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d02b48c6 | 1 | /* ssl/s3_srvr.c */ |
58964a49 | 2 | /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) |
d02b48c6 RE |
3 | * All rights reserved. |
4 | * | |
5 | * This package is an SSL implementation written | |
6 | * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). | |
7 | * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. | |
40720ce3 | 8 | * |
d02b48c6 RE |
9 | * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as |
10 | * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions | |
11 | * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, | |
12 | * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation | |
13 | * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms | |
14 | * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). | |
40720ce3 | 15 | * |
d02b48c6 RE |
16 | * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in |
17 | * the code are not to be removed. | |
18 | * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution | |
19 | * as the author of the parts of the library used. | |
20 | * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or | |
21 | * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. | |
40720ce3 | 22 | * |
d02b48c6 RE |
23 | * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
24 | * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | |
25 | * are met: | |
26 | * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright | |
27 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. | |
28 | * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | |
29 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the | |
30 | * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. | |
31 | * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software | |
32 | * must display the following acknowledgement: | |
33 | * "This product includes cryptographic software written by | |
34 | * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" | |
35 | * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library | |
36 | * being used are not cryptographic related :-). | |
40720ce3 | 37 | * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from |
d02b48c6 RE |
38 | * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: |
39 | * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" | |
40720ce3 | 40 | * |
d02b48c6 RE |
41 | * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND |
42 | * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE | |
43 | * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE | |
44 | * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE | |
45 | * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL | |
46 | * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS | |
47 | * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) | |
48 | * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT | |
49 | * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY | |
50 | * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF | |
51 | * SUCH DAMAGE. | |
40720ce3 | 52 | * |
d02b48c6 RE |
53 | * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or |
54 | * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be | |
55 | * copied and put under another distribution licence | |
56 | * [including the GNU Public Licence.] | |
57 | */ | |
8e2f6b79 | 58 | /* ==================================================================== |
36d16f8e | 59 | * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. |
8e2f6b79 BM |
60 | * |
61 | * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without | |
62 | * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | |
63 | * are met: | |
64 | * | |
65 | * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright | |
40720ce3 | 66 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
8e2f6b79 BM |
67 | * |
68 | * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | |
69 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in | |
70 | * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the | |
71 | * distribution. | |
72 | * | |
73 | * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this | |
74 | * software must display the following acknowledgment: | |
75 | * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project | |
76 | * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" | |
77 | * | |
78 | * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to | |
79 | * endorse or promote products derived from this software without | |
80 | * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact | |
81 | * openssl-core@openssl.org. | |
82 | * | |
83 | * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" | |
84 | * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written | |
85 | * permission of the OpenSSL Project. | |
86 | * | |
87 | * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following | |
88 | * acknowledgment: | |
89 | * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project | |
90 | * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" | |
91 | * | |
92 | * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY | |
93 | * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE | |
94 | * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR | |
95 | * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR | |
96 | * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, | |
97 | * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT | |
98 | * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; | |
99 | * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) | |
100 | * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, | |
101 | * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) | |
102 | * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED | |
103 | * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. | |
104 | * ==================================================================== | |
105 | * | |
106 | * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young | |
107 | * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim | |
108 | * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). | |
109 | * | |
110 | */ | |
ea262260 BM |
111 | /* ==================================================================== |
112 | * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. | |
113 | * | |
40720ce3 | 114 | * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by |
ea262260 BM |
115 | * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project. |
116 | * | |
117 | * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source | |
118 | * license provided above. | |
119 | * | |
ea262260 BM |
120 | * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by |
121 | * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories. | |
122 | * | |
123 | */ | |
d02b48c6 RE |
124 | |
125 | #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG | |
de469ef2 DSH |
126 | #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG |
127 | ||
d02b48c6 | 128 | #include <stdio.h> |
7b63c0fa LJ |
129 | #include "ssl_locl.h" |
130 | #include "kssl_lcl.h" | |
699d78ce | 131 | #include "../crypto/constant_time_locl.h" |
ec577822 BM |
132 | #include <openssl/buffer.h> |
133 | #include <openssl/rand.h> | |
134 | #include <openssl/objects.h> | |
135 | #include <openssl/evp.h> | |
865a90eb | 136 | #include <openssl/hmac.h> |
ec577822 | 137 | #include <openssl/x509.h> |
4913b88f | 138 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH |
40720ce3 | 139 | # include <openssl/dh.h> |
4913b88f | 140 | #endif |
d095b68d | 141 | #include <openssl/bn.h> |
5fdf0666 | 142 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 |
40720ce3 | 143 | # include <openssl/krb5_asn.h> |
5fdf0666 | 144 | #endif |
dbad1690 | 145 | #include <openssl/md5.h> |
f9b3bff6 | 146 | |
9b3086fe | 147 | static SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver); |
ea262260 BM |
148 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH |
149 | static int nid2curve_id(int nid); | |
150 | #endif | |
151 | ||
6b691a5c | 152 | static SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver) |
40720ce3 MC |
153 | { |
154 | if (ver == SSL3_VERSION) | |
155 | return (SSLv3_server_method()); | |
156 | else | |
157 | return (NULL); | |
158 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 159 | |
222f2246 | 160 | IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method, |
40720ce3 MC |
161 | ssl3_accept, |
162 | ssl_undefined_function, ssl3_get_server_method) | |
d02b48c6 | 163 | |
6b691a5c | 164 | int ssl3_accept(SSL *s) |
40720ce3 MC |
165 | { |
166 | BUF_MEM *buf; | |
167 | unsigned long l, Time = (unsigned long)time(NULL); | |
168 | void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL; | |
169 | int ret = -1; | |
170 | int new_state, state, skip = 0; | |
171 | ||
172 | RAND_add(&Time, sizeof(Time), 0); | |
173 | ERR_clear_error(); | |
174 | clear_sys_error(); | |
175 | ||
176 | if (s->info_callback != NULL) | |
177 | cb = s->info_callback; | |
178 | else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) | |
179 | cb = s->ctx->info_callback; | |
180 | ||
181 | /* init things to blank */ | |
182 | s->in_handshake++; | |
183 | if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) | |
184 | SSL_clear(s); | |
185 | ||
186 | if (s->cert == NULL) { | |
187 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET); | |
188 | return (-1); | |
189 | } | |
190 | ||
191 | for (;;) { | |
192 | state = s->state; | |
193 | ||
194 | switch (s->state) { | |
195 | case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE: | |
196 | s->new_session = 1; | |
197 | /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */ | |
198 | ||
199 | case SSL_ST_BEFORE: | |
200 | case SSL_ST_ACCEPT: | |
201 | case SSL_ST_BEFORE | SSL_ST_ACCEPT: | |
202 | case SSL_ST_OK | SSL_ST_ACCEPT: | |
203 | ||
204 | s->server = 1; | |
205 | if (cb != NULL) | |
206 | cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1); | |
207 | ||
208 | if ((s->version >> 8) != 3) { | |
209 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
210 | return -1; | |
211 | } | |
212 | s->type = SSL_ST_ACCEPT; | |
213 | ||
214 | if (s->init_buf == NULL) { | |
215 | if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) { | |
216 | ret = -1; | |
217 | goto end; | |
218 | } | |
219 | if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) { | |
220 | ret = -1; | |
221 | goto end; | |
222 | } | |
223 | s->init_buf = buf; | |
224 | } | |
225 | ||
226 | if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) { | |
227 | ret = -1; | |
228 | goto end; | |
229 | } | |
230 | ||
231 | s->init_num = 0; | |
232 | s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE; | |
233 | ||
234 | if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE) { | |
235 | /* | |
236 | * Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that the | |
237 | * output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-) | |
238 | */ | |
239 | if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 1)) { | |
240 | ret = -1; | |
241 | goto end; | |
242 | } | |
243 | ||
244 | ssl3_init_finished_mac(s); | |
245 | s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A; | |
246 | s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++; | |
247 | } else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding && | |
248 | !(s->options & | |
249 | SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) { | |
250 | /* | |
251 | * Server attempting to renegotiate with client that doesn't | |
252 | * support secure renegotiation. | |
253 | */ | |
254 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, | |
255 | SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); | |
256 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); | |
257 | ret = -1; | |
258 | goto end; | |
259 | } else { | |
260 | /* | |
261 | * s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE, we will just send a | |
262 | * HelloRequest | |
263 | */ | |
264 | s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++; | |
265 | s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A; | |
266 | } | |
267 | break; | |
268 | ||
269 | case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A: | |
270 | case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B: | |
271 | ||
272 | s->shutdown = 0; | |
273 | ret = ssl3_send_hello_request(s); | |
274 | if (ret <= 0) | |
275 | goto end; | |
276 | s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C; | |
277 | s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; | |
278 | s->init_num = 0; | |
279 | ||
280 | ssl3_init_finished_mac(s); | |
281 | break; | |
282 | ||
283 | case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C: | |
284 | s->state = SSL_ST_OK; | |
285 | break; | |
286 | ||
287 | case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A: | |
288 | case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B: | |
289 | case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C: | |
290 | ||
291 | s->shutdown = 0; | |
292 | ret = ssl3_get_client_hello(s); | |
293 | if (ret <= 0) | |
294 | goto end; | |
295 | s->new_session = 2; | |
296 | s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A; | |
297 | s->init_num = 0; | |
298 | break; | |
299 | ||
300 | case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A: | |
301 | case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B: | |
302 | ret = ssl3_send_server_hello(s); | |
303 | if (ret <= 0) | |
304 | goto end; | |
3c8f3150 | 305 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT |
40720ce3 MC |
306 | if (s->hit) { |
307 | if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) | |
308 | s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A; | |
309 | else | |
310 | s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; | |
311 | } | |
3c8f3150 | 312 | #else |
40720ce3 MC |
313 | if (s->hit) |
314 | s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; | |
3c8f3150 | 315 | #endif |
40720ce3 MC |
316 | else |
317 | s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A; | |
318 | s->init_num = 0; | |
319 | break; | |
320 | ||
321 | case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A: | |
322 | case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B: | |
323 | /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH or KRB5 */ | |
324 | if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL) | |
325 | && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aKRB5)) { | |
326 | ret = ssl3_send_server_certificate(s); | |
327 | if (ret <= 0) | |
328 | goto end; | |
a5232767 | 329 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT |
40720ce3 MC |
330 | if (s->tlsext_status_expected) |
331 | s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A; | |
332 | else | |
333 | s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; | |
334 | } else { | |
335 | skip = 1; | |
336 | s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; | |
337 | } | |
a5232767 | 338 | #else |
40720ce3 MC |
339 | } else |
340 | skip = 1; | |
a5232767 | 341 | |
40720ce3 | 342 | s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; |
a5232767 | 343 | #endif |
40720ce3 MC |
344 | s->init_num = 0; |
345 | break; | |
346 | ||
347 | case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A: | |
348 | case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B: | |
349 | l = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms; | |
350 | ||
351 | /* | |
352 | * clear this, it may get reset by send_server_key_exchange | |
353 | */ | |
354 | s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 0; | |
355 | ||
356 | /* | |
357 | * only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or RSA but we have a | |
358 | * sign only certificate For ECC ciphersuites, we send a | |
359 | * serverKeyExchange message only if the cipher suite is either | |
360 | * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the server certificate | |
361 | * contains the server's public key for key exchange. | |
362 | */ | |
363 | if ((l & SSL_kECDHE) | |
364 | || (l & (SSL_DH | SSL_kFZA)) | |
365 | || ((l & SSL_kRSA) | |
366 | && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL | |
367 | || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) | |
6f1f3c66 | 368 | && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys |
40720ce3 MC |
369 | [SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey) * |
370 | 8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) | |
371 | ) | |
372 | ) | |
373 | ) | |
374 | ) { | |
375 | ret = ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s); | |
376 | if (ret <= 0) | |
377 | goto end; | |
378 | } else | |
379 | skip = 1; | |
380 | ||
381 | s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A; | |
382 | s->init_num = 0; | |
383 | break; | |
384 | ||
385 | case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A: | |
386 | case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B: | |
387 | if ( /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */ | |
388 | !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) || | |
389 | /* | |
390 | * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert | |
391 | * during re-negotiation: | |
392 | */ | |
393 | ((s->session->peer != NULL) && | |
394 | (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) || | |
395 | /* | |
396 | * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see | |
397 | * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in | |
398 | * RFC 2246): | |
399 | */ | |
400 | ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL) && | |
401 | /* | |
402 | * ... except when the application insists on | |
403 | * verification (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts | |
404 | * this for SSL 3) | |
405 | */ | |
406 | !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) || | |
407 | /* | |
408 | * never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites | |
409 | */ | |
410 | (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aKRB5)) { | |
411 | /* no cert request */ | |
412 | skip = 1; | |
413 | s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0; | |
414 | s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A; | |
415 | } else { | |
416 | s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1; | |
417 | ret = ssl3_send_certificate_request(s); | |
418 | if (ret <= 0) | |
419 | goto end; | |
de469ef2 | 420 | #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG |
40720ce3 | 421 | s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A; |
de469ef2 | 422 | #else |
40720ce3 MC |
423 | s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; |
424 | s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A; | |
de469ef2 | 425 | #endif |
40720ce3 MC |
426 | s->init_num = 0; |
427 | } | |
428 | break; | |
429 | ||
430 | case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A: | |
431 | case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B: | |
432 | ret = ssl3_send_server_done(s); | |
433 | if (ret <= 0) | |
434 | goto end; | |
435 | s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A; | |
436 | s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; | |
437 | s->init_num = 0; | |
438 | break; | |
439 | ||
440 | case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH: | |
441 | ||
442 | /* | |
443 | * This code originally checked to see if any data was pending | |
444 | * using BIO_CTRL_INFO and then flushed. This caused problems as | |
445 | * documented in PR#1939. The proposed fix doesn't completely | |
446 | * resolve this issue as buggy implementations of | |
447 | * BIO_CTRL_PENDING still exist. So instead we just flush | |
448 | * unconditionally. | |
449 | */ | |
450 | ||
451 | s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING; | |
452 | if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) { | |
453 | ret = -1; | |
454 | goto end; | |
455 | } | |
456 | s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; | |
457 | ||
458 | s->state = s->s3->tmp.next_state; | |
459 | break; | |
460 | ||
461 | case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A: | |
462 | case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B: | |
463 | /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */ | |
464 | ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s); | |
465 | if (ret <= 0) | |
466 | goto end; | |
467 | if (ret == 2) | |
468 | s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C; | |
469 | else { | |
470 | if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) { | |
471 | ret = ssl3_get_client_certificate(s); | |
472 | if (ret <= 0) | |
473 | goto end; | |
474 | } | |
475 | s->init_num = 0; | |
476 | s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A; | |
477 | } | |
478 | break; | |
479 | ||
480 | case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A: | |
481 | case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B: | |
482 | ret = ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s); | |
483 | if (ret <= 0) | |
484 | goto end; | |
485 | if (ret == 2) { | |
486 | /* | |
487 | * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH | |
488 | * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is | |
489 | * not sent. | |
490 | */ | |
491 | s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; | |
492 | s->init_num = 0; | |
493 | } else { | |
494 | s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A; | |
495 | s->init_num = 0; | |
496 | ||
497 | /* | |
498 | * We need to get hashes here so if there is a client cert, | |
499 | * it can be verified | |
500 | */ | |
501 | s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s, | |
502 | &(s->s3->finish_dgst1), | |
503 | &(s->s3-> | |
504 | tmp.cert_verify_md | |
505 | [0])); | |
506 | s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s, | |
507 | &(s->s3->finish_dgst2), | |
508 | &(s->s3-> | |
509 | tmp.cert_verify_md | |
510 | [MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH])); | |
511 | } | |
512 | break; | |
513 | ||
514 | case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A: | |
515 | case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B: | |
516 | ||
517 | s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; | |
518 | /* we should decide if we expected this one */ | |
519 | ret = ssl3_get_cert_verify(s); | |
520 | if (ret <= 0) | |
521 | goto end; | |
522 | ||
523 | s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; | |
524 | s->init_num = 0; | |
525 | break; | |
526 | ||
527 | case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A: | |
528 | case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B: | |
529 | s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; | |
530 | ret = ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A, | |
531 | SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B); | |
532 | if (ret <= 0) | |
533 | goto end; | |
534 | if (s->hit) | |
535 | s->state = SSL_ST_OK; | |
865a90eb | 536 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT |
40720ce3 MC |
537 | else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) |
538 | s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A; | |
865a90eb | 539 | #endif |
40720ce3 MC |
540 | else |
541 | s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; | |
542 | s->init_num = 0; | |
543 | break; | |
d02b48c6 | 544 | |
865a90eb | 545 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT |
40720ce3 MC |
546 | case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A: |
547 | case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B: | |
548 | ret = ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s); | |
549 | if (ret <= 0) | |
550 | goto end; | |
551 | s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; | |
552 | s->init_num = 0; | |
553 | break; | |
554 | ||
555 | case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A: | |
556 | case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B: | |
557 | ret = ssl3_send_cert_status(s); | |
558 | if (ret <= 0) | |
559 | goto end; | |
560 | s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; | |
561 | s->init_num = 0; | |
562 | break; | |
a5232767 | 563 | |
865a90eb DSH |
564 | #endif |
565 | ||
40720ce3 MC |
566 | case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A: |
567 | case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B: | |
568 | ||
569 | s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; | |
570 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) { | |
571 | ret = -1; | |
572 | goto end; | |
573 | } | |
574 | ||
575 | ret = ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s, | |
576 | SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A, | |
577 | SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B); | |
578 | ||
579 | if (ret <= 0) | |
580 | goto end; | |
581 | s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A; | |
582 | s->init_num = 0; | |
583 | ||
584 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, | |
585 | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) | |
586 | { | |
587 | ret = -1; | |
588 | goto end; | |
589 | } | |
590 | ||
591 | break; | |
592 | ||
593 | case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A: | |
594 | case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B: | |
595 | ret = ssl3_send_finished(s, | |
596 | SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A, | |
597 | SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B, | |
598 | s->method-> | |
599 | ssl3_enc->server_finished_label, | |
600 | s->method-> | |
601 | ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len); | |
602 | if (ret <= 0) | |
603 | goto end; | |
604 | s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; | |
605 | if (s->hit) | |
606 | s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; | |
607 | else | |
608 | s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL_ST_OK; | |
609 | s->init_num = 0; | |
610 | break; | |
611 | ||
612 | case SSL_ST_OK: | |
613 | /* clean a few things up */ | |
614 | ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); | |
615 | ||
616 | BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); | |
617 | s->init_buf = NULL; | |
618 | ||
619 | /* remove buffering on output */ | |
620 | ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s); | |
621 | ||
622 | s->init_num = 0; | |
623 | ||
624 | if (s->new_session == 2) { /* skipped if we just sent a | |
625 | * HelloRequest */ | |
626 | /* | |
627 | * actually not necessarily a 'new' session unless | |
628 | * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is set | |
629 | */ | |
630 | ||
631 | s->new_session = 0; | |
632 | ||
633 | ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER); | |
634 | ||
635 | s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++; | |
636 | /* s->server=1; */ | |
637 | s->handshake_func = ssl3_accept; | |
638 | ||
639 | if (cb != NULL) | |
640 | cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1); | |
641 | } | |
642 | ||
643 | ret = 1; | |
644 | goto end; | |
645 | /* break; */ | |
646 | ||
647 | default: | |
648 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE); | |
649 | ret = -1; | |
650 | goto end; | |
651 | /* break; */ | |
652 | } | |
653 | ||
654 | if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) { | |
655 | if (s->debug) { | |
656 | if ((ret = BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0) | |
657 | goto end; | |
658 | } | |
659 | ||
660 | if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) { | |
661 | new_state = s->state; | |
662 | s->state = state; | |
663 | cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 1); | |
664 | s->state = new_state; | |
665 | } | |
666 | } | |
667 | skip = 0; | |
668 | } | |
669 | end: | |
670 | /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */ | |
671 | ||
672 | s->in_handshake--; | |
673 | if (cb != NULL) | |
674 | cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT, ret); | |
675 | return (ret); | |
676 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 677 | |
36d16f8e | 678 | int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s) |
40720ce3 MC |
679 | { |
680 | unsigned char *p; | |
681 | ||
682 | if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) { | |
683 | p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; | |
684 | *(p++) = SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST; | |
685 | *(p++) = 0; | |
686 | *(p++) = 0; | |
687 | *(p++) = 0; | |
688 | ||
689 | s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B; | |
690 | /* number of bytes to write */ | |
691 | s->init_num = 4; | |
692 | s->init_off = 0; | |
693 | } | |
694 | ||
695 | /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */ | |
696 | return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); | |
697 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 698 | |
36d16f8e | 699 | int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s) |
40720ce3 MC |
700 | { |
701 | int ok; | |
702 | long n; | |
703 | ||
704 | /* | |
705 | * this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message, | |
706 | * so permit appropriate message length | |
707 | */ | |
708 | n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, | |
709 | SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A, | |
710 | SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B, | |
711 | -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok); | |
712 | if (!ok) | |
713 | return ((int)n); | |
714 | s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1; | |
715 | if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) { | |
716 | /* | |
717 | * We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per | |
718 | * negotiation. | |
719 | */ | |
720 | if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE) { | |
721 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO, | |
722 | SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS); | |
723 | return -1; | |
724 | } | |
725 | /* | |
726 | * Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake, | |
727 | * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.) | |
728 | */ | |
bc36ee62 | 729 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH |
40720ce3 MC |
730 | if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) { |
731 | DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh); | |
732 | s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL; | |
733 | } | |
db453084 BM |
734 | #endif |
735 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH | |
40720ce3 MC |
736 | if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) { |
737 | EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh); | |
738 | s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL; | |
739 | } | |
a2a01589 | 740 | #endif |
40720ce3 MC |
741 | s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE; |
742 | return 2; | |
743 | } | |
744 | return 1; | |
3d14b9d0 DSH |
745 | } |
746 | ||
36d16f8e | 747 | int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) |
40720ce3 MC |
748 | { |
749 | int i, j, ok, al, ret = -1; | |
750 | unsigned int cookie_len; | |
751 | long n; | |
752 | unsigned long id; | |
753 | unsigned char *p, *d, *q; | |
754 | SSL_CIPHER *c; | |
54f51116 | 755 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP |
40720ce3 | 756 | SSL_COMP *comp = NULL; |
54f51116 | 757 | #endif |
40720ce3 MC |
758 | STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL; |
759 | ||
760 | /* | |
761 | * We do this so that we will respond with our native type. If we are | |
762 | * TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1, This down | |
763 | * switching should be handled by a different method. If we are SSLv3, we | |
764 | * will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with TLSv1. | |
765 | */ | |
766 | if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) { | |
767 | s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B; | |
768 | } | |
769 | s->first_packet = 1; | |
770 | n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, | |
771 | SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B, | |
772 | SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C, | |
773 | SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO, | |
774 | SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok); | |
775 | ||
776 | if (!ok) | |
777 | return ((int)n); | |
778 | s->first_packet = 0; | |
779 | d = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg; | |
780 | ||
eeda9661 MC |
781 | /* |
782 | * 2 bytes for client version, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE bytes for random, 1 byte | |
783 | * for session id length | |
784 | */ | |
785 | if (n < 2 + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + 1) { | |
786 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
787 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); | |
788 | goto f_err; | |
789 | } | |
790 | ||
40720ce3 MC |
791 | /* |
792 | * use version from inside client hello, not from record header (may | |
793 | * differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) | |
794 | */ | |
795 | s->client_version = (((int)p[0]) << 8) | (int)p[1]; | |
796 | p += 2; | |
797 | ||
798 | if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) || | |
799 | (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version)) { | |
800 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); | |
801 | if ((s->client_version >> 8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) { | |
802 | /* | |
803 | * similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version | |
804 | * number | |
805 | */ | |
806 | s->version = s->client_version; | |
807 | } | |
808 | al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; | |
809 | goto f_err; | |
810 | } | |
811 | ||
812 | /* | |
813 | * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one, just | |
814 | * return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet. So check | |
815 | * cookie length... | |
816 | */ | |
817 | if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) { | |
818 | unsigned int session_length, cookie_length; | |
819 | ||
820 | session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); | |
eeda9661 MC |
821 | |
822 | if (p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1 >= d + n) { | |
823 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
824 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); | |
825 | goto f_err; | |
826 | } | |
40720ce3 MC |
827 | cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1); |
828 | ||
829 | if (cookie_length == 0) | |
830 | return 1; | |
831 | } | |
832 | ||
833 | /* load the client random */ | |
834 | memcpy(s->s3->client_random, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); | |
835 | p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; | |
836 | ||
837 | /* get the session-id */ | |
838 | j = *(p++); | |
839 | ||
eeda9661 MC |
840 | if (p + j > d + n) { |
841 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
842 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); | |
843 | goto f_err; | |
844 | } | |
845 | ||
40720ce3 MC |
846 | s->hit = 0; |
847 | /* | |
848 | * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow session reuse during renegotiation | |
849 | * (i.e. when s->new_session is true), option | |
850 | * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is new with 0.9.7. Maybe | |
851 | * this optional behaviour should always have been the default, but we | |
852 | * cannot safely change the default behaviour (or new applications might | |
853 | * be written that become totally unsecure when compiled with an earlier | |
854 | * library version) | |
855 | */ | |
856 | if ((s->new_session | |
857 | && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) { | |
858 | if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) | |
859 | goto err; | |
860 | } else { | |
861 | i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n); | |
862 | if (i == 1) { /* previous session */ | |
863 | s->hit = 1; | |
864 | } else if (i == -1) | |
865 | goto err; | |
866 | else { /* i == 0 */ | |
867 | ||
868 | if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) | |
869 | goto err; | |
870 | } | |
871 | } | |
872 | ||
873 | p += j; | |
874 | ||
875 | if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) { | |
876 | /* cookie stuff */ | |
eeda9661 MC |
877 | if (p + 1 > d + n) { |
878 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
879 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); | |
880 | goto f_err; | |
881 | } | |
40720ce3 MC |
882 | cookie_len = *(p++); |
883 | ||
eeda9661 MC |
884 | if (p + cookie_len > d + n) { |
885 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
886 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); | |
887 | goto f_err; | |
888 | } | |
889 | ||
40720ce3 MC |
890 | /* |
891 | * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the | |
892 | * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it | |
893 | * does not cause an overflow. | |
894 | */ | |
895 | if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie)) { | |
896 | /* too much data */ | |
897 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
898 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); | |
899 | goto f_err; | |
900 | } | |
901 | ||
902 | /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */ | |
903 | if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) && cookie_len > 0) { | |
904 | memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len); | |
905 | ||
906 | if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) { | |
907 | if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie, | |
908 | cookie_len) == 0) { | |
909 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
910 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, | |
911 | SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); | |
912 | goto f_err; | |
913 | } | |
914 | /* else cookie verification succeeded */ | |
915 | } | |
916 | /* default verification */ | |
917 | else if (memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie, | |
918 | s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) { | |
919 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
920 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); | |
921 | goto f_err; | |
922 | } | |
923 | ||
924 | ret = 2; | |
925 | } | |
926 | ||
927 | p += cookie_len; | |
928 | } | |
929 | ||
eeda9661 MC |
930 | if (p + 2 > d + n) { |
931 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
932 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); | |
933 | goto f_err; | |
934 | } | |
40720ce3 MC |
935 | n2s(p, i); |
936 | if ((i == 0) && (j != 0)) { | |
937 | /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */ | |
938 | al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
939 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED); | |
940 | goto f_err; | |
941 | } | |
eeda9661 MC |
942 | |
943 | /* i bytes of cipher data + 1 byte for compression length later */ | |
944 | if ((p + i + 1) > (d + n)) { | |
40720ce3 MC |
945 | /* not enough data */ |
946 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
947 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
948 | goto f_err; | |
949 | } | |
950 | if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, p, i, &(ciphers)) | |
951 | == NULL)) { | |
952 | goto err; | |
953 | } | |
954 | p += i; | |
955 | ||
956 | /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */ | |
957 | if ((s->hit) && (i > 0)) { | |
958 | j = 0; | |
959 | id = s->session->cipher->id; | |
d02b48c6 | 960 | |
413c4f45 | 961 | #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG |
40720ce3 | 962 | printf("client sent %d ciphers\n", sk_num(ciphers)); |
413c4f45 | 963 | #endif |
40720ce3 MC |
964 | for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) { |
965 | c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i); | |
413c4f45 | 966 | #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG |
40720ce3 MC |
967 | printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n", |
968 | i, sk_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c)); | |
413c4f45 | 969 | #endif |
40720ce3 MC |
970 | if (c->id == id) { |
971 | j = 1; | |
972 | break; | |
973 | } | |
974 | } | |
975 | /* | |
976 | * Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade attack: | |
977 | * CVE-2010-4180. | |
978 | */ | |
7890b562 | 979 | #if 0 |
40720ce3 MC |
980 | if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) |
981 | && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1)) { | |
982 | /* | |
983 | * Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used | |
984 | * cipher may not be in the current list, the client instead | |
985 | * might be trying to continue using a cipher that before wasn't | |
986 | * chosen due to server preferences. We'll have to reject the | |
987 | * connection if the cipher is not enabled, though. | |
988 | */ | |
989 | c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0); | |
990 | if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0) { | |
991 | s->session->cipher = c; | |
992 | j = 1; | |
993 | } | |
994 | } | |
7890b562 | 995 | #endif |
40720ce3 MC |
996 | if (j == 0) { |
997 | /* | |
998 | * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked | |
999 | * to reuse it | |
1000 | */ | |
1001 | al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
1002 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, | |
1003 | SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING); | |
1004 | goto f_err; | |
1005 | } | |
1006 | } | |
1007 | ||
1008 | /* compression */ | |
1009 | i = *(p++); | |
1010 | if ((p + i) > (d + n)) { | |
1011 | /* not enough data */ | |
1012 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
1013 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
1014 | goto f_err; | |
1015 | } | |
1016 | q = p; | |
1017 | for (j = 0; j < i; j++) { | |
1018 | if (p[j] == 0) | |
1019 | break; | |
1020 | } | |
1021 | ||
1022 | p += i; | |
1023 | if (j >= i) { | |
1024 | /* no compress */ | |
1025 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
1026 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED); | |
1027 | goto f_err; | |
1028 | } | |
865a90eb | 1029 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT |
40720ce3 MC |
1030 | /* TLS extensions */ |
1031 | if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) { | |
1032 | if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &p, d, n, &al)) { | |
1033 | /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */ | |
1034 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT); | |
1035 | goto f_err; | |
1036 | } | |
1037 | } | |
1038 | if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) { | |
1039 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); | |
1040 | goto err; | |
1041 | } | |
865a90eb | 1042 | #endif |
40720ce3 MC |
1043 | /* |
1044 | * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other | |
1045 | * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression | |
1046 | * algorithms from the client, starting at q. | |
1047 | */ | |
1048 | s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL; | |
54f51116 | 1049 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP |
40720ce3 | 1050 | if (s->ctx->comp_methods != NULL) { |
d26667b2 | 1051 | /* See if we have a match */ |
40720ce3 MC |
1052 | int m, nn, o, v, done = 0; |
1053 | ||
1054 | nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); | |
1055 | for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) { | |
1056 | comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m); | |
1057 | v = comp->id; | |
1058 | for (o = 0; o < i; o++) { | |
1059 | if (v == q[o]) { | |
1060 | done = 1; | |
1061 | break; | |
1062 | } | |
1063 | } | |
1064 | if (done) | |
1065 | break; | |
1066 | } | |
1067 | if (done) | |
1068 | s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp; | |
1069 | else | |
1070 | comp = NULL; | |
1071 | } | |
54f51116 | 1072 | #endif |
413c4f45 | 1073 | |
40720ce3 | 1074 | /* TLS does not mind if there is extra stuff */ |
9d03aabe | 1075 | #if 0 |
40720ce3 MC |
1076 | /* |
1077 | * SSL 3.0 does not mind either, so we should disable this test (was | |
1078 | * enabled in 0.9.6d through 0.9.6j and 0.9.7 through 0.9.7b, in earlier | |
1079 | * SSLeay/OpenSSL releases this test existed but was buggy) | |
1080 | */ | |
1081 | if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { | |
1082 | if (p < (d + n)) { | |
1083 | /* | |
1084 | * wrong number of bytes, there could be more to follow | |
1085 | */ | |
1086 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
1087 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
1088 | goto f_err; | |
1089 | } | |
1090 | } | |
ddc38679 | 1091 | #endif |
d02b48c6 | 1092 | |
40720ce3 MC |
1093 | /* |
1094 | * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher | |
1095 | */ | |
d02b48c6 | 1096 | |
40720ce3 | 1097 | if (!s->hit) { |
54f51116 | 1098 | #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP |
40720ce3 | 1099 | s->session->compress_meth = 0; |
54f51116 | 1100 | #else |
40720ce3 | 1101 | s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id; |
54f51116 | 1102 | #endif |
40720ce3 MC |
1103 | if (s->session->ciphers != NULL) |
1104 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers); | |
1105 | s->session->ciphers = ciphers; | |
1106 | if (ciphers == NULL) { | |
1107 | al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
1108 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED); | |
1109 | goto f_err; | |
1110 | } | |
1111 | ciphers = NULL; | |
1112 | c = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s)); | |
1113 | ||
1114 | if (c == NULL) { | |
1115 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
1116 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); | |
1117 | goto f_err; | |
1118 | } | |
1119 | s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c; | |
1120 | } else { | |
1121 | /* Session-id reuse */ | |
d02b48c6 | 1122 | #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG |
40720ce3 MC |
1123 | STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; |
1124 | SSL_CIPHER *nc = NULL; | |
1125 | SSL_CIPHER *ec = NULL; | |
1126 | ||
1127 | if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) { | |
1128 | sk = s->session->ciphers; | |
1129 | for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) { | |
1130 | c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i); | |
1131 | if (c->algorithms & SSL_eNULL) | |
1132 | nc = c; | |
1133 | if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c)) | |
1134 | ec = c; | |
1135 | } | |
1136 | if (nc != NULL) | |
1137 | s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = nc; | |
1138 | else if (ec != NULL) | |
1139 | s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = ec; | |
1140 | else | |
1141 | s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher; | |
1142 | } else | |
d02b48c6 | 1143 | #endif |
40720ce3 MC |
1144 | s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher; |
1145 | } | |
1146 | ||
02f0c26c MC |
1147 | /*- |
1148 | * we now have the following setup. | |
1149 | * client_random | |
1150 | * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers | |
1151 | * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers | |
1152 | * compression - basically ignored right now | |
1153 | * ssl version is set - sslv3 | |
1154 | * s->session - The ssl session has been setup. | |
1155 | * s->hit - session reuse flag | |
1156 | * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use. | |
1157 | */ | |
d02b48c6 | 1158 | |
db731da8 | 1159 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT |
40720ce3 MC |
1160 | /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */ |
1161 | if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) { | |
1162 | if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0) { | |
1163 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); | |
1164 | goto err; | |
1165 | } | |
1166 | } | |
db731da8 | 1167 | #endif |
48bcdad0 | 1168 | |
40720ce3 MC |
1169 | if (ret < 0) |
1170 | ret = 1; | |
1171 | if (0) { | |
1172 | f_err: | |
1173 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
1174 | } | |
1175 | err: | |
1176 | if (ciphers != NULL) | |
1177 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers); | |
1178 | return (ret); | |
1179 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 1180 | |
36d16f8e | 1181 | int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s) |
40720ce3 MC |
1182 | { |
1183 | unsigned char *buf; | |
1184 | unsigned char *p, *d; | |
1185 | int i, sl; | |
1186 | unsigned long l, Time; | |
1187 | ||
1188 | if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) { | |
1189 | buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; | |
1190 | p = s->s3->server_random; | |
1191 | Time = (unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */ | |
1192 | l2n(Time, p); | |
1193 | if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE - 4) <= 0) | |
1194 | return -1; | |
1195 | /* Do the message type and length last */ | |
1196 | d = p = &(buf[4]); | |
1197 | ||
1198 | *(p++) = s->version >> 8; | |
1199 | *(p++) = s->version & 0xff; | |
1200 | ||
1201 | /* Random stuff */ | |
1202 | memcpy(p, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); | |
1203 | p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; | |
1204 | ||
1205 | /* | |
1206 | * now in theory we have 3 options to sending back the session id. | |
1207 | * If it is a re-use, we send back the old session-id, if it is a new | |
1208 | * session, we send back the new session-id or we send back a 0 | |
1209 | * length session-id if we want it to be single use. Currently I will | |
1210 | * not implement the '0' length session-id 12-Jan-98 - I'll now | |
1211 | * support the '0' length stuff. We also have an additional case | |
1212 | * where stateless session resumption is successful: we always send | |
1213 | * back the old session id. In this case s->hit is non zero: this can | |
1214 | * only happen if stateless session resumption is succesful if session | |
1215 | * caching is disabled so existing functionality is unaffected. | |
1216 | */ | |
1217 | if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER) | |
1218 | && !s->hit) | |
1219 | s->session->session_id_length = 0; | |
1220 | ||
1221 | sl = s->session->session_id_length; | |
1222 | if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) { | |
1223 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1224 | return -1; | |
1225 | } | |
1226 | *(p++) = sl; | |
1227 | memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, sl); | |
1228 | p += sl; | |
1229 | ||
1230 | /* put the cipher */ | |
1231 | i = ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, p); | |
1232 | p += i; | |
1233 | ||
1234 | /* put the compression method */ | |
54f51116 | 1235 | #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP |
40720ce3 | 1236 | *(p++) = 0; |
54f51116 | 1237 | #else |
40720ce3 MC |
1238 | if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) |
1239 | *(p++) = 0; | |
1240 | else | |
1241 | *(p++) = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id; | |
54f51116 | 1242 | #endif |
865a90eb | 1243 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT |
40720ce3 MC |
1244 | if ((p = |
1245 | ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, | |
1246 | buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == | |
1247 | NULL) { | |
1248 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1249 | return -1; | |
1250 | } | |
865a90eb | 1251 | #endif |
40720ce3 MC |
1252 | /* do the header */ |
1253 | l = (p - d); | |
1254 | d = buf; | |
1255 | *(d++) = SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO; | |
1256 | l2n3(l, d); | |
1257 | ||
1258 | s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B; | |
1259 | /* number of bytes to write */ | |
1260 | s->init_num = p - buf; | |
1261 | s->init_off = 0; | |
1262 | } | |
1263 | ||
1264 | /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */ | |
1265 | return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); | |
1266 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 1267 | |
36d16f8e | 1268 | int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s) |
40720ce3 MC |
1269 | { |
1270 | unsigned char *p; | |
d02b48c6 | 1271 | |
40720ce3 MC |
1272 | if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A) { |
1273 | p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; | |
d02b48c6 | 1274 | |
40720ce3 MC |
1275 | /* do the header */ |
1276 | *(p++) = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE; | |
1277 | *(p++) = 0; | |
1278 | *(p++) = 0; | |
1279 | *(p++) = 0; | |
d02b48c6 | 1280 | |
40720ce3 MC |
1281 | s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B; |
1282 | /* number of bytes to write */ | |
1283 | s->init_num = 4; | |
1284 | s->init_off = 0; | |
1285 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 1286 | |
40720ce3 MC |
1287 | /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */ |
1288 | return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); | |
1289 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 1290 | |
36d16f8e | 1291 | int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) |
40720ce3 | 1292 | { |
bc36ee62 | 1293 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA |
40720ce3 MC |
1294 | unsigned char *q; |
1295 | int j, num; | |
1296 | RSA *rsa; | |
1297 | unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; | |
1298 | unsigned int u; | |
d02b48c6 | 1299 | #endif |
bc36ee62 | 1300 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH |
40720ce3 | 1301 | DH *dh = NULL, *dhp; |
ea262260 BM |
1302 | #endif |
1303 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH | |
40720ce3 MC |
1304 | EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL, *ecdhp; |
1305 | unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL; | |
1306 | int encodedlen = 0; | |
1307 | int curve_id = 0; | |
1308 | BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; | |
d02b48c6 | 1309 | #endif |
40720ce3 MC |
1310 | EVP_PKEY *pkey; |
1311 | unsigned char *p, *d; | |
1312 | int al, i; | |
1313 | unsigned long type; | |
1314 | int n; | |
1315 | CERT *cert; | |
1316 | BIGNUM *r[4]; | |
1317 | int nr[4], kn; | |
1318 | BUF_MEM *buf; | |
1319 | EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; | |
1320 | ||
1321 | EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); | |
1322 | if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) { | |
1323 | type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_MKEY_MASK; | |
1324 | cert = s->cert; | |
1325 | ||
1326 | buf = s->init_buf; | |
1327 | ||
1328 | r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL; | |
1329 | n = 0; | |
bc36ee62 | 1330 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA |
40720ce3 MC |
1331 | if (type & SSL_kRSA) { |
1332 | rsa = cert->rsa_tmp; | |
1333 | if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL)) { | |
1334 | rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s, | |
1335 | SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3-> | |
1336 | tmp.new_cipher), | |
1337 | SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3-> | |
1338 | tmp.new_cipher)); | |
1339 | if (rsa == NULL) { | |
1340 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
1341 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
1342 | SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY); | |
1343 | goto f_err; | |
1344 | } | |
1345 | RSA_up_ref(rsa); | |
1346 | cert->rsa_tmp = rsa; | |
1347 | } | |
1348 | if (rsa == NULL) { | |
1349 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
1350 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
1351 | SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY); | |
1352 | goto f_err; | |
1353 | } | |
1354 | r[0] = rsa->n; | |
1355 | r[1] = rsa->e; | |
1356 | s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 1; | |
1357 | } else | |
d02b48c6 | 1358 | #endif |
bc36ee62 | 1359 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH |
40720ce3 MC |
1360 | if (type & SSL_kEDH) { |
1361 | dhp = cert->dh_tmp; | |
1362 | if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) | |
1363 | dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, | |
1364 | SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3-> | |
1365 | tmp.new_cipher), | |
1366 | SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3-> | |
1367 | tmp.new_cipher)); | |
1368 | if (dhp == NULL) { | |
1369 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
1370 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
1371 | SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); | |
1372 | goto f_err; | |
1373 | } | |
1374 | ||
1375 | if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) { | |
1376 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
1377 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1378 | goto err; | |
1379 | } | |
1380 | ||
1381 | if ((dh = DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL) { | |
1382 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB); | |
1383 | goto err; | |
1384 | } | |
1385 | ||
1386 | s->s3->tmp.dh = dh; | |
1387 | if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL || | |
1388 | dhp->priv_key == NULL || | |
1389 | (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE))) { | |
1390 | if (!DH_generate_key(dh)) { | |
1391 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB); | |
1392 | goto err; | |
1393 | } | |
1394 | } else { | |
1395 | dh->pub_key = BN_dup(dhp->pub_key); | |
1396 | dh->priv_key = BN_dup(dhp->priv_key); | |
1397 | if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) || (dh->priv_key == NULL)) { | |
1398 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB); | |
1399 | goto err; | |
1400 | } | |
1401 | } | |
1402 | r[0] = dh->p; | |
1403 | r[1] = dh->g; | |
1404 | r[2] = dh->pub_key; | |
1405 | } else | |
d02b48c6 | 1406 | #endif |
ea262260 | 1407 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH |
40720ce3 MC |
1408 | if (type & SSL_kECDHE) { |
1409 | const EC_GROUP *group; | |
1410 | ||
1411 | ecdhp = cert->ecdh_tmp; | |
1412 | if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL)) { | |
1413 | ecdhp = s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s, | |
1414 | SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3-> | |
1415 | tmp.new_cipher), | |
1416 | SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s-> | |
1417 | s3->tmp.new_cipher)); | |
1418 | } | |
1419 | if (ecdhp == NULL) { | |
1420 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
1421 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
1422 | SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY); | |
1423 | goto f_err; | |
1424 | } | |
1425 | ||
1426 | if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) { | |
1427 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
1428 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1429 | goto err; | |
1430 | } | |
1431 | ||
1432 | /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */ | |
1433 | if (ecdhp == NULL) { | |
1434 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); | |
1435 | goto err; | |
1436 | } | |
1437 | if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL) { | |
1438 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); | |
1439 | goto err; | |
1440 | } | |
1441 | ||
1442 | s->s3->tmp.ecdh = ecdh; | |
1443 | if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) || | |
1444 | (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) || | |
1445 | (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE)) { | |
1446 | if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh)) { | |
1447 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
1448 | ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); | |
1449 | goto err; | |
1450 | } | |
1451 | } | |
1452 | ||
1453 | if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) || | |
1454 | (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) || | |
1455 | (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL)) { | |
1456 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); | |
1457 | goto err; | |
1458 | } | |
1459 | ||
1460 | if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && | |
1461 | (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) { | |
1462 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
1463 | SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER); | |
1464 | goto err; | |
1465 | } | |
1466 | ||
1467 | /* | |
1468 | * XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH keys over named | |
1469 | * (not generic) curves. For supported named curves, curve_id is | |
1470 | * non-zero. | |
1471 | */ | |
1472 | if ((curve_id = nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group))) | |
1473 | == 0) { | |
1474 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
1475 | SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE); | |
1476 | goto err; | |
1477 | } | |
1478 | ||
1479 | /* | |
1480 | * Encode the public key. First check the size of encoding and | |
1481 | * allocate memory accordingly. | |
1482 | */ | |
1483 | encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, | |
1484 | EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh), | |
1485 | POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, | |
1486 | NULL, 0, NULL); | |
1487 | ||
1488 | encodedPoint = (unsigned char *) | |
1489 | OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen * sizeof(unsigned char)); | |
1490 | bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); | |
1491 | if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) { | |
1492 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
1493 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
1494 | goto err; | |
1495 | } | |
1496 | ||
1497 | encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, | |
1498 | EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh), | |
1499 | POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, | |
1500 | encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx); | |
1501 | ||
1502 | if (encodedlen == 0) { | |
1503 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); | |
1504 | goto err; | |
1505 | } | |
1506 | ||
1507 | BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); | |
1508 | bn_ctx = NULL; | |
1509 | ||
1510 | /* | |
1511 | * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves in | |
1512 | * ECDH ephemeral key exchanges. In this situation, we need four | |
1513 | * additional bytes to encode the entire ServerECDHParams | |
1514 | * structure. | |
1515 | */ | |
1516 | n = 4 + encodedlen; | |
1517 | ||
1518 | /* | |
1519 | * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we | |
1520 | * can set these to NULLs | |
1521 | */ | |
1522 | r[0] = NULL; | |
1523 | r[1] = NULL; | |
1524 | r[2] = NULL; | |
1525 | r[3] = NULL; | |
1526 | } else | |
1527 | #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */ | |
1528 | { | |
1529 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
1530 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
1531 | SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE); | |
1532 | goto f_err; | |
1533 | } | |
1534 | for (i = 0; r[i] != NULL; i++) { | |
1535 | nr[i] = BN_num_bytes(r[i]); | |
1536 | n += 2 + nr[i]; | |
1537 | } | |
1538 | ||
1539 | if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL)) { | |
1540 | if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) | |
1541 | == NULL) { | |
1542 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
1543 | goto f_err; | |
1544 | } | |
1545 | kn = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); | |
1546 | } else { | |
1547 | pkey = NULL; | |
1548 | kn = 0; | |
1549 | } | |
1550 | ||
1551 | if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, n + 4 + kn)) { | |
1552 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_BUF); | |
1553 | goto err; | |
1554 | } | |
1555 | d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; | |
1556 | p = &(d[4]); | |
1557 | ||
1558 | for (i = 0; r[i] != NULL; i++) { | |
1559 | s2n(nr[i], p); | |
1560 | BN_bn2bin(r[i], p); | |
1561 | p += nr[i]; | |
1562 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 1563 | |
ea262260 | 1564 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH |
40720ce3 MC |
1565 | if (type & SSL_kECDHE) { |
1566 | /* | |
1567 | * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. In | |
1568 | * this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: [1 byte | |
1569 | * CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] [1 byte length of encoded | |
1570 | * point], followed by the actual encoded point itself | |
1571 | */ | |
1572 | *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE; | |
1573 | p += 1; | |
1574 | *p = 0; | |
1575 | p += 1; | |
1576 | *p = curve_id; | |
1577 | p += 1; | |
1578 | *p = encodedlen; | |
1579 | p += 1; | |
1580 | memcpy((unsigned char *)p, | |
1581 | (unsigned char *)encodedPoint, encodedlen); | |
1582 | OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); | |
1583 | encodedPoint = NULL; | |
1584 | p += encodedlen; | |
1585 | } | |
ea262260 BM |
1586 | #endif |
1587 | ||
40720ce3 MC |
1588 | /* not anonymous */ |
1589 | if (pkey != NULL) { | |
1590 | /* | |
1591 | * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p | |
1592 | * points to the space at the end. | |
1593 | */ | |
bc36ee62 | 1594 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA |
40720ce3 MC |
1595 | if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) { |
1596 | q = md_buf; | |
1597 | j = 0; | |
1598 | for (num = 2; num > 0; num--) { | |
1599 | EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, | |
1600 | EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW); | |
1601 | EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, (num == 2) | |
1602 | ? s->ctx->md5 : s->ctx->sha1, NULL); | |
1603 | EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]), | |
1604 | SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); | |
1605 | EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]), | |
1606 | SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); | |
1607 | EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(d[4]), n); | |
1608 | EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q, (unsigned int *)&i); | |
1609 | q += i; | |
1610 | j += i; | |
1611 | } | |
1612 | if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j, | |
1613 | &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) { | |
1614 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_RSA); | |
1615 | goto err; | |
1616 | } | |
1617 | s2n(u, p); | |
1618 | n += u + 2; | |
1619 | } else | |
d02b48c6 | 1620 | #endif |
bc36ee62 | 1621 | #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA) |
40720ce3 MC |
1622 | if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) { |
1623 | /* lets do DSS */ | |
1624 | EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, EVP_dss1(), NULL); | |
1625 | EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]), | |
1626 | SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); | |
1627 | EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]), | |
1628 | SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); | |
1629 | EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(d[4]), n); | |
1630 | if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx, &(p[2]), | |
1631 | (unsigned int *)&i, pkey)) { | |
1632 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_DSA); | |
1633 | goto err; | |
1634 | } | |
1635 | s2n(i, p); | |
1636 | n += i + 2; | |
1637 | } else | |
ea262260 BM |
1638 | #endif |
1639 | #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA) | |
40720ce3 MC |
1640 | if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) { |
1641 | /* let's do ECDSA */ | |
1642 | EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, EVP_ecdsa(), NULL); | |
1643 | EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]), | |
1644 | SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); | |
1645 | EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]), | |
1646 | SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); | |
1647 | EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(d[4]), n); | |
1648 | if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx, &(p[2]), | |
1649 | (unsigned int *)&i, pkey)) { | |
1650 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
1651 | ERR_LIB_ECDSA); | |
1652 | goto err; | |
1653 | } | |
1654 | s2n(i, p); | |
1655 | n += i + 2; | |
1656 | } else | |
d02b48c6 | 1657 | #endif |
40720ce3 MC |
1658 | { |
1659 | /* Is this error check actually needed? */ | |
1660 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
1661 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
1662 | SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE); | |
1663 | goto f_err; | |
1664 | } | |
1665 | } | |
1666 | ||
1667 | *(d++) = SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; | |
1668 | l2n3(n, d); | |
1669 | ||
1670 | /* | |
1671 | * we should now have things packed up, so lets send it off | |
1672 | */ | |
1673 | s->init_num = n + 4; | |
1674 | s->init_off = 0; | |
1675 | } | |
1676 | ||
1677 | s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B; | |
1678 | EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); | |
1679 | return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); | |
1680 | f_err: | |
1681 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
1682 | err: | |
ea262260 | 1683 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH |
40720ce3 MC |
1684 | if (encodedPoint != NULL) |
1685 | OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); | |
1686 | BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); | |
ea262260 | 1687 | #endif |
40720ce3 MC |
1688 | EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); |
1689 | return (-1); | |
1690 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 1691 | |
36d16f8e | 1692 | int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s) |
40720ce3 MC |
1693 | { |
1694 | unsigned char *p, *d; | |
1695 | int i, j, nl, off, n; | |
1696 | STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL; | |
1697 | X509_NAME *name; | |
1698 | BUF_MEM *buf; | |
1699 | ||
1700 | if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A) { | |
1701 | buf = s->init_buf; | |
1702 | ||
1703 | d = p = (unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]); | |
1704 | ||
1705 | /* get the list of acceptable cert types */ | |
1706 | p++; | |
1707 | n = ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, p); | |
1708 | d[0] = n; | |
1709 | p += n; | |
1710 | n++; | |
1711 | ||
1712 | off = n; | |
1713 | p += 2; | |
1714 | n += 2; | |
1715 | ||
1716 | sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s); | |
1717 | nl = 0; | |
1718 | if (sk != NULL) { | |
1719 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) { | |
1720 | name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i); | |
1721 | j = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL); | |
1722 | if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, 4 + n + j + 2)) { | |
1723 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, | |
1724 | ERR_R_BUF_LIB); | |
1725 | goto err; | |
1726 | } | |
1727 | p = (unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4 + n]); | |
1728 | if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG)) { | |
1729 | s2n(j, p); | |
1730 | i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p); | |
1731 | n += 2 + j; | |
1732 | nl += 2 + j; | |
1733 | } else { | |
1734 | d = p; | |
1735 | i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p); | |
1736 | j -= 2; | |
1737 | s2n(j, d); | |
1738 | j += 2; | |
1739 | n += j; | |
1740 | nl += j; | |
1741 | } | |
1742 | } | |
1743 | } | |
1744 | /* else no CA names */ | |
1745 | p = (unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4 + off]); | |
1746 | s2n(nl, p); | |
1747 | ||
1748 | d = (unsigned char *)buf->data; | |
1749 | *(d++) = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST; | |
1750 | l2n3(n, d); | |
1751 | ||
1752 | /* | |
1753 | * we should now have things packed up, so lets send it off | |
1754 | */ | |
1755 | ||
1756 | s->init_num = n + 4; | |
1757 | s->init_off = 0; | |
de469ef2 | 1758 | #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG |
40720ce3 MC |
1759 | if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, s->init_num + 4)) { |
1760 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); | |
1761 | goto err; | |
1762 | } | |
1763 | p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num; | |
1764 | ||
1765 | /* do the header */ | |
1766 | *(p++) = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE; | |
1767 | *(p++) = 0; | |
1768 | *(p++) = 0; | |
1769 | *(p++) = 0; | |
1770 | s->init_num += 4; | |
de469ef2 DSH |
1771 | #endif |
1772 | ||
40720ce3 MC |
1773 | s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B; |
1774 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 1775 | |
40720ce3 MC |
1776 | /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */ |
1777 | return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); | |
1778 | err: | |
1779 | return (-1); | |
1780 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 1781 | |
36d16f8e | 1782 | int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) |
40720ce3 MC |
1783 | { |
1784 | int i, al, ok; | |
1785 | long n; | |
1786 | unsigned long l; | |
1787 | unsigned char *p; | |
bc36ee62 | 1788 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA |
40720ce3 MC |
1789 | RSA *rsa = NULL; |
1790 | EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; | |
79df9d62 | 1791 | #endif |
bc36ee62 | 1792 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH |
40720ce3 MC |
1793 | BIGNUM *pub = NULL; |
1794 | DH *dh_srvr; | |
58964a49 | 1795 | #endif |
bc36ee62 | 1796 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 |
40720ce3 MC |
1797 | KSSL_ERR kssl_err; |
1798 | #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ | |
d02b48c6 | 1799 | |
ea262260 | 1800 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH |
40720ce3 MC |
1801 | EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL; |
1802 | EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL; | |
1803 | EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL; | |
1804 | BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; | |
ea262260 BM |
1805 | #endif |
1806 | ||
40720ce3 MC |
1807 | n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, |
1808 | SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A, | |
1809 | SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B, | |
1810 | SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2048, &ok); | |
d02b48c6 | 1811 | |
40720ce3 MC |
1812 | if (!ok) |
1813 | return ((int)n); | |
1814 | p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg; | |
d02b48c6 | 1815 | |
40720ce3 | 1816 | l = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms; |
d02b48c6 | 1817 | |
bc36ee62 | 1818 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA |
40720ce3 MC |
1819 | if (l & SSL_kRSA) { |
1820 | unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; | |
1821 | int decrypt_len; | |
1822 | unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good; | |
1823 | ||
1824 | /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */ | |
1825 | if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp) { | |
1826 | if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL)) | |
1827 | rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp; | |
1828 | /* | |
1829 | * Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should be sent already | |
1830 | */ | |
1831 | if (rsa == NULL) { | |
1832 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
1833 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
1834 | SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY); | |
1835 | goto f_err; | |
1836 | ||
1837 | } | |
1838 | } else { | |
1839 | pkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey; | |
1840 | if ((pkey == NULL) || | |
1841 | (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) || (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) { | |
1842 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
1843 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
1844 | SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE); | |
1845 | goto f_err; | |
1846 | } | |
1847 | rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa; | |
1848 | } | |
1849 | ||
1850 | /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS, including pre-0.9.8f */ | |
1851 | if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->client_version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) { | |
1852 | n2s(p, i); | |
1853 | if (n != i + 2) { | |
1854 | if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG)) { | |
1855 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
1856 | SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); | |
1857 | goto err; | |
1858 | } else | |
1859 | p -= 2; | |
1860 | } else | |
1861 | n = i; | |
1862 | } | |
1863 | ||
1864 | /* | |
1865 | * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of | |
1866 | * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246, | |
1867 | * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and | |
1868 | * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt | |
1869 | * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1 | |
1870 | */ | |
1871 | ||
1872 | /* | |
1873 | * should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure. | |
1874 | */ | |
1875 | if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(rand_premaster_secret, | |
1876 | sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0) | |
1877 | goto err; | |
1878 | decrypt_len = | |
1879 | RSA_private_decrypt((int)n, p, p, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING); | |
1880 | ERR_clear_error(); | |
1881 | ||
1882 | /* | |
1883 | * decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH. decrypt_good will | |
1884 | * be 0xff if so and zero otherwise. | |
1885 | */ | |
1886 | decrypt_good = | |
1887 | constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_len, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH); | |
1888 | ||
1889 | /* | |
1890 | * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then | |
1891 | * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The | |
1892 | * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack | |
1893 | * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number | |
1894 | * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in | |
1895 | * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error. | |
1896 | */ | |
1897 | version_good = | |
1898 | constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8)); | |
1899 | version_good &= | |
1900 | constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff)); | |
1901 | ||
1902 | /* | |
1903 | * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the | |
1904 | * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the | |
1905 | * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites). | |
1906 | * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol | |
1907 | * version instead if the server does not support the requested | |
1908 | * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such | |
1909 | * clients. | |
1910 | */ | |
1911 | if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) { | |
1912 | unsigned char workaround_good; | |
1913 | workaround_good = | |
1914 | constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->version >> 8)); | |
1915 | workaround_good &= | |
1916 | constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff)); | |
1917 | version_good |= workaround_good; | |
1918 | } | |
1919 | ||
1920 | /* | |
1921 | * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to | |
1922 | * remain non-zero (0xff). | |
1923 | */ | |
1924 | decrypt_good &= version_good; | |
1925 | ||
1926 | /* | |
1927 | * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over p using decrypt_good_mask. | |
1928 | */ | |
1929 | for (i = 0; i < (int)sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); i++) { | |
1930 | p[i] = constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, p[i], | |
1931 | rand_premaster_secret[i]); | |
1932 | } | |
1933 | ||
1934 | s->session->master_key_length = | |
1935 | s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, | |
1936 | s-> | |
1937 | session->master_key, | |
1938 | p, i); | |
1939 | OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i); | |
1940 | } else | |
4c5fac4a | 1941 | #endif |
bc36ee62 | 1942 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH |
40720ce3 MC |
1943 | if (l & (SSL_kEDH | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) { |
1944 | n2s(p, i); | |
1945 | if (n != i + 2) { | |
1946 | if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG)) { | |
1947 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
1948 | SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); | |
1949 | goto err; | |
1950 | } else { | |
1951 | p -= 2; | |
1952 | i = (int)n; | |
1953 | } | |
1954 | } | |
1955 | ||
1956 | if (n == 0L) { /* the parameters are in the cert */ | |
1957 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
1958 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
1959 | SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS); | |
1960 | goto f_err; | |
1961 | } else { | |
1962 | if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL) { | |
1963 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
1964 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
1965 | SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); | |
1966 | goto f_err; | |
1967 | } else | |
1968 | dh_srvr = s->s3->tmp.dh; | |
1969 | } | |
1970 | ||
1971 | pub = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL); | |
1972 | if (pub == NULL) { | |
1973 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BN_LIB); | |
1974 | goto err; | |
1975 | } | |
1976 | ||
1977 | i = DH_compute_key(p, pub, dh_srvr); | |
1978 | ||
1979 | if (i <= 0) { | |
1980 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB); | |
1981 | BN_clear_free(pub); | |
1982 | goto err; | |
1983 | } | |
1984 | ||
1985 | DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh); | |
1986 | s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL; | |
1987 | ||
1988 | BN_clear_free(pub); | |
1989 | pub = NULL; | |
1990 | s->session->master_key_length = | |
1991 | s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, | |
1992 | s-> | |
1993 | session->master_key, | |
1994 | p, i); | |
1995 | OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i); | |
1996 | } else | |
d02b48c6 | 1997 | #endif |
bc36ee62 | 1998 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 |
40720ce3 MC |
1999 | if (l & SSL_kKRB5) { |
2000 | krb5_error_code krb5rc; | |
2001 | krb5_data enc_ticket; | |
2002 | krb5_data authenticator; | |
2003 | krb5_data enc_pms; | |
2004 | KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx; | |
2005 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx; | |
2006 | EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL; | |
2007 | unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; | |
2008 | unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH]; | |
2009 | int padl, outl; | |
2010 | krb5_timestamp authtime = 0; | |
2011 | krb5_ticket_times ttimes; | |
2012 | ||
2013 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx); | |
2014 | ||
2015 | if (!kssl_ctx) | |
2016 | kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new(); | |
2017 | ||
2018 | n2s(p, i); | |
2019 | enc_ticket.length = i; | |
2020 | ||
2021 | if (n < (int)enc_ticket.length + 6) { | |
2022 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2023 | SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); | |
2024 | goto err; | |
2025 | } | |
2026 | ||
2027 | enc_ticket.data = (char *)p; | |
2028 | p += enc_ticket.length; | |
2029 | ||
2030 | n2s(p, i); | |
2031 | authenticator.length = i; | |
2032 | ||
2033 | if (n < (int)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length) + 6) { | |
2034 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2035 | SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); | |
2036 | goto err; | |
2037 | } | |
2038 | ||
2039 | authenticator.data = (char *)p; | |
2040 | p += authenticator.length; | |
2041 | ||
2042 | n2s(p, i); | |
2043 | enc_pms.length = i; | |
2044 | enc_pms.data = (char *)p; | |
2045 | p += enc_pms.length; | |
2046 | ||
2047 | /* | |
2048 | * Note that the length is checked again below, ** after decryption | |
2049 | */ | |
2050 | if (enc_pms.length > sizeof pms) { | |
2051 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2052 | SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); | |
2053 | goto err; | |
2054 | } | |
2055 | ||
2056 | if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + | |
2057 | enc_pms.length + 6)) { | |
2058 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2059 | SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); | |
2060 | goto err; | |
2061 | } | |
2062 | ||
2063 | if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes, | |
2064 | &kssl_err)) != 0) { | |
2065 | # ifdef KSSL_DEBUG | |
2066 | printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n", krb5rc, kssl_err.reason); | |
2067 | if (kssl_err.text) | |
2068 | printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text); | |
2069 | # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ | |
2070 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason); | |
2071 | goto err; | |
2072 | } | |
2073 | ||
2074 | /* | |
2075 | * Note: no authenticator is not considered an error, ** but will | |
2076 | * return authtime == 0. | |
2077 | */ | |
2078 | if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator, | |
2079 | &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0) { | |
2080 | # ifdef KSSL_DEBUG | |
2081 | printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n", | |
2082 | krb5rc, kssl_err.reason); | |
2083 | if (kssl_err.text) | |
2084 | printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text); | |
2085 | # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ | |
2086 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason); | |
2087 | goto err; | |
2088 | } | |
2089 | ||
2090 | if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0) { | |
2091 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc); | |
2092 | goto err; | |
2093 | } | |
2094 | # ifdef KSSL_DEBUG | |
2095 | kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx); | |
2096 | # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ | |
2097 | ||
2098 | enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype); | |
2099 | if (enc == NULL) | |
2100 | goto err; | |
2101 | ||
2102 | memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */ | |
2103 | ||
2104 | if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx, enc, NULL, kssl_ctx->key, iv)) { | |
2105 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2106 | SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); | |
2107 | goto err; | |
2108 | } | |
2109 | if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms, &outl, | |
2110 | (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length)) | |
2111 | { | |
2112 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2113 | SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); | |
2114 | goto err; | |
2115 | } | |
2116 | if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) { | |
2117 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2118 | SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); | |
2119 | goto err; | |
2120 | } | |
2121 | if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx, &(pms[outl]), &padl)) { | |
2122 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2123 | SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); | |
2124 | goto err; | |
2125 | } | |
2126 | outl += padl; | |
2127 | if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) { | |
2128 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2129 | SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); | |
2130 | goto err; | |
2131 | } | |
2132 | if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version >> 8)) | |
2133 | && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff)))) { | |
2134 | /* | |
2135 | * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as | |
2136 | * the ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, | |
2137 | * the protocol does not offer such protection for DH | |
2138 | * ciphersuites). However, buggy clients exist that send random | |
2139 | * bytes instead of the protocol version. If | |
2140 | * SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. | |
2141 | * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos | |
2142 | * cipher) | |
2143 | */ | |
2144 | if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG)) { | |
2145 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2146 | SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); | |
2147 | goto err; | |
2148 | } | |
2149 | } | |
2150 | ||
2151 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx); | |
2152 | ||
2153 | s->session->master_key_length = | |
2154 | s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, | |
2155 | s-> | |
2156 | session->master_key, | |
2157 | pms, outl); | |
2158 | ||
2159 | if (kssl_ctx->client_princ) { | |
2160 | size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ); | |
2161 | if (len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH) { | |
2162 | s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len; | |
2163 | memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ, kssl_ctx->client_princ, | |
2164 | len); | |
2165 | } | |
2166 | } | |
2167 | ||
02f0c26c MC |
2168 | /*- Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here, |
2169 | * but it caused problems for apache. | |
2170 | * kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx); | |
2171 | * if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL; | |
2172 | */ | |
40720ce3 MC |
2173 | } else |
2174 | #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ | |
ea262260 BM |
2175 | |
2176 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH | |
40720ce3 MC |
2177 | if ((l & SSL_kECDH) || (l & SSL_kECDHE)) { |
2178 | int ret = 1; | |
2179 | int field_size = 0; | |
2180 | const EC_KEY *tkey; | |
2181 | const EC_GROUP *group; | |
2182 | const BIGNUM *priv_key; | |
2183 | ||
2184 | /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */ | |
2185 | if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) { | |
2186 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
2187 | goto err; | |
2188 | } | |
2189 | ||
2190 | /* Let's get server private key and group information */ | |
2191 | if (l & SSL_kECDH) { | |
2192 | /* use the certificate */ | |
2193 | tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec; | |
2194 | } else { | |
2195 | /* | |
2196 | * use the ephermeral values we saved when generating the | |
2197 | * ServerKeyExchange msg. | |
2198 | */ | |
2199 | tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh; | |
2200 | } | |
2201 | ||
2202 | group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey); | |
2203 | priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey); | |
2204 | ||
2205 | if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) || | |
2206 | !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key)) { | |
2207 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); | |
2208 | goto err; | |
2209 | } | |
2210 | ||
2211 | /* Let's get client's public key */ | |
2212 | if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) { | |
2213 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
2214 | goto err; | |
2215 | } | |
2216 | ||
2217 | if (n == 0L) { | |
2218 | /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */ | |
2219 | ||
2220 | if (l & SSL_kECDHE) { | |
2221 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
2222 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2223 | SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY); | |
2224 | goto f_err; | |
2225 | } | |
2226 | if (((clnt_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer)) | |
2227 | == NULL) || (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)) { | |
2228 | /* | |
2229 | * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication | |
2230 | * using ECDH certificates so this branch (n == 0L) of the | |
2231 | * code is never executed. When that support is added, we | |
2232 | * ought to ensure the key received in the certificate is | |
2233 | * authorized for key agreement. ECDH_compute_key implicitly | |
2234 | * checks that the two ECDH shares are for the same group. | |
2235 | */ | |
2236 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
2237 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2238 | SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS); | |
2239 | goto f_err; | |
2240 | } | |
2241 | ||
2242 | if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint, | |
2243 | EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey-> | |
2244 | pkey.ec)) == 0) { | |
2245 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); | |
2246 | goto err; | |
2247 | } | |
2248 | ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */ | |
2249 | } else { | |
2250 | /* | |
2251 | * Get client's public key from encoded point in the | |
2252 | * ClientKeyExchange message. | |
2253 | */ | |
2254 | if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) { | |
2255 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2256 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
2257 | goto err; | |
2258 | } | |
2259 | ||
2260 | /* Get encoded point length */ | |
2261 | i = *p; | |
2262 | p += 1; | |
2263 | if (n != 1 + i) { | |
2264 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); | |
2265 | goto err; | |
2266 | } | |
2267 | if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0) { | |
2268 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); | |
2269 | goto err; | |
2270 | } | |
2271 | /* | |
2272 | * p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer currently, so set it | |
2273 | * to the start | |
2274 | */ | |
2275 | p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; | |
2276 | } | |
2277 | ||
2278 | /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */ | |
2279 | field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group); | |
2280 | if (field_size <= 0) { | |
2281 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); | |
2282 | goto err; | |
2283 | } | |
2284 | i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size + 7) / 8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, | |
2285 | NULL); | |
2286 | if (i <= 0) { | |
2287 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); | |
2288 | goto err; | |
2289 | } | |
2290 | ||
2291 | EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey); | |
2292 | EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint); | |
2293 | if (srvr_ecdh != NULL) | |
2294 | EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh); | |
2295 | BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); | |
2296 | ||
2297 | /* Compute the master secret */ | |
2298 | s->session->master_key_length = | |
2299 | s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, | |
2300 | s-> | |
2301 | session->master_key, | |
2302 | p, i); | |
2303 | ||
2304 | OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i); | |
2305 | return (ret); | |
2306 | } else | |
ea262260 | 2307 | #endif |
40720ce3 MC |
2308 | { |
2309 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
2310 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE); | |
2311 | goto f_err; | |
2312 | } | |
2313 | ||
2314 | return (1); | |
2315 | f_err: | |
2316 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
ea262260 | 2317 | #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) |
40720ce3 | 2318 | err: |
ea262260 | 2319 | #endif |
d020e701 | 2320 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH |
40720ce3 MC |
2321 | EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey); |
2322 | EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint); | |
2323 | if (srvr_ecdh != NULL) | |
2324 | EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh); | |
2325 | BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); | |
58964a49 | 2326 | #endif |
40720ce3 MC |
2327 | return (-1); |
2328 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 2329 | |
36d16f8e | 2330 | int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s) |
40720ce3 MC |
2331 | { |
2332 | EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; | |
2333 | unsigned char *p; | |
2334 | int al, ok, ret = 0; | |
2335 | long n; | |
2336 | int type = 0, i, j; | |
2337 | X509 *peer; | |
2338 | ||
2339 | n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, | |
2340 | SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A, | |
2341 | SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, | |
2342 | -1, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok); | |
2343 | ||
2344 | if (!ok) | |
2345 | return ((int)n); | |
2346 | ||
2347 | if (s->session->peer != NULL) { | |
2348 | peer = s->session->peer; | |
2349 | pkey = X509_get_pubkey(peer); | |
2350 | type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey); | |
2351 | } else { | |
2352 | peer = NULL; | |
2353 | pkey = NULL; | |
2354 | } | |
2355 | ||
2356 | if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) { | |
2357 | s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1; | |
2358 | if (peer != NULL) { | |
2359 | al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; | |
2360 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE); | |
2361 | goto f_err; | |
2362 | } | |
2363 | ret = 1; | |
2364 | goto end; | |
2365 | } | |
2366 | ||
2367 | if (peer == NULL) { | |
2368 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED); | |
2369 | al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; | |
2370 | goto f_err; | |
2371 | } | |
2372 | ||
2373 | if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) { | |
2374 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, | |
2375 | SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE); | |
2376 | al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
2377 | goto f_err; | |
2378 | } | |
2379 | ||
2380 | if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec) { | |
2381 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); | |
2382 | al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; | |
2383 | goto f_err; | |
2384 | } | |
2385 | ||
2386 | /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */ | |
2387 | p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg; | |
2388 | n2s(p, i); | |
2389 | n -= 2; | |
2390 | if (i > n) { | |
2391 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
2392 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
2393 | goto f_err; | |
2394 | } | |
2395 | ||
2396 | j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); | |
2397 | if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0)) { | |
2398 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE); | |
2399 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
2400 | goto f_err; | |
2401 | } | |
2402 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA | |
2403 | if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) { | |
2404 | i = RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md, | |
2405 | MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, | |
2406 | pkey->pkey.rsa); | |
2407 | if (i < 0) { | |
2408 | al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; | |
2409 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); | |
2410 | goto f_err; | |
2411 | } | |
2412 | if (i == 0) { | |
2413 | al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; | |
2414 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE); | |
2415 | goto f_err; | |
2416 | } | |
2417 | } else | |
d02b48c6 | 2418 | #endif |
bc36ee62 | 2419 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA |
40720ce3 MC |
2420 | if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) { |
2421 | j = DSA_verify(pkey->save_type, | |
2422 | &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]), | |
2423 | SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.dsa); | |
2424 | if (j <= 0) { | |
2425 | /* bad signature */ | |
2426 | al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; | |
2427 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE); | |
2428 | goto f_err; | |
2429 | } | |
2430 | } else | |
ea262260 BM |
2431 | #endif |
2432 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA | |
40720ce3 MC |
2433 | if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) { |
2434 | j = ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type, | |
2435 | &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]), | |
2436 | SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.ec); | |
2437 | if (j <= 0) { | |
2438 | /* bad signature */ | |
2439 | al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; | |
2440 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE); | |
2441 | goto f_err; | |
2442 | } | |
2443 | } else | |
d02b48c6 | 2444 | #endif |
40720ce3 MC |
2445 | { |
2446 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2447 | al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE; | |
2448 | goto f_err; | |
2449 | } | |
2450 | ||
2451 | ret = 1; | |
2452 | if (0) { | |
2453 | f_err: | |
2454 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
2455 | } | |
2456 | end: | |
2457 | EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); | |
2458 | return (ret); | |
2459 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 2460 | |
36d16f8e | 2461 | int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s) |
40720ce3 MC |
2462 | { |
2463 | int i, ok, al, ret = -1; | |
2464 | X509 *x = NULL; | |
2465 | unsigned long l, nc, llen, n; | |
2466 | const unsigned char *p, *q; | |
2467 | unsigned char *d; | |
2468 | STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL; | |
2469 | ||
2470 | n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, | |
2471 | SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A, | |
2472 | SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B, | |
2473 | -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok); | |
2474 | ||
2475 | if (!ok) | |
2476 | return ((int)n); | |
2477 | ||
2478 | if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) { | |
2479 | if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && | |
2480 | (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) { | |
2481 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, | |
2482 | SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); | |
2483 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
2484 | goto f_err; | |
2485 | } | |
2486 | /* | |
2487 | * If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list | |
2488 | */ | |
2489 | if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request) { | |
2490 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, | |
2491 | SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST); | |
2492 | al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; | |
2493 | goto f_err; | |
2494 | } | |
2495 | s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1; | |
2496 | return (1); | |
2497 | } | |
2498 | ||
2499 | if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) { | |
2500 | al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; | |
2501 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE); | |
2502 | goto f_err; | |
2503 | } | |
2504 | p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg; | |
2505 | ||
2506 | if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) { | |
2507 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
2508 | goto err; | |
2509 | } | |
2510 | ||
2511 | n2l3(p, llen); | |
2512 | if (llen + 3 != n) { | |
2513 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
2514 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
2515 | goto f_err; | |
2516 | } | |
2517 | for (nc = 0; nc < llen;) { | |
2518 | n2l3(p, l); | |
2519 | if ((l + nc + 3) > llen) { | |
2520 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
2521 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, | |
2522 | SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
2523 | goto f_err; | |
2524 | } | |
2525 | ||
2526 | q = p; | |
2527 | x = d2i_X509(NULL, &p, l); | |
2528 | if (x == NULL) { | |
2529 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); | |
2530 | goto err; | |
2531 | } | |
2532 | if (p != (q + l)) { | |
2533 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
2534 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, | |
2535 | SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
2536 | goto f_err; | |
2537 | } | |
2538 | if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) { | |
2539 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
2540 | goto err; | |
2541 | } | |
2542 | x = NULL; | |
2543 | nc += l + 3; | |
2544 | } | |
2545 | ||
2546 | if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) { | |
2547 | /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */ | |
2548 | if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { | |
2549 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
2550 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, | |
2551 | SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED); | |
2552 | goto f_err; | |
2553 | } | |
2554 | /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */ | |
2555 | else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && | |
2556 | (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) { | |
2557 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, | |
2558 | SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); | |
2559 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
2560 | goto f_err; | |
2561 | } | |
2562 | } else { | |
2563 | i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk); | |
2564 | if (i <= 0) { | |
2565 | al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result); | |
2566 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, | |
2567 | SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED); | |
2568 | goto f_err; | |
2569 | } | |
2570 | } | |
2571 | ||
2572 | if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */ | |
2573 | X509_free(s->session->peer); | |
2574 | s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk); | |
2575 | s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result; | |
2576 | ||
2577 | /* | |
2578 | * With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL when we | |
2579 | * arrive here. | |
2580 | */ | |
2581 | if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) { | |
2582 | s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new(); | |
2583 | if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) { | |
2584 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
2585 | goto err; | |
2586 | } | |
2587 | } | |
2588 | if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL) | |
2589 | sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free); | |
2590 | s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain = sk; | |
2591 | /* | |
2592 | * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own | |
2593 | * certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c | |
2594 | */ | |
2595 | ||
2596 | sk = NULL; | |
2597 | ||
2598 | ret = 1; | |
2599 | if (0) { | |
2600 | f_err: | |
2601 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
2602 | } | |
2603 | err: | |
2604 | if (x != NULL) | |
2605 | X509_free(x); | |
2606 | if (sk != NULL) | |
2607 | sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free); | |
2608 | return (ret); | |
2609 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 2610 | |
6b691a5c | 2611 | int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s) |
40720ce3 MC |
2612 | { |
2613 | unsigned long l; | |
2614 | X509 *x; | |
2615 | ||
2616 | if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A) { | |
2617 | x = ssl_get_server_send_cert(s); | |
2618 | if (x == NULL && | |
2619 | /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */ | |
2620 | (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms | |
2621 | & (SSL_MKEY_MASK | SSL_AUTH_MASK)) | |
2622 | != (SSL_aKRB5 | SSL_kKRB5)) { | |
2623 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2624 | return (0); | |
2625 | } | |
2626 | ||
2627 | l = ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, x); | |
2628 | s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B; | |
2629 | s->init_num = (int)l; | |
2630 | s->init_off = 0; | |
2631 | } | |
2632 | ||
2633 | /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */ | |
2634 | return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); | |
2635 | } | |
ea262260 BM |
2636 | |
2637 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH | |
2638 | /* This is the complement of curve_id2nid in s3_clnt.c. */ | |
2639 | static int nid2curve_id(int nid) | |
2640 | { | |
40720ce3 MC |
2641 | /* |
2642 | * ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-01.txt (Mar 15, 2001) (no changes | |
2643 | * in draft-ietf-tls-ecc-03.txt [June 2003]) | |
2644 | */ | |
2645 | switch (nid) { | |
2646 | case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */ | |
2647 | return 1; | |
2648 | case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */ | |
2649 | return 2; | |
2650 | case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */ | |
2651 | return 3; | |
2652 | case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */ | |
2653 | return 4; | |
2654 | case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */ | |
2655 | return 5; | |
2656 | case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */ | |
2657 | return 6; | |
2658 | case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */ | |
2659 | return 7; | |
2660 | case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */ | |
2661 | return 8; | |
2662 | case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */ | |
2663 | return 9; | |
2664 | case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */ | |
2665 | return 10; | |
2666 | case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */ | |
2667 | return 11; | |
2668 | case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */ | |
2669 | return 12; | |
2670 | case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */ | |
2671 | return 13; | |
2672 | case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */ | |
2673 | return 14; | |
2674 | case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */ | |
2675 | return 15; | |
2676 | case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */ | |
2677 | return 16; | |
2678 | case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */ | |
2679 | return 17; | |
2680 | case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */ | |
2681 | return 18; | |
2682 | case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */ | |
2683 | return 19; | |
2684 | case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */ | |
2685 | return 20; | |
2686 | case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */ | |
2687 | return 21; | |
2688 | case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */ | |
2689 | return 22; | |
2690 | case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */ | |
2691 | return 23; | |
2692 | case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */ | |
2693 | return 24; | |
2694 | case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */ | |
2695 | return 25; | |
2696 | default: | |
2697 | return 0; | |
2698 | } | |
ea262260 BM |
2699 | } |
2700 | #endif | |
865a90eb DSH |
2701 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT |
2702 | int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s) | |
40720ce3 MC |
2703 | { |
2704 | if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A) { | |
2705 | unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart; | |
2706 | int len, slen; | |
2707 | unsigned int hlen; | |
2708 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; | |
2709 | HMAC_CTX hctx; | |
2710 | SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx; | |
2711 | unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; | |
2712 | unsigned char key_name[16]; | |
2713 | ||
2714 | /* get session encoding length */ | |
2715 | slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL); | |
2716 | /* | |
2717 | * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too | |
2718 | * long | |
2719 | */ | |
2720 | if (slen > 0xFF00) | |
2721 | return -1; | |
02f0c26c MC |
2722 | /*- |
2723 | * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as | |
2724 | * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length | |
2725 | * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) + | |
2726 | * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) + | |
2727 | * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session | |
2728 | * length) + max_md_size (HMAC). | |
2729 | */ | |
40720ce3 MC |
2730 | if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, |
2731 | 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + | |
2732 | EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen)) | |
2733 | return -1; | |
2734 | senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen); | |
2735 | if (!senc) | |
2736 | return -1; | |
2737 | p = senc; | |
2738 | i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p); | |
2739 | ||
2740 | p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; | |
2741 | /* do the header */ | |
2742 | *(p++) = SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET; | |
2743 | /* Skip message length for now */ | |
2744 | p += 3; | |
2745 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx); | |
2746 | HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx); | |
2747 | /* | |
2748 | * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does | |
2749 | * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx. | |
2750 | */ | |
2751 | if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) { | |
2752 | if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx, | |
2753 | &hctx, 1) < 0) { | |
2754 | OPENSSL_free(senc); | |
2755 | return -1; | |
2756 | } | |
2757 | } else { | |
2758 | RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16); | |
2759 | EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, | |
2760 | tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv); | |
2761 | HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16, | |
2762 | tlsext_tick_md(), NULL); | |
2763 | memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16); | |
2764 | } | |
2765 | l2n(s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint, p); | |
2766 | /* Skip ticket length for now */ | |
2767 | p += 2; | |
2768 | /* Output key name */ | |
2769 | macstart = p; | |
2770 | memcpy(p, key_name, 16); | |
2771 | p += 16; | |
2772 | /* output IV */ | |
2773 | memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx)); | |
2774 | p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); | |
2775 | /* Encrypt session data */ | |
2776 | EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen); | |
2777 | p += len; | |
2778 | EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len); | |
2779 | p += len; | |
2780 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); | |
2781 | ||
2782 | HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart); | |
2783 | HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen); | |
2784 | HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); | |
2785 | ||
2786 | p += hlen; | |
2787 | /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */ | |
2788 | /* Total length */ | |
2789 | len = p - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; | |
2790 | p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + 1; | |
2791 | l2n3(len - 4, p); /* Message length */ | |
2792 | p += 4; | |
2793 | s2n(len - 10, p); /* Ticket length */ | |
2794 | ||
2795 | /* number of bytes to write */ | |
2796 | s->init_num = len; | |
2797 | s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B; | |
2798 | s->init_off = 0; | |
2799 | OPENSSL_free(senc); | |
2800 | } | |
2801 | ||
2802 | /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */ | |
2803 | return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); | |
2804 | } | |
a5232767 DSH |
2805 | |
2806 | int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s) | |
40720ce3 MC |
2807 | { |
2808 | if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A) { | |
2809 | unsigned char *p; | |
02f0c26c MC |
2810 | /*- |
2811 | * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as | |
2812 | * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) + | |
2813 | * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length) | |
2814 | * + (ocsp response) | |
2815 | */ | |
40720ce3 MC |
2816 | if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen)) |
2817 | return -1; | |
2818 | ||
2819 | p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; | |
2820 | ||
2821 | /* do the header */ | |
2822 | *(p++) = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS; | |
2823 | /* message length */ | |
2824 | l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p); | |
2825 | /* status type */ | |
2826 | *(p++) = s->tlsext_status_type; | |
2827 | /* length of OCSP response */ | |
2828 | l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p); | |
2829 | /* actual response */ | |
2830 | memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen); | |
2831 | /* number of bytes to write */ | |
2832 | s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen; | |
2833 | s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B; | |
2834 | s->init_off = 0; | |
2835 | } | |
2836 | ||
2837 | /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */ | |
2838 | return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); | |
2839 | } | |
865a90eb | 2840 | #endif |