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d02b48c6 | 1 | /* ssl/s3_pkt.c */ |
58964a49 | 2 | /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) |
d02b48c6 RE |
3 | * All rights reserved. |
4 | * | |
5 | * This package is an SSL implementation written | |
6 | * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). | |
7 | * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. | |
0f113f3e | 8 | * |
d02b48c6 RE |
9 | * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as |
10 | * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions | |
11 | * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, | |
12 | * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation | |
13 | * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms | |
14 | * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). | |
0f113f3e | 15 | * |
d02b48c6 RE |
16 | * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in |
17 | * the code are not to be removed. | |
18 | * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution | |
19 | * as the author of the parts of the library used. | |
20 | * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or | |
21 | * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. | |
0f113f3e | 22 | * |
d02b48c6 RE |
23 | * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
24 | * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | |
25 | * are met: | |
26 | * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright | |
27 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. | |
28 | * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | |
29 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the | |
30 | * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. | |
31 | * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software | |
32 | * must display the following acknowledgement: | |
33 | * "This product includes cryptographic software written by | |
34 | * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" | |
35 | * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library | |
36 | * being used are not cryptographic related :-). | |
0f113f3e | 37 | * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from |
d02b48c6 RE |
38 | * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: |
39 | * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" | |
0f113f3e | 40 | * |
d02b48c6 RE |
41 | * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND |
42 | * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE | |
43 | * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE | |
44 | * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE | |
45 | * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL | |
46 | * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS | |
47 | * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) | |
48 | * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT | |
49 | * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY | |
50 | * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF | |
51 | * SUCH DAMAGE. | |
0f113f3e | 52 | * |
d02b48c6 RE |
53 | * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or |
54 | * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be | |
55 | * copied and put under another distribution licence | |
56 | * [including the GNU Public Licence.] | |
57 | */ | |
c51ae173 | 58 | /* ==================================================================== |
82b0bf0b | 59 | * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. |
c51ae173 BM |
60 | * |
61 | * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without | |
62 | * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | |
63 | * are met: | |
64 | * | |
65 | * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright | |
0f113f3e | 66 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
c51ae173 BM |
67 | * |
68 | * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | |
69 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in | |
70 | * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the | |
71 | * distribution. | |
72 | * | |
73 | * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this | |
74 | * software must display the following acknowledgment: | |
75 | * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project | |
76 | * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" | |
77 | * | |
78 | * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to | |
79 | * endorse or promote products derived from this software without | |
80 | * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact | |
81 | * openssl-core@openssl.org. | |
82 | * | |
83 | * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" | |
84 | * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written | |
85 | * permission of the OpenSSL Project. | |
86 | * | |
87 | * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following | |
88 | * acknowledgment: | |
89 | * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project | |
90 | * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" | |
91 | * | |
92 | * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY | |
93 | * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE | |
94 | * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR | |
95 | * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR | |
96 | * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, | |
97 | * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT | |
98 | * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; | |
99 | * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) | |
100 | * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, | |
101 | * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) | |
102 | * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED | |
103 | * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. | |
104 | * ==================================================================== | |
105 | * | |
106 | * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young | |
107 | * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim | |
108 | * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). | |
109 | * | |
110 | */ | |
d02b48c6 RE |
111 | |
112 | #include <stdio.h> | |
339da43d | 113 | #include <limits.h> |
d02b48c6 RE |
114 | #include <errno.h> |
115 | #define USE_SOCKETS | |
7b63c0fa | 116 | #include "ssl_locl.h" |
ec577822 BM |
117 | #include <openssl/evp.h> |
118 | #include <openssl/buffer.h> | |
637f374a | 119 | #include <openssl/rand.h> |
d02b48c6 | 120 | |
78038e09 AP |
121 | #ifndef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK |
122 | # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0 | |
123 | #endif | |
124 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
125 | #if defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) || \ |
126 | !( defined(AES_ASM) && ( \ | |
127 | defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \ | |
128 | defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) || \ | |
129 | defined(__INTEL__) ) \ | |
130 | ) | |
a9c6edcd AP |
131 | # undef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK |
132 | # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0 | |
133 | #endif | |
134 | ||
61f5b6f3 | 135 | static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, |
0f113f3e | 136 | unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment); |
d02b48c6 | 137 | static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s); |
c51ae173 | 138 | |
36d16f8e | 139 | int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend) |
0f113f3e MC |
140 | { |
141 | /* | |
142 | * If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase | |
143 | * packet by another n bytes. The packet will be in the sub-array of | |
144 | * s->s3->rbuf.buf specified by s->packet and s->packet_length. (If | |
52e1d7b1 | 145 | * s->rlayer.read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf [plus |
0f113f3e MC |
146 | * s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].) |
147 | */ | |
148 | int i, len, left; | |
149 | long align = 0; | |
150 | unsigned char *pkt; | |
151 | SSL3_BUFFER *rb; | |
152 | ||
153 | if (n <= 0) | |
154 | return n; | |
155 | ||
28d59af8 | 156 | rb = RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer); |
0f113f3e MC |
157 | if (rb->buf == NULL) |
158 | if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s)) | |
159 | return -1; | |
160 | ||
161 | left = rb->left; | |
a4d64c7f | 162 | #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0 |
0f113f3e MC |
163 | align = (long)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; |
164 | align = (-align) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1); | |
a4d64c7f | 165 | #endif |
d02b48c6 | 166 | |
0f113f3e MC |
167 | if (!extend) { |
168 | /* start with empty packet ... */ | |
169 | if (left == 0) | |
170 | rb->offset = align; | |
171 | else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { | |
172 | /* | |
173 | * check if next packet length is large enough to justify payload | |
174 | * alignment... | |
175 | */ | |
176 | pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset; | |
177 | if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA | |
178 | && (pkt[3] << 8 | pkt[4]) >= 128) { | |
179 | /* | |
180 | * Note that even if packet is corrupted and its length field | |
181 | * is insane, we can only be led to wrong decision about | |
182 | * whether memmove will occur or not. Header values has no | |
183 | * effect on memmove arguments and therefore no buffer | |
184 | * overrun can be triggered. | |
185 | */ | |
186 | memmove(rb->buf + align, pkt, left); | |
187 | rb->offset = align; | |
188 | } | |
189 | } | |
190 | s->packet = rb->buf + rb->offset; | |
191 | s->packet_length = 0; | |
192 | /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */ | |
193 | } | |
194 | ||
195 | /* | |
196 | * For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets because the read | |
197 | * operation returns the whole packet at once (as long as it fits into | |
198 | * the buffer). | |
199 | */ | |
200 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
201 | if (left == 0 && extend) | |
202 | return 0; | |
203 | if (left > 0 && n > left) | |
204 | n = left; | |
205 | } | |
206 | ||
207 | /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */ | |
208 | if (left >= n) { | |
209 | s->packet_length += n; | |
210 | rb->left = left - n; | |
211 | rb->offset += n; | |
212 | return (n); | |
213 | } | |
214 | ||
215 | /* else we need to read more data */ | |
216 | ||
217 | len = s->packet_length; | |
218 | pkt = rb->buf + align; | |
219 | /* | |
220 | * Move any available bytes to front of buffer: 'len' bytes already | |
221 | * pointed to by 'packet', 'left' extra ones at the end | |
222 | */ | |
223 | if (s->packet != pkt) { /* len > 0 */ | |
224 | memmove(pkt, s->packet, len + left); | |
225 | s->packet = pkt; | |
226 | rb->offset = len + align; | |
227 | } | |
228 | ||
229 | if (n > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset)) { /* does not happen */ | |
230 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
231 | return -1; | |
232 | } | |
233 | ||
8dd4ad0f | 234 | /* We always act like read_ahead is set for DTLS */ |
52e1d7b1 | 235 | if (!RECORD_LAYER_get_read_ahead(&s->rlayer) && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) |
0f113f3e MC |
236 | /* ignore max parameter */ |
237 | max = n; | |
238 | else { | |
239 | if (max < n) | |
240 | max = n; | |
241 | if (max > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset)) | |
242 | max = rb->len - rb->offset; | |
243 | } | |
244 | ||
245 | while (left < n) { | |
246 | /* | |
247 | * Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf and | |
248 | * need to read in more until we have len+n (up to len+max if | |
249 | * possible) | |
250 | */ | |
251 | ||
252 | clear_sys_error(); | |
253 | if (s->rbio != NULL) { | |
254 | s->rwstate = SSL_READING; | |
255 | i = BIO_read(s->rbio, pkt + len + left, max - left); | |
256 | } else { | |
257 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET); | |
258 | i = -1; | |
259 | } | |
260 | ||
261 | if (i <= 0) { | |
262 | rb->left = left; | |
263 | if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) | |
264 | if (len + left == 0) | |
265 | ssl3_release_read_buffer(s); | |
266 | return (i); | |
267 | } | |
268 | left += i; | |
269 | /* | |
270 | * reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because the | |
271 | * underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed to | |
272 | * byte oriented as in the TLS case. | |
273 | */ | |
274 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
275 | if (n > left) | |
276 | n = left; /* makes the while condition false */ | |
277 | } | |
278 | } | |
279 | ||
280 | /* done reading, now the book-keeping */ | |
281 | rb->offset += n; | |
282 | rb->left = left - n; | |
283 | s->packet_length += n; | |
284 | s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; | |
285 | return (n); | |
286 | } | |
287 | ||
288 | /* | |
289 | * MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS defines the number of consecutive, empty records that | |
290 | * will be processed per call to ssl3_get_record. Without this limit an | |
291 | * attacker could send empty records at a faster rate than we can process and | |
292 | * cause ssl3_get_record to loop forever. | |
293 | */ | |
64a786a2 AL |
294 | #define MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS 32 |
295 | ||
1d97c843 TH |
296 | /*- |
297 | * Call this to get a new input record. | |
d02b48c6 RE |
298 | * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error |
299 | * or non-blocking IO. | |
300 | * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in | |
c51ae173 | 301 | * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record |
0f113f3e | 302 | * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data |
d02b48c6 RE |
303 | * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes |
304 | */ | |
b35e9050 | 305 | /* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */ |
6b691a5c | 306 | static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s) |
0f113f3e MC |
307 | { |
308 | int ssl_major, ssl_minor, al; | |
309 | int enc_err, n, i, ret = -1; | |
310 | SSL3_RECORD *rr; | |
311 | SSL_SESSION *sess; | |
312 | unsigned char *p; | |
313 | unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; | |
314 | short version; | |
315 | unsigned mac_size; | |
316 | size_t extra; | |
317 | unsigned empty_record_count = 0; | |
318 | ||
319 | rr = &(s->s3->rrec); | |
320 | sess = s->session; | |
321 | ||
322 | if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER) | |
323 | extra = SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA; | |
324 | else | |
325 | extra = 0; | |
326 | if (extra && !s->s3->init_extra) { | |
327 | /* | |
328 | * An application error: SLS_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER set after | |
329 | * ssl3_setup_buffers() was done | |
330 | */ | |
331 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
332 | return -1; | |
333 | } | |
334 | ||
335 | again: | |
336 | /* check if we have the header */ | |
337 | if ((s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) || | |
338 | (s->packet_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) { | |
28d59af8 MC |
339 | n = ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, |
340 | SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer)), 0); | |
0f113f3e MC |
341 | if (n <= 0) |
342 | return (n); /* error or non-blocking */ | |
343 | s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_BODY; | |
344 | ||
345 | p = s->packet; | |
346 | if (s->msg_callback) | |
347 | s->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, p, 5, s, | |
348 | s->msg_callback_arg); | |
349 | ||
350 | /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */ | |
351 | rr->type = *(p++); | |
352 | ssl_major = *(p++); | |
353 | ssl_minor = *(p++); | |
354 | version = (ssl_major << 8) | ssl_minor; | |
355 | n2s(p, rr->length); | |
00b52578 | 356 | |
0f113f3e MC |
357 | /* Lets check version */ |
358 | if (!s->first_packet) { | |
359 | if (version != s->version) { | |
360 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); | |
361 | if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00) | |
362 | && !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash) | |
363 | /* | |
364 | * Send back error using their minor version number :-) | |
365 | */ | |
366 | s->version = (unsigned short)version; | |
367 | al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; | |
368 | goto f_err; | |
369 | } | |
370 | } | |
371 | ||
372 | if ((version >> 8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) { | |
373 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); | |
374 | goto err; | |
375 | } | |
376 | ||
28d59af8 MC |
377 | if (rr->length > |
378 | SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer)) | |
379 | - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { | |
0f113f3e MC |
380 | al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; |
381 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); | |
382 | goto f_err; | |
383 | } | |
384 | ||
385 | /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */ | |
386 | } | |
387 | ||
388 | /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */ | |
389 | ||
390 | if (rr->length > s->packet_length - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { | |
391 | /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */ | |
392 | i = rr->length; | |
393 | n = ssl3_read_n(s, i, i, 1); | |
394 | if (n <= 0) | |
395 | return (n); /* error or non-blocking io */ | |
396 | /* | |
397 | * now n == rr->length, and s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH | |
398 | * + rr->length | |
399 | */ | |
400 | } | |
401 | ||
402 | s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */ | |
403 | ||
404 | /* | |
405 | * At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length, | |
406 | * and we have that many bytes in s->packet | |
407 | */ | |
408 | rr->input = &(s->packet[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]); | |
409 | ||
410 | /* | |
411 | * ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr' rr->input points | |
412 | * at rr->length bytes, which need to be copied into rr->data by either | |
413 | * the decryption or by the decompression When the data is 'copied' into | |
414 | * the rr->data buffer, rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer | |
415 | */ | |
416 | ||
417 | /* | |
418 | * We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ] rr->length | |
419 | * bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. | |
420 | */ | |
421 | ||
422 | /* check is not needed I believe */ | |
423 | if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH + extra) { | |
424 | al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; | |
425 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); | |
426 | goto f_err; | |
427 | } | |
428 | ||
429 | /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */ | |
430 | rr->data = rr->input; | |
431 | rr->orig_len = rr->length; | |
432 | /* | |
433 | * If in encrypt-then-mac mode calculate mac from encrypted record. All | |
434 | * the details below are public so no timing details can leak. | |
435 | */ | |
436 | if (SSL_USE_ETM(s) && s->read_hash) { | |
437 | unsigned char *mac; | |
438 | mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); | |
439 | OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); | |
440 | if (rr->length < mac_size) { | |
441 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
442 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); | |
443 | goto f_err; | |
444 | } | |
445 | rr->length -= mac_size; | |
446 | mac = rr->data + rr->length; | |
447 | i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, md, 0 /* not send */ ); | |
448 | if (i < 0 || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0) { | |
449 | al = SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC; | |
450 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, | |
451 | SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC); | |
452 | goto f_err; | |
453 | } | |
454 | } | |
455 | ||
456 | enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 0); | |
50e735f9 MC |
457 | /*- |
458 | * enc_err is: | |
459 | * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid. | |
460 | * 1: if the padding is valid | |
461 | * -1: if the padding is invalid | |
462 | */ | |
0f113f3e MC |
463 | if (enc_err == 0) { |
464 | al = SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED; | |
465 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG); | |
466 | goto f_err; | |
467 | } | |
58964a49 | 468 | #ifdef TLS_DEBUG |
0f113f3e MC |
469 | printf("dec %d\n", rr->length); |
470 | { | |
471 | unsigned int z; | |
472 | for (z = 0; z < rr->length; z++) | |
473 | printf("%02X%c", rr->data[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n'); | |
474 | } | |
475 | printf("\n"); | |
58964a49 | 476 | #endif |
ee60d9fb | 477 | |
0f113f3e MC |
478 | /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */ |
479 | if ((sess != NULL) && | |
480 | (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) && | |
481 | (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL) && !SSL_USE_ETM(s)) { | |
482 | /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */ | |
483 | unsigned char *mac = NULL; | |
484 | unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; | |
485 | mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); | |
486 | OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); | |
487 | ||
488 | /* | |
489 | * orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was | |
490 | * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use, | |
491 | * therefore we can safely process the record in a different amount | |
492 | * of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC. | |
493 | */ | |
494 | if (rr->orig_len < mac_size || | |
495 | /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */ | |
496 | (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE && | |
497 | rr->orig_len < mac_size + 1)) { | |
498 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
499 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); | |
500 | goto f_err; | |
501 | } | |
502 | ||
503 | if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) { | |
504 | /* | |
505 | * We update the length so that the TLS header bytes can be | |
506 | * constructed correctly but we need to extract the MAC in | |
507 | * constant time from within the record, without leaking the | |
508 | * contents of the padding bytes. | |
509 | */ | |
510 | mac = mac_tmp; | |
511 | ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size); | |
512 | rr->length -= mac_size; | |
513 | } else { | |
514 | /* | |
515 | * In this case there's no padding, so |rec->orig_len| equals | |
516 | * |rec->length| and we checked that there's enough bytes for | |
517 | * |mac_size| above. | |
518 | */ | |
519 | rr->length -= mac_size; | |
520 | mac = &rr->data[rr->length]; | |
521 | } | |
522 | ||
523 | i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, md, 0 /* not send */ ); | |
524 | if (i < 0 || mac == NULL | |
525 | || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0) | |
526 | enc_err = -1; | |
527 | if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + extra + mac_size) | |
528 | enc_err = -1; | |
529 | } | |
530 | ||
531 | if (enc_err < 0) { | |
532 | /* | |
533 | * A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0, | |
534 | * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption | |
535 | * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway, we should | |
536 | * not reveal which kind of error occurred -- this might become | |
537 | * visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile) | |
538 | */ | |
539 | al = SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC; | |
540 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, | |
541 | SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC); | |
542 | goto f_err; | |
543 | } | |
544 | ||
545 | /* r->length is now just compressed */ | |
546 | if (s->expand != NULL) { | |
547 | if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + extra) { | |
548 | al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; | |
549 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); | |
550 | goto f_err; | |
551 | } | |
552 | if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s)) { | |
553 | al = SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE; | |
554 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION); | |
555 | goto f_err; | |
556 | } | |
557 | } | |
558 | ||
559 | if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH + extra) { | |
560 | al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; | |
561 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); | |
562 | goto f_err; | |
563 | } | |
564 | ||
565 | rr->off = 0; | |
50e735f9 MC |
566 | /*- |
567 | * So at this point the following is true | |
568 | * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record | |
569 | * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record | |
570 | * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte | |
571 | * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment | |
572 | * after use :-). | |
573 | */ | |
0f113f3e MC |
574 | |
575 | /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */ | |
576 | s->packet_length = 0; | |
577 | ||
578 | /* just read a 0 length packet */ | |
579 | if (rr->length == 0) { | |
580 | empty_record_count++; | |
581 | if (empty_record_count > MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS) { | |
582 | al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; | |
583 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL); | |
584 | goto f_err; | |
585 | } | |
586 | goto again; | |
587 | } | |
566dda07 | 588 | |
0f113f3e | 589 | return (1); |
ee60d9fb | 590 | |
0f113f3e MC |
591 | f_err: |
592 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
593 | err: | |
594 | return (ret); | |
595 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 596 | |
36d16f8e | 597 | int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl) |
0f113f3e | 598 | { |
09b6c2ef | 599 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP |
0f113f3e MC |
600 | int i; |
601 | SSL3_RECORD *rr; | |
602 | ||
603 | rr = &(ssl->s3->rrec); | |
604 | i = COMP_expand_block(ssl->expand, rr->comp, | |
605 | SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, rr->data, | |
606 | (int)rr->length); | |
607 | if (i < 0) | |
608 | return (0); | |
609 | else | |
610 | rr->length = i; | |
611 | rr->data = rr->comp; | |
09b6c2ef | 612 | #endif |
0f113f3e MC |
613 | return (1); |
614 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 615 | |
36d16f8e | 616 | int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl) |
0f113f3e | 617 | { |
09b6c2ef | 618 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP |
0f113f3e MC |
619 | int i; |
620 | SSL3_RECORD *wr; | |
621 | ||
622 | wr = &(ssl->s3->wrec); | |
623 | i = COMP_compress_block(ssl->compress, wr->data, | |
624 | SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH, | |
625 | wr->input, (int)wr->length); | |
626 | if (i < 0) | |
627 | return (0); | |
628 | else | |
629 | wr->length = i; | |
630 | ||
631 | wr->input = wr->data; | |
09b6c2ef | 632 | #endif |
0f113f3e MC |
633 | return (1); |
634 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 635 | |
0f113f3e MC |
636 | /* |
637 | * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if | |
638 | * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO. | |
d02b48c6 | 639 | */ |
52732b38 | 640 | int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len) |
0f113f3e MC |
641 | { |
642 | const unsigned char *buf = buf_; | |
643 | int tot; | |
644 | unsigned int n, nw; | |
f1f7598c | 645 | #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK |
0f113f3e | 646 | unsigned int max_send_fragment; |
f1f7598c | 647 | #endif |
db9a32e7 | 648 | SSL3_BUFFER *wb = RECORD_LAYER_get_wbuf(&s->rlayer); |
0f113f3e MC |
649 | int i; |
650 | unsigned int u_len = (unsigned int)len; | |
651 | ||
652 | if (len < 0) { | |
653 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_NEGATIVE_LENGTH); | |
654 | return -1; | |
655 | } | |
656 | ||
657 | s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; | |
658 | OPENSSL_assert(s->s3->wnum <= INT_MAX); | |
659 | tot = s->s3->wnum; | |
660 | s->s3->wnum = 0; | |
661 | ||
662 | if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake) { | |
663 | i = s->handshake_func(s); | |
664 | if (i < 0) | |
665 | return (i); | |
666 | if (i == 0) { | |
667 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); | |
668 | return -1; | |
669 | } | |
670 | } | |
671 | ||
672 | /* | |
673 | * ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out | |
674 | * than the the original len from a write which didn't complete for | |
675 | * non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for | |
676 | * this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be | |
677 | * possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then | |
678 | * promptly send beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and | |
679 | * report the error in a way the user will notice | |
680 | */ | |
681 | if (len < tot) { | |
682 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); | |
683 | return (-1); | |
684 | } | |
685 | ||
686 | /* | |
687 | * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This | |
688 | * will happen with non blocking IO | |
689 | */ | |
690 | if (wb->left != 0) { | |
691 | i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], s->s3->wpend_tot); | |
692 | if (i <= 0) { | |
693 | /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */ | |
694 | s->s3->wnum = tot; | |
695 | return i; | |
696 | } | |
697 | tot += i; /* this might be last fragment */ | |
698 | } | |
a9c6edcd | 699 | #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK |
0f113f3e MC |
700 | /* |
701 | * Depending on platform multi-block can deliver several *times* | |
702 | * better performance. Downside is that it has to allocate | |
703 | * jumbo buffer to accomodate up to 8 records, but the | |
704 | * compromise is considered worthy. | |
705 | */ | |
706 | if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && | |
707 | u_len >= 4 * (max_send_fragment = s->max_send_fragment) && | |
708 | s->compress == NULL && s->msg_callback == NULL && | |
709 | !SSL_USE_ETM(s) && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) && | |
739a5eee | 710 | EVP_CIPHER_flags(s->enc_write_ctx->cipher) & |
0f113f3e MC |
711 | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK) { |
712 | unsigned char aad[13]; | |
713 | EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param; | |
714 | int packlen; | |
715 | ||
716 | /* minimize address aliasing conflicts */ | |
717 | if ((max_send_fragment & 0xfff) == 0) | |
718 | max_send_fragment -= 512; | |
719 | ||
720 | if (tot == 0 || wb->buf == NULL) { /* allocate jumbo buffer */ | |
721 | ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); | |
722 | ||
723 | packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx, | |
724 | EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_BUFSIZE, | |
725 | max_send_fragment, NULL); | |
726 | ||
727 | if (u_len >= 8 * max_send_fragment) | |
728 | packlen *= 8; | |
729 | else | |
730 | packlen *= 4; | |
731 | ||
732 | wb->buf = OPENSSL_malloc(packlen); | |
918bb865 MC |
733 | if(!wb->buf) { |
734 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
735 | return -1; | |
736 | } | |
0f113f3e MC |
737 | wb->len = packlen; |
738 | } else if (tot == len) { /* done? */ | |
739 | OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */ | |
740 | wb->buf = NULL; | |
741 | return tot; | |
742 | } | |
743 | ||
744 | n = (len - tot); | |
745 | for (;;) { | |
746 | if (n < 4 * max_send_fragment) { | |
747 | OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */ | |
748 | wb->buf = NULL; | |
749 | break; | |
750 | } | |
751 | ||
752 | if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) { | |
753 | i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s); | |
754 | if (i <= 0) { | |
755 | s->s3->wnum = tot; | |
756 | return i; | |
757 | } | |
758 | } | |
759 | ||
760 | if (n >= 8 * max_send_fragment) | |
761 | nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 8); | |
762 | else | |
763 | nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 4); | |
764 | ||
765 | memcpy(aad, s->s3->write_sequence, 8); | |
766 | aad[8] = type; | |
767 | aad[9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8); | |
768 | aad[10] = (unsigned char)(s->version); | |
769 | aad[11] = 0; | |
770 | aad[12] = 0; | |
771 | mb_param.out = NULL; | |
772 | mb_param.inp = aad; | |
773 | mb_param.len = nw; | |
774 | ||
775 | packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx, | |
776 | EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD, | |
777 | sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param); | |
778 | ||
779 | if (packlen <= 0 || packlen > (int)wb->len) { /* never happens */ | |
780 | OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */ | |
781 | wb->buf = NULL; | |
782 | break; | |
783 | } | |
784 | ||
785 | mb_param.out = wb->buf; | |
786 | mb_param.inp = &buf[tot]; | |
787 | mb_param.len = nw; | |
788 | ||
789 | if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx, | |
790 | EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT, | |
791 | sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param) <= 0) | |
792 | return -1; | |
793 | ||
794 | s->s3->write_sequence[7] += mb_param.interleave; | |
795 | if (s->s3->write_sequence[7] < mb_param.interleave) { | |
796 | int j = 6; | |
797 | while (j >= 0 && (++s->s3->write_sequence[j--]) == 0) ; | |
798 | } | |
799 | ||
800 | wb->offset = 0; | |
801 | wb->left = packlen; | |
802 | ||
803 | s->s3->wpend_tot = nw; | |
804 | s->s3->wpend_buf = &buf[tot]; | |
805 | s->s3->wpend_type = type; | |
806 | s->s3->wpend_ret = nw; | |
807 | ||
808 | i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], nw); | |
809 | if (i <= 0) { | |
1d2a18dc | 810 | if (i < 0 && (!s->wbio || !BIO_should_retry(s->wbio))) { |
0f113f3e MC |
811 | OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); |
812 | wb->buf = NULL; | |
813 | } | |
814 | s->s3->wnum = tot; | |
815 | return i; | |
816 | } | |
817 | if (i == (int)n) { | |
818 | OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */ | |
819 | wb->buf = NULL; | |
820 | return tot + i; | |
821 | } | |
822 | n -= i; | |
823 | tot += i; | |
824 | } | |
825 | } else | |
a9c6edcd | 826 | #endif |
0f113f3e MC |
827 | if (tot == len) { /* done? */ |
828 | if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) | |
829 | ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); | |
830 | ||
831 | return tot; | |
832 | } | |
833 | ||
834 | n = (len - tot); | |
835 | for (;;) { | |
836 | if (n > s->max_send_fragment) | |
837 | nw = s->max_send_fragment; | |
838 | else | |
839 | nw = n; | |
840 | ||
841 | i = do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, 0); | |
842 | if (i <= 0) { | |
843 | /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */ | |
844 | s->s3->wnum = tot; | |
845 | return i; | |
846 | } | |
847 | ||
848 | if ((i == (int)n) || | |
849 | (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && | |
850 | (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE))) { | |
851 | /* | |
852 | * next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment | |
853 | * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness: | |
854 | */ | |
855 | s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0; | |
856 | ||
857 | if ((i == (int)n) && s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && | |
858 | !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) | |
859 | ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); | |
860 | ||
861 | return tot + i; | |
862 | } | |
863 | ||
864 | n -= i; | |
865 | tot += i; | |
866 | } | |
867 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 868 | |
61f5b6f3 | 869 | static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, |
0f113f3e MC |
870 | unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment) |
871 | { | |
872 | unsigned char *p, *plen; | |
873 | int i, mac_size, clear = 0; | |
874 | int prefix_len = 0; | |
875 | int eivlen; | |
876 | long align = 0; | |
877 | SSL3_RECORD *wr; | |
db9a32e7 | 878 | SSL3_BUFFER *wb = RECORD_LAYER_get_wbuf(&s->rlayer); |
0f113f3e MC |
879 | SSL_SESSION *sess; |
880 | ||
881 | /* | |
882 | * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This | |
883 | * will happen with non blocking IO | |
884 | */ | |
885 | if (wb->left != 0) | |
886 | return (ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len)); | |
887 | ||
888 | /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */ | |
889 | if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) { | |
890 | i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s); | |
891 | if (i <= 0) | |
892 | return (i); | |
893 | /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */ | |
894 | } | |
895 | ||
896 | if (wb->buf == NULL) | |
897 | if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s)) | |
898 | return -1; | |
899 | ||
900 | if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment) | |
901 | return 0; | |
902 | ||
903 | wr = &(s->s3->wrec); | |
904 | sess = s->session; | |
905 | ||
906 | if ((sess == NULL) || | |
907 | (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) || | |
908 | (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL)) { | |
0f113f3e | 909 | clear = s->enc_write_ctx ? 0 : 1; /* must be AEAD cipher */ |
0f113f3e MC |
910 | mac_size = 0; |
911 | } else { | |
912 | mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash); | |
913 | if (mac_size < 0) | |
914 | goto err; | |
915 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 916 | |
0f113f3e MC |
917 | /* |
918 | * 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself | |
919 | */ | |
920 | if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done) { | |
921 | /* | |
922 | * countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites (see | |
923 | * http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) | |
924 | */ | |
925 | ||
926 | if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) { | |
927 | /* | |
928 | * recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; this | |
929 | * prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment (these | |
930 | * 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later together with the actual | |
931 | * payload) | |
932 | */ | |
933 | prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1); | |
934 | if (prefix_len <= 0) | |
935 | goto err; | |
936 | ||
937 | if (prefix_len > | |
938 | (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD)) | |
939 | { | |
940 | /* insufficient space */ | |
941 | SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
942 | goto err; | |
943 | } | |
944 | } | |
945 | ||
946 | s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1; | |
947 | } | |
948 | ||
949 | if (create_empty_fragment) { | |
a4d64c7f | 950 | #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0 |
0f113f3e MC |
951 | /* |
952 | * extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks, which would be | |
953 | * multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so if we want to align the real | |
954 | * payload, then we can just pretent we simply have two headers. | |
955 | */ | |
956 | align = (long)wb->buf + 2 * SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
957 | align = (-align) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1); | |
a4d64c7f | 958 | #endif |
0f113f3e MC |
959 | p = wb->buf + align; |
960 | wb->offset = align; | |
961 | } else if (prefix_len) { | |
962 | p = wb->buf + wb->offset + prefix_len; | |
963 | } else { | |
a4d64c7f | 964 | #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0 |
0f113f3e MC |
965 | align = (long)wb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; |
966 | align = (-align) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1); | |
a4d64c7f | 967 | #endif |
0f113f3e MC |
968 | p = wb->buf + align; |
969 | wb->offset = align; | |
970 | } | |
971 | ||
972 | /* write the header */ | |
973 | ||
974 | *(p++) = type & 0xff; | |
975 | wr->type = type; | |
976 | ||
977 | *(p++) = (s->version >> 8); | |
978 | /* | |
979 | * Some servers hang if iniatial client hello is larger than 256 bytes | |
980 | * and record version number > TLS 1.0 | |
981 | */ | |
982 | if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B | |
983 | && !s->renegotiate && TLS1_get_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION) | |
984 | *(p++) = 0x1; | |
985 | else | |
986 | *(p++) = s->version & 0xff; | |
987 | ||
988 | /* field where we are to write out packet length */ | |
989 | plen = p; | |
990 | p += 2; | |
991 | /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */ | |
992 | if (s->enc_write_ctx && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)) { | |
993 | int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx); | |
994 | if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) { | |
995 | eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx); | |
996 | if (eivlen <= 1) | |
997 | eivlen = 0; | |
998 | } | |
999 | /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */ | |
1000 | else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) | |
1001 | eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; | |
1002 | else | |
1003 | eivlen = 0; | |
1004 | } else | |
1005 | eivlen = 0; | |
1006 | ||
1007 | /* lets setup the record stuff. */ | |
1008 | wr->data = p + eivlen; | |
1009 | wr->length = (int)len; | |
1010 | wr->input = (unsigned char *)buf; | |
1011 | ||
1012 | /* | |
1013 | * we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into wr->data | |
1014 | */ | |
1015 | ||
1016 | /* first we compress */ | |
1017 | if (s->compress != NULL) { | |
1018 | if (!ssl3_do_compress(s)) { | |
1019 | SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE); | |
1020 | goto err; | |
1021 | } | |
1022 | } else { | |
1023 | memcpy(wr->data, wr->input, wr->length); | |
1024 | wr->input = wr->data; | |
1025 | } | |
1026 | ||
1027 | /* | |
1028 | * we should still have the output to wr->data and the input from | |
1029 | * wr->input. Length should be wr->length. wr->data still points in the | |
1030 | * wb->buf | |
1031 | */ | |
1032 | ||
1033 | if (!SSL_USE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) { | |
1034 | if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, &(p[wr->length + eivlen]), 1) < 0) | |
1035 | goto err; | |
1036 | wr->length += mac_size; | |
1037 | } | |
1038 | ||
1039 | wr->input = p; | |
1040 | wr->data = p; | |
1041 | ||
1042 | if (eivlen) { | |
1043 | /* | |
1044 | * if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, eivlen) <= 0) goto err; | |
1045 | */ | |
1046 | wr->length += eivlen; | |
1047 | } | |
1048 | ||
1049 | if (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 1) < 1) | |
1050 | goto err; | |
1051 | ||
1052 | if (SSL_USE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) { | |
1053 | if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, p + wr->length, 1) < 0) | |
1054 | goto err; | |
1055 | wr->length += mac_size; | |
1056 | } | |
1057 | ||
1058 | /* record length after mac and block padding */ | |
1059 | s2n(wr->length, plen); | |
1060 | ||
1061 | if (s->msg_callback) | |
1062 | s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, plen - 5, 5, s, | |
1063 | s->msg_callback_arg); | |
1064 | ||
1065 | /* | |
1066 | * we should now have wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is | |
1067 | * wr->length long | |
1068 | */ | |
1069 | wr->type = type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */ | |
1070 | wr->length += SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
1071 | ||
1072 | if (create_empty_fragment) { | |
1073 | /* | |
1074 | * we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write | |
1075 | * out anything here | |
1076 | */ | |
1077 | return wr->length; | |
1078 | } | |
1079 | ||
1080 | /* now let's set up wb */ | |
1081 | wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length; | |
1082 | ||
1083 | /* | |
1084 | * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write | |
1085 | * retries later | |
1086 | */ | |
1087 | s->s3->wpend_tot = len; | |
1088 | s->s3->wpend_buf = buf; | |
1089 | s->s3->wpend_type = type; | |
1090 | s->s3->wpend_ret = len; | |
1091 | ||
1092 | /* we now just need to write the buffer */ | |
1093 | return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len); | |
1094 | err: | |
1095 | return -1; | |
1096 | } | |
d02b48c6 RE |
1097 | |
1098 | /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */ | |
36d16f8e | 1099 | int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, |
0f113f3e MC |
1100 | unsigned int len) |
1101 | { | |
1102 | int i; | |
db9a32e7 | 1103 | SSL3_BUFFER *wb = RECORD_LAYER_get_wbuf(&s->rlayer); |
d02b48c6 | 1104 | |
58964a49 | 1105 | /* XXXX */ |
0f113f3e MC |
1106 | if ((s->s3->wpend_tot > (int)len) |
1107 | || ((s->s3->wpend_buf != buf) && | |
1108 | !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER)) | |
1109 | || (s->s3->wpend_type != type)) { | |
1110 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY); | |
1111 | return (-1); | |
1112 | } | |
1113 | ||
1114 | for (;;) { | |
1115 | clear_sys_error(); | |
1116 | if (s->wbio != NULL) { | |
1117 | s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING; | |
1118 | i = BIO_write(s->wbio, | |
1119 | (char *)&(wb->buf[wb->offset]), | |
1120 | (unsigned int)wb->left); | |
1121 | } else { | |
1122 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET); | |
1123 | i = -1; | |
1124 | } | |
1125 | if (i == wb->left) { | |
1126 | wb->left = 0; | |
1127 | wb->offset += i; | |
1128 | s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; | |
1129 | return (s->s3->wpend_ret); | |
1130 | } else if (i <= 0) { | |
1131 | if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) { | |
1132 | /* | |
1133 | * For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole point in | |
1134 | * using a datagram service | |
1135 | */ | |
1136 | wb->left = 0; | |
1137 | } | |
1138 | return (i); | |
1139 | } | |
1140 | wb->offset += i; | |
1141 | wb->left -= i; | |
1142 | } | |
1143 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 1144 | |
1d97c843 TH |
1145 | /*- |
1146 | * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records. | |
b35e9050 BM |
1147 | * 'type' is one of the following: |
1148 | * | |
1149 | * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us) | |
1150 | * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us) | |
1151 | * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned) | |
1152 | * | |
1153 | * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first | |
1154 | * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return). | |
1155 | * | |
1156 | * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as | |
1157 | * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really | |
1158 | * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests. | |
1159 | * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store | |
1160 | * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol | |
1161 | * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving): | |
1162 | * Change cipher spec protocol | |
1163 | * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored | |
1164 | * Alert protocol | |
1165 | * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription) | |
1166 | * Handshake protocol | |
1167 | * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have | |
1168 | * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages | |
1169 | * here, anything else is handled by higher layers | |
1170 | * Application data protocol | |
1171 | * none of our business | |
1172 | */ | |
5a4fbc69 | 1173 | int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek) |
0f113f3e MC |
1174 | { |
1175 | int al, i, j, ret; | |
1176 | unsigned int n; | |
1177 | SSL3_RECORD *rr; | |
1178 | void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL; | |
1179 | ||
28d59af8 MC |
1180 | if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer))) { |
1181 | /* Not initialized yet */ | |
0f113f3e MC |
1182 | if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s)) |
1183 | return (-1); | |
28d59af8 | 1184 | } |
0f113f3e MC |
1185 | |
1186 | if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) | |
1187 | && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) || (peek | |
1188 | && (type != | |
1189 | SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) { | |
1190 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1191 | return -1; | |
1192 | } | |
1193 | ||
1194 | if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0)) | |
1195 | /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */ | |
1196 | { | |
1197 | unsigned char *src = s->s3->handshake_fragment; | |
1198 | unsigned char *dst = buf; | |
1199 | unsigned int k; | |
1200 | ||
1201 | /* peek == 0 */ | |
1202 | n = 0; | |
1203 | while ((len > 0) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0)) { | |
1204 | *dst++ = *src++; | |
1205 | len--; | |
1206 | s->s3->handshake_fragment_len--; | |
1207 | n++; | |
1208 | } | |
1209 | /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */ | |
1210 | for (k = 0; k < s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; k++) | |
1211 | s->s3->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++; | |
1212 | return n; | |
1213 | } | |
1214 | ||
1215 | /* | |
1216 | * Now s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. | |
1217 | */ | |
1218 | ||
1219 | if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s)) { | |
1220 | /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */ | |
1221 | i = s->handshake_func(s); | |
1222 | if (i < 0) | |
1223 | return (i); | |
1224 | if (i == 0) { | |
1225 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); | |
1226 | return (-1); | |
1227 | } | |
1228 | } | |
1229 | start: | |
1230 | s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; | |
1231 | ||
50e735f9 MC |
1232 | /*- |
1233 | * s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record | |
1234 | * s->s3->rrec.data, - data | |
1235 | * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read | |
1236 | * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes. | |
1237 | */ | |
0f113f3e MC |
1238 | rr = &(s->s3->rrec); |
1239 | ||
1240 | /* get new packet if necessary */ | |
1241 | if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)) { | |
1242 | ret = ssl3_get_record(s); | |
1243 | if (ret <= 0) | |
1244 | return (ret); | |
1245 | } | |
1246 | ||
1247 | /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */ | |
1248 | ||
1249 | if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec, | |
1250 | * reset by ssl3_get_finished */ | |
1251 | && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) { | |
1252 | al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; | |
1253 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED); | |
1254 | goto f_err; | |
1255 | } | |
1256 | ||
1257 | /* | |
1258 | * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in | |
1259 | * 'peek' mode) | |
1260 | */ | |
1261 | if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) { | |
1262 | rr->length = 0; | |
1263 | s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; | |
1264 | return (0); | |
1265 | } | |
1266 | ||
1267 | if (type == rr->type) { /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or | |
1268 | * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */ | |
1269 | /* | |
1270 | * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are | |
1271 | * doing a handshake for the first time | |
1272 | */ | |
1273 | if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && | |
1274 | (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) { | |
1275 | al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; | |
1276 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE); | |
1277 | goto f_err; | |
1278 | } | |
1279 | ||
1280 | if (len <= 0) | |
1281 | return (len); | |
1282 | ||
1283 | if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length) | |
1284 | n = rr->length; | |
1285 | else | |
1286 | n = (unsigned int)len; | |
1287 | ||
1288 | memcpy(buf, &(rr->data[rr->off]), n); | |
1289 | if (!peek) { | |
1290 | rr->length -= n; | |
1291 | rr->off += n; | |
1292 | if (rr->length == 0) { | |
1293 | s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; | |
1294 | rr->off = 0; | |
1295 | if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS | |
28d59af8 MC |
1296 | && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left( |
1297 | RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer)) == 0) | |
0f113f3e MC |
1298 | ssl3_release_read_buffer(s); |
1299 | } | |
1300 | } | |
1301 | return (n); | |
1302 | } | |
1303 | ||
1304 | /* | |
1305 | * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message, | |
1306 | * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). | |
1307 | */ | |
1308 | ||
1309 | /* | |
1310 | * In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage, fill | |
1311 | * that so that we can process the data at a fixed place. | |
1312 | */ | |
1313 | { | |
1314 | unsigned int dest_maxlen = 0; | |
1315 | unsigned char *dest = NULL; | |
1316 | unsigned int *dest_len = NULL; | |
1317 | ||
1318 | if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { | |
1319 | dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->handshake_fragment; | |
1320 | dest = s->s3->handshake_fragment; | |
1321 | dest_len = &s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; | |
1322 | } else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) { | |
1323 | dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->alert_fragment; | |
1324 | dest = s->s3->alert_fragment; | |
1325 | dest_len = &s->s3->alert_fragment_len; | |
1326 | } | |
4817504d | 1327 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS |
0f113f3e | 1328 | else if (rr->type == TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT) { |
69f68237 MC |
1329 | /* We can ignore 0 return values */ |
1330 | if(tls1_process_heartbeat(s) < 0) { | |
1331 | return -1; | |
1332 | } | |
0f113f3e MC |
1333 | |
1334 | /* Exit and notify application to read again */ | |
1335 | rr->length = 0; | |
1336 | s->rwstate = SSL_READING; | |
1337 | BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s)); | |
1338 | BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s)); | |
1339 | return (-1); | |
1340 | } | |
4817504d | 1341 | #endif |
b35e9050 | 1342 | |
0f113f3e MC |
1343 | if (dest_maxlen > 0) { |
1344 | n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */ | |
1345 | if (rr->length < n) | |
1346 | n = rr->length; /* available bytes */ | |
1347 | ||
1348 | /* now move 'n' bytes: */ | |
1349 | while (n-- > 0) { | |
1350 | dest[(*dest_len)++] = rr->data[rr->off++]; | |
1351 | rr->length--; | |
1352 | } | |
1353 | ||
1354 | if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen) | |
1355 | goto start; /* fragment was too small */ | |
1356 | } | |
1357 | } | |
1358 | ||
50e735f9 MC |
1359 | /*- |
1360 | * s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE; | |
1361 | * s->s3->alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT. | |
1362 | * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) | |
1363 | */ | |
0f113f3e MC |
1364 | |
1365 | /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */ | |
1366 | if ((!s->server) && | |
1367 | (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && | |
1368 | (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) && | |
1369 | (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) { | |
1370 | s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0; | |
1371 | ||
1372 | if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) || | |
1373 | (s->s3->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) || | |
1374 | (s->s3->handshake_fragment[3] != 0)) { | |
1375 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
1376 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST); | |
1377 | goto f_err; | |
1378 | } | |
1379 | ||
1380 | if (s->msg_callback) | |
1381 | s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, | |
1382 | s->s3->handshake_fragment, 4, s, | |
1383 | s->msg_callback_arg); | |
1384 | ||
1385 | if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) && | |
1386 | !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) && | |
1387 | !s->s3->renegotiate) { | |
1388 | ssl3_renegotiate(s); | |
1389 | if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s)) { | |
1390 | i = s->handshake_func(s); | |
1391 | if (i < 0) | |
1392 | return (i); | |
1393 | if (i == 0) { | |
1394 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, | |
1395 | SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); | |
1396 | return (-1); | |
1397 | } | |
1398 | ||
1399 | if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) { | |
28d59af8 MC |
1400 | if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left( |
1401 | RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer)) == 0) { | |
1402 | /* no read-ahead left? */ | |
0f113f3e MC |
1403 | BIO *bio; |
1404 | /* | |
1405 | * In the case where we try to read application data, | |
1406 | * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with | |
1407 | * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may | |
1408 | * cause nasty problems in the blocking world | |
1409 | */ | |
1410 | s->rwstate = SSL_READING; | |
1411 | bio = SSL_get_rbio(s); | |
1412 | BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); | |
1413 | BIO_set_retry_read(bio); | |
1414 | return (-1); | |
1415 | } | |
1416 | } | |
1417 | } | |
1418 | } | |
1419 | /* | |
1420 | * we either finished a handshake or ignored the request, now try | |
1421 | * again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for | |
1422 | */ | |
1423 | goto start; | |
1424 | } | |
1425 | /* | |
1426 | * If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't | |
1427 | * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on. WARNING: | |
1428 | * experimental code, needs reviewing (steve) | |
1429 | */ | |
1430 | if (s->server && | |
1431 | SSL_is_init_finished(s) && | |
1432 | !s->s3->send_connection_binding && | |
1433 | (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && | |
1434 | (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && | |
1435 | (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) && | |
1436 | (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL) && | |
1437 | !(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) { | |
1438 | /* | |
1439 | * s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0; | |
1440 | */ | |
1441 | rr->length = 0; | |
1442 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION); | |
1443 | goto start; | |
1444 | } | |
1445 | if (s->s3->alert_fragment_len >= 2) { | |
1446 | int alert_level = s->s3->alert_fragment[0]; | |
1447 | int alert_descr = s->s3->alert_fragment[1]; | |
1448 | ||
1449 | s->s3->alert_fragment_len = 0; | |
1450 | ||
1451 | if (s->msg_callback) | |
1452 | s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, | |
1453 | s->s3->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg); | |
1454 | ||
1455 | if (s->info_callback != NULL) | |
1456 | cb = s->info_callback; | |
1457 | else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) | |
1458 | cb = s->ctx->info_callback; | |
1459 | ||
1460 | if (cb != NULL) { | |
1461 | j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr; | |
1462 | cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j); | |
1463 | } | |
1464 | ||
fd865cad | 1465 | if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) { |
0f113f3e MC |
1466 | s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr; |
1467 | if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) { | |
1468 | s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; | |
1469 | return (0); | |
1470 | } | |
1471 | /* | |
1472 | * This is a warning but we receive it if we requested | |
1473 | * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal | |
1474 | * alert because if application tried to renegotiatie it | |
1475 | * presumably had a good reason and expects it to succeed. In | |
1476 | * future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if | |
1477 | * the peer refused it where we carry on. | |
1478 | */ | |
1479 | else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION) { | |
1480 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
1481 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION); | |
1482 | goto f_err; | |
1483 | } | |
edc032b5 | 1484 | #ifdef SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME |
0f113f3e MC |
1485 | else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME) |
1486 | return (0); | |
edc032b5 | 1487 | #endif |
fd865cad | 1488 | } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL) { |
0f113f3e MC |
1489 | char tmp[16]; |
1490 | ||
1491 | s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; | |
1492 | s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr; | |
1493 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr); | |
1494 | BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%d", alert_descr); | |
1495 | ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp); | |
1496 | s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; | |
1497 | SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx, s->session); | |
1498 | return (0); | |
1499 | } else { | |
1500 | al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
1501 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE); | |
1502 | goto f_err; | |
1503 | } | |
1504 | ||
1505 | goto start; | |
1506 | } | |
1507 | ||
1508 | if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) { /* but we have not received a | |
1509 | * shutdown */ | |
1510 | s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; | |
1511 | rr->length = 0; | |
1512 | return (0); | |
1513 | } | |
1514 | ||
1515 | if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { | |
1516 | /* | |
1517 | * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know exactly | |
1518 | * what the record payload has to look like | |
1519 | */ | |
1520 | if ((rr->length != 1) || (rr->off != 0) || | |
1521 | (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS)) { | |
1522 | al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
1523 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); | |
1524 | goto f_err; | |
1525 | } | |
1526 | ||
1527 | /* Check we have a cipher to change to */ | |
1528 | if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) { | |
1529 | al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; | |
1530 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); | |
1531 | goto f_err; | |
1532 | } | |
1533 | ||
1534 | if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK)) { | |
1535 | al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; | |
1536 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); | |
1537 | goto f_err; | |
1538 | } | |
1539 | ||
1540 | s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; | |
1541 | ||
1542 | rr->length = 0; | |
1543 | ||
1544 | if (s->msg_callback) | |
1545 | s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, | |
1546 | rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg); | |
1547 | ||
1548 | s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 1; | |
1549 | if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) | |
1550 | goto err; | |
1551 | else | |
1552 | goto start; | |
1553 | } | |
1554 | ||
1555 | /* | |
1556 | * Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) | |
1557 | */ | |
1558 | if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && !s->in_handshake) { | |
1559 | if (((s->state & SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) && | |
1560 | !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS)) { | |
0f113f3e | 1561 | s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT; |
0f113f3e MC |
1562 | s->renegotiate = 1; |
1563 | s->new_session = 1; | |
1564 | } | |
1565 | i = s->handshake_func(s); | |
1566 | if (i < 0) | |
1567 | return (i); | |
1568 | if (i == 0) { | |
1569 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); | |
1570 | return (-1); | |
1571 | } | |
1572 | ||
1573 | if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) { | |
28d59af8 MC |
1574 | if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer)) == 0) { |
1575 | /* no read-ahead left? */ | |
0f113f3e MC |
1576 | BIO *bio; |
1577 | /* | |
1578 | * In the case where we try to read application data, but we | |
1579 | * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry | |
1580 | * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty | |
1581 | * problems in the blocking world | |
1582 | */ | |
1583 | s->rwstate = SSL_READING; | |
1584 | bio = SSL_get_rbio(s); | |
1585 | BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); | |
1586 | BIO_set_retry_read(bio); | |
1587 | return (-1); | |
1588 | } | |
1589 | } | |
1590 | goto start; | |
1591 | } | |
1592 | ||
1593 | switch (rr->type) { | |
1594 | default: | |
0f113f3e MC |
1595 | /* |
1596 | * TLS up to v1.1 just ignores unknown message types: TLS v1.2 give | |
1597 | * an unexpected message alert. | |
1598 | */ | |
1599 | if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->version <= TLS1_1_VERSION) { | |
1600 | rr->length = 0; | |
1601 | goto start; | |
1602 | } | |
0f113f3e MC |
1603 | al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; |
1604 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); | |
1605 | goto f_err; | |
1606 | case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC: | |
1607 | case SSL3_RT_ALERT: | |
1608 | case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE: | |
1609 | /* | |
1610 | * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of | |
1611 | * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that should not | |
1612 | * happen when type != rr->type | |
1613 | */ | |
1614 | al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; | |
1615 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1616 | goto f_err; | |
1617 | case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA: | |
1618 | /* | |
1619 | * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have | |
1620 | * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read() | |
1621 | * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read | |
1622 | * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet | |
1623 | * started), we will indulge it. | |
1624 | */ | |
1625 | if (s->s3->in_read_app_data && | |
1626 | (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) && | |
1627 | (((s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) && | |
1628 | (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) && | |
1629 | (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A) | |
1630 | ) || ((s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) && | |
1631 | (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) && | |
1632 | (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) | |
1633 | ) | |
1634 | )) { | |
1635 | s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2; | |
1636 | return (-1); | |
1637 | } else { | |
1638 | al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; | |
1639 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); | |
1640 | goto f_err; | |
1641 | } | |
1642 | } | |
1643 | /* not reached */ | |
1644 | ||
1645 | f_err: | |
1646 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
1647 | err: | |
1648 | return (-1); | |
1649 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 1650 | |
36d16f8e | 1651 | int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s) |
0f113f3e MC |
1652 | { |
1653 | int i; | |
1654 | const char *sender; | |
1655 | int slen; | |
1656 | ||
1657 | if (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) | |
1658 | i = SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ; | |
1659 | else | |
1660 | i = SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ; | |
1661 | ||
1662 | if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL) { | |
1663 | if (s->session == NULL || s->session->master_key_length == 0) { | |
1664 | /* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */ | |
1665 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, | |
1666 | SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); | |
1667 | return (0); | |
1668 | } | |
1669 | ||
1670 | s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; | |
1671 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) | |
1672 | return (0); | |
1673 | } | |
1674 | ||
1675 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, i)) | |
1676 | return (0); | |
1677 | ||
1678 | /* | |
1679 | * we have to record the message digest at this point so we can get it | |
1680 | * before we read the finished message | |
1681 | */ | |
1682 | if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) { | |
1683 | sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label; | |
1684 | slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len; | |
1685 | } else { | |
1686 | sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label; | |
1687 | slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len; | |
1688 | } | |
1689 | ||
1690 | i = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, | |
1691 | sender, slen, | |
1692 | s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md); | |
1693 | if (i == 0) { | |
1694 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1695 | return 0; | |
1696 | } | |
1697 | s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = i; | |
1698 | ||
1699 | return (1); | |
1700 | } | |
58964a49 | 1701 | |
cc7399e7 | 1702 | int ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc) |
0f113f3e MC |
1703 | { |
1704 | /* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */ | |
1705 | desc = s->method->ssl3_enc->alert_value(desc); | |
1706 | if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && desc == SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION) | |
1707 | desc = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; /* SSL 3.0 does not have | |
1708 | * protocol_version alerts */ | |
1709 | if (desc < 0) | |
1710 | return -1; | |
1711 | /* If a fatal one, remove from cache */ | |
1712 | if ((level == SSL3_AL_FATAL) && (s->session != NULL)) | |
1713 | SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx, s->session); | |
1714 | ||
1715 | s->s3->alert_dispatch = 1; | |
1716 | s->s3->send_alert[0] = level; | |
1717 | s->s3->send_alert[1] = desc; | |
db9a32e7 MC |
1718 | if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(RECORD_LAYER_get_wbuf(&s->rlayer)) == 0) { |
1719 | /* data still being written out? */ | |
0f113f3e | 1720 | return s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s); |
db9a32e7 | 1721 | } |
0f113f3e MC |
1722 | /* |
1723 | * else data is still being written out, we will get written some time in | |
1724 | * the future | |
1725 | */ | |
1726 | return -1; | |
1727 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 1728 | |
6b691a5c | 1729 | int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s) |
0f113f3e MC |
1730 | { |
1731 | int i, j; | |
1732 | void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL; | |
1733 | ||
1734 | s->s3->alert_dispatch = 0; | |
1735 | i = do_ssl3_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &s->s3->send_alert[0], 2, 0); | |
1736 | if (i <= 0) { | |
1737 | s->s3->alert_dispatch = 1; | |
1738 | } else { | |
1739 | /* | |
1740 | * Alert sent to BIO. If it is important, flush it now. If the | |
1741 | * message does not get sent due to non-blocking IO, we will not | |
1742 | * worry too much. | |
1743 | */ | |
1744 | if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL) | |
1745 | (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio); | |
1746 | ||
1747 | if (s->msg_callback) | |
1748 | s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert, | |
1749 | 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg); | |
1750 | ||
1751 | if (s->info_callback != NULL) | |
1752 | cb = s->info_callback; | |
1753 | else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) | |
1754 | cb = s->ctx->info_callback; | |
1755 | ||
1756 | if (cb != NULL) { | |
1757 | j = (s->s3->send_alert[0] << 8) | s->s3->send_alert[1]; | |
1758 | cb(s, SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT, j); | |
1759 | } | |
1760 | } | |
1761 | return (i); | |
1762 | } |