 | /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */ | |
412 | (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE && | |
413 | orig_len < mac_size + 1)) { | |
414 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
415 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); | |
416 | goto f_err; | |
417 | } | |
418 | ||
419 | if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) { | |
420 | /* | |
421 | * We update the length so that the TLS header bytes can be | |
422 | * constructed correctly but we need to extract the MAC in | |
423 | * constant time from within the record, without leaking the | |
424 | * contents of the padding bytes. | |
425 | */ | |
426 | mac = mac_tmp; | |
427 | ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size, orig_len); | |
428 | rr->length -= mac_size; | |
429 | } else { | |
430 | /* | |
431 | * In this case there's no padding, so |orig_len| equals | |
432 | * |rec->length| and we checked that there's enough bytes for | |
433 | * |mac_size| above. | |
434 | */ | |
435 | rr->length -= mac_size; | |
436 | mac = &rr->data[rr->length]; | |
437 | } | |
438 | ||
439 | i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, md, 0 /* not send */ ); | |
440 | if (i < 0 || mac == NULL | |
441 | || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0) | |
442 | enc_err = -1; | |
443 | if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + extra + mac_size) | |
444 | enc_err = -1; | |
445 | } | |
446 | ||
447 | if (enc_err < 0) { | |
448 | /* | |
449 | * A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0, | |
450 | * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption | |
451 | * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway, we should | |
452 | * not reveal which kind of error occured -- this might become | |
453 | * visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile) | |
454 | */ | |
455 | al = SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC; | |
456 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, | |
457 | SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC); | |
458 | goto f_err; | |
459 | } | |
460 | ||
461 | /* r->length is now just compressed */ | |
462 | if (s->expand != NULL) { | |
463 | if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + extra) { | |
464 | al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; | |
465 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); | |
466 | goto f_err; | |
467 | } | |
468 | if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s)) { | |
469 | al = SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE; | |
470 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION); | |
471 | goto f_err; | |
472 | } | |
473 | } | |
474 | ||
475 | if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH + extra) { | |
476 | al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; | |
477 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); | |
478 | goto f_err; | |
479 | } | |
480 | ||
481 | rr->off = 0; | |
02f0c26c MC |
482 | /*- |
483 | * So at this point the following is true | |
484 | * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record | |
485 | * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record | |
486 | * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte | |
487 | * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment | |
488 | * after use :-). | |
489 | */ | |
40720ce3 MC |
490 | |
491 | /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */ | |
492 | s->packet_length = 0; | |
493 | ||
494 | /* just read a 0 length packet */ | |
495 | if (rr->length == 0) { | |
496 | empty_record_count++; | |
497 | if (empty_record_count > MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS) { | |
498 | al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; | |
499 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL); | |
500 | goto f_err; | |
501 | } | |
502 | goto again; | |
503 | } | |
504 | ||
505 | return (1); | |
506 | ||
507 | f_err: | |
508 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
509 | err: | |
510 | return (ret); | |
511 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 512 | |
36d16f8e | 513 | int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl) |
40720ce3 | 514 | { |
54f51116 | 515 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP |
40720ce3 MC |
516 | int i; |
517 | SSL3_RECORD *rr; | |
518 | ||
519 | rr = &(ssl->s3->rrec); | |
520 | i = COMP_expand_block(ssl->expand, rr->comp, | |
521 | SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, rr->data, | |
522 | (int)rr->length); | |
523 | if (i < 0) | |
524 | return (0); | |
525 | else | |
526 | rr->length = i; | |
527 | rr->data = rr->comp; | |
54f51116 | 528 | #endif |
40720ce3 MC |
529 | return (1); |
530 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 531 | |
36d16f8e | 532 | int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl) |
40720ce3 | 533 | { |
54f51116 | 534 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP |
40720ce3 MC |
535 | int i; |
536 | SSL3_RECORD *wr; | |
537 | ||
538 | wr = &(ssl->s3->wrec); | |
539 | i = COMP_compress_block(ssl->compress, wr->data, | |
540 | SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH, | |
541 | wr->input, (int)wr->length); | |
542 | if (i < 0) | |
543 | return (0); | |
544 | else | |
545 | wr->length = i; | |
546 | ||
547 | wr->input = wr->data; | |
54f51116 | 548 | #endif |
40720ce3 MC |
549 | return (1); |
550 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 551 | |
40720ce3 MC |
552 | /* |
553 | * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if | |
554 | * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO. | |
d02b48c6 | 555 | */ |
52732b38 | 556 | int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len) |
40720ce3 MC |
557 | { |
558 | const unsigned char *buf = buf_; | |
559 | unsigned int n, nw; | |
560 | int i, tot; | |
561 | ||
562 | s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; | |
563 | OPENSSL_assert(s->s3->wnum <= INT_MAX); | |
564 | tot = s->s3->wnum; | |
565 | s->s3->wnum = 0; | |
566 | ||
567 | if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake) { | |
568 | i = s->handshake_func(s); | |
569 | if (i < 0) | |
570 | return (i); | |
571 | if (i == 0) { | |
572 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); | |
573 | return -1; | |
574 | } | |
575 | } | |
576 | ||
577 | /* | |
578 | * ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out | |
579 | * than the the original len from a write which didn't complete for | |
580 | * non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for | |
581 | * this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be | |
582 | * possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then | |
583 | * promptly send beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and | |
584 | * report the error in a way the user will notice | |
585 | */ | |
586 | if (len < tot) { | |
587 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); | |
588 | return (-1); | |
589 | } | |
590 | ||
591 | n = (len - tot); | |
592 | for (;;) { | |
593 | if (n > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) | |
594 | nw = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH; | |
595 | else | |
596 | nw = n; | |
597 | ||
598 | i = do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, 0); | |
599 | if (i <= 0) { | |
600 | s->s3->wnum = tot; | |
601 | return i; | |
602 | } | |
603 | ||
604 | if ((i == (int)n) || | |
605 | (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && | |
606 | (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE))) { | |
607 | /* | |
608 | * next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment | |
609 | * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness: | |
610 | */ | |
611 | s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0; | |
612 | ||
613 | return tot + i; | |
614 | } | |
615 | ||
616 | n -= i; | |
617 | tot += i; | |
618 | } | |
619 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 620 | |
61f5b6f3 | 621 | static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, |
40720ce3 MC |
622 | unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment) |
623 | { | |
624 | unsigned char *p, *plen; | |
625 | int i, mac_size, clear = 0; | |
626 | int prefix_len = 0; | |
627 | SSL3_RECORD *wr; | |
628 | SSL3_BUFFER *wb; | |
629 | SSL_SESSION *sess; | |
630 | ||
631 | /* | |
632 | * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This | |
633 | * will happen with non blocking IO | |
634 | */ | |
635 | if (s->s3->wbuf.left != 0) | |
636 | return (ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len)); | |
637 | ||
638 | /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */ | |
639 | if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) { | |
640 | i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s); | |
641 | if (i <= 0) | |
642 | return (i); | |
643 | /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */ | |
644 | } | |
645 | ||
646 | if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment) | |
647 | return 0; | |
648 | ||
649 | wr = &(s->s3->wrec); | |
650 | wb = &(s->s3->wbuf); | |
651 | sess = s->session; | |
652 | ||
653 | if ((sess == NULL) || | |
654 | (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) || (s->write_hash == NULL)) | |
655 | clear = 1; | |
656 | ||
657 | if (clear) | |
658 | mac_size = 0; | |
659 | else | |
660 | mac_size = EVP_MD_size(s->write_hash); | |
661 | ||
662 | /* | |
663 | * 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself | |
664 | */ | |
665 | if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done) { | |
666 | /* | |
667 | * countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites (see | |
668 | * http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) | |
669 | */ | |
670 | ||
671 | if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) { | |
672 | /* | |
673 | * recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; this | |
674 | * prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment (these | |
675 | * 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later together with the actual | |
676 | * payload) | |
677 | */ | |
678 | prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1); | |
679 | if (prefix_len <= 0) | |
680 | goto err; | |
681 | ||
682 | if (s->s3->wbuf.len < | |
683 | (size_t)prefix_len + SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE) { | |
684 | /* insufficient space */ | |
685 | SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
686 | goto err; | |
687 | } | |
688 | } | |
689 | ||
690 | s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1; | |
691 | } | |
692 | ||
693 | p = wb->buf + prefix_len; | |
694 | ||
695 | /* write the header */ | |
696 | ||
697 | *(p++) = type & 0xff; | |
698 | wr->type = type; | |
699 | ||
700 | *(p++) = (s->version >> 8); | |
701 | *(p++) = s->version & 0xff; | |
702 | ||
703 | /* field where we are to write out packet length */ | |
704 | plen = p; | |
705 | p += 2; | |
706 | ||
707 | /* lets setup the record stuff. */ | |
708 | wr->data = p; | |
709 | wr->length = (int)len; | |
710 | wr->input = (unsigned char *)buf; | |
711 | ||
712 | /* | |
713 | * we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into wr->data | |
714 | */ | |
715 | ||
716 | /* first we compress */ | |
717 | if (s->compress != NULL) { | |
718 | if (!ssl3_do_compress(s)) { | |
719 | SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE); | |
720 | goto err; | |
721 | } | |
722 | } else { | |
723 | memcpy(wr->data, wr->input, wr->length); | |
724 | wr->input = wr->data; | |
725 | } | |
726 | ||
727 | /* | |
728 | * we should still have the output to wr->data and the input from | |
729 | * wr->input. Length should be wr->length. wr->data still points in the | |
730 | * wb->buf | |
731 | */ | |
732 | ||
733 | if (mac_size != 0) { | |
734 | s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, &(p[wr->length]), 1); | |
735 | wr->length += mac_size; | |
736 | wr->input = p; | |
737 | wr->data = p; | |
738 | } | |
739 | ||
740 | /* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */ | |
741 | s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 1); | |
742 | ||
743 | /* record length after mac and block padding */ | |
744 | s2n(wr->length, plen); | |
745 | ||
746 | /* | |
747 | * we should now have wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is | |
748 | * wr->length long | |
749 | */ | |
750 | wr->type = type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */ | |
751 | wr->length += SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
752 | ||
753 | if (create_empty_fragment) { | |
754 | /* | |
755 | * we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write | |
756 | * out anything here | |
757 | */ | |
758 | return wr->length; | |
759 | } | |
760 | ||
761 | /* now let's set up wb */ | |
762 | wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length; | |
763 | wb->offset = 0; | |
764 | ||
765 | /* | |
766 | * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write | |
767 | * retries later | |
768 | */ | |
769 | s->s3->wpend_tot = len; | |
770 | s->s3->wpend_buf = buf; | |
771 | s->s3->wpend_type = type; | |
772 | s->s3->wpend_ret = len; | |
773 | ||
774 | /* we now just need to write the buffer */ | |
775 | return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len); | |
776 | err: | |
777 | return -1; | |
778 | } | |
d02b48c6 RE |
779 | |
780 | /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */ | |
36d16f8e | 781 | int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, |
40720ce3 MC |
782 | unsigned int len) |
783 | { | |
784 | int i; | |
d02b48c6 | 785 | |
58964a49 | 786 | /* XXXX */ |
40720ce3 MC |
787 | if ((s->s3->wpend_tot > (int)len) |
788 | || ((s->s3->wpend_buf != buf) && | |
789 | !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER)) | |
790 | || (s->s3->wpend_type != type)) { | |
791 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY); | |
792 | return (-1); | |
793 | } | |
794 | ||
795 | for (;;) { | |
796 | clear_sys_error(); | |
797 | if (s->wbio != NULL) { | |
798 | s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING; | |
799 | i = BIO_write(s->wbio, | |
800 | (char *)&(s->s3->wbuf.buf[s->s3->wbuf.offset]), | |
801 | (unsigned int)s->s3->wbuf.left); | |
802 | } else { | |
803 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET); | |
804 | i = -1; | |
805 | } | |
806 | if (i == s->s3->wbuf.left) { | |
807 | s->s3->wbuf.left = 0; | |
808 | s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; | |
809 | return (s->s3->wpend_ret); | |
810 | } else if (i <= 0) { | |
811 | if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) { | |
812 | /* | |
813 | * For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole point in | |
814 | * using a datagram service | |
815 | */ | |
816 | s->s3->wbuf.left = 0; | |
817 | } | |
818 | return (i); | |
819 | } | |
820 | s->s3->wbuf.offset += i; | |
821 | s->s3->wbuf.left -= i; | |
822 | } | |
823 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 824 | |
b558c8d5 TH |
825 | /*- |
826 | * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records. | |
b35e9050 BM |
827 | * 'type' is one of the following: |
828 | * | |
829 | * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us) | |
830 | * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us) | |
831 | * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned) | |
832 | * | |
833 | * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first | |
834 | * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return). | |
835 | * | |
836 | * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as | |
837 | * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really | |
838 | * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests. | |
839 | * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store | |
840 | * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol | |
841 | * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving): | |
842 | * Change cipher spec protocol | |
843 | * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored | |
844 | * Alert protocol | |
845 | * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription) | |
846 | * Handshake protocol | |
847 | * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have | |
848 | * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages | |
849 | * here, anything else is handled by higher layers | |
850 | * Application data protocol | |
851 | * none of our business | |
852 | */ | |
5a4fbc69 | 853 | int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek) |
40720ce3 MC |
854 | { |
855 | int al, i, j, ret; | |
856 | unsigned int n; | |
857 | SSL3_RECORD *rr; | |
858 | void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL; | |
859 | ||
860 | if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */ | |
861 | if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) | |
862 | return (-1); | |
863 | ||
864 | if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) | |
865 | && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) || (peek | |
866 | && (type != | |
867 | SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) { | |
868 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
869 | return -1; | |
870 | } | |
871 | ||
872 | if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0)) | |
873 | /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */ | |
874 | { | |
875 | unsigned char *src = s->s3->handshake_fragment; | |
876 | unsigned char *dst = buf; | |
877 | unsigned int k; | |
878 | ||
879 | /* peek == 0 */ | |
880 | n = 0; | |
881 | while ((len > 0) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0)) { | |
882 | *dst++ = *src++; | |
883 | len--; | |
884 | s->s3->handshake_fragment_len--; | |
885 | n++; | |
886 | } | |
887 | /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */ | |
888 | for (k = 0; k < s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; k++) | |
889 | s->s3->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++; | |
890 | return n; | |
891 | } | |
892 | ||
893 | /* | |
894 | * Now s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. | |
895 | */ | |
896 | ||
897 | if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s)) { | |
898 | /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */ | |
899 | i = s->handshake_func(s); | |
900 | if (i < 0) | |
901 | return (i); | |
902 | if (i == 0) { | |
903 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); | |
904 | return (-1); | |
905 | } | |
906 | } | |
907 | start: | |
908 | s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; | |
909 | ||
02f0c26c MC |
910 | /*- |
911 | * s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record | |
912 | * s->s3->rrec.data, - data | |
913 | * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read | |
914 | * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes. | |
915 | */ | |
40720ce3 MC |
916 | rr = &(s->s3->rrec); |
917 | ||
918 | /* get new packet if necessary */ | |
919 | if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)) { | |
920 | ret = ssl3_get_record(s); | |
921 | if (ret <= 0) | |
922 | return (ret); | |
923 | } | |
924 | ||
925 | /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */ | |
926 | ||
927 | if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec, | |
928 | * reset by ssl3_get_finished */ | |
929 | && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) { | |
930 | al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; | |
931 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED); | |
932 | goto f_err; | |
933 | } | |
934 | ||
935 | /* | |
936 | * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in | |
937 | * 'peek' mode) | |
938 | */ | |
939 | if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) { | |
940 | rr->length = 0; | |
941 | s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; | |
942 | return (0); | |
943 | } | |
944 | ||
945 | if (type == rr->type) { /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or | |
946 | * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */ | |
947 | /* | |
948 | * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are | |
949 | * doing a handshake for the first time | |
950 | */ | |
951 | if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && | |
952 | (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) { | |
953 | al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; | |
954 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE); | |
955 | goto f_err; | |
956 | } | |
957 | ||
958 | if (len <= 0) | |
959 | return (len); | |
960 | ||
961 | if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length) | |
962 | n = rr->length; | |
963 | else | |
964 | n = (unsigned int)len; | |
965 | ||
966 | memcpy(buf, &(rr->data[rr->off]), n); | |
967 | if (!peek) { | |
968 | rr->length -= n; | |
969 | rr->off += n; | |
970 | if (rr->length == 0) { | |
971 | s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; | |
972 | rr->off = 0; | |
973 | } | |
974 | } | |
975 | return (n); | |
976 | } | |
977 | ||
978 | /* | |
979 | * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message, | |
980 | * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). | |
981 | */ | |
982 | ||
983 | /* | |
984 | * In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage, fill | |
985 | * that so that we can process the data at a fixed place. | |
986 | */ | |
987 | { | |
988 | unsigned int dest_maxlen = 0; | |
989 | unsigned char *dest = NULL; | |
990 | unsigned int *dest_len = NULL; | |
991 | ||
992 | if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { | |
993 | dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->handshake_fragment; | |
994 | dest = s->s3->handshake_fragment; | |
995 | dest_len = &s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; | |
996 | } else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) { | |
997 | dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->alert_fragment; | |
998 | dest = s->s3->alert_fragment; | |
999 | dest_len = &s->s3->alert_fragment_len; | |
1000 | } | |
1001 | ||
1002 | if (dest_maxlen > 0) { | |
1003 | n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */ | |
1004 | if (rr->length < n) | |
1005 | n = rr->length; /* available bytes */ | |
1006 | ||
1007 | /* now move 'n' bytes: */ | |
1008 | while (n-- > 0) { | |
1009 | dest[(*dest_len)++] = rr->data[rr->off++]; | |
1010 | rr->length--; | |
1011 | } | |
1012 | ||
1013 | if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen) | |
1014 | goto start; /* fragment was too small */ | |
1015 | } | |
1016 | } | |
1017 | ||
02f0c26c MC |
1018 | /*- |
1019 | * s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE; | |
1020 | * s->s3->alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT. | |
1021 | * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) | |
1022 | */ | |
40720ce3 MC |
1023 | |
1024 | /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */ | |
1025 | if ((!s->server) && | |
1026 | (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && | |
1027 | (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) && | |
1028 | (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) { | |
1029 | s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0; | |
1030 | ||
1031 | if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) || | |
1032 | (s->s3->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) || | |
1033 | (s->s3->handshake_fragment[3] != 0)) { | |
1034 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
1035 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST); | |
1036 | goto f_err; | |
1037 | } | |
1038 | ||
1039 | if (s->msg_callback) | |
1040 | s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, | |
1041 | s->s3->handshake_fragment, 4, s, | |
1042 | s->msg_callback_arg); | |
1043 | ||
1044 | if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) && | |
1045 | !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) && | |
1046 | !s->s3->renegotiate) { | |
1047 | ssl3_renegotiate(s); | |
1048 | if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s)) { | |
1049 | i = s->handshake_func(s); | |
1050 | if (i < 0) | |
1051 | return (i); | |
1052 | if (i == 0) { | |
1053 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, | |
1054 | SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); | |
1055 | return (-1); | |
1056 | } | |
1057 | ||
1058 | if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) { | |
1059 | if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) { /* no read-ahead left? */ | |
1060 | BIO *bio; | |
1061 | /* | |
1062 | * In the case where we try to read application data, | |
1063 | * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with | |
1064 | * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may | |
1065 | * cause nasty problems in the blocking world | |
1066 | */ | |
1067 | s->rwstate = SSL_READING; | |
1068 | bio = SSL_get_rbio(s); | |
1069 | BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); | |
1070 | BIO_set_retry_read(bio); | |
1071 | return (-1); | |
1072 | } | |
1073 | } | |
1074 | } | |
1075 | } | |
1076 | /* | |
1077 | * we either finished a handshake or ignored the request, now try | |
1078 | * again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for | |
1079 | */ | |
1080 | goto start; | |
1081 | } | |
1082 | /* | |
1083 | * If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't | |
1084 | * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on. WARNING: | |
1085 | * experimental code, needs reviewing (steve) | |
1086 | */ | |
1087 | if (s->server && | |
1088 | SSL_is_init_finished(s) && | |
1089 | !s->s3->send_connection_binding && | |
1090 | (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && | |
1091 | (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && | |
1092 | (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) && | |
1093 | (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL) && | |
1094 | !(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) { | |
1095 | /* | |
1096 | * s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0; | |
1097 | */ | |
1098 | rr->length = 0; | |
1099 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION); | |
1100 | goto start; | |
1101 | } | |
1102 | if (s->s3->alert_fragment_len >= 2) { | |
1103 | int alert_level = s->s3->alert_fragment[0]; | |
1104 | int alert_descr = s->s3->alert_fragment[1]; | |
1105 | ||
1106 | s->s3->alert_fragment_len = 0; | |
1107 | ||
1108 | if (s->msg_callback) | |
1109 | s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, | |
1110 | s->s3->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg); | |
1111 | ||
1112 | if (s->info_callback != NULL) | |
1113 | cb = s->info_callback; | |
1114 | else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) | |
1115 | cb = s->ctx->info_callback; | |
1116 | ||
1117 | if (cb != NULL) { | |
1118 | j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr; | |
1119 | cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j); | |
1120 | } | |
1121 | ||
1122 | if (alert_level == 1) { /* warning */ | |
1123 | s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr; | |
1124 | if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) { | |
1125 | s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; | |
1126 | return (0); | |
1127 | } | |
1128 | /* | |
1129 | * This is a warning but we receive it if we requested | |
1130 | * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal | |
1131 | * alert because if application tried to renegotiatie it | |
1132 | * presumably had a good reason and expects it to succeed. In | |
1133 | * future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if | |
1134 | * the peer refused it where we carry on. | |
1135 | */ | |
1136 | else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION) { | |
1137 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
1138 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION); | |
1139 | goto f_err; | |
1140 | } | |
1141 | } else if (alert_level == 2) { /* fatal */ | |
1142 | char tmp[16]; | |
1143 | ||
1144 | s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; | |
1145 | s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr; | |
1146 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr); | |
1147 | BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%d", alert_descr); | |
1148 | ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp); | |
1149 | s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; | |
1150 | SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx, s->session); | |
1151 | return (0); | |
1152 | } else { | |
1153 | al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
1154 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE); | |
1155 | goto f_err; | |
1156 | } | |
1157 | ||
1158 | goto start; | |
1159 | } | |
1160 | ||
1161 | if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) { /* but we have not received a | |
1162 | * shutdown */ | |
1163 | s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; | |
1164 | rr->length = 0; | |
1165 | return (0); | |
1166 | } | |
1167 | ||
1168 | if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { | |
1169 | /* | |
1170 | * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know exactly | |
1171 | * what the record payload has to look like | |
1172 | */ | |
1173 | if ((rr->length != 1) || (rr->off != 0) || | |
1174 | (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS)) { | |
1175 | al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
1176 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); | |
1177 | goto f_err; | |
1178 | } | |
1179 | ||
1180 | /* Check we have a cipher to change to */ | |
1181 | if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) { | |
1182 | al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; | |
1183 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); | |
1184 | goto f_err; | |
1185 | } | |
1186 | ||
1187 | if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK)) { | |
1188 | al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; | |
1189 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); | |
1190 | goto f_err; | |
1191 | } | |
1192 | ||
1193 | s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; | |
1194 | ||
1195 | rr->length = 0; | |
1196 | ||
1197 | if (s->msg_callback) | |
1198 | s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, | |
1199 | rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg); | |
1200 | ||
1201 | s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 1; | |
1202 | if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) | |
1203 | goto err; | |
1204 | else | |
1205 | goto start; | |
1206 | } | |
1207 | ||
1208 | /* | |
1209 | * Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) | |
1210 | */ | |
1211 | if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && !s->in_handshake) { | |
1212 | if (((s->state & SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) && | |
1213 | !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS)) { | |
1214 | #if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences | |
1215 | * are not as expected (and because this is | |
1216 | * not really needed for clients except for | |
1217 | * detecting protocol violations): */ | |
1218 | s->state = SSL_ST_BEFORE | (s->server) | |
1219 | ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT; | |
a2a01589 | 1220 | #else |
40720ce3 | 1221 | s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT; |
a2a01589 | 1222 | #endif |
40720ce3 MC |
1223 | s->new_session = 1; |
1224 | } | |
1225 | i = s->handshake_func(s); | |
1226 | if (i < 0) | |
1227 | return (i); | |
1228 | if (i == 0) { | |
1229 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); | |
1230 | return (-1); | |
1231 | } | |
1232 | ||
1233 | if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) { | |
1234 | if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) { /* no read-ahead left? */ | |
1235 | BIO *bio; | |
1236 | /* | |
1237 | * In the case where we try to read application data, but we | |
1238 | * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry | |
1239 | * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty | |
1240 | * problems in the blocking world | |
1241 | */ | |
1242 | s->rwstate = SSL_READING; | |
1243 | bio = SSL_get_rbio(s); | |
1244 | BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); | |
1245 | BIO_set_retry_read(bio); | |
1246 | return (-1); | |
1247 | } | |
1248 | } | |
1249 | goto start; | |
1250 | } | |
1251 | ||
1252 | switch (rr->type) { | |
1253 | default: | |
bc36ee62 | 1254 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS |
40720ce3 MC |
1255 | /* TLS just ignores unknown message types */ |
1256 | if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION) { | |
1257 | rr->length = 0; | |
1258 | goto start; | |
1259 | } | |
58964a49 | 1260 | #endif |
40720ce3 MC |
1261 | al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; |
1262 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); | |
1263 | goto f_err; | |
1264 | case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC: | |
1265 | case SSL3_RT_ALERT: | |
1266 | case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE: | |
1267 | /* | |
1268 | * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of | |
1269 | * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that should not | |
1270 | * happen when type != rr->type | |
1271 | */ | |
1272 | al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; | |
1273 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1274 | goto f_err; | |
1275 | case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA: | |
1276 | /* | |
1277 | * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have | |
1278 | * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read() | |
1279 | * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read | |
1280 | * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet | |
1281 | * started), we will indulge it. | |
1282 | */ | |
1283 | if (s->s3->in_read_app_data && | |
1284 | (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) && | |
1285 | (((s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) && | |
1286 | (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) && | |
1287 | (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A) | |
1288 | ) || ((s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) && | |
1289 | (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) && | |
1290 | (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) | |
1291 | ) | |
1292 | )) { | |
1293 | s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2; | |
1294 | return (-1); | |
1295 | } else { | |
1296 | al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; | |
1297 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); | |
1298 | goto f_err; | |
1299 | } | |
1300 | } | |
1301 | /* not reached */ | |
1302 | ||
1303 | f_err: | |
1304 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
1305 | err: | |
1306 | return (-1); | |
1307 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 1308 | |
36d16f8e | 1309 | int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s) |
40720ce3 MC |
1310 | { |
1311 | int i; | |
1312 | const char *sender; | |
1313 | int slen; | |
1314 | ||
1315 | if (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) | |
1316 | i = SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ; | |
1317 | else | |
1318 | i = SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ; | |
1319 | ||
1320 | if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL) { | |
1321 | if (s->session == NULL || s->session->master_key_length == 0) { | |
1322 | /* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */ | |
1323 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, | |
1324 | SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); | |
1325 | return (0); | |
1326 | } | |
1327 | ||
1328 | s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; | |
1329 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) | |
1330 | return (0); | |
1331 | } | |
1332 | ||
1333 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, i)) | |
1334 | return (0); | |
1335 | ||
1336 | /* | |
1337 | * we have to record the message digest at this point so we can get it | |
1338 | * before we read the finished message | |
1339 | */ | |
1340 | if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) { | |
1341 | sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label; | |
1342 | slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len; | |
1343 | } else { | |
1344 | sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label; | |
1345 | slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len; | |
1346 | } | |
1347 | ||
1348 | s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, | |
1349 | & | |
1350 | (s->s3->finish_dgst1), | |
1351 | & | |
1352 | (s->s3->finish_dgst2), | |
1353 | sender, | |
1354 | slen, | |
1355 | s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md); | |
1356 | ||
1357 | return (1); | |
1358 | } | |
58964a49 | 1359 | |
0d399f97 | 1360 | int ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc) |
40720ce3 MC |
1361 | { |
1362 | /* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */ | |
1363 | desc = s->method->ssl3_enc->alert_value(desc); | |
1364 | if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && desc == SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION) | |
1365 | desc = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; /* SSL 3.0 does not have | |
1366 | * protocol_version alerts */ | |
1367 | if (desc < 0) | |
1368 | return -1; | |
1369 | /* If a fatal one, remove from cache */ | |
1370 | if ((level == 2) && (s->session != NULL)) | |
1371 | SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx, s->session); | |
1372 | ||
1373 | s->s3->alert_dispatch = 1; | |
1374 | s->s3->send_alert[0] = level; | |
1375 | s->s3->send_alert[1] = desc; | |
1376 | if (s->s3->wbuf.left == 0) /* data still being written out? */ | |
1377 | return s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s); | |
1378 | /* | |
1379 | * else data is still being written out, we will get written some time in | |
1380 | * the future | |
1381 | */ | |
1382 | return -1; | |
1383 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 1384 | |
6b691a5c | 1385 | int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s) |
40720ce3 MC |
1386 | { |
1387 | int i, j; | |
1388 | void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL; | |
1389 | ||
1390 | s->s3->alert_dispatch = 0; | |
1391 | i = do_ssl3_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &s->s3->send_alert[0], 2, 0); | |
1392 | if (i <= 0) { | |
1393 | s->s3->alert_dispatch = 1; | |
1394 | } else { | |
1395 | /* | |
1396 | * Alert sent to BIO. If it is important, flush it now. If the | |
1397 | * message does not get sent due to non-blocking IO, we will not | |
1398 | * worry too much. | |
1399 | */ | |
1400 | if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL) | |
1401 | (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio); | |
1402 | ||
1403 | if (s->msg_callback) | |
1404 | s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert, | |
1405 | 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg); | |
1406 | ||
1407 | if (s->info_callback != NULL) | |
1408 | cb = s->info_callback; | |
1409 | else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) | |
1410 | cb = s->ctx->info_callback; | |
1411 | ||
1412 | if (cb != NULL) { | |
1413 | j = (s->s3->send_alert[0] << 8) | s->s3->send_alert[1]; | |
1414 | cb(s, SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT, j); | |
1415 | } | |
1416 | } | |
1417 | return (i); | |
1418 | } |