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58964a49 | 1 | /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) |
d02b48c6 RE |
2 | * All rights reserved. |
3 | * | |
4 | * This package is an SSL implementation written | |
5 | * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). | |
6 | * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. | |
0f113f3e | 7 | * |
d02b48c6 RE |
8 | * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as |
9 | * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions | |
10 | * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, | |
11 | * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation | |
12 | * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms | |
13 | * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). | |
0f113f3e | 14 | * |
d02b48c6 RE |
15 | * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in |
16 | * the code are not to be removed. | |
17 | * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution | |
18 | * as the author of the parts of the library used. | |
19 | * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or | |
20 | * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. | |
0f113f3e | 21 | * |
d02b48c6 RE |
22 | * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
23 | * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | |
24 | * are met: | |
25 | * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright | |
26 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. | |
27 | * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | |
28 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the | |
29 | * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. | |
30 | * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software | |
31 | * must display the following acknowledgement: | |
32 | * "This product includes cryptographic software written by | |
33 | * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" | |
34 | * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library | |
35 | * being used are not cryptographic related :-). | |
0f113f3e | 36 | * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from |
d02b48c6 RE |
37 | * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: |
38 | * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" | |
0f113f3e | 39 | * |
d02b48c6 RE |
40 | * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND |
41 | * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE | |
42 | * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE | |
43 | * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE | |
44 | * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL | |
45 | * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS | |
46 | * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) | |
47 | * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT | |
48 | * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY | |
49 | * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF | |
50 | * SUCH DAMAGE. | |
0f113f3e | 51 | * |
d02b48c6 RE |
52 | * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or |
53 | * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be | |
54 | * copied and put under another distribution licence | |
55 | * [including the GNU Public Licence.] | |
56 | */ | |
3813046d | 57 | /* ==================================================================== |
82b0bf0b | 58 | * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. |
3813046d BM |
59 | * |
60 | * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without | |
61 | * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | |
62 | * are met: | |
63 | * | |
64 | * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright | |
0f113f3e | 65 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
3813046d BM |
66 | * |
67 | * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | |
68 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in | |
69 | * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the | |
70 | * distribution. | |
71 | * | |
72 | * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this | |
73 | * software must display the following acknowledgment: | |
74 | * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project | |
75 | * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" | |
76 | * | |
77 | * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to | |
78 | * endorse or promote products derived from this software without | |
79 | * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact | |
80 | * openssl-core@openssl.org. | |
81 | * | |
82 | * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" | |
83 | * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written | |
84 | * permission of the OpenSSL Project. | |
85 | * | |
86 | * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following | |
87 | * acknowledgment: | |
88 | * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project | |
89 | * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" | |
90 | * | |
91 | * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY | |
92 | * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE | |
93 | * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR | |
94 | * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR | |
95 | * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, | |
96 | * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT | |
97 | * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; | |
98 | * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) | |
99 | * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, | |
100 | * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) | |
101 | * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED | |
102 | * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. | |
103 | * ==================================================================== | |
104 | * | |
105 | * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young | |
106 | * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim | |
107 | * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). | |
108 | * | |
109 | */ | |
ea262260 BM |
110 | /* ==================================================================== |
111 | * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. | |
0f113f3e | 112 | * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by |
ea262260 BM |
113 | * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. |
114 | */ | |
d02b48c6 | 115 | |
48948d53 | 116 | #include <limits.h> |
f2d9a32c | 117 | #include <string.h> |
d02b48c6 | 118 | #include <stdio.h> |
8ba708e5 | 119 | #include "../ssl_locl.h" |
61ae935a | 120 | #include "statem_locl.h" |
ec577822 BM |
121 | #include <openssl/buffer.h> |
122 | #include <openssl/rand.h> | |
123 | #include <openssl/objects.h> | |
124 | #include <openssl/evp.h> | |
125 | #include <openssl/x509.h> | |
d02b48c6 | 126 | |
0f113f3e MC |
127 | /* |
128 | * send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or | |
129 | * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) | |
130 | */ | |
e7ecc7d4 | 131 | int ssl3_do_write(SSL *s, int type) |
0f113f3e MC |
132 | { |
133 | int ret; | |
134 | ||
135 | ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, type, &s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], | |
136 | s->init_num); | |
137 | if (ret < 0) | |
138 | return (-1); | |
139 | if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) | |
140 | /* | |
141 | * should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case we'll | |
142 | * ignore the result anyway | |
143 | */ | |
144 | ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], | |
145 | ret); | |
146 | ||
147 | if (ret == s->init_num) { | |
148 | if (s->msg_callback) | |
149 | s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data, | |
150 | (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s, | |
151 | s->msg_callback_arg); | |
152 | return (1); | |
153 | } | |
154 | s->init_off += ret; | |
155 | s->init_num -= ret; | |
156 | return (0); | |
157 | } | |
e7ecc7d4 | 158 | |
b9908bf9 | 159 | int tls_construct_finished(SSL *s, const char *sender, int slen) |
0f113f3e MC |
160 | { |
161 | unsigned char *p; | |
162 | int i; | |
163 | unsigned long l; | |
164 | ||
b9908bf9 | 165 | p = ssl_handshake_start(s); |
0f113f3e | 166 | |
b9908bf9 MC |
167 | i = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, |
168 | sender, slen, | |
169 | s->s3->tmp.finish_md); | |
170 | if (i <= 0) | |
171 | return 0; | |
172 | s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = i; | |
173 | memcpy(p, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i); | |
174 | l = i; | |
0f113f3e | 175 | |
b9908bf9 MC |
176 | /* |
177 | * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks | |
178 | */ | |
23a635c0 | 179 | if (!s->server) { |
b9908bf9 MC |
180 | OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); |
181 | memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i); | |
182 | s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = i; | |
183 | } else { | |
184 | OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); | |
185 | memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i); | |
186 | s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = i; | |
187 | } | |
0f113f3e | 188 | |
b9908bf9 MC |
189 | if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_FINISHED, l)) { |
190 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
191 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e MC |
192 | } |
193 | ||
b9908bf9 | 194 | return 1; |
0f113f3e | 195 | } |
d02b48c6 | 196 | |
bf48836c | 197 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG |
0f113f3e MC |
198 | /* |
199 | * ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen | |
200 | * to far. | |
201 | */ | |
ee2ffc27 | 202 | static void ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s) |
0f113f3e MC |
203 | { |
204 | const char *sender; | |
205 | int slen; | |
206 | /* | |
207 | * If no new cipher setup return immediately: other functions will set | |
208 | * the appropriate error. | |
209 | */ | |
210 | if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) | |
211 | return; | |
49ae7423 | 212 | if (!s->server) { |
0f113f3e MC |
213 | sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label; |
214 | slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len; | |
215 | } else { | |
216 | sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label; | |
217 | slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len; | |
218 | } | |
219 | ||
220 | s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, | |
221 | sender, | |
222 | slen, | |
223 | s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md); | |
224 | } | |
ee2ffc27 BL |
225 | #endif |
226 | ||
be3583fa | 227 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
b9908bf9 MC |
228 | { |
229 | int al; | |
73999b62 | 230 | long remain; |
4fa52141 | 231 | |
73999b62 | 232 | remain = PACKET_remaining(pkt); |
657da85e MC |
233 | /* |
234 | * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, which should already have | |
c69f2adf MC |
235 | * been consumed by ssl_get_message() so there should be no bytes left, |
236 | * unless we're using DTLS1_BAD_VER, which has an extra 2 bytes | |
657da85e | 237 | */ |
c69f2adf | 238 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
73999b62 MC |
239 | if ((s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER |
240 | && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH + 1) | |
c69f2adf | 241 | || (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER |
73999b62 | 242 | && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH - 1)) { |
c69f2adf | 243 | al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
b9908bf9 MC |
244 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, |
245 | SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); | |
c69f2adf MC |
246 | goto f_err; |
247 | } | |
248 | } else { | |
73999b62 | 249 | if (remain != 0) { |
c69f2adf | 250 | al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
b9908bf9 MC |
251 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, |
252 | SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); | |
c69f2adf MC |
253 | goto f_err; |
254 | } | |
657da85e MC |
255 | } |
256 | ||
257 | /* Check we have a cipher to change to */ | |
258 | if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) { | |
259 | al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; | |
b9908bf9 | 260 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); |
657da85e MC |
261 | goto f_err; |
262 | } | |
263 | ||
264 | s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 1; | |
265 | if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) { | |
266 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
b9908bf9 | 267 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
657da85e MC |
268 | goto f_err; |
269 | } | |
270 | ||
c69f2adf MC |
271 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
272 | dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ); | |
273 | ||
274 | if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) | |
275 | s->d1->handshake_read_seq++; | |
276 | ||
277 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
278 | /* | |
279 | * Remember that a CCS has been received, so that an old key of | |
280 | * SCTP-Auth can be deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored if no | |
281 | * SCTP is used | |
282 | */ | |
283 | BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD, 1, NULL); | |
284 | #endif | |
285 | } | |
286 | ||
b9908bf9 | 287 | return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; |
657da85e MC |
288 | f_err: |
289 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
fe3a3291 | 290 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); |
b9908bf9 | 291 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
657da85e MC |
292 | } |
293 | ||
be3583fa | 294 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_finished(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
b9908bf9 MC |
295 | { |
296 | int al, i; | |
b9908bf9 | 297 | |
0f113f3e MC |
298 | /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */ |
299 | if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) { | |
300 | al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; | |
b9908bf9 | 301 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS); |
0f113f3e MC |
302 | goto f_err; |
303 | } | |
304 | s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0; | |
305 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
306 | i = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len; |
307 | ||
956de7b2 | 308 | if ((unsigned long)i != PACKET_remaining(pkt)) { |
0f113f3e | 309 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
b9908bf9 | 310 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH); |
0f113f3e MC |
311 | goto f_err; |
312 | } | |
313 | ||
73999b62 | 314 | if (CRYPTO_memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt), s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, i) != 0) { |
0f113f3e | 315 | al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; |
b9908bf9 | 316 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED); |
0f113f3e MC |
317 | goto f_err; |
318 | } | |
319 | ||
320 | /* | |
321 | * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks | |
322 | */ | |
23a635c0 | 323 | if (s->server) { |
0f113f3e MC |
324 | OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); |
325 | memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, i); | |
326 | s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = i; | |
327 | } else { | |
328 | OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); | |
329 | memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, i); | |
330 | s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = i; | |
331 | } | |
332 | ||
e6575156 | 333 | return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; |
0f113f3e MC |
334 | f_err: |
335 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
fe3a3291 | 336 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); |
b9908bf9 | 337 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
0f113f3e | 338 | } |
d02b48c6 | 339 | |
b9908bf9 MC |
340 | int tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s) |
341 | { | |
342 | unsigned char *p; | |
343 | ||
344 | p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; | |
345 | *p = SSL3_MT_CCS; | |
346 | s->init_num = 1; | |
347 | s->init_off = 0; | |
348 | ||
349 | return 1; | |
350 | } | |
351 | ||
c526ed41 | 352 | unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, CERT_PKEY *cpk) |
0f113f3e MC |
353 | { |
354 | unsigned char *p; | |
355 | unsigned long l = 3 + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s); | |
356 | ||
357 | if (!ssl_add_cert_chain(s, cpk, &l)) | |
358 | return 0; | |
359 | ||
360 | l -= 3 + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s); | |
361 | p = ssl_handshake_start(s); | |
362 | l2n3(l, p); | |
363 | l += 3; | |
77d514c5 | 364 | |
61986d32 | 365 | if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE, l)) { |
77d514c5 MC |
366 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
367 | return 0; | |
368 | } | |
0f113f3e MC |
369 | return l + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s); |
370 | } | |
371 | ||
be3583fa | 372 | WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) |
8723588e MC |
373 | { |
374 | void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL; | |
375 | ||
376 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
377 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) { | |
be3583fa | 378 | WORK_STATE ret; |
8723588e MC |
379 | ret = dtls_wait_for_dry(s); |
380 | if (ret != WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE) | |
381 | return ret; | |
382 | } | |
383 | #endif | |
384 | ||
385 | /* clean a few things up */ | |
386 | ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); | |
473483d4 MC |
387 | |
388 | if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
389 | /* | |
390 | * We don't do this in DTLS because we may still need the init_buf | |
391 | * in case there are any unexpected retransmits | |
392 | */ | |
393 | BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); | |
394 | s->init_buf = NULL; | |
395 | } | |
8723588e MC |
396 | |
397 | ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s); | |
398 | ||
399 | s->init_num = 0; | |
400 | ||
401 | if (!s->server || s->renegotiate == 2) { | |
402 | /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */ | |
403 | s->renegotiate = 0; | |
404 | s->new_session = 0; | |
405 | ||
406 | if (s->server) { | |
8723588e MC |
407 | ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER); |
408 | ||
409 | s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++; | |
fe3a3291 | 410 | s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_accept; |
8723588e MC |
411 | } else { |
412 | ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT); | |
413 | if (s->hit) | |
414 | s->ctx->stats.sess_hit++; | |
415 | ||
fe3a3291 | 416 | s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_connect; |
8723588e MC |
417 | s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_good++; |
418 | } | |
419 | ||
420 | if (s->info_callback != NULL) | |
421 | cb = s->info_callback; | |
422 | else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) | |
423 | cb = s->ctx->info_callback; | |
424 | ||
425 | if (cb != NULL) | |
426 | cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1); | |
427 | ||
428 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
429 | /* done with handshaking */ | |
430 | s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0; | |
431 | s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 0; | |
432 | s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0; | |
433 | } | |
434 | } | |
435 | ||
436 | return WORK_FINISHED_STOP; | |
437 | } | |
438 | ||
9ab930b2 MC |
439 | int tls_get_message_header(SSL *s, int *mt) |
440 | { | |
441 | /* s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */ | |
442 | int skip_message, i, recvd_type, al; | |
443 | unsigned char *p; | |
444 | unsigned long l; | |
445 | ||
446 | p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; | |
447 | ||
448 | do { | |
449 | while (s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) { | |
450 | i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, &recvd_type, | |
451 | &p[s->init_num], SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - s->init_num, 0); | |
452 | if (i <= 0) { | |
453 | s->rwstate = SSL_READING; | |
454 | return 0; | |
32ec4153 | 455 | } |
9ab930b2 MC |
456 | if (recvd_type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { |
457 | s->s3->tmp.message_type = *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; | |
458 | s->init_num = i - 1; | |
459 | s->s3->tmp.message_size = i; | |
460 | return 1; | |
461 | } else if (recvd_type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { | |
462 | al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; | |
463 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); | |
32ec4153 MC |
464 | goto f_err; |
465 | } | |
9ab930b2 MC |
466 | s->init_num += i; |
467 | } | |
468 | ||
469 | skip_message = 0; | |
470 | if (!s->server) | |
471 | if (p[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) | |
472 | /* | |
473 | * The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages -- | |
474 | * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if | |
475 | * their format is correct. Does not count for 'Finished' | |
476 | * MAC. | |
477 | */ | |
478 | if (p[1] == 0 && p[2] == 0 && p[3] == 0) { | |
479 | s->init_num = 0; | |
480 | skip_message = 1; | |
481 | ||
482 | if (s->msg_callback) | |
483 | s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, | |
484 | p, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s, | |
485 | s->msg_callback_arg); | |
486 | } | |
487 | } while (skip_message); | |
488 | /* s->init_num == SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */ | |
489 | ||
490 | *mt = *p; | |
491 | s->s3->tmp.message_type = *(p++); | |
32ec4153 | 492 | |
9ab930b2 MC |
493 | if(RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) { |
494 | /* | |
495 | * Only happens with SSLv3+ in an SSLv2 backward compatible | |
496 | * ClientHello | |
497 | */ | |
498 | /* | |
499 | * Total message size is the remaining record bytes to read | |
500 | * plus the SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH bytes that we already read | |
501 | */ | |
502 | l = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(&s->rlayer) | |
503 | + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
504 | if (l && !BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf, (int)l)) { | |
505 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); | |
506 | goto err; | |
507 | } | |
508 | s->s3->tmp.message_size = l; | |
509 | ||
510 | s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data; | |
511 | s->init_num = SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
512 | } else { | |
513 | n2l3(p, l); | |
514 | /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */ | |
515 | if (l > (INT_MAX - SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { | |
516 | al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
517 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE); | |
518 | goto f_err; | |
32ec4153 | 519 | } |
9ab930b2 MC |
520 | if (l && !BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf, |
521 | (int)l + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { | |
522 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); | |
523 | goto err; | |
524 | } | |
525 | s->s3->tmp.message_size = l; | |
526 | ||
527 | s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
528 | s->init_num = 0; | |
529 | } | |
530 | ||
531 | return 1; | |
532 | f_err: | |
533 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
534 | err: | |
535 | return 0; | |
536 | } | |
537 | ||
538 | int tls_get_message_body(SSL *s, unsigned long *len) | |
539 | { | |
540 | long n; | |
541 | unsigned char *p; | |
542 | int i; | |
543 | ||
544 | if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { | |
545 | /* We've already read everything in */ | |
546 | *len = (unsigned long)s->init_num; | |
547 | return 1; | |
0f113f3e MC |
548 | } |
549 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
550 | p = s->init_msg; |
551 | n = s->s3->tmp.message_size - s->init_num; | |
552 | while (n > 0) { | |
657da85e MC |
553 | i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, NULL, |
554 | &p[s->init_num], n, 0); | |
0f113f3e MC |
555 | if (i <= 0) { |
556 | s->rwstate = SSL_READING; | |
9ab930b2 MC |
557 | *len = 0; |
558 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e MC |
559 | } |
560 | s->init_num += i; | |
561 | n -= i; | |
562 | } | |
ee2ffc27 | 563 | |
bf48836c | 564 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG |
0f113f3e MC |
565 | /* |
566 | * If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for | |
567 | * Finished verification. | |
568 | */ | |
569 | if (*s->init_buf->data == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) | |
570 | ssl3_take_mac(s); | |
ee2ffc27 BL |
571 | #endif |
572 | ||
0f113f3e | 573 | /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */ |
32ec4153 MC |
574 | if(RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) { |
575 | ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, s->init_num); | |
32ec4153 MC |
576 | if (s->msg_callback) |
577 | s->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION, 0, s->init_buf->data, | |
578 | (size_t)s->init_num, s, s->msg_callback_arg); | |
579 | } else { | |
580 | ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, | |
581 | s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH); | |
582 | if (s->msg_callback) | |
583 | s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data, | |
584 | (size_t)s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s, | |
585 | s->msg_callback_arg); | |
586 | } | |
587 | ||
9ab930b2 MC |
588 | /* |
589 | * init_num should never be negative...should probably be declared | |
590 | * unsigned | |
591 | */ | |
592 | if (s->init_num < 0) { | |
593 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
594 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
595 | *len = 0; | |
596 | return 0; | |
597 | } | |
598 | *len = (unsigned long)s->init_num; | |
599 | return 1; | |
0f113f3e | 600 | } |
d02b48c6 | 601 | |
17a72388 | 602 | int ssl_cert_type(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk) |
0f113f3e | 603 | { |
17a72388 VD |
604 | if (pk == NULL && |
605 | (pk = X509_get0_pubkey(x)) == NULL) | |
606 | return -1; | |
607 | ||
608 | switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) { | |
609 | default: | |
610 | return -1; | |
611 | case EVP_PKEY_RSA: | |
612 | return SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC; | |
613 | case EVP_PKEY_DSA: | |
614 | return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN; | |
ea262260 | 615 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
17a72388 VD |
616 | case EVP_PKEY_EC: |
617 | return SSL_PKEY_ECC; | |
ea262260 | 618 | #endif |
2a9b9654 | 619 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST |
17a72388 VD |
620 | case NID_id_GostR3410_2001: |
621 | return SSL_PKEY_GOST01; | |
622 | case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256: | |
623 | return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256; | |
624 | case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512: | |
625 | return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512; | |
2a9b9654 | 626 | #endif |
82049c54 | 627 | } |
0f113f3e | 628 | } |
d02b48c6 | 629 | |
6b691a5c | 630 | int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type) |
0f113f3e MC |
631 | { |
632 | int al; | |
633 | ||
634 | switch (type) { | |
635 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT: | |
636 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL: | |
637 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER: | |
638 | al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA; | |
639 | break; | |
640 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE: | |
641 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE: | |
642 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY: | |
643 | case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD: | |
644 | case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD: | |
645 | case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD: | |
646 | case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD: | |
647 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID: | |
648 | case X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID: | |
649 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED: | |
650 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED: | |
651 | al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE; | |
652 | break; | |
653 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE: | |
654 | case X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE: | |
655 | al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; | |
656 | break; | |
657 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED: | |
658 | case X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED: | |
659 | al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED; | |
660 | break; | |
661 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED: | |
662 | al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED; | |
663 | break; | |
664 | case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM: | |
665 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
666 | break; | |
667 | case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT: | |
668 | case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN: | |
669 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY: | |
670 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE: | |
671 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG: | |
672 | case X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED: | |
673 | case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA: | |
674 | al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA; | |
675 | break; | |
676 | case X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION: | |
677 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
678 | break; | |
679 | case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE: | |
680 | al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE; | |
681 | break; | |
682 | default: | |
683 | al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN; | |
684 | break; | |
685 | } | |
686 | return (al); | |
687 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 688 | |
b362ccab | 689 | int ssl_allow_compression(SSL *s) |
0f113f3e MC |
690 | { |
691 | if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) | |
692 | return 0; | |
693 | return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION, 0, 0, NULL); | |
694 | } | |
4fa52141 | 695 | |
068c358a | 696 | static int version_cmp(const SSL *s, int a, int b) |
4fa52141 VD |
697 | { |
698 | int dtls = SSL_IS_DTLS(s); | |
699 | ||
700 | if (a == b) | |
701 | return 0; | |
702 | if (!dtls) | |
703 | return a < b ? -1 : 1; | |
704 | return DTLS_VERSION_LT(a, b) ? -1 : 1; | |
705 | } | |
706 | ||
707 | typedef struct { | |
708 | int version; | |
709 | const SSL_METHOD *(*cmeth)(void); | |
710 | const SSL_METHOD *(*smeth)(void); | |
711 | } version_info; | |
712 | ||
713 | #if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_2_VERSION | |
714 | # error Code needs update for TLS_method() support beyond TLS1_2_VERSION. | |
715 | #endif | |
716 | ||
717 | static const version_info tls_version_table[] = { | |
6b01bed2 | 718 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2 |
4fa52141 | 719 | { TLS1_2_VERSION, TLSv1_2_client_method, TLSv1_2_server_method }, |
6b01bed2 VD |
720 | #else |
721 | { TLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL }, | |
722 | #endif | |
723 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1 | |
4fa52141 | 724 | { TLS1_1_VERSION, TLSv1_1_client_method, TLSv1_1_server_method }, |
6b01bed2 VD |
725 | #else |
726 | { TLS1_1_VERSION, NULL, NULL }, | |
727 | #endif | |
728 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1 | |
4fa52141 | 729 | { TLS1_VERSION, TLSv1_client_method, TLSv1_server_method }, |
6b01bed2 VD |
730 | #else |
731 | { TLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL }, | |
732 | #endif | |
4fa52141 VD |
733 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3 |
734 | { SSL3_VERSION, SSLv3_client_method, SSLv3_server_method }, | |
6b01bed2 VD |
735 | #else |
736 | { SSL3_VERSION, NULL, NULL }, | |
4fa52141 VD |
737 | #endif |
738 | { 0, NULL, NULL }, | |
739 | }; | |
740 | ||
741 | #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION != DTLS1_2_VERSION | |
742 | # error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_2_VERSION. | |
743 | #endif | |
744 | ||
745 | static const version_info dtls_version_table[] = { | |
6b01bed2 | 746 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2 |
4fa52141 | 747 | { DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLSv1_2_client_method, DTLSv1_2_server_method }, |
6b01bed2 VD |
748 | #else |
749 | { DTLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL }, | |
750 | #endif | |
751 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1 | |
4fa52141 | 752 | { DTLS1_VERSION, DTLSv1_client_method, DTLSv1_server_method }, |
6b01bed2 VD |
753 | #else |
754 | { DTLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL }, | |
755 | #endif | |
4fa52141 VD |
756 | { 0, NULL, NULL }, |
757 | }; | |
758 | ||
759 | /* | |
760 | * ssl_method_error - Check whether an SSL_METHOD is enabled. | |
761 | * | |
762 | * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method | |
763 | * @method: the intended method. | |
764 | * | |
765 | * Returns 0 on success, or an SSL error reason on failure. | |
766 | */ | |
068c358a | 767 | static int ssl_method_error(const SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *method) |
4fa52141 VD |
768 | { |
769 | int version = method->version; | |
770 | ||
771 | if ((s->min_proto_version != 0 && | |
772 | version_cmp(s, version, s->min_proto_version) < 0) || | |
773 | ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, version, NULL) == 0) | |
774 | return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW; | |
775 | ||
776 | if (s->max_proto_version != 0 && | |
777 | version_cmp(s, version, s->max_proto_version) > 0) | |
778 | return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_HIGH; | |
779 | ||
780 | if ((s->options & method->mask) != 0) | |
781 | return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; | |
782 | if ((method->flags & SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB) != 0 && tls1_suiteb(s)) | |
783 | return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_2_NEEDED_IN_SUITEB_MODE; | |
784 | else if ((method->flags & SSL_METHOD_NO_FIPS) != 0 && FIPS_mode()) | |
785 | return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_0_NEEDED_IN_FIPS_MODE; | |
786 | ||
787 | return 0; | |
788 | } | |
789 | ||
790 | /* | |
791 | * ssl_check_version_downgrade - In response to RFC7507 SCSV version | |
792 | * fallback indication from a client check whether we're using the highest | |
793 | * supported protocol version. | |
794 | * | |
795 | * @s server SSL handle. | |
796 | * | |
797 | * Returns 1 when using the highest enabled version, 0 otherwise. | |
798 | */ | |
799 | int ssl_check_version_downgrade(SSL *s) | |
800 | { | |
801 | const version_info *vent; | |
802 | const version_info *table; | |
803 | ||
804 | /* | |
805 | * Check that the current protocol is the highest enabled version | |
806 | * (according to s->ctx->method, as version negotiation may have changed | |
807 | * s->method). | |
808 | */ | |
809 | if (s->version == s->ctx->method->version) | |
810 | return 1; | |
811 | ||
812 | /* | |
813 | * Apparently we're using a version-flexible SSL_METHOD (not at its | |
814 | * highest protocol version). | |
815 | */ | |
816 | if (s->ctx->method->version == TLS_method()->version) | |
817 | table = tls_version_table; | |
818 | else if (s->ctx->method->version == DTLS_method()->version) | |
819 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
820 | else { | |
821 | /* Unexpected state; fail closed. */ | |
822 | return 0; | |
823 | } | |
824 | ||
825 | for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { | |
826 | if (vent->smeth != NULL && | |
827 | ssl_method_error(s, vent->smeth()) == 0) | |
828 | return s->version == vent->version; | |
829 | } | |
830 | return 0; | |
831 | } | |
832 | ||
833 | /* | |
834 | * ssl_set_version_bound - set an upper or lower bound on the supported (D)TLS | |
835 | * protocols, provided the initial (D)TLS method is version-flexible. This | |
836 | * function sanity-checks the proposed value and makes sure the method is | |
837 | * version-flexible, then sets the limit if all is well. | |
838 | * | |
839 | * @method_version: The version of the current SSL_METHOD. | |
840 | * @version: the intended limit. | |
841 | * @bound: pointer to limit to be updated. | |
842 | * | |
843 | * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure. | |
844 | */ | |
845 | int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version, int version, int *bound) | |
846 | { | |
869e978c KR |
847 | if (version == 0) { |
848 | *bound = version; | |
849 | return 1; | |
850 | } | |
851 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
852 | /*- |
853 | * Restrict TLS methods to TLS protocol versions. | |
854 | * Restrict DTLS methods to DTLS protocol versions. | |
855 | * Note, DTLS version numbers are decreasing, use comparison macros. | |
856 | * | |
857 | * Note that for both lower-bounds we use explicit versions, not | |
858 | * (D)TLS_MIN_VERSION. This is because we don't want to break user | |
859 | * configurations. If the MIN (supported) version ever rises, the user's | |
860 | * "floor" remains valid even if no longer available. We don't expect the | |
861 | * MAX ceiling to ever get lower, so making that variable makes sense. | |
862 | */ | |
863 | switch (method_version) { | |
864 | default: | |
865 | /* | |
866 | * XXX For fixed version methods, should we always fail and not set any | |
867 | * bounds, always succeed and not set any bounds, or set the bounds and | |
868 | * arrange to fail later if they are not met? At present fixed-version | |
869 | * methods are not subject to controls that disable individual protocol | |
870 | * versions. | |
871 | */ | |
872 | return 0; | |
873 | ||
874 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
875 | if (version < SSL3_VERSION || version > TLS_MAX_VERSION) | |
876 | return 0; | |
877 | break; | |
878 | ||
879 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
880 | if (DTLS_VERSION_GT(version, DTLS_MAX_VERSION) || | |
881 | DTLS_VERSION_LT(version, DTLS1_VERSION)) | |
882 | return 0; | |
883 | break; | |
884 | } | |
885 | ||
886 | *bound = version; | |
887 | return 1; | |
888 | } | |
889 | ||
890 | /* | |
891 | * ssl_choose_server_version - Choose server (D)TLS version. Called when the | |
892 | * client HELLO is received to select the final server protocol version and | |
893 | * the version specific method. | |
894 | * | |
895 | * @s: server SSL handle. | |
896 | * | |
897 | * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. | |
898 | */ | |
899 | int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s) | |
900 | { | |
901 | /*- | |
902 | * With version-flexible methods we have an initial state with: | |
903 | * | |
904 | * s->method->version == (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION, | |
905 | * s->version == (D)TLS_MAX_VERSION. | |
906 | * | |
907 | * So we detect version-flexible methods via the method version, not the | |
908 | * handle version. | |
909 | */ | |
910 | int server_version = s->method->version; | |
911 | int client_version = s->client_version; | |
912 | const version_info *vent; | |
913 | const version_info *table; | |
914 | int disabled = 0; | |
915 | ||
916 | switch (server_version) { | |
917 | default: | |
918 | if (version_cmp(s, client_version, s->version) < 0) | |
919 | return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION; | |
920 | /* | |
921 | * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't | |
922 | * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope | |
923 | * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol | |
924 | * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return | |
925 | * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) | |
926 | */ | |
927 | return 0; | |
928 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
929 | table = tls_version_table; | |
930 | break; | |
931 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
932 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
933 | break; | |
934 | } | |
935 | ||
936 | for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { | |
937 | const SSL_METHOD *method; | |
938 | ||
939 | if (vent->smeth == NULL || | |
940 | version_cmp(s, client_version, vent->version) < 0) | |
941 | continue; | |
942 | method = vent->smeth(); | |
943 | if (ssl_method_error(s, method) == 0) { | |
944 | s->version = vent->version; | |
945 | s->method = method; | |
946 | return 0; | |
947 | } | |
948 | disabled = 1; | |
949 | } | |
950 | return disabled ? SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL : SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW; | |
951 | } | |
952 | ||
953 | /* | |
954 | * ssl_choose_client_version - Choose client (D)TLS version. Called when the | |
955 | * server HELLO is received to select the final client protocol version and | |
956 | * the version specific method. | |
957 | * | |
958 | * @s: client SSL handle. | |
959 | * @version: The proposed version from the server's HELLO. | |
960 | * | |
961 | * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. | |
962 | */ | |
963 | int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version) | |
964 | { | |
965 | const version_info *vent; | |
966 | const version_info *table; | |
967 | ||
968 | switch (s->method->version) { | |
969 | default: | |
970 | if (version != s->version) | |
971 | return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION; | |
972 | /* | |
973 | * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't | |
974 | * (and never did) check min/max, FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope | |
975 | * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol | |
976 | * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return | |
977 | * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) | |
978 | */ | |
979 | s->session->ssl_version = s->version; | |
980 | return 0; | |
981 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
982 | table = tls_version_table; | |
983 | break; | |
984 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
985 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
986 | break; | |
987 | } | |
988 | ||
989 | for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { | |
990 | const SSL_METHOD *method; | |
991 | int err; | |
992 | ||
993 | if (version != vent->version) | |
994 | continue; | |
995 | if (vent->cmeth == NULL) | |
996 | break; | |
997 | method = vent->cmeth(); | |
998 | err = ssl_method_error(s, method); | |
999 | if (err != 0) | |
1000 | return err; | |
1001 | s->method = method; | |
1002 | s->session->ssl_version = s->version = version; | |
1003 | return 0; | |
1004 | } | |
1005 | ||
1006 | return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; | |
1007 | } | |
1008 | ||
068c358a KR |
1009 | /* |
1010 | * ssl_get_client_min_max_version - get minimum and maximum client version | |
1011 | * @s: The SSL connection | |
1012 | * @min_version: The minimum supported version | |
1013 | * @max_version: The maximum supported version | |
1014 | * | |
1015 | * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if the | |
1016 | * version is initially (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION. We apply any explicit SSL_OP_NO_xxx | |
1017 | * options, the MinProtocol and MaxProtocol configuration commands, any Suite B | |
1018 | * or FIPS_mode() constraints and any floor imposed by the security level here, | |
1019 | * so we don't advertise the wrong protocol version to only reject the outcome later. | |
4fa52141 VD |
1020 | * |
1021 | * Computing the right floor matters. If, e.g., TLS 1.0 and 1.2 are enabled, | |
1022 | * TLS 1.1 is disabled, but the security level, Suite-B and/or MinProtocol | |
1023 | * only allow TLS 1.2, we want to advertise TLS1.2, *not* TLS1. | |
1024 | * | |
068c358a KR |
1025 | * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. On failure |
1026 | * min_version and max_version will also be set to 0. | |
4fa52141 | 1027 | */ |
068c358a | 1028 | int ssl_get_client_min_max_version(const SSL *s, int *min_version, int *max_version) |
4fa52141 VD |
1029 | { |
1030 | int version; | |
1031 | int hole; | |
1032 | const SSL_METHOD *single = NULL; | |
1033 | const SSL_METHOD *method; | |
1034 | const version_info *table; | |
1035 | const version_info *vent; | |
1036 | ||
1037 | switch (s->method->version) { | |
1038 | default: | |
1039 | /* | |
1040 | * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't | |
1041 | * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope | |
1042 | * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol | |
1043 | * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return | |
1044 | * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) | |
1045 | */ | |
068c358a | 1046 | *min_version = *max_version = s->version; |
4fa52141 VD |
1047 | return 0; |
1048 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1049 | table = tls_version_table; | |
1050 | break; | |
1051 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1052 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
1053 | break; | |
1054 | } | |
1055 | ||
1056 | /* | |
1057 | * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are some protocols | |
1058 | * below X enabled. This is required in order to maintain the "version | |
1059 | * capability" vector contiguous. Any versions with a NULL client method | |
1060 | * (protocol version client is disabled at compile-time) is also a "hole". | |
1061 | * | |
1062 | * Our initial state is hole == 1, version == 0. That is, versions above | |
1063 | * the first version in the method table are disabled (a "hole" above | |
1064 | * the valid protocol entries) and we don't have a selected version yet. | |
1065 | * | |
1066 | * Whenever "hole == 1", and we hit an enabled method, its version becomes | |
1067 | * the selected version, and the method becomes a candidate "single" | |
1068 | * method. We're no longer in a hole, so "hole" becomes 0. | |
1069 | * | |
1070 | * If "hole == 0" and we hit an enabled method, then "single" is cleared, | |
1071 | * as we support a contiguous range of at least two methods. If we hit | |
1072 | * a disabled method, then hole becomes true again, but nothing else | |
1073 | * changes yet, because all the remaining methods may be disabled too. | |
1074 | * If we again hit an enabled method after the new hole, it becomes | |
1075 | * selected, as we start from scratch. | |
1076 | */ | |
068c358a | 1077 | *min_version = version = 0; |
4fa52141 VD |
1078 | hole = 1; |
1079 | for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { | |
1080 | /* | |
1081 | * A table entry with a NULL client method is still a hole in the | |
1082 | * "version capability" vector. | |
1083 | */ | |
1084 | if (vent->cmeth == NULL) { | |
1085 | hole = 1; | |
1086 | continue; | |
1087 | } | |
1088 | method = vent->cmeth(); | |
1089 | if (ssl_method_error(s, method) != 0) { | |
1090 | hole = 1; | |
1091 | } else if (!hole) { | |
1092 | single = NULL; | |
068c358a | 1093 | *min_version = method->version; |
4fa52141 VD |
1094 | } else { |
1095 | version = (single = method)->version; | |
068c358a | 1096 | *min_version = version; |
4fa52141 VD |
1097 | hole = 0; |
1098 | } | |
1099 | } | |
1100 | ||
068c358a KR |
1101 | *max_version = version; |
1102 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1103 | /* Fail if everything is disabled */ |
1104 | if (version == 0) | |
1105 | return SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE; | |
1106 | ||
068c358a KR |
1107 | return 0; |
1108 | } | |
1109 | ||
1110 | /* | |
1111 | * ssl_set_client_hello_version - Work out what version we should be using for | |
1112 | * the initial ClientHello. | |
1113 | * | |
1114 | * @s: client SSL handle. | |
1115 | * | |
1116 | * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. | |
1117 | */ | |
1118 | int ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL *s) | |
1119 | { | |
3eb2aff4 | 1120 | int ver_min, ver_max, ret; |
068c358a | 1121 | |
3eb2aff4 | 1122 | ret = ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max); |
068c358a KR |
1123 | |
1124 | if (ret != 0) | |
1125 | return ret; | |
1126 | ||
3eb2aff4 | 1127 | s->client_version = s->version = ver_max; |
4fa52141 VD |
1128 | return 0; |
1129 | } |