]>
Commit | Line | Data |
---|---|---|
846e33c7 RS |
1 | /* |
2 | * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. | |
3813046d | 3 | * |
846e33c7 RS |
4 | * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use |
5 | * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy | |
6 | * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at | |
7 | * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html | |
3813046d | 8 | */ |
846e33c7 | 9 | |
ea262260 BM |
10 | /* ==================================================================== |
11 | * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. | |
0f113f3e | 12 | * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by |
ea262260 BM |
13 | * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. |
14 | */ | |
d02b48c6 | 15 | |
48948d53 | 16 | #include <limits.h> |
f2d9a32c | 17 | #include <string.h> |
d02b48c6 | 18 | #include <stdio.h> |
8ba708e5 | 19 | #include "../ssl_locl.h" |
61ae935a | 20 | #include "statem_locl.h" |
ec577822 | 21 | #include <openssl/buffer.h> |
ec577822 BM |
22 | #include <openssl/objects.h> |
23 | #include <openssl/evp.h> | |
24 | #include <openssl/x509.h> | |
d02b48c6 | 25 | |
0f113f3e MC |
26 | /* |
27 | * send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or | |
28 | * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) | |
29 | */ | |
e7ecc7d4 | 30 | int ssl3_do_write(SSL *s, int type) |
0f113f3e MC |
31 | { |
32 | int ret; | |
7ee8627f | 33 | size_t written = 0; |
0f113f3e MC |
34 | |
35 | ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, type, &s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], | |
7ee8627f | 36 | s->init_num, &written); |
0f113f3e MC |
37 | if (ret < 0) |
38 | return (-1); | |
39 | if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) | |
40 | /* | |
41 | * should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case we'll | |
42 | * ignore the result anyway | |
43 | */ | |
d166ed8c DSH |
44 | if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, |
45 | (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], | |
7ee8627f | 46 | written)) |
d166ed8c | 47 | return -1; |
0f113f3e | 48 | |
7ee8627f | 49 | if (written == s->init_num) { |
0f113f3e MC |
50 | if (s->msg_callback) |
51 | s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data, | |
52 | (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s, | |
53 | s->msg_callback_arg); | |
54 | return (1); | |
55 | } | |
7ee8627f MC |
56 | s->init_off += written; |
57 | s->init_num -= written; | |
0f113f3e MC |
58 | return (0); |
59 | } | |
e7ecc7d4 | 60 | |
4a01c59f | 61 | int tls_close_construct_packet(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int htype) |
2c7b4dbc MC |
62 | { |
63 | size_t msglen; | |
64 | ||
4a01c59f | 65 | if ((htype != SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) |
f1ec23c0 | 66 | || !WPACKET_get_length(pkt, &msglen) |
7cea05dc | 67 | || msglen > INT_MAX) |
2c7b4dbc MC |
68 | return 0; |
69 | s->init_num = (int)msglen; | |
70 | s->init_off = 0; | |
71 | ||
72 | return 1; | |
73 | } | |
74 | ||
1f5b44e9 MC |
75 | int tls_setup_handshake(SSL *s) |
76 | { | |
c7f47786 MC |
77 | if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) |
78 | return 0; | |
79 | ||
b186a592 MC |
80 | /* Reset any extension flags */ |
81 | memset(s->ext.extflags, 0, sizeof(s->ext.extflags)); | |
82 | ||
c7f47786 | 83 | if (s->server) { |
38a73150 MC |
84 | STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = SSL_get_ciphers(s); |
85 | int i, ver_min, ver_max, ok = 0; | |
86 | ||
87 | /* | |
88 | * Sanity check that the maximum version we accept has ciphers | |
89 | * enabled. For clients we do this check during construction of the | |
90 | * ClientHello. | |
91 | */ | |
92 | if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max) != 0) { | |
93 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
94 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
95 | return 0; | |
96 | } | |
97 | for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) { | |
98 | const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i); | |
99 | ||
100 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
101 | if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(ver_max, c->min_dtls) && | |
102 | DTLS_VERSION_LE(ver_max, c->max_dtls)) | |
103 | ok = 1; | |
104 | } else if (ver_max >= c->min_tls && ver_max <= c->max_tls) { | |
105 | ok = 1; | |
106 | } | |
107 | if (ok) | |
108 | break; | |
109 | } | |
110 | if (!ok) { | |
111 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE); | |
112 | ERR_add_error_data(1, "No ciphers enabled for max supported " | |
113 | "SSL/TLS version"); | |
114 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); | |
115 | return 0; | |
116 | } | |
c7f47786 MC |
117 | if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) { |
118 | s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++; | |
119 | } else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding && | |
120 | !(s->options & | |
121 | SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) { | |
122 | /* | |
123 | * Server attempting to renegotiate with client that doesn't | |
124 | * support secure renegotiation. | |
125 | */ | |
126 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE, | |
127 | SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); | |
128 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); | |
129 | return 0; | |
130 | } else { | |
131 | s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++; | |
132 | ||
133 | s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0; | |
134 | } | |
135 | } else { | |
136 | if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) | |
137 | s->ctx->stats.sess_connect++; | |
138 | else | |
139 | s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate++; | |
140 | ||
141 | /* mark client_random uninitialized */ | |
142 | memset(s->s3->client_random, 0, sizeof(s->s3->client_random)); | |
143 | s->hit = 0; | |
144 | ||
145 | s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0; | |
146 | ||
1f5b44e9 | 147 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) |
c7f47786 | 148 | s->statem.use_timer = 1; |
c7f47786 MC |
149 | } |
150 | ||
151 | return 1; | |
152 | } | |
153 | ||
2c5dfdc3 MC |
154 | /* |
155 | * Size of the to-be-signed TLS13 data, without the hash size itself: | |
156 | * 64 bytes of value 32, 33 context bytes, 1 byte separator | |
157 | */ | |
158 | #define TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE 64 | |
159 | #define TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE (TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE + 33 + 1) | |
160 | ||
161 | static int get_cert_verify_tbs_data(SSL *s, unsigned char *tls13tbs, | |
162 | void **hdata, size_t *hdatalen) | |
163 | { | |
164 | static const char *servercontext = "TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify"; | |
165 | static const char *clientcontext = "TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify"; | |
166 | ||
167 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { | |
168 | size_t hashlen; | |
169 | ||
170 | /* Set the first 64 bytes of to-be-signed data to octet 32 */ | |
171 | memset(tls13tbs, 32, TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE); | |
172 | /* This copies the 33 bytes of context plus the 0 separator byte */ | |
173 | if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY | |
174 | || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY) | |
175 | strcpy((char *)tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE, servercontext); | |
176 | else | |
177 | strcpy((char *)tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE, clientcontext); | |
178 | ||
179 | /* | |
180 | * If we're currently reading then we need to use the saved handshake | |
181 | * hash value. We can't use the current handshake hash state because | |
182 | * that includes the CertVerify itself. | |
183 | */ | |
184 | if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY | |
185 | || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY) { | |
186 | memcpy(tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE, s->cert_verify_hash, | |
187 | s->cert_verify_hash_len); | |
188 | hashlen = s->cert_verify_hash_len; | |
189 | } else if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE, | |
190 | EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &hashlen)) { | |
191 | return 0; | |
192 | } | |
193 | ||
194 | *hdata = tls13tbs; | |
195 | *hdatalen = TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + hashlen; | |
196 | } else { | |
197 | size_t retlen; | |
198 | ||
199 | retlen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, hdata); | |
200 | if (retlen <= 0) | |
201 | return 0; | |
202 | *hdatalen = retlen; | |
203 | } | |
204 | ||
205 | return 1; | |
206 | } | |
207 | ||
d8bc1399 MC |
208 | int tls_construct_cert_verify(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
209 | { | |
ad4dd362 DSH |
210 | EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; |
211 | const EVP_MD *md = NULL; | |
d8bc1399 | 212 | EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL; |
5f9b64a2 MC |
213 | EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; |
214 | size_t hdatalen = 0, siglen = 0; | |
d8bc1399 MC |
215 | void *hdata; |
216 | unsigned char *sig = NULL; | |
2c5dfdc3 | 217 | unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
ad4dd362 | 218 | const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3->tmp.sigalg; |
2c5dfdc3 | 219 | |
ad4dd362 DSH |
220 | if (lu == NULL || s->s3->tmp.cert == NULL) { |
221 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
222 | goto err; | |
223 | } | |
224 | pkey = s->s3->tmp.cert->privatekey; | |
225 | md = ssl_md(lu->hash_idx); | |
226 | ||
227 | if (pkey == NULL || md == NULL) { | |
228 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
229 | goto err; | |
230 | } | |
d8bc1399 MC |
231 | |
232 | mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); | |
233 | if (mctx == NULL) { | |
234 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
235 | goto err; | |
236 | } | |
d8bc1399 | 237 | |
2c5dfdc3 MC |
238 | /* Get the data to be signed */ |
239 | if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) { | |
d8bc1399 MC |
240 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
241 | goto err; | |
242 | } | |
243 | ||
ad4dd362 | 244 | if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg)) { |
d8bc1399 MC |
245 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
246 | goto err; | |
247 | } | |
5f9b64a2 MC |
248 | siglen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); |
249 | sig = OPENSSL_malloc(siglen); | |
d8bc1399 MC |
250 | if (sig == NULL) { |
251 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
252 | goto err; | |
253 | } | |
5f9b64a2 | 254 | |
75394189 | 255 | if (EVP_DigestSignInit(mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) { |
5f9b64a2 MC |
256 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
257 | goto err; | |
258 | } | |
259 | ||
ad4dd362 | 260 | if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) { |
5f9b64a2 | 261 | if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0 |
968ae5b3 DSH |
262 | || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, |
263 | RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) { | |
5f9b64a2 MC |
264 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
265 | goto err; | |
266 | } | |
caf2b6b5 DSH |
267 | } |
268 | if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { | |
269 | if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0 | |
270 | || !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET, | |
271 | (int)s->session->master_key_length, | |
272 | s->session->master_key) | |
273 | || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx, sig, &siglen) <= 0) { | |
274 | ||
5f9b64a2 MC |
275 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
276 | goto err; | |
277 | } | |
caf2b6b5 | 278 | } else if (EVP_DigestSign(mctx, sig, &siglen, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0) { |
d8bc1399 MC |
279 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
280 | goto err; | |
281 | } | |
5f9b64a2 | 282 | |
d8bc1399 MC |
283 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST |
284 | { | |
ad4dd362 DSH |
285 | int pktype = lu->sig; |
286 | ||
d8bc1399 MC |
287 | if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001 |
288 | || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256 | |
289 | || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) | |
5f9b64a2 | 290 | BUF_reverse(sig, NULL, siglen); |
d8bc1399 MC |
291 | } |
292 | #endif | |
293 | ||
5f9b64a2 | 294 | if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, sig, siglen)) { |
d8bc1399 MC |
295 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
296 | goto err; | |
297 | } | |
298 | ||
299 | /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */ | |
300 | if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) | |
301 | goto err; | |
302 | ||
303 | OPENSSL_free(sig); | |
304 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); | |
305 | return 1; | |
306 | err: | |
307 | OPENSSL_free(sig); | |
308 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); | |
309 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
310 | return 0; | |
311 | } | |
312 | ||
313 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) | |
314 | { | |
315 | EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; | |
703bcee0 | 316 | const unsigned char *data; |
d8bc1399 MC |
317 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST |
318 | unsigned char *gost_data = NULL; | |
319 | #endif | |
5f9b64a2 | 320 | int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
dc8da7b1 | 321 | int type = 0, j; |
d8bc1399 MC |
322 | unsigned int len; |
323 | X509 *peer; | |
324 | const EVP_MD *md = NULL; | |
2c5dfdc3 | 325 | size_t hdatalen = 0; |
d8bc1399 | 326 | void *hdata; |
2c5dfdc3 | 327 | unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
d8bc1399 | 328 | EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); |
5f9b64a2 | 329 | EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; |
d8bc1399 MC |
330 | |
331 | if (mctx == NULL) { | |
332 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
d8bc1399 MC |
333 | goto f_err; |
334 | } | |
335 | ||
336 | peer = s->session->peer; | |
337 | pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(peer); | |
fb34a0f4 | 338 | if (pkey == NULL) |
83b4049a | 339 | goto f_err; |
83b4049a | 340 | |
d8bc1399 MC |
341 | type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey); |
342 | ||
343 | if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) { | |
344 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, | |
345 | SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE); | |
346 | al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
347 | goto f_err; | |
348 | } | |
349 | ||
350 | /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */ | |
351 | /* | |
352 | * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without | |
353 | * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till CSP 4.0) | |
354 | */ | |
355 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST | |
356 | if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 64 | |
357 | && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) { | |
358 | len = 64; | |
359 | } else | |
360 | #endif | |
361 | { | |
362 | if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { | |
363 | int rv; | |
703bcee0 | 364 | unsigned int sigalg; |
d8bc1399 | 365 | |
703bcee0 | 366 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) { |
d8bc1399 MC |
367 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
368 | goto f_err; | |
369 | } | |
5554facb | 370 | rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey); |
d8bc1399 | 371 | if (rv == -1) { |
d8bc1399 MC |
372 | goto f_err; |
373 | } else if (rv == 0) { | |
374 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
375 | goto f_err; | |
376 | } | |
377 | #ifdef SSL_DEBUG | |
378 | fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); | |
379 | #endif | |
f365a3e2 | 380 | } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) { |
d8bc1399 MC |
381 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
382 | goto f_err; | |
d8bc1399 MC |
383 | } |
384 | ||
f365a3e2 DSH |
385 | md = ssl_md(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg->hash_idx); |
386 | ||
d8bc1399 MC |
387 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len)) { |
388 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
389 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
390 | goto f_err; | |
391 | } | |
392 | } | |
393 | j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); | |
394 | if (((int)len > j) || ((int)PACKET_remaining(pkt) > j) | |
395 | || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) { | |
396 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE); | |
397 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
398 | goto f_err; | |
399 | } | |
400 | if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, len)) { | |
401 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
402 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
403 | goto f_err; | |
404 | } | |
405 | ||
2c5dfdc3 | 406 | if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) { |
d8bc1399 | 407 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
d8bc1399 MC |
408 | goto f_err; |
409 | } | |
410 | ||
411 | #ifdef SSL_DEBUG | |
412 | fprintf(stderr, "Using client verify alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); | |
413 | #endif | |
75394189 | 414 | if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) { |
d8bc1399 | 415 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
d8bc1399 MC |
416 | goto f_err; |
417 | } | |
418 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST | |
419 | { | |
dc8da7b1 | 420 | int pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey); |
d8bc1399 MC |
421 | if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001 |
422 | || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256 | |
423 | || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) { | |
424 | if ((gost_data = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) { | |
425 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
d8bc1399 MC |
426 | goto f_err; |
427 | } | |
428 | BUF_reverse(gost_data, data, len); | |
429 | data = gost_data; | |
430 | } | |
431 | } | |
432 | #endif | |
433 | ||
5554facb | 434 | if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) { |
5f9b64a2 | 435 | if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0 |
968ae5b3 DSH |
436 | || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, |
437 | RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) { | |
5f9b64a2 MC |
438 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
439 | goto f_err; | |
440 | } | |
d8bc1399 | 441 | } |
caf2b6b5 DSH |
442 | if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { |
443 | if (EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0 | |
444 | || !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET, | |
445 | (int)s->session->master_key_length, | |
446 | s->session->master_key)) { | |
447 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
448 | goto f_err; | |
449 | } | |
450 | if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(mctx, data, len) <= 0) { | |
451 | al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; | |
452 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); | |
453 | goto f_err; | |
454 | } | |
455 | } else { | |
456 | j = EVP_DigestVerify(mctx, data, len, hdata, hdatalen); | |
457 | if (j < 0) { | |
458 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
459 | goto f_err; | |
460 | } else if (j == 0) { | |
461 | al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; | |
462 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); | |
463 | goto f_err; | |
464 | } | |
d8bc1399 MC |
465 | } |
466 | ||
bd79bcb4 | 467 | ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; |
d8bc1399 MC |
468 | if (0) { |
469 | f_err: | |
470 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
471 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); | |
472 | } | |
473 | BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer); | |
474 | s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL; | |
475 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); | |
476 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST | |
477 | OPENSSL_free(gost_data); | |
478 | #endif | |
479 | return ret; | |
480 | } | |
481 | ||
229185e6 | 482 | int tls_construct_finished(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
0f113f3e | 483 | { |
12472b45 | 484 | size_t finish_md_len; |
229185e6 | 485 | const char *sender; |
8b0e934a | 486 | size_t slen; |
229185e6 | 487 | |
f7e393be MC |
488 | /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */ |
489 | if (!s->server) | |
490 | s->statem.cleanuphand = 1; | |
491 | ||
492 | /* | |
493 | * We only change the keys if we didn't already do this when we sent the | |
494 | * client certificate | |
495 | */ | |
496 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) | |
497 | && !s->server | |
498 | && s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 0 | |
499 | && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, | |
500 | SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) { | |
501 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER); | |
502 | goto err; | |
503 | } | |
504 | ||
229185e6 MC |
505 | if (s->server) { |
506 | sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label; | |
507 | slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len; | |
508 | } else { | |
509 | sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label; | |
510 | slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len; | |
511 | } | |
0f113f3e | 512 | |
12472b45 MC |
513 | finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, |
514 | sender, slen, | |
515 | s->s3->tmp.finish_md); | |
516 | if (finish_md_len == 0) { | |
4f89bfbf MC |
517 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
518 | goto err; | |
519 | } | |
520 | ||
12472b45 | 521 | s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = finish_md_len; |
4f89bfbf | 522 | |
12472b45 | 523 | if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, finish_md_len)) { |
4f89bfbf MC |
524 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
525 | goto err; | |
526 | } | |
0f113f3e | 527 | |
2c7bd692 CB |
528 | /* |
529 | * Log the master secret, if logging is enabled. We don't log it for | |
530 | * TLSv1.3: there's a different key schedule for that. | |
531 | */ | |
532 | if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl_log_secret(s, MASTER_SECRET_LABEL, | |
533 | s->session->master_key, | |
380a522f MC |
534 | s->session->master_key_length)) { |
535 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
536 | goto err; | |
537 | } | |
2faa1b48 | 538 | |
b9908bf9 MC |
539 | /* |
540 | * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks | |
541 | */ | |
380a522f MC |
542 | if (!ossl_assert(finish_md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) { |
543 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
544 | goto err; | |
545 | } | |
23a635c0 | 546 | if (!s->server) { |
12472b45 MC |
547 | memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, |
548 | finish_md_len); | |
549 | s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = finish_md_len; | |
b9908bf9 | 550 | } else { |
12472b45 MC |
551 | memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, |
552 | finish_md_len); | |
553 | s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = finish_md_len; | |
b9908bf9 | 554 | } |
0f113f3e | 555 | |
b9908bf9 | 556 | return 1; |
4f89bfbf | 557 | err: |
4f89bfbf MC |
558 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
559 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e | 560 | } |
d02b48c6 | 561 | |
44c04a2e MC |
562 | int tls_construct_key_update(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
563 | { | |
564 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->key_update)) { | |
565 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_KEY_UPDATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
566 | goto err; | |
567 | } | |
568 | ||
9412b3ad | 569 | s->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE; |
44c04a2e | 570 | return 1; |
f14afcaa | 571 | |
44c04a2e MC |
572 | err: |
573 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
574 | return 0; | |
575 | } | |
576 | ||
e1c3de44 MC |
577 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_update(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
578 | { | |
57389a32 | 579 | int al; |
e1c3de44 MC |
580 | unsigned int updatetype; |
581 | ||
82f992cb MC |
582 | s->key_update_count++; |
583 | if (s->key_update_count > MAX_KEY_UPDATE_MESSAGES) { | |
584 | al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
585 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, SSL_R_TOO_MANY_KEY_UPDATES); | |
586 | goto err; | |
587 | } | |
588 | ||
524420d8 MC |
589 | /* |
590 | * A KeyUpdate message signals a key change so the end of the message must | |
591 | * be on a record boundary. | |
592 | */ | |
593 | if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) { | |
594 | al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; | |
595 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY); | |
596 | goto err; | |
597 | } | |
598 | ||
e1c3de44 | 599 | if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &updatetype) |
2d871227 | 600 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { |
57389a32 | 601 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
e1c3de44 | 602 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE); |
57389a32 | 603 | goto err; |
e1c3de44 MC |
604 | } |
605 | ||
9010b7bc MC |
606 | /* |
607 | * There are only two defined key update types. Fail if we get a value we | |
608 | * didn't recognise. | |
609 | */ | |
2d871227 MC |
610 | if (updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED |
611 | && updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED) { | |
612 | al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
613 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE); | |
614 | goto err; | |
615 | } | |
616 | ||
5bf47933 MC |
617 | /* |
618 | * If we get a request for us to update our sending keys too then, we need | |
619 | * to additionally send a KeyUpdate message. However that message should | |
620 | * not also request an update (otherwise we get into an infinite loop). | |
621 | */ | |
622 | if (updatetype == SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED) | |
623 | s->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED; | |
624 | ||
57389a32 MC |
625 | if (!tls13_update_key(s, 0)) { |
626 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
627 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
628 | goto err; | |
629 | } | |
630 | ||
e1c3de44 | 631 | return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; |
57389a32 MC |
632 | err: |
633 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
634 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); | |
635 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
e1c3de44 MC |
636 | } |
637 | ||
bf48836c | 638 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG |
0f113f3e MC |
639 | /* |
640 | * ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen | |
641 | * to far. | |
642 | */ | |
ee2ffc27 | 643 | static void ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s) |
0f113f3e MC |
644 | { |
645 | const char *sender; | |
8b0e934a | 646 | size_t slen; |
0f113f3e MC |
647 | /* |
648 | * If no new cipher setup return immediately: other functions will set | |
649 | * the appropriate error. | |
650 | */ | |
651 | if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) | |
652 | return; | |
49ae7423 | 653 | if (!s->server) { |
0f113f3e MC |
654 | sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label; |
655 | slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len; | |
656 | } else { | |
657 | sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label; | |
658 | slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len; | |
659 | } | |
660 | ||
661 | s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, | |
662 | sender, | |
663 | slen, | |
664 | s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md); | |
665 | } | |
ee2ffc27 BL |
666 | #endif |
667 | ||
be3583fa | 668 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
b9908bf9 MC |
669 | { |
670 | int al; | |
348240c6 | 671 | size_t remain; |
4fa52141 | 672 | |
73999b62 | 673 | remain = PACKET_remaining(pkt); |
657da85e MC |
674 | /* |
675 | * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, which should already have | |
c69f2adf MC |
676 | * been consumed by ssl_get_message() so there should be no bytes left, |
677 | * unless we're using DTLS1_BAD_VER, which has an extra 2 bytes | |
657da85e | 678 | */ |
c69f2adf | 679 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
73999b62 | 680 | if ((s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER |
a230b26e EK |
681 | && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH + 1) |
682 | || (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER | |
683 | && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH - 1)) { | |
fb34a0f4 | 684 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
a230b26e EK |
685 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, |
686 | SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); | |
687 | goto f_err; | |
c69f2adf MC |
688 | } |
689 | } else { | |
73999b62 | 690 | if (remain != 0) { |
fb34a0f4 | 691 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
b9908bf9 MC |
692 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, |
693 | SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); | |
c69f2adf MC |
694 | goto f_err; |
695 | } | |
657da85e MC |
696 | } |
697 | ||
698 | /* Check we have a cipher to change to */ | |
699 | if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) { | |
700 | al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; | |
b9908bf9 | 701 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); |
657da85e MC |
702 | goto f_err; |
703 | } | |
704 | ||
705 | s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 1; | |
706 | if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) { | |
707 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
b9908bf9 | 708 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
657da85e MC |
709 | goto f_err; |
710 | } | |
711 | ||
c69f2adf MC |
712 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
713 | dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ); | |
714 | ||
715 | if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) | |
716 | s->d1->handshake_read_seq++; | |
717 | ||
718 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
719 | /* | |
720 | * Remember that a CCS has been received, so that an old key of | |
721 | * SCTP-Auth can be deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored if no | |
722 | * SCTP is used | |
723 | */ | |
724 | BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD, 1, NULL); | |
725 | #endif | |
726 | } | |
727 | ||
b9908bf9 | 728 | return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; |
657da85e MC |
729 | f_err: |
730 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
fe3a3291 | 731 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); |
b9908bf9 | 732 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
657da85e MC |
733 | } |
734 | ||
be3583fa | 735 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_finished(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
b9908bf9 | 736 | { |
7776a36c | 737 | int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
12472b45 | 738 | size_t md_len; |
b9908bf9 | 739 | |
d781d247 MC |
740 | |
741 | /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */ | |
f7e393be MC |
742 | if (s->server) |
743 | s->statem.cleanuphand = 1; | |
d781d247 | 744 | |
524420d8 MC |
745 | /* |
746 | * In TLSv1.3 a Finished message signals a key change so the end of the | |
747 | * message must be on a record boundary. | |
748 | */ | |
749 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) { | |
750 | al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; | |
751 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY); | |
752 | goto f_err; | |
753 | } | |
754 | ||
0f113f3e | 755 | /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */ |
92760c21 | 756 | if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->s3->change_cipher_spec) { |
0f113f3e | 757 | al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; |
b9908bf9 | 758 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS); |
0f113f3e MC |
759 | goto f_err; |
760 | } | |
761 | s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0; | |
762 | ||
12472b45 | 763 | md_len = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len; |
0f113f3e | 764 | |
12472b45 | 765 | if (md_len != PACKET_remaining(pkt)) { |
0f113f3e | 766 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
b9908bf9 | 767 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH); |
0f113f3e MC |
768 | goto f_err; |
769 | } | |
770 | ||
12472b45 MC |
771 | if (CRYPTO_memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt), s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, |
772 | md_len) != 0) { | |
0f113f3e | 773 | al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; |
b9908bf9 | 774 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED); |
0f113f3e MC |
775 | goto f_err; |
776 | } | |
777 | ||
778 | /* | |
779 | * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks | |
780 | */ | |
380a522f MC |
781 | if (!ossl_assert(md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) { |
782 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
783 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
784 | goto f_err; | |
785 | } | |
23a635c0 | 786 | if (s->server) { |
12472b45 MC |
787 | memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, |
788 | md_len); | |
789 | s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = md_len; | |
0f113f3e | 790 | } else { |
12472b45 MC |
791 | memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, |
792 | md_len); | |
793 | s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = md_len; | |
0f113f3e MC |
794 | } |
795 | ||
7776a36c MC |
796 | /* |
797 | * In TLS1.3 we also have to change cipher state and do any final processing | |
798 | * of the initial server flight (if we are a client) | |
799 | */ | |
92760c21 MC |
800 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
801 | if (s->server) { | |
802 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, | |
803 | SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) { | |
92760c21 MC |
804 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER); |
805 | goto f_err; | |
806 | } | |
807 | } else { | |
808 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, | |
ec15acb6 | 809 | s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0, |
92760c21 | 810 | &s->session->master_key_length)) { |
92760c21 MC |
811 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER); |
812 | goto f_err; | |
813 | } | |
814 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, | |
815 | SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ)) { | |
92760c21 MC |
816 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER); |
817 | goto f_err; | |
818 | } | |
7776a36c MC |
819 | if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s, &al)) |
820 | goto f_err; | |
92760c21 MC |
821 | } |
822 | } | |
823 | ||
e6575156 | 824 | return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; |
0f113f3e MC |
825 | f_err: |
826 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
fe3a3291 | 827 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); |
b9908bf9 | 828 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
0f113f3e | 829 | } |
d02b48c6 | 830 | |
7cea05dc | 831 | int tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
b9908bf9 | 832 | { |
7cea05dc | 833 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, SSL3_MT_CCS)) { |
3c106325 | 834 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
85a7a5e6 MC |
835 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
836 | return 0; | |
837 | } | |
b9908bf9 | 838 | |
b9908bf9 MC |
839 | return 1; |
840 | } | |
841 | ||
e96e0f8e MC |
842 | /* Add a certificate to the WPACKET */ |
843 | static int ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, int chain, | |
844 | int *al) | |
0f113f3e | 845 | { |
e96e0f8e MC |
846 | int len; |
847 | unsigned char *outbytes; | |
848 | ||
849 | len = i2d_X509(x, NULL); | |
850 | if (len < 0) { | |
f63e4288 | 851 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); |
e96e0f8e MC |
852 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
853 | return 0; | |
854 | } | |
855 | if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u24(pkt, len, &outbytes) | |
856 | || i2d_X509(x, &outbytes) != len) { | |
f63e4288 | 857 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
e96e0f8e MC |
858 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
859 | return 0; | |
860 | } | |
861 | ||
862 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) | |
fe874d27 | 863 | && !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, x, |
e96e0f8e MC |
864 | chain, al)) |
865 | return 0; | |
866 | ||
867 | return 1; | |
868 | } | |
869 | ||
870 | /* Add certificate chain to provided WPACKET */ | |
871 | static int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk, int *al) | |
872 | { | |
873 | int i, chain_count; | |
874 | X509 *x; | |
875 | STACK_OF(X509) *extra_certs; | |
876 | STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL; | |
877 | X509_STORE *chain_store; | |
878 | int tmpal = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
879 | ||
880 | if (cpk == NULL || cpk->x509 == NULL) | |
881 | return 1; | |
882 | ||
883 | x = cpk->x509; | |
884 | ||
885 | /* | |
886 | * If we have a certificate specific chain use it, else use parent ctx. | |
887 | */ | |
d805a57b | 888 | if (cpk->chain != NULL) |
e96e0f8e MC |
889 | extra_certs = cpk->chain; |
890 | else | |
891 | extra_certs = s->ctx->extra_certs; | |
892 | ||
893 | if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN) || extra_certs) | |
894 | chain_store = NULL; | |
895 | else if (s->cert->chain_store) | |
896 | chain_store = s->cert->chain_store; | |
897 | else | |
898 | chain_store = s->ctx->cert_store; | |
899 | ||
d805a57b | 900 | if (chain_store != NULL) { |
e96e0f8e MC |
901 | X509_STORE_CTX *xs_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new(); |
902 | ||
903 | if (xs_ctx == NULL) { | |
904 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
905 | goto err; | |
906 | } | |
907 | if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(xs_ctx, chain_store, x, NULL)) { | |
908 | X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); | |
909 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_X509_LIB); | |
910 | goto err; | |
911 | } | |
912 | /* | |
913 | * It is valid for the chain not to be complete (because normally we | |
914 | * don't include the root cert in the chain). Therefore we deliberately | |
915 | * ignore the error return from this call. We're not actually verifying | |
916 | * the cert - we're just building as much of the chain as we can | |
917 | */ | |
918 | (void)X509_verify_cert(xs_ctx); | |
919 | /* Don't leave errors in the queue */ | |
920 | ERR_clear_error(); | |
921 | chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(xs_ctx); | |
922 | i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, chain, NULL, 0); | |
923 | if (i != 1) { | |
924 | #if 0 | |
925 | /* Dummy error calls so mkerr generates them */ | |
926 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL); | |
927 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL); | |
928 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK); | |
929 | #endif | |
930 | X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); | |
931 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i); | |
932 | goto err; | |
933 | } | |
934 | chain_count = sk_X509_num(chain); | |
935 | for (i = 0; i < chain_count; i++) { | |
936 | x = sk_X509_value(chain, i); | |
937 | ||
938 | if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i, &tmpal)) { | |
939 | X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); | |
940 | goto err; | |
941 | } | |
942 | } | |
943 | X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); | |
944 | } else { | |
945 | i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, extra_certs, x, 0); | |
946 | if (i != 1) { | |
947 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i); | |
948 | goto err; | |
949 | } | |
950 | if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, 0, &tmpal)) | |
951 | goto err; | |
952 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(extra_certs); i++) { | |
953 | x = sk_X509_value(extra_certs, i); | |
954 | if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i + 1, &tmpal)) | |
955 | goto err; | |
956 | } | |
957 | } | |
958 | return 1; | |
959 | ||
960 | err: | |
961 | *al = tmpal; | |
962 | return 0; | |
963 | } | |
964 | ||
965 | unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk, | |
966 | int *al) | |
967 | { | |
968 | int tmpal = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
969 | ||
5923ad4b | 970 | if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt) |
e96e0f8e | 971 | || !ssl_add_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk, &tmpal) |
5923ad4b | 972 | || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { |
c49e1912 | 973 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
e96e0f8e | 974 | *al = tmpal; |
7cea05dc | 975 | return 0; |
77d514c5 | 976 | } |
c49e1912 | 977 | return 1; |
0f113f3e MC |
978 | } |
979 | ||
30f05b19 MC |
980 | /* |
981 | * Tidy up after the end of a handshake. In the case of SCTP this may result | |
982 | * in NBIO events. If |clearbufs| is set then init_buf and the wbio buffer is | |
983 | * freed up as well. | |
984 | */ | |
985 | WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst, int clearbufs) | |
8723588e MC |
986 | { |
987 | void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL; | |
988 | ||
989 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
990 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) { | |
be3583fa | 991 | WORK_STATE ret; |
8723588e MC |
992 | ret = dtls_wait_for_dry(s); |
993 | if (ret != WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE) | |
994 | return ret; | |
995 | } | |
996 | #endif | |
997 | ||
30f05b19 MC |
998 | if (clearbufs) { |
999 | if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
1000 | /* | |
1001 | * We don't do this in DTLS because we may still need the init_buf | |
1002 | * in case there are any unexpected retransmits | |
1003 | */ | |
1004 | BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); | |
1005 | s->init_buf = NULL; | |
1006 | } | |
b77f3ed1 MC |
1007 | if (!ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s)) |
1008 | return WORK_ERROR; | |
30f05b19 | 1009 | s->init_num = 0; |
473483d4 | 1010 | } |
8723588e | 1011 | |
c7f47786 | 1012 | if (s->statem.cleanuphand) { |
8723588e MC |
1013 | /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */ |
1014 | s->renegotiate = 0; | |
1015 | s->new_session = 0; | |
c7f47786 | 1016 | s->statem.cleanuphand = 0; |
8723588e | 1017 | |
30f05b19 MC |
1018 | ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); |
1019 | ||
8723588e | 1020 | if (s->server) { |
8723588e MC |
1021 | ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER); |
1022 | ||
1023 | s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++; | |
fe3a3291 | 1024 | s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_accept; |
8723588e MC |
1025 | } else { |
1026 | ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT); | |
1027 | if (s->hit) | |
1028 | s->ctx->stats.sess_hit++; | |
1029 | ||
fe3a3291 | 1030 | s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_connect; |
8723588e MC |
1031 | s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_good++; |
1032 | } | |
1033 | ||
1034 | if (s->info_callback != NULL) | |
1035 | cb = s->info_callback; | |
1036 | else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) | |
1037 | cb = s->ctx->info_callback; | |
1038 | ||
1039 | if (cb != NULL) | |
1040 | cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1); | |
1041 | ||
1042 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
1043 | /* done with handshaking */ | |
1044 | s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0; | |
1045 | s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 0; | |
1046 | s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0; | |
f5c7f5df | 1047 | dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s); |
8723588e MC |
1048 | } |
1049 | } | |
1050 | ||
30f05b19 MC |
1051 | /* |
1052 | * If we've not cleared the buffers its because we've got more work to do, | |
1053 | * so continue. | |
1054 | */ | |
1055 | if (!clearbufs) | |
1056 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; | |
1057 | ||
4004ce5f | 1058 | ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0); |
8723588e MC |
1059 | return WORK_FINISHED_STOP; |
1060 | } | |
1061 | ||
9ab930b2 MC |
1062 | int tls_get_message_header(SSL *s, int *mt) |
1063 | { | |
1064 | /* s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */ | |
1065 | int skip_message, i, recvd_type, al; | |
1066 | unsigned char *p; | |
54105ddd | 1067 | size_t l, readbytes; |
9ab930b2 MC |
1068 | |
1069 | p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; | |
1070 | ||
1071 | do { | |
1072 | while (s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) { | |
1073 | i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, &recvd_type, | |
a230b26e EK |
1074 | &p[s->init_num], |
1075 | SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - s->init_num, | |
54105ddd | 1076 | 0, &readbytes); |
9ab930b2 MC |
1077 | if (i <= 0) { |
1078 | s->rwstate = SSL_READING; | |
1079 | return 0; | |
32ec4153 | 1080 | } |
9ab930b2 | 1081 | if (recvd_type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { |
1257adec | 1082 | /* |
a230b26e EK |
1083 | * A ChangeCipherSpec must be a single byte and may not occur |
1084 | * in the middle of a handshake message. | |
1085 | */ | |
54105ddd | 1086 | if (s->init_num != 0 || readbytes != 1 || p[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS) { |
1257adec DB |
1087 | al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; |
1088 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, | |
1089 | SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); | |
1090 | goto f_err; | |
1091 | } | |
9ab930b2 | 1092 | s->s3->tmp.message_type = *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; |
54105ddd | 1093 | s->init_num = readbytes - 1; |
c4377574 | 1094 | s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data; |
54105ddd | 1095 | s->s3->tmp.message_size = readbytes; |
9ab930b2 MC |
1096 | return 1; |
1097 | } else if (recvd_type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { | |
1098 | al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; | |
1099 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); | |
32ec4153 MC |
1100 | goto f_err; |
1101 | } | |
54105ddd | 1102 | s->init_num += readbytes; |
9ab930b2 MC |
1103 | } |
1104 | ||
1105 | skip_message = 0; | |
1106 | if (!s->server) | |
c7f47786 MC |
1107 | if (s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_OK |
1108 | && p[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) | |
9ab930b2 MC |
1109 | /* |
1110 | * The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages -- | |
1111 | * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if | |
1112 | * their format is correct. Does not count for 'Finished' | |
1113 | * MAC. | |
1114 | */ | |
1115 | if (p[1] == 0 && p[2] == 0 && p[3] == 0) { | |
1116 | s->init_num = 0; | |
1117 | skip_message = 1; | |
1118 | ||
1119 | if (s->msg_callback) | |
1120 | s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, | |
1121 | p, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s, | |
1122 | s->msg_callback_arg); | |
1123 | } | |
1124 | } while (skip_message); | |
1125 | /* s->init_num == SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */ | |
1126 | ||
1127 | *mt = *p; | |
1128 | s->s3->tmp.message_type = *(p++); | |
32ec4153 | 1129 | |
e8aa8b6c | 1130 | if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) { |
9ab930b2 MC |
1131 | /* |
1132 | * Only happens with SSLv3+ in an SSLv2 backward compatible | |
1133 | * ClientHello | |
e8aa8b6c F |
1134 | * |
1135 | * Total message size is the remaining record bytes to read | |
1136 | * plus the SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH bytes that we already read | |
9ab930b2 | 1137 | */ |
9ab930b2 MC |
1138 | l = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(&s->rlayer) |
1139 | + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
9ab930b2 MC |
1140 | s->s3->tmp.message_size = l; |
1141 | ||
1142 | s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data; | |
1143 | s->init_num = SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
1144 | } else { | |
1145 | n2l3(p, l); | |
1146 | /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */ | |
1147 | if (l > (INT_MAX - SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { | |
1148 | al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
1149 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE); | |
1150 | goto f_err; | |
32ec4153 | 1151 | } |
9ab930b2 MC |
1152 | s->s3->tmp.message_size = l; |
1153 | ||
1154 | s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
1155 | s->init_num = 0; | |
1156 | } | |
1157 | ||
1158 | return 1; | |
1159 | f_err: | |
1160 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
9ab930b2 MC |
1161 | return 0; |
1162 | } | |
1163 | ||
eda75751 | 1164 | int tls_get_message_body(SSL *s, size_t *len) |
9ab930b2 | 1165 | { |
54105ddd | 1166 | size_t n, readbytes; |
9ab930b2 MC |
1167 | unsigned char *p; |
1168 | int i; | |
1169 | ||
1170 | if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { | |
1171 | /* We've already read everything in */ | |
1172 | *len = (unsigned long)s->init_num; | |
1173 | return 1; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1174 | } |
1175 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
1176 | p = s->init_msg; |
1177 | n = s->s3->tmp.message_size - s->init_num; | |
1178 | while (n > 0) { | |
657da85e | 1179 | i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, NULL, |
54105ddd | 1180 | &p[s->init_num], n, 0, &readbytes); |
0f113f3e MC |
1181 | if (i <= 0) { |
1182 | s->rwstate = SSL_READING; | |
9ab930b2 MC |
1183 | *len = 0; |
1184 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e | 1185 | } |
54105ddd MC |
1186 | s->init_num += readbytes; |
1187 | n -= readbytes; | |
0f113f3e | 1188 | } |
ee2ffc27 | 1189 | |
bf48836c | 1190 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG |
0f113f3e MC |
1191 | /* |
1192 | * If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for | |
1193 | * Finished verification. | |
1194 | */ | |
1195 | if (*s->init_buf->data == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) | |
1196 | ssl3_take_mac(s); | |
ee2ffc27 BL |
1197 | #endif |
1198 | ||
0f113f3e | 1199 | /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */ |
e8aa8b6c | 1200 | if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) { |
d166ed8c DSH |
1201 | if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, |
1202 | s->init_num)) { | |
1203 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
1204 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1205 | *len = 0; | |
1206 | return 0; | |
1207 | } | |
32ec4153 | 1208 | if (s->msg_callback) |
a230b26e | 1209 | s->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION, 0, s->init_buf->data, |
32ec4153 MC |
1210 | (size_t)s->init_num, s, s->msg_callback_arg); |
1211 | } else { | |
11c67eea MC |
1212 | /* |
1213 | * We defer feeding in the HRR until later. We'll do it as part of | |
1214 | * processing the message | |
1215 | */ | |
1216 | if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST | |
1217 | && !ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, | |
1218 | s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { | |
d166ed8c DSH |
1219 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
1220 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1221 | *len = 0; | |
1222 | return 0; | |
1223 | } | |
32ec4153 MC |
1224 | if (s->msg_callback) |
1225 | s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data, | |
1226 | (size_t)s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s, | |
1227 | s->msg_callback_arg); | |
1228 | } | |
1229 | ||
eda75751 | 1230 | *len = s->init_num; |
9ab930b2 | 1231 | return 1; |
0f113f3e | 1232 | } |
d02b48c6 | 1233 | |
2e5ead83 | 1234 | int ssl_cert_type(const X509 *x, const EVP_PKEY *pk) |
0f113f3e | 1235 | { |
a230b26e | 1236 | if (pk == NULL && (pk = X509_get0_pubkey(x)) == NULL) |
17a72388 VD |
1237 | return -1; |
1238 | ||
1239 | switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) { | |
1240 | default: | |
1241 | return -1; | |
1242 | case EVP_PKEY_RSA: | |
d0ff28f8 | 1243 | return SSL_PKEY_RSA; |
17a72388 VD |
1244 | case EVP_PKEY_DSA: |
1245 | return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN; | |
ea262260 | 1246 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
17a72388 VD |
1247 | case EVP_PKEY_EC: |
1248 | return SSL_PKEY_ECC; | |
ea262260 | 1249 | #endif |
2a9b9654 | 1250 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST |
17a72388 VD |
1251 | case NID_id_GostR3410_2001: |
1252 | return SSL_PKEY_GOST01; | |
1253 | case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256: | |
1254 | return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256; | |
1255 | case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512: | |
1256 | return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512; | |
2a9b9654 | 1257 | #endif |
82049c54 | 1258 | } |
0f113f3e | 1259 | } |
d02b48c6 | 1260 | |
6b691a5c | 1261 | int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type) |
0f113f3e MC |
1262 | { |
1263 | int al; | |
1264 | ||
1265 | switch (type) { | |
1266 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT: | |
1267 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL: | |
1268 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER: | |
1269 | al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA; | |
1270 | break; | |
1271 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE: | |
1272 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE: | |
1273 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY: | |
1274 | case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD: | |
1275 | case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD: | |
1276 | case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD: | |
1277 | case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD: | |
1278 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID: | |
1279 | case X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID: | |
1280 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED: | |
1281 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED: | |
f3e235ed VD |
1282 | case X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH: |
1283 | case X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH: | |
1284 | case X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH: | |
1285 | case X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH: | |
1286 | case X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL: | |
1287 | case X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL: | |
1288 | case X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK: | |
0f113f3e MC |
1289 | al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE; |
1290 | break; | |
1291 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE: | |
1292 | case X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE: | |
1293 | al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; | |
1294 | break; | |
1295 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED: | |
1296 | case X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED: | |
1297 | al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED; | |
1298 | break; | |
1299 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED: | |
1300 | al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED; | |
1301 | break; | |
f3e235ed | 1302 | case X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED: |
0f113f3e | 1303 | case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM: |
f3e235ed VD |
1304 | case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL: |
1305 | case X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP: | |
0f113f3e MC |
1306 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
1307 | break; | |
1308 | case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT: | |
1309 | case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN: | |
1310 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY: | |
1311 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE: | |
1312 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG: | |
1313 | case X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED: | |
1314 | case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA: | |
1315 | al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA; | |
1316 | break; | |
1317 | case X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION: | |
1318 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
1319 | break; | |
1320 | case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE: | |
1321 | al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE; | |
1322 | break; | |
1323 | default: | |
1324 | al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN; | |
1325 | break; | |
1326 | } | |
1327 | return (al); | |
1328 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 1329 | |
b362ccab | 1330 | int ssl_allow_compression(SSL *s) |
0f113f3e MC |
1331 | { |
1332 | if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) | |
1333 | return 0; | |
1334 | return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION, 0, 0, NULL); | |
1335 | } | |
4fa52141 | 1336 | |
068c358a | 1337 | static int version_cmp(const SSL *s, int a, int b) |
4fa52141 VD |
1338 | { |
1339 | int dtls = SSL_IS_DTLS(s); | |
1340 | ||
1341 | if (a == b) | |
1342 | return 0; | |
1343 | if (!dtls) | |
1344 | return a < b ? -1 : 1; | |
1345 | return DTLS_VERSION_LT(a, b) ? -1 : 1; | |
1346 | } | |
1347 | ||
1348 | typedef struct { | |
1349 | int version; | |
a230b26e EK |
1350 | const SSL_METHOD *(*cmeth) (void); |
1351 | const SSL_METHOD *(*smeth) (void); | |
4fa52141 VD |
1352 | } version_info; |
1353 | ||
582a17d6 MC |
1354 | #if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_3_VERSION |
1355 | # error Code needs update for TLS_method() support beyond TLS1_3_VERSION. | |
4fa52141 VD |
1356 | #endif |
1357 | ||
f7f2a01d | 1358 | /* Must be in order high to low */ |
4fa52141 | 1359 | static const version_info tls_version_table[] = { |
582a17d6 MC |
1360 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 |
1361 | {TLS1_3_VERSION, tlsv1_3_client_method, tlsv1_3_server_method}, | |
1362 | #else | |
1363 | {TLS1_3_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, | |
1364 | #endif | |
6b01bed2 | 1365 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2 |
a230b26e | 1366 | {TLS1_2_VERSION, tlsv1_2_client_method, tlsv1_2_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 1367 | #else |
a230b26e | 1368 | {TLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
6b01bed2 VD |
1369 | #endif |
1370 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1 | |
a230b26e | 1371 | {TLS1_1_VERSION, tlsv1_1_client_method, tlsv1_1_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 1372 | #else |
a230b26e | 1373 | {TLS1_1_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
6b01bed2 VD |
1374 | #endif |
1375 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1 | |
a230b26e | 1376 | {TLS1_VERSION, tlsv1_client_method, tlsv1_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 1377 | #else |
a230b26e | 1378 | {TLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
6b01bed2 | 1379 | #endif |
4fa52141 | 1380 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3 |
a230b26e | 1381 | {SSL3_VERSION, sslv3_client_method, sslv3_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 1382 | #else |
a230b26e | 1383 | {SSL3_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
4fa52141 | 1384 | #endif |
a230b26e | 1385 | {0, NULL, NULL}, |
4fa52141 VD |
1386 | }; |
1387 | ||
1388 | #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION != DTLS1_2_VERSION | |
1389 | # error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_2_VERSION. | |
1390 | #endif | |
1391 | ||
f7f2a01d | 1392 | /* Must be in order high to low */ |
4fa52141 | 1393 | static const version_info dtls_version_table[] = { |
6b01bed2 | 1394 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2 |
a230b26e | 1395 | {DTLS1_2_VERSION, dtlsv1_2_client_method, dtlsv1_2_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 1396 | #else |
a230b26e | 1397 | {DTLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
6b01bed2 VD |
1398 | #endif |
1399 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1 | |
a230b26e EK |
1400 | {DTLS1_VERSION, dtlsv1_client_method, dtlsv1_server_method}, |
1401 | {DTLS1_BAD_VER, dtls_bad_ver_client_method, NULL}, | |
6b01bed2 | 1402 | #else |
a230b26e EK |
1403 | {DTLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
1404 | {DTLS1_BAD_VER, NULL, NULL}, | |
6b01bed2 | 1405 | #endif |
a230b26e | 1406 | {0, NULL, NULL}, |
4fa52141 VD |
1407 | }; |
1408 | ||
1409 | /* | |
1410 | * ssl_method_error - Check whether an SSL_METHOD is enabled. | |
1411 | * | |
1412 | * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method | |
1413 | * @method: the intended method. | |
1414 | * | |
1415 | * Returns 0 on success, or an SSL error reason on failure. | |
1416 | */ | |
068c358a | 1417 | static int ssl_method_error(const SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *method) |
4fa52141 VD |
1418 | { |
1419 | int version = method->version; | |
1420 | ||
1421 | if ((s->min_proto_version != 0 && | |
1422 | version_cmp(s, version, s->min_proto_version) < 0) || | |
1423 | ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, version, NULL) == 0) | |
1424 | return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW; | |
1425 | ||
1426 | if (s->max_proto_version != 0 && | |
a230b26e | 1427 | version_cmp(s, version, s->max_proto_version) > 0) |
4fa52141 VD |
1428 | return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_HIGH; |
1429 | ||
1430 | if ((s->options & method->mask) != 0) | |
1431 | return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; | |
1432 | if ((method->flags & SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB) != 0 && tls1_suiteb(s)) | |
1433 | return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_2_NEEDED_IN_SUITEB_MODE; | |
4fa52141 VD |
1434 | |
1435 | return 0; | |
1436 | } | |
1437 | ||
ccae4a15 FI |
1438 | /* |
1439 | * ssl_version_supported - Check that the specified `version` is supported by | |
1440 | * `SSL *` instance | |
1441 | * | |
1442 | * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method | |
1443 | * @version: Protocol version to test against | |
1444 | * | |
1445 | * Returns 1 when supported, otherwise 0 | |
1446 | */ | |
1447 | int ssl_version_supported(const SSL *s, int version) | |
1448 | { | |
1449 | const version_info *vent; | |
1450 | const version_info *table; | |
1451 | ||
1452 | switch (s->method->version) { | |
1453 | default: | |
1454 | /* Version should match method version for non-ANY method */ | |
1455 | return version_cmp(s, version, s->version) == 0; | |
1456 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1457 | table = tls_version_table; | |
1458 | break; | |
1459 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1460 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
1461 | break; | |
1462 | } | |
1463 | ||
1464 | for (vent = table; | |
1465 | vent->version != 0 && version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) <= 0; | |
1466 | ++vent) { | |
1467 | if (vent->cmeth != NULL && | |
1468 | version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) == 0 && | |
1469 | ssl_method_error(s, vent->cmeth()) == 0) { | |
1470 | return 1; | |
1471 | } | |
1472 | } | |
1473 | return 0; | |
1474 | } | |
1475 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1476 | /* |
1477 | * ssl_check_version_downgrade - In response to RFC7507 SCSV version | |
1478 | * fallback indication from a client check whether we're using the highest | |
1479 | * supported protocol version. | |
1480 | * | |
1481 | * @s server SSL handle. | |
1482 | * | |
1483 | * Returns 1 when using the highest enabled version, 0 otherwise. | |
1484 | */ | |
1485 | int ssl_check_version_downgrade(SSL *s) | |
1486 | { | |
1487 | const version_info *vent; | |
1488 | const version_info *table; | |
1489 | ||
1490 | /* | |
1491 | * Check that the current protocol is the highest enabled version | |
1492 | * (according to s->ctx->method, as version negotiation may have changed | |
1493 | * s->method). | |
1494 | */ | |
1495 | if (s->version == s->ctx->method->version) | |
1496 | return 1; | |
1497 | ||
1498 | /* | |
1499 | * Apparently we're using a version-flexible SSL_METHOD (not at its | |
1500 | * highest protocol version). | |
1501 | */ | |
1502 | if (s->ctx->method->version == TLS_method()->version) | |
1503 | table = tls_version_table; | |
1504 | else if (s->ctx->method->version == DTLS_method()->version) | |
1505 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
1506 | else { | |
1507 | /* Unexpected state; fail closed. */ | |
1508 | return 0; | |
1509 | } | |
1510 | ||
1511 | for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { | |
a230b26e | 1512 | if (vent->smeth != NULL && ssl_method_error(s, vent->smeth()) == 0) |
4fa52141 VD |
1513 | return s->version == vent->version; |
1514 | } | |
1515 | return 0; | |
1516 | } | |
1517 | ||
1518 | /* | |
1519 | * ssl_set_version_bound - set an upper or lower bound on the supported (D)TLS | |
1520 | * protocols, provided the initial (D)TLS method is version-flexible. This | |
1521 | * function sanity-checks the proposed value and makes sure the method is | |
1522 | * version-flexible, then sets the limit if all is well. | |
1523 | * | |
1524 | * @method_version: The version of the current SSL_METHOD. | |
1525 | * @version: the intended limit. | |
1526 | * @bound: pointer to limit to be updated. | |
1527 | * | |
1528 | * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure. | |
1529 | */ | |
1530 | int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version, int version, int *bound) | |
1531 | { | |
869e978c KR |
1532 | if (version == 0) { |
1533 | *bound = version; | |
1534 | return 1; | |
1535 | } | |
1536 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1537 | /*- |
1538 | * Restrict TLS methods to TLS protocol versions. | |
1539 | * Restrict DTLS methods to DTLS protocol versions. | |
1540 | * Note, DTLS version numbers are decreasing, use comparison macros. | |
1541 | * | |
1542 | * Note that for both lower-bounds we use explicit versions, not | |
1543 | * (D)TLS_MIN_VERSION. This is because we don't want to break user | |
1544 | * configurations. If the MIN (supported) version ever rises, the user's | |
1545 | * "floor" remains valid even if no longer available. We don't expect the | |
1546 | * MAX ceiling to ever get lower, so making that variable makes sense. | |
1547 | */ | |
1548 | switch (method_version) { | |
1549 | default: | |
1550 | /* | |
1551 | * XXX For fixed version methods, should we always fail and not set any | |
1552 | * bounds, always succeed and not set any bounds, or set the bounds and | |
1553 | * arrange to fail later if they are not met? At present fixed-version | |
1554 | * methods are not subject to controls that disable individual protocol | |
1555 | * versions. | |
1556 | */ | |
1557 | return 0; | |
1558 | ||
1559 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1560 | if (version < SSL3_VERSION || version > TLS_MAX_VERSION) | |
1561 | return 0; | |
1562 | break; | |
1563 | ||
1564 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1565 | if (DTLS_VERSION_GT(version, DTLS_MAX_VERSION) || | |
032924c4 | 1566 | DTLS_VERSION_LT(version, DTLS1_BAD_VER)) |
4fa52141 VD |
1567 | return 0; |
1568 | break; | |
1569 | } | |
1570 | ||
1571 | *bound = version; | |
1572 | return 1; | |
1573 | } | |
1574 | ||
f7f2a01d MC |
1575 | static void check_for_downgrade(SSL *s, int vers, DOWNGRADE *dgrd) |
1576 | { | |
1577 | if (vers == TLS1_2_VERSION | |
1578 | && ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_3_VERSION)) { | |
1579 | *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_TO_1_2; | |
1580 | } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && vers < TLS1_2_VERSION | |
1581 | && (ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_2_VERSION) | |
1582 | || ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_3_VERSION))) { | |
1583 | *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_TO_1_1; | |
1584 | } else { | |
1585 | *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE; | |
1586 | } | |
1587 | } | |
1588 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1589 | /* |
1590 | * ssl_choose_server_version - Choose server (D)TLS version. Called when the | |
1591 | * client HELLO is received to select the final server protocol version and | |
1592 | * the version specific method. | |
1593 | * | |
1594 | * @s: server SSL handle. | |
1595 | * | |
1596 | * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. | |
1597 | */ | |
f7f2a01d | 1598 | int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello, DOWNGRADE *dgrd) |
4fa52141 VD |
1599 | { |
1600 | /*- | |
1601 | * With version-flexible methods we have an initial state with: | |
1602 | * | |
1603 | * s->method->version == (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION, | |
1604 | * s->version == (D)TLS_MAX_VERSION. | |
1605 | * | |
1606 | * So we detect version-flexible methods via the method version, not the | |
1607 | * handle version. | |
1608 | */ | |
1609 | int server_version = s->method->version; | |
df7ce507 | 1610 | int client_version = hello->legacy_version; |
4fa52141 VD |
1611 | const version_info *vent; |
1612 | const version_info *table; | |
1613 | int disabled = 0; | |
cd998837 | 1614 | RAW_EXTENSION *suppversions; |
4fa52141 | 1615 | |
1ab3836b MC |
1616 | s->client_version = client_version; |
1617 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1618 | switch (server_version) { |
1619 | default: | |
7d061fce MC |
1620 | if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
1621 | if (version_cmp(s, client_version, s->version) < 0) | |
1622 | return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION; | |
f7f2a01d | 1623 | *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE; |
7d061fce MC |
1624 | /* |
1625 | * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't | |
1626 | * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope | |
1627 | * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol | |
1628 | * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return | |
1629 | * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) | |
1630 | */ | |
1631 | return 0; | |
1632 | } | |
d2f42576 | 1633 | /* |
7d061fce MC |
1634 | * Fall through if we are TLSv1.3 already (this means we must be after |
1635 | * a HelloRetryRequest | |
4fa52141 | 1636 | */ |
018fcbec | 1637 | /* fall thru */ |
4fa52141 VD |
1638 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: |
1639 | table = tls_version_table; | |
1640 | break; | |
1641 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1642 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
1643 | break; | |
1644 | } | |
1645 | ||
70af3d8e | 1646 | suppversions = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions]; |
cd998837 | 1647 | |
70af3d8e | 1648 | if (suppversions->present && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
cd998837 MC |
1649 | unsigned int candidate_vers = 0; |
1650 | unsigned int best_vers = 0; | |
1651 | const SSL_METHOD *best_method = NULL; | |
1652 | PACKET versionslist; | |
1653 | ||
6b473aca MC |
1654 | suppversions->parsed = 1; |
1655 | ||
16bce0e0 | 1656 | if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&suppversions->data, &versionslist)) { |
cd998837 MC |
1657 | /* Trailing or invalid data? */ |
1658 | return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH; | |
1659 | } | |
1660 | ||
1661 | while (PACKET_get_net_2(&versionslist, &candidate_vers)) { | |
1662 | /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this before release */ | |
1663 | if (candidate_vers == TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT) | |
1664 | candidate_vers = TLS1_3_VERSION; | |
f2342b7a MC |
1665 | /* |
1666 | * TODO(TLS1.3): There is some discussion on the TLS list about | |
1ee4b98e | 1667 | * whether to ignore versions <TLS1.2 in supported_versions. At the |
f2342b7a MC |
1668 | * moment we honour them if present. To be reviewed later |
1669 | */ | |
cd998837 MC |
1670 | if (version_cmp(s, candidate_vers, best_vers) <= 0) |
1671 | continue; | |
1672 | for (vent = table; | |
1673 | vent->version != 0 && vent->version != (int)candidate_vers; | |
16bce0e0 | 1674 | ++vent) |
bf0ba5e7 | 1675 | continue; |
bf85ef1b | 1676 | if (vent->version != 0 && vent->smeth != NULL) { |
cd998837 MC |
1677 | const SSL_METHOD *method; |
1678 | ||
1679 | method = vent->smeth(); | |
1680 | if (ssl_method_error(s, method) == 0) { | |
1681 | best_vers = candidate_vers; | |
1682 | best_method = method; | |
1683 | } | |
1684 | } | |
1685 | } | |
1686 | if (PACKET_remaining(&versionslist) != 0) { | |
1687 | /* Trailing data? */ | |
1688 | return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH; | |
1689 | } | |
1690 | ||
1691 | if (best_vers > 0) { | |
7d061fce MC |
1692 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
1693 | /* | |
1694 | * We get here if this is after a HelloRetryRequest. In this | |
1695 | * case we just check that we still negotiated TLSv1.3 | |
1696 | */ | |
1697 | if (best_vers != TLS1_3_VERSION) | |
1698 | return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; | |
1699 | return 0; | |
1700 | } | |
f7f2a01d | 1701 | check_for_downgrade(s, best_vers, dgrd); |
cd998837 MC |
1702 | s->version = best_vers; |
1703 | s->method = best_method; | |
1704 | return 0; | |
1705 | } | |
1706 | return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; | |
1707 | } | |
1708 | ||
1709 | /* | |
1710 | * If the supported versions extension isn't present, then the highest | |
1711 | * version we can negotiate is TLSv1.2 | |
1712 | */ | |
1713 | if (version_cmp(s, client_version, TLS1_3_VERSION) >= 0) | |
1714 | client_version = TLS1_2_VERSION; | |
1715 | ||
1716 | /* | |
1717 | * No supported versions extension, so we just use the version supplied in | |
1718 | * the ClientHello. | |
1719 | */ | |
4fa52141 VD |
1720 | for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { |
1721 | const SSL_METHOD *method; | |
1722 | ||
1723 | if (vent->smeth == NULL || | |
1724 | version_cmp(s, client_version, vent->version) < 0) | |
1725 | continue; | |
1726 | method = vent->smeth(); | |
1727 | if (ssl_method_error(s, method) == 0) { | |
f7f2a01d | 1728 | check_for_downgrade(s, vent->version, dgrd); |
4fa52141 VD |
1729 | s->version = vent->version; |
1730 | s->method = method; | |
1731 | return 0; | |
1732 | } | |
1733 | disabled = 1; | |
1734 | } | |
1735 | return disabled ? SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL : SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW; | |
1736 | } | |
1737 | ||
1738 | /* | |
1739 | * ssl_choose_client_version - Choose client (D)TLS version. Called when the | |
1740 | * server HELLO is received to select the final client protocol version and | |
1741 | * the version specific method. | |
1742 | * | |
1743 | * @s: client SSL handle. | |
1744 | * @version: The proposed version from the server's HELLO. | |
c3043dcd MC |
1745 | * @checkdgrd: Whether to check the downgrade sentinels in the server_random |
1746 | * @al: Where to store any alert value that may be generated | |
4fa52141 VD |
1747 | * |
1748 | * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. | |
1749 | */ | |
c3043dcd | 1750 | int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version, int checkdgrd, int *al) |
4fa52141 VD |
1751 | { |
1752 | const version_info *vent; | |
1753 | const version_info *table; | |
c3043dcd | 1754 | int highver = 0; |
4fa52141 | 1755 | |
b97667ce MC |
1756 | /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this before release */ |
1757 | if (version == TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT) | |
1758 | version = TLS1_3_VERSION; | |
1759 | ||
c3043dcd MC |
1760 | if (s->hello_retry_request && version != TLS1_3_VERSION) { |
1761 | *al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; | |
1762 | return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION; | |
1763 | } | |
1764 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1765 | switch (s->method->version) { |
1766 | default: | |
c3043dcd MC |
1767 | if (version != s->version) { |
1768 | *al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; | |
4fa52141 | 1769 | return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION; |
c3043dcd | 1770 | } |
4fa52141 VD |
1771 | /* |
1772 | * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't | |
1773 | * (and never did) check min/max, FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope | |
1774 | * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol | |
1775 | * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return | |
1776 | * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) | |
1777 | */ | |
4fa52141 VD |
1778 | return 0; |
1779 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1780 | table = tls_version_table; | |
1781 | break; | |
1782 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1783 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
1784 | break; | |
1785 | } | |
1786 | ||
1787 | for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { | |
1788 | const SSL_METHOD *method; | |
1789 | int err; | |
1790 | ||
4fa52141 | 1791 | if (vent->cmeth == NULL) |
c3043dcd MC |
1792 | continue; |
1793 | ||
1794 | if (highver != 0 && version != vent->version) | |
1795 | continue; | |
3847d426 | 1796 | |
4fa52141 VD |
1797 | method = vent->cmeth(); |
1798 | err = ssl_method_error(s, method); | |
c3043dcd MC |
1799 | if (err != 0) { |
1800 | if (version == vent->version) { | |
1801 | *al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; | |
1802 | return err; | |
1803 | } | |
1804 | ||
1805 | continue; | |
1806 | } | |
1807 | if (highver == 0) | |
1808 | highver = vent->version; | |
1809 | ||
1810 | if (version != vent->version) | |
1811 | continue; | |
1812 | ||
1813 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS13DOWNGRADE | |
1814 | /* Check for downgrades */ | |
1815 | if (checkdgrd) { | |
1816 | if (version == TLS1_2_VERSION && highver > version) { | |
1817 | if (memcmp(tls12downgrade, | |
1818 | s->s3->server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE | |
1819 | - sizeof(tls12downgrade), | |
1820 | sizeof(tls12downgrade)) == 0) { | |
1821 | *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
1822 | return SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK; | |
1823 | } | |
1824 | } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) | |
1825 | && version < TLS1_2_VERSION | |
1826 | && highver > version) { | |
1827 | if (memcmp(tls11downgrade, | |
1828 | s->s3->server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE | |
1829 | - sizeof(tls11downgrade), | |
1830 | sizeof(tls11downgrade)) == 0) { | |
1831 | *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
1832 | return SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK; | |
1833 | } | |
1834 | } | |
1835 | } | |
1836 | #endif | |
1837 | ||
4fa52141 | 1838 | s->method = method; |
ccae4a15 | 1839 | s->version = version; |
4fa52141 VD |
1840 | return 0; |
1841 | } | |
1842 | ||
c3043dcd | 1843 | *al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; |
4fa52141 VD |
1844 | return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; |
1845 | } | |
1846 | ||
068c358a | 1847 | /* |
38a73150 | 1848 | * ssl_get_min_max_version - get minimum and maximum protocol version |
068c358a KR |
1849 | * @s: The SSL connection |
1850 | * @min_version: The minimum supported version | |
1851 | * @max_version: The maximum supported version | |
1852 | * | |
1853 | * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if the | |
1854 | * version is initially (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION. We apply any explicit SSL_OP_NO_xxx | |
1855 | * options, the MinProtocol and MaxProtocol configuration commands, any Suite B | |
b53338cb | 1856 | * constraints and any floor imposed by the security level here, |
068c358a | 1857 | * so we don't advertise the wrong protocol version to only reject the outcome later. |
4fa52141 | 1858 | * |
0485d540 | 1859 | * Computing the right floor matters. If, e.g., TLS 1.0 and 1.2 are enabled, |
4fa52141 VD |
1860 | * TLS 1.1 is disabled, but the security level, Suite-B and/or MinProtocol |
1861 | * only allow TLS 1.2, we want to advertise TLS1.2, *not* TLS1. | |
1862 | * | |
068c358a KR |
1863 | * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. On failure |
1864 | * min_version and max_version will also be set to 0. | |
4fa52141 | 1865 | */ |
38a73150 | 1866 | int ssl_get_min_max_version(const SSL *s, int *min_version, int *max_version) |
4fa52141 VD |
1867 | { |
1868 | int version; | |
1869 | int hole; | |
1870 | const SSL_METHOD *single = NULL; | |
1871 | const SSL_METHOD *method; | |
1872 | const version_info *table; | |
1873 | const version_info *vent; | |
1874 | ||
1875 | switch (s->method->version) { | |
1876 | default: | |
1877 | /* | |
1878 | * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't | |
1879 | * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope | |
1880 | * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol | |
1881 | * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return | |
1882 | * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) | |
1883 | */ | |
068c358a | 1884 | *min_version = *max_version = s->version; |
4fa52141 VD |
1885 | return 0; |
1886 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1887 | table = tls_version_table; | |
1888 | break; | |
1889 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1890 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
1891 | break; | |
1892 | } | |
1893 | ||
1894 | /* | |
1895 | * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are some protocols | |
1896 | * below X enabled. This is required in order to maintain the "version | |
1897 | * capability" vector contiguous. Any versions with a NULL client method | |
1898 | * (protocol version client is disabled at compile-time) is also a "hole". | |
1899 | * | |
1900 | * Our initial state is hole == 1, version == 0. That is, versions above | |
1901 | * the first version in the method table are disabled (a "hole" above | |
1902 | * the valid protocol entries) and we don't have a selected version yet. | |
1903 | * | |
1904 | * Whenever "hole == 1", and we hit an enabled method, its version becomes | |
1905 | * the selected version, and the method becomes a candidate "single" | |
1906 | * method. We're no longer in a hole, so "hole" becomes 0. | |
1907 | * | |
1908 | * If "hole == 0" and we hit an enabled method, then "single" is cleared, | |
1909 | * as we support a contiguous range of at least two methods. If we hit | |
1910 | * a disabled method, then hole becomes true again, but nothing else | |
1911 | * changes yet, because all the remaining methods may be disabled too. | |
1912 | * If we again hit an enabled method after the new hole, it becomes | |
1913 | * selected, as we start from scratch. | |
1914 | */ | |
068c358a | 1915 | *min_version = version = 0; |
4fa52141 VD |
1916 | hole = 1; |
1917 | for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { | |
1918 | /* | |
1919 | * A table entry with a NULL client method is still a hole in the | |
1920 | * "version capability" vector. | |
1921 | */ | |
1922 | if (vent->cmeth == NULL) { | |
1923 | hole = 1; | |
1924 | continue; | |
1925 | } | |
1926 | method = vent->cmeth(); | |
1927 | if (ssl_method_error(s, method) != 0) { | |
1928 | hole = 1; | |
1929 | } else if (!hole) { | |
1930 | single = NULL; | |
068c358a | 1931 | *min_version = method->version; |
4fa52141 VD |
1932 | } else { |
1933 | version = (single = method)->version; | |
068c358a | 1934 | *min_version = version; |
4fa52141 VD |
1935 | hole = 0; |
1936 | } | |
1937 | } | |
1938 | ||
068c358a KR |
1939 | *max_version = version; |
1940 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1941 | /* Fail if everything is disabled */ |
1942 | if (version == 0) | |
1943 | return SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE; | |
1944 | ||
068c358a KR |
1945 | return 0; |
1946 | } | |
1947 | ||
1948 | /* | |
1949 | * ssl_set_client_hello_version - Work out what version we should be using for | |
7acb8b64 | 1950 | * the initial ClientHello.legacy_version field. |
068c358a KR |
1951 | * |
1952 | * @s: client SSL handle. | |
1953 | * | |
1954 | * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. | |
1955 | */ | |
1956 | int ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL *s) | |
1957 | { | |
3eb2aff4 | 1958 | int ver_min, ver_max, ret; |
068c358a | 1959 | |
38a73150 | 1960 | ret = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max); |
068c358a KR |
1961 | |
1962 | if (ret != 0) | |
1963 | return ret; | |
1964 | ||
7acb8b64 MC |
1965 | s->version = ver_max; |
1966 | ||
1967 | /* TLS1.3 always uses TLS1.2 in the legacy_version field */ | |
1968 | if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ver_max > TLS1_2_VERSION) | |
1969 | ver_max = TLS1_2_VERSION; | |
1970 | ||
1971 | s->client_version = ver_max; | |
4fa52141 VD |
1972 | return 0; |
1973 | } | |
aff9929b MC |
1974 | |
1975 | /* | |
1976 | * Checks a list of |groups| to determine if the |group_id| is in it. If it is | |
1977 | * and |checkallow| is 1 then additionally check if the group is allowed to be | |
1978 | * used. Returns 1 if the group is in the list (and allowed if |checkallow| is | |
1979 | * 1) or 0 otherwise. | |
1980 | */ | |
deb2d5e7 | 1981 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
aff9929b MC |
1982 | int check_in_list(SSL *s, unsigned int group_id, const unsigned char *groups, |
1983 | size_t num_groups, int checkallow) | |
1984 | { | |
1985 | size_t i; | |
1986 | ||
1987 | if (groups == NULL || num_groups == 0) | |
1988 | return 0; | |
1989 | ||
1990 | for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++, groups += 2) { | |
6af87546 | 1991 | if (group_id == GET_GROUP_ID(groups, 0) |
aff9929b MC |
1992 | && (!checkallow |
1993 | || tls_curve_allowed(s, groups, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))) { | |
0acee504 | 1994 | return 1; |
aff9929b MC |
1995 | } |
1996 | } | |
1997 | ||
0acee504 | 1998 | return 0; |
aff9929b | 1999 | } |
deb2d5e7 | 2000 | #endif |
11c67eea MC |
2001 | |
2002 | /* Replace ClientHello1 in the transcript hash with a synthetic message */ | |
2003 | int create_synthetic_message_hash(SSL *s) | |
2004 | { | |
2005 | unsigned char hashval[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; | |
2006 | size_t hashlen = 0; | |
635b7d3f MC |
2007 | unsigned char msghdr[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]; |
2008 | ||
2009 | memset(msghdr, 0, sizeof(msghdr)); | |
11c67eea MC |
2010 | |
2011 | /* Get the hash of the initial ClientHello */ | |
2012 | if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0) | |
2013 | || !ssl_handshake_hash(s, hashval, sizeof(hashval), &hashlen)) { | |
2014 | SSLerr(SSL_F_CREATE_SYNTHETIC_MESSAGE_HASH, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2015 | return 0; | |
2016 | } | |
2017 | ||
2018 | /* Reinitialise the transcript hash */ | |
2019 | if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) | |
2020 | return 0; | |
2021 | ||
2022 | /* Inject the synthetic message_hash message */ | |
635b7d3f | 2023 | msghdr[0] = SSL3_MT_MESSAGE_HASH; |
11c67eea MC |
2024 | msghdr[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - 1] = hashlen; |
2025 | if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, msghdr, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) | |
2026 | || !ssl3_finish_mac(s, hashval, hashlen)) { | |
2027 | SSLerr(SSL_F_CREATE_SYNTHETIC_MESSAGE_HASH, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2028 | return 0; | |
2029 | } | |
2030 | ||
2031 | return 1; | |
2032 | } | |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2033 | |
2034 | static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b) | |
2035 | { | |
2036 | return X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b); | |
2037 | } | |
2038 | ||
2039 | int parse_ca_names(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) | |
2040 | { | |
2041 | STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp); | |
2042 | X509_NAME *xn = NULL; | |
2043 | PACKET cadns; | |
2044 | ||
2045 | if (ca_sk == NULL) { | |
2046 | SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
2047 | goto decerr; | |
2048 | } | |
2049 | /* get the CA RDNs */ | |
2050 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cadns)) { | |
2051 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
2052 | SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
2053 | goto decerr; | |
2054 | } | |
2055 | ||
2056 | while (PACKET_remaining(&cadns)) { | |
2057 | const unsigned char *namestart, *namebytes; | |
2058 | unsigned int name_len; | |
2059 | ||
2060 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cadns, &name_len) | |
2061 | || !PACKET_get_bytes(&cadns, &namebytes, name_len)) { | |
2062 | SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
2063 | goto decerr; | |
2064 | } | |
2065 | ||
2066 | namestart = namebytes; | |
2067 | if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &namebytes, name_len)) == NULL) { | |
2068 | SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); | |
2069 | goto decerr; | |
2070 | } | |
2071 | if (namebytes != (namestart + name_len)) { | |
2072 | SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
2073 | goto decerr; | |
2074 | } | |
2075 | ||
2076 | if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) { | |
2077 | SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
2078 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
2079 | goto err; | |
2080 | } | |
2081 | xn = NULL; | |
2082 | } | |
2083 | ||
fa7c2637 DSH |
2084 | sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_ca_names, X509_NAME_free); |
2085 | s->s3->tmp.peer_ca_names = ca_sk; | |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2086 | |
2087 | return 1; | |
2088 | ||
2089 | decerr: | |
2090 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
2091 | err: | |
2092 | sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free); | |
2093 | X509_NAME_free(xn); | |
2094 | return 0; | |
2095 | } | |
2096 | ||
2097 | int construct_ca_names(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) | |
2098 | { | |
9784ec04 | 2099 | const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = SSL_get0_CA_list(s); |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2100 | |
2101 | /* Start sub-packet for client CA list */ | |
2102 | if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) | |
2103 | return 0; | |
2104 | ||
2105 | if (ca_sk != NULL) { | |
2106 | int i; | |
2107 | ||
2108 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk); i++) { | |
2109 | unsigned char *namebytes; | |
2110 | X509_NAME *name = sk_X509_NAME_value(ca_sk, i); | |
2111 | int namelen; | |
2112 | ||
2113 | if (name == NULL | |
2114 | || (namelen = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL)) < 0 | |
2115 | || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, namelen, | |
2116 | &namebytes) | |
2117 | || i2d_X509_NAME(name, &namebytes) != namelen) { | |
2118 | return 0; | |
2119 | } | |
2120 | } | |
2121 | } | |
2122 | ||
2123 | if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) | |
2124 | return 0; | |
2125 | ||
2126 | return 1; | |
2127 | } |