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846e33c7 | 1 | /* |
fecb3aae | 2 | * Copyright 1995-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. |
aa8f3d76 | 3 | * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved |
3813046d | 4 | * |
2c18d164 | 5 | * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use |
846e33c7 RS |
6 | * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy |
7 | * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at | |
8 | * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html | |
3813046d | 9 | */ |
846e33c7 | 10 | |
48948d53 | 11 | #include <limits.h> |
f2d9a32c | 12 | #include <string.h> |
d02b48c6 | 13 | #include <stdio.h> |
706457b7 DMSP |
14 | #include "../ssl_local.h" |
15 | #include "statem_local.h" | |
67dc995e | 16 | #include "internal/cryptlib.h" |
ec577822 | 17 | #include <openssl/buffer.h> |
ec577822 BM |
18 | #include <openssl/objects.h> |
19 | #include <openssl/evp.h> | |
d7e498ac | 20 | #include <openssl/rsa.h> |
ec577822 | 21 | #include <openssl/x509.h> |
49b26f54 | 22 | #include <openssl/trace.h> |
d02b48c6 | 23 | |
c6d38183 RS |
24 | /* |
25 | * Map error codes to TLS/SSL alart types. | |
26 | */ | |
27 | typedef struct x509err2alert_st { | |
28 | int x509err; | |
29 | int alert; | |
30 | } X509ERR2ALERT; | |
31 | ||
597c51bc MC |
32 | /* Fixed value used in the ServerHello random field to identify an HRR */ |
33 | const unsigned char hrrrandom[] = { | |
34 | 0xcf, 0x21, 0xad, 0x74, 0xe5, 0x9a, 0x61, 0x11, 0xbe, 0x1d, 0x8c, 0x02, | |
35 | 0x1e, 0x65, 0xb8, 0x91, 0xc2, 0xa2, 0x11, 0x16, 0x7a, 0xbb, 0x8c, 0x5e, | |
36 | 0x07, 0x9e, 0x09, 0xe2, 0xc8, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x9c | |
37 | }; | |
38 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
39 | /* |
40 | * send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or | |
41 | * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) | |
42 | */ | |
38b051a1 | 43 | int ssl3_do_write(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int type) |
0f113f3e MC |
44 | { |
45 | int ret; | |
7ee8627f | 46 | size_t written = 0; |
38b051a1 | 47 | SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s); |
0f113f3e | 48 | |
38b051a1 | 49 | ret = ssl3_write_bytes(ssl, type, &s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], |
7ee8627f | 50 | s->init_num, &written); |
0f113f3e | 51 | if (ret < 0) |
26a7d938 | 52 | return -1; |
0f113f3e MC |
53 | if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) |
54 | /* | |
55 | * should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case we'll | |
56 | * ignore the result anyway | |
9d75dce3 | 57 | * TLS1.3 KeyUpdate and NewSessionTicket do not need to be added |
0f113f3e | 58 | */ |
38b051a1 TM |
59 | if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) |
60 | || (s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET | |
9d75dce3 TS |
61 | && s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE |
62 | && s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE)) | |
63 | if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, | |
64 | (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], | |
65 | written)) | |
66 | return -1; | |
7ee8627f | 67 | if (written == s->init_num) { |
0f113f3e MC |
68 | if (s->msg_callback) |
69 | s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data, | |
38b051a1 | 70 | (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), ssl, |
0f113f3e | 71 | s->msg_callback_arg); |
208fb891 | 72 | return 1; |
0f113f3e | 73 | } |
7ee8627f MC |
74 | s->init_off += written; |
75 | s->init_num -= written; | |
26a7d938 | 76 | return 0; |
0f113f3e | 77 | } |
e7ecc7d4 | 78 | |
38b051a1 | 79 | int tls_close_construct_packet(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt, int htype) |
2c7b4dbc MC |
80 | { |
81 | size_t msglen; | |
82 | ||
4a01c59f | 83 | if ((htype != SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) |
f1ec23c0 | 84 | || !WPACKET_get_length(pkt, &msglen) |
7cea05dc | 85 | || msglen > INT_MAX) |
2c7b4dbc MC |
86 | return 0; |
87 | s->init_num = (int)msglen; | |
88 | s->init_off = 0; | |
89 | ||
90 | return 1; | |
91 | } | |
92 | ||
38b051a1 | 93 | int tls_setup_handshake(SSL_CONNECTION *s) |
1f5b44e9 | 94 | { |
8e32ea63 | 95 | int ver_min, ver_max, ok; |
38b051a1 TM |
96 | SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s); |
97 | SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s); | |
8e32ea63 | 98 | |
f63a17d6 MC |
99 | if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) { |
100 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
c7f47786 | 101 | return 0; |
f63a17d6 | 102 | } |
c7f47786 | 103 | |
b186a592 MC |
104 | /* Reset any extension flags */ |
105 | memset(s->ext.extflags, 0, sizeof(s->ext.extflags)); | |
106 | ||
8e32ea63 | 107 | if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max, NULL) != 0) { |
c48ffbcc | 108 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE); |
8e32ea63 MC |
109 | return 0; |
110 | } | |
111 | ||
112 | /* Sanity check that we have MD5-SHA1 if we need it */ | |
38b051a1 | 113 | if (sctx->ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX] == NULL) { |
8e32ea63 MC |
114 | int md5sha1_needed = 0; |
115 | ||
116 | /* We don't have MD5-SHA1 - do we need it? */ | |
38b051a1 | 117 | if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
8e32ea63 MC |
118 | if (DTLS_VERSION_LE(ver_max, DTLS1_VERSION)) |
119 | md5sha1_needed = 1; | |
120 | } else { | |
121 | if (ver_max <= TLS1_1_VERSION) | |
122 | md5sha1_needed = 1; | |
123 | } | |
124 | if (md5sha1_needed) { | |
c48ffbcc RL |
125 | SSLfatal_data(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, |
126 | SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_DIGEST_ALGORITHM, | |
127 | "The max supported SSL/TLS version needs the" | |
128 | " MD5-SHA1 digest but it is not available" | |
129 | " in the loaded providers. Use (D)TLSv1.2 or" | |
130 | " above, or load different providers"); | |
8e32ea63 MC |
131 | return 0; |
132 | } | |
133 | ||
134 | ok = 1; | |
135 | /* Don't allow TLSv1.1 or below to be negotiated */ | |
38b051a1 | 136 | if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
8e32ea63 | 137 | if (DTLS_VERSION_LT(ver_min, DTLS1_2_VERSION)) |
38b051a1 | 138 | ok = SSL_set_min_proto_version(ssl, DTLS1_2_VERSION); |
8e32ea63 MC |
139 | } else { |
140 | if (ver_min < TLS1_2_VERSION) | |
38b051a1 | 141 | ok = SSL_set_min_proto_version(ssl, TLS1_2_VERSION); |
8e32ea63 MC |
142 | } |
143 | if (!ok) { | |
144 | /* Shouldn't happen */ | |
c48ffbcc | 145 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
8e32ea63 MC |
146 | return 0; |
147 | } | |
148 | } | |
149 | ||
150 | ok = 0; | |
c7f47786 | 151 | if (s->server) { |
38b051a1 | 152 | STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = SSL_get_ciphers(ssl); |
8e32ea63 | 153 | int i; |
38a73150 MC |
154 | |
155 | /* | |
156 | * Sanity check that the maximum version we accept has ciphers | |
157 | * enabled. For clients we do this check during construction of the | |
158 | * ClientHello. | |
159 | */ | |
38a73150 MC |
160 | for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) { |
161 | const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i); | |
162 | ||
38b051a1 | 163 | if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
38a73150 MC |
164 | if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(ver_max, c->min_dtls) && |
165 | DTLS_VERSION_LE(ver_max, c->max_dtls)) | |
166 | ok = 1; | |
167 | } else if (ver_max >= c->min_tls && ver_max <= c->max_tls) { | |
168 | ok = 1; | |
169 | } | |
170 | if (ok) | |
171 | break; | |
172 | } | |
173 | if (!ok) { | |
c48ffbcc RL |
174 | SSLfatal_data(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, |
175 | SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE, | |
176 | "No ciphers enabled for max supported " | |
177 | "SSL/TLS version"); | |
38a73150 MC |
178 | return 0; |
179 | } | |
c7f47786 | 180 | if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) { |
0e6161bc | 181 | /* N.B. s->session_ctx == s->ctx here */ |
acce0557 | 182 | ssl_tsan_counter(s->session_ctx, &s->session_ctx->stats.sess_accept); |
c7f47786 | 183 | } else { |
0e6161bc | 184 | /* N.B. s->ctx may not equal s->session_ctx */ |
38b051a1 | 185 | ssl_tsan_counter(sctx, &sctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate); |
c7f47786 | 186 | |
555cbb32 | 187 | s->s3.tmp.cert_request = 0; |
c7f47786 MC |
188 | } |
189 | } else { | |
190 | if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) | |
acce0557 | 191 | ssl_tsan_counter(s->session_ctx, &s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect); |
c7f47786 | 192 | else |
acce0557 P |
193 | ssl_tsan_counter(s->session_ctx, |
194 | &s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate); | |
c7f47786 MC |
195 | |
196 | /* mark client_random uninitialized */ | |
555cbb32 | 197 | memset(s->s3.client_random, 0, sizeof(s->s3.client_random)); |
c7f47786 MC |
198 | s->hit = 0; |
199 | ||
555cbb32 | 200 | s->s3.tmp.cert_req = 0; |
c7f47786 | 201 | |
38b051a1 | 202 | if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) |
c7f47786 | 203 | s->statem.use_timer = 1; |
c7f47786 MC |
204 | } |
205 | ||
206 | return 1; | |
207 | } | |
208 | ||
2c5dfdc3 MC |
209 | /* |
210 | * Size of the to-be-signed TLS13 data, without the hash size itself: | |
211 | * 64 bytes of value 32, 33 context bytes, 1 byte separator | |
212 | */ | |
213 | #define TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE 64 | |
214 | #define TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE (TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE + 33 + 1) | |
215 | ||
38b051a1 | 216 | static int get_cert_verify_tbs_data(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned char *tls13tbs, |
2c5dfdc3 MC |
217 | void **hdata, size_t *hdatalen) |
218 | { | |
44e47328 TS |
219 | /* ASCII: "TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */ |
220 | static const char servercontext[] = "\x54\x4c\x53\x20\x31\x2e\x33\x2c\x20\x73\x65\x72" | |
221 | "\x76\x65\x72\x20\x43\x65\x72\x74\x69\x66\x69\x63\x61\x74\x65\x56\x65\x72\x69\x66\x79"; | |
222 | /* ASCII: "TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */ | |
223 | static const char clientcontext[] = "\x54\x4c\x53\x20\x31\x2e\x33\x2c\x20\x63\x6c\x69" | |
224 | "\x65\x6e\x74\x20\x43\x65\x72\x74\x69\x66\x69\x63\x61\x74\x65\x56\x65\x72\x69\x66\x79"; | |
38b051a1 TM |
225 | |
226 | if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) { | |
2c5dfdc3 MC |
227 | size_t hashlen; |
228 | ||
229 | /* Set the first 64 bytes of to-be-signed data to octet 32 */ | |
230 | memset(tls13tbs, 32, TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE); | |
231 | /* This copies the 33 bytes of context plus the 0 separator byte */ | |
232 | if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY | |
233 | || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY) | |
234 | strcpy((char *)tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE, servercontext); | |
235 | else | |
236 | strcpy((char *)tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE, clientcontext); | |
237 | ||
238 | /* | |
239 | * If we're currently reading then we need to use the saved handshake | |
240 | * hash value. We can't use the current handshake hash state because | |
241 | * that includes the CertVerify itself. | |
242 | */ | |
243 | if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY | |
244 | || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY) { | |
245 | memcpy(tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE, s->cert_verify_hash, | |
246 | s->cert_verify_hash_len); | |
247 | hashlen = s->cert_verify_hash_len; | |
248 | } else if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE, | |
249 | EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &hashlen)) { | |
f63a17d6 | 250 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
2c5dfdc3 MC |
251 | return 0; |
252 | } | |
253 | ||
254 | *hdata = tls13tbs; | |
255 | *hdatalen = TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + hashlen; | |
256 | } else { | |
257 | size_t retlen; | |
60690b5b | 258 | long retlen_l; |
2c5dfdc3 | 259 | |
555cbb32 | 260 | retlen = retlen_l = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3.handshake_buffer, hdata); |
60690b5b | 261 | if (retlen_l <= 0) { |
c48ffbcc | 262 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
2c5dfdc3 | 263 | return 0; |
f63a17d6 | 264 | } |
2c5dfdc3 MC |
265 | *hdatalen = retlen; |
266 | } | |
267 | ||
268 | return 1; | |
269 | } | |
270 | ||
67ec6d2b | 271 | CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_cert_verify(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
d8bc1399 | 272 | { |
ad4dd362 DSH |
273 | EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; |
274 | const EVP_MD *md = NULL; | |
d8bc1399 | 275 | EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL; |
5f9b64a2 MC |
276 | EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; |
277 | size_t hdatalen = 0, siglen = 0; | |
d8bc1399 MC |
278 | void *hdata; |
279 | unsigned char *sig = NULL; | |
2c5dfdc3 | 280 | unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
555cbb32 | 281 | const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3.tmp.sigalg; |
38b051a1 | 282 | SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s); |
2c5dfdc3 | 283 | |
555cbb32 | 284 | if (lu == NULL || s->s3.tmp.cert == NULL) { |
c48ffbcc | 285 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
ad4dd362 DSH |
286 | goto err; |
287 | } | |
555cbb32 | 288 | pkey = s->s3.tmp.cert->privatekey; |
ad4dd362 | 289 | |
38b051a1 | 290 | if (pkey == NULL || !tls1_lookup_md(sctx, lu, &md)) { |
c48ffbcc | 291 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
ad4dd362 DSH |
292 | goto err; |
293 | } | |
d8bc1399 MC |
294 | |
295 | mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); | |
296 | if (mctx == NULL) { | |
c48ffbcc | 297 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
d8bc1399 MC |
298 | goto err; |
299 | } | |
d8bc1399 | 300 | |
2c5dfdc3 MC |
301 | /* Get the data to be signed */ |
302 | if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) { | |
f63a17d6 | 303 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
d8bc1399 MC |
304 | goto err; |
305 | } | |
306 | ||
ad4dd362 | 307 | if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg)) { |
c48ffbcc | 308 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
d8bc1399 MC |
309 | goto err; |
310 | } | |
5f9b64a2 | 311 | |
ed576acd TM |
312 | if (EVP_DigestSignInit_ex(mctx, &pctx, |
313 | md == NULL ? NULL : EVP_MD_get0_name(md), | |
38b051a1 | 314 | sctx->libctx, sctx->propq, pkey, |
d38b6ae9 | 315 | NULL) <= 0) { |
c48ffbcc | 316 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
5f9b64a2 MC |
317 | goto err; |
318 | } | |
319 | ||
ad4dd362 | 320 | if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) { |
5f9b64a2 | 321 | if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0 |
968ae5b3 DSH |
322 | || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, |
323 | RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) { | |
c48ffbcc | 324 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
5f9b64a2 MC |
325 | goto err; |
326 | } | |
caf2b6b5 DSH |
327 | } |
328 | if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { | |
bddbfae1 MC |
329 | /* |
330 | * Here we use EVP_DigestSignUpdate followed by EVP_DigestSignFinal | |
331 | * in order to add the EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET call between them. | |
332 | */ | |
caf2b6b5 | 333 | if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0 |
83b4a243 SL |
334 | || EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET, |
335 | (int)s->session->master_key_length, | |
336 | s->session->master_key) <= 0 | |
bddbfae1 | 337 | || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx, NULL, &siglen) <= 0) { |
caf2b6b5 | 338 | |
c48ffbcc | 339 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
5f9b64a2 MC |
340 | goto err; |
341 | } | |
bddbfae1 MC |
342 | sig = OPENSSL_malloc(siglen); |
343 | if (sig == NULL | |
344 | || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx, sig, &siglen) <= 0) { | |
c48ffbcc | 345 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
bddbfae1 MC |
346 | goto err; |
347 | } | |
348 | } else { | |
349 | /* | |
350 | * Here we *must* use EVP_DigestSign() because Ed25519/Ed448 does not | |
351 | * support streaming via EVP_DigestSignUpdate/EVP_DigestSignFinal | |
352 | */ | |
353 | if (EVP_DigestSign(mctx, NULL, &siglen, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0) { | |
c48ffbcc | 354 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
bddbfae1 MC |
355 | goto err; |
356 | } | |
357 | sig = OPENSSL_malloc(siglen); | |
358 | if (sig == NULL | |
359 | || EVP_DigestSign(mctx, sig, &siglen, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0) { | |
c48ffbcc | 360 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
bddbfae1 MC |
361 | goto err; |
362 | } | |
d8bc1399 | 363 | } |
5f9b64a2 | 364 | |
d8bc1399 MC |
365 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST |
366 | { | |
ad4dd362 DSH |
367 | int pktype = lu->sig; |
368 | ||
d8bc1399 MC |
369 | if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001 |
370 | || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256 | |
371 | || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) | |
5f9b64a2 | 372 | BUF_reverse(sig, NULL, siglen); |
d8bc1399 MC |
373 | } |
374 | #endif | |
375 | ||
5f9b64a2 | 376 | if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, sig, siglen)) { |
c48ffbcc | 377 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
d8bc1399 MC |
378 | goto err; |
379 | } | |
380 | ||
381 | /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */ | |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
382 | if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { |
383 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
d8bc1399 | 384 | goto err; |
d4d2f3a4 | 385 | } |
d8bc1399 MC |
386 | |
387 | OPENSSL_free(sig); | |
388 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); | |
67ec6d2b | 389 | return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS; |
d8bc1399 MC |
390 | err: |
391 | OPENSSL_free(sig); | |
392 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); | |
67ec6d2b | 393 | return CON_FUNC_ERROR; |
d8bc1399 MC |
394 | } |
395 | ||
38b051a1 | 396 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt) |
d8bc1399 MC |
397 | { |
398 | EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; | |
703bcee0 | 399 | const unsigned char *data; |
d8bc1399 MC |
400 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST |
401 | unsigned char *gost_data = NULL; | |
402 | #endif | |
eb5fd03b | 403 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
dd24857b | 404 | int j; |
d8bc1399 MC |
405 | unsigned int len; |
406 | X509 *peer; | |
407 | const EVP_MD *md = NULL; | |
2c5dfdc3 | 408 | size_t hdatalen = 0; |
d8bc1399 | 409 | void *hdata; |
2c5dfdc3 | 410 | unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
d8bc1399 | 411 | EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); |
5f9b64a2 | 412 | EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; |
38b051a1 | 413 | SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s); |
d8bc1399 MC |
414 | |
415 | if (mctx == NULL) { | |
c48ffbcc | 416 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
f63a17d6 | 417 | goto err; |
d8bc1399 MC |
418 | } |
419 | ||
420 | peer = s->session->peer; | |
421 | pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(peer); | |
f63a17d6 | 422 | if (pkey == NULL) { |
c48ffbcc | 423 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
f63a17d6 MC |
424 | goto err; |
425 | } | |
83b4049a | 426 | |
dd24857b | 427 | if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, NULL) == NULL) { |
c48ffbcc | 428 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, |
f63a17d6 MC |
429 | SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE); |
430 | goto err; | |
d8bc1399 MC |
431 | } |
432 | ||
f464f9c0 | 433 | if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { |
f464f9c0 PD |
434 | unsigned int sigalg; |
435 | ||
436 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 437 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET); |
f63a17d6 | 438 | goto err; |
f464f9c0 | 439 | } |
f63a17d6 MC |
440 | if (tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey) <= 0) { |
441 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
442 | goto err; | |
f464f9c0 | 443 | } |
f464f9c0 | 444 | } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) { |
c48ffbcc | 445 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
f63a17d6 | 446 | goto err; |
f464f9c0 PD |
447 | } |
448 | ||
38b051a1 | 449 | if (!tls1_lookup_md(sctx, s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg, &md)) { |
c48ffbcc | 450 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
f63a17d6 | 451 | goto err; |
168067b6 | 452 | } |
f464f9c0 | 453 | |
572fa024 | 454 | if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) |
49b26f54 | 455 | OSSL_TRACE1(TLS, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", |
ed576acd | 456 | md == NULL ? "n/a" : EVP_MD_get0_name(md)); |
572fa024 | 457 | |
d8bc1399 MC |
458 | /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */ |
459 | /* | |
f464f9c0 PD |
460 | * If key is GOST and len is exactly 64 or 128, it is signature without |
461 | * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till TLS 1.2) | |
d8bc1399 MC |
462 | */ |
463 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST | |
f464f9c0 PD |
464 | if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) |
465 | && ((PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 64 | |
ed576acd TM |
466 | && (EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001 |
467 | || EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256)) | |
f464f9c0 | 468 | || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 128 |
ed576acd | 469 | && EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512))) { |
f464f9c0 | 470 | len = PACKET_remaining(pkt); |
d8bc1399 MC |
471 | } else |
472 | #endif | |
f464f9c0 | 473 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len)) { |
c48ffbcc | 474 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
f63a17d6 | 475 | goto err; |
d8bc1399 | 476 | } |
f464f9c0 | 477 | |
d8bc1399 | 478 | if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, len)) { |
c48ffbcc | 479 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
f63a17d6 | 480 | goto err; |
d8bc1399 MC |
481 | } |
482 | ||
2c5dfdc3 | 483 | if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
484 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
485 | goto err; | |
d8bc1399 MC |
486 | } |
487 | ||
49b26f54 | 488 | OSSL_TRACE1(TLS, "Using client verify alg %s\n", |
ed576acd | 489 | md == NULL ? "n/a" : EVP_MD_get0_name(md)); |
49b26f54 | 490 | |
d8652be0 | 491 | if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit_ex(mctx, &pctx, |
ed576acd | 492 | md == NULL ? NULL : EVP_MD_get0_name(md), |
38b051a1 | 493 | sctx->libctx, sctx->propq, pkey, |
d38b6ae9 | 494 | NULL) <= 0) { |
c48ffbcc | 495 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
f63a17d6 | 496 | goto err; |
d8bc1399 MC |
497 | } |
498 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST | |
499 | { | |
ed576acd | 500 | int pktype = EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey); |
d8bc1399 MC |
501 | if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001 |
502 | || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256 | |
503 | || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) { | |
504 | if ((gost_data = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) { | |
c48ffbcc | 505 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
f63a17d6 | 506 | goto err; |
d8bc1399 MC |
507 | } |
508 | BUF_reverse(gost_data, data, len); | |
509 | data = gost_data; | |
510 | } | |
511 | } | |
512 | #endif | |
513 | ||
5554facb | 514 | if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) { |
5f9b64a2 | 515 | if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0 |
968ae5b3 DSH |
516 | || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, |
517 | RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) { | |
c48ffbcc | 518 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
f63a17d6 | 519 | goto err; |
5f9b64a2 | 520 | } |
d8bc1399 | 521 | } |
caf2b6b5 DSH |
522 | if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { |
523 | if (EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0 | |
83b4a243 SL |
524 | || EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET, |
525 | (int)s->session->master_key_length, | |
526 | s->session->master_key) <= 0) { | |
c48ffbcc | 527 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
f63a17d6 | 528 | goto err; |
caf2b6b5 DSH |
529 | } |
530 | if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(mctx, data, len) <= 0) { | |
c48ffbcc | 531 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); |
f63a17d6 | 532 | goto err; |
caf2b6b5 DSH |
533 | } |
534 | } else { | |
535 | j = EVP_DigestVerify(mctx, data, len, hdata, hdatalen); | |
25ffeb11 | 536 | if (j <= 0) { |
c48ffbcc | 537 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); |
f63a17d6 | 538 | goto err; |
caf2b6b5 | 539 | } |
d8bc1399 MC |
540 | } |
541 | ||
e4562014 MC |
542 | /* |
543 | * In TLSv1.3 on the client side we make sure we prepare the client | |
544 | * certificate after the CertVerify instead of when we get the | |
545 | * CertificateRequest. This is because in TLSv1.3 the CertificateRequest | |
546 | * comes *before* the Certificate message. In TLSv1.2 it comes after. We | |
8c2bfd25 | 547 | * want to make sure that SSL_get1_peer_certificate() will return the actual |
e4562014 MC |
548 | * server certificate from the client_cert_cb callback. |
549 | */ | |
38b051a1 | 550 | if (!s->server && SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 1) |
e4562014 MC |
551 | ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; |
552 | else | |
553 | ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; | |
f63a17d6 | 554 | err: |
555cbb32 TS |
555 | BIO_free(s->s3.handshake_buffer); |
556 | s->s3.handshake_buffer = NULL; | |
d8bc1399 MC |
557 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); |
558 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST | |
559 | OPENSSL_free(gost_data); | |
560 | #endif | |
561 | return ret; | |
562 | } | |
563 | ||
67ec6d2b | 564 | CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_finished(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
0f113f3e | 565 | { |
12472b45 | 566 | size_t finish_md_len; |
229185e6 | 567 | const char *sender; |
8b0e934a | 568 | size_t slen; |
38b051a1 | 569 | SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s); |
229185e6 | 570 | |
f7e393be | 571 | /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */ |
9d75dce3 | 572 | if (!s->server && s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) |
f7e393be MC |
573 | s->statem.cleanuphand = 1; |
574 | ||
575 | /* | |
576 | * We only change the keys if we didn't already do this when we sent the | |
577 | * client certificate | |
578 | */ | |
38b051a1 | 579 | if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) |
f7e393be | 580 | && !s->server |
555cbb32 | 581 | && s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 0 |
38b051a1 | 582 | && (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
583 | SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) {; |
584 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
67ec6d2b | 585 | return CON_FUNC_ERROR; |
f7e393be MC |
586 | } |
587 | ||
229185e6 | 588 | if (s->server) { |
38b051a1 TM |
589 | sender = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label; |
590 | slen = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len; | |
229185e6 | 591 | } else { |
38b051a1 TM |
592 | sender = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label; |
593 | slen = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len; | |
229185e6 | 594 | } |
0f113f3e | 595 | |
38b051a1 TM |
596 | finish_md_len = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, |
597 | sender, slen, | |
598 | s->s3.tmp.finish_md); | |
12472b45 | 599 | if (finish_md_len == 0) { |
d4d2f3a4 | 600 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
67ec6d2b | 601 | return CON_FUNC_ERROR; |
4f89bfbf MC |
602 | } |
603 | ||
555cbb32 | 604 | s->s3.tmp.finish_md_len = finish_md_len; |
4f89bfbf | 605 | |
555cbb32 | 606 | if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3.tmp.finish_md, finish_md_len)) { |
c48ffbcc | 607 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
67ec6d2b | 608 | return CON_FUNC_ERROR; |
4f89bfbf | 609 | } |
0f113f3e | 610 | |
2c7bd692 CB |
611 | /* |
612 | * Log the master secret, if logging is enabled. We don't log it for | |
613 | * TLSv1.3: there's a different key schedule for that. | |
614 | */ | |
38b051a1 TM |
615 | if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) |
616 | && !ssl_log_secret(s, MASTER_SECRET_LABEL, s->session->master_key, | |
617 | s->session->master_key_length)) { | |
d4d2f3a4 | 618 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
67ec6d2b | 619 | return CON_FUNC_ERROR; |
380a522f | 620 | } |
2faa1b48 | 621 | |
b9908bf9 MC |
622 | /* |
623 | * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks | |
624 | */ | |
380a522f | 625 | if (!ossl_assert(finish_md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) { |
c48ffbcc | 626 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
67ec6d2b | 627 | return CON_FUNC_ERROR; |
380a522f | 628 | } |
23a635c0 | 629 | if (!s->server) { |
555cbb32 | 630 | memcpy(s->s3.previous_client_finished, s->s3.tmp.finish_md, |
12472b45 | 631 | finish_md_len); |
555cbb32 | 632 | s->s3.previous_client_finished_len = finish_md_len; |
b9908bf9 | 633 | } else { |
555cbb32 | 634 | memcpy(s->s3.previous_server_finished, s->s3.tmp.finish_md, |
12472b45 | 635 | finish_md_len); |
555cbb32 | 636 | s->s3.previous_server_finished_len = finish_md_len; |
b9908bf9 | 637 | } |
0f113f3e | 638 | |
67ec6d2b | 639 | return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS; |
0f113f3e | 640 | } |
d02b48c6 | 641 | |
67ec6d2b | 642 | CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_key_update(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
44c04a2e MC |
643 | { |
644 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->key_update)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 645 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
67ec6d2b | 646 | return CON_FUNC_ERROR; |
44c04a2e MC |
647 | } |
648 | ||
9412b3ad | 649 | s->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE; |
67ec6d2b | 650 | return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS; |
44c04a2e MC |
651 | } |
652 | ||
38b051a1 | 653 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_update(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt) |
e1c3de44 MC |
654 | { |
655 | unsigned int updatetype; | |
656 | ||
524420d8 MC |
657 | /* |
658 | * A KeyUpdate message signals a key change so the end of the message must | |
659 | * be on a record boundary. | |
660 | */ | |
661 | if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 662 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY); |
f63a17d6 | 663 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
524420d8 MC |
664 | } |
665 | ||
e1c3de44 | 666 | if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &updatetype) |
2d871227 | 667 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { |
c48ffbcc | 668 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE); |
f63a17d6 | 669 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
e1c3de44 MC |
670 | } |
671 | ||
9010b7bc MC |
672 | /* |
673 | * There are only two defined key update types. Fail if we get a value we | |
674 | * didn't recognise. | |
675 | */ | |
2d871227 MC |
676 | if (updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED |
677 | && updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED) { | |
c48ffbcc | 678 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE); |
f63a17d6 | 679 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
2d871227 MC |
680 | } |
681 | ||
5bf47933 MC |
682 | /* |
683 | * If we get a request for us to update our sending keys too then, we need | |
684 | * to additionally send a KeyUpdate message. However that message should | |
feb9e31c | 685 | * not also request an update (otherwise we get into an infinite loop). |
5bf47933 | 686 | */ |
feb9e31c | 687 | if (updatetype == SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED) |
5bf47933 MC |
688 | s->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED; |
689 | ||
57389a32 | 690 | if (!tls13_update_key(s, 0)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
691 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
692 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
57389a32 MC |
693 | } |
694 | ||
e1c3de44 MC |
695 | return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; |
696 | } | |
697 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
698 | /* |
699 | * ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen | |
700 | * to far. | |
701 | */ | |
38b051a1 | 702 | int ssl3_take_mac(SSL_CONNECTION *s) |
0f113f3e MC |
703 | { |
704 | const char *sender; | |
8b0e934a | 705 | size_t slen; |
38b051a1 | 706 | SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s); |
5d671101 | 707 | |
49ae7423 | 708 | if (!s->server) { |
38b051a1 TM |
709 | sender = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label; |
710 | slen = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len; | |
0f113f3e | 711 | } else { |
38b051a1 TM |
712 | sender = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label; |
713 | slen = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len; | |
0f113f3e MC |
714 | } |
715 | ||
555cbb32 | 716 | s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md_len = |
38b051a1 TM |
717 | ssl->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, sender, slen, |
718 | s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md); | |
5d671101 | 719 | |
555cbb32 | 720 | if (s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md_len == 0) { |
5d671101 MC |
721 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
722 | return 0; | |
723 | } | |
724 | ||
725 | return 1; | |
0f113f3e | 726 | } |
ee2ffc27 | 727 | |
38b051a1 TM |
728 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL_CONNECTION *s, |
729 | PACKET *pkt) | |
b9908bf9 | 730 | { |
348240c6 | 731 | size_t remain; |
4fa52141 | 732 | |
73999b62 | 733 | remain = PACKET_remaining(pkt); |
657da85e MC |
734 | /* |
735 | * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, which should already have | |
c69f2adf MC |
736 | * been consumed by ssl_get_message() so there should be no bytes left, |
737 | * unless we're using DTLS1_BAD_VER, which has an extra 2 bytes | |
657da85e | 738 | */ |
38b051a1 | 739 | if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
73999b62 | 740 | if ((s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER |
a230b26e EK |
741 | && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH + 1) |
742 | || (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER | |
743 | && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH - 1)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 744 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); |
f63a17d6 | 745 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
c69f2adf MC |
746 | } |
747 | } else { | |
73999b62 | 748 | if (remain != 0) { |
c48ffbcc | 749 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); |
f63a17d6 | 750 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
c69f2adf | 751 | } |
657da85e MC |
752 | } |
753 | ||
754 | /* Check we have a cipher to change to */ | |
555cbb32 | 755 | if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher == NULL) { |
c48ffbcc | 756 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); |
f63a17d6 | 757 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
657da85e MC |
758 | } |
759 | ||
555cbb32 | 760 | s->s3.change_cipher_spec = 1; |
657da85e | 761 | if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) { |
c48ffbcc | 762 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
f63a17d6 | 763 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
657da85e MC |
764 | } |
765 | ||
38b051a1 | 766 | if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
c69f2adf MC |
767 | dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ); |
768 | ||
769 | if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) | |
770 | s->d1->handshake_read_seq++; | |
771 | ||
772 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
773 | /* | |
774 | * Remember that a CCS has been received, so that an old key of | |
775 | * SCTP-Auth can be deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored if no | |
776 | * SCTP is used | |
777 | */ | |
38b051a1 TM |
778 | BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)), |
779 | BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD, 1, NULL); | |
c69f2adf MC |
780 | #endif |
781 | } | |
782 | ||
b9908bf9 | 783 | return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; |
657da85e MC |
784 | } |
785 | ||
38b051a1 | 786 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_finished(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt) |
b9908bf9 | 787 | { |
12472b45 | 788 | size_t md_len; |
38b051a1 | 789 | SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s); |
1853d20a | 790 | int was_first = SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s); |
b9908bf9 | 791 | |
d781d247 MC |
792 | |
793 | /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */ | |
9d75dce3 | 794 | if (s->server) { |
de9e884b MC |
795 | /* |
796 | * To get this far we must have read encrypted data from the client. We | |
1853d20a MC |
797 | * no longer tolerate unencrypted alerts. This is ignored if less than |
798 | * TLSv1.3 | |
de9e884b | 799 | */ |
cffafb5f MC |
800 | if (s->rlayer.rrlmethod->set_plain_alerts != NULL) |
801 | s->rlayer.rrlmethod->set_plain_alerts(s->rlayer.rrl, 0); | |
9d75dce3 TS |
802 | if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) |
803 | s->statem.cleanuphand = 1; | |
38b051a1 TM |
804 | if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) |
805 | && !tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) { | |
9d75dce3 TS |
806 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
807 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
808 | } | |
809 | } | |
d781d247 | 810 | |
524420d8 MC |
811 | /* |
812 | * In TLSv1.3 a Finished message signals a key change so the end of the | |
813 | * message must be on a record boundary. | |
814 | */ | |
38b051a1 TM |
815 | if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) |
816 | && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 817 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY); |
f63a17d6 | 818 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
524420d8 MC |
819 | } |
820 | ||
0f113f3e | 821 | /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */ |
38b051a1 | 822 | if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->s3.change_cipher_spec) { |
c48ffbcc | 823 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS); |
f63a17d6 | 824 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
0f113f3e | 825 | } |
555cbb32 | 826 | s->s3.change_cipher_spec = 0; |
0f113f3e | 827 | |
555cbb32 | 828 | md_len = s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md_len; |
0f113f3e | 829 | |
12472b45 | 830 | if (md_len != PACKET_remaining(pkt)) { |
c48ffbcc | 831 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH); |
f63a17d6 | 832 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
0f113f3e MC |
833 | } |
834 | ||
555cbb32 | 835 | if (CRYPTO_memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt), s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md, |
12472b45 | 836 | md_len) != 0) { |
c48ffbcc | 837 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED); |
f63a17d6 | 838 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
0f113f3e MC |
839 | } |
840 | ||
841 | /* | |
842 | * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks | |
843 | */ | |
380a522f | 844 | if (!ossl_assert(md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) { |
c48ffbcc | 845 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
f63a17d6 | 846 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
380a522f | 847 | } |
23a635c0 | 848 | if (s->server) { |
555cbb32 | 849 | memcpy(s->s3.previous_client_finished, s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md, |
12472b45 | 850 | md_len); |
555cbb32 | 851 | s->s3.previous_client_finished_len = md_len; |
0f113f3e | 852 | } else { |
555cbb32 | 853 | memcpy(s->s3.previous_server_finished, s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md, |
12472b45 | 854 | md_len); |
555cbb32 | 855 | s->s3.previous_server_finished_len = md_len; |
0f113f3e MC |
856 | } |
857 | ||
7776a36c MC |
858 | /* |
859 | * In TLS1.3 we also have to change cipher state and do any final processing | |
860 | * of the initial server flight (if we are a client) | |
861 | */ | |
38b051a1 | 862 | if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
92760c21 | 863 | if (s->server) { |
9d75dce3 | 864 | if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED && |
38b051a1 TM |
865 | !ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, |
866 | SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
867 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
868 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
92760c21 MC |
869 | } |
870 | } else { | |
d74014c4 BK |
871 | /* TLS 1.3 gets the secret size from the handshake md */ |
872 | size_t dummy; | |
38b051a1 | 873 | if (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, |
ec15acb6 | 874 | s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0, |
d74014c4 | 875 | &dummy)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
876 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
877 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
92760c21 | 878 | } |
38b051a1 | 879 | if (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, |
92760c21 | 880 | SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
881 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
882 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
883 | } | |
884 | if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s)) { | |
885 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
886 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
92760c21 MC |
887 | } |
888 | } | |
889 | } | |
890 | ||
1853d20a MC |
891 | if (was_first |
892 | && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s) | |
cffafb5f MC |
893 | && s->rlayer.rrlmethod->set_first_handshake != NULL) |
894 | s->rlayer.rrlmethod->set_first_handshake(s->rlayer.rrl, 0); | |
1853d20a | 895 | |
e6575156 | 896 | return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; |
0f113f3e | 897 | } |
d02b48c6 | 898 | |
67ec6d2b | 899 | CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
b9908bf9 | 900 | { |
7cea05dc | 901 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, SSL3_MT_CCS)) { |
c48ffbcc | 902 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
67ec6d2b | 903 | return CON_FUNC_ERROR; |
85a7a5e6 | 904 | } |
b9908bf9 | 905 | |
67ec6d2b | 906 | return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS; |
b9908bf9 MC |
907 | } |
908 | ||
e96e0f8e | 909 | /* Add a certificate to the WPACKET */ |
38b051a1 TM |
910 | static int ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt, |
911 | X509 *x, int chain) | |
0f113f3e | 912 | { |
e96e0f8e MC |
913 | int len; |
914 | unsigned char *outbytes; | |
915 | ||
916 | len = i2d_X509(x, NULL); | |
917 | if (len < 0) { | |
c48ffbcc | 918 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); |
e96e0f8e MC |
919 | return 0; |
920 | } | |
921 | if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u24(pkt, len, &outbytes) | |
922 | || i2d_X509(x, &outbytes) != len) { | |
c48ffbcc | 923 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
e96e0f8e MC |
924 | return 0; |
925 | } | |
926 | ||
38b051a1 | 927 | if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) |
fe874d27 | 928 | && !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, x, |
f63a17d6 MC |
929 | chain)) { |
930 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
e96e0f8e | 931 | return 0; |
f63a17d6 | 932 | } |
e96e0f8e MC |
933 | |
934 | return 1; | |
935 | } | |
936 | ||
937 | /* Add certificate chain to provided WPACKET */ | |
38b051a1 | 938 | static int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk) |
e96e0f8e MC |
939 | { |
940 | int i, chain_count; | |
941 | X509 *x; | |
942 | STACK_OF(X509) *extra_certs; | |
943 | STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL; | |
944 | X509_STORE *chain_store; | |
38b051a1 | 945 | SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s); |
e96e0f8e MC |
946 | |
947 | if (cpk == NULL || cpk->x509 == NULL) | |
948 | return 1; | |
949 | ||
950 | x = cpk->x509; | |
951 | ||
952 | /* | |
953 | * If we have a certificate specific chain use it, else use parent ctx. | |
954 | */ | |
d805a57b | 955 | if (cpk->chain != NULL) |
e96e0f8e MC |
956 | extra_certs = cpk->chain; |
957 | else | |
38b051a1 | 958 | extra_certs = sctx->extra_certs; |
e96e0f8e MC |
959 | |
960 | if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN) || extra_certs) | |
961 | chain_store = NULL; | |
962 | else if (s->cert->chain_store) | |
963 | chain_store = s->cert->chain_store; | |
964 | else | |
38b051a1 | 965 | chain_store = sctx->cert_store; |
e96e0f8e | 966 | |
d805a57b | 967 | if (chain_store != NULL) { |
38b051a1 TM |
968 | X509_STORE_CTX *xs_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new_ex(sctx->libctx, |
969 | sctx->propq); | |
e96e0f8e MC |
970 | |
971 | if (xs_ctx == NULL) { | |
c48ffbcc | 972 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
f63a17d6 | 973 | return 0; |
e96e0f8e MC |
974 | } |
975 | if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(xs_ctx, chain_store, x, NULL)) { | |
976 | X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); | |
c48ffbcc | 977 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_X509_LIB); |
f63a17d6 | 978 | return 0; |
e96e0f8e MC |
979 | } |
980 | /* | |
981 | * It is valid for the chain not to be complete (because normally we | |
982 | * don't include the root cert in the chain). Therefore we deliberately | |
983 | * ignore the error return from this call. We're not actually verifying | |
984 | * the cert - we're just building as much of the chain as we can | |
985 | */ | |
986 | (void)X509_verify_cert(xs_ctx); | |
987 | /* Don't leave errors in the queue */ | |
988 | ERR_clear_error(); | |
989 | chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(xs_ctx); | |
990 | i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, chain, NULL, 0); | |
991 | if (i != 1) { | |
992 | #if 0 | |
993 | /* Dummy error calls so mkerr generates them */ | |
6849b73c RL |
994 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL); |
995 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL); | |
996 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK); | |
e96e0f8e MC |
997 | #endif |
998 | X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); | |
c48ffbcc | 999 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, i); |
f63a17d6 | 1000 | return 0; |
e96e0f8e MC |
1001 | } |
1002 | chain_count = sk_X509_num(chain); | |
1003 | for (i = 0; i < chain_count; i++) { | |
1004 | x = sk_X509_value(chain, i); | |
1005 | ||
f63a17d6 MC |
1006 | if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i)) { |
1007 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
e96e0f8e | 1008 | X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); |
f63a17d6 | 1009 | return 0; |
e96e0f8e MC |
1010 | } |
1011 | } | |
1012 | X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); | |
1013 | } else { | |
1014 | i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, extra_certs, x, 0); | |
1015 | if (i != 1) { | |
c48ffbcc | 1016 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, i); |
f63a17d6 MC |
1017 | return 0; |
1018 | } | |
1019 | if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, 0)) { | |
1020 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
1021 | return 0; | |
e96e0f8e | 1022 | } |
e96e0f8e MC |
1023 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(extra_certs); i++) { |
1024 | x = sk_X509_value(extra_certs, i); | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1025 | if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i + 1)) { |
1026 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
1027 | return 0; | |
1028 | } | |
e96e0f8e MC |
1029 | } |
1030 | } | |
1031 | return 1; | |
e96e0f8e MC |
1032 | } |
1033 | ||
38b051a1 TM |
1034 | unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt, |
1035 | CERT_PKEY *cpk) | |
e96e0f8e | 1036 | { |
f63a17d6 | 1037 | if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt)) { |
c48ffbcc | 1038 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
f63a17d6 MC |
1039 | return 0; |
1040 | } | |
e96e0f8e | 1041 | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1042 | if (!ssl_add_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk)) |
1043 | return 0; | |
1044 | ||
1045 | if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 1046 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
7cea05dc | 1047 | return 0; |
77d514c5 | 1048 | } |
f63a17d6 | 1049 | |
c49e1912 | 1050 | return 1; |
0f113f3e MC |
1051 | } |
1052 | ||
30f05b19 MC |
1053 | /* |
1054 | * Tidy up after the end of a handshake. In the case of SCTP this may result | |
1055 | * in NBIO events. If |clearbufs| is set then init_buf and the wbio buffer is | |
1056 | * freed up as well. | |
1057 | */ | |
38b051a1 | 1058 | WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL_CONNECTION *s, ossl_unused WORK_STATE wst, |
a7e6a3d8 | 1059 | int clearbufs, int stop) |
8723588e MC |
1060 | { |
1061 | void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL; | |
4af5836b | 1062 | int cleanuphand = s->statem.cleanuphand; |
38b051a1 TM |
1063 | SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s); |
1064 | SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s); | |
8723588e | 1065 | |
30f05b19 | 1066 | if (clearbufs) { |
38b051a1 | 1067 | if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) |
e7c27a6c | 1068 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP |
30f05b19 | 1069 | /* |
e7c27a6c N |
1070 | * RFC6083: SCTP provides a reliable and in-sequence transport service for DTLS |
1071 | * messages that require it. Therefore, DTLS procedures for retransmissions | |
1072 | * MUST NOT be used. | |
1073 | * Hence the init_buf can be cleared when DTLS over SCTP as transport is used. | |
1074 | */ | |
38b051a1 | 1075 | || BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(ssl)) |
e7c27a6c N |
1076 | #endif |
1077 | ) { | |
1078 | /* | |
1079 | * We don't do this in DTLS over UDP because we may still need the init_buf | |
30f05b19 MC |
1080 | * in case there are any unexpected retransmits |
1081 | */ | |
1082 | BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); | |
1083 | s->init_buf = NULL; | |
1084 | } | |
e7c27a6c | 1085 | |
a2c2e000 | 1086 | if (!ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s)) { |
c48ffbcc | 1087 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
b77f3ed1 | 1088 | return WORK_ERROR; |
a2c2e000 | 1089 | } |
30f05b19 | 1090 | s->init_num = 0; |
473483d4 | 1091 | } |
8723588e | 1092 | |
38b051a1 | 1093 | if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->server |
9d75dce3 TS |
1094 | && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) |
1095 | s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT; | |
1096 | ||
c2c1d8a4 MC |
1097 | /* |
1098 | * Only set if there was a Finished message and this isn't after a TLSv1.3 | |
1099 | * post handshake exchange | |
1100 | */ | |
4af5836b | 1101 | if (cleanuphand) { |
8723588e MC |
1102 | /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */ |
1103 | s->renegotiate = 0; | |
1104 | s->new_session = 0; | |
c7f47786 | 1105 | s->statem.cleanuphand = 0; |
c0638ade | 1106 | s->ext.ticket_expected = 0; |
8723588e | 1107 | |
30f05b19 MC |
1108 | ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); |
1109 | ||
8723588e | 1110 | if (s->server) { |
16ff1342 MC |
1111 | /* |
1112 | * In TLSv1.3 we update the cache as part of constructing the | |
1113 | * NewSessionTicket | |
1114 | */ | |
38b051a1 | 1115 | if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) |
16ff1342 | 1116 | ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER); |
8723588e | 1117 | |
0e6161bc | 1118 | /* N.B. s->ctx may not equal s->session_ctx */ |
38b051a1 | 1119 | ssl_tsan_counter(sctx, &sctx->stats.sess_accept_good); |
fe3a3291 | 1120 | s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_accept; |
8723588e | 1121 | } else { |
38b051a1 | 1122 | if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
4cb00457 MC |
1123 | /* |
1124 | * We encourage applications to only use TLSv1.3 tickets once, | |
1125 | * so we remove this one from the cache. | |
1126 | */ | |
1127 | if ((s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode | |
1128 | & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) != 0) | |
1129 | SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session); | |
1130 | } else { | |
1131 | /* | |
1132 | * In TLSv1.3 we update the cache as part of processing the | |
1133 | * NewSessionTicket | |
1134 | */ | |
5d61491c | 1135 | ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT); |
4cb00457 | 1136 | } |
8723588e | 1137 | if (s->hit) |
acce0557 P |
1138 | ssl_tsan_counter(s->session_ctx, |
1139 | &s->session_ctx->stats.sess_hit); | |
8723588e | 1140 | |
fe3a3291 | 1141 | s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_connect; |
acce0557 P |
1142 | ssl_tsan_counter(s->session_ctx, |
1143 | &s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_good); | |
8723588e MC |
1144 | } |
1145 | ||
38b051a1 | 1146 | if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
8723588e MC |
1147 | /* done with handshaking */ |
1148 | s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0; | |
1149 | s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 0; | |
1150 | s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0; | |
f5c7f5df | 1151 | dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s); |
8723588e MC |
1152 | } |
1153 | } | |
1154 | ||
c2c1d8a4 MC |
1155 | if (s->info_callback != NULL) |
1156 | cb = s->info_callback; | |
38b051a1 TM |
1157 | else if (sctx->info_callback != NULL) |
1158 | cb = sctx->info_callback; | |
c2c1d8a4 | 1159 | |
4ce787b9 MC |
1160 | /* The callback may expect us to not be in init at handshake done */ |
1161 | ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0); | |
1162 | ||
4af5836b MC |
1163 | if (cb != NULL) { |
1164 | if (cleanuphand | |
38b051a1 | 1165 | || !SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) |
4af5836b | 1166 | || SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) |
38b051a1 | 1167 | cb(ssl, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1); |
4af5836b | 1168 | } |
c2c1d8a4 | 1169 | |
4ce787b9 MC |
1170 | if (!stop) { |
1171 | /* If we've got more work to do we go back into init */ | |
1172 | ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1); | |
30f05b19 | 1173 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; |
4ce787b9 | 1174 | } |
30f05b19 | 1175 | |
8723588e MC |
1176 | return WORK_FINISHED_STOP; |
1177 | } | |
1178 | ||
38b051a1 | 1179 | int tls_get_message_header(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int *mt) |
9ab930b2 MC |
1180 | { |
1181 | /* s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */ | |
d4d2f3a4 | 1182 | int skip_message, i, recvd_type; |
9ab930b2 | 1183 | unsigned char *p; |
54105ddd | 1184 | size_t l, readbytes; |
38b051a1 | 1185 | SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s); |
9ab930b2 MC |
1186 | |
1187 | p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; | |
1188 | ||
1189 | do { | |
1190 | while (s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) { | |
38b051a1 TM |
1191 | i = ssl->method->ssl_read_bytes(ssl, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, &recvd_type, |
1192 | &p[s->init_num], | |
1193 | SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - s->init_num, | |
1194 | 0, &readbytes); | |
9ab930b2 MC |
1195 | if (i <= 0) { |
1196 | s->rwstate = SSL_READING; | |
1197 | return 0; | |
32ec4153 | 1198 | } |
9ab930b2 | 1199 | if (recvd_type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { |
1257adec | 1200 | /* |
a230b26e EK |
1201 | * A ChangeCipherSpec must be a single byte and may not occur |
1202 | * in the middle of a handshake message. | |
1203 | */ | |
54105ddd | 1204 | if (s->init_num != 0 || readbytes != 1 || p[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS) { |
d4d2f3a4 | 1205 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
1206 | SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); |
1207 | return 0; | |
1257adec | 1208 | } |
e9359719 | 1209 | if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_BEFORE |
555cbb32 | 1210 | && (s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) != 0) { |
e9359719 MC |
1211 | /* |
1212 | * We are stateless and we received a CCS. Probably this is | |
1213 | * from a client between the first and second ClientHellos. | |
1214 | * We should ignore this, but return an error because we do | |
1215 | * not return success until we see the second ClientHello | |
1216 | * with a valid cookie. | |
1217 | */ | |
1218 | return 0; | |
1219 | } | |
555cbb32 | 1220 | s->s3.tmp.message_type = *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; |
54105ddd | 1221 | s->init_num = readbytes - 1; |
c4377574 | 1222 | s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data; |
555cbb32 | 1223 | s->s3.tmp.message_size = readbytes; |
9ab930b2 MC |
1224 | return 1; |
1225 | } else if (recvd_type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { | |
d4d2f3a4 | 1226 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
1227 | SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); |
1228 | return 0; | |
32ec4153 | 1229 | } |
54105ddd | 1230 | s->init_num += readbytes; |
9ab930b2 MC |
1231 | } |
1232 | ||
1233 | skip_message = 0; | |
1234 | if (!s->server) | |
c7f47786 MC |
1235 | if (s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_OK |
1236 | && p[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) | |
9ab930b2 MC |
1237 | /* |
1238 | * The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages -- | |
1239 | * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if | |
1240 | * their format is correct. Does not count for 'Finished' | |
1241 | * MAC. | |
1242 | */ | |
1243 | if (p[1] == 0 && p[2] == 0 && p[3] == 0) { | |
1244 | s->init_num = 0; | |
1245 | skip_message = 1; | |
1246 | ||
1247 | if (s->msg_callback) | |
1248 | s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, | |
38b051a1 | 1249 | p, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, ssl, |
9ab930b2 MC |
1250 | s->msg_callback_arg); |
1251 | } | |
1252 | } while (skip_message); | |
1253 | /* s->init_num == SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */ | |
1254 | ||
1255 | *mt = *p; | |
555cbb32 | 1256 | s->s3.tmp.message_type = *(p++); |
32ec4153 | 1257 | |
e8aa8b6c | 1258 | if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) { |
9ab930b2 MC |
1259 | /* |
1260 | * Only happens with SSLv3+ in an SSLv2 backward compatible | |
1261 | * ClientHello | |
e8aa8b6c F |
1262 | * |
1263 | * Total message size is the remaining record bytes to read | |
1264 | * plus the SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH bytes that we already read | |
9ab930b2 | 1265 | */ |
4030869d | 1266 | l = s->rlayer.tlsrecs[0].length + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; |
555cbb32 | 1267 | s->s3.tmp.message_size = l; |
9ab930b2 MC |
1268 | |
1269 | s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data; | |
1270 | s->init_num = SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
1271 | } else { | |
1272 | n2l3(p, l); | |
1273 | /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */ | |
1274 | if (l > (INT_MAX - SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 1275 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
1276 | SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE); |
1277 | return 0; | |
32ec4153 | 1278 | } |
555cbb32 | 1279 | s->s3.tmp.message_size = l; |
9ab930b2 MC |
1280 | |
1281 | s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
1282 | s->init_num = 0; | |
1283 | } | |
1284 | ||
1285 | return 1; | |
9ab930b2 MC |
1286 | } |
1287 | ||
38b051a1 | 1288 | int tls_get_message_body(SSL_CONNECTION *s, size_t *len) |
9ab930b2 | 1289 | { |
54105ddd | 1290 | size_t n, readbytes; |
9ab930b2 MC |
1291 | unsigned char *p; |
1292 | int i; | |
38b051a1 | 1293 | SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s); |
9ab930b2 | 1294 | |
555cbb32 | 1295 | if (s->s3.tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { |
9ab930b2 MC |
1296 | /* We've already read everything in */ |
1297 | *len = (unsigned long)s->init_num; | |
1298 | return 1; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1299 | } |
1300 | ||
0f113f3e | 1301 | p = s->init_msg; |
555cbb32 | 1302 | n = s->s3.tmp.message_size - s->init_num; |
0f113f3e | 1303 | while (n > 0) { |
38b051a1 TM |
1304 | i = ssl->method->ssl_read_bytes(ssl, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, NULL, |
1305 | &p[s->init_num], n, 0, &readbytes); | |
0f113f3e MC |
1306 | if (i <= 0) { |
1307 | s->rwstate = SSL_READING; | |
9ab930b2 MC |
1308 | *len = 0; |
1309 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e | 1310 | } |
54105ddd MC |
1311 | s->init_num += readbytes; |
1312 | n -= readbytes; | |
0f113f3e | 1313 | } |
ee2ffc27 | 1314 | |
0f113f3e MC |
1315 | /* |
1316 | * If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for | |
1317 | * Finished verification. | |
1318 | */ | |
5d671101 MC |
1319 | if (*(s->init_buf->data) == SSL3_MT_FINISHED && !ssl3_take_mac(s)) { |
1320 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
1321 | *len = 0; | |
1322 | return 0; | |
1323 | } | |
ee2ffc27 | 1324 | |
0f113f3e | 1325 | /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */ |
e8aa8b6c | 1326 | if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) { |
d166ed8c DSH |
1327 | if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, |
1328 | s->init_num)) { | |
d4d2f3a4 | 1329 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
d166ed8c DSH |
1330 | *len = 0; |
1331 | return 0; | |
1332 | } | |
32ec4153 | 1333 | if (s->msg_callback) |
a230b26e | 1334 | s->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION, 0, s->init_buf->data, |
38b051a1 | 1335 | (size_t)s->init_num, ssl, s->msg_callback_arg); |
32ec4153 | 1336 | } else { |
11c67eea MC |
1337 | /* |
1338 | * We defer feeding in the HRR until later. We'll do it as part of | |
1339 | * processing the message | |
9d75dce3 TS |
1340 | * The TLsv1.3 handshake transcript stops at the ClientFinished |
1341 | * message. | |
11c67eea | 1342 | */ |
597c51bc | 1343 | #define SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET (SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 2) |
9d75dce3 | 1344 | /* KeyUpdate and NewSessionTicket do not need to be added */ |
38b051a1 TM |
1345 | if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) |
1346 | || (s->s3.tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET | |
1347 | && s->s3.tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE)) { | |
555cbb32 | 1348 | if (s->s3.tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO |
9d75dce3 TS |
1349 | || s->init_num < SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE |
1350 | || memcmp(hrrrandom, | |
1351 | s->init_buf->data + SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET, | |
1352 | SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) != 0) { | |
1353 | if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, | |
1354 | s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { | |
1355 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
1356 | *len = 0; | |
1357 | return 0; | |
1358 | } | |
597c51bc | 1359 | } |
d166ed8c | 1360 | } |
32ec4153 MC |
1361 | if (s->msg_callback) |
1362 | s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data, | |
38b051a1 | 1363 | (size_t)s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, ssl, |
32ec4153 MC |
1364 | s->msg_callback_arg); |
1365 | } | |
1366 | ||
eda75751 | 1367 | *len = s->init_num; |
9ab930b2 | 1368 | return 1; |
0f113f3e | 1369 | } |
d02b48c6 | 1370 | |
c6d38183 RS |
1371 | static const X509ERR2ALERT x509table[] = { |
1372 | {X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE}, | |
1373 | {X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
cccf532f | 1374 | {X509_V_ERR_EC_KEY_EXPLICIT_PARAMS, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, |
c6d38183 RS |
1375 | {X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, |
1376 | {X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, | |
1377 | {X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED}, | |
1378 | {X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1379 | {X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1380 | {X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED}, | |
1381 | {X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR}, | |
1382 | {X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1383 | {X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED}, | |
1384 | {X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1385 | {X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR}, | |
1386 | {X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1387 | {X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, | |
1388 | {X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1389 | {X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1390 | {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1391 | {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1392 | {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1393 | {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1394 | {X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1395 | {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, | |
1396 | {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR}, | |
1397 | {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1398 | {X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1399 | {X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR}, | |
1400 | {X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, | |
1401 | {X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, | |
1402 | {X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR}, | |
1403 | {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1404 | {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1405 | {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1406 | {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, | |
1407 | {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, | |
1408 | {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, | |
1409 | {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, | |
1410 | {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, | |
1411 | {X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR}, | |
1412 | ||
1413 | /* Last entry; return this if we don't find the value above. */ | |
1414 | {X509_V_OK, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN} | |
1415 | }; | |
1416 | ||
1417 | int ssl_x509err2alert(int x509err) | |
0f113f3e | 1418 | { |
c6d38183 RS |
1419 | const X509ERR2ALERT *tp; |
1420 | ||
1421 | for (tp = x509table; tp->x509err != X509_V_OK; ++tp) | |
1422 | if (tp->x509err == x509err) | |
1423 | break; | |
1424 | return tp->alert; | |
0f113f3e | 1425 | } |
d02b48c6 | 1426 | |
38b051a1 | 1427 | int ssl_allow_compression(SSL_CONNECTION *s) |
0f113f3e MC |
1428 | { |
1429 | if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) | |
1430 | return 0; | |
1431 | return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION, 0, 0, NULL); | |
1432 | } | |
4fa52141 | 1433 | |
38b051a1 | 1434 | static int version_cmp(const SSL_CONNECTION *s, int a, int b) |
4fa52141 | 1435 | { |
38b051a1 | 1436 | int dtls = SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s); |
4fa52141 VD |
1437 | |
1438 | if (a == b) | |
1439 | return 0; | |
1440 | if (!dtls) | |
1441 | return a < b ? -1 : 1; | |
1442 | return DTLS_VERSION_LT(a, b) ? -1 : 1; | |
1443 | } | |
1444 | ||
1445 | typedef struct { | |
1446 | int version; | |
a230b26e EK |
1447 | const SSL_METHOD *(*cmeth) (void); |
1448 | const SSL_METHOD *(*smeth) (void); | |
4fa52141 VD |
1449 | } version_info; |
1450 | ||
5c587fb6 | 1451 | #if TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL != TLS1_3_VERSION |
582a17d6 | 1452 | # error Code needs update for TLS_method() support beyond TLS1_3_VERSION. |
4fa52141 VD |
1453 | #endif |
1454 | ||
f7f2a01d | 1455 | /* Must be in order high to low */ |
4fa52141 | 1456 | static const version_info tls_version_table[] = { |
582a17d6 MC |
1457 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 |
1458 | {TLS1_3_VERSION, tlsv1_3_client_method, tlsv1_3_server_method}, | |
1459 | #else | |
1460 | {TLS1_3_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, | |
1461 | #endif | |
6b01bed2 | 1462 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2 |
a230b26e | 1463 | {TLS1_2_VERSION, tlsv1_2_client_method, tlsv1_2_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 1464 | #else |
a230b26e | 1465 | {TLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
6b01bed2 VD |
1466 | #endif |
1467 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1 | |
a230b26e | 1468 | {TLS1_1_VERSION, tlsv1_1_client_method, tlsv1_1_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 1469 | #else |
a230b26e | 1470 | {TLS1_1_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
6b01bed2 VD |
1471 | #endif |
1472 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1 | |
a230b26e | 1473 | {TLS1_VERSION, tlsv1_client_method, tlsv1_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 1474 | #else |
a230b26e | 1475 | {TLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
6b01bed2 | 1476 | #endif |
4fa52141 | 1477 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3 |
a230b26e | 1478 | {SSL3_VERSION, sslv3_client_method, sslv3_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 1479 | #else |
a230b26e | 1480 | {SSL3_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
4fa52141 | 1481 | #endif |
a230b26e | 1482 | {0, NULL, NULL}, |
4fa52141 VD |
1483 | }; |
1484 | ||
5c587fb6 | 1485 | #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL != DTLS1_2_VERSION |
4fa52141 VD |
1486 | # error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_2_VERSION. |
1487 | #endif | |
1488 | ||
f7f2a01d | 1489 | /* Must be in order high to low */ |
4fa52141 | 1490 | static const version_info dtls_version_table[] = { |
6b01bed2 | 1491 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2 |
a230b26e | 1492 | {DTLS1_2_VERSION, dtlsv1_2_client_method, dtlsv1_2_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 1493 | #else |
a230b26e | 1494 | {DTLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
6b01bed2 VD |
1495 | #endif |
1496 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1 | |
a230b26e EK |
1497 | {DTLS1_VERSION, dtlsv1_client_method, dtlsv1_server_method}, |
1498 | {DTLS1_BAD_VER, dtls_bad_ver_client_method, NULL}, | |
6b01bed2 | 1499 | #else |
a230b26e EK |
1500 | {DTLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
1501 | {DTLS1_BAD_VER, NULL, NULL}, | |
6b01bed2 | 1502 | #endif |
a230b26e | 1503 | {0, NULL, NULL}, |
4fa52141 VD |
1504 | }; |
1505 | ||
1506 | /* | |
1507 | * ssl_method_error - Check whether an SSL_METHOD is enabled. | |
1508 | * | |
1509 | * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method | |
1510 | * @method: the intended method. | |
1511 | * | |
1512 | * Returns 0 on success, or an SSL error reason on failure. | |
1513 | */ | |
38b051a1 | 1514 | static int ssl_method_error(const SSL_CONNECTION *s, const SSL_METHOD *method) |
4fa52141 VD |
1515 | { |
1516 | int version = method->version; | |
1517 | ||
1518 | if ((s->min_proto_version != 0 && | |
1519 | version_cmp(s, version, s->min_proto_version) < 0) || | |
1520 | ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, version, NULL) == 0) | |
1521 | return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW; | |
1522 | ||
1523 | if (s->max_proto_version != 0 && | |
a230b26e | 1524 | version_cmp(s, version, s->max_proto_version) > 0) |
4fa52141 VD |
1525 | return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_HIGH; |
1526 | ||
1527 | if ((s->options & method->mask) != 0) | |
1528 | return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; | |
1529 | if ((method->flags & SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB) != 0 && tls1_suiteb(s)) | |
1530 | return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_2_NEEDED_IN_SUITEB_MODE; | |
4fa52141 VD |
1531 | |
1532 | return 0; | |
1533 | } | |
1534 | ||
baa45c3e MC |
1535 | /* |
1536 | * Only called by servers. Returns 1 if the server has a TLSv1.3 capable | |
ebda646d MC |
1537 | * certificate type, or has PSK or a certificate callback configured, or has |
1538 | * a servername callback configure. Otherwise returns 0. | |
baa45c3e | 1539 | */ |
38b051a1 | 1540 | static int is_tls13_capable(const SSL_CONNECTION *s) |
baa45c3e | 1541 | { |
65d2c16c | 1542 | int i; |
65d2c16c | 1543 | int curve; |
38b051a1 | 1544 | SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s); |
baa45c3e | 1545 | |
38b051a1 | 1546 | if (!ossl_assert(sctx != NULL) || !ossl_assert(s->session_ctx != NULL)) |
ebda646d MC |
1547 | return 0; |
1548 | ||
1549 | /* | |
1550 | * A servername callback can change the available certs, so if a servername | |
1551 | * cb is set then we just assume TLSv1.3 will be ok | |
1552 | */ | |
38b051a1 | 1553 | if (sctx->ext.servername_cb != NULL |
ebda646d MC |
1554 | || s->session_ctx->ext.servername_cb != NULL) |
1555 | return 1; | |
1556 | ||
d162340d MC |
1557 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK |
1558 | if (s->psk_server_callback != NULL) | |
1559 | return 1; | |
1560 | #endif | |
1561 | ||
cd3b53b8 | 1562 | if (s->psk_find_session_cb != NULL || s->cert->cert_cb != NULL) |
baa45c3e MC |
1563 | return 1; |
1564 | ||
1565 | for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) { | |
1566 | /* Skip over certs disallowed for TLSv1.3 */ | |
1567 | switch (i) { | |
1568 | case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN: | |
1569 | case SSL_PKEY_GOST01: | |
1570 | case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256: | |
1571 | case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512: | |
1572 | continue; | |
1573 | default: | |
1574 | break; | |
1575 | } | |
de4dc598 MC |
1576 | if (!ssl_has_cert(s, i)) |
1577 | continue; | |
1578 | if (i != SSL_PKEY_ECC) | |
1579 | return 1; | |
1580 | /* | |
1581 | * Prior to TLSv1.3 sig algs allowed any curve to be used. TLSv1.3 is | |
1582 | * more restrictive so check that our sig algs are consistent with this | |
1583 | * EC cert. See section 4.2.3 of RFC8446. | |
1584 | */ | |
d8975dec | 1585 | curve = ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey); |
de4dc598 | 1586 | if (tls_check_sigalg_curve(s, curve)) |
baa45c3e MC |
1587 | return 1; |
1588 | } | |
1589 | ||
1590 | return 0; | |
1591 | } | |
1592 | ||
ccae4a15 FI |
1593 | /* |
1594 | * ssl_version_supported - Check that the specified `version` is supported by | |
1595 | * `SSL *` instance | |
1596 | * | |
1597 | * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method | |
1598 | * @version: Protocol version to test against | |
1599 | * | |
1600 | * Returns 1 when supported, otherwise 0 | |
1601 | */ | |
38b051a1 TM |
1602 | int ssl_version_supported(const SSL_CONNECTION *s, int version, |
1603 | const SSL_METHOD **meth) | |
ccae4a15 FI |
1604 | { |
1605 | const version_info *vent; | |
1606 | const version_info *table; | |
1607 | ||
38b051a1 | 1608 | switch (SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)->method->version) { |
ccae4a15 FI |
1609 | default: |
1610 | /* Version should match method version for non-ANY method */ | |
1611 | return version_cmp(s, version, s->version) == 0; | |
1612 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1613 | table = tls_version_table; | |
1614 | break; | |
1615 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1616 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
1617 | break; | |
1618 | } | |
1619 | ||
1620 | for (vent = table; | |
1621 | vent->version != 0 && version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) <= 0; | |
1622 | ++vent) { | |
baa45c3e MC |
1623 | if (vent->cmeth != NULL |
1624 | && version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) == 0 | |
1625 | && ssl_method_error(s, vent->cmeth()) == 0 | |
1626 | && (!s->server | |
1627 | || version != TLS1_3_VERSION | |
1628 | || is_tls13_capable(s))) { | |
4fd12788 MC |
1629 | if (meth != NULL) |
1630 | *meth = vent->cmeth(); | |
ccae4a15 FI |
1631 | return 1; |
1632 | } | |
1633 | } | |
1634 | return 0; | |
1635 | } | |
1636 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1637 | /* |
1638 | * ssl_check_version_downgrade - In response to RFC7507 SCSV version | |
1639 | * fallback indication from a client check whether we're using the highest | |
1640 | * supported protocol version. | |
1641 | * | |
1642 | * @s server SSL handle. | |
1643 | * | |
1644 | * Returns 1 when using the highest enabled version, 0 otherwise. | |
1645 | */ | |
38b051a1 | 1646 | int ssl_check_version_downgrade(SSL_CONNECTION *s) |
4fa52141 VD |
1647 | { |
1648 | const version_info *vent; | |
1649 | const version_info *table; | |
38b051a1 | 1650 | SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s); |
4fa52141 VD |
1651 | |
1652 | /* | |
1653 | * Check that the current protocol is the highest enabled version | |
1654 | * (according to s->ctx->method, as version negotiation may have changed | |
1655 | * s->method). | |
1656 | */ | |
38b051a1 | 1657 | if (s->version == sctx->method->version) |
4fa52141 VD |
1658 | return 1; |
1659 | ||
1660 | /* | |
1661 | * Apparently we're using a version-flexible SSL_METHOD (not at its | |
1662 | * highest protocol version). | |
1663 | */ | |
38b051a1 | 1664 | if (sctx->method->version == TLS_method()->version) |
4fa52141 | 1665 | table = tls_version_table; |
38b051a1 | 1666 | else if (sctx->method->version == DTLS_method()->version) |
4fa52141 VD |
1667 | table = dtls_version_table; |
1668 | else { | |
1669 | /* Unexpected state; fail closed. */ | |
1670 | return 0; | |
1671 | } | |
1672 | ||
1673 | for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { | |
a230b26e | 1674 | if (vent->smeth != NULL && ssl_method_error(s, vent->smeth()) == 0) |
4fa52141 VD |
1675 | return s->version == vent->version; |
1676 | } | |
1677 | return 0; | |
1678 | } | |
1679 | ||
1680 | /* | |
1681 | * ssl_set_version_bound - set an upper or lower bound on the supported (D)TLS | |
1682 | * protocols, provided the initial (D)TLS method is version-flexible. This | |
1683 | * function sanity-checks the proposed value and makes sure the method is | |
1684 | * version-flexible, then sets the limit if all is well. | |
1685 | * | |
1686 | * @method_version: The version of the current SSL_METHOD. | |
1687 | * @version: the intended limit. | |
1688 | * @bound: pointer to limit to be updated. | |
1689 | * | |
1690 | * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure. | |
1691 | */ | |
1692 | int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version, int version, int *bound) | |
1693 | { | |
77174598 VD |
1694 | int valid_tls; |
1695 | int valid_dtls; | |
1696 | ||
869e978c KR |
1697 | if (version == 0) { |
1698 | *bound = version; | |
1699 | return 1; | |
1700 | } | |
1701 | ||
77174598 VD |
1702 | valid_tls = version >= SSL3_VERSION && version <= TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL; |
1703 | valid_dtls = | |
1704 | DTLS_VERSION_LE(version, DTLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL) && | |
1705 | DTLS_VERSION_GE(version, DTLS1_BAD_VER); | |
1706 | ||
1707 | if (!valid_tls && !valid_dtls) | |
1708 | return 0; | |
1709 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1710 | /*- |
1711 | * Restrict TLS methods to TLS protocol versions. | |
1712 | * Restrict DTLS methods to DTLS protocol versions. | |
1713 | * Note, DTLS version numbers are decreasing, use comparison macros. | |
1714 | * | |
1715 | * Note that for both lower-bounds we use explicit versions, not | |
1716 | * (D)TLS_MIN_VERSION. This is because we don't want to break user | |
1717 | * configurations. If the MIN (supported) version ever rises, the user's | |
1718 | * "floor" remains valid even if no longer available. We don't expect the | |
1719 | * MAX ceiling to ever get lower, so making that variable makes sense. | |
77174598 VD |
1720 | * |
1721 | * We ignore attempts to set bounds on version-inflexible methods, | |
1722 | * returning success. | |
4fa52141 VD |
1723 | */ |
1724 | switch (method_version) { | |
1725 | default: | |
77174598 | 1726 | break; |
4fa52141 VD |
1727 | |
1728 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
77174598 VD |
1729 | if (valid_tls) |
1730 | *bound = version; | |
4fa52141 VD |
1731 | break; |
1732 | ||
1733 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
77174598 VD |
1734 | if (valid_dtls) |
1735 | *bound = version; | |
4fa52141 VD |
1736 | break; |
1737 | } | |
4fa52141 VD |
1738 | return 1; |
1739 | } | |
1740 | ||
38b051a1 | 1741 | static void check_for_downgrade(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int vers, DOWNGRADE *dgrd) |
f7f2a01d MC |
1742 | { |
1743 | if (vers == TLS1_2_VERSION | |
4fd12788 | 1744 | && ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_3_VERSION, NULL)) { |
f7f2a01d | 1745 | *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_TO_1_2; |
38b051a1 | 1746 | } else if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) |
5627f9f2 MC |
1747 | && vers < TLS1_2_VERSION |
1748 | /* | |
1749 | * We need to ensure that a server that disables TLSv1.2 | |
1750 | * (creating a hole between TLSv1.3 and TLSv1.1) can still | |
1751 | * complete handshakes with clients that support TLSv1.2 and | |
1752 | * below. Therefore we do not enable the sentinel if TLSv1.3 is | |
1753 | * enabled and TLSv1.2 is not. | |
1754 | */ | |
1755 | && ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_2_VERSION, NULL)) { | |
f7f2a01d MC |
1756 | *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_TO_1_1; |
1757 | } else { | |
1758 | *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE; | |
1759 | } | |
1760 | } | |
1761 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1762 | /* |
1763 | * ssl_choose_server_version - Choose server (D)TLS version. Called when the | |
1764 | * client HELLO is received to select the final server protocol version and | |
1765 | * the version specific method. | |
1766 | * | |
1767 | * @s: server SSL handle. | |
1768 | * | |
1769 | * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. | |
1770 | */ | |
38b051a1 TM |
1771 | int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL_CONNECTION *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello, |
1772 | DOWNGRADE *dgrd) | |
4fa52141 VD |
1773 | { |
1774 | /*- | |
1775 | * With version-flexible methods we have an initial state with: | |
1776 | * | |
1777 | * s->method->version == (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION, | |
5c587fb6 | 1778 | * s->version == (D)TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL. |
4fa52141 VD |
1779 | * |
1780 | * So we detect version-flexible methods via the method version, not the | |
1781 | * handle version. | |
1782 | */ | |
38b051a1 TM |
1783 | SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s); |
1784 | int server_version = ssl->method->version; | |
df7ce507 | 1785 | int client_version = hello->legacy_version; |
4fa52141 VD |
1786 | const version_info *vent; |
1787 | const version_info *table; | |
1788 | int disabled = 0; | |
cd998837 | 1789 | RAW_EXTENSION *suppversions; |
4fa52141 | 1790 | |
1ab3836b MC |
1791 | s->client_version = client_version; |
1792 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1793 | switch (server_version) { |
1794 | default: | |
38b051a1 | 1795 | if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
7d061fce MC |
1796 | if (version_cmp(s, client_version, s->version) < 0) |
1797 | return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION; | |
f7f2a01d | 1798 | *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE; |
7d061fce MC |
1799 | /* |
1800 | * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't | |
1801 | * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope | |
1802 | * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol | |
1803 | * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return | |
1804 | * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) | |
1805 | */ | |
1806 | return 0; | |
1807 | } | |
d2f42576 | 1808 | /* |
7d061fce MC |
1809 | * Fall through if we are TLSv1.3 already (this means we must be after |
1810 | * a HelloRetryRequest | |
4fa52141 | 1811 | */ |
018fcbec | 1812 | /* fall thru */ |
4fa52141 VD |
1813 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: |
1814 | table = tls_version_table; | |
1815 | break; | |
1816 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1817 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
1818 | break; | |
1819 | } | |
1820 | ||
70af3d8e | 1821 | suppversions = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions]; |
cd998837 | 1822 | |
6f40214f | 1823 | /* If we did an HRR then supported versions is mandatory */ |
fc7129dc | 1824 | if (!suppversions->present && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) |
6f40214f MC |
1825 | return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; |
1826 | ||
38b051a1 | 1827 | if (suppversions->present && !SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
cd998837 MC |
1828 | unsigned int candidate_vers = 0; |
1829 | unsigned int best_vers = 0; | |
1830 | const SSL_METHOD *best_method = NULL; | |
1831 | PACKET versionslist; | |
1832 | ||
6b473aca MC |
1833 | suppversions->parsed = 1; |
1834 | ||
16bce0e0 | 1835 | if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&suppversions->data, &versionslist)) { |
cd998837 MC |
1836 | /* Trailing or invalid data? */ |
1837 | return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH; | |
1838 | } | |
1839 | ||
d8434cf8 MC |
1840 | /* |
1841 | * The TLSv1.3 spec says the client MUST set this to TLS1_2_VERSION. | |
1842 | * The spec only requires servers to check that it isn't SSLv3: | |
1843 | * "Any endpoint receiving a Hello message with | |
1844 | * ClientHello.legacy_version or ServerHello.legacy_version set to | |
1845 | * 0x0300 MUST abort the handshake with a "protocol_version" alert." | |
1846 | * We are slightly stricter and require that it isn't SSLv3 or lower. | |
1847 | * We tolerate TLSv1 and TLSv1.1. | |
1848 | */ | |
1849 | if (client_version <= SSL3_VERSION) | |
1850 | return SSL_R_BAD_LEGACY_VERSION; | |
1851 | ||
cd998837 | 1852 | while (PACKET_get_net_2(&versionslist, &candidate_vers)) { |
cd998837 MC |
1853 | if (version_cmp(s, candidate_vers, best_vers) <= 0) |
1854 | continue; | |
4fd12788 MC |
1855 | if (ssl_version_supported(s, candidate_vers, &best_method)) |
1856 | best_vers = candidate_vers; | |
cd998837 MC |
1857 | } |
1858 | if (PACKET_remaining(&versionslist) != 0) { | |
1859 | /* Trailing data? */ | |
1860 | return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH; | |
1861 | } | |
1862 | ||
1863 | if (best_vers > 0) { | |
fc7129dc | 1864 | if (s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) { |
7d061fce | 1865 | /* |
6f40214f MC |
1866 | * This is after a HelloRetryRequest so we better check that we |
1867 | * negotiated TLSv1.3 | |
7d061fce MC |
1868 | */ |
1869 | if (best_vers != TLS1_3_VERSION) | |
1870 | return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; | |
1871 | return 0; | |
1872 | } | |
f7f2a01d | 1873 | check_for_downgrade(s, best_vers, dgrd); |
cd998837 | 1874 | s->version = best_vers; |
38b051a1 | 1875 | ssl->method = best_method; |
cffafb5f MC |
1876 | if (!s->rlayer.rrlmethod->set_protocol_version(s->rlayer.rrl, |
1877 | best_vers)) | |
1853d20a MC |
1878 | return ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
1879 | ||
cd998837 MC |
1880 | return 0; |
1881 | } | |
1882 | return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; | |
1883 | } | |
1884 | ||
1885 | /* | |
1886 | * If the supported versions extension isn't present, then the highest | |
1887 | * version we can negotiate is TLSv1.2 | |
1888 | */ | |
1889 | if (version_cmp(s, client_version, TLS1_3_VERSION) >= 0) | |
1890 | client_version = TLS1_2_VERSION; | |
1891 | ||
1892 | /* | |
1893 | * No supported versions extension, so we just use the version supplied in | |
1894 | * the ClientHello. | |
1895 | */ | |
4fa52141 VD |
1896 | for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { |
1897 | const SSL_METHOD *method; | |
1898 | ||
1899 | if (vent->smeth == NULL || | |
1900 | version_cmp(s, client_version, vent->version) < 0) | |
1901 | continue; | |
1902 | method = vent->smeth(); | |
1903 | if (ssl_method_error(s, method) == 0) { | |
f7f2a01d | 1904 | check_for_downgrade(s, vent->version, dgrd); |
4fa52141 | 1905 | s->version = vent->version; |
38b051a1 | 1906 | ssl->method = method; |
cffafb5f MC |
1907 | if (!s->rlayer.rrlmethod->set_protocol_version(s->rlayer.rrl, |
1908 | s->version)) | |
1853d20a MC |
1909 | return ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
1910 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1911 | return 0; |
1912 | } | |
1913 | disabled = 1; | |
1914 | } | |
1915 | return disabled ? SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL : SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW; | |
1916 | } | |
1917 | ||
1918 | /* | |
1919 | * ssl_choose_client_version - Choose client (D)TLS version. Called when the | |
1920 | * server HELLO is received to select the final client protocol version and | |
1921 | * the version specific method. | |
1922 | * | |
1923 | * @s: client SSL handle. | |
1924 | * @version: The proposed version from the server's HELLO. | |
88050dd1 | 1925 | * @extensions: The extensions received |
4fa52141 | 1926 | * |
29bfd5b7 | 1927 | * Returns 1 on success or 0 on error. |
4fa52141 | 1928 | */ |
38b051a1 TM |
1929 | int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int version, |
1930 | RAW_EXTENSION *extensions) | |
4fa52141 VD |
1931 | { |
1932 | const version_info *vent; | |
1933 | const version_info *table; | |
b5b993b2 | 1934 | int ret, ver_min, ver_max, real_max, origv; |
38b051a1 | 1935 | SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s); |
4fa52141 | 1936 | |
88050dd1 MC |
1937 | origv = s->version; |
1938 | s->version = version; | |
b97667ce | 1939 | |
88050dd1 MC |
1940 | /* This will overwrite s->version if the extension is present */ |
1941 | if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions, | |
1942 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO | |
1943 | | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO, extensions, | |
1944 | NULL, 0)) { | |
1945 | s->version = origv; | |
1946 | return 0; | |
1947 | } | |
1948 | ||
fc7129dc MC |
1949 | if (s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE |
1950 | && s->version != TLS1_3_VERSION) { | |
88050dd1 | 1951 | s->version = origv; |
c48ffbcc | 1952 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION); |
29bfd5b7 | 1953 | return 0; |
c3043dcd MC |
1954 | } |
1955 | ||
38b051a1 | 1956 | switch (ssl->method->version) { |
4fa52141 | 1957 | default: |
38b051a1 | 1958 | if (s->version != ssl->method->version) { |
88050dd1 | 1959 | s->version = origv; |
c48ffbcc | 1960 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION); |
29bfd5b7 | 1961 | return 0; |
c3043dcd | 1962 | } |
4fa52141 VD |
1963 | /* |
1964 | * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't | |
1965 | * (and never did) check min/max, FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope | |
1966 | * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol | |
1967 | * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return | |
1968 | * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) | |
1969 | */ | |
cffafb5f MC |
1970 | if (!s->rlayer.rrlmethod->set_protocol_version(s->rlayer.rrl, |
1971 | s->version)) { | |
1853d20a MC |
1972 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
1973 | return 0; | |
1974 | } | |
29bfd5b7 | 1975 | return 1; |
4fa52141 VD |
1976 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: |
1977 | table = tls_version_table; | |
1978 | break; | |
1979 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1980 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
1981 | break; | |
1982 | } | |
1983 | ||
b5b993b2 MC |
1984 | ret = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max, &real_max); |
1985 | if (ret != 0) { | |
1986 | s->version = origv; | |
c48ffbcc | 1987 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, ret); |
b5b993b2 MC |
1988 | return 0; |
1989 | } | |
38b051a1 TM |
1990 | if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) ? DTLS_VERSION_LT(s->version, ver_min) |
1991 | : s->version < ver_min) { | |
b5b993b2 | 1992 | s->version = origv; |
c48ffbcc | 1993 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL); |
b5b993b2 | 1994 | return 0; |
38b051a1 TM |
1995 | } else if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) ? DTLS_VERSION_GT(s->version, ver_max) |
1996 | : s->version > ver_max) { | |
b5b993b2 | 1997 | s->version = origv; |
c48ffbcc | 1998 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL); |
b5b993b2 MC |
1999 | return 0; |
2000 | } | |
5df22060 | 2001 | |
b5b993b2 MC |
2002 | if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) == 0) |
2003 | real_max = ver_max; | |
c3043dcd | 2004 | |
b5b993b2 MC |
2005 | /* Check for downgrades */ |
2006 | if (s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION && real_max > s->version) { | |
2007 | if (memcmp(tls12downgrade, | |
555cbb32 | 2008 | s->s3.server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE |
b5b993b2 MC |
2009 | - sizeof(tls12downgrade), |
2010 | sizeof(tls12downgrade)) == 0) { | |
2011 | s->version = origv; | |
2012 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, | |
b5b993b2 MC |
2013 | SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); |
2014 | return 0; | |
2015 | } | |
38b051a1 | 2016 | } else if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) |
b5b993b2 MC |
2017 | && s->version < TLS1_2_VERSION |
2018 | && real_max > s->version) { | |
2019 | if (memcmp(tls11downgrade, | |
555cbb32 | 2020 | s->s3.server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE |
b5b993b2 MC |
2021 | - sizeof(tls11downgrade), |
2022 | sizeof(tls11downgrade)) == 0) { | |
2023 | s->version = origv; | |
2024 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, | |
b5b993b2 MC |
2025 | SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); |
2026 | return 0; | |
c3043dcd | 2027 | } |
b5b993b2 | 2028 | } |
c3043dcd | 2029 | |
b5b993b2 MC |
2030 | for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { |
2031 | if (vent->cmeth == NULL || s->version != vent->version) | |
c3043dcd MC |
2032 | continue; |
2033 | ||
38b051a1 | 2034 | ssl->method = vent->cmeth(); |
cffafb5f MC |
2035 | if (!s->rlayer.rrlmethod->set_protocol_version(s->rlayer.rrl, |
2036 | s->version)) { | |
1853d20a MC |
2037 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
2038 | return 0; | |
2039 | } | |
29bfd5b7 | 2040 | return 1; |
4fa52141 VD |
2041 | } |
2042 | ||
88050dd1 | 2043 | s->version = origv; |
c48ffbcc | 2044 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL); |
29bfd5b7 | 2045 | return 0; |
4fa52141 VD |
2046 | } |
2047 | ||
068c358a | 2048 | /* |
38a73150 | 2049 | * ssl_get_min_max_version - get minimum and maximum protocol version |
068c358a KR |
2050 | * @s: The SSL connection |
2051 | * @min_version: The minimum supported version | |
2052 | * @max_version: The maximum supported version | |
b5b993b2 MC |
2053 | * @real_max: The highest version below the lowest compile time version hole |
2054 | * where that hole lies above at least one run-time enabled | |
2055 | * protocol. | |
068c358a KR |
2056 | * |
2057 | * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if the | |
2058 | * version is initially (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION. We apply any explicit SSL_OP_NO_xxx | |
2059 | * options, the MinProtocol and MaxProtocol configuration commands, any Suite B | |
b53338cb | 2060 | * constraints and any floor imposed by the security level here, |
068c358a | 2061 | * so we don't advertise the wrong protocol version to only reject the outcome later. |
4fa52141 | 2062 | * |
0485d540 | 2063 | * Computing the right floor matters. If, e.g., TLS 1.0 and 1.2 are enabled, |
4fa52141 VD |
2064 | * TLS 1.1 is disabled, but the security level, Suite-B and/or MinProtocol |
2065 | * only allow TLS 1.2, we want to advertise TLS1.2, *not* TLS1. | |
2066 | * | |
068c358a KR |
2067 | * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. On failure |
2068 | * min_version and max_version will also be set to 0. | |
4fa52141 | 2069 | */ |
38b051a1 TM |
2070 | int ssl_get_min_max_version(const SSL_CONNECTION *s, int *min_version, |
2071 | int *max_version, int *real_max) | |
4fa52141 | 2072 | { |
b5b993b2 | 2073 | int version, tmp_real_max; |
4fa52141 VD |
2074 | int hole; |
2075 | const SSL_METHOD *single = NULL; | |
2076 | const SSL_METHOD *method; | |
2077 | const version_info *table; | |
2078 | const version_info *vent; | |
38b051a1 | 2079 | const SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s); |
4fa52141 | 2080 | |
38b051a1 | 2081 | switch (ssl->method->version) { |
4fa52141 VD |
2082 | default: |
2083 | /* | |
2084 | * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't | |
2085 | * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope | |
2086 | * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol | |
2087 | * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return | |
2088 | * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) | |
2089 | */ | |
068c358a | 2090 | *min_version = *max_version = s->version; |
b5b993b2 MC |
2091 | /* |
2092 | * Providing a real_max only makes sense where we're using a version | |
2093 | * flexible method. | |
2094 | */ | |
2095 | if (!ossl_assert(real_max == NULL)) | |
2096 | return ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
4fa52141 VD |
2097 | return 0; |
2098 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
2099 | table = tls_version_table; | |
2100 | break; | |
2101 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
2102 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
2103 | break; | |
2104 | } | |
2105 | ||
2106 | /* | |
2107 | * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are some protocols | |
2108 | * below X enabled. This is required in order to maintain the "version | |
2109 | * capability" vector contiguous. Any versions with a NULL client method | |
2110 | * (protocol version client is disabled at compile-time) is also a "hole". | |
2111 | * | |
2112 | * Our initial state is hole == 1, version == 0. That is, versions above | |
2113 | * the first version in the method table are disabled (a "hole" above | |
2114 | * the valid protocol entries) and we don't have a selected version yet. | |
2115 | * | |
2116 | * Whenever "hole == 1", and we hit an enabled method, its version becomes | |
2117 | * the selected version, and the method becomes a candidate "single" | |
2118 | * method. We're no longer in a hole, so "hole" becomes 0. | |
2119 | * | |
2120 | * If "hole == 0" and we hit an enabled method, then "single" is cleared, | |
2121 | * as we support a contiguous range of at least two methods. If we hit | |
2122 | * a disabled method, then hole becomes true again, but nothing else | |
2123 | * changes yet, because all the remaining methods may be disabled too. | |
2124 | * If we again hit an enabled method after the new hole, it becomes | |
2125 | * selected, as we start from scratch. | |
2126 | */ | |
068c358a | 2127 | *min_version = version = 0; |
4fa52141 | 2128 | hole = 1; |
b5b993b2 MC |
2129 | if (real_max != NULL) |
2130 | *real_max = 0; | |
2131 | tmp_real_max = 0; | |
4fa52141 VD |
2132 | for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { |
2133 | /* | |
2134 | * A table entry with a NULL client method is still a hole in the | |
2135 | * "version capability" vector. | |
2136 | */ | |
2137 | if (vent->cmeth == NULL) { | |
2138 | hole = 1; | |
b5b993b2 | 2139 | tmp_real_max = 0; |
4fa52141 VD |
2140 | continue; |
2141 | } | |
2142 | method = vent->cmeth(); | |
b5b993b2 MC |
2143 | |
2144 | if (hole == 1 && tmp_real_max == 0) | |
2145 | tmp_real_max = vent->version; | |
2146 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
2147 | if (ssl_method_error(s, method) != 0) { |
2148 | hole = 1; | |
2149 | } else if (!hole) { | |
2150 | single = NULL; | |
068c358a | 2151 | *min_version = method->version; |
4fa52141 | 2152 | } else { |
b5b993b2 MC |
2153 | if (real_max != NULL && tmp_real_max != 0) |
2154 | *real_max = tmp_real_max; | |
4fa52141 | 2155 | version = (single = method)->version; |
068c358a | 2156 | *min_version = version; |
4fa52141 VD |
2157 | hole = 0; |
2158 | } | |
2159 | } | |
2160 | ||
068c358a KR |
2161 | *max_version = version; |
2162 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
2163 | /* Fail if everything is disabled */ |
2164 | if (version == 0) | |
2165 | return SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE; | |
2166 | ||
068c358a KR |
2167 | return 0; |
2168 | } | |
2169 | ||
2170 | /* | |
2171 | * ssl_set_client_hello_version - Work out what version we should be using for | |
7acb8b64 | 2172 | * the initial ClientHello.legacy_version field. |
068c358a KR |
2173 | * |
2174 | * @s: client SSL handle. | |
2175 | * | |
2176 | * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. | |
2177 | */ | |
38b051a1 | 2178 | int ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL_CONNECTION *s) |
068c358a | 2179 | { |
3eb2aff4 | 2180 | int ver_min, ver_max, ret; |
068c358a | 2181 | |
447cc0ad MC |
2182 | /* |
2183 | * In a renegotiation we always send the same client_version that we sent | |
2184 | * last time, regardless of which version we eventually negotiated. | |
2185 | */ | |
2186 | if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) | |
2187 | return 0; | |
2188 | ||
b5b993b2 | 2189 | ret = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max, NULL); |
068c358a KR |
2190 | |
2191 | if (ret != 0) | |
2192 | return ret; | |
2193 | ||
7acb8b64 MC |
2194 | s->version = ver_max; |
2195 | ||
222cf410 MC |
2196 | if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
2197 | if (ver_max == DTLS1_BAD_VER) { | |
2198 | /* | |
2199 | * Even though this is technically before version negotiation, | |
2200 | * because we have asked for DTLS1_BAD_VER we will never negotiate | |
2201 | * anything else, and this has impacts on the record layer for when | |
2202 | * we read the ServerHello. So we need to tell the record layer | |
2203 | * about this immediately. | |
2204 | */ | |
cffafb5f | 2205 | s->rlayer.rrlmethod->set_protocol_version(s->rlayer.rrl, ver_max); |
222cf410 MC |
2206 | } |
2207 | } else if (ver_max > TLS1_2_VERSION) { | |
2208 | /* TLS1.3 always uses TLS1.2 in the legacy_version field */ | |
7acb8b64 | 2209 | ver_max = TLS1_2_VERSION; |
222cf410 | 2210 | } |
7acb8b64 MC |
2211 | |
2212 | s->client_version = ver_max; | |
4fa52141 VD |
2213 | return 0; |
2214 | } | |
aff9929b MC |
2215 | |
2216 | /* | |
2217 | * Checks a list of |groups| to determine if the |group_id| is in it. If it is | |
2218 | * and |checkallow| is 1 then additionally check if the group is allowed to be | |
2219 | * used. Returns 1 if the group is in the list (and allowed if |checkallow| is | |
2220 | * 1) or 0 otherwise. | |
2221 | */ | |
38b051a1 | 2222 | int check_in_list(SSL_CONNECTION *s, uint16_t group_id, const uint16_t *groups, |
aff9929b MC |
2223 | size_t num_groups, int checkallow) |
2224 | { | |
2225 | size_t i; | |
2226 | ||
2227 | if (groups == NULL || num_groups == 0) | |
2228 | return 0; | |
2229 | ||
0a10825a BE |
2230 | if (checkallow == 1) |
2231 | group_id = ssl_group_id_tls13_to_internal(group_id); | |
2232 | ||
9e84a42d DSH |
2233 | for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) { |
2234 | uint16_t group = groups[i]; | |
2235 | ||
0a10825a BE |
2236 | if (checkallow == 2) |
2237 | group = ssl_group_id_tls13_to_internal(group); | |
2238 | ||
9e84a42d | 2239 | if (group_id == group |
aff9929b | 2240 | && (!checkallow |
dbc6268f | 2241 | || tls_group_allowed(s, group, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))) { |
0acee504 | 2242 | return 1; |
aff9929b MC |
2243 | } |
2244 | } | |
2245 | ||
0acee504 | 2246 | return 0; |
aff9929b | 2247 | } |
11c67eea MC |
2248 | |
2249 | /* Replace ClientHello1 in the transcript hash with a synthetic message */ | |
38b051a1 TM |
2250 | int create_synthetic_message_hash(SSL_CONNECTION *s, |
2251 | const unsigned char *hashval, | |
43054d3d MC |
2252 | size_t hashlen, const unsigned char *hrr, |
2253 | size_t hrrlen) | |
11c67eea | 2254 | { |
43054d3d | 2255 | unsigned char hashvaltmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
635b7d3f MC |
2256 | unsigned char msghdr[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]; |
2257 | ||
2258 | memset(msghdr, 0, sizeof(msghdr)); | |
11c67eea | 2259 | |
43054d3d MC |
2260 | if (hashval == NULL) { |
2261 | hashval = hashvaltmp; | |
2262 | hashlen = 0; | |
2263 | /* Get the hash of the initial ClientHello */ | |
2264 | if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0) | |
2265 | || !ssl_handshake_hash(s, hashvaltmp, sizeof(hashvaltmp), | |
2266 | &hashlen)) { | |
2267 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
2268 | return 0; | |
2269 | } | |
11c67eea MC |
2270 | } |
2271 | ||
2272 | /* Reinitialise the transcript hash */ | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2273 | if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) { |
2274 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
11c67eea | 2275 | return 0; |
f63a17d6 | 2276 | } |
11c67eea MC |
2277 | |
2278 | /* Inject the synthetic message_hash message */ | |
635b7d3f | 2279 | msghdr[0] = SSL3_MT_MESSAGE_HASH; |
3a63c0ed | 2280 | msghdr[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - 1] = (unsigned char)hashlen; |
11c67eea MC |
2281 | if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, msghdr, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) |
2282 | || !ssl3_finish_mac(s, hashval, hashlen)) { | |
f63a17d6 | 2283 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
11c67eea MC |
2284 | return 0; |
2285 | } | |
2286 | ||
43054d3d MC |
2287 | /* |
2288 | * Now re-inject the HRR and current message if appropriate (we just deleted | |
2289 | * it when we reinitialised the transcript hash above). Only necessary after | |
2290 | * receiving a ClientHello2 with a cookie. | |
2291 | */ | |
2292 | if (hrr != NULL | |
2293 | && (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, hrr, hrrlen) | |
2294 | || !ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, | |
555cbb32 | 2295 | s->s3.tmp.message_size |
43054d3d MC |
2296 | + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH))) { |
2297 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
2298 | return 0; | |
2299 | } | |
2300 | ||
11c67eea MC |
2301 | return 1; |
2302 | } | |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2303 | |
2304 | static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b) | |
2305 | { | |
2306 | return X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b); | |
2307 | } | |
2308 | ||
38b051a1 | 2309 | int parse_ca_names(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt) |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2310 | { |
2311 | STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp); | |
2312 | X509_NAME *xn = NULL; | |
2313 | PACKET cadns; | |
2314 | ||
2315 | if (ca_sk == NULL) { | |
c48ffbcc | 2316 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
f63a17d6 | 2317 | goto err; |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2318 | } |
2319 | /* get the CA RDNs */ | |
2320 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cadns)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 2321 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
f63a17d6 | 2322 | goto err; |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2323 | } |
2324 | ||
2325 | while (PACKET_remaining(&cadns)) { | |
2326 | const unsigned char *namestart, *namebytes; | |
2327 | unsigned int name_len; | |
2328 | ||
2329 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cadns, &name_len) | |
2330 | || !PACKET_get_bytes(&cadns, &namebytes, name_len)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 2331 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
f63a17d6 | 2332 | goto err; |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2333 | } |
2334 | ||
2335 | namestart = namebytes; | |
2336 | if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &namebytes, name_len)) == NULL) { | |
c48ffbcc | 2337 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); |
f63a17d6 | 2338 | goto err; |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2339 | } |
2340 | if (namebytes != (namestart + name_len)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 2341 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
f63a17d6 | 2342 | goto err; |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2343 | } |
2344 | ||
2345 | if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 2346 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2347 | goto err; |
2348 | } | |
2349 | xn = NULL; | |
2350 | } | |
2351 | ||
555cbb32 TS |
2352 | sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3.tmp.peer_ca_names, X509_NAME_free); |
2353 | s->s3.tmp.peer_ca_names = ca_sk; | |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2354 | |
2355 | return 1; | |
2356 | ||
5d6cca05 DSH |
2357 | err: |
2358 | sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free); | |
2359 | X509_NAME_free(xn); | |
2360 | return 0; | |
2361 | } | |
2362 | ||
38b051a1 | 2363 | const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *get_ca_names(SSL_CONNECTION *s) |
5d6cca05 | 2364 | { |
1e331727 | 2365 | const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL; |
38b051a1 | 2366 | SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s); |
5d6cca05 | 2367 | |
98732979 | 2368 | if (s->server) { |
38b051a1 | 2369 | ca_sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(ssl); |
98732979 MC |
2370 | if (ca_sk != NULL && sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk) == 0) |
2371 | ca_sk = NULL; | |
2372 | } | |
2373 | ||
2374 | if (ca_sk == NULL) | |
38b051a1 | 2375 | ca_sk = SSL_get0_CA_list(ssl); |
98732979 MC |
2376 | |
2377 | return ca_sk; | |
2378 | } | |
2379 | ||
38b051a1 TM |
2380 | int construct_ca_names(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk, |
2381 | WPACKET *pkt) | |
98732979 | 2382 | { |
5d6cca05 | 2383 | /* Start sub-packet for client CA list */ |
f63a17d6 | 2384 | if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { |
c48ffbcc | 2385 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
5d6cca05 | 2386 | return 0; |
f63a17d6 | 2387 | } |
5d6cca05 | 2388 | |
90fc2c26 | 2389 | if ((ca_sk != NULL) && !(s->options & SSL_OP_DISABLE_TLSEXT_CA_NAMES)) { |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2390 | int i; |
2391 | ||
2392 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk); i++) { | |
2393 | unsigned char *namebytes; | |
2394 | X509_NAME *name = sk_X509_NAME_value(ca_sk, i); | |
2395 | int namelen; | |
2396 | ||
2397 | if (name == NULL | |
2398 | || (namelen = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL)) < 0 | |
2399 | || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, namelen, | |
2400 | &namebytes) | |
2401 | || i2d_X509_NAME(name, &namebytes) != namelen) { | |
c48ffbcc | 2402 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2403 | return 0; |
2404 | } | |
2405 | } | |
2406 | } | |
2407 | ||
f63a17d6 | 2408 | if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) { |
c48ffbcc | 2409 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
5d6cca05 | 2410 | return 0; |
f63a17d6 | 2411 | } |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2412 | |
2413 | return 1; | |
2414 | } | |
72ceb6a6 DSH |
2415 | |
2416 | /* Create a buffer containing data to be signed for server key exchange */ | |
38b051a1 | 2417 | size_t construct_key_exchange_tbs(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned char **ptbs, |
72ceb6a6 DSH |
2418 | const void *param, size_t paramlen) |
2419 | { | |
2420 | size_t tbslen = 2 * SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + paramlen; | |
2421 | unsigned char *tbs = OPENSSL_malloc(tbslen); | |
2422 | ||
f63a17d6 | 2423 | if (tbs == NULL) { |
c48ffbcc | 2424 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
72ceb6a6 | 2425 | return 0; |
f63a17d6 | 2426 | } |
555cbb32 TS |
2427 | memcpy(tbs, s->s3.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); |
2428 | memcpy(tbs + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, s->s3.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); | |
72ceb6a6 DSH |
2429 | |
2430 | memcpy(tbs + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE * 2, param, paramlen); | |
2431 | ||
2432 | *ptbs = tbs; | |
2433 | return tbslen; | |
2434 | } | |
9d75dce3 TS |
2435 | |
2436 | /* | |
2437 | * Saves the current handshake digest for Post-Handshake Auth, | |
2438 | * Done after ClientFinished is processed, done exactly once | |
2439 | */ | |
38b051a1 | 2440 | int tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(SSL_CONNECTION *s) |
9d75dce3 TS |
2441 | { |
2442 | if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) { | |
2443 | if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) | |
2444 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
2445 | return 0; | |
2446 | ||
2447 | s->pha_dgst = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); | |
2448 | if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) { | |
c48ffbcc | 2449 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
9d75dce3 TS |
2450 | return 0; |
2451 | } | |
2452 | if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(s->pha_dgst, | |
555cbb32 | 2453 | s->s3.handshake_dgst)) { |
c48ffbcc | 2454 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
963eb12d | 2455 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(s->pha_dgst); |
2456 | s->pha_dgst = NULL; | |
9d75dce3 TS |
2457 | return 0; |
2458 | } | |
2459 | } | |
2460 | return 1; | |
2461 | } | |
2462 | ||
2463 | /* | |
2464 | * Restores the Post-Handshake Auth handshake digest | |
2465 | * Done just before sending/processing the Cert Request | |
2466 | */ | |
38b051a1 | 2467 | int tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(SSL_CONNECTION *s) |
9d75dce3 TS |
2468 | { |
2469 | if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) { | |
c48ffbcc | 2470 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
9d75dce3 TS |
2471 | return 0; |
2472 | } | |
555cbb32 | 2473 | if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(s->s3.handshake_dgst, |
9d75dce3 | 2474 | s->pha_dgst)) { |
c48ffbcc | 2475 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
9d75dce3 TS |
2476 | return 0; |
2477 | } | |
2478 | return 1; | |
2479 | } |