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25670f3e MC |
1 | /* |
2 | * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. | |
3 | * | |
4 | * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use | |
5 | * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy | |
6 | * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at | |
7 | * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html | |
8 | */ | |
9 | ||
10 | #include <openssl/ocsp.h> | |
11 | #include "../ssl_locl.h" | |
12 | #include "statem_locl.h" | |
13 | ||
14 | /* | |
15 | * Parse the client's renegotiation binding and abort if it's not right | |
16 | */ | |
1266eefd | 17 | int tls_parse_ctos_renegotiate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) |
25670f3e MC |
18 | { |
19 | unsigned int ilen; | |
20 | const unsigned char *data; | |
21 | ||
22 | /* Parse the length byte */ | |
23 | if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &ilen) | |
24 | || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, ilen)) { | |
e56c33b9 | 25 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CLIENT_RENEGOTIATE, |
25670f3e MC |
26 | SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR); |
27 | *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
28 | return 0; | |
29 | } | |
30 | ||
31 | /* Check that the extension matches */ | |
32 | if (ilen != s->s3->previous_client_finished_len) { | |
e56c33b9 | 33 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CLIENT_RENEGOTIATE, |
25670f3e MC |
34 | SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH); |
35 | *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
36 | return 0; | |
37 | } | |
38 | ||
39 | if (memcmp(data, s->s3->previous_client_finished, | |
40 | s->s3->previous_client_finished_len)) { | |
e56c33b9 | 41 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CLIENT_RENEGOTIATE, |
25670f3e MC |
42 | SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH); |
43 | *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
44 | return 0; | |
45 | } | |
46 | ||
47 | s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1; | |
48 | ||
49 | return 1; | |
50 | } | |
51 | ||
1266eefd MC |
52 | /*- |
53 | * The servername extension is treated as follows: | |
54 | * | |
55 | * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255. | |
56 | * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros, | |
57 | * in which case an fatal alert is generated. | |
58 | * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache. | |
59 | * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order | |
60 | * to allow the application to position itself to the right context. | |
61 | * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when | |
62 | * it is identical to a previously used for the same session. | |
63 | * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time | |
64 | * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the | |
65 | * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and | |
66 | * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername | |
67 | * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches | |
68 | * the value of the Host: field. | |
69 | * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION | |
70 | * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the | |
71 | * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername | |
72 | * extension. | |
73 | * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent. | |
74 | */ | |
75 | int tls_parse_ctos_server_name(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) | |
25670f3e MC |
76 | { |
77 | unsigned int servname_type; | |
78 | PACKET sni, hostname; | |
79 | ||
25670f3e MC |
80 | if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &sni) |
81 | /* ServerNameList must be at least 1 byte long. */ | |
82 | || PACKET_remaining(&sni) == 0) { | |
83 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
84 | return 0; | |
85 | } | |
86 | ||
87 | /* | |
88 | * Although the server_name extension was intended to be | |
89 | * extensible to new name types, RFC 4366 defined the | |
1266eefd | 90 | * syntax inextensibly and OpenSSL 1.0.x parses it as |
25670f3e MC |
91 | * such. |
92 | * RFC 6066 corrected the mistake but adding new name types | |
93 | * is nevertheless no longer feasible, so act as if no other | |
94 | * SNI types can exist, to simplify parsing. | |
95 | * | |
96 | * Also note that the RFC permits only one SNI value per type, | |
97 | * i.e., we can only have a single hostname. | |
98 | */ | |
99 | if (!PACKET_get_1(&sni, &servname_type) | |
100 | || servname_type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name | |
101 | || !PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&sni, &hostname)) { | |
102 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
103 | return 0; | |
104 | } | |
105 | ||
106 | if (!s->hit) { | |
107 | if (PACKET_remaining(&hostname) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) { | |
108 | *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; | |
109 | return 0; | |
110 | } | |
111 | ||
112 | if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&hostname)) { | |
113 | *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; | |
114 | return 0; | |
115 | } | |
116 | ||
117 | if (!PACKET_strndup(&hostname, &s->session->tlsext_hostname)) { | |
118 | *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
119 | return 0; | |
120 | } | |
121 | ||
122 | s->servername_done = 1; | |
123 | } else { | |
124 | /* | |
125 | * TODO(openssl-team): if the SNI doesn't match, we MUST | |
126 | * fall back to a full handshake. | |
127 | */ | |
128 | s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname | |
129 | && PACKET_equal(&hostname, s->session->tlsext_hostname, | |
130 | strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname)); | |
131 | } | |
132 | ||
133 | return 1; | |
134 | } | |
135 | ||
136 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP | |
1266eefd | 137 | int tls_parse_ctos_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) |
25670f3e MC |
138 | { |
139 | PACKET srp_I; | |
140 | ||
141 | if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &srp_I) | |
142 | || PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&srp_I)) { | |
143 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
144 | return 0; | |
145 | } | |
146 | ||
147 | /* | |
148 | * TODO(openssl-team): currently, we re-authenticate the user | |
149 | * upon resumption. Instead, we MUST ignore the login. | |
150 | */ | |
151 | if (!PACKET_strndup(&srp_I, &s->srp_ctx.login)) { | |
152 | *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
153 | return 0; | |
154 | } | |
155 | ||
156 | return 1; | |
157 | } | |
158 | #endif | |
159 | ||
160 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC | |
1266eefd | 161 | int tls_parse_ctos_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) |
25670f3e MC |
162 | { |
163 | PACKET ec_point_format_list; | |
164 | ||
165 | if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ec_point_format_list) | |
166 | || PACKET_remaining(&ec_point_format_list) == 0) { | |
167 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
168 | return 0; | |
169 | } | |
170 | ||
171 | if (!s->hit) { | |
172 | if (!PACKET_memdup(&ec_point_format_list, | |
173 | &s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, | |
174 | &s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length)) { | |
175 | *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
176 | return 0; | |
177 | } | |
178 | } | |
179 | ||
180 | return 1; | |
181 | } | |
182 | #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ | |
183 | ||
1266eefd | 184 | int tls_parse_ctos_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) |
25670f3e MC |
185 | { |
186 | if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb && | |
187 | !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, PACKET_data(pkt), | |
188 | PACKET_remaining(pkt), | |
189 | s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) { | |
190 | *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
191 | return 0; | |
192 | } | |
193 | ||
194 | return 1; | |
195 | } | |
196 | ||
1266eefd | 197 | int tls_parse_ctos_sig_algs(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) |
25670f3e MC |
198 | { |
199 | PACKET supported_sig_algs; | |
200 | ||
201 | if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &supported_sig_algs) | |
202 | || (PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) % 2) != 0 | |
203 | || PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) { | |
204 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
205 | return 0; | |
206 | } | |
207 | ||
208 | if (!s->hit && !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, PACKET_data(&supported_sig_algs), | |
209 | PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs))) { | |
210 | *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
211 | return 0; | |
212 | } | |
213 | ||
214 | return 1; | |
215 | } | |
216 | ||
ab83e314 | 217 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP |
1266eefd | 218 | int tls_parse_ctos_status_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) |
25670f3e | 219 | { |
1266eefd MC |
220 | PACKET responder_id_list, exts; |
221 | ||
25670f3e MC |
222 | if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, (unsigned int *)&s->tlsext_status_type)) { |
223 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
224 | return 0; | |
225 | } | |
ab83e314 | 226 | |
1266eefd | 227 | if (s->tlsext_status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) { |
25670f3e | 228 | /* |
1266eefd | 229 | * We don't know what to do with any other type so ignore it. |
25670f3e | 230 | */ |
1266eefd MC |
231 | s->tlsext_status_type = -1; |
232 | return 1; | |
233 | } | |
25670f3e | 234 | |
1266eefd MC |
235 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2 (pkt, &responder_id_list)) { |
236 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
237 | return 0; | |
238 | } | |
25670f3e | 239 | |
1266eefd MC |
240 | /* |
241 | * We remove any OCSP_RESPIDs from a previous handshake | |
242 | * to prevent unbounded memory growth - CVE-2016-6304 | |
243 | */ | |
244 | sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, OCSP_RESPID_free); | |
245 | if (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) { | |
246 | s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null(); | |
247 | if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids == NULL) { | |
248 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
249 | return 0; | |
250 | } | |
251 | } else { | |
252 | s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = NULL; | |
253 | } | |
25670f3e | 254 | |
1266eefd MC |
255 | while (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) { |
256 | OCSP_RESPID *id; | |
257 | PACKET responder_id; | |
258 | const unsigned char *id_data; | |
25670f3e | 259 | |
1266eefd MC |
260 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&responder_id_list, &responder_id) |
261 | || PACKET_remaining(&responder_id) == 0) { | |
262 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
263 | return 0; | |
264 | } | |
25670f3e | 265 | |
1266eefd MC |
266 | id_data = PACKET_data(&responder_id); |
267 | /* TODO(size_t): Convert d2i_* to size_t */ | |
268 | id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &id_data, | |
269 | (int)PACKET_remaining(&responder_id)); | |
270 | if (id == NULL) { | |
271 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
272 | return 0; | |
25670f3e MC |
273 | } |
274 | ||
1266eefd MC |
275 | if (id_data != PACKET_end(&responder_id)) { |
276 | OCSP_RESPID_free(id); | |
25670f3e MC |
277 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
278 | return 0; | |
279 | } | |
280 | ||
1266eefd MC |
281 | if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) { |
282 | OCSP_RESPID_free(id); | |
283 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
284 | return 0; | |
285 | } | |
286 | } | |
287 | ||
288 | /* Read in request_extensions */ | |
289 | if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &exts)) { | |
290 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
291 | return 0; | |
292 | } | |
293 | ||
294 | if (PACKET_remaining(&exts) > 0) { | |
295 | const unsigned char *ext_data = PACKET_data(&exts); | |
296 | ||
297 | sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, | |
298 | X509_EXTENSION_free); | |
299 | s->tlsext_ocsp_exts = | |
300 | d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &ext_data, (int)PACKET_remaining(&exts)); | |
301 | if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts == NULL || ext_data != PACKET_end(&exts)) { | |
302 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
303 | return 0; | |
25670f3e | 304 | } |
25670f3e MC |
305 | } |
306 | ||
307 | return 1; | |
308 | } | |
ab83e314 | 309 | #endif |
25670f3e MC |
310 | |
311 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG | |
1266eefd | 312 | int tls_parse_ctos_npn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) |
25670f3e | 313 | { |
1266eefd MC |
314 | /* |
315 | * We shouldn't accept this extension on a | |
316 | * renegotiation. | |
317 | * | |
318 | * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we | |
319 | * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on | |
320 | * the initial renegotiation too in certain cases (when | |
321 | * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an | |
322 | * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing | |
323 | * anything like that, but this might change). | |
324 | * | |
325 | * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake | |
326 | * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len > | |
327 | * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen | |
328 | * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new | |
329 | * Finished message could have been computed.) | |
330 | */ | |
331 | if (s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) | |
25670f3e | 332 | s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; |
25670f3e MC |
333 | |
334 | return 1; | |
335 | } | |
336 | #endif | |
337 | ||
338 | /* | |
1266eefd MC |
339 | * Save the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.|pkt| holds the contents of the ALPN |
340 | * extension, not including type and length. |al| is a pointer to the alert | |
341 | * value to send in the event of a failure. Returns: 1 on success, 0 on error. | |
25670f3e | 342 | */ |
1266eefd | 343 | int tls_parse_ctos_alpn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) |
25670f3e MC |
344 | { |
345 | PACKET protocol_list, save_protocol_list, protocol; | |
346 | ||
347 | if (s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len != 0) | |
348 | return 1; | |
349 | ||
350 | if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &protocol_list) | |
351 | || PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) < 2) { | |
352 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
353 | return 0; | |
354 | } | |
355 | ||
356 | save_protocol_list = protocol_list; | |
357 | do { | |
358 | /* Protocol names can't be empty. */ | |
359 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&protocol_list, &protocol) | |
360 | || PACKET_remaining(&protocol) == 0) { | |
361 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
362 | return 0; | |
363 | } | |
364 | } while (PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) != 0); | |
365 | ||
366 | if (!PACKET_memdup(&save_protocol_list, | |
367 | &s->s3->alpn_proposed, &s->s3->alpn_proposed_len)) { | |
368 | *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
369 | return 0; | |
370 | } | |
371 | ||
372 | return 1; | |
373 | } | |
374 | ||
375 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP | |
1266eefd | 376 | int tls_parse_ctos_use_srtp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) |
25670f3e | 377 | { |
25670f3e MC |
378 | STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *srvr; |
379 | unsigned int ct, mki_len, id; | |
380 | int i, srtp_pref; | |
381 | PACKET subpkt; | |
382 | ||
383 | /* Ignore this if we have no SRTP profiles */ | |
384 | if (SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s) == NULL) | |
385 | return 1; | |
386 | ||
387 | /* Pull off the length of the cipher suite list and check it is even */ | |
1266eefd MC |
388 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ct) || (ct & 1) != 0 |
389 | || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &subpkt, ct)) { | |
e56c33b9 | 390 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CLIENT_USE_SRTP, |
25670f3e MC |
391 | SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST); |
392 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
393 | return 0; | |
394 | } | |
395 | ||
396 | srvr = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s); | |
397 | s->srtp_profile = NULL; | |
398 | /* Search all profiles for a match initially */ | |
399 | srtp_pref = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(srvr); | |
400 | ||
401 | while (PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) { | |
402 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &id)) { | |
e56c33b9 | 403 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CLIENT_USE_SRTP, |
25670f3e MC |
404 | SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST); |
405 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
406 | return 0; | |
407 | } | |
408 | ||
409 | /* | |
410 | * Only look for match in profiles of higher preference than | |
411 | * current match. | |
412 | * If no profiles have been have been configured then this | |
413 | * does nothing. | |
414 | */ | |
415 | for (i = 0; i < srtp_pref; i++) { | |
d270de32 | 416 | SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *sprof = |
1266eefd MC |
417 | sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(srvr, i); |
418 | ||
25670f3e MC |
419 | if (sprof->id == id) { |
420 | s->srtp_profile = sprof; | |
421 | srtp_pref = i; | |
422 | break; | |
423 | } | |
424 | } | |
425 | } | |
426 | ||
1266eefd | 427 | /* Now extract the MKI value as a sanity check, but discard it for now */ |
25670f3e | 428 | if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mki_len)) { |
e56c33b9 | 429 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CLIENT_USE_SRTP, |
25670f3e MC |
430 | SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST); |
431 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
432 | return 0; | |
433 | } | |
434 | ||
435 | if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, mki_len) | |
436 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt)) { | |
e56c33b9 | 437 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CLIENT_USE_SRTP, SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE); |
25670f3e MC |
438 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
439 | return 0; | |
440 | } | |
441 | ||
442 | return 1; | |
443 | } | |
444 | #endif | |
445 | ||
1266eefd | 446 | int tls_parse_ctos_etm(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) |
25670f3e MC |
447 | { |
448 | if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)) | |
449 | s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC; | |
450 | ||
451 | return 1; | |
452 | } | |
453 | ||
454 | /* | |
455 | * Checks a list of |groups| to determine if the |group_id| is in it. If it is | |
456 | * and |checkallow| is 1 then additionally check if the group is allowed to be | |
457 | * used. Returns 1 if the group is in the list (and allowed if |checkallow| is | |
458 | * 1) or 0 otherwise. | |
459 | */ | |
460 | static int check_in_list(SSL *s, unsigned int group_id, | |
461 | const unsigned char *groups, size_t num_groups, | |
462 | int checkallow) | |
463 | { | |
464 | size_t i; | |
465 | ||
466 | if (groups == NULL || num_groups == 0) | |
467 | return 0; | |
468 | ||
469 | for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++, groups += 2) { | |
470 | unsigned int share_id = (groups[0] << 8) | (groups[1]); | |
471 | ||
472 | if (group_id == share_id | |
1266eefd MC |
473 | && (!checkallow |
474 | || tls_curve_allowed(s, groups, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))) { | |
25670f3e MC |
475 | break; |
476 | } | |
477 | } | |
478 | ||
479 | /* If i == num_groups then not in the list */ | |
480 | return i < num_groups; | |
481 | } | |
482 | ||
483 | /* | |
484 | * Process a key_share extension received in the ClientHello. |pkt| contains | |
485 | * the raw PACKET data for the extension. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure. | |
486 | * If a failure occurs then |*al| is set to an appropriate alert value. | |
487 | */ | |
1266eefd | 488 | int tls_parse_ctos_key_share(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) |
25670f3e MC |
489 | { |
490 | unsigned int group_id; | |
491 | PACKET key_share_list, encoded_pt; | |
492 | const unsigned char *clntcurves, *srvrcurves; | |
493 | size_t clnt_num_curves, srvr_num_curves; | |
494 | int group_nid, found = 0; | |
495 | unsigned int curve_flags; | |
496 | ||
497 | if (s->hit) | |
498 | return 1; | |
499 | ||
500 | /* Sanity check */ | |
501 | if (s->s3->peer_tmp != NULL) { | |
502 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
e56c33b9 | 503 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CLIENT_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
25670f3e MC |
504 | return 0; |
505 | } | |
506 | ||
507 | if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &key_share_list)) { | |
508 | *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
e56c33b9 | 509 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CLIENT_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
25670f3e MC |
510 | return 0; |
511 | } | |
512 | ||
513 | /* Get our list of supported curves */ | |
514 | if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &srvrcurves, &srvr_num_curves)) { | |
515 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
e56c33b9 | 516 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CLIENT_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
25670f3e MC |
517 | return 0; |
518 | } | |
519 | ||
24b8e4b2 | 520 | /* |
70af3d8e | 521 | * Get the clients list of supported curves. |
24b8e4b2 MC |
522 | * TODO(TLS1.3): We should validate that we actually received |
523 | * supported_groups! | |
524 | */ | |
25670f3e MC |
525 | if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 1, &clntcurves, &clnt_num_curves)) { |
526 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
e56c33b9 | 527 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CLIENT_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
25670f3e MC |
528 | return 0; |
529 | } | |
530 | ||
531 | while (PACKET_remaining(&key_share_list) > 0) { | |
532 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&key_share_list, &group_id) | |
533 | || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&key_share_list, &encoded_pt) | |
534 | || PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt) == 0) { | |
535 | *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
e56c33b9 | 536 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CLIENT_KEY_SHARE, |
25670f3e MC |
537 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
538 | return 0; | |
539 | } | |
540 | ||
541 | /* | |
542 | * If we already found a suitable key_share we loop through the | |
543 | * rest to verify the structure, but don't process them. | |
544 | */ | |
545 | if (found) | |
546 | continue; | |
547 | ||
548 | /* Check if this share is in supported_groups sent from client */ | |
549 | if (!check_in_list(s, group_id, clntcurves, clnt_num_curves, 0)) { | |
550 | *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
e56c33b9 | 551 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CLIENT_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE); |
25670f3e MC |
552 | return 0; |
553 | } | |
554 | ||
555 | /* Check if this share is for a group we can use */ | |
556 | if (!check_in_list(s, group_id, srvrcurves, srvr_num_curves, 1)) { | |
557 | /* Share not suitable */ | |
558 | continue; | |
559 | } | |
560 | ||
561 | group_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(group_id, &curve_flags); | |
562 | ||
563 | if (group_nid == 0) { | |
564 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
e56c33b9 | 565 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CLIENT_KEY_SHARE, |
25670f3e MC |
566 | SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS); |
567 | return 0; | |
568 | } | |
569 | ||
570 | if ((curve_flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM) { | |
571 | /* Can happen for some curves, e.g. X25519 */ | |
572 | EVP_PKEY *key = EVP_PKEY_new(); | |
573 | ||
574 | if (key == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_set_type(key, group_nid)) { | |
575 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
e56c33b9 | 576 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CLIENT_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
25670f3e MC |
577 | EVP_PKEY_free(key); |
578 | return 0; | |
579 | } | |
580 | s->s3->peer_tmp = key; | |
581 | } else { | |
582 | /* Set up EVP_PKEY with named curve as parameters */ | |
583 | EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC, NULL); | |
1266eefd | 584 | |
25670f3e MC |
585 | if (pctx == NULL |
586 | || EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(pctx) <= 0 | |
587 | || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(pctx, | |
588 | group_nid) <= 0 | |
589 | || EVP_PKEY_paramgen(pctx, &s->s3->peer_tmp) <= 0) { | |
590 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
e56c33b9 | 591 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CLIENT_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
25670f3e MC |
592 | EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); |
593 | return 0; | |
594 | } | |
595 | EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); | |
596 | pctx = NULL; | |
597 | } | |
598 | s->s3->group_id = group_id; | |
599 | ||
600 | if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp, | |
601 | PACKET_data(&encoded_pt), | |
602 | PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) { | |
603 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
e56c33b9 | 604 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CLIENT_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT); |
25670f3e MC |
605 | return 0; |
606 | } | |
607 | ||
608 | found = 1; | |
609 | } | |
610 | ||
611 | return 1; | |
612 | } | |
613 | ||
614 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC | |
1266eefd | 615 | int tls_parse_ctos_supported_groups(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) |
25670f3e MC |
616 | { |
617 | PACKET supported_groups_list; | |
618 | ||
619 | /* Each group is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1. */ | |
620 | if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &supported_groups_list) | |
621 | || PACKET_remaining(&supported_groups_list) == 0 | |
622 | || (PACKET_remaining(&supported_groups_list) % 2) != 0) { | |
623 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
624 | return 0; | |
625 | } | |
626 | ||
627 | if (!s->hit | |
628 | && !PACKET_memdup(&supported_groups_list, | |
629 | &s->session->tlsext_supportedgroupslist, | |
630 | &s->session->tlsext_supportedgroupslist_length)) { | |
631 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
632 | return 0; | |
633 | } | |
634 | ||
635 | return 1; | |
636 | } | |
637 | #endif | |
638 | ||
1266eefd | 639 | int tls_parse_ctos_ems(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) |
25670f3e MC |
640 | { |
641 | /* The extension must always be empty */ | |
642 | if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { | |
643 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
644 | return 0; | |
645 | } | |
646 | ||
647 | s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS; | |
648 | ||
649 | return 1; | |
650 | } | |
7da160b0 | 651 | |
1266eefd MC |
652 | /* |
653 | * Add the server's renegotiation binding | |
654 | */ | |
655 | int tls_construct_stoc_renegotiate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al) | |
7da160b0 MC |
656 | { |
657 | if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding) | |
658 | return 1; | |
659 | ||
660 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) | |
661 | || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) | |
662 | || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt) | |
663 | || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->previous_client_finished, | |
664 | s->s3->previous_client_finished_len) | |
665 | || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->previous_server_finished, | |
666 | s->s3->previous_server_finished_len) | |
667 | || !WPACKET_close(pkt) | |
668 | || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { | |
669 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_RENEGOTIATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
670 | return 0; | |
671 | } | |
672 | ||
673 | return 1; | |
674 | } | |
675 | ||
1266eefd | 676 | int tls_construct_stoc_server_name(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al) |
7da160b0 MC |
677 | { |
678 | if (s->hit || s->servername_done != 1 | |
679 | || s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) | |
680 | return 1; | |
681 | ||
682 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) | |
683 | || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) { | |
684 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_SERVER_NAME, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
685 | return 0; | |
686 | } | |
687 | ||
688 | return 1; | |
689 | } | |
690 | ||
691 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC | |
1266eefd | 692 | int tls_construct_stoc_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al) |
7da160b0 MC |
693 | { |
694 | unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; | |
695 | unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; | |
89247375 MC |
696 | int using_ecc = ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)) |
697 | && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL); | |
7da160b0 MC |
698 | const unsigned char *plist; |
699 | size_t plistlen; | |
700 | ||
701 | if (!using_ecc) | |
702 | return 1; | |
703 | ||
704 | tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen); | |
7da160b0 MC |
705 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) |
706 | || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) | |
707 | || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, plist, plistlen) | |
708 | || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { | |
709 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_EC_PT_FORMATS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
710 | return 0; | |
711 | } | |
712 | ||
713 | return 1; | |
714 | } | |
715 | #endif | |
716 | ||
1266eefd | 717 | int tls_construct_stoc_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al) |
7da160b0 MC |
718 | { |
719 | if (!s->tlsext_ticket_expected || !tls_use_ticket(s)) { | |
720 | s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0; | |
721 | return 1; | |
722 | } | |
723 | ||
724 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) | |
725 | || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) { | |
726 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
727 | return 0; | |
728 | } | |
729 | ||
730 | return 1; | |
731 | } | |
732 | ||
ab83e314 | 733 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP |
1266eefd | 734 | int tls_construct_stoc_status_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al) |
7da160b0 MC |
735 | { |
736 | if (!s->tlsext_status_expected) | |
737 | return 1; | |
738 | ||
739 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) | |
740 | || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) { | |
741 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
742 | return 0; | |
743 | } | |
744 | ||
745 | return 1; | |
746 | } | |
ab83e314 | 747 | #endif |
7da160b0 MC |
748 | |
749 | ||
750 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG | |
1266eefd | 751 | int tls_construct_stoc_next_proto_neg(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al) |
7da160b0 MC |
752 | { |
753 | const unsigned char *npa; | |
754 | unsigned int npalen; | |
755 | int ret; | |
756 | int next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen; | |
757 | ||
758 | s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; | |
759 | if (!next_proto_neg_seen || s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb == NULL) | |
760 | return 1; | |
761 | ||
762 | ret = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, | |
763 | s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg); | |
764 | if (ret == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) { | |
765 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg) | |
766 | || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, npa, npalen)) { | |
767 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_NEXT_PROTO_NEG, | |
768 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
769 | return 0; | |
770 | } | |
771 | s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; | |
772 | } | |
773 | ||
774 | return 1; | |
775 | } | |
776 | #endif | |
777 | ||
1266eefd | 778 | int tls_construct_stoc_alpn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al) |
7da160b0 MC |
779 | { |
780 | if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) | |
781 | return 1; | |
782 | ||
783 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, | |
784 | TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) | |
785 | || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) | |
786 | || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) | |
787 | || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3->alpn_selected, | |
788 | s->s3->alpn_selected_len) | |
789 | || !WPACKET_close(pkt) | |
790 | || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { | |
791 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_ALPN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
792 | return 0; | |
793 | } | |
794 | ||
795 | return 1; | |
796 | } | |
797 | ||
798 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP | |
1266eefd | 799 | int tls_construct_stoc_use_srtp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al) |
7da160b0 MC |
800 | { |
801 | if (s->srtp_profile == NULL) | |
802 | return 1; | |
a1448c26 | 803 | |
7da160b0 MC |
804 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) |
805 | || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) | |
806 | || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 2) | |
807 | || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->srtp_profile->id) | |
808 | || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) | |
809 | || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { | |
810 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_USE_SRTP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
811 | return 0; | |
812 | } | |
813 | ||
814 | return 1; | |
815 | } | |
816 | #endif | |
817 | ||
1266eefd | 818 | int tls_construct_stoc_etm(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al) |
7da160b0 MC |
819 | { |
820 | if ((s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) == 0) | |
821 | return 1; | |
822 | ||
823 | /* | |
824 | * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable | |
825 | * for other cases too. | |
826 | */ | |
827 | if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD | |
828 | || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4 | |
829 | || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT | |
830 | || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12) { | |
831 | s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC; | |
832 | return 1; | |
833 | } | |
834 | ||
835 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) | |
836 | || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) { | |
837 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_ETM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
838 | return 0; | |
839 | } | |
840 | ||
841 | return 1; | |
842 | } | |
843 | ||
1266eefd | 844 | int tls_construct_stoc_ems(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al) |
7da160b0 MC |
845 | { |
846 | if ((s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) == 0) | |
847 | return 1; | |
848 | ||
849 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) | |
850 | || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) { | |
851 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_EMS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
852 | return 0; | |
853 | } | |
854 | ||
855 | return 1; | |
856 | } | |
857 | ||
1266eefd | 858 | int tls_construct_stoc_key_share(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al) |
7da160b0 MC |
859 | { |
860 | unsigned char *encodedPoint; | |
861 | size_t encoded_pt_len = 0; | |
862 | EVP_PKEY *ckey = s->s3->peer_tmp, *skey = NULL; | |
863 | ||
864 | if (s->hit) | |
865 | return 1; | |
866 | ||
867 | if (ckey == NULL) { | |
868 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
869 | return 0; | |
870 | } | |
871 | ||
872 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share) | |
873 | || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) | |
874 | || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->s3->group_id)) { | |
875 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
876 | return 0; | |
877 | } | |
878 | ||
879 | skey = ssl_generate_pkey(ckey); | |
880 | if (skey == NULL) { | |
881 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
882 | return 0; | |
883 | } | |
884 | ||
885 | /* Generate encoding of server key */ | |
886 | encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(skey, &encodedPoint); | |
887 | if (encoded_pt_len == 0) { | |
888 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); | |
889 | EVP_PKEY_free(skey); | |
890 | return 0; | |
891 | } | |
892 | ||
893 | if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len) | |
894 | || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { | |
895 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
896 | EVP_PKEY_free(skey); | |
897 | OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); | |
898 | return 0; | |
899 | } | |
900 | OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); | |
901 | ||
902 | /* This causes the crypto state to be updated based on the derived keys */ | |
903 | s->s3->tmp.pkey = skey; | |
904 | if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) { | |
905 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
906 | return 0; | |
907 | } | |
908 | ||
909 | return 1; | |
910 | } | |
911 | ||
1266eefd | 912 | int tls_construct_stoc_cryptopro_bug(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al) |
7da160b0 MC |
913 | { |
914 | const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = { | |
915 | 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */ | |
916 | 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */ | |
917 | 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, | |
918 | 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, | |
919 | 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08, | |
920 | 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17 | |
921 | }; | |
922 | ||
923 | if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) != 0x80 | |
924 | && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) != 0x81) | |
925 | || (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG) == 0) | |
926 | return 1; | |
927 | ||
928 | if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, cryptopro_ext, sizeof(cryptopro_ext))) { | |
929 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CRYPTOPRO_BUG, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
930 | return 0; | |
931 | } | |
932 | ||
933 | return 1; | |
934 | } |