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Commit | Line | Data |
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846e33c7 RS |
1 | /* |
2 | * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. | |
3813046d | 3 | * |
846e33c7 RS |
4 | * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use |
5 | * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy | |
6 | * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at | |
7 | * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html | |
3813046d | 8 | */ |
846e33c7 | 9 | |
ea262260 BM |
10 | /* ==================================================================== |
11 | * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. | |
0f113f3e | 12 | * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by |
ea262260 BM |
13 | * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. |
14 | */ | |
d02b48c6 | 15 | |
48948d53 | 16 | #include <limits.h> |
f2d9a32c | 17 | #include <string.h> |
d02b48c6 | 18 | #include <stdio.h> |
8ba708e5 | 19 | #include "../ssl_locl.h" |
61ae935a | 20 | #include "statem_locl.h" |
ec577822 | 21 | #include <openssl/buffer.h> |
ec577822 BM |
22 | #include <openssl/objects.h> |
23 | #include <openssl/evp.h> | |
24 | #include <openssl/x509.h> | |
d02b48c6 | 25 | |
0f113f3e MC |
26 | /* |
27 | * send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or | |
28 | * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) | |
29 | */ | |
e7ecc7d4 | 30 | int ssl3_do_write(SSL *s, int type) |
0f113f3e MC |
31 | { |
32 | int ret; | |
33 | ||
34 | ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, type, &s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], | |
35 | s->init_num); | |
36 | if (ret < 0) | |
37 | return (-1); | |
38 | if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) | |
39 | /* | |
40 | * should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case we'll | |
41 | * ignore the result anyway | |
42 | */ | |
d166ed8c DSH |
43 | if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, |
44 | (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], | |
45 | ret)) | |
46 | return -1; | |
0f113f3e MC |
47 | |
48 | if (ret == s->init_num) { | |
49 | if (s->msg_callback) | |
50 | s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data, | |
51 | (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s, | |
52 | s->msg_callback_arg); | |
53 | return (1); | |
54 | } | |
55 | s->init_off += ret; | |
56 | s->init_num -= ret; | |
57 | return (0); | |
58 | } | |
e7ecc7d4 | 59 | |
b9908bf9 | 60 | int tls_construct_finished(SSL *s, const char *sender, int slen) |
0f113f3e MC |
61 | { |
62 | unsigned char *p; | |
63 | int i; | |
64 | unsigned long l; | |
65 | ||
b9908bf9 | 66 | p = ssl_handshake_start(s); |
0f113f3e | 67 | |
b9908bf9 MC |
68 | i = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, |
69 | sender, slen, | |
70 | s->s3->tmp.finish_md); | |
71 | if (i <= 0) | |
72 | return 0; | |
73 | s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = i; | |
74 | memcpy(p, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i); | |
75 | l = i; | |
0f113f3e | 76 | |
b9908bf9 MC |
77 | /* |
78 | * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks | |
79 | */ | |
23a635c0 | 80 | if (!s->server) { |
b9908bf9 MC |
81 | OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); |
82 | memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i); | |
83 | s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = i; | |
84 | } else { | |
85 | OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); | |
86 | memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i); | |
87 | s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = i; | |
88 | } | |
0f113f3e | 89 | |
b9908bf9 MC |
90 | if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_FINISHED, l)) { |
91 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
92 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e MC |
93 | } |
94 | ||
b9908bf9 | 95 | return 1; |
0f113f3e | 96 | } |
d02b48c6 | 97 | |
bf48836c | 98 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG |
0f113f3e MC |
99 | /* |
100 | * ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen | |
101 | * to far. | |
102 | */ | |
ee2ffc27 | 103 | static void ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s) |
0f113f3e MC |
104 | { |
105 | const char *sender; | |
106 | int slen; | |
107 | /* | |
108 | * If no new cipher setup return immediately: other functions will set | |
109 | * the appropriate error. | |
110 | */ | |
111 | if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) | |
112 | return; | |
49ae7423 | 113 | if (!s->server) { |
0f113f3e MC |
114 | sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label; |
115 | slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len; | |
116 | } else { | |
117 | sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label; | |
118 | slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len; | |
119 | } | |
120 | ||
121 | s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, | |
122 | sender, | |
123 | slen, | |
124 | s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md); | |
125 | } | |
ee2ffc27 BL |
126 | #endif |
127 | ||
be3583fa | 128 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
b9908bf9 MC |
129 | { |
130 | int al; | |
73999b62 | 131 | long remain; |
4fa52141 | 132 | |
73999b62 | 133 | remain = PACKET_remaining(pkt); |
657da85e MC |
134 | /* |
135 | * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, which should already have | |
c69f2adf MC |
136 | * been consumed by ssl_get_message() so there should be no bytes left, |
137 | * unless we're using DTLS1_BAD_VER, which has an extra 2 bytes | |
657da85e | 138 | */ |
c69f2adf | 139 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
73999b62 MC |
140 | if ((s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER |
141 | && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH + 1) | |
c69f2adf | 142 | || (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER |
73999b62 | 143 | && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH - 1)) { |
c69f2adf | 144 | al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
b9908bf9 MC |
145 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, |
146 | SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); | |
c69f2adf MC |
147 | goto f_err; |
148 | } | |
149 | } else { | |
73999b62 | 150 | if (remain != 0) { |
c69f2adf | 151 | al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
b9908bf9 MC |
152 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, |
153 | SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); | |
c69f2adf MC |
154 | goto f_err; |
155 | } | |
657da85e MC |
156 | } |
157 | ||
158 | /* Check we have a cipher to change to */ | |
159 | if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) { | |
160 | al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; | |
b9908bf9 | 161 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); |
657da85e MC |
162 | goto f_err; |
163 | } | |
164 | ||
165 | s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 1; | |
166 | if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) { | |
167 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
b9908bf9 | 168 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
657da85e MC |
169 | goto f_err; |
170 | } | |
171 | ||
c69f2adf MC |
172 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
173 | dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ); | |
174 | ||
175 | if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) | |
176 | s->d1->handshake_read_seq++; | |
177 | ||
178 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
179 | /* | |
180 | * Remember that a CCS has been received, so that an old key of | |
181 | * SCTP-Auth can be deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored if no | |
182 | * SCTP is used | |
183 | */ | |
184 | BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD, 1, NULL); | |
185 | #endif | |
186 | } | |
187 | ||
b9908bf9 | 188 | return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; |
657da85e MC |
189 | f_err: |
190 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
fe3a3291 | 191 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); |
b9908bf9 | 192 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
657da85e MC |
193 | } |
194 | ||
be3583fa | 195 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_finished(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
b9908bf9 MC |
196 | { |
197 | int al, i; | |
b9908bf9 | 198 | |
0f113f3e MC |
199 | /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */ |
200 | if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) { | |
201 | al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; | |
b9908bf9 | 202 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS); |
0f113f3e MC |
203 | goto f_err; |
204 | } | |
205 | s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0; | |
206 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
207 | i = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len; |
208 | ||
956de7b2 | 209 | if ((unsigned long)i != PACKET_remaining(pkt)) { |
0f113f3e | 210 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
b9908bf9 | 211 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH); |
0f113f3e MC |
212 | goto f_err; |
213 | } | |
214 | ||
73999b62 | 215 | if (CRYPTO_memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt), s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, i) != 0) { |
0f113f3e | 216 | al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; |
b9908bf9 | 217 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED); |
0f113f3e MC |
218 | goto f_err; |
219 | } | |
220 | ||
221 | /* | |
222 | * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks | |
223 | */ | |
23a635c0 | 224 | if (s->server) { |
0f113f3e MC |
225 | OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); |
226 | memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, i); | |
227 | s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = i; | |
228 | } else { | |
229 | OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); | |
230 | memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, i); | |
231 | s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = i; | |
232 | } | |
233 | ||
e6575156 | 234 | return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; |
0f113f3e MC |
235 | f_err: |
236 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
fe3a3291 | 237 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); |
b9908bf9 | 238 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
0f113f3e | 239 | } |
d02b48c6 | 240 | |
b9908bf9 MC |
241 | int tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s) |
242 | { | |
243 | unsigned char *p; | |
244 | ||
245 | p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; | |
246 | *p = SSL3_MT_CCS; | |
247 | s->init_num = 1; | |
248 | s->init_off = 0; | |
249 | ||
250 | return 1; | |
251 | } | |
252 | ||
c526ed41 | 253 | unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, CERT_PKEY *cpk) |
0f113f3e MC |
254 | { |
255 | unsigned char *p; | |
256 | unsigned long l = 3 + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s); | |
257 | ||
258 | if (!ssl_add_cert_chain(s, cpk, &l)) | |
259 | return 0; | |
260 | ||
261 | l -= 3 + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s); | |
262 | p = ssl_handshake_start(s); | |
263 | l2n3(l, p); | |
264 | l += 3; | |
77d514c5 | 265 | |
61986d32 | 266 | if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE, l)) { |
77d514c5 MC |
267 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
268 | return 0; | |
269 | } | |
0f113f3e MC |
270 | return l + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s); |
271 | } | |
272 | ||
be3583fa | 273 | WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) |
8723588e MC |
274 | { |
275 | void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL; | |
276 | ||
277 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
278 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) { | |
be3583fa | 279 | WORK_STATE ret; |
8723588e MC |
280 | ret = dtls_wait_for_dry(s); |
281 | if (ret != WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE) | |
282 | return ret; | |
283 | } | |
284 | #endif | |
285 | ||
286 | /* clean a few things up */ | |
287 | ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); | |
473483d4 MC |
288 | |
289 | if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
290 | /* | |
291 | * We don't do this in DTLS because we may still need the init_buf | |
292 | * in case there are any unexpected retransmits | |
293 | */ | |
294 | BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); | |
295 | s->init_buf = NULL; | |
296 | } | |
8723588e MC |
297 | |
298 | ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s); | |
299 | ||
300 | s->init_num = 0; | |
301 | ||
302 | if (!s->server || s->renegotiate == 2) { | |
303 | /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */ | |
304 | s->renegotiate = 0; | |
305 | s->new_session = 0; | |
306 | ||
307 | if (s->server) { | |
8723588e MC |
308 | ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER); |
309 | ||
310 | s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++; | |
fe3a3291 | 311 | s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_accept; |
8723588e MC |
312 | } else { |
313 | ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT); | |
314 | if (s->hit) | |
315 | s->ctx->stats.sess_hit++; | |
316 | ||
fe3a3291 | 317 | s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_connect; |
8723588e MC |
318 | s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_good++; |
319 | } | |
320 | ||
321 | if (s->info_callback != NULL) | |
322 | cb = s->info_callback; | |
323 | else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) | |
324 | cb = s->ctx->info_callback; | |
325 | ||
326 | if (cb != NULL) | |
327 | cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1); | |
328 | ||
329 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
330 | /* done with handshaking */ | |
331 | s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0; | |
332 | s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 0; | |
333 | s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0; | |
334 | } | |
335 | } | |
336 | ||
337 | return WORK_FINISHED_STOP; | |
338 | } | |
339 | ||
9ab930b2 MC |
340 | int tls_get_message_header(SSL *s, int *mt) |
341 | { | |
342 | /* s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */ | |
343 | int skip_message, i, recvd_type, al; | |
344 | unsigned char *p; | |
345 | unsigned long l; | |
346 | ||
347 | p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; | |
348 | ||
349 | do { | |
350 | while (s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) { | |
351 | i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, &recvd_type, | |
352 | &p[s->init_num], SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - s->init_num, 0); | |
353 | if (i <= 0) { | |
354 | s->rwstate = SSL_READING; | |
355 | return 0; | |
32ec4153 | 356 | } |
9ab930b2 | 357 | if (recvd_type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { |
1257adec DB |
358 | /* |
359 | * A ChangeCipherSpec must be a single byte and may not occur | |
360 | * in the middle of a handshake message. | |
361 | */ | |
362 | if (s->init_num != 0 || i != 1 || p[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS) { | |
363 | al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; | |
364 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, | |
365 | SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); | |
366 | goto f_err; | |
367 | } | |
9ab930b2 MC |
368 | s->s3->tmp.message_type = *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; |
369 | s->init_num = i - 1; | |
370 | s->s3->tmp.message_size = i; | |
371 | return 1; | |
372 | } else if (recvd_type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { | |
373 | al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; | |
374 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); | |
32ec4153 MC |
375 | goto f_err; |
376 | } | |
9ab930b2 MC |
377 | s->init_num += i; |
378 | } | |
379 | ||
380 | skip_message = 0; | |
381 | if (!s->server) | |
382 | if (p[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) | |
383 | /* | |
384 | * The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages -- | |
385 | * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if | |
386 | * their format is correct. Does not count for 'Finished' | |
387 | * MAC. | |
388 | */ | |
389 | if (p[1] == 0 && p[2] == 0 && p[3] == 0) { | |
390 | s->init_num = 0; | |
391 | skip_message = 1; | |
392 | ||
393 | if (s->msg_callback) | |
394 | s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, | |
395 | p, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s, | |
396 | s->msg_callback_arg); | |
397 | } | |
398 | } while (skip_message); | |
399 | /* s->init_num == SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */ | |
400 | ||
401 | *mt = *p; | |
402 | s->s3->tmp.message_type = *(p++); | |
32ec4153 | 403 | |
e8aa8b6c | 404 | if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) { |
9ab930b2 MC |
405 | /* |
406 | * Only happens with SSLv3+ in an SSLv2 backward compatible | |
407 | * ClientHello | |
e8aa8b6c F |
408 | * |
409 | * Total message size is the remaining record bytes to read | |
410 | * plus the SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH bytes that we already read | |
9ab930b2 | 411 | */ |
9ab930b2 MC |
412 | l = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(&s->rlayer) |
413 | + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
414 | if (l && !BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf, (int)l)) { | |
415 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); | |
416 | goto err; | |
417 | } | |
418 | s->s3->tmp.message_size = l; | |
419 | ||
420 | s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data; | |
421 | s->init_num = SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
422 | } else { | |
423 | n2l3(p, l); | |
424 | /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */ | |
425 | if (l > (INT_MAX - SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { | |
426 | al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
427 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE); | |
428 | goto f_err; | |
32ec4153 | 429 | } |
9ab930b2 MC |
430 | if (l && !BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf, |
431 | (int)l + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { | |
432 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); | |
433 | goto err; | |
434 | } | |
435 | s->s3->tmp.message_size = l; | |
436 | ||
437 | s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
438 | s->init_num = 0; | |
439 | } | |
440 | ||
441 | return 1; | |
442 | f_err: | |
443 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
444 | err: | |
445 | return 0; | |
446 | } | |
447 | ||
448 | int tls_get_message_body(SSL *s, unsigned long *len) | |
449 | { | |
450 | long n; | |
451 | unsigned char *p; | |
452 | int i; | |
453 | ||
454 | if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { | |
455 | /* We've already read everything in */ | |
456 | *len = (unsigned long)s->init_num; | |
457 | return 1; | |
0f113f3e MC |
458 | } |
459 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
460 | p = s->init_msg; |
461 | n = s->s3->tmp.message_size - s->init_num; | |
462 | while (n > 0) { | |
657da85e MC |
463 | i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, NULL, |
464 | &p[s->init_num], n, 0); | |
0f113f3e MC |
465 | if (i <= 0) { |
466 | s->rwstate = SSL_READING; | |
9ab930b2 MC |
467 | *len = 0; |
468 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e MC |
469 | } |
470 | s->init_num += i; | |
471 | n -= i; | |
472 | } | |
ee2ffc27 | 473 | |
bf48836c | 474 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG |
0f113f3e MC |
475 | /* |
476 | * If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for | |
477 | * Finished verification. | |
478 | */ | |
479 | if (*s->init_buf->data == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) | |
480 | ssl3_take_mac(s); | |
ee2ffc27 BL |
481 | #endif |
482 | ||
0f113f3e | 483 | /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */ |
e8aa8b6c | 484 | if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) { |
d166ed8c DSH |
485 | if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, |
486 | s->init_num)) { | |
487 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
488 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
489 | *len = 0; | |
490 | return 0; | |
491 | } | |
32ec4153 MC |
492 | if (s->msg_callback) |
493 | s->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION, 0, s->init_buf->data, | |
494 | (size_t)s->init_num, s, s->msg_callback_arg); | |
495 | } else { | |
d166ed8c DSH |
496 | if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, |
497 | s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { | |
498 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
499 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
500 | *len = 0; | |
501 | return 0; | |
502 | } | |
32ec4153 MC |
503 | if (s->msg_callback) |
504 | s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data, | |
505 | (size_t)s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s, | |
506 | s->msg_callback_arg); | |
507 | } | |
508 | ||
9ab930b2 MC |
509 | /* |
510 | * init_num should never be negative...should probably be declared | |
511 | * unsigned | |
512 | */ | |
513 | if (s->init_num < 0) { | |
514 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
515 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
516 | *len = 0; | |
517 | return 0; | |
518 | } | |
519 | *len = (unsigned long)s->init_num; | |
520 | return 1; | |
0f113f3e | 521 | } |
d02b48c6 | 522 | |
8900f3e3 | 523 | int ssl_cert_type(X509 *x, const EVP_PKEY *pk) |
0f113f3e | 524 | { |
17a72388 VD |
525 | if (pk == NULL && |
526 | (pk = X509_get0_pubkey(x)) == NULL) | |
527 | return -1; | |
528 | ||
529 | switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) { | |
530 | default: | |
531 | return -1; | |
532 | case EVP_PKEY_RSA: | |
533 | return SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC; | |
534 | case EVP_PKEY_DSA: | |
535 | return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN; | |
ea262260 | 536 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
17a72388 VD |
537 | case EVP_PKEY_EC: |
538 | return SSL_PKEY_ECC; | |
ea262260 | 539 | #endif |
2a9b9654 | 540 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST |
17a72388 VD |
541 | case NID_id_GostR3410_2001: |
542 | return SSL_PKEY_GOST01; | |
543 | case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256: | |
544 | return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256; | |
545 | case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512: | |
546 | return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512; | |
2a9b9654 | 547 | #endif |
82049c54 | 548 | } |
0f113f3e | 549 | } |
d02b48c6 | 550 | |
6b691a5c | 551 | int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type) |
0f113f3e MC |
552 | { |
553 | int al; | |
554 | ||
555 | switch (type) { | |
556 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT: | |
557 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL: | |
558 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER: | |
559 | al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA; | |
560 | break; | |
561 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE: | |
562 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE: | |
563 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY: | |
564 | case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD: | |
565 | case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD: | |
566 | case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD: | |
567 | case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD: | |
568 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID: | |
569 | case X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID: | |
570 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED: | |
571 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED: | |
f3e235ed VD |
572 | case X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH: |
573 | case X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH: | |
574 | case X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH: | |
575 | case X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH: | |
576 | case X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL: | |
577 | case X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL: | |
578 | case X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK: | |
0f113f3e MC |
579 | al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE; |
580 | break; | |
581 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE: | |
582 | case X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE: | |
583 | al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; | |
584 | break; | |
585 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED: | |
586 | case X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED: | |
587 | al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED; | |
588 | break; | |
589 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED: | |
590 | al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED; | |
591 | break; | |
f3e235ed | 592 | case X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED: |
0f113f3e | 593 | case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM: |
f3e235ed VD |
594 | case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL: |
595 | case X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP: | |
0f113f3e MC |
596 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
597 | break; | |
598 | case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT: | |
599 | case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN: | |
600 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY: | |
601 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE: | |
602 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG: | |
603 | case X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED: | |
604 | case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA: | |
605 | al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA; | |
606 | break; | |
607 | case X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION: | |
608 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
609 | break; | |
610 | case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE: | |
611 | al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE; | |
612 | break; | |
613 | default: | |
614 | al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN; | |
615 | break; | |
616 | } | |
617 | return (al); | |
618 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 619 | |
b362ccab | 620 | int ssl_allow_compression(SSL *s) |
0f113f3e MC |
621 | { |
622 | if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) | |
623 | return 0; | |
624 | return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION, 0, 0, NULL); | |
625 | } | |
4fa52141 | 626 | |
068c358a | 627 | static int version_cmp(const SSL *s, int a, int b) |
4fa52141 VD |
628 | { |
629 | int dtls = SSL_IS_DTLS(s); | |
630 | ||
631 | if (a == b) | |
632 | return 0; | |
633 | if (!dtls) | |
634 | return a < b ? -1 : 1; | |
635 | return DTLS_VERSION_LT(a, b) ? -1 : 1; | |
636 | } | |
637 | ||
638 | typedef struct { | |
639 | int version; | |
640 | const SSL_METHOD *(*cmeth)(void); | |
641 | const SSL_METHOD *(*smeth)(void); | |
642 | } version_info; | |
643 | ||
644 | #if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_2_VERSION | |
645 | # error Code needs update for TLS_method() support beyond TLS1_2_VERSION. | |
646 | #endif | |
647 | ||
648 | static const version_info tls_version_table[] = { | |
6b01bed2 | 649 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2 |
2b8fa1d5 | 650 | { TLS1_2_VERSION, tlsv1_2_client_method, tlsv1_2_server_method }, |
6b01bed2 VD |
651 | #else |
652 | { TLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL }, | |
653 | #endif | |
654 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1 | |
2b8fa1d5 | 655 | { TLS1_1_VERSION, tlsv1_1_client_method, tlsv1_1_server_method }, |
6b01bed2 VD |
656 | #else |
657 | { TLS1_1_VERSION, NULL, NULL }, | |
658 | #endif | |
659 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1 | |
2b8fa1d5 | 660 | { TLS1_VERSION, tlsv1_client_method, tlsv1_server_method }, |
6b01bed2 VD |
661 | #else |
662 | { TLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL }, | |
663 | #endif | |
4fa52141 | 664 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3 |
2b8fa1d5 | 665 | { SSL3_VERSION, sslv3_client_method, sslv3_server_method }, |
6b01bed2 VD |
666 | #else |
667 | { SSL3_VERSION, NULL, NULL }, | |
4fa52141 VD |
668 | #endif |
669 | { 0, NULL, NULL }, | |
670 | }; | |
671 | ||
672 | #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION != DTLS1_2_VERSION | |
673 | # error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_2_VERSION. | |
674 | #endif | |
675 | ||
676 | static const version_info dtls_version_table[] = { | |
6b01bed2 | 677 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2 |
2b8fa1d5 | 678 | { DTLS1_2_VERSION, dtlsv1_2_client_method, dtlsv1_2_server_method }, |
6b01bed2 VD |
679 | #else |
680 | { DTLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL }, | |
681 | #endif | |
682 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1 | |
2b8fa1d5 | 683 | { DTLS1_VERSION, dtlsv1_client_method, dtlsv1_server_method }, |
032924c4 | 684 | { DTLS1_BAD_VER, dtls_bad_ver_client_method, NULL }, |
6b01bed2 VD |
685 | #else |
686 | { DTLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL }, | |
032924c4 | 687 | { DTLS1_BAD_VER, NULL, NULL }, |
6b01bed2 | 688 | #endif |
4fa52141 VD |
689 | { 0, NULL, NULL }, |
690 | }; | |
691 | ||
692 | /* | |
693 | * ssl_method_error - Check whether an SSL_METHOD is enabled. | |
694 | * | |
695 | * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method | |
696 | * @method: the intended method. | |
697 | * | |
698 | * Returns 0 on success, or an SSL error reason on failure. | |
699 | */ | |
068c358a | 700 | static int ssl_method_error(const SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *method) |
4fa52141 VD |
701 | { |
702 | int version = method->version; | |
703 | ||
704 | if ((s->min_proto_version != 0 && | |
705 | version_cmp(s, version, s->min_proto_version) < 0) || | |
706 | ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, version, NULL) == 0) | |
707 | return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW; | |
708 | ||
709 | if (s->max_proto_version != 0 && | |
710 | version_cmp(s, version, s->max_proto_version) > 0) | |
711 | return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_HIGH; | |
712 | ||
713 | if ((s->options & method->mask) != 0) | |
714 | return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; | |
715 | if ((method->flags & SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB) != 0 && tls1_suiteb(s)) | |
716 | return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_2_NEEDED_IN_SUITEB_MODE; | |
717 | else if ((method->flags & SSL_METHOD_NO_FIPS) != 0 && FIPS_mode()) | |
718 | return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_0_NEEDED_IN_FIPS_MODE; | |
719 | ||
720 | return 0; | |
721 | } | |
722 | ||
ccae4a15 FI |
723 | /* |
724 | * ssl_version_supported - Check that the specified `version` is supported by | |
725 | * `SSL *` instance | |
726 | * | |
727 | * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method | |
728 | * @version: Protocol version to test against | |
729 | * | |
730 | * Returns 1 when supported, otherwise 0 | |
731 | */ | |
732 | int ssl_version_supported(const SSL *s, int version) | |
733 | { | |
734 | const version_info *vent; | |
735 | const version_info *table; | |
736 | ||
737 | switch (s->method->version) { | |
738 | default: | |
739 | /* Version should match method version for non-ANY method */ | |
740 | return version_cmp(s, version, s->version) == 0; | |
741 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
742 | table = tls_version_table; | |
743 | break; | |
744 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
745 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
746 | break; | |
747 | } | |
748 | ||
749 | for (vent = table; | |
750 | vent->version != 0 && version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) <= 0; | |
751 | ++vent) { | |
752 | if (vent->cmeth != NULL && | |
753 | version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) == 0 && | |
754 | ssl_method_error(s, vent->cmeth()) == 0) { | |
755 | return 1; | |
756 | } | |
757 | } | |
758 | return 0; | |
759 | } | |
760 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
761 | /* |
762 | * ssl_check_version_downgrade - In response to RFC7507 SCSV version | |
763 | * fallback indication from a client check whether we're using the highest | |
764 | * supported protocol version. | |
765 | * | |
766 | * @s server SSL handle. | |
767 | * | |
768 | * Returns 1 when using the highest enabled version, 0 otherwise. | |
769 | */ | |
770 | int ssl_check_version_downgrade(SSL *s) | |
771 | { | |
772 | const version_info *vent; | |
773 | const version_info *table; | |
774 | ||
775 | /* | |
776 | * Check that the current protocol is the highest enabled version | |
777 | * (according to s->ctx->method, as version negotiation may have changed | |
778 | * s->method). | |
779 | */ | |
780 | if (s->version == s->ctx->method->version) | |
781 | return 1; | |
782 | ||
783 | /* | |
784 | * Apparently we're using a version-flexible SSL_METHOD (not at its | |
785 | * highest protocol version). | |
786 | */ | |
787 | if (s->ctx->method->version == TLS_method()->version) | |
788 | table = tls_version_table; | |
789 | else if (s->ctx->method->version == DTLS_method()->version) | |
790 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
791 | else { | |
792 | /* Unexpected state; fail closed. */ | |
793 | return 0; | |
794 | } | |
795 | ||
796 | for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { | |
797 | if (vent->smeth != NULL && | |
798 | ssl_method_error(s, vent->smeth()) == 0) | |
799 | return s->version == vent->version; | |
800 | } | |
801 | return 0; | |
802 | } | |
803 | ||
804 | /* | |
805 | * ssl_set_version_bound - set an upper or lower bound on the supported (D)TLS | |
806 | * protocols, provided the initial (D)TLS method is version-flexible. This | |
807 | * function sanity-checks the proposed value and makes sure the method is | |
808 | * version-flexible, then sets the limit if all is well. | |
809 | * | |
810 | * @method_version: The version of the current SSL_METHOD. | |
811 | * @version: the intended limit. | |
812 | * @bound: pointer to limit to be updated. | |
813 | * | |
814 | * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure. | |
815 | */ | |
816 | int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version, int version, int *bound) | |
817 | { | |
869e978c KR |
818 | if (version == 0) { |
819 | *bound = version; | |
820 | return 1; | |
821 | } | |
822 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
823 | /*- |
824 | * Restrict TLS methods to TLS protocol versions. | |
825 | * Restrict DTLS methods to DTLS protocol versions. | |
826 | * Note, DTLS version numbers are decreasing, use comparison macros. | |
827 | * | |
828 | * Note that for both lower-bounds we use explicit versions, not | |
829 | * (D)TLS_MIN_VERSION. This is because we don't want to break user | |
830 | * configurations. If the MIN (supported) version ever rises, the user's | |
831 | * "floor" remains valid even if no longer available. We don't expect the | |
832 | * MAX ceiling to ever get lower, so making that variable makes sense. | |
833 | */ | |
834 | switch (method_version) { | |
835 | default: | |
836 | /* | |
837 | * XXX For fixed version methods, should we always fail and not set any | |
838 | * bounds, always succeed and not set any bounds, or set the bounds and | |
839 | * arrange to fail later if they are not met? At present fixed-version | |
840 | * methods are not subject to controls that disable individual protocol | |
841 | * versions. | |
842 | */ | |
843 | return 0; | |
844 | ||
845 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
846 | if (version < SSL3_VERSION || version > TLS_MAX_VERSION) | |
847 | return 0; | |
848 | break; | |
849 | ||
850 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
851 | if (DTLS_VERSION_GT(version, DTLS_MAX_VERSION) || | |
032924c4 | 852 | DTLS_VERSION_LT(version, DTLS1_BAD_VER)) |
4fa52141 VD |
853 | return 0; |
854 | break; | |
855 | } | |
856 | ||
857 | *bound = version; | |
858 | return 1; | |
859 | } | |
860 | ||
861 | /* | |
862 | * ssl_choose_server_version - Choose server (D)TLS version. Called when the | |
863 | * client HELLO is received to select the final server protocol version and | |
864 | * the version specific method. | |
865 | * | |
866 | * @s: server SSL handle. | |
867 | * | |
868 | * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. | |
869 | */ | |
870 | int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s) | |
871 | { | |
872 | /*- | |
873 | * With version-flexible methods we have an initial state with: | |
874 | * | |
875 | * s->method->version == (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION, | |
876 | * s->version == (D)TLS_MAX_VERSION. | |
877 | * | |
878 | * So we detect version-flexible methods via the method version, not the | |
879 | * handle version. | |
880 | */ | |
881 | int server_version = s->method->version; | |
882 | int client_version = s->client_version; | |
883 | const version_info *vent; | |
884 | const version_info *table; | |
885 | int disabled = 0; | |
886 | ||
887 | switch (server_version) { | |
888 | default: | |
889 | if (version_cmp(s, client_version, s->version) < 0) | |
890 | return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION; | |
891 | /* | |
892 | * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't | |
893 | * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope | |
894 | * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol | |
895 | * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return | |
896 | * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) | |
897 | */ | |
898 | return 0; | |
899 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
900 | table = tls_version_table; | |
901 | break; | |
902 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
903 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
904 | break; | |
905 | } | |
906 | ||
907 | for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { | |
908 | const SSL_METHOD *method; | |
909 | ||
910 | if (vent->smeth == NULL || | |
911 | version_cmp(s, client_version, vent->version) < 0) | |
912 | continue; | |
913 | method = vent->smeth(); | |
914 | if (ssl_method_error(s, method) == 0) { | |
915 | s->version = vent->version; | |
916 | s->method = method; | |
917 | return 0; | |
918 | } | |
919 | disabled = 1; | |
920 | } | |
921 | return disabled ? SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL : SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW; | |
922 | } | |
923 | ||
924 | /* | |
925 | * ssl_choose_client_version - Choose client (D)TLS version. Called when the | |
926 | * server HELLO is received to select the final client protocol version and | |
927 | * the version specific method. | |
928 | * | |
929 | * @s: client SSL handle. | |
930 | * @version: The proposed version from the server's HELLO. | |
931 | * | |
932 | * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. | |
933 | */ | |
934 | int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version) | |
935 | { | |
936 | const version_info *vent; | |
937 | const version_info *table; | |
938 | ||
939 | switch (s->method->version) { | |
940 | default: | |
941 | if (version != s->version) | |
942 | return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION; | |
943 | /* | |
944 | * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't | |
945 | * (and never did) check min/max, FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope | |
946 | * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol | |
947 | * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return | |
948 | * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) | |
949 | */ | |
4fa52141 VD |
950 | return 0; |
951 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
952 | table = tls_version_table; | |
953 | break; | |
954 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
955 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
956 | break; | |
957 | } | |
958 | ||
959 | for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { | |
960 | const SSL_METHOD *method; | |
961 | int err; | |
962 | ||
963 | if (version != vent->version) | |
964 | continue; | |
965 | if (vent->cmeth == NULL) | |
966 | break; | |
967 | method = vent->cmeth(); | |
968 | err = ssl_method_error(s, method); | |
969 | if (err != 0) | |
970 | return err; | |
971 | s->method = method; | |
ccae4a15 | 972 | s->version = version; |
4fa52141 VD |
973 | return 0; |
974 | } | |
975 | ||
976 | return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; | |
977 | } | |
978 | ||
068c358a KR |
979 | /* |
980 | * ssl_get_client_min_max_version - get minimum and maximum client version | |
981 | * @s: The SSL connection | |
982 | * @min_version: The minimum supported version | |
983 | * @max_version: The maximum supported version | |
984 | * | |
985 | * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if the | |
986 | * version is initially (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION. We apply any explicit SSL_OP_NO_xxx | |
987 | * options, the MinProtocol and MaxProtocol configuration commands, any Suite B | |
988 | * or FIPS_mode() constraints and any floor imposed by the security level here, | |
989 | * so we don't advertise the wrong protocol version to only reject the outcome later. | |
4fa52141 | 990 | * |
0485d540 | 991 | * Computing the right floor matters. If, e.g., TLS 1.0 and 1.2 are enabled, |
4fa52141 VD |
992 | * TLS 1.1 is disabled, but the security level, Suite-B and/or MinProtocol |
993 | * only allow TLS 1.2, we want to advertise TLS1.2, *not* TLS1. | |
994 | * | |
068c358a KR |
995 | * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. On failure |
996 | * min_version and max_version will also be set to 0. | |
4fa52141 | 997 | */ |
068c358a | 998 | int ssl_get_client_min_max_version(const SSL *s, int *min_version, int *max_version) |
4fa52141 VD |
999 | { |
1000 | int version; | |
1001 | int hole; | |
1002 | const SSL_METHOD *single = NULL; | |
1003 | const SSL_METHOD *method; | |
1004 | const version_info *table; | |
1005 | const version_info *vent; | |
1006 | ||
1007 | switch (s->method->version) { | |
1008 | default: | |
1009 | /* | |
1010 | * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't | |
1011 | * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope | |
1012 | * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol | |
1013 | * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return | |
1014 | * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) | |
1015 | */ | |
068c358a | 1016 | *min_version = *max_version = s->version; |
4fa52141 VD |
1017 | return 0; |
1018 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1019 | table = tls_version_table; | |
1020 | break; | |
1021 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1022 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
1023 | break; | |
1024 | } | |
1025 | ||
1026 | /* | |
1027 | * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are some protocols | |
1028 | * below X enabled. This is required in order to maintain the "version | |
1029 | * capability" vector contiguous. Any versions with a NULL client method | |
1030 | * (protocol version client is disabled at compile-time) is also a "hole". | |
1031 | * | |
1032 | * Our initial state is hole == 1, version == 0. That is, versions above | |
1033 | * the first version in the method table are disabled (a "hole" above | |
1034 | * the valid protocol entries) and we don't have a selected version yet. | |
1035 | * | |
1036 | * Whenever "hole == 1", and we hit an enabled method, its version becomes | |
1037 | * the selected version, and the method becomes a candidate "single" | |
1038 | * method. We're no longer in a hole, so "hole" becomes 0. | |
1039 | * | |
1040 | * If "hole == 0" and we hit an enabled method, then "single" is cleared, | |
1041 | * as we support a contiguous range of at least two methods. If we hit | |
1042 | * a disabled method, then hole becomes true again, but nothing else | |
1043 | * changes yet, because all the remaining methods may be disabled too. | |
1044 | * If we again hit an enabled method after the new hole, it becomes | |
1045 | * selected, as we start from scratch. | |
1046 | */ | |
068c358a | 1047 | *min_version = version = 0; |
4fa52141 VD |
1048 | hole = 1; |
1049 | for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { | |
1050 | /* | |
1051 | * A table entry with a NULL client method is still a hole in the | |
1052 | * "version capability" vector. | |
1053 | */ | |
1054 | if (vent->cmeth == NULL) { | |
1055 | hole = 1; | |
1056 | continue; | |
1057 | } | |
1058 | method = vent->cmeth(); | |
1059 | if (ssl_method_error(s, method) != 0) { | |
1060 | hole = 1; | |
1061 | } else if (!hole) { | |
1062 | single = NULL; | |
068c358a | 1063 | *min_version = method->version; |
4fa52141 VD |
1064 | } else { |
1065 | version = (single = method)->version; | |
068c358a | 1066 | *min_version = version; |
4fa52141 VD |
1067 | hole = 0; |
1068 | } | |
1069 | } | |
1070 | ||
068c358a KR |
1071 | *max_version = version; |
1072 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1073 | /* Fail if everything is disabled */ |
1074 | if (version == 0) | |
1075 | return SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE; | |
1076 | ||
068c358a KR |
1077 | return 0; |
1078 | } | |
1079 | ||
1080 | /* | |
1081 | * ssl_set_client_hello_version - Work out what version we should be using for | |
1082 | * the initial ClientHello. | |
1083 | * | |
1084 | * @s: client SSL handle. | |
1085 | * | |
1086 | * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. | |
1087 | */ | |
1088 | int ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL *s) | |
1089 | { | |
3eb2aff4 | 1090 | int ver_min, ver_max, ret; |
068c358a | 1091 | |
3eb2aff4 | 1092 | ret = ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max); |
068c358a KR |
1093 | |
1094 | if (ret != 0) | |
1095 | return ret; | |
1096 | ||
3eb2aff4 | 1097 | s->client_version = s->version = ver_max; |
4fa52141 VD |
1098 | return 0; |
1099 | } |