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25670f3e MC |
1 | /* |
2 | * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. | |
3 | * | |
4 | * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use | |
5 | * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy | |
6 | * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at | |
7 | * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html | |
8 | */ | |
9 | ||
10 | #include <openssl/ocsp.h> | |
11 | #include "../ssl_locl.h" | |
12 | #include "statem_locl.h" | |
13 | ||
14 | /* | |
15 | * Parse the client's renegotiation binding and abort if it's not right | |
16 | */ | |
8521ced6 | 17 | int tls_parse_ctos_renegotiate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, |
f97d4c37 | 18 | int *al) |
25670f3e MC |
19 | { |
20 | unsigned int ilen; | |
21 | const unsigned char *data; | |
22 | ||
23 | /* Parse the length byte */ | |
24 | if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &ilen) | |
25 | || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, ilen)) { | |
7fe97c07 | 26 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE, |
25670f3e MC |
27 | SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR); |
28 | *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
29 | return 0; | |
30 | } | |
31 | ||
32 | /* Check that the extension matches */ | |
33 | if (ilen != s->s3->previous_client_finished_len) { | |
7fe97c07 | 34 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE, |
25670f3e MC |
35 | SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH); |
36 | *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
37 | return 0; | |
38 | } | |
39 | ||
40 | if (memcmp(data, s->s3->previous_client_finished, | |
41 | s->s3->previous_client_finished_len)) { | |
7fe97c07 | 42 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE, |
25670f3e MC |
43 | SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH); |
44 | *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
45 | return 0; | |
46 | } | |
47 | ||
48 | s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1; | |
49 | ||
50 | return 1; | |
51 | } | |
52 | ||
1266eefd MC |
53 | /*- |
54 | * The servername extension is treated as follows: | |
55 | * | |
56 | * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255. | |
57 | * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros, | |
58 | * in which case an fatal alert is generated. | |
59 | * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache. | |
60 | * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order | |
61 | * to allow the application to position itself to the right context. | |
62 | * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when | |
63 | * it is identical to a previously used for the same session. | |
64 | * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time | |
65 | * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the | |
66 | * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and | |
67 | * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername | |
68 | * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches | |
69 | * the value of the Host: field. | |
70 | * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION | |
71 | * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the | |
72 | * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername | |
73 | * extension. | |
74 | * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent. | |
75 | */ | |
8521ced6 | 76 | int tls_parse_ctos_server_name(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, |
f97d4c37 | 77 | int *al) |
25670f3e MC |
78 | { |
79 | unsigned int servname_type; | |
80 | PACKET sni, hostname; | |
81 | ||
25670f3e MC |
82 | if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &sni) |
83 | /* ServerNameList must be at least 1 byte long. */ | |
84 | || PACKET_remaining(&sni) == 0) { | |
85 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
86 | return 0; | |
87 | } | |
88 | ||
89 | /* | |
90 | * Although the server_name extension was intended to be | |
91 | * extensible to new name types, RFC 4366 defined the | |
1266eefd | 92 | * syntax inextensibly and OpenSSL 1.0.x parses it as |
25670f3e MC |
93 | * such. |
94 | * RFC 6066 corrected the mistake but adding new name types | |
95 | * is nevertheless no longer feasible, so act as if no other | |
96 | * SNI types can exist, to simplify parsing. | |
97 | * | |
98 | * Also note that the RFC permits only one SNI value per type, | |
99 | * i.e., we can only have a single hostname. | |
100 | */ | |
101 | if (!PACKET_get_1(&sni, &servname_type) | |
102 | || servname_type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name | |
103 | || !PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&sni, &hostname)) { | |
104 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
105 | return 0; | |
106 | } | |
107 | ||
108 | if (!s->hit) { | |
109 | if (PACKET_remaining(&hostname) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) { | |
110 | *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; | |
111 | return 0; | |
112 | } | |
113 | ||
114 | if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&hostname)) { | |
115 | *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; | |
116 | return 0; | |
117 | } | |
118 | ||
119 | if (!PACKET_strndup(&hostname, &s->session->tlsext_hostname)) { | |
120 | *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
121 | return 0; | |
122 | } | |
123 | ||
124 | s->servername_done = 1; | |
125 | } else { | |
126 | /* | |
127 | * TODO(openssl-team): if the SNI doesn't match, we MUST | |
128 | * fall back to a full handshake. | |
129 | */ | |
130 | s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname | |
131 | && PACKET_equal(&hostname, s->session->tlsext_hostname, | |
132 | strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname)); | |
133 | } | |
134 | ||
135 | return 1; | |
136 | } | |
137 | ||
138 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP | |
8521ced6 | 139 | int tls_parse_ctos_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) |
25670f3e MC |
140 | { |
141 | PACKET srp_I; | |
142 | ||
143 | if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &srp_I) | |
144 | || PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&srp_I)) { | |
145 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
146 | return 0; | |
147 | } | |
148 | ||
149 | /* | |
150 | * TODO(openssl-team): currently, we re-authenticate the user | |
151 | * upon resumption. Instead, we MUST ignore the login. | |
152 | */ | |
153 | if (!PACKET_strndup(&srp_I, &s->srp_ctx.login)) { | |
154 | *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
155 | return 0; | |
156 | } | |
157 | ||
158 | return 1; | |
159 | } | |
160 | #endif | |
161 | ||
162 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC | |
8521ced6 | 163 | int tls_parse_ctos_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, |
f97d4c37 | 164 | int *al) |
25670f3e MC |
165 | { |
166 | PACKET ec_point_format_list; | |
167 | ||
168 | if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ec_point_format_list) | |
169 | || PACKET_remaining(&ec_point_format_list) == 0) { | |
170 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
171 | return 0; | |
172 | } | |
173 | ||
174 | if (!s->hit) { | |
175 | if (!PACKET_memdup(&ec_point_format_list, | |
176 | &s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, | |
177 | &s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length)) { | |
178 | *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
179 | return 0; | |
180 | } | |
181 | } | |
182 | ||
183 | return 1; | |
184 | } | |
185 | #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ | |
186 | ||
8521ced6 | 187 | int tls_parse_ctos_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, |
f97d4c37 | 188 | int *al) |
25670f3e MC |
189 | { |
190 | if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb && | |
191 | !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, PACKET_data(pkt), | |
192 | PACKET_remaining(pkt), | |
193 | s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) { | |
194 | *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
195 | return 0; | |
196 | } | |
197 | ||
198 | return 1; | |
199 | } | |
200 | ||
8521ced6 MC |
201 | int tls_parse_ctos_sig_algs(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, |
202 | int *al) | |
25670f3e MC |
203 | { |
204 | PACKET supported_sig_algs; | |
205 | ||
206 | if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &supported_sig_algs) | |
207 | || (PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) % 2) != 0 | |
208 | || PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) { | |
209 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
210 | return 0; | |
211 | } | |
212 | ||
213 | if (!s->hit && !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, PACKET_data(&supported_sig_algs), | |
214 | PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs))) { | |
215 | *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
216 | return 0; | |
217 | } | |
218 | ||
219 | return 1; | |
220 | } | |
221 | ||
ab83e314 | 222 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP |
8521ced6 | 223 | int tls_parse_ctos_status_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, |
f97d4c37 | 224 | int *al) |
25670f3e | 225 | { |
1266eefd MC |
226 | PACKET responder_id_list, exts; |
227 | ||
e96e0f8e MC |
228 | /* Not defined if we get one of these in a client Certificate */ |
229 | if (x != NULL) | |
230 | return 1; | |
231 | ||
25670f3e MC |
232 | if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, (unsigned int *)&s->tlsext_status_type)) { |
233 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
234 | return 0; | |
235 | } | |
ab83e314 | 236 | |
1266eefd | 237 | if (s->tlsext_status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) { |
25670f3e | 238 | /* |
1266eefd | 239 | * We don't know what to do with any other type so ignore it. |
25670f3e | 240 | */ |
cbb09544 | 241 | s->tlsext_status_type = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing; |
1266eefd MC |
242 | return 1; |
243 | } | |
25670f3e | 244 | |
1266eefd MC |
245 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2 (pkt, &responder_id_list)) { |
246 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
247 | return 0; | |
248 | } | |
25670f3e | 249 | |
1266eefd MC |
250 | /* |
251 | * We remove any OCSP_RESPIDs from a previous handshake | |
252 | * to prevent unbounded memory growth - CVE-2016-6304 | |
253 | */ | |
254 | sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, OCSP_RESPID_free); | |
255 | if (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) { | |
256 | s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null(); | |
257 | if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids == NULL) { | |
258 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
259 | return 0; | |
260 | } | |
261 | } else { | |
262 | s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = NULL; | |
263 | } | |
25670f3e | 264 | |
1266eefd MC |
265 | while (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) { |
266 | OCSP_RESPID *id; | |
267 | PACKET responder_id; | |
268 | const unsigned char *id_data; | |
25670f3e | 269 | |
1266eefd MC |
270 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&responder_id_list, &responder_id) |
271 | || PACKET_remaining(&responder_id) == 0) { | |
272 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
273 | return 0; | |
274 | } | |
25670f3e | 275 | |
1266eefd MC |
276 | id_data = PACKET_data(&responder_id); |
277 | /* TODO(size_t): Convert d2i_* to size_t */ | |
278 | id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &id_data, | |
279 | (int)PACKET_remaining(&responder_id)); | |
280 | if (id == NULL) { | |
281 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
282 | return 0; | |
25670f3e MC |
283 | } |
284 | ||
1266eefd MC |
285 | if (id_data != PACKET_end(&responder_id)) { |
286 | OCSP_RESPID_free(id); | |
25670f3e MC |
287 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
288 | return 0; | |
289 | } | |
290 | ||
1266eefd MC |
291 | if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) { |
292 | OCSP_RESPID_free(id); | |
293 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
294 | return 0; | |
295 | } | |
296 | } | |
297 | ||
298 | /* Read in request_extensions */ | |
299 | if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &exts)) { | |
300 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
301 | return 0; | |
302 | } | |
303 | ||
304 | if (PACKET_remaining(&exts) > 0) { | |
305 | const unsigned char *ext_data = PACKET_data(&exts); | |
306 | ||
307 | sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, | |
308 | X509_EXTENSION_free); | |
309 | s->tlsext_ocsp_exts = | |
310 | d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &ext_data, (int)PACKET_remaining(&exts)); | |
311 | if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts == NULL || ext_data != PACKET_end(&exts)) { | |
312 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
313 | return 0; | |
25670f3e | 314 | } |
25670f3e MC |
315 | } |
316 | ||
317 | return 1; | |
318 | } | |
ab83e314 | 319 | #endif |
25670f3e MC |
320 | |
321 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG | |
8521ced6 | 322 | int tls_parse_ctos_npn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) |
25670f3e | 323 | { |
1266eefd MC |
324 | /* |
325 | * We shouldn't accept this extension on a | |
326 | * renegotiation. | |
327 | * | |
328 | * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we | |
329 | * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on | |
330 | * the initial renegotiation too in certain cases (when | |
331 | * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an | |
332 | * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing | |
333 | * anything like that, but this might change). | |
334 | * | |
335 | * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake | |
336 | * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len > | |
337 | * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen | |
338 | * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new | |
339 | * Finished message could have been computed.) | |
340 | */ | |
341 | if (s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) | |
25670f3e | 342 | s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; |
25670f3e MC |
343 | |
344 | return 1; | |
345 | } | |
346 | #endif | |
347 | ||
348 | /* | |
1266eefd MC |
349 | * Save the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.|pkt| holds the contents of the ALPN |
350 | * extension, not including type and length. |al| is a pointer to the alert | |
351 | * value to send in the event of a failure. Returns: 1 on success, 0 on error. | |
25670f3e | 352 | */ |
8521ced6 | 353 | int tls_parse_ctos_alpn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) |
25670f3e MC |
354 | { |
355 | PACKET protocol_list, save_protocol_list, protocol; | |
356 | ||
357 | if (s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len != 0) | |
358 | return 1; | |
359 | ||
360 | if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &protocol_list) | |
361 | || PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) < 2) { | |
362 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
363 | return 0; | |
364 | } | |
365 | ||
366 | save_protocol_list = protocol_list; | |
367 | do { | |
368 | /* Protocol names can't be empty. */ | |
369 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&protocol_list, &protocol) | |
370 | || PACKET_remaining(&protocol) == 0) { | |
371 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
372 | return 0; | |
373 | } | |
374 | } while (PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) != 0); | |
375 | ||
376 | if (!PACKET_memdup(&save_protocol_list, | |
377 | &s->s3->alpn_proposed, &s->s3->alpn_proposed_len)) { | |
378 | *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
379 | return 0; | |
380 | } | |
381 | ||
382 | return 1; | |
383 | } | |
384 | ||
385 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP | |
8521ced6 MC |
386 | int tls_parse_ctos_use_srtp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, |
387 | int *al) | |
25670f3e | 388 | { |
25670f3e MC |
389 | STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *srvr; |
390 | unsigned int ct, mki_len, id; | |
391 | int i, srtp_pref; | |
392 | PACKET subpkt; | |
393 | ||
394 | /* Ignore this if we have no SRTP profiles */ | |
395 | if (SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s) == NULL) | |
396 | return 1; | |
397 | ||
398 | /* Pull off the length of the cipher suite list and check it is even */ | |
1266eefd MC |
399 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ct) || (ct & 1) != 0 |
400 | || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &subpkt, ct)) { | |
7fe97c07 | 401 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP, |
25670f3e MC |
402 | SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST); |
403 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
404 | return 0; | |
405 | } | |
406 | ||
407 | srvr = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s); | |
408 | s->srtp_profile = NULL; | |
409 | /* Search all profiles for a match initially */ | |
410 | srtp_pref = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(srvr); | |
411 | ||
412 | while (PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) { | |
413 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &id)) { | |
7fe97c07 | 414 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP, |
25670f3e MC |
415 | SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST); |
416 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
417 | return 0; | |
418 | } | |
419 | ||
420 | /* | |
421 | * Only look for match in profiles of higher preference than | |
422 | * current match. | |
423 | * If no profiles have been have been configured then this | |
424 | * does nothing. | |
425 | */ | |
426 | for (i = 0; i < srtp_pref; i++) { | |
d270de32 | 427 | SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *sprof = |
1266eefd MC |
428 | sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(srvr, i); |
429 | ||
25670f3e MC |
430 | if (sprof->id == id) { |
431 | s->srtp_profile = sprof; | |
432 | srtp_pref = i; | |
433 | break; | |
434 | } | |
435 | } | |
436 | } | |
437 | ||
1266eefd | 438 | /* Now extract the MKI value as a sanity check, but discard it for now */ |
25670f3e | 439 | if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mki_len)) { |
7fe97c07 | 440 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP, |
25670f3e MC |
441 | SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST); |
442 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
443 | return 0; | |
444 | } | |
445 | ||
446 | if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, mki_len) | |
447 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt)) { | |
7fe97c07 | 448 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP, SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE); |
25670f3e MC |
449 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
450 | return 0; | |
451 | } | |
452 | ||
453 | return 1; | |
454 | } | |
455 | #endif | |
456 | ||
8521ced6 | 457 | int tls_parse_ctos_etm(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) |
25670f3e MC |
458 | { |
459 | if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)) | |
460 | s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC; | |
461 | ||
462 | return 1; | |
463 | } | |
464 | ||
465 | /* | |
466 | * Checks a list of |groups| to determine if the |group_id| is in it. If it is | |
467 | * and |checkallow| is 1 then additionally check if the group is allowed to be | |
468 | * used. Returns 1 if the group is in the list (and allowed if |checkallow| is | |
469 | * 1) or 0 otherwise. | |
470 | */ | |
3cf96e88 | 471 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 |
25670f3e MC |
472 | static int check_in_list(SSL *s, unsigned int group_id, |
473 | const unsigned char *groups, size_t num_groups, | |
474 | int checkallow) | |
475 | { | |
476 | size_t i; | |
477 | ||
478 | if (groups == NULL || num_groups == 0) | |
479 | return 0; | |
480 | ||
481 | for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++, groups += 2) { | |
482 | unsigned int share_id = (groups[0] << 8) | (groups[1]); | |
483 | ||
484 | if (group_id == share_id | |
1266eefd MC |
485 | && (!checkallow |
486 | || tls_curve_allowed(s, groups, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))) { | |
25670f3e MC |
487 | break; |
488 | } | |
489 | } | |
490 | ||
491 | /* If i == num_groups then not in the list */ | |
492 | return i < num_groups; | |
493 | } | |
3cf96e88 | 494 | #endif |
25670f3e MC |
495 | |
496 | /* | |
497 | * Process a key_share extension received in the ClientHello. |pkt| contains | |
498 | * the raw PACKET data for the extension. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure. | |
499 | * If a failure occurs then |*al| is set to an appropriate alert value. | |
500 | */ | |
8521ced6 | 501 | int tls_parse_ctos_key_share(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, |
f97d4c37 | 502 | int *al) |
25670f3e | 503 | { |
3cf96e88 | 504 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 |
25670f3e MC |
505 | unsigned int group_id; |
506 | PACKET key_share_list, encoded_pt; | |
507 | const unsigned char *clntcurves, *srvrcurves; | |
508 | size_t clnt_num_curves, srvr_num_curves; | |
509 | int group_nid, found = 0; | |
510 | unsigned int curve_flags; | |
511 | ||
512 | if (s->hit) | |
513 | return 1; | |
514 | ||
515 | /* Sanity check */ | |
516 | if (s->s3->peer_tmp != NULL) { | |
517 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
7fe97c07 | 518 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
25670f3e MC |
519 | return 0; |
520 | } | |
521 | ||
522 | if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &key_share_list)) { | |
523 | *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
7fe97c07 | 524 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
25670f3e MC |
525 | return 0; |
526 | } | |
527 | ||
528 | /* Get our list of supported curves */ | |
529 | if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &srvrcurves, &srvr_num_curves)) { | |
530 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
7fe97c07 | 531 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
25670f3e MC |
532 | return 0; |
533 | } | |
534 | ||
24b8e4b2 | 535 | /* |
70af3d8e | 536 | * Get the clients list of supported curves. |
24b8e4b2 MC |
537 | * TODO(TLS1.3): We should validate that we actually received |
538 | * supported_groups! | |
539 | */ | |
25670f3e MC |
540 | if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 1, &clntcurves, &clnt_num_curves)) { |
541 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
7fe97c07 | 542 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
25670f3e MC |
543 | return 0; |
544 | } | |
545 | ||
546 | while (PACKET_remaining(&key_share_list) > 0) { | |
547 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&key_share_list, &group_id) | |
548 | || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&key_share_list, &encoded_pt) | |
549 | || PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt) == 0) { | |
550 | *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
7fe97c07 | 551 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, |
25670f3e MC |
552 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
553 | return 0; | |
554 | } | |
555 | ||
556 | /* | |
557 | * If we already found a suitable key_share we loop through the | |
558 | * rest to verify the structure, but don't process them. | |
559 | */ | |
560 | if (found) | |
561 | continue; | |
562 | ||
563 | /* Check if this share is in supported_groups sent from client */ | |
564 | if (!check_in_list(s, group_id, clntcurves, clnt_num_curves, 0)) { | |
565 | *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
7fe97c07 | 566 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE); |
25670f3e MC |
567 | return 0; |
568 | } | |
569 | ||
570 | /* Check if this share is for a group we can use */ | |
571 | if (!check_in_list(s, group_id, srvrcurves, srvr_num_curves, 1)) { | |
572 | /* Share not suitable */ | |
573 | continue; | |
574 | } | |
575 | ||
576 | group_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(group_id, &curve_flags); | |
577 | ||
578 | if (group_nid == 0) { | |
579 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
7fe97c07 | 580 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, |
25670f3e MC |
581 | SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS); |
582 | return 0; | |
583 | } | |
584 | ||
585 | if ((curve_flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM) { | |
586 | /* Can happen for some curves, e.g. X25519 */ | |
587 | EVP_PKEY *key = EVP_PKEY_new(); | |
588 | ||
589 | if (key == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_set_type(key, group_nid)) { | |
590 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
7fe97c07 | 591 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
25670f3e MC |
592 | EVP_PKEY_free(key); |
593 | return 0; | |
594 | } | |
595 | s->s3->peer_tmp = key; | |
596 | } else { | |
597 | /* Set up EVP_PKEY with named curve as parameters */ | |
598 | EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC, NULL); | |
1266eefd | 599 | |
25670f3e MC |
600 | if (pctx == NULL |
601 | || EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(pctx) <= 0 | |
602 | || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(pctx, | |
603 | group_nid) <= 0 | |
604 | || EVP_PKEY_paramgen(pctx, &s->s3->peer_tmp) <= 0) { | |
605 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
7fe97c07 | 606 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
25670f3e MC |
607 | EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); |
608 | return 0; | |
609 | } | |
610 | EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); | |
611 | pctx = NULL; | |
612 | } | |
613 | s->s3->group_id = group_id; | |
614 | ||
615 | if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp, | |
616 | PACKET_data(&encoded_pt), | |
617 | PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) { | |
618 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
7fe97c07 | 619 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT); |
25670f3e MC |
620 | return 0; |
621 | } | |
622 | ||
623 | found = 1; | |
624 | } | |
3cf96e88 | 625 | #endif |
25670f3e MC |
626 | |
627 | return 1; | |
628 | } | |
629 | ||
630 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC | |
8521ced6 MC |
631 | int tls_parse_ctos_supported_groups(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, |
632 | size_t chainidx, int *al) | |
25670f3e MC |
633 | { |
634 | PACKET supported_groups_list; | |
635 | ||
636 | /* Each group is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1. */ | |
637 | if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &supported_groups_list) | |
638 | || PACKET_remaining(&supported_groups_list) == 0 | |
639 | || (PACKET_remaining(&supported_groups_list) % 2) != 0) { | |
640 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
641 | return 0; | |
642 | } | |
643 | ||
644 | if (!s->hit | |
645 | && !PACKET_memdup(&supported_groups_list, | |
646 | &s->session->tlsext_supportedgroupslist, | |
647 | &s->session->tlsext_supportedgroupslist_length)) { | |
648 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
649 | return 0; | |
650 | } | |
651 | ||
652 | return 1; | |
653 | } | |
654 | #endif | |
655 | ||
8521ced6 | 656 | int tls_parse_ctos_ems(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) |
25670f3e MC |
657 | { |
658 | /* The extension must always be empty */ | |
659 | if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { | |
660 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
661 | return 0; | |
662 | } | |
663 | ||
664 | s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS; | |
665 | ||
666 | return 1; | |
667 | } | |
7da160b0 | 668 | |
1266eefd MC |
669 | /* |
670 | * Add the server's renegotiation binding | |
671 | */ | |
8521ced6 MC |
672 | int tls_construct_stoc_renegotiate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t |
673 | chainidx, int *al) | |
7da160b0 MC |
674 | { |
675 | if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding) | |
676 | return 1; | |
677 | ||
678 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) | |
679 | || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) | |
680 | || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt) | |
681 | || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->previous_client_finished, | |
682 | s->s3->previous_client_finished_len) | |
683 | || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->previous_server_finished, | |
684 | s->s3->previous_server_finished_len) | |
685 | || !WPACKET_close(pkt) | |
686 | || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { | |
7fe97c07 | 687 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_RENEGOTIATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
7da160b0 MC |
688 | return 0; |
689 | } | |
690 | ||
691 | return 1; | |
692 | } | |
693 | ||
8521ced6 MC |
694 | int tls_construct_stoc_server_name(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, |
695 | size_t chainidx, int *al) | |
7da160b0 MC |
696 | { |
697 | if (s->hit || s->servername_done != 1 | |
698 | || s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) | |
699 | return 1; | |
700 | ||
701 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) | |
702 | || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) { | |
7fe97c07 | 703 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SERVER_NAME, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
7da160b0 MC |
704 | return 0; |
705 | } | |
706 | ||
707 | return 1; | |
708 | } | |
709 | ||
710 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC | |
30aeba43 | 711 | int tls_construct_stoc_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, |
8521ced6 | 712 | size_t chainidx, int *al) |
7da160b0 MC |
713 | { |
714 | unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; | |
715 | unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; | |
89247375 MC |
716 | int using_ecc = ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)) |
717 | && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL); | |
7da160b0 MC |
718 | const unsigned char *plist; |
719 | size_t plistlen; | |
720 | ||
721 | if (!using_ecc) | |
722 | return 1; | |
723 | ||
724 | tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen); | |
7da160b0 MC |
725 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) |
726 | || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) | |
727 | || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, plist, plistlen) | |
728 | || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { | |
7fe97c07 | 729 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EC_PT_FORMATS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
7da160b0 MC |
730 | return 0; |
731 | } | |
732 | ||
733 | return 1; | |
734 | } | |
735 | #endif | |
736 | ||
30aeba43 | 737 | int tls_construct_stoc_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, |
8521ced6 | 738 | size_t chainidx, int *al) |
7da160b0 MC |
739 | { |
740 | if (!s->tlsext_ticket_expected || !tls_use_ticket(s)) { | |
741 | s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0; | |
742 | return 1; | |
743 | } | |
744 | ||
745 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) | |
746 | || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) { | |
7fe97c07 | 747 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
7da160b0 MC |
748 | return 0; |
749 | } | |
750 | ||
751 | return 1; | |
752 | } | |
753 | ||
ab83e314 | 754 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP |
30aeba43 | 755 | int tls_construct_stoc_status_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, |
8521ced6 | 756 | size_t chainidx, int *al) |
7da160b0 MC |
757 | { |
758 | if (!s->tlsext_status_expected) | |
759 | return 1; | |
760 | ||
8521ced6 | 761 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && chainidx != 0) |
e96e0f8e MC |
762 | return 1; |
763 | ||
7da160b0 | 764 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) |
f63e4288 MC |
765 | || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { |
766 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
767 | return 0; | |
768 | } | |
769 | ||
770 | /* | |
771 | * In TLSv1.3 we include the certificate status itself. In <= TLSv1.2 we | |
772 | * send back an empty extension, with the certificate status appearing as a | |
773 | * separate message | |
774 | */ | |
775 | if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !tls_construct_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) | |
776 | || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { | |
7fe97c07 | 777 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
7da160b0 MC |
778 | return 0; |
779 | } | |
780 | ||
781 | return 1; | |
782 | } | |
ab83e314 | 783 | #endif |
7da160b0 | 784 | |
7da160b0 | 785 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG |
30aeba43 | 786 | int tls_construct_stoc_next_proto_neg(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, |
8521ced6 | 787 | size_t chainidx, int *al) |
7da160b0 MC |
788 | { |
789 | const unsigned char *npa; | |
790 | unsigned int npalen; | |
791 | int ret; | |
792 | int next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen; | |
793 | ||
794 | s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; | |
795 | if (!next_proto_neg_seen || s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb == NULL) | |
796 | return 1; | |
797 | ||
798 | ret = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, | |
799 | s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg); | |
800 | if (ret == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) { | |
801 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg) | |
802 | || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, npa, npalen)) { | |
7fe97c07 | 803 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_NEXT_PROTO_NEG, |
7da160b0 MC |
804 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
805 | return 0; | |
806 | } | |
807 | s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; | |
808 | } | |
809 | ||
810 | return 1; | |
811 | } | |
812 | #endif | |
813 | ||
8521ced6 | 814 | int tls_construct_stoc_alpn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, |
30aeba43 | 815 | int *al) |
7da160b0 MC |
816 | { |
817 | if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) | |
818 | return 1; | |
819 | ||
820 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, | |
821 | TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) | |
822 | || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) | |
823 | || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) | |
824 | || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3->alpn_selected, | |
825 | s->s3->alpn_selected_len) | |
826 | || !WPACKET_close(pkt) | |
827 | || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { | |
7fe97c07 | 828 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_ALPN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
7da160b0 MC |
829 | return 0; |
830 | } | |
831 | ||
832 | return 1; | |
833 | } | |
834 | ||
835 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP | |
8521ced6 | 836 | int tls_construct_stoc_use_srtp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, |
30aeba43 | 837 | int *al) |
7da160b0 MC |
838 | { |
839 | if (s->srtp_profile == NULL) | |
840 | return 1; | |
a1448c26 | 841 | |
7da160b0 MC |
842 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) |
843 | || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) | |
844 | || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 2) | |
845 | || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->srtp_profile->id) | |
846 | || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) | |
847 | || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { | |
7fe97c07 | 848 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_USE_SRTP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
7da160b0 MC |
849 | return 0; |
850 | } | |
851 | ||
852 | return 1; | |
853 | } | |
854 | #endif | |
855 | ||
8521ced6 MC |
856 | int tls_construct_stoc_etm(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, |
857 | int *al) | |
7da160b0 MC |
858 | { |
859 | if ((s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) == 0) | |
860 | return 1; | |
861 | ||
862 | /* | |
863 | * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable | |
864 | * for other cases too. | |
865 | */ | |
866 | if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD | |
867 | || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4 | |
868 | || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT | |
869 | || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12) { | |
870 | s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC; | |
871 | return 1; | |
872 | } | |
873 | ||
874 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) | |
875 | || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) { | |
7fe97c07 | 876 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_ETM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
7da160b0 MC |
877 | return 0; |
878 | } | |
879 | ||
880 | return 1; | |
881 | } | |
882 | ||
8521ced6 MC |
883 | int tls_construct_stoc_ems(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, |
884 | int *al) | |
7da160b0 MC |
885 | { |
886 | if ((s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) == 0) | |
887 | return 1; | |
888 | ||
889 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) | |
890 | || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) { | |
7fe97c07 | 891 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EMS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
7da160b0 MC |
892 | return 0; |
893 | } | |
894 | ||
895 | return 1; | |
896 | } | |
897 | ||
8521ced6 | 898 | int tls_construct_stoc_key_share(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, |
30aeba43 | 899 | int *al) |
7da160b0 | 900 | { |
3cf96e88 | 901 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 |
7da160b0 MC |
902 | unsigned char *encodedPoint; |
903 | size_t encoded_pt_len = 0; | |
904 | EVP_PKEY *ckey = s->s3->peer_tmp, *skey = NULL; | |
905 | ||
906 | if (s->hit) | |
907 | return 1; | |
908 | ||
909 | if (ckey == NULL) { | |
7fe97c07 | 910 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
7da160b0 MC |
911 | return 0; |
912 | } | |
913 | ||
914 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share) | |
915 | || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) | |
916 | || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->s3->group_id)) { | |
7fe97c07 | 917 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
7da160b0 MC |
918 | return 0; |
919 | } | |
920 | ||
921 | skey = ssl_generate_pkey(ckey); | |
922 | if (skey == NULL) { | |
7fe97c07 | 923 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
7da160b0 MC |
924 | return 0; |
925 | } | |
926 | ||
927 | /* Generate encoding of server key */ | |
928 | encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(skey, &encodedPoint); | |
929 | if (encoded_pt_len == 0) { | |
7fe97c07 | 930 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); |
7da160b0 MC |
931 | EVP_PKEY_free(skey); |
932 | return 0; | |
933 | } | |
934 | ||
935 | if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len) | |
936 | || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { | |
7fe97c07 | 937 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
7da160b0 MC |
938 | EVP_PKEY_free(skey); |
939 | OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); | |
940 | return 0; | |
941 | } | |
942 | OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); | |
943 | ||
944 | /* This causes the crypto state to be updated based on the derived keys */ | |
945 | s->s3->tmp.pkey = skey; | |
946 | if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) { | |
7fe97c07 | 947 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
7da160b0 MC |
948 | return 0; |
949 | } | |
3cf96e88 | 950 | #endif |
7da160b0 MC |
951 | |
952 | return 1; | |
953 | } | |
954 | ||
30aeba43 | 955 | int tls_construct_stoc_cryptopro_bug(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, |
8521ced6 | 956 | size_t chainidx, int *al) |
7da160b0 MC |
957 | { |
958 | const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = { | |
959 | 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */ | |
960 | 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */ | |
961 | 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, | |
962 | 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, | |
963 | 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08, | |
964 | 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17 | |
965 | }; | |
966 | ||
967 | if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) != 0x80 | |
968 | && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) != 0x81) | |
969 | || (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG) == 0) | |
970 | return 1; | |
971 | ||
972 | if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, cryptopro_ext, sizeof(cryptopro_ext))) { | |
7fe97c07 | 973 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_CRYPTOPRO_BUG, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
7da160b0 MC |
974 | return 0; |
975 | } | |
976 | ||
977 | return 1; | |
978 | } |