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Commit | Line | Data |
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846e33c7 RS |
1 | /* |
2 | * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. | |
3813046d | 3 | * |
846e33c7 RS |
4 | * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use |
5 | * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy | |
6 | * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at | |
7 | * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html | |
3813046d | 8 | */ |
846e33c7 | 9 | |
ea262260 BM |
10 | /* ==================================================================== |
11 | * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. | |
0f113f3e | 12 | * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by |
ea262260 BM |
13 | * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. |
14 | */ | |
d02b48c6 | 15 | |
48948d53 | 16 | #include <limits.h> |
f2d9a32c | 17 | #include <string.h> |
d02b48c6 | 18 | #include <stdio.h> |
8ba708e5 | 19 | #include "../ssl_locl.h" |
61ae935a | 20 | #include "statem_locl.h" |
ec577822 | 21 | #include <openssl/buffer.h> |
ec577822 BM |
22 | #include <openssl/objects.h> |
23 | #include <openssl/evp.h> | |
24 | #include <openssl/x509.h> | |
d02b48c6 | 25 | |
0f113f3e MC |
26 | /* |
27 | * send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or | |
28 | * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) | |
29 | */ | |
e7ecc7d4 | 30 | int ssl3_do_write(SSL *s, int type) |
0f113f3e MC |
31 | { |
32 | int ret; | |
7ee8627f | 33 | size_t written = 0; |
0f113f3e MC |
34 | |
35 | ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, type, &s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], | |
7ee8627f | 36 | s->init_num, &written); |
0f113f3e MC |
37 | if (ret < 0) |
38 | return (-1); | |
39 | if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) | |
40 | /* | |
41 | * should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case we'll | |
42 | * ignore the result anyway | |
43 | */ | |
d166ed8c DSH |
44 | if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, |
45 | (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], | |
7ee8627f | 46 | written)) |
d166ed8c | 47 | return -1; |
0f113f3e | 48 | |
7ee8627f | 49 | if (written == s->init_num) { |
0f113f3e MC |
50 | if (s->msg_callback) |
51 | s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data, | |
52 | (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s, | |
53 | s->msg_callback_arg); | |
54 | return (1); | |
55 | } | |
7ee8627f MC |
56 | s->init_off += written; |
57 | s->init_num -= written; | |
0f113f3e MC |
58 | return (0); |
59 | } | |
e7ecc7d4 | 60 | |
4a01c59f | 61 | int tls_close_construct_packet(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int htype) |
2c7b4dbc MC |
62 | { |
63 | size_t msglen; | |
64 | ||
4a01c59f | 65 | if ((htype != SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) |
f1ec23c0 | 66 | || !WPACKET_get_length(pkt, &msglen) |
7cea05dc | 67 | || msglen > INT_MAX) |
2c7b4dbc MC |
68 | return 0; |
69 | s->init_num = (int)msglen; | |
70 | s->init_off = 0; | |
71 | ||
72 | return 1; | |
73 | } | |
74 | ||
229185e6 | 75 | int tls_construct_finished(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
0f113f3e | 76 | { |
12472b45 | 77 | size_t finish_md_len; |
229185e6 | 78 | const char *sender; |
8b0e934a | 79 | size_t slen; |
229185e6 MC |
80 | |
81 | if (s->server) { | |
82 | sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label; | |
83 | slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len; | |
84 | } else { | |
85 | sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label; | |
86 | slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len; | |
87 | } | |
0f113f3e | 88 | |
12472b45 MC |
89 | finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, |
90 | sender, slen, | |
91 | s->s3->tmp.finish_md); | |
92 | if (finish_md_len == 0) { | |
4f89bfbf MC |
93 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
94 | goto err; | |
95 | } | |
96 | ||
12472b45 | 97 | s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = finish_md_len; |
4f89bfbf | 98 | |
12472b45 | 99 | if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, finish_md_len)) { |
4f89bfbf MC |
100 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
101 | goto err; | |
102 | } | |
0f113f3e | 103 | |
b9908bf9 MC |
104 | /* |
105 | * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks | |
106 | */ | |
23a635c0 | 107 | if (!s->server) { |
12472b45 MC |
108 | OPENSSL_assert(finish_md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); |
109 | memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, | |
110 | finish_md_len); | |
111 | s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = finish_md_len; | |
b9908bf9 | 112 | } else { |
12472b45 MC |
113 | OPENSSL_assert(finish_md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); |
114 | memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, | |
115 | finish_md_len); | |
116 | s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = finish_md_len; | |
b9908bf9 | 117 | } |
0f113f3e | 118 | |
b9908bf9 | 119 | return 1; |
4f89bfbf | 120 | err: |
4f89bfbf MC |
121 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
122 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e | 123 | } |
d02b48c6 | 124 | |
bf48836c | 125 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG |
0f113f3e MC |
126 | /* |
127 | * ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen | |
128 | * to far. | |
129 | */ | |
ee2ffc27 | 130 | static void ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s) |
0f113f3e MC |
131 | { |
132 | const char *sender; | |
8b0e934a | 133 | size_t slen; |
0f113f3e MC |
134 | /* |
135 | * If no new cipher setup return immediately: other functions will set | |
136 | * the appropriate error. | |
137 | */ | |
138 | if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) | |
139 | return; | |
49ae7423 | 140 | if (!s->server) { |
0f113f3e MC |
141 | sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label; |
142 | slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len; | |
143 | } else { | |
144 | sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label; | |
145 | slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len; | |
146 | } | |
147 | ||
148 | s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, | |
149 | sender, | |
150 | slen, | |
151 | s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md); | |
152 | } | |
ee2ffc27 BL |
153 | #endif |
154 | ||
64386324 MC |
155 | /* |
156 | * Comparison function used in a call to qsort (see tls_collect_extensions() | |
157 | * below.) | |
158 | * The two arguments |p1| and |p2| are expected to be pointers to RAW_EXTENSIONs | |
159 | * | |
160 | * Returns: | |
161 | * 1 if the type for p1 is greater than p2 | |
162 | * 0 if the type for p1 and p2 are the same | |
163 | * -1 if the type for p1 is less than p2 | |
164 | */ | |
1ab3836b MC |
165 | static int compare_extensions(const void *p1, const void *p2) |
166 | { | |
167 | const RAW_EXTENSION *e1 = (const RAW_EXTENSION *)p1; | |
168 | const RAW_EXTENSION *e2 = (const RAW_EXTENSION *)p2; | |
b1b4b543 | 169 | |
1ab3836b MC |
170 | if (e1->type < e2->type) |
171 | return -1; | |
172 | else if (e1->type > e2->type) | |
173 | return 1; | |
b1b4b543 MC |
174 | |
175 | return 0; | |
1ab3836b MC |
176 | } |
177 | ||
178 | /* | |
179 | * Gather a list of all the extensions. We don't actually process the content | |
180 | * of the extensions yet, except to check their types. | |
181 | * | |
182 | * Per http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4, there may not be | |
183 | * more than one extension of the same type in a ClientHello or ServerHello. | |
184 | * This function returns 1 if all extensions are unique and we have parsed their | |
185 | * types, and 0 if the extensions contain duplicates, could not be successfully | |
186 | * parsed, or an internal error occurred. | |
187 | */ | |
de7d61d5 MC |
188 | /* |
189 | * TODO(TLS1.3): Refactor ServerHello extension parsing to use this and then | |
190 | * remove tls1_check_duplicate_extensions() | |
191 | */ | |
b1b4b543 | 192 | int tls_collect_extensions(PACKET *packet, RAW_EXTENSION **res, |
1ab3836b MC |
193 | size_t *numfound, int *ad) |
194 | { | |
195 | PACKET extensions = *packet; | |
196 | size_t num_extensions = 0, i = 0; | |
197 | RAW_EXTENSION *raw_extensions = NULL; | |
198 | ||
199 | /* First pass: count the extensions. */ | |
200 | while (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) > 0) { | |
201 | unsigned int type; | |
202 | PACKET extension; | |
b1b4b543 | 203 | |
1ab3836b MC |
204 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type) || |
205 | !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) { | |
206 | *ad = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
b1b4b543 | 207 | goto err; |
1ab3836b MC |
208 | } |
209 | num_extensions++; | |
210 | } | |
211 | ||
212 | if (num_extensions > 0) { | |
b1b4b543 MC |
213 | raw_extensions = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*raw_extensions) |
214 | * num_extensions); | |
1ab3836b MC |
215 | if (raw_extensions == NULL) { |
216 | *ad = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
801cb720 | 217 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_COLLECT_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
b1b4b543 | 218 | goto err; |
1ab3836b MC |
219 | } |
220 | ||
64386324 | 221 | /* Second pass: collect the extensions. */ |
1ab3836b MC |
222 | for (i = 0; i < num_extensions; i++) { |
223 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(packet, &raw_extensions[i].type) || | |
224 | !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(packet, | |
225 | &raw_extensions[i].data)) { | |
226 | /* This should not happen. */ | |
227 | *ad = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
801cb720 | 228 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_COLLECT_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
b1b4b543 | 229 | goto err; |
1ab3836b MC |
230 | } |
231 | } | |
232 | ||
233 | if (PACKET_remaining(packet) != 0) { | |
234 | *ad = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
801cb720 | 235 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_COLLECT_EXTENSIONS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
b1b4b543 | 236 | goto err; |
1ab3836b MC |
237 | } |
238 | /* Sort the extensions and make sure there are no duplicates. */ | |
b1b4b543 | 239 | qsort(raw_extensions, num_extensions, sizeof(*raw_extensions), |
1ab3836b MC |
240 | compare_extensions); |
241 | for (i = 1; i < num_extensions; i++) { | |
242 | if (raw_extensions[i - 1].type == raw_extensions[i].type) { | |
243 | *ad = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
b1b4b543 | 244 | goto err; |
1ab3836b MC |
245 | } |
246 | } | |
247 | } | |
248 | ||
249 | *res = raw_extensions; | |
250 | *numfound = num_extensions; | |
251 | return 1; | |
252 | ||
b1b4b543 | 253 | err: |
1ab3836b MC |
254 | OPENSSL_free(raw_extensions); |
255 | return 0; | |
256 | } | |
257 | ||
258 | ||
259 | ||
be3583fa | 260 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
b9908bf9 MC |
261 | { |
262 | int al; | |
348240c6 | 263 | size_t remain; |
4fa52141 | 264 | |
73999b62 | 265 | remain = PACKET_remaining(pkt); |
657da85e MC |
266 | /* |
267 | * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, which should already have | |
c69f2adf MC |
268 | * been consumed by ssl_get_message() so there should be no bytes left, |
269 | * unless we're using DTLS1_BAD_VER, which has an extra 2 bytes | |
657da85e | 270 | */ |
c69f2adf | 271 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
73999b62 | 272 | if ((s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER |
a230b26e EK |
273 | && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH + 1) |
274 | || (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER | |
275 | && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH - 1)) { | |
276 | al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
277 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, | |
278 | SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); | |
279 | goto f_err; | |
c69f2adf MC |
280 | } |
281 | } else { | |
73999b62 | 282 | if (remain != 0) { |
c69f2adf | 283 | al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
b9908bf9 MC |
284 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, |
285 | SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); | |
c69f2adf MC |
286 | goto f_err; |
287 | } | |
657da85e MC |
288 | } |
289 | ||
290 | /* Check we have a cipher to change to */ | |
291 | if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) { | |
292 | al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; | |
b9908bf9 | 293 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); |
657da85e MC |
294 | goto f_err; |
295 | } | |
296 | ||
297 | s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 1; | |
298 | if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) { | |
299 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
b9908bf9 | 300 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
657da85e MC |
301 | goto f_err; |
302 | } | |
303 | ||
c69f2adf MC |
304 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
305 | dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ); | |
306 | ||
307 | if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) | |
308 | s->d1->handshake_read_seq++; | |
309 | ||
310 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
311 | /* | |
312 | * Remember that a CCS has been received, so that an old key of | |
313 | * SCTP-Auth can be deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored if no | |
314 | * SCTP is used | |
315 | */ | |
316 | BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD, 1, NULL); | |
317 | #endif | |
318 | } | |
319 | ||
b9908bf9 | 320 | return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; |
657da85e MC |
321 | f_err: |
322 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
fe3a3291 | 323 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); |
b9908bf9 | 324 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
657da85e MC |
325 | } |
326 | ||
be3583fa | 327 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_finished(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
b9908bf9 | 328 | { |
7776a36c | 329 | int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
12472b45 | 330 | size_t md_len; |
b9908bf9 | 331 | |
0f113f3e | 332 | /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */ |
92760c21 | 333 | if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->s3->change_cipher_spec) { |
0f113f3e | 334 | al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; |
b9908bf9 | 335 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS); |
0f113f3e MC |
336 | goto f_err; |
337 | } | |
338 | s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0; | |
339 | ||
12472b45 | 340 | md_len = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len; |
0f113f3e | 341 | |
12472b45 | 342 | if (md_len != PACKET_remaining(pkt)) { |
0f113f3e | 343 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
b9908bf9 | 344 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH); |
0f113f3e MC |
345 | goto f_err; |
346 | } | |
347 | ||
12472b45 MC |
348 | if (CRYPTO_memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt), s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, |
349 | md_len) != 0) { | |
0f113f3e | 350 | al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; |
b9908bf9 | 351 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED); |
0f113f3e MC |
352 | goto f_err; |
353 | } | |
354 | ||
355 | /* | |
356 | * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks | |
357 | */ | |
23a635c0 | 358 | if (s->server) { |
12472b45 MC |
359 | OPENSSL_assert(md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); |
360 | memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, | |
361 | md_len); | |
362 | s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = md_len; | |
0f113f3e | 363 | } else { |
12472b45 MC |
364 | OPENSSL_assert(md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); |
365 | memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, | |
366 | md_len); | |
367 | s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = md_len; | |
0f113f3e MC |
368 | } |
369 | ||
7776a36c MC |
370 | /* |
371 | * In TLS1.3 we also have to change cipher state and do any final processing | |
372 | * of the initial server flight (if we are a client) | |
373 | */ | |
92760c21 MC |
374 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
375 | if (s->server) { | |
376 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, | |
377 | SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) { | |
92760c21 MC |
378 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER); |
379 | goto f_err; | |
380 | } | |
381 | } else { | |
382 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, | |
383 | s->session->master_key, s->handshake_secret, 0, | |
384 | &s->session->master_key_length)) { | |
92760c21 MC |
385 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER); |
386 | goto f_err; | |
387 | } | |
388 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, | |
389 | SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ)) { | |
92760c21 MC |
390 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER); |
391 | goto f_err; | |
392 | } | |
7776a36c MC |
393 | if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s, &al)) |
394 | goto f_err; | |
92760c21 MC |
395 | } |
396 | } | |
397 | ||
e6575156 | 398 | return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; |
0f113f3e MC |
399 | f_err: |
400 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
fe3a3291 | 401 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); |
b9908bf9 | 402 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
0f113f3e | 403 | } |
d02b48c6 | 404 | |
7cea05dc | 405 | int tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
b9908bf9 | 406 | { |
7cea05dc | 407 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, SSL3_MT_CCS)) { |
3c106325 | 408 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
85a7a5e6 MC |
409 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
410 | return 0; | |
411 | } | |
b9908bf9 | 412 | |
b9908bf9 MC |
413 | return 1; |
414 | } | |
415 | ||
7cea05dc | 416 | unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk) |
0f113f3e | 417 | { |
5923ad4b | 418 | if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt) |
7cea05dc | 419 | || !ssl_add_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk) |
5923ad4b | 420 | || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { |
c49e1912 | 421 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
7cea05dc | 422 | return 0; |
77d514c5 | 423 | } |
c49e1912 | 424 | return 1; |
0f113f3e MC |
425 | } |
426 | ||
be3583fa | 427 | WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) |
8723588e MC |
428 | { |
429 | void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL; | |
430 | ||
431 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
432 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) { | |
be3583fa | 433 | WORK_STATE ret; |
8723588e MC |
434 | ret = dtls_wait_for_dry(s); |
435 | if (ret != WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE) | |
436 | return ret; | |
437 | } | |
438 | #endif | |
439 | ||
440 | /* clean a few things up */ | |
441 | ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); | |
473483d4 MC |
442 | |
443 | if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
444 | /* | |
445 | * We don't do this in DTLS because we may still need the init_buf | |
446 | * in case there are any unexpected retransmits | |
447 | */ | |
448 | BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); | |
449 | s->init_buf = NULL; | |
450 | } | |
8723588e MC |
451 | |
452 | ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s); | |
453 | ||
454 | s->init_num = 0; | |
455 | ||
456 | if (!s->server || s->renegotiate == 2) { | |
457 | /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */ | |
458 | s->renegotiate = 0; | |
459 | s->new_session = 0; | |
460 | ||
461 | if (s->server) { | |
8723588e MC |
462 | ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER); |
463 | ||
464 | s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++; | |
fe3a3291 | 465 | s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_accept; |
8723588e MC |
466 | } else { |
467 | ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT); | |
468 | if (s->hit) | |
469 | s->ctx->stats.sess_hit++; | |
470 | ||
fe3a3291 | 471 | s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_connect; |
8723588e MC |
472 | s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_good++; |
473 | } | |
474 | ||
475 | if (s->info_callback != NULL) | |
476 | cb = s->info_callback; | |
477 | else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) | |
478 | cb = s->ctx->info_callback; | |
479 | ||
480 | if (cb != NULL) | |
481 | cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1); | |
482 | ||
483 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
484 | /* done with handshaking */ | |
485 | s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0; | |
486 | s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 0; | |
487 | s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0; | |
f5c7f5df | 488 | dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s); |
8723588e MC |
489 | } |
490 | } | |
491 | ||
492 | return WORK_FINISHED_STOP; | |
493 | } | |
494 | ||
9ab930b2 MC |
495 | int tls_get_message_header(SSL *s, int *mt) |
496 | { | |
497 | /* s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */ | |
498 | int skip_message, i, recvd_type, al; | |
499 | unsigned char *p; | |
54105ddd | 500 | size_t l, readbytes; |
9ab930b2 MC |
501 | |
502 | p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; | |
503 | ||
504 | do { | |
505 | while (s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) { | |
506 | i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, &recvd_type, | |
a230b26e EK |
507 | &p[s->init_num], |
508 | SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - s->init_num, | |
54105ddd | 509 | 0, &readbytes); |
9ab930b2 MC |
510 | if (i <= 0) { |
511 | s->rwstate = SSL_READING; | |
512 | return 0; | |
32ec4153 | 513 | } |
9ab930b2 | 514 | if (recvd_type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { |
1257adec | 515 | /* |
a230b26e EK |
516 | * A ChangeCipherSpec must be a single byte and may not occur |
517 | * in the middle of a handshake message. | |
518 | */ | |
54105ddd | 519 | if (s->init_num != 0 || readbytes != 1 || p[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS) { |
1257adec DB |
520 | al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; |
521 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, | |
522 | SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); | |
523 | goto f_err; | |
524 | } | |
9ab930b2 | 525 | s->s3->tmp.message_type = *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; |
54105ddd | 526 | s->init_num = readbytes - 1; |
c4377574 | 527 | s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data; |
54105ddd | 528 | s->s3->tmp.message_size = readbytes; |
9ab930b2 MC |
529 | return 1; |
530 | } else if (recvd_type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { | |
531 | al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; | |
532 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); | |
32ec4153 MC |
533 | goto f_err; |
534 | } | |
54105ddd | 535 | s->init_num += readbytes; |
9ab930b2 MC |
536 | } |
537 | ||
538 | skip_message = 0; | |
539 | if (!s->server) | |
540 | if (p[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) | |
541 | /* | |
542 | * The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages -- | |
543 | * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if | |
544 | * their format is correct. Does not count for 'Finished' | |
545 | * MAC. | |
546 | */ | |
547 | if (p[1] == 0 && p[2] == 0 && p[3] == 0) { | |
548 | s->init_num = 0; | |
549 | skip_message = 1; | |
550 | ||
551 | if (s->msg_callback) | |
552 | s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, | |
553 | p, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s, | |
554 | s->msg_callback_arg); | |
555 | } | |
556 | } while (skip_message); | |
557 | /* s->init_num == SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */ | |
558 | ||
559 | *mt = *p; | |
560 | s->s3->tmp.message_type = *(p++); | |
32ec4153 | 561 | |
e8aa8b6c | 562 | if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) { |
9ab930b2 MC |
563 | /* |
564 | * Only happens with SSLv3+ in an SSLv2 backward compatible | |
565 | * ClientHello | |
e8aa8b6c F |
566 | * |
567 | * Total message size is the remaining record bytes to read | |
568 | * plus the SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH bytes that we already read | |
9ab930b2 | 569 | */ |
9ab930b2 MC |
570 | l = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(&s->rlayer) |
571 | + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
9ab930b2 MC |
572 | s->s3->tmp.message_size = l; |
573 | ||
574 | s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data; | |
575 | s->init_num = SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
576 | } else { | |
577 | n2l3(p, l); | |
578 | /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */ | |
579 | if (l > (INT_MAX - SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { | |
580 | al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
581 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE); | |
582 | goto f_err; | |
32ec4153 | 583 | } |
9ab930b2 MC |
584 | s->s3->tmp.message_size = l; |
585 | ||
586 | s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
587 | s->init_num = 0; | |
588 | } | |
589 | ||
590 | return 1; | |
591 | f_err: | |
592 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
9ab930b2 MC |
593 | return 0; |
594 | } | |
595 | ||
eda75751 | 596 | int tls_get_message_body(SSL *s, size_t *len) |
9ab930b2 | 597 | { |
54105ddd | 598 | size_t n, readbytes; |
9ab930b2 MC |
599 | unsigned char *p; |
600 | int i; | |
601 | ||
602 | if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { | |
603 | /* We've already read everything in */ | |
604 | *len = (unsigned long)s->init_num; | |
605 | return 1; | |
0f113f3e MC |
606 | } |
607 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
608 | p = s->init_msg; |
609 | n = s->s3->tmp.message_size - s->init_num; | |
610 | while (n > 0) { | |
657da85e | 611 | i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, NULL, |
54105ddd | 612 | &p[s->init_num], n, 0, &readbytes); |
0f113f3e MC |
613 | if (i <= 0) { |
614 | s->rwstate = SSL_READING; | |
9ab930b2 MC |
615 | *len = 0; |
616 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e | 617 | } |
54105ddd MC |
618 | s->init_num += readbytes; |
619 | n -= readbytes; | |
0f113f3e | 620 | } |
ee2ffc27 | 621 | |
bf48836c | 622 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG |
0f113f3e MC |
623 | /* |
624 | * If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for | |
625 | * Finished verification. | |
626 | */ | |
627 | if (*s->init_buf->data == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) | |
628 | ssl3_take_mac(s); | |
ee2ffc27 BL |
629 | #endif |
630 | ||
0f113f3e | 631 | /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */ |
e8aa8b6c | 632 | if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) { |
d166ed8c DSH |
633 | if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, |
634 | s->init_num)) { | |
635 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
636 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
637 | *len = 0; | |
638 | return 0; | |
639 | } | |
32ec4153 | 640 | if (s->msg_callback) |
a230b26e | 641 | s->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION, 0, s->init_buf->data, |
32ec4153 MC |
642 | (size_t)s->init_num, s, s->msg_callback_arg); |
643 | } else { | |
d166ed8c | 644 | if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, |
a230b26e | 645 | s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { |
d166ed8c DSH |
646 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
647 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
648 | *len = 0; | |
649 | return 0; | |
650 | } | |
32ec4153 MC |
651 | if (s->msg_callback) |
652 | s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data, | |
653 | (size_t)s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s, | |
654 | s->msg_callback_arg); | |
655 | } | |
656 | ||
eda75751 | 657 | *len = s->init_num; |
9ab930b2 | 658 | return 1; |
0f113f3e | 659 | } |
d02b48c6 | 660 | |
2e5ead83 | 661 | int ssl_cert_type(const X509 *x, const EVP_PKEY *pk) |
0f113f3e | 662 | { |
a230b26e | 663 | if (pk == NULL && (pk = X509_get0_pubkey(x)) == NULL) |
17a72388 VD |
664 | return -1; |
665 | ||
666 | switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) { | |
667 | default: | |
668 | return -1; | |
669 | case EVP_PKEY_RSA: | |
670 | return SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC; | |
671 | case EVP_PKEY_DSA: | |
672 | return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN; | |
ea262260 | 673 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
17a72388 VD |
674 | case EVP_PKEY_EC: |
675 | return SSL_PKEY_ECC; | |
ea262260 | 676 | #endif |
2a9b9654 | 677 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST |
17a72388 VD |
678 | case NID_id_GostR3410_2001: |
679 | return SSL_PKEY_GOST01; | |
680 | case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256: | |
681 | return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256; | |
682 | case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512: | |
683 | return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512; | |
2a9b9654 | 684 | #endif |
82049c54 | 685 | } |
0f113f3e | 686 | } |
d02b48c6 | 687 | |
6b691a5c | 688 | int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type) |
0f113f3e MC |
689 | { |
690 | int al; | |
691 | ||
692 | switch (type) { | |
693 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT: | |
694 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL: | |
695 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER: | |
696 | al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA; | |
697 | break; | |
698 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE: | |
699 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE: | |
700 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY: | |
701 | case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD: | |
702 | case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD: | |
703 | case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD: | |
704 | case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD: | |
705 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID: | |
706 | case X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID: | |
707 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED: | |
708 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED: | |
f3e235ed VD |
709 | case X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH: |
710 | case X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH: | |
711 | case X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH: | |
712 | case X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH: | |
713 | case X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL: | |
714 | case X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL: | |
715 | case X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK: | |
0f113f3e MC |
716 | al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE; |
717 | break; | |
718 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE: | |
719 | case X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE: | |
720 | al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; | |
721 | break; | |
722 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED: | |
723 | case X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED: | |
724 | al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED; | |
725 | break; | |
726 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED: | |
727 | al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED; | |
728 | break; | |
f3e235ed | 729 | case X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED: |
0f113f3e | 730 | case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM: |
f3e235ed VD |
731 | case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL: |
732 | case X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP: | |
0f113f3e MC |
733 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
734 | break; | |
735 | case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT: | |
736 | case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN: | |
737 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY: | |
738 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE: | |
739 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG: | |
740 | case X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED: | |
741 | case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA: | |
742 | al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA; | |
743 | break; | |
744 | case X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION: | |
745 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
746 | break; | |
747 | case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE: | |
748 | al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE; | |
749 | break; | |
750 | default: | |
751 | al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN; | |
752 | break; | |
753 | } | |
754 | return (al); | |
755 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 756 | |
b362ccab | 757 | int ssl_allow_compression(SSL *s) |
0f113f3e MC |
758 | { |
759 | if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) | |
760 | return 0; | |
761 | return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION, 0, 0, NULL); | |
762 | } | |
4fa52141 | 763 | |
068c358a | 764 | static int version_cmp(const SSL *s, int a, int b) |
4fa52141 VD |
765 | { |
766 | int dtls = SSL_IS_DTLS(s); | |
767 | ||
768 | if (a == b) | |
769 | return 0; | |
770 | if (!dtls) | |
771 | return a < b ? -1 : 1; | |
772 | return DTLS_VERSION_LT(a, b) ? -1 : 1; | |
773 | } | |
774 | ||
775 | typedef struct { | |
776 | int version; | |
a230b26e EK |
777 | const SSL_METHOD *(*cmeth) (void); |
778 | const SSL_METHOD *(*smeth) (void); | |
4fa52141 VD |
779 | } version_info; |
780 | ||
582a17d6 MC |
781 | #if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_3_VERSION |
782 | # error Code needs update for TLS_method() support beyond TLS1_3_VERSION. | |
4fa52141 VD |
783 | #endif |
784 | ||
785 | static const version_info tls_version_table[] = { | |
582a17d6 MC |
786 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 |
787 | {TLS1_3_VERSION, tlsv1_3_client_method, tlsv1_3_server_method}, | |
788 | #else | |
789 | {TLS1_3_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, | |
790 | #endif | |
6b01bed2 | 791 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2 |
a230b26e | 792 | {TLS1_2_VERSION, tlsv1_2_client_method, tlsv1_2_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 793 | #else |
a230b26e | 794 | {TLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
6b01bed2 VD |
795 | #endif |
796 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1 | |
a230b26e | 797 | {TLS1_1_VERSION, tlsv1_1_client_method, tlsv1_1_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 798 | #else |
a230b26e | 799 | {TLS1_1_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
6b01bed2 VD |
800 | #endif |
801 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1 | |
a230b26e | 802 | {TLS1_VERSION, tlsv1_client_method, tlsv1_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 803 | #else |
a230b26e | 804 | {TLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
6b01bed2 | 805 | #endif |
4fa52141 | 806 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3 |
a230b26e | 807 | {SSL3_VERSION, sslv3_client_method, sslv3_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 808 | #else |
a230b26e | 809 | {SSL3_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
4fa52141 | 810 | #endif |
a230b26e | 811 | {0, NULL, NULL}, |
4fa52141 VD |
812 | }; |
813 | ||
814 | #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION != DTLS1_2_VERSION | |
815 | # error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_2_VERSION. | |
816 | #endif | |
817 | ||
818 | static const version_info dtls_version_table[] = { | |
6b01bed2 | 819 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2 |
a230b26e | 820 | {DTLS1_2_VERSION, dtlsv1_2_client_method, dtlsv1_2_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 821 | #else |
a230b26e | 822 | {DTLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
6b01bed2 VD |
823 | #endif |
824 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1 | |
a230b26e EK |
825 | {DTLS1_VERSION, dtlsv1_client_method, dtlsv1_server_method}, |
826 | {DTLS1_BAD_VER, dtls_bad_ver_client_method, NULL}, | |
6b01bed2 | 827 | #else |
a230b26e EK |
828 | {DTLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
829 | {DTLS1_BAD_VER, NULL, NULL}, | |
6b01bed2 | 830 | #endif |
a230b26e | 831 | {0, NULL, NULL}, |
4fa52141 VD |
832 | }; |
833 | ||
834 | /* | |
835 | * ssl_method_error - Check whether an SSL_METHOD is enabled. | |
836 | * | |
837 | * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method | |
838 | * @method: the intended method. | |
839 | * | |
840 | * Returns 0 on success, or an SSL error reason on failure. | |
841 | */ | |
068c358a | 842 | static int ssl_method_error(const SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *method) |
4fa52141 VD |
843 | { |
844 | int version = method->version; | |
845 | ||
846 | if ((s->min_proto_version != 0 && | |
847 | version_cmp(s, version, s->min_proto_version) < 0) || | |
848 | ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, version, NULL) == 0) | |
849 | return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW; | |
850 | ||
851 | if (s->max_proto_version != 0 && | |
a230b26e | 852 | version_cmp(s, version, s->max_proto_version) > 0) |
4fa52141 VD |
853 | return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_HIGH; |
854 | ||
855 | if ((s->options & method->mask) != 0) | |
856 | return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; | |
857 | if ((method->flags & SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB) != 0 && tls1_suiteb(s)) | |
858 | return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_2_NEEDED_IN_SUITEB_MODE; | |
859 | else if ((method->flags & SSL_METHOD_NO_FIPS) != 0 && FIPS_mode()) | |
860 | return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_0_NEEDED_IN_FIPS_MODE; | |
861 | ||
862 | return 0; | |
863 | } | |
864 | ||
ccae4a15 FI |
865 | /* |
866 | * ssl_version_supported - Check that the specified `version` is supported by | |
867 | * `SSL *` instance | |
868 | * | |
869 | * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method | |
870 | * @version: Protocol version to test against | |
871 | * | |
872 | * Returns 1 when supported, otherwise 0 | |
873 | */ | |
874 | int ssl_version_supported(const SSL *s, int version) | |
875 | { | |
876 | const version_info *vent; | |
877 | const version_info *table; | |
878 | ||
879 | switch (s->method->version) { | |
880 | default: | |
881 | /* Version should match method version for non-ANY method */ | |
882 | return version_cmp(s, version, s->version) == 0; | |
883 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
884 | table = tls_version_table; | |
885 | break; | |
886 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
887 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
888 | break; | |
889 | } | |
890 | ||
891 | for (vent = table; | |
892 | vent->version != 0 && version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) <= 0; | |
893 | ++vent) { | |
894 | if (vent->cmeth != NULL && | |
895 | version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) == 0 && | |
896 | ssl_method_error(s, vent->cmeth()) == 0) { | |
897 | return 1; | |
898 | } | |
899 | } | |
900 | return 0; | |
901 | } | |
902 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
903 | /* |
904 | * ssl_check_version_downgrade - In response to RFC7507 SCSV version | |
905 | * fallback indication from a client check whether we're using the highest | |
906 | * supported protocol version. | |
907 | * | |
908 | * @s server SSL handle. | |
909 | * | |
910 | * Returns 1 when using the highest enabled version, 0 otherwise. | |
911 | */ | |
912 | int ssl_check_version_downgrade(SSL *s) | |
913 | { | |
914 | const version_info *vent; | |
915 | const version_info *table; | |
916 | ||
917 | /* | |
918 | * Check that the current protocol is the highest enabled version | |
919 | * (according to s->ctx->method, as version negotiation may have changed | |
920 | * s->method). | |
921 | */ | |
922 | if (s->version == s->ctx->method->version) | |
923 | return 1; | |
924 | ||
925 | /* | |
926 | * Apparently we're using a version-flexible SSL_METHOD (not at its | |
927 | * highest protocol version). | |
928 | */ | |
929 | if (s->ctx->method->version == TLS_method()->version) | |
930 | table = tls_version_table; | |
931 | else if (s->ctx->method->version == DTLS_method()->version) | |
932 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
933 | else { | |
934 | /* Unexpected state; fail closed. */ | |
935 | return 0; | |
936 | } | |
937 | ||
938 | for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { | |
a230b26e | 939 | if (vent->smeth != NULL && ssl_method_error(s, vent->smeth()) == 0) |
4fa52141 VD |
940 | return s->version == vent->version; |
941 | } | |
942 | return 0; | |
943 | } | |
944 | ||
945 | /* | |
946 | * ssl_set_version_bound - set an upper or lower bound on the supported (D)TLS | |
947 | * protocols, provided the initial (D)TLS method is version-flexible. This | |
948 | * function sanity-checks the proposed value and makes sure the method is | |
949 | * version-flexible, then sets the limit if all is well. | |
950 | * | |
951 | * @method_version: The version of the current SSL_METHOD. | |
952 | * @version: the intended limit. | |
953 | * @bound: pointer to limit to be updated. | |
954 | * | |
955 | * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure. | |
956 | */ | |
957 | int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version, int version, int *bound) | |
958 | { | |
869e978c KR |
959 | if (version == 0) { |
960 | *bound = version; | |
961 | return 1; | |
962 | } | |
963 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
964 | /*- |
965 | * Restrict TLS methods to TLS protocol versions. | |
966 | * Restrict DTLS methods to DTLS protocol versions. | |
967 | * Note, DTLS version numbers are decreasing, use comparison macros. | |
968 | * | |
969 | * Note that for both lower-bounds we use explicit versions, not | |
970 | * (D)TLS_MIN_VERSION. This is because we don't want to break user | |
971 | * configurations. If the MIN (supported) version ever rises, the user's | |
972 | * "floor" remains valid even if no longer available. We don't expect the | |
973 | * MAX ceiling to ever get lower, so making that variable makes sense. | |
974 | */ | |
975 | switch (method_version) { | |
976 | default: | |
977 | /* | |
978 | * XXX For fixed version methods, should we always fail and not set any | |
979 | * bounds, always succeed and not set any bounds, or set the bounds and | |
980 | * arrange to fail later if they are not met? At present fixed-version | |
981 | * methods are not subject to controls that disable individual protocol | |
982 | * versions. | |
983 | */ | |
984 | return 0; | |
985 | ||
986 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
987 | if (version < SSL3_VERSION || version > TLS_MAX_VERSION) | |
988 | return 0; | |
989 | break; | |
990 | ||
991 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
992 | if (DTLS_VERSION_GT(version, DTLS_MAX_VERSION) || | |
032924c4 | 993 | DTLS_VERSION_LT(version, DTLS1_BAD_VER)) |
4fa52141 VD |
994 | return 0; |
995 | break; | |
996 | } | |
997 | ||
998 | *bound = version; | |
999 | return 1; | |
1000 | } | |
1001 | ||
1002 | /* | |
1003 | * ssl_choose_server_version - Choose server (D)TLS version. Called when the | |
1004 | * client HELLO is received to select the final server protocol version and | |
1005 | * the version specific method. | |
1006 | * | |
1007 | * @s: server SSL handle. | |
1008 | * | |
1009 | * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. | |
1010 | */ | |
1ab3836b | 1011 | int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello) |
4fa52141 VD |
1012 | { |
1013 | /*- | |
1014 | * With version-flexible methods we have an initial state with: | |
1015 | * | |
1016 | * s->method->version == (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION, | |
1017 | * s->version == (D)TLS_MAX_VERSION. | |
1018 | * | |
1019 | * So we detect version-flexible methods via the method version, not the | |
1020 | * handle version. | |
1021 | */ | |
1022 | int server_version = s->method->version; | |
df7ce507 | 1023 | int client_version = hello->legacy_version; |
4fa52141 VD |
1024 | const version_info *vent; |
1025 | const version_info *table; | |
1026 | int disabled = 0; | |
cd998837 | 1027 | RAW_EXTENSION *suppversions; |
4fa52141 | 1028 | |
1ab3836b MC |
1029 | s->client_version = client_version; |
1030 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1031 | switch (server_version) { |
1032 | default: | |
d2f42576 MC |
1033 | /* |
1034 | * TODO(TLS1.3): This check will fail if someone attempts to do | |
1035 | * renegotiation in TLS1.3 at the moment. We need to ensure we disable | |
1036 | * renegotiation for TLS1.3 | |
1037 | */ | |
4fa52141 VD |
1038 | if (version_cmp(s, client_version, s->version) < 0) |
1039 | return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION; | |
1040 | /* | |
1041 | * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't | |
1042 | * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope | |
1043 | * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol | |
1044 | * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return | |
1045 | * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) | |
1046 | */ | |
1047 | return 0; | |
1048 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1049 | table = tls_version_table; | |
1050 | break; | |
1051 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1052 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
1053 | break; | |
1054 | } | |
1055 | ||
cd998837 MC |
1056 | suppversions = tls_get_extension_by_type(hello->pre_proc_exts, |
1057 | hello->num_extensions, | |
1058 | TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions); | |
1059 | ||
7b21c00e | 1060 | if (suppversions != NULL && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
cd998837 MC |
1061 | unsigned int candidate_vers = 0; |
1062 | unsigned int best_vers = 0; | |
1063 | const SSL_METHOD *best_method = NULL; | |
1064 | PACKET versionslist; | |
1065 | ||
16bce0e0 | 1066 | if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&suppversions->data, &versionslist)) { |
cd998837 MC |
1067 | /* Trailing or invalid data? */ |
1068 | return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH; | |
1069 | } | |
1070 | ||
1071 | while (PACKET_get_net_2(&versionslist, &candidate_vers)) { | |
1072 | /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this before release */ | |
1073 | if (candidate_vers == TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT) | |
1074 | candidate_vers = TLS1_3_VERSION; | |
f2342b7a MC |
1075 | /* |
1076 | * TODO(TLS1.3): There is some discussion on the TLS list about | |
1077 | * wheter to ignore versions <TLS1.2 in supported_versions. At the | |
1078 | * moment we honour them if present. To be reviewed later | |
1079 | */ | |
cd998837 MC |
1080 | if (version_cmp(s, candidate_vers, best_vers) <= 0) |
1081 | continue; | |
1082 | for (vent = table; | |
1083 | vent->version != 0 && vent->version != (int)candidate_vers; | |
16bce0e0 | 1084 | ++vent) |
bf0ba5e7 | 1085 | continue; |
bf85ef1b | 1086 | if (vent->version != 0 && vent->smeth != NULL) { |
cd998837 MC |
1087 | const SSL_METHOD *method; |
1088 | ||
1089 | method = vent->smeth(); | |
1090 | if (ssl_method_error(s, method) == 0) { | |
1091 | best_vers = candidate_vers; | |
1092 | best_method = method; | |
1093 | } | |
1094 | } | |
1095 | } | |
1096 | if (PACKET_remaining(&versionslist) != 0) { | |
1097 | /* Trailing data? */ | |
1098 | return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH; | |
1099 | } | |
1100 | ||
1101 | if (best_vers > 0) { | |
1102 | s->version = best_vers; | |
1103 | s->method = best_method; | |
1104 | return 0; | |
1105 | } | |
1106 | return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; | |
1107 | } | |
1108 | ||
1109 | /* | |
1110 | * If the supported versions extension isn't present, then the highest | |
1111 | * version we can negotiate is TLSv1.2 | |
1112 | */ | |
1113 | if (version_cmp(s, client_version, TLS1_3_VERSION) >= 0) | |
1114 | client_version = TLS1_2_VERSION; | |
1115 | ||
1116 | /* | |
1117 | * No supported versions extension, so we just use the version supplied in | |
1118 | * the ClientHello. | |
1119 | */ | |
4fa52141 VD |
1120 | for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { |
1121 | const SSL_METHOD *method; | |
1122 | ||
1123 | if (vent->smeth == NULL || | |
1124 | version_cmp(s, client_version, vent->version) < 0) | |
1125 | continue; | |
1126 | method = vent->smeth(); | |
1127 | if (ssl_method_error(s, method) == 0) { | |
1128 | s->version = vent->version; | |
1129 | s->method = method; | |
1130 | return 0; | |
1131 | } | |
1132 | disabled = 1; | |
1133 | } | |
1134 | return disabled ? SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL : SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW; | |
1135 | } | |
1136 | ||
1137 | /* | |
1138 | * ssl_choose_client_version - Choose client (D)TLS version. Called when the | |
1139 | * server HELLO is received to select the final client protocol version and | |
1140 | * the version specific method. | |
1141 | * | |
1142 | * @s: client SSL handle. | |
1143 | * @version: The proposed version from the server's HELLO. | |
1144 | * | |
1145 | * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. | |
1146 | */ | |
1147 | int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version) | |
1148 | { | |
1149 | const version_info *vent; | |
1150 | const version_info *table; | |
1151 | ||
b97667ce MC |
1152 | /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this before release */ |
1153 | if (version == TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT) | |
1154 | version = TLS1_3_VERSION; | |
1155 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1156 | switch (s->method->version) { |
1157 | default: | |
1158 | if (version != s->version) | |
1159 | return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION; | |
1160 | /* | |
1161 | * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't | |
1162 | * (and never did) check min/max, FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope | |
1163 | * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol | |
1164 | * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return | |
1165 | * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) | |
1166 | */ | |
4fa52141 VD |
1167 | return 0; |
1168 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1169 | table = tls_version_table; | |
1170 | break; | |
1171 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1172 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
1173 | break; | |
1174 | } | |
1175 | ||
1176 | for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { | |
1177 | const SSL_METHOD *method; | |
1178 | int err; | |
1179 | ||
1180 | if (version != vent->version) | |
1181 | continue; | |
1182 | if (vent->cmeth == NULL) | |
1183 | break; | |
1184 | method = vent->cmeth(); | |
1185 | err = ssl_method_error(s, method); | |
1186 | if (err != 0) | |
1187 | return err; | |
1188 | s->method = method; | |
ccae4a15 | 1189 | s->version = version; |
4fa52141 VD |
1190 | return 0; |
1191 | } | |
1192 | ||
1193 | return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; | |
1194 | } | |
1195 | ||
068c358a KR |
1196 | /* |
1197 | * ssl_get_client_min_max_version - get minimum and maximum client version | |
1198 | * @s: The SSL connection | |
1199 | * @min_version: The minimum supported version | |
1200 | * @max_version: The maximum supported version | |
1201 | * | |
1202 | * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if the | |
1203 | * version is initially (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION. We apply any explicit SSL_OP_NO_xxx | |
1204 | * options, the MinProtocol and MaxProtocol configuration commands, any Suite B | |
1205 | * or FIPS_mode() constraints and any floor imposed by the security level here, | |
1206 | * so we don't advertise the wrong protocol version to only reject the outcome later. | |
4fa52141 | 1207 | * |
0485d540 | 1208 | * Computing the right floor matters. If, e.g., TLS 1.0 and 1.2 are enabled, |
4fa52141 VD |
1209 | * TLS 1.1 is disabled, but the security level, Suite-B and/or MinProtocol |
1210 | * only allow TLS 1.2, we want to advertise TLS1.2, *not* TLS1. | |
1211 | * | |
068c358a KR |
1212 | * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. On failure |
1213 | * min_version and max_version will also be set to 0. | |
4fa52141 | 1214 | */ |
a230b26e EK |
1215 | int ssl_get_client_min_max_version(const SSL *s, int *min_version, |
1216 | int *max_version) | |
4fa52141 VD |
1217 | { |
1218 | int version; | |
1219 | int hole; | |
1220 | const SSL_METHOD *single = NULL; | |
1221 | const SSL_METHOD *method; | |
1222 | const version_info *table; | |
1223 | const version_info *vent; | |
1224 | ||
1225 | switch (s->method->version) { | |
1226 | default: | |
1227 | /* | |
1228 | * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't | |
1229 | * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope | |
1230 | * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol | |
1231 | * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return | |
1232 | * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) | |
1233 | */ | |
068c358a | 1234 | *min_version = *max_version = s->version; |
4fa52141 VD |
1235 | return 0; |
1236 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1237 | table = tls_version_table; | |
1238 | break; | |
1239 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1240 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
1241 | break; | |
1242 | } | |
1243 | ||
1244 | /* | |
1245 | * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are some protocols | |
1246 | * below X enabled. This is required in order to maintain the "version | |
1247 | * capability" vector contiguous. Any versions with a NULL client method | |
1248 | * (protocol version client is disabled at compile-time) is also a "hole". | |
1249 | * | |
1250 | * Our initial state is hole == 1, version == 0. That is, versions above | |
1251 | * the first version in the method table are disabled (a "hole" above | |
1252 | * the valid protocol entries) and we don't have a selected version yet. | |
1253 | * | |
1254 | * Whenever "hole == 1", and we hit an enabled method, its version becomes | |
1255 | * the selected version, and the method becomes a candidate "single" | |
1256 | * method. We're no longer in a hole, so "hole" becomes 0. | |
1257 | * | |
1258 | * If "hole == 0" and we hit an enabled method, then "single" is cleared, | |
1259 | * as we support a contiguous range of at least two methods. If we hit | |
1260 | * a disabled method, then hole becomes true again, but nothing else | |
1261 | * changes yet, because all the remaining methods may be disabled too. | |
1262 | * If we again hit an enabled method after the new hole, it becomes | |
1263 | * selected, as we start from scratch. | |
1264 | */ | |
068c358a | 1265 | *min_version = version = 0; |
4fa52141 VD |
1266 | hole = 1; |
1267 | for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { | |
1268 | /* | |
1269 | * A table entry with a NULL client method is still a hole in the | |
1270 | * "version capability" vector. | |
1271 | */ | |
1272 | if (vent->cmeth == NULL) { | |
1273 | hole = 1; | |
1274 | continue; | |
1275 | } | |
1276 | method = vent->cmeth(); | |
1277 | if (ssl_method_error(s, method) != 0) { | |
1278 | hole = 1; | |
1279 | } else if (!hole) { | |
1280 | single = NULL; | |
068c358a | 1281 | *min_version = method->version; |
4fa52141 VD |
1282 | } else { |
1283 | version = (single = method)->version; | |
068c358a | 1284 | *min_version = version; |
4fa52141 VD |
1285 | hole = 0; |
1286 | } | |
1287 | } | |
1288 | ||
068c358a KR |
1289 | *max_version = version; |
1290 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1291 | /* Fail if everything is disabled */ |
1292 | if (version == 0) | |
1293 | return SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE; | |
1294 | ||
068c358a KR |
1295 | return 0; |
1296 | } | |
1297 | ||
1298 | /* | |
1299 | * ssl_set_client_hello_version - Work out what version we should be using for | |
7acb8b64 | 1300 | * the initial ClientHello.legacy_version field. |
068c358a KR |
1301 | * |
1302 | * @s: client SSL handle. | |
1303 | * | |
1304 | * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. | |
1305 | */ | |
1306 | int ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL *s) | |
1307 | { | |
3eb2aff4 | 1308 | int ver_min, ver_max, ret; |
068c358a | 1309 | |
3eb2aff4 | 1310 | ret = ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max); |
068c358a KR |
1311 | |
1312 | if (ret != 0) | |
1313 | return ret; | |
1314 | ||
7acb8b64 MC |
1315 | s->version = ver_max; |
1316 | ||
1317 | /* TLS1.3 always uses TLS1.2 in the legacy_version field */ | |
1318 | if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ver_max > TLS1_2_VERSION) | |
1319 | ver_max = TLS1_2_VERSION; | |
1320 | ||
1321 | s->client_version = ver_max; | |
4fa52141 VD |
1322 | return 0; |
1323 | } |