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846e33c7 | 1 | /* |
9d75dce3 | 2 | * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. |
aa8f3d76 | 3 | * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved |
3813046d | 4 | * |
2c18d164 | 5 | * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use |
846e33c7 RS |
6 | * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy |
7 | * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at | |
8 | * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html | |
3813046d | 9 | */ |
846e33c7 | 10 | |
48948d53 | 11 | #include <limits.h> |
f2d9a32c | 12 | #include <string.h> |
d02b48c6 | 13 | #include <stdio.h> |
8ba708e5 | 14 | #include "../ssl_locl.h" |
61ae935a | 15 | #include "statem_locl.h" |
67dc995e | 16 | #include "internal/cryptlib.h" |
ec577822 | 17 | #include <openssl/buffer.h> |
ec577822 BM |
18 | #include <openssl/objects.h> |
19 | #include <openssl/evp.h> | |
20 | #include <openssl/x509.h> | |
49b26f54 | 21 | #include <openssl/trace.h> |
d02b48c6 | 22 | |
c6d38183 RS |
23 | /* |
24 | * Map error codes to TLS/SSL alart types. | |
25 | */ | |
26 | typedef struct x509err2alert_st { | |
27 | int x509err; | |
28 | int alert; | |
29 | } X509ERR2ALERT; | |
30 | ||
597c51bc MC |
31 | /* Fixed value used in the ServerHello random field to identify an HRR */ |
32 | const unsigned char hrrrandom[] = { | |
33 | 0xcf, 0x21, 0xad, 0x74, 0xe5, 0x9a, 0x61, 0x11, 0xbe, 0x1d, 0x8c, 0x02, | |
34 | 0x1e, 0x65, 0xb8, 0x91, 0xc2, 0xa2, 0x11, 0x16, 0x7a, 0xbb, 0x8c, 0x5e, | |
35 | 0x07, 0x9e, 0x09, 0xe2, 0xc8, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x9c | |
36 | }; | |
37 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
38 | /* |
39 | * send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or | |
40 | * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) | |
41 | */ | |
e7ecc7d4 | 42 | int ssl3_do_write(SSL *s, int type) |
0f113f3e MC |
43 | { |
44 | int ret; | |
7ee8627f | 45 | size_t written = 0; |
0f113f3e MC |
46 | |
47 | ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, type, &s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], | |
7ee8627f | 48 | s->init_num, &written); |
0f113f3e | 49 | if (ret < 0) |
26a7d938 | 50 | return -1; |
0f113f3e MC |
51 | if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) |
52 | /* | |
53 | * should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case we'll | |
54 | * ignore the result anyway | |
9d75dce3 | 55 | * TLS1.3 KeyUpdate and NewSessionTicket do not need to be added |
0f113f3e | 56 | */ |
9d75dce3 TS |
57 | if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || (s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET |
58 | && s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE | |
59 | && s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE)) | |
60 | if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, | |
61 | (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], | |
62 | written)) | |
63 | return -1; | |
7ee8627f | 64 | if (written == s->init_num) { |
0f113f3e MC |
65 | if (s->msg_callback) |
66 | s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data, | |
67 | (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s, | |
68 | s->msg_callback_arg); | |
208fb891 | 69 | return 1; |
0f113f3e | 70 | } |
7ee8627f MC |
71 | s->init_off += written; |
72 | s->init_num -= written; | |
26a7d938 | 73 | return 0; |
0f113f3e | 74 | } |
e7ecc7d4 | 75 | |
4a01c59f | 76 | int tls_close_construct_packet(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int htype) |
2c7b4dbc MC |
77 | { |
78 | size_t msglen; | |
79 | ||
4a01c59f | 80 | if ((htype != SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) |
f1ec23c0 | 81 | || !WPACKET_get_length(pkt, &msglen) |
7cea05dc | 82 | || msglen > INT_MAX) |
2c7b4dbc MC |
83 | return 0; |
84 | s->init_num = (int)msglen; | |
85 | s->init_off = 0; | |
86 | ||
87 | return 1; | |
88 | } | |
89 | ||
1f5b44e9 MC |
90 | int tls_setup_handshake(SSL *s) |
91 | { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
92 | if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) { |
93 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
c7f47786 | 94 | return 0; |
f63a17d6 | 95 | } |
c7f47786 | 96 | |
b186a592 MC |
97 | /* Reset any extension flags */ |
98 | memset(s->ext.extflags, 0, sizeof(s->ext.extflags)); | |
99 | ||
c7f47786 | 100 | if (s->server) { |
38a73150 MC |
101 | STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = SSL_get_ciphers(s); |
102 | int i, ver_min, ver_max, ok = 0; | |
103 | ||
104 | /* | |
105 | * Sanity check that the maximum version we accept has ciphers | |
106 | * enabled. For clients we do this check during construction of the | |
107 | * ClientHello. | |
108 | */ | |
b5b993b2 | 109 | if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max, NULL) != 0) { |
4752c5de MC |
110 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE, |
111 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
38a73150 MC |
112 | return 0; |
113 | } | |
114 | for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) { | |
115 | const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i); | |
116 | ||
117 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
118 | if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(ver_max, c->min_dtls) && | |
119 | DTLS_VERSION_LE(ver_max, c->max_dtls)) | |
120 | ok = 1; | |
121 | } else if (ver_max >= c->min_tls && ver_max <= c->max_tls) { | |
122 | ok = 1; | |
123 | } | |
124 | if (ok) | |
125 | break; | |
126 | } | |
127 | if (!ok) { | |
4752c5de MC |
128 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE, |
129 | SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE); | |
38a73150 MC |
130 | ERR_add_error_data(1, "No ciphers enabled for max supported " |
131 | "SSL/TLS version"); | |
38a73150 MC |
132 | return 0; |
133 | } | |
c7f47786 | 134 | if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) { |
0e6161bc | 135 | /* N.B. s->session_ctx == s->ctx here */ |
9ef9088c | 136 | tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_accept); |
c7f47786 | 137 | } else { |
0e6161bc | 138 | /* N.B. s->ctx may not equal s->session_ctx */ |
9ef9088c | 139 | tsan_counter(&s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate); |
c7f47786 | 140 | |
555cbb32 | 141 | s->s3.tmp.cert_request = 0; |
c7f47786 MC |
142 | } |
143 | } else { | |
144 | if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) | |
9ef9088c | 145 | tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect); |
c7f47786 | 146 | else |
9ef9088c | 147 | tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate); |
c7f47786 MC |
148 | |
149 | /* mark client_random uninitialized */ | |
555cbb32 | 150 | memset(s->s3.client_random, 0, sizeof(s->s3.client_random)); |
c7f47786 MC |
151 | s->hit = 0; |
152 | ||
555cbb32 | 153 | s->s3.tmp.cert_req = 0; |
c7f47786 | 154 | |
1f5b44e9 | 155 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) |
c7f47786 | 156 | s->statem.use_timer = 1; |
c7f47786 MC |
157 | } |
158 | ||
159 | return 1; | |
160 | } | |
161 | ||
2c5dfdc3 MC |
162 | /* |
163 | * Size of the to-be-signed TLS13 data, without the hash size itself: | |
164 | * 64 bytes of value 32, 33 context bytes, 1 byte separator | |
165 | */ | |
166 | #define TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE 64 | |
167 | #define TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE (TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE + 33 + 1) | |
168 | ||
169 | static int get_cert_verify_tbs_data(SSL *s, unsigned char *tls13tbs, | |
170 | void **hdata, size_t *hdatalen) | |
171 | { | |
172 | static const char *servercontext = "TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify"; | |
173 | static const char *clientcontext = "TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify"; | |
174 | ||
175 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { | |
176 | size_t hashlen; | |
177 | ||
178 | /* Set the first 64 bytes of to-be-signed data to octet 32 */ | |
179 | memset(tls13tbs, 32, TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE); | |
180 | /* This copies the 33 bytes of context plus the 0 separator byte */ | |
181 | if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY | |
182 | || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY) | |
183 | strcpy((char *)tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE, servercontext); | |
184 | else | |
185 | strcpy((char *)tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE, clientcontext); | |
186 | ||
187 | /* | |
188 | * If we're currently reading then we need to use the saved handshake | |
189 | * hash value. We can't use the current handshake hash state because | |
190 | * that includes the CertVerify itself. | |
191 | */ | |
192 | if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY | |
193 | || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY) { | |
194 | memcpy(tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE, s->cert_verify_hash, | |
195 | s->cert_verify_hash_len); | |
196 | hashlen = s->cert_verify_hash_len; | |
197 | } else if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE, | |
198 | EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &hashlen)) { | |
f63a17d6 | 199 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
2c5dfdc3 MC |
200 | return 0; |
201 | } | |
202 | ||
203 | *hdata = tls13tbs; | |
204 | *hdatalen = TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + hashlen; | |
205 | } else { | |
206 | size_t retlen; | |
60690b5b | 207 | long retlen_l; |
2c5dfdc3 | 208 | |
555cbb32 | 209 | retlen = retlen_l = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3.handshake_buffer, hdata); |
60690b5b | 210 | if (retlen_l <= 0) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
211 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_GET_CERT_VERIFY_TBS_DATA, |
212 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2c5dfdc3 | 213 | return 0; |
f63a17d6 | 214 | } |
2c5dfdc3 MC |
215 | *hdatalen = retlen; |
216 | } | |
217 | ||
218 | return 1; | |
219 | } | |
220 | ||
d8bc1399 MC |
221 | int tls_construct_cert_verify(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
222 | { | |
ad4dd362 DSH |
223 | EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; |
224 | const EVP_MD *md = NULL; | |
d8bc1399 | 225 | EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL; |
5f9b64a2 MC |
226 | EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; |
227 | size_t hdatalen = 0, siglen = 0; | |
d8bc1399 MC |
228 | void *hdata; |
229 | unsigned char *sig = NULL; | |
2c5dfdc3 | 230 | unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
555cbb32 | 231 | const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3.tmp.sigalg; |
2c5dfdc3 | 232 | |
555cbb32 | 233 | if (lu == NULL || s->s3.tmp.cert == NULL) { |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
234 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, |
235 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
ad4dd362 DSH |
236 | goto err; |
237 | } | |
555cbb32 | 238 | pkey = s->s3.tmp.cert->privatekey; |
ad4dd362 | 239 | |
168067b6 | 240 | if (pkey == NULL || !tls1_lookup_md(lu, &md)) { |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
241 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, |
242 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
ad4dd362 DSH |
243 | goto err; |
244 | } | |
d8bc1399 MC |
245 | |
246 | mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); | |
247 | if (mctx == NULL) { | |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
248 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, |
249 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
d8bc1399 MC |
250 | goto err; |
251 | } | |
d8bc1399 | 252 | |
2c5dfdc3 MC |
253 | /* Get the data to be signed */ |
254 | if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) { | |
f63a17d6 | 255 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
d8bc1399 MC |
256 | goto err; |
257 | } | |
258 | ||
ad4dd362 | 259 | if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg)) { |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
260 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, |
261 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
d8bc1399 MC |
262 | goto err; |
263 | } | |
5f9b64a2 MC |
264 | siglen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); |
265 | sig = OPENSSL_malloc(siglen); | |
d8bc1399 | 266 | if (sig == NULL) { |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
267 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, |
268 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
d8bc1399 MC |
269 | goto err; |
270 | } | |
5f9b64a2 | 271 | |
75394189 | 272 | if (EVP_DigestSignInit(mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) { |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
273 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, |
274 | ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
5f9b64a2 MC |
275 | goto err; |
276 | } | |
277 | ||
ad4dd362 | 278 | if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) { |
5f9b64a2 | 279 | if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0 |
968ae5b3 DSH |
280 | || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, |
281 | RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) { | |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
282 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, |
283 | ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
5f9b64a2 MC |
284 | goto err; |
285 | } | |
caf2b6b5 DSH |
286 | } |
287 | if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { | |
288 | if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0 | |
83b4a243 SL |
289 | /* |
290 | * TODO(3.0) Replace this when EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl() is deprecated | |
291 | * with a call to ssl3_digest_master_key_set_params() | |
292 | */ | |
293 | || EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET, | |
294 | (int)s->session->master_key_length, | |
295 | s->session->master_key) <= 0 | |
caf2b6b5 DSH |
296 | || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx, sig, &siglen) <= 0) { |
297 | ||
d4d2f3a4 MC |
298 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, |
299 | ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
5f9b64a2 MC |
300 | goto err; |
301 | } | |
caf2b6b5 | 302 | } else if (EVP_DigestSign(mctx, sig, &siglen, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0) { |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
303 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, |
304 | ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
d8bc1399 MC |
305 | goto err; |
306 | } | |
5f9b64a2 | 307 | |
d8bc1399 MC |
308 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST |
309 | { | |
ad4dd362 DSH |
310 | int pktype = lu->sig; |
311 | ||
d8bc1399 MC |
312 | if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001 |
313 | || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256 | |
314 | || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) | |
5f9b64a2 | 315 | BUF_reverse(sig, NULL, siglen); |
d8bc1399 MC |
316 | } |
317 | #endif | |
318 | ||
5f9b64a2 | 319 | if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, sig, siglen)) { |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
320 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, |
321 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
d8bc1399 MC |
322 | goto err; |
323 | } | |
324 | ||
325 | /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */ | |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
326 | if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { |
327 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
d8bc1399 | 328 | goto err; |
d4d2f3a4 | 329 | } |
d8bc1399 MC |
330 | |
331 | OPENSSL_free(sig); | |
332 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); | |
333 | return 1; | |
334 | err: | |
335 | OPENSSL_free(sig); | |
336 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); | |
d8bc1399 MC |
337 | return 0; |
338 | } | |
339 | ||
340 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) | |
341 | { | |
342 | EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; | |
703bcee0 | 343 | const unsigned char *data; |
d8bc1399 MC |
344 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST |
345 | unsigned char *gost_data = NULL; | |
346 | #endif | |
eb5fd03b | 347 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
dd24857b | 348 | int j; |
d8bc1399 MC |
349 | unsigned int len; |
350 | X509 *peer; | |
351 | const EVP_MD *md = NULL; | |
2c5dfdc3 | 352 | size_t hdatalen = 0; |
d8bc1399 | 353 | void *hdata; |
2c5dfdc3 | 354 | unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
d8bc1399 | 355 | EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); |
5f9b64a2 | 356 | EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; |
d8bc1399 MC |
357 | |
358 | if (mctx == NULL) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
359 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, |
360 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
361 | goto err; | |
d8bc1399 MC |
362 | } |
363 | ||
364 | peer = s->session->peer; | |
365 | pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(peer); | |
f63a17d6 MC |
366 | if (pkey == NULL) { |
367 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, | |
368 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
369 | goto err; | |
370 | } | |
83b4049a | 371 | |
dd24857b | 372 | if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, NULL) == NULL) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
373 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, |
374 | SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE); | |
375 | goto err; | |
d8bc1399 MC |
376 | } |
377 | ||
f464f9c0 | 378 | if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { |
f464f9c0 PD |
379 | unsigned int sigalg; |
380 | ||
381 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
382 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, |
383 | SSL_R_BAD_PACKET); | |
384 | goto err; | |
f464f9c0 | 385 | } |
f63a17d6 MC |
386 | if (tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey) <= 0) { |
387 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
388 | goto err; | |
f464f9c0 | 389 | } |
f464f9c0 | 390 | } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
391 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, |
392 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
393 | goto err; | |
f464f9c0 PD |
394 | } |
395 | ||
555cbb32 | 396 | if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg, &md)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
397 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, |
398 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
399 | goto err; | |
168067b6 | 400 | } |
f464f9c0 | 401 | |
572fa024 | 402 | if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) |
49b26f54 RL |
403 | OSSL_TRACE1(TLS, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", |
404 | md == NULL ? "n/a" : EVP_MD_name(md)); | |
572fa024 | 405 | |
d8bc1399 MC |
406 | /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */ |
407 | /* | |
f464f9c0 PD |
408 | * If key is GOST and len is exactly 64 or 128, it is signature without |
409 | * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till TLS 1.2) | |
d8bc1399 MC |
410 | */ |
411 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST | |
f464f9c0 PD |
412 | if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) |
413 | && ((PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 64 | |
414 | && (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001 | |
415 | || EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256)) | |
416 | || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 128 | |
417 | && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512))) { | |
418 | len = PACKET_remaining(pkt); | |
d8bc1399 MC |
419 | } else |
420 | #endif | |
f464f9c0 | 421 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
422 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, |
423 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
424 | goto err; | |
d8bc1399 | 425 | } |
f464f9c0 | 426 | |
d8bc1399 MC |
427 | j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); |
428 | if (((int)len > j) || ((int)PACKET_remaining(pkt) > j) | |
429 | || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
430 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, |
431 | SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE); | |
432 | goto err; | |
d8bc1399 MC |
433 | } |
434 | if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, len)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
435 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, |
436 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
437 | goto err; | |
d8bc1399 MC |
438 | } |
439 | ||
2c5dfdc3 | 440 | if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
441 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
442 | goto err; | |
d8bc1399 MC |
443 | } |
444 | ||
49b26f54 RL |
445 | OSSL_TRACE1(TLS, "Using client verify alg %s\n", |
446 | md == NULL ? "n/a" : EVP_MD_name(md)); | |
447 | ||
75394189 | 448 | if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
449 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, |
450 | ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
451 | goto err; | |
d8bc1399 MC |
452 | } |
453 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST | |
454 | { | |
dc8da7b1 | 455 | int pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey); |
d8bc1399 MC |
456 | if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001 |
457 | || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256 | |
458 | || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) { | |
459 | if ((gost_data = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
460 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
461 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
462 | goto err; | |
d8bc1399 MC |
463 | } |
464 | BUF_reverse(gost_data, data, len); | |
465 | data = gost_data; | |
466 | } | |
467 | } | |
468 | #endif | |
469 | ||
5554facb | 470 | if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) { |
5f9b64a2 | 471 | if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0 |
968ae5b3 DSH |
472 | || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, |
473 | RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
474 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, |
475 | ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
476 | goto err; | |
5f9b64a2 | 477 | } |
d8bc1399 | 478 | } |
caf2b6b5 | 479 | if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { |
83b4a243 SL |
480 | /* |
481 | * TODO(3.0) Replace this when EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl() is deprecated | |
482 | * with a call to ssl3_digest_master_key_set_params() | |
483 | */ | |
caf2b6b5 | 484 | if (EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0 |
83b4a243 SL |
485 | || EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET, |
486 | (int)s->session->master_key_length, | |
487 | s->session->master_key) <= 0) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
488 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, |
489 | ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
490 | goto err; | |
caf2b6b5 DSH |
491 | } |
492 | if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(mctx, data, len) <= 0) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
493 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, |
494 | SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); | |
495 | goto err; | |
caf2b6b5 DSH |
496 | } |
497 | } else { | |
498 | j = EVP_DigestVerify(mctx, data, len, hdata, hdatalen); | |
25ffeb11 | 499 | if (j <= 0) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
500 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, |
501 | SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); | |
502 | goto err; | |
caf2b6b5 | 503 | } |
d8bc1399 MC |
504 | } |
505 | ||
e4562014 MC |
506 | /* |
507 | * In TLSv1.3 on the client side we make sure we prepare the client | |
508 | * certificate after the CertVerify instead of when we get the | |
509 | * CertificateRequest. This is because in TLSv1.3 the CertificateRequest | |
510 | * comes *before* the Certificate message. In TLSv1.2 it comes after. We | |
511 | * want to make sure that SSL_get_peer_certificate() will return the actual | |
512 | * server certificate from the client_cert_cb callback. | |
513 | */ | |
555cbb32 | 514 | if (!s->server && SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 1) |
e4562014 MC |
515 | ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; |
516 | else | |
517 | ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; | |
f63a17d6 | 518 | err: |
555cbb32 TS |
519 | BIO_free(s->s3.handshake_buffer); |
520 | s->s3.handshake_buffer = NULL; | |
d8bc1399 MC |
521 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); |
522 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST | |
523 | OPENSSL_free(gost_data); | |
524 | #endif | |
525 | return ret; | |
526 | } | |
527 | ||
229185e6 | 528 | int tls_construct_finished(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
0f113f3e | 529 | { |
12472b45 | 530 | size_t finish_md_len; |
229185e6 | 531 | const char *sender; |
8b0e934a | 532 | size_t slen; |
229185e6 | 533 | |
f7e393be | 534 | /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */ |
9d75dce3 | 535 | if (!s->server && s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) |
f7e393be MC |
536 | s->statem.cleanuphand = 1; |
537 | ||
538 | /* | |
539 | * We only change the keys if we didn't already do this when we sent the | |
540 | * client certificate | |
541 | */ | |
542 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) | |
543 | && !s->server | |
555cbb32 | 544 | && s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 0 |
f7e393be | 545 | && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
546 | SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) {; |
547 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
b43c3765 | 548 | return 0; |
f7e393be MC |
549 | } |
550 | ||
229185e6 MC |
551 | if (s->server) { |
552 | sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label; | |
553 | slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len; | |
554 | } else { | |
555 | sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label; | |
556 | slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len; | |
557 | } | |
0f113f3e | 558 | |
12472b45 MC |
559 | finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, |
560 | sender, slen, | |
555cbb32 | 561 | s->s3.tmp.finish_md); |
12472b45 | 562 | if (finish_md_len == 0) { |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
563 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
564 | return 0; | |
4f89bfbf MC |
565 | } |
566 | ||
555cbb32 | 567 | s->s3.tmp.finish_md_len = finish_md_len; |
4f89bfbf | 568 | |
555cbb32 | 569 | if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3.tmp.finish_md, finish_md_len)) { |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
570 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, |
571 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
572 | return 0; | |
4f89bfbf | 573 | } |
0f113f3e | 574 | |
2c7bd692 CB |
575 | /* |
576 | * Log the master secret, if logging is enabled. We don't log it for | |
577 | * TLSv1.3: there's a different key schedule for that. | |
578 | */ | |
579 | if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl_log_secret(s, MASTER_SECRET_LABEL, | |
580 | s->session->master_key, | |
380a522f | 581 | s->session->master_key_length)) { |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
582 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
583 | return 0; | |
380a522f | 584 | } |
2faa1b48 | 585 | |
b9908bf9 MC |
586 | /* |
587 | * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks | |
588 | */ | |
380a522f | 589 | if (!ossl_assert(finish_md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) { |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
590 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, |
591 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
592 | return 0; | |
380a522f | 593 | } |
23a635c0 | 594 | if (!s->server) { |
555cbb32 | 595 | memcpy(s->s3.previous_client_finished, s->s3.tmp.finish_md, |
12472b45 | 596 | finish_md_len); |
555cbb32 | 597 | s->s3.previous_client_finished_len = finish_md_len; |
b9908bf9 | 598 | } else { |
555cbb32 | 599 | memcpy(s->s3.previous_server_finished, s->s3.tmp.finish_md, |
12472b45 | 600 | finish_md_len); |
555cbb32 | 601 | s->s3.previous_server_finished_len = finish_md_len; |
b9908bf9 | 602 | } |
0f113f3e | 603 | |
b9908bf9 | 604 | return 1; |
0f113f3e | 605 | } |
d02b48c6 | 606 | |
44c04a2e MC |
607 | int tls_construct_key_update(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
608 | { | |
609 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->key_update)) { | |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
610 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_KEY_UPDATE, |
611 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
612 | return 0; | |
44c04a2e MC |
613 | } |
614 | ||
9412b3ad | 615 | s->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE; |
44c04a2e | 616 | return 1; |
44c04a2e MC |
617 | } |
618 | ||
e1c3de44 MC |
619 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_update(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
620 | { | |
621 | unsigned int updatetype; | |
622 | ||
524420d8 MC |
623 | /* |
624 | * A KeyUpdate message signals a key change so the end of the message must | |
625 | * be on a record boundary. | |
626 | */ | |
627 | if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
628 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, |
629 | SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY); | |
630 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
524420d8 MC |
631 | } |
632 | ||
e1c3de44 | 633 | if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &updatetype) |
2d871227 | 634 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
635 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, |
636 | SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE); | |
637 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
e1c3de44 MC |
638 | } |
639 | ||
9010b7bc MC |
640 | /* |
641 | * There are only two defined key update types. Fail if we get a value we | |
642 | * didn't recognise. | |
643 | */ | |
2d871227 MC |
644 | if (updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED |
645 | && updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
646 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, |
647 | SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE); | |
648 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
2d871227 MC |
649 | } |
650 | ||
5bf47933 MC |
651 | /* |
652 | * If we get a request for us to update our sending keys too then, we need | |
653 | * to additionally send a KeyUpdate message. However that message should | |
feb9e31c | 654 | * not also request an update (otherwise we get into an infinite loop). |
5bf47933 | 655 | */ |
feb9e31c | 656 | if (updatetype == SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED) |
5bf47933 MC |
657 | s->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED; |
658 | ||
57389a32 | 659 | if (!tls13_update_key(s, 0)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
660 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
661 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
57389a32 MC |
662 | } |
663 | ||
e1c3de44 MC |
664 | return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; |
665 | } | |
666 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
667 | /* |
668 | * ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen | |
669 | * to far. | |
670 | */ | |
5d671101 | 671 | int ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s) |
0f113f3e MC |
672 | { |
673 | const char *sender; | |
8b0e934a | 674 | size_t slen; |
5d671101 | 675 | |
49ae7423 | 676 | if (!s->server) { |
0f113f3e MC |
677 | sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label; |
678 | slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len; | |
679 | } else { | |
680 | sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label; | |
681 | slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len; | |
682 | } | |
683 | ||
555cbb32 | 684 | s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md_len = |
5d671101 | 685 | s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, sender, slen, |
555cbb32 | 686 | s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md); |
5d671101 | 687 | |
555cbb32 | 688 | if (s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md_len == 0) { |
5d671101 MC |
689 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
690 | return 0; | |
691 | } | |
692 | ||
693 | return 1; | |
0f113f3e | 694 | } |
ee2ffc27 | 695 | |
be3583fa | 696 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
b9908bf9 | 697 | { |
348240c6 | 698 | size_t remain; |
4fa52141 | 699 | |
73999b62 | 700 | remain = PACKET_remaining(pkt); |
657da85e MC |
701 | /* |
702 | * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, which should already have | |
c69f2adf MC |
703 | * been consumed by ssl_get_message() so there should be no bytes left, |
704 | * unless we're using DTLS1_BAD_VER, which has an extra 2 bytes | |
657da85e | 705 | */ |
c69f2adf | 706 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
73999b62 | 707 | if ((s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER |
a230b26e EK |
708 | && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH + 1) |
709 | || (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER | |
710 | && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH - 1)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
711 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, |
712 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, | |
713 | SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); | |
714 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
c69f2adf MC |
715 | } |
716 | } else { | |
73999b62 | 717 | if (remain != 0) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
718 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, |
719 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, | |
720 | SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); | |
721 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
c69f2adf | 722 | } |
657da85e MC |
723 | } |
724 | ||
725 | /* Check we have a cipher to change to */ | |
555cbb32 | 726 | if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher == NULL) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
727 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, |
728 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); | |
729 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
657da85e MC |
730 | } |
731 | ||
555cbb32 | 732 | s->s3.change_cipher_spec = 1; |
657da85e | 733 | if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
734 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, |
735 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
736 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
657da85e MC |
737 | } |
738 | ||
c69f2adf MC |
739 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
740 | dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ); | |
741 | ||
742 | if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) | |
743 | s->d1->handshake_read_seq++; | |
744 | ||
745 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
746 | /* | |
747 | * Remember that a CCS has been received, so that an old key of | |
748 | * SCTP-Auth can be deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored if no | |
749 | * SCTP is used | |
750 | */ | |
751 | BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD, 1, NULL); | |
752 | #endif | |
753 | } | |
754 | ||
b9908bf9 | 755 | return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; |
657da85e MC |
756 | } |
757 | ||
be3583fa | 758 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_finished(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
b9908bf9 | 759 | { |
12472b45 | 760 | size_t md_len; |
b9908bf9 | 761 | |
d781d247 MC |
762 | |
763 | /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */ | |
9d75dce3 | 764 | if (s->server) { |
de9e884b MC |
765 | /* |
766 | * To get this far we must have read encrypted data from the client. We | |
767 | * no longer tolerate unencrypted alerts. This value is ignored if less | |
768 | * than TLSv1.3 | |
769 | */ | |
770 | s->statem.enc_read_state = ENC_READ_STATE_VALID; | |
9d75dce3 TS |
771 | if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) |
772 | s->statem.cleanuphand = 1; | |
773 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) { | |
774 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
775 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
776 | } | |
777 | } | |
d781d247 | 778 | |
524420d8 MC |
779 | /* |
780 | * In TLSv1.3 a Finished message signals a key change so the end of the | |
781 | * message must be on a record boundary. | |
782 | */ | |
783 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
784 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, |
785 | SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY); | |
786 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
524420d8 MC |
787 | } |
788 | ||
0f113f3e | 789 | /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */ |
555cbb32 | 790 | if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->s3.change_cipher_spec) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
791 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, |
792 | SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS); | |
793 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
0f113f3e | 794 | } |
555cbb32 | 795 | s->s3.change_cipher_spec = 0; |
0f113f3e | 796 | |
555cbb32 | 797 | md_len = s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md_len; |
0f113f3e | 798 | |
12472b45 | 799 | if (md_len != PACKET_remaining(pkt)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
800 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, |
801 | SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH); | |
802 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
0f113f3e MC |
803 | } |
804 | ||
555cbb32 | 805 | if (CRYPTO_memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt), s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md, |
12472b45 | 806 | md_len) != 0) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
807 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, |
808 | SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED); | |
809 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
0f113f3e MC |
810 | } |
811 | ||
812 | /* | |
813 | * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks | |
814 | */ | |
380a522f | 815 | if (!ossl_assert(md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
816 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, |
817 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
818 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
380a522f | 819 | } |
23a635c0 | 820 | if (s->server) { |
555cbb32 | 821 | memcpy(s->s3.previous_client_finished, s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md, |
12472b45 | 822 | md_len); |
555cbb32 | 823 | s->s3.previous_client_finished_len = md_len; |
0f113f3e | 824 | } else { |
555cbb32 | 825 | memcpy(s->s3.previous_server_finished, s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md, |
12472b45 | 826 | md_len); |
555cbb32 | 827 | s->s3.previous_server_finished_len = md_len; |
0f113f3e MC |
828 | } |
829 | ||
7776a36c MC |
830 | /* |
831 | * In TLS1.3 we also have to change cipher state and do any final processing | |
832 | * of the initial server flight (if we are a client) | |
833 | */ | |
92760c21 MC |
834 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
835 | if (s->server) { | |
9d75dce3 TS |
836 | if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED && |
837 | !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, | |
92760c21 | 838 | SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
839 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
840 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
92760c21 MC |
841 | } |
842 | } else { | |
843 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, | |
ec15acb6 | 844 | s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0, |
92760c21 | 845 | &s->session->master_key_length)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
846 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
847 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
92760c21 MC |
848 | } |
849 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, | |
850 | SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
851 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
852 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
853 | } | |
854 | if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s)) { | |
855 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
856 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
92760c21 MC |
857 | } |
858 | } | |
859 | } | |
860 | ||
e6575156 | 861 | return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; |
0f113f3e | 862 | } |
d02b48c6 | 863 | |
7cea05dc | 864 | int tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
b9908bf9 | 865 | { |
7cea05dc | 866 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, SSL3_MT_CCS)) { |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
867 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
868 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
85a7a5e6 MC |
869 | return 0; |
870 | } | |
b9908bf9 | 871 | |
b9908bf9 MC |
872 | return 1; |
873 | } | |
874 | ||
e96e0f8e | 875 | /* Add a certificate to the WPACKET */ |
f63a17d6 | 876 | static int ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, int chain) |
0f113f3e | 877 | { |
e96e0f8e MC |
878 | int len; |
879 | unsigned char *outbytes; | |
880 | ||
881 | len = i2d_X509(x, NULL); | |
882 | if (len < 0) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
883 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET, |
884 | ERR_R_BUF_LIB); | |
e96e0f8e MC |
885 | return 0; |
886 | } | |
887 | if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u24(pkt, len, &outbytes) | |
888 | || i2d_X509(x, &outbytes) != len) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
889 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET, |
890 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
e96e0f8e MC |
891 | return 0; |
892 | } | |
893 | ||
894 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) | |
fe874d27 | 895 | && !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, x, |
f63a17d6 MC |
896 | chain)) { |
897 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
e96e0f8e | 898 | return 0; |
f63a17d6 | 899 | } |
e96e0f8e MC |
900 | |
901 | return 1; | |
902 | } | |
903 | ||
904 | /* Add certificate chain to provided WPACKET */ | |
f63a17d6 | 905 | static int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk) |
e96e0f8e MC |
906 | { |
907 | int i, chain_count; | |
908 | X509 *x; | |
909 | STACK_OF(X509) *extra_certs; | |
910 | STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL; | |
911 | X509_STORE *chain_store; | |
e96e0f8e MC |
912 | |
913 | if (cpk == NULL || cpk->x509 == NULL) | |
914 | return 1; | |
915 | ||
916 | x = cpk->x509; | |
917 | ||
918 | /* | |
919 | * If we have a certificate specific chain use it, else use parent ctx. | |
920 | */ | |
d805a57b | 921 | if (cpk->chain != NULL) |
e96e0f8e MC |
922 | extra_certs = cpk->chain; |
923 | else | |
924 | extra_certs = s->ctx->extra_certs; | |
925 | ||
926 | if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN) || extra_certs) | |
927 | chain_store = NULL; | |
928 | else if (s->cert->chain_store) | |
929 | chain_store = s->cert->chain_store; | |
930 | else | |
931 | chain_store = s->ctx->cert_store; | |
932 | ||
d805a57b | 933 | if (chain_store != NULL) { |
e96e0f8e MC |
934 | X509_STORE_CTX *xs_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new(); |
935 | ||
936 | if (xs_ctx == NULL) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
937 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, |
938 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
939 | return 0; | |
e96e0f8e MC |
940 | } |
941 | if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(xs_ctx, chain_store, x, NULL)) { | |
942 | X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); | |
f63a17d6 MC |
943 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, |
944 | ERR_R_X509_LIB); | |
945 | return 0; | |
e96e0f8e MC |
946 | } |
947 | /* | |
948 | * It is valid for the chain not to be complete (because normally we | |
949 | * don't include the root cert in the chain). Therefore we deliberately | |
950 | * ignore the error return from this call. We're not actually verifying | |
951 | * the cert - we're just building as much of the chain as we can | |
952 | */ | |
953 | (void)X509_verify_cert(xs_ctx); | |
954 | /* Don't leave errors in the queue */ | |
955 | ERR_clear_error(); | |
956 | chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(xs_ctx); | |
957 | i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, chain, NULL, 0); | |
958 | if (i != 1) { | |
959 | #if 0 | |
960 | /* Dummy error calls so mkerr generates them */ | |
961 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL); | |
962 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL); | |
963 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK); | |
964 | #endif | |
965 | X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); | |
f63a17d6 MC |
966 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i); |
967 | return 0; | |
e96e0f8e MC |
968 | } |
969 | chain_count = sk_X509_num(chain); | |
970 | for (i = 0; i < chain_count; i++) { | |
971 | x = sk_X509_value(chain, i); | |
972 | ||
f63a17d6 MC |
973 | if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i)) { |
974 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
e96e0f8e | 975 | X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); |
f63a17d6 | 976 | return 0; |
e96e0f8e MC |
977 | } |
978 | } | |
979 | X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); | |
980 | } else { | |
981 | i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, extra_certs, x, 0); | |
982 | if (i != 1) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
983 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i); |
984 | return 0; | |
985 | } | |
986 | if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, 0)) { | |
987 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
988 | return 0; | |
e96e0f8e | 989 | } |
e96e0f8e MC |
990 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(extra_certs); i++) { |
991 | x = sk_X509_value(extra_certs, i); | |
f63a17d6 MC |
992 | if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i + 1)) { |
993 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
994 | return 0; | |
995 | } | |
e96e0f8e MC |
996 | } |
997 | } | |
998 | return 1; | |
e96e0f8e MC |
999 | } |
1000 | ||
f63a17d6 | 1001 | unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk) |
e96e0f8e | 1002 | { |
f63a17d6 MC |
1003 | if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt)) { |
1004 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN, | |
1005 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1006 | return 0; | |
1007 | } | |
e96e0f8e | 1008 | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1009 | if (!ssl_add_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk)) |
1010 | return 0; | |
1011 | ||
1012 | if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) { | |
1013 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN, | |
1014 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
7cea05dc | 1015 | return 0; |
77d514c5 | 1016 | } |
f63a17d6 | 1017 | |
c49e1912 | 1018 | return 1; |
0f113f3e MC |
1019 | } |
1020 | ||
30f05b19 MC |
1021 | /* |
1022 | * Tidy up after the end of a handshake. In the case of SCTP this may result | |
1023 | * in NBIO events. If |clearbufs| is set then init_buf and the wbio buffer is | |
1024 | * freed up as well. | |
1025 | */ | |
2a8db717 | 1026 | WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst, int clearbufs, int stop) |
8723588e MC |
1027 | { |
1028 | void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL; | |
4af5836b | 1029 | int cleanuphand = s->statem.cleanuphand; |
8723588e | 1030 | |
30f05b19 MC |
1031 | if (clearbufs) { |
1032 | if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
1033 | /* | |
1034 | * We don't do this in DTLS because we may still need the init_buf | |
1035 | * in case there are any unexpected retransmits | |
1036 | */ | |
1037 | BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); | |
1038 | s->init_buf = NULL; | |
1039 | } | |
a2c2e000 MC |
1040 | if (!ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s)) { |
1041 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_FINISH_HANDSHAKE, | |
1042 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
b77f3ed1 | 1043 | return WORK_ERROR; |
a2c2e000 | 1044 | } |
30f05b19 | 1045 | s->init_num = 0; |
473483d4 | 1046 | } |
8723588e | 1047 | |
9d75dce3 TS |
1048 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->server |
1049 | && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) | |
1050 | s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT; | |
1051 | ||
c2c1d8a4 MC |
1052 | /* |
1053 | * Only set if there was a Finished message and this isn't after a TLSv1.3 | |
1054 | * post handshake exchange | |
1055 | */ | |
4af5836b | 1056 | if (cleanuphand) { |
8723588e MC |
1057 | /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */ |
1058 | s->renegotiate = 0; | |
1059 | s->new_session = 0; | |
c7f47786 | 1060 | s->statem.cleanuphand = 0; |
c0638ade | 1061 | s->ext.ticket_expected = 0; |
8723588e | 1062 | |
30f05b19 MC |
1063 | ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); |
1064 | ||
8723588e | 1065 | if (s->server) { |
16ff1342 MC |
1066 | /* |
1067 | * In TLSv1.3 we update the cache as part of constructing the | |
1068 | * NewSessionTicket | |
1069 | */ | |
1070 | if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) | |
1071 | ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER); | |
8723588e | 1072 | |
0e6161bc | 1073 | /* N.B. s->ctx may not equal s->session_ctx */ |
9ef9088c | 1074 | tsan_counter(&s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good); |
fe3a3291 | 1075 | s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_accept; |
8723588e | 1076 | } else { |
4cb00457 MC |
1077 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
1078 | /* | |
1079 | * We encourage applications to only use TLSv1.3 tickets once, | |
1080 | * so we remove this one from the cache. | |
1081 | */ | |
1082 | if ((s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode | |
1083 | & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) != 0) | |
1084 | SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session); | |
1085 | } else { | |
1086 | /* | |
1087 | * In TLSv1.3 we update the cache as part of processing the | |
1088 | * NewSessionTicket | |
1089 | */ | |
5d61491c | 1090 | ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT); |
4cb00457 | 1091 | } |
8723588e | 1092 | if (s->hit) |
9ef9088c | 1093 | tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_hit); |
8723588e | 1094 | |
fe3a3291 | 1095 | s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_connect; |
9ef9088c | 1096 | tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_good); |
8723588e MC |
1097 | } |
1098 | ||
8723588e MC |
1099 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
1100 | /* done with handshaking */ | |
1101 | s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0; | |
1102 | s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 0; | |
1103 | s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0; | |
f5c7f5df | 1104 | dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s); |
8723588e MC |
1105 | } |
1106 | } | |
1107 | ||
c2c1d8a4 MC |
1108 | if (s->info_callback != NULL) |
1109 | cb = s->info_callback; | |
1110 | else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) | |
1111 | cb = s->ctx->info_callback; | |
1112 | ||
4ce787b9 MC |
1113 | /* The callback may expect us to not be in init at handshake done */ |
1114 | ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0); | |
1115 | ||
4af5836b MC |
1116 | if (cb != NULL) { |
1117 | if (cleanuphand | |
1118 | || !SSL_IS_TLS13(s) | |
1119 | || SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) | |
1120 | cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1); | |
1121 | } | |
c2c1d8a4 | 1122 | |
4ce787b9 MC |
1123 | if (!stop) { |
1124 | /* If we've got more work to do we go back into init */ | |
1125 | ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1); | |
30f05b19 | 1126 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; |
4ce787b9 | 1127 | } |
30f05b19 | 1128 | |
8723588e MC |
1129 | return WORK_FINISHED_STOP; |
1130 | } | |
1131 | ||
9ab930b2 MC |
1132 | int tls_get_message_header(SSL *s, int *mt) |
1133 | { | |
1134 | /* s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */ | |
d4d2f3a4 | 1135 | int skip_message, i, recvd_type; |
9ab930b2 | 1136 | unsigned char *p; |
54105ddd | 1137 | size_t l, readbytes; |
9ab930b2 MC |
1138 | |
1139 | p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; | |
1140 | ||
1141 | do { | |
1142 | while (s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) { | |
1143 | i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, &recvd_type, | |
a230b26e EK |
1144 | &p[s->init_num], |
1145 | SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - s->init_num, | |
54105ddd | 1146 | 0, &readbytes); |
9ab930b2 MC |
1147 | if (i <= 0) { |
1148 | s->rwstate = SSL_READING; | |
1149 | return 0; | |
32ec4153 | 1150 | } |
9ab930b2 | 1151 | if (recvd_type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { |
1257adec | 1152 | /* |
a230b26e EK |
1153 | * A ChangeCipherSpec must be a single byte and may not occur |
1154 | * in the middle of a handshake message. | |
1155 | */ | |
54105ddd | 1156 | if (s->init_num != 0 || readbytes != 1 || p[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS) { |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
1157 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, |
1158 | SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, | |
1159 | SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); | |
1160 | return 0; | |
1257adec | 1161 | } |
e9359719 | 1162 | if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_BEFORE |
555cbb32 | 1163 | && (s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) != 0) { |
e9359719 MC |
1164 | /* |
1165 | * We are stateless and we received a CCS. Probably this is | |
1166 | * from a client between the first and second ClientHellos. | |
1167 | * We should ignore this, but return an error because we do | |
1168 | * not return success until we see the second ClientHello | |
1169 | * with a valid cookie. | |
1170 | */ | |
1171 | return 0; | |
1172 | } | |
555cbb32 | 1173 | s->s3.tmp.message_type = *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; |
54105ddd | 1174 | s->init_num = readbytes - 1; |
c4377574 | 1175 | s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data; |
555cbb32 | 1176 | s->s3.tmp.message_size = readbytes; |
9ab930b2 MC |
1177 | return 1; |
1178 | } else if (recvd_type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { | |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
1179 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, |
1180 | SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, | |
1181 | SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); | |
1182 | return 0; | |
32ec4153 | 1183 | } |
54105ddd | 1184 | s->init_num += readbytes; |
9ab930b2 MC |
1185 | } |
1186 | ||
1187 | skip_message = 0; | |
1188 | if (!s->server) | |
c7f47786 MC |
1189 | if (s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_OK |
1190 | && p[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) | |
9ab930b2 MC |
1191 | /* |
1192 | * The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages -- | |
1193 | * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if | |
1194 | * their format is correct. Does not count for 'Finished' | |
1195 | * MAC. | |
1196 | */ | |
1197 | if (p[1] == 0 && p[2] == 0 && p[3] == 0) { | |
1198 | s->init_num = 0; | |
1199 | skip_message = 1; | |
1200 | ||
1201 | if (s->msg_callback) | |
1202 | s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, | |
1203 | p, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s, | |
1204 | s->msg_callback_arg); | |
1205 | } | |
1206 | } while (skip_message); | |
1207 | /* s->init_num == SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */ | |
1208 | ||
1209 | *mt = *p; | |
555cbb32 | 1210 | s->s3.tmp.message_type = *(p++); |
32ec4153 | 1211 | |
e8aa8b6c | 1212 | if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) { |
9ab930b2 MC |
1213 | /* |
1214 | * Only happens with SSLv3+ in an SSLv2 backward compatible | |
1215 | * ClientHello | |
e8aa8b6c F |
1216 | * |
1217 | * Total message size is the remaining record bytes to read | |
1218 | * plus the SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH bytes that we already read | |
9ab930b2 | 1219 | */ |
9ab930b2 MC |
1220 | l = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(&s->rlayer) |
1221 | + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
555cbb32 | 1222 | s->s3.tmp.message_size = l; |
9ab930b2 MC |
1223 | |
1224 | s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data; | |
1225 | s->init_num = SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
1226 | } else { | |
1227 | n2l3(p, l); | |
1228 | /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */ | |
1229 | if (l > (INT_MAX - SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { | |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
1230 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, |
1231 | SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE); | |
1232 | return 0; | |
32ec4153 | 1233 | } |
555cbb32 | 1234 | s->s3.tmp.message_size = l; |
9ab930b2 MC |
1235 | |
1236 | s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
1237 | s->init_num = 0; | |
1238 | } | |
1239 | ||
1240 | return 1; | |
9ab930b2 MC |
1241 | } |
1242 | ||
eda75751 | 1243 | int tls_get_message_body(SSL *s, size_t *len) |
9ab930b2 | 1244 | { |
54105ddd | 1245 | size_t n, readbytes; |
9ab930b2 MC |
1246 | unsigned char *p; |
1247 | int i; | |
1248 | ||
555cbb32 | 1249 | if (s->s3.tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { |
9ab930b2 MC |
1250 | /* We've already read everything in */ |
1251 | *len = (unsigned long)s->init_num; | |
1252 | return 1; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1253 | } |
1254 | ||
0f113f3e | 1255 | p = s->init_msg; |
555cbb32 | 1256 | n = s->s3.tmp.message_size - s->init_num; |
0f113f3e | 1257 | while (n > 0) { |
657da85e | 1258 | i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, NULL, |
54105ddd | 1259 | &p[s->init_num], n, 0, &readbytes); |
0f113f3e MC |
1260 | if (i <= 0) { |
1261 | s->rwstate = SSL_READING; | |
9ab930b2 MC |
1262 | *len = 0; |
1263 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e | 1264 | } |
54105ddd MC |
1265 | s->init_num += readbytes; |
1266 | n -= readbytes; | |
0f113f3e | 1267 | } |
ee2ffc27 | 1268 | |
0f113f3e MC |
1269 | /* |
1270 | * If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for | |
1271 | * Finished verification. | |
1272 | */ | |
5d671101 MC |
1273 | if (*(s->init_buf->data) == SSL3_MT_FINISHED && !ssl3_take_mac(s)) { |
1274 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
1275 | *len = 0; | |
1276 | return 0; | |
1277 | } | |
ee2ffc27 | 1278 | |
0f113f3e | 1279 | /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */ |
e8aa8b6c | 1280 | if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) { |
d166ed8c DSH |
1281 | if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, |
1282 | s->init_num)) { | |
d4d2f3a4 | 1283 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
d166ed8c DSH |
1284 | *len = 0; |
1285 | return 0; | |
1286 | } | |
32ec4153 | 1287 | if (s->msg_callback) |
a230b26e | 1288 | s->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION, 0, s->init_buf->data, |
32ec4153 MC |
1289 | (size_t)s->init_num, s, s->msg_callback_arg); |
1290 | } else { | |
11c67eea MC |
1291 | /* |
1292 | * We defer feeding in the HRR until later. We'll do it as part of | |
1293 | * processing the message | |
9d75dce3 TS |
1294 | * The TLsv1.3 handshake transcript stops at the ClientFinished |
1295 | * message. | |
11c67eea | 1296 | */ |
597c51bc | 1297 | #define SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET (SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 2) |
9d75dce3 | 1298 | /* KeyUpdate and NewSessionTicket do not need to be added */ |
555cbb32 TS |
1299 | if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || (s->s3.tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET |
1300 | && s->s3.tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE)) { | |
1301 | if (s->s3.tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO | |
9d75dce3 TS |
1302 | || s->init_num < SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE |
1303 | || memcmp(hrrrandom, | |
1304 | s->init_buf->data + SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET, | |
1305 | SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) != 0) { | |
1306 | if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, | |
1307 | s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { | |
1308 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
1309 | *len = 0; | |
1310 | return 0; | |
1311 | } | |
597c51bc | 1312 | } |
d166ed8c | 1313 | } |
32ec4153 MC |
1314 | if (s->msg_callback) |
1315 | s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data, | |
1316 | (size_t)s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s, | |
1317 | s->msg_callback_arg); | |
1318 | } | |
1319 | ||
eda75751 | 1320 | *len = s->init_num; |
9ab930b2 | 1321 | return 1; |
0f113f3e | 1322 | } |
d02b48c6 | 1323 | |
c6d38183 RS |
1324 | static const X509ERR2ALERT x509table[] = { |
1325 | {X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE}, | |
1326 | {X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1327 | {X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1328 | {X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, | |
1329 | {X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED}, | |
1330 | {X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1331 | {X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1332 | {X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED}, | |
1333 | {X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR}, | |
1334 | {X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1335 | {X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED}, | |
1336 | {X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1337 | {X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR}, | |
1338 | {X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1339 | {X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, | |
1340 | {X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1341 | {X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1342 | {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1343 | {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1344 | {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1345 | {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1346 | {X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1347 | {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, | |
1348 | {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR}, | |
1349 | {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1350 | {X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1351 | {X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR}, | |
1352 | {X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, | |
1353 | {X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, | |
1354 | {X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR}, | |
1355 | {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1356 | {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1357 | {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1358 | {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, | |
1359 | {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, | |
1360 | {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, | |
1361 | {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, | |
1362 | {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, | |
1363 | {X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR}, | |
1364 | ||
1365 | /* Last entry; return this if we don't find the value above. */ | |
1366 | {X509_V_OK, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN} | |
1367 | }; | |
1368 | ||
1369 | int ssl_x509err2alert(int x509err) | |
0f113f3e | 1370 | { |
c6d38183 RS |
1371 | const X509ERR2ALERT *tp; |
1372 | ||
1373 | for (tp = x509table; tp->x509err != X509_V_OK; ++tp) | |
1374 | if (tp->x509err == x509err) | |
1375 | break; | |
1376 | return tp->alert; | |
0f113f3e | 1377 | } |
d02b48c6 | 1378 | |
b362ccab | 1379 | int ssl_allow_compression(SSL *s) |
0f113f3e MC |
1380 | { |
1381 | if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) | |
1382 | return 0; | |
1383 | return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION, 0, 0, NULL); | |
1384 | } | |
4fa52141 | 1385 | |
068c358a | 1386 | static int version_cmp(const SSL *s, int a, int b) |
4fa52141 VD |
1387 | { |
1388 | int dtls = SSL_IS_DTLS(s); | |
1389 | ||
1390 | if (a == b) | |
1391 | return 0; | |
1392 | if (!dtls) | |
1393 | return a < b ? -1 : 1; | |
1394 | return DTLS_VERSION_LT(a, b) ? -1 : 1; | |
1395 | } | |
1396 | ||
1397 | typedef struct { | |
1398 | int version; | |
a230b26e EK |
1399 | const SSL_METHOD *(*cmeth) (void); |
1400 | const SSL_METHOD *(*smeth) (void); | |
4fa52141 VD |
1401 | } version_info; |
1402 | ||
5c587fb6 | 1403 | #if TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL != TLS1_3_VERSION |
582a17d6 | 1404 | # error Code needs update for TLS_method() support beyond TLS1_3_VERSION. |
4fa52141 VD |
1405 | #endif |
1406 | ||
f7f2a01d | 1407 | /* Must be in order high to low */ |
4fa52141 | 1408 | static const version_info tls_version_table[] = { |
582a17d6 MC |
1409 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 |
1410 | {TLS1_3_VERSION, tlsv1_3_client_method, tlsv1_3_server_method}, | |
1411 | #else | |
1412 | {TLS1_3_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, | |
1413 | #endif | |
6b01bed2 | 1414 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2 |
a230b26e | 1415 | {TLS1_2_VERSION, tlsv1_2_client_method, tlsv1_2_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 1416 | #else |
a230b26e | 1417 | {TLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
6b01bed2 VD |
1418 | #endif |
1419 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1 | |
a230b26e | 1420 | {TLS1_1_VERSION, tlsv1_1_client_method, tlsv1_1_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 1421 | #else |
a230b26e | 1422 | {TLS1_1_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
6b01bed2 VD |
1423 | #endif |
1424 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1 | |
a230b26e | 1425 | {TLS1_VERSION, tlsv1_client_method, tlsv1_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 1426 | #else |
a230b26e | 1427 | {TLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
6b01bed2 | 1428 | #endif |
4fa52141 | 1429 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3 |
a230b26e | 1430 | {SSL3_VERSION, sslv3_client_method, sslv3_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 1431 | #else |
a230b26e | 1432 | {SSL3_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
4fa52141 | 1433 | #endif |
a230b26e | 1434 | {0, NULL, NULL}, |
4fa52141 VD |
1435 | }; |
1436 | ||
5c587fb6 | 1437 | #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL != DTLS1_2_VERSION |
4fa52141 VD |
1438 | # error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_2_VERSION. |
1439 | #endif | |
1440 | ||
f7f2a01d | 1441 | /* Must be in order high to low */ |
4fa52141 | 1442 | static const version_info dtls_version_table[] = { |
6b01bed2 | 1443 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2 |
a230b26e | 1444 | {DTLS1_2_VERSION, dtlsv1_2_client_method, dtlsv1_2_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 1445 | #else |
a230b26e | 1446 | {DTLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
6b01bed2 VD |
1447 | #endif |
1448 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1 | |
a230b26e EK |
1449 | {DTLS1_VERSION, dtlsv1_client_method, dtlsv1_server_method}, |
1450 | {DTLS1_BAD_VER, dtls_bad_ver_client_method, NULL}, | |
6b01bed2 | 1451 | #else |
a230b26e EK |
1452 | {DTLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
1453 | {DTLS1_BAD_VER, NULL, NULL}, | |
6b01bed2 | 1454 | #endif |
a230b26e | 1455 | {0, NULL, NULL}, |
4fa52141 VD |
1456 | }; |
1457 | ||
1458 | /* | |
1459 | * ssl_method_error - Check whether an SSL_METHOD is enabled. | |
1460 | * | |
1461 | * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method | |
1462 | * @method: the intended method. | |
1463 | * | |
1464 | * Returns 0 on success, or an SSL error reason on failure. | |
1465 | */ | |
068c358a | 1466 | static int ssl_method_error(const SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *method) |
4fa52141 VD |
1467 | { |
1468 | int version = method->version; | |
1469 | ||
1470 | if ((s->min_proto_version != 0 && | |
1471 | version_cmp(s, version, s->min_proto_version) < 0) || | |
1472 | ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, version, NULL) == 0) | |
1473 | return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW; | |
1474 | ||
1475 | if (s->max_proto_version != 0 && | |
a230b26e | 1476 | version_cmp(s, version, s->max_proto_version) > 0) |
4fa52141 VD |
1477 | return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_HIGH; |
1478 | ||
1479 | if ((s->options & method->mask) != 0) | |
1480 | return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; | |
1481 | if ((method->flags & SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB) != 0 && tls1_suiteb(s)) | |
1482 | return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_2_NEEDED_IN_SUITEB_MODE; | |
4fa52141 VD |
1483 | |
1484 | return 0; | |
1485 | } | |
1486 | ||
baa45c3e MC |
1487 | /* |
1488 | * Only called by servers. Returns 1 if the server has a TLSv1.3 capable | |
cd3b53b8 MC |
1489 | * certificate type, or has PSK or a certificate callback configured. Otherwise |
1490 | * returns 0. | |
baa45c3e MC |
1491 | */ |
1492 | static int is_tls13_capable(const SSL *s) | |
1493 | { | |
65d2c16c MC |
1494 | int i; |
1495 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC | |
1496 | int curve; | |
de4dc598 | 1497 | EC_KEY *eckey; |
65d2c16c | 1498 | #endif |
baa45c3e | 1499 | |
d162340d MC |
1500 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK |
1501 | if (s->psk_server_callback != NULL) | |
1502 | return 1; | |
1503 | #endif | |
1504 | ||
cd3b53b8 | 1505 | if (s->psk_find_session_cb != NULL || s->cert->cert_cb != NULL) |
baa45c3e MC |
1506 | return 1; |
1507 | ||
1508 | for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) { | |
1509 | /* Skip over certs disallowed for TLSv1.3 */ | |
1510 | switch (i) { | |
1511 | case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN: | |
1512 | case SSL_PKEY_GOST01: | |
1513 | case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256: | |
1514 | case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512: | |
1515 | continue; | |
1516 | default: | |
1517 | break; | |
1518 | } | |
de4dc598 MC |
1519 | if (!ssl_has_cert(s, i)) |
1520 | continue; | |
65d2c16c | 1521 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
de4dc598 MC |
1522 | if (i != SSL_PKEY_ECC) |
1523 | return 1; | |
1524 | /* | |
1525 | * Prior to TLSv1.3 sig algs allowed any curve to be used. TLSv1.3 is | |
1526 | * more restrictive so check that our sig algs are consistent with this | |
1527 | * EC cert. See section 4.2.3 of RFC8446. | |
1528 | */ | |
1529 | eckey = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey); | |
1530 | if (eckey == NULL) | |
1531 | continue; | |
1532 | curve = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey)); | |
1533 | if (tls_check_sigalg_curve(s, curve)) | |
baa45c3e | 1534 | return 1; |
65d2c16c MC |
1535 | #else |
1536 | return 1; | |
1537 | #endif | |
baa45c3e MC |
1538 | } |
1539 | ||
1540 | return 0; | |
1541 | } | |
1542 | ||
ccae4a15 FI |
1543 | /* |
1544 | * ssl_version_supported - Check that the specified `version` is supported by | |
1545 | * `SSL *` instance | |
1546 | * | |
1547 | * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method | |
1548 | * @version: Protocol version to test against | |
1549 | * | |
1550 | * Returns 1 when supported, otherwise 0 | |
1551 | */ | |
4fd12788 | 1552 | int ssl_version_supported(const SSL *s, int version, const SSL_METHOD **meth) |
ccae4a15 FI |
1553 | { |
1554 | const version_info *vent; | |
1555 | const version_info *table; | |
1556 | ||
1557 | switch (s->method->version) { | |
1558 | default: | |
1559 | /* Version should match method version for non-ANY method */ | |
1560 | return version_cmp(s, version, s->version) == 0; | |
1561 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1562 | table = tls_version_table; | |
1563 | break; | |
1564 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1565 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
1566 | break; | |
1567 | } | |
1568 | ||
1569 | for (vent = table; | |
1570 | vent->version != 0 && version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) <= 0; | |
1571 | ++vent) { | |
baa45c3e MC |
1572 | if (vent->cmeth != NULL |
1573 | && version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) == 0 | |
1574 | && ssl_method_error(s, vent->cmeth()) == 0 | |
1575 | && (!s->server | |
1576 | || version != TLS1_3_VERSION | |
1577 | || is_tls13_capable(s))) { | |
4fd12788 MC |
1578 | if (meth != NULL) |
1579 | *meth = vent->cmeth(); | |
ccae4a15 FI |
1580 | return 1; |
1581 | } | |
1582 | } | |
1583 | return 0; | |
1584 | } | |
1585 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1586 | /* |
1587 | * ssl_check_version_downgrade - In response to RFC7507 SCSV version | |
1588 | * fallback indication from a client check whether we're using the highest | |
1589 | * supported protocol version. | |
1590 | * | |
1591 | * @s server SSL handle. | |
1592 | * | |
1593 | * Returns 1 when using the highest enabled version, 0 otherwise. | |
1594 | */ | |
1595 | int ssl_check_version_downgrade(SSL *s) | |
1596 | { | |
1597 | const version_info *vent; | |
1598 | const version_info *table; | |
1599 | ||
1600 | /* | |
1601 | * Check that the current protocol is the highest enabled version | |
1602 | * (according to s->ctx->method, as version negotiation may have changed | |
1603 | * s->method). | |
1604 | */ | |
1605 | if (s->version == s->ctx->method->version) | |
1606 | return 1; | |
1607 | ||
1608 | /* | |
1609 | * Apparently we're using a version-flexible SSL_METHOD (not at its | |
1610 | * highest protocol version). | |
1611 | */ | |
1612 | if (s->ctx->method->version == TLS_method()->version) | |
1613 | table = tls_version_table; | |
1614 | else if (s->ctx->method->version == DTLS_method()->version) | |
1615 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
1616 | else { | |
1617 | /* Unexpected state; fail closed. */ | |
1618 | return 0; | |
1619 | } | |
1620 | ||
1621 | for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { | |
a230b26e | 1622 | if (vent->smeth != NULL && ssl_method_error(s, vent->smeth()) == 0) |
4fa52141 VD |
1623 | return s->version == vent->version; |
1624 | } | |
1625 | return 0; | |
1626 | } | |
1627 | ||
1628 | /* | |
1629 | * ssl_set_version_bound - set an upper or lower bound on the supported (D)TLS | |
1630 | * protocols, provided the initial (D)TLS method is version-flexible. This | |
1631 | * function sanity-checks the proposed value and makes sure the method is | |
1632 | * version-flexible, then sets the limit if all is well. | |
1633 | * | |
1634 | * @method_version: The version of the current SSL_METHOD. | |
1635 | * @version: the intended limit. | |
1636 | * @bound: pointer to limit to be updated. | |
1637 | * | |
1638 | * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure. | |
1639 | */ | |
1640 | int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version, int version, int *bound) | |
1641 | { | |
869e978c KR |
1642 | if (version == 0) { |
1643 | *bound = version; | |
1644 | return 1; | |
1645 | } | |
1646 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1647 | /*- |
1648 | * Restrict TLS methods to TLS protocol versions. | |
1649 | * Restrict DTLS methods to DTLS protocol versions. | |
1650 | * Note, DTLS version numbers are decreasing, use comparison macros. | |
1651 | * | |
1652 | * Note that for both lower-bounds we use explicit versions, not | |
1653 | * (D)TLS_MIN_VERSION. This is because we don't want to break user | |
1654 | * configurations. If the MIN (supported) version ever rises, the user's | |
1655 | * "floor" remains valid even if no longer available. We don't expect the | |
1656 | * MAX ceiling to ever get lower, so making that variable makes sense. | |
1657 | */ | |
1658 | switch (method_version) { | |
1659 | default: | |
1660 | /* | |
1661 | * XXX For fixed version methods, should we always fail and not set any | |
1662 | * bounds, always succeed and not set any bounds, or set the bounds and | |
1663 | * arrange to fail later if they are not met? At present fixed-version | |
1664 | * methods are not subject to controls that disable individual protocol | |
1665 | * versions. | |
1666 | */ | |
1667 | return 0; | |
1668 | ||
1669 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
5c587fb6 | 1670 | if (version < SSL3_VERSION || version > TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL) |
4fa52141 VD |
1671 | return 0; |
1672 | break; | |
1673 | ||
1674 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
5c587fb6 | 1675 | if (DTLS_VERSION_GT(version, DTLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL) || |
032924c4 | 1676 | DTLS_VERSION_LT(version, DTLS1_BAD_VER)) |
4fa52141 VD |
1677 | return 0; |
1678 | break; | |
1679 | } | |
1680 | ||
1681 | *bound = version; | |
1682 | return 1; | |
1683 | } | |
1684 | ||
f7f2a01d MC |
1685 | static void check_for_downgrade(SSL *s, int vers, DOWNGRADE *dgrd) |
1686 | { | |
1687 | if (vers == TLS1_2_VERSION | |
4fd12788 | 1688 | && ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_3_VERSION, NULL)) { |
f7f2a01d | 1689 | *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_TO_1_2; |
5627f9f2 MC |
1690 | } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) |
1691 | && vers < TLS1_2_VERSION | |
1692 | /* | |
1693 | * We need to ensure that a server that disables TLSv1.2 | |
1694 | * (creating a hole between TLSv1.3 and TLSv1.1) can still | |
1695 | * complete handshakes with clients that support TLSv1.2 and | |
1696 | * below. Therefore we do not enable the sentinel if TLSv1.3 is | |
1697 | * enabled and TLSv1.2 is not. | |
1698 | */ | |
1699 | && ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_2_VERSION, NULL)) { | |
f7f2a01d MC |
1700 | *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_TO_1_1; |
1701 | } else { | |
1702 | *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE; | |
1703 | } | |
1704 | } | |
1705 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1706 | /* |
1707 | * ssl_choose_server_version - Choose server (D)TLS version. Called when the | |
1708 | * client HELLO is received to select the final server protocol version and | |
1709 | * the version specific method. | |
1710 | * | |
1711 | * @s: server SSL handle. | |
1712 | * | |
1713 | * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. | |
1714 | */ | |
f7f2a01d | 1715 | int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello, DOWNGRADE *dgrd) |
4fa52141 VD |
1716 | { |
1717 | /*- | |
1718 | * With version-flexible methods we have an initial state with: | |
1719 | * | |
1720 | * s->method->version == (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION, | |
5c587fb6 | 1721 | * s->version == (D)TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL. |
4fa52141 VD |
1722 | * |
1723 | * So we detect version-flexible methods via the method version, not the | |
1724 | * handle version. | |
1725 | */ | |
1726 | int server_version = s->method->version; | |
df7ce507 | 1727 | int client_version = hello->legacy_version; |
4fa52141 VD |
1728 | const version_info *vent; |
1729 | const version_info *table; | |
1730 | int disabled = 0; | |
cd998837 | 1731 | RAW_EXTENSION *suppversions; |
4fa52141 | 1732 | |
1ab3836b MC |
1733 | s->client_version = client_version; |
1734 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1735 | switch (server_version) { |
1736 | default: | |
7d061fce MC |
1737 | if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
1738 | if (version_cmp(s, client_version, s->version) < 0) | |
1739 | return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION; | |
f7f2a01d | 1740 | *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE; |
7d061fce MC |
1741 | /* |
1742 | * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't | |
1743 | * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope | |
1744 | * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol | |
1745 | * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return | |
1746 | * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) | |
1747 | */ | |
1748 | return 0; | |
1749 | } | |
d2f42576 | 1750 | /* |
7d061fce MC |
1751 | * Fall through if we are TLSv1.3 already (this means we must be after |
1752 | * a HelloRetryRequest | |
4fa52141 | 1753 | */ |
018fcbec | 1754 | /* fall thru */ |
4fa52141 VD |
1755 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: |
1756 | table = tls_version_table; | |
1757 | break; | |
1758 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1759 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
1760 | break; | |
1761 | } | |
1762 | ||
70af3d8e | 1763 | suppversions = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions]; |
cd998837 | 1764 | |
6f40214f | 1765 | /* If we did an HRR then supported versions is mandatory */ |
fc7129dc | 1766 | if (!suppversions->present && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) |
6f40214f MC |
1767 | return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; |
1768 | ||
70af3d8e | 1769 | if (suppversions->present && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
cd998837 MC |
1770 | unsigned int candidate_vers = 0; |
1771 | unsigned int best_vers = 0; | |
1772 | const SSL_METHOD *best_method = NULL; | |
1773 | PACKET versionslist; | |
1774 | ||
6b473aca MC |
1775 | suppversions->parsed = 1; |
1776 | ||
16bce0e0 | 1777 | if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&suppversions->data, &versionslist)) { |
cd998837 MC |
1778 | /* Trailing or invalid data? */ |
1779 | return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH; | |
1780 | } | |
1781 | ||
d8434cf8 MC |
1782 | /* |
1783 | * The TLSv1.3 spec says the client MUST set this to TLS1_2_VERSION. | |
1784 | * The spec only requires servers to check that it isn't SSLv3: | |
1785 | * "Any endpoint receiving a Hello message with | |
1786 | * ClientHello.legacy_version or ServerHello.legacy_version set to | |
1787 | * 0x0300 MUST abort the handshake with a "protocol_version" alert." | |
1788 | * We are slightly stricter and require that it isn't SSLv3 or lower. | |
1789 | * We tolerate TLSv1 and TLSv1.1. | |
1790 | */ | |
1791 | if (client_version <= SSL3_VERSION) | |
1792 | return SSL_R_BAD_LEGACY_VERSION; | |
1793 | ||
cd998837 | 1794 | while (PACKET_get_net_2(&versionslist, &candidate_vers)) { |
cd998837 MC |
1795 | if (version_cmp(s, candidate_vers, best_vers) <= 0) |
1796 | continue; | |
4fd12788 MC |
1797 | if (ssl_version_supported(s, candidate_vers, &best_method)) |
1798 | best_vers = candidate_vers; | |
cd998837 MC |
1799 | } |
1800 | if (PACKET_remaining(&versionslist) != 0) { | |
1801 | /* Trailing data? */ | |
1802 | return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH; | |
1803 | } | |
1804 | ||
1805 | if (best_vers > 0) { | |
fc7129dc | 1806 | if (s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) { |
7d061fce | 1807 | /* |
6f40214f MC |
1808 | * This is after a HelloRetryRequest so we better check that we |
1809 | * negotiated TLSv1.3 | |
7d061fce MC |
1810 | */ |
1811 | if (best_vers != TLS1_3_VERSION) | |
1812 | return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; | |
1813 | return 0; | |
1814 | } | |
f7f2a01d | 1815 | check_for_downgrade(s, best_vers, dgrd); |
cd998837 MC |
1816 | s->version = best_vers; |
1817 | s->method = best_method; | |
1818 | return 0; | |
1819 | } | |
1820 | return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; | |
1821 | } | |
1822 | ||
1823 | /* | |
1824 | * If the supported versions extension isn't present, then the highest | |
1825 | * version we can negotiate is TLSv1.2 | |
1826 | */ | |
1827 | if (version_cmp(s, client_version, TLS1_3_VERSION) >= 0) | |
1828 | client_version = TLS1_2_VERSION; | |
1829 | ||
1830 | /* | |
1831 | * No supported versions extension, so we just use the version supplied in | |
1832 | * the ClientHello. | |
1833 | */ | |
4fa52141 VD |
1834 | for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { |
1835 | const SSL_METHOD *method; | |
1836 | ||
1837 | if (vent->smeth == NULL || | |
1838 | version_cmp(s, client_version, vent->version) < 0) | |
1839 | continue; | |
1840 | method = vent->smeth(); | |
1841 | if (ssl_method_error(s, method) == 0) { | |
f7f2a01d | 1842 | check_for_downgrade(s, vent->version, dgrd); |
4fa52141 VD |
1843 | s->version = vent->version; |
1844 | s->method = method; | |
1845 | return 0; | |
1846 | } | |
1847 | disabled = 1; | |
1848 | } | |
1849 | return disabled ? SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL : SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW; | |
1850 | } | |
1851 | ||
1852 | /* | |
1853 | * ssl_choose_client_version - Choose client (D)TLS version. Called when the | |
1854 | * server HELLO is received to select the final client protocol version and | |
1855 | * the version specific method. | |
1856 | * | |
1857 | * @s: client SSL handle. | |
1858 | * @version: The proposed version from the server's HELLO. | |
88050dd1 | 1859 | * @extensions: The extensions received |
4fa52141 | 1860 | * |
29bfd5b7 | 1861 | * Returns 1 on success or 0 on error. |
4fa52141 | 1862 | */ |
88050dd1 | 1863 | int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version, RAW_EXTENSION *extensions) |
4fa52141 VD |
1864 | { |
1865 | const version_info *vent; | |
1866 | const version_info *table; | |
b5b993b2 | 1867 | int ret, ver_min, ver_max, real_max, origv; |
4fa52141 | 1868 | |
88050dd1 MC |
1869 | origv = s->version; |
1870 | s->version = version; | |
b97667ce | 1871 | |
88050dd1 MC |
1872 | /* This will overwrite s->version if the extension is present */ |
1873 | if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions, | |
1874 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO | |
1875 | | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO, extensions, | |
1876 | NULL, 0)) { | |
1877 | s->version = origv; | |
1878 | return 0; | |
1879 | } | |
1880 | ||
fc7129dc MC |
1881 | if (s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE |
1882 | && s->version != TLS1_3_VERSION) { | |
88050dd1 | 1883 | s->version = origv; |
29bfd5b7 MC |
1884 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, |
1885 | SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION); | |
1886 | return 0; | |
c3043dcd MC |
1887 | } |
1888 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1889 | switch (s->method->version) { |
1890 | default: | |
88050dd1 MC |
1891 | if (s->version != s->method->version) { |
1892 | s->version = origv; | |
29bfd5b7 MC |
1893 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, |
1894 | SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, | |
1895 | SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION); | |
1896 | return 0; | |
c3043dcd | 1897 | } |
4fa52141 VD |
1898 | /* |
1899 | * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't | |
1900 | * (and never did) check min/max, FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope | |
1901 | * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol | |
1902 | * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return | |
1903 | * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) | |
1904 | */ | |
29bfd5b7 | 1905 | return 1; |
4fa52141 VD |
1906 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: |
1907 | table = tls_version_table; | |
1908 | break; | |
1909 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1910 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
1911 | break; | |
1912 | } | |
1913 | ||
b5b993b2 MC |
1914 | ret = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max, &real_max); |
1915 | if (ret != 0) { | |
1916 | s->version = origv; | |
1917 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, | |
1918 | SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, ret); | |
1919 | return 0; | |
1920 | } | |
1921 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? DTLS_VERSION_LT(s->version, ver_min) | |
1922 | : s->version < ver_min) { | |
1923 | s->version = origv; | |
1924 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, | |
1925 | SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL); | |
1926 | return 0; | |
1927 | } else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? DTLS_VERSION_GT(s->version, ver_max) | |
1928 | : s->version > ver_max) { | |
1929 | s->version = origv; | |
1930 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, | |
1931 | SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL); | |
1932 | return 0; | |
1933 | } | |
5df22060 | 1934 | |
b5b993b2 MC |
1935 | if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) == 0) |
1936 | real_max = ver_max; | |
c3043dcd | 1937 | |
b5b993b2 MC |
1938 | /* Check for downgrades */ |
1939 | if (s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION && real_max > s->version) { | |
1940 | if (memcmp(tls12downgrade, | |
555cbb32 | 1941 | s->s3.server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE |
b5b993b2 MC |
1942 | - sizeof(tls12downgrade), |
1943 | sizeof(tls12downgrade)) == 0) { | |
1944 | s->version = origv; | |
1945 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, | |
1946 | SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, | |
1947 | SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); | |
1948 | return 0; | |
1949 | } | |
1950 | } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) | |
1951 | && s->version < TLS1_2_VERSION | |
1952 | && real_max > s->version) { | |
1953 | if (memcmp(tls11downgrade, | |
555cbb32 | 1954 | s->s3.server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE |
b5b993b2 MC |
1955 | - sizeof(tls11downgrade), |
1956 | sizeof(tls11downgrade)) == 0) { | |
1957 | s->version = origv; | |
1958 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, | |
1959 | SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, | |
1960 | SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); | |
1961 | return 0; | |
c3043dcd | 1962 | } |
b5b993b2 | 1963 | } |
c3043dcd | 1964 | |
b5b993b2 MC |
1965 | for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { |
1966 | if (vent->cmeth == NULL || s->version != vent->version) | |
c3043dcd MC |
1967 | continue; |
1968 | ||
b5b993b2 | 1969 | s->method = vent->cmeth(); |
29bfd5b7 | 1970 | return 1; |
4fa52141 VD |
1971 | } |
1972 | ||
88050dd1 | 1973 | s->version = origv; |
29bfd5b7 MC |
1974 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, |
1975 | SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL); | |
1976 | return 0; | |
4fa52141 VD |
1977 | } |
1978 | ||
068c358a | 1979 | /* |
38a73150 | 1980 | * ssl_get_min_max_version - get minimum and maximum protocol version |
068c358a KR |
1981 | * @s: The SSL connection |
1982 | * @min_version: The minimum supported version | |
1983 | * @max_version: The maximum supported version | |
b5b993b2 MC |
1984 | * @real_max: The highest version below the lowest compile time version hole |
1985 | * where that hole lies above at least one run-time enabled | |
1986 | * protocol. | |
068c358a KR |
1987 | * |
1988 | * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if the | |
1989 | * version is initially (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION. We apply any explicit SSL_OP_NO_xxx | |
1990 | * options, the MinProtocol and MaxProtocol configuration commands, any Suite B | |
b53338cb | 1991 | * constraints and any floor imposed by the security level here, |
068c358a | 1992 | * so we don't advertise the wrong protocol version to only reject the outcome later. |
4fa52141 | 1993 | * |
0485d540 | 1994 | * Computing the right floor matters. If, e.g., TLS 1.0 and 1.2 are enabled, |
4fa52141 VD |
1995 | * TLS 1.1 is disabled, but the security level, Suite-B and/or MinProtocol |
1996 | * only allow TLS 1.2, we want to advertise TLS1.2, *not* TLS1. | |
1997 | * | |
068c358a KR |
1998 | * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. On failure |
1999 | * min_version and max_version will also be set to 0. | |
4fa52141 | 2000 | */ |
b5b993b2 MC |
2001 | int ssl_get_min_max_version(const SSL *s, int *min_version, int *max_version, |
2002 | int *real_max) | |
4fa52141 | 2003 | { |
b5b993b2 | 2004 | int version, tmp_real_max; |
4fa52141 VD |
2005 | int hole; |
2006 | const SSL_METHOD *single = NULL; | |
2007 | const SSL_METHOD *method; | |
2008 | const version_info *table; | |
2009 | const version_info *vent; | |
2010 | ||
2011 | switch (s->method->version) { | |
2012 | default: | |
2013 | /* | |
2014 | * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't | |
2015 | * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope | |
2016 | * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol | |
2017 | * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return | |
2018 | * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) | |
2019 | */ | |
068c358a | 2020 | *min_version = *max_version = s->version; |
b5b993b2 MC |
2021 | /* |
2022 | * Providing a real_max only makes sense where we're using a version | |
2023 | * flexible method. | |
2024 | */ | |
2025 | if (!ossl_assert(real_max == NULL)) | |
2026 | return ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
4fa52141 VD |
2027 | return 0; |
2028 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
2029 | table = tls_version_table; | |
2030 | break; | |
2031 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
2032 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
2033 | break; | |
2034 | } | |
2035 | ||
2036 | /* | |
2037 | * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are some protocols | |
2038 | * below X enabled. This is required in order to maintain the "version | |
2039 | * capability" vector contiguous. Any versions with a NULL client method | |
2040 | * (protocol version client is disabled at compile-time) is also a "hole". | |
2041 | * | |
2042 | * Our initial state is hole == 1, version == 0. That is, versions above | |
2043 | * the first version in the method table are disabled (a "hole" above | |
2044 | * the valid protocol entries) and we don't have a selected version yet. | |
2045 | * | |
2046 | * Whenever "hole == 1", and we hit an enabled method, its version becomes | |
2047 | * the selected version, and the method becomes a candidate "single" | |
2048 | * method. We're no longer in a hole, so "hole" becomes 0. | |
2049 | * | |
2050 | * If "hole == 0" and we hit an enabled method, then "single" is cleared, | |
2051 | * as we support a contiguous range of at least two methods. If we hit | |
2052 | * a disabled method, then hole becomes true again, but nothing else | |
2053 | * changes yet, because all the remaining methods may be disabled too. | |
2054 | * If we again hit an enabled method after the new hole, it becomes | |
2055 | * selected, as we start from scratch. | |
2056 | */ | |
068c358a | 2057 | *min_version = version = 0; |
4fa52141 | 2058 | hole = 1; |
b5b993b2 MC |
2059 | if (real_max != NULL) |
2060 | *real_max = 0; | |
2061 | tmp_real_max = 0; | |
4fa52141 VD |
2062 | for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { |
2063 | /* | |
2064 | * A table entry with a NULL client method is still a hole in the | |
2065 | * "version capability" vector. | |
2066 | */ | |
2067 | if (vent->cmeth == NULL) { | |
2068 | hole = 1; | |
b5b993b2 | 2069 | tmp_real_max = 0; |
4fa52141 VD |
2070 | continue; |
2071 | } | |
2072 | method = vent->cmeth(); | |
b5b993b2 MC |
2073 | |
2074 | if (hole == 1 && tmp_real_max == 0) | |
2075 | tmp_real_max = vent->version; | |
2076 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
2077 | if (ssl_method_error(s, method) != 0) { |
2078 | hole = 1; | |
2079 | } else if (!hole) { | |
2080 | single = NULL; | |
068c358a | 2081 | *min_version = method->version; |
4fa52141 | 2082 | } else { |
b5b993b2 MC |
2083 | if (real_max != NULL && tmp_real_max != 0) |
2084 | *real_max = tmp_real_max; | |
4fa52141 | 2085 | version = (single = method)->version; |
068c358a | 2086 | *min_version = version; |
4fa52141 VD |
2087 | hole = 0; |
2088 | } | |
2089 | } | |
2090 | ||
068c358a KR |
2091 | *max_version = version; |
2092 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
2093 | /* Fail if everything is disabled */ |
2094 | if (version == 0) | |
2095 | return SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE; | |
2096 | ||
068c358a KR |
2097 | return 0; |
2098 | } | |
2099 | ||
2100 | /* | |
2101 | * ssl_set_client_hello_version - Work out what version we should be using for | |
7acb8b64 | 2102 | * the initial ClientHello.legacy_version field. |
068c358a KR |
2103 | * |
2104 | * @s: client SSL handle. | |
2105 | * | |
2106 | * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. | |
2107 | */ | |
2108 | int ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL *s) | |
2109 | { | |
3eb2aff4 | 2110 | int ver_min, ver_max, ret; |
068c358a | 2111 | |
447cc0ad MC |
2112 | /* |
2113 | * In a renegotiation we always send the same client_version that we sent | |
2114 | * last time, regardless of which version we eventually negotiated. | |
2115 | */ | |
2116 | if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) | |
2117 | return 0; | |
2118 | ||
b5b993b2 | 2119 | ret = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max, NULL); |
068c358a KR |
2120 | |
2121 | if (ret != 0) | |
2122 | return ret; | |
2123 | ||
7acb8b64 MC |
2124 | s->version = ver_max; |
2125 | ||
2126 | /* TLS1.3 always uses TLS1.2 in the legacy_version field */ | |
2127 | if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ver_max > TLS1_2_VERSION) | |
2128 | ver_max = TLS1_2_VERSION; | |
2129 | ||
2130 | s->client_version = ver_max; | |
4fa52141 VD |
2131 | return 0; |
2132 | } | |
aff9929b MC |
2133 | |
2134 | /* | |
2135 | * Checks a list of |groups| to determine if the |group_id| is in it. If it is | |
2136 | * and |checkallow| is 1 then additionally check if the group is allowed to be | |
2137 | * used. Returns 1 if the group is in the list (and allowed if |checkallow| is | |
2138 | * 1) or 0 otherwise. | |
2139 | */ | |
deb2d5e7 | 2140 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
9e84a42d | 2141 | int check_in_list(SSL *s, uint16_t group_id, const uint16_t *groups, |
aff9929b MC |
2142 | size_t num_groups, int checkallow) |
2143 | { | |
2144 | size_t i; | |
2145 | ||
2146 | if (groups == NULL || num_groups == 0) | |
2147 | return 0; | |
2148 | ||
9e84a42d DSH |
2149 | for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) { |
2150 | uint16_t group = groups[i]; | |
2151 | ||
2152 | if (group_id == group | |
aff9929b | 2153 | && (!checkallow |
9e84a42d | 2154 | || tls_curve_allowed(s, group, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))) { |
0acee504 | 2155 | return 1; |
aff9929b MC |
2156 | } |
2157 | } | |
2158 | ||
0acee504 | 2159 | return 0; |
aff9929b | 2160 | } |
deb2d5e7 | 2161 | #endif |
11c67eea MC |
2162 | |
2163 | /* Replace ClientHello1 in the transcript hash with a synthetic message */ | |
43054d3d MC |
2164 | int create_synthetic_message_hash(SSL *s, const unsigned char *hashval, |
2165 | size_t hashlen, const unsigned char *hrr, | |
2166 | size_t hrrlen) | |
11c67eea | 2167 | { |
43054d3d | 2168 | unsigned char hashvaltmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
635b7d3f MC |
2169 | unsigned char msghdr[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]; |
2170 | ||
2171 | memset(msghdr, 0, sizeof(msghdr)); | |
11c67eea | 2172 | |
43054d3d MC |
2173 | if (hashval == NULL) { |
2174 | hashval = hashvaltmp; | |
2175 | hashlen = 0; | |
2176 | /* Get the hash of the initial ClientHello */ | |
2177 | if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0) | |
2178 | || !ssl_handshake_hash(s, hashvaltmp, sizeof(hashvaltmp), | |
2179 | &hashlen)) { | |
2180 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
2181 | return 0; | |
2182 | } | |
11c67eea MC |
2183 | } |
2184 | ||
2185 | /* Reinitialise the transcript hash */ | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2186 | if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) { |
2187 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
11c67eea | 2188 | return 0; |
f63a17d6 | 2189 | } |
11c67eea MC |
2190 | |
2191 | /* Inject the synthetic message_hash message */ | |
635b7d3f | 2192 | msghdr[0] = SSL3_MT_MESSAGE_HASH; |
3a63c0ed | 2193 | msghdr[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - 1] = (unsigned char)hashlen; |
11c67eea MC |
2194 | if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, msghdr, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) |
2195 | || !ssl3_finish_mac(s, hashval, hashlen)) { | |
f63a17d6 | 2196 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
11c67eea MC |
2197 | return 0; |
2198 | } | |
2199 | ||
43054d3d MC |
2200 | /* |
2201 | * Now re-inject the HRR and current message if appropriate (we just deleted | |
2202 | * it when we reinitialised the transcript hash above). Only necessary after | |
2203 | * receiving a ClientHello2 with a cookie. | |
2204 | */ | |
2205 | if (hrr != NULL | |
2206 | && (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, hrr, hrrlen) | |
2207 | || !ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, | |
555cbb32 | 2208 | s->s3.tmp.message_size |
43054d3d MC |
2209 | + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH))) { |
2210 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
2211 | return 0; | |
2212 | } | |
2213 | ||
11c67eea MC |
2214 | return 1; |
2215 | } | |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2216 | |
2217 | static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b) | |
2218 | { | |
2219 | return X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b); | |
2220 | } | |
2221 | ||
f63a17d6 | 2222 | int parse_ca_names(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2223 | { |
2224 | STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp); | |
2225 | X509_NAME *xn = NULL; | |
2226 | PACKET cadns; | |
2227 | ||
2228 | if (ca_sk == NULL) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2229 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, |
2230 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
2231 | goto err; | |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2232 | } |
2233 | /* get the CA RDNs */ | |
2234 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cadns)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2235 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, |
2236 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
2237 | goto err; | |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2238 | } |
2239 | ||
2240 | while (PACKET_remaining(&cadns)) { | |
2241 | const unsigned char *namestart, *namebytes; | |
2242 | unsigned int name_len; | |
2243 | ||
2244 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cadns, &name_len) | |
2245 | || !PACKET_get_bytes(&cadns, &namebytes, name_len)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2246 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, |
2247 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
2248 | goto err; | |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2249 | } |
2250 | ||
2251 | namestart = namebytes; | |
2252 | if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &namebytes, name_len)) == NULL) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2253 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, |
2254 | ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); | |
2255 | goto err; | |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2256 | } |
2257 | if (namebytes != (namestart + name_len)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2258 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, |
2259 | SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
2260 | goto err; | |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2261 | } |
2262 | ||
2263 | if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2264 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, |
2265 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2266 | goto err; |
2267 | } | |
2268 | xn = NULL; | |
2269 | } | |
2270 | ||
555cbb32 TS |
2271 | sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3.tmp.peer_ca_names, X509_NAME_free); |
2272 | s->s3.tmp.peer_ca_names = ca_sk; | |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2273 | |
2274 | return 1; | |
2275 | ||
5d6cca05 DSH |
2276 | err: |
2277 | sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free); | |
2278 | X509_NAME_free(xn); | |
2279 | return 0; | |
2280 | } | |
2281 | ||
98732979 | 2282 | const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *get_ca_names(SSL *s) |
5d6cca05 | 2283 | { |
98732979 | 2284 | const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL;; |
5d6cca05 | 2285 | |
98732979 MC |
2286 | if (s->server) { |
2287 | ca_sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s); | |
2288 | if (ca_sk != NULL && sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk) == 0) | |
2289 | ca_sk = NULL; | |
2290 | } | |
2291 | ||
2292 | if (ca_sk == NULL) | |
2293 | ca_sk = SSL_get0_CA_list(s); | |
2294 | ||
2295 | return ca_sk; | |
2296 | } | |
2297 | ||
2298 | int construct_ca_names(SSL *s, const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk, WPACKET *pkt) | |
2299 | { | |
5d6cca05 | 2300 | /* Start sub-packet for client CA list */ |
f63a17d6 MC |
2301 | if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { |
2302 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_CA_NAMES, | |
2303 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
5d6cca05 | 2304 | return 0; |
f63a17d6 | 2305 | } |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2306 | |
2307 | if (ca_sk != NULL) { | |
2308 | int i; | |
2309 | ||
2310 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk); i++) { | |
2311 | unsigned char *namebytes; | |
2312 | X509_NAME *name = sk_X509_NAME_value(ca_sk, i); | |
2313 | int namelen; | |
2314 | ||
2315 | if (name == NULL | |
2316 | || (namelen = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL)) < 0 | |
2317 | || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, namelen, | |
2318 | &namebytes) | |
2319 | || i2d_X509_NAME(name, &namebytes) != namelen) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2320 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_CA_NAMES, |
2321 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2322 | return 0; |
2323 | } | |
2324 | } | |
2325 | } | |
2326 | ||
f63a17d6 MC |
2327 | if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) { |
2328 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_CA_NAMES, | |
2329 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
5d6cca05 | 2330 | return 0; |
f63a17d6 | 2331 | } |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2332 | |
2333 | return 1; | |
2334 | } | |
72ceb6a6 DSH |
2335 | |
2336 | /* Create a buffer containing data to be signed for server key exchange */ | |
f63a17d6 | 2337 | size_t construct_key_exchange_tbs(SSL *s, unsigned char **ptbs, |
72ceb6a6 DSH |
2338 | const void *param, size_t paramlen) |
2339 | { | |
2340 | size_t tbslen = 2 * SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + paramlen; | |
2341 | unsigned char *tbs = OPENSSL_malloc(tbslen); | |
2342 | ||
f63a17d6 MC |
2343 | if (tbs == NULL) { |
2344 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_KEY_EXCHANGE_TBS, | |
2345 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
72ceb6a6 | 2346 | return 0; |
f63a17d6 | 2347 | } |
555cbb32 TS |
2348 | memcpy(tbs, s->s3.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); |
2349 | memcpy(tbs + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, s->s3.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); | |
72ceb6a6 DSH |
2350 | |
2351 | memcpy(tbs + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE * 2, param, paramlen); | |
2352 | ||
2353 | *ptbs = tbs; | |
2354 | return tbslen; | |
2355 | } | |
9d75dce3 TS |
2356 | |
2357 | /* | |
2358 | * Saves the current handshake digest for Post-Handshake Auth, | |
2359 | * Done after ClientFinished is processed, done exactly once | |
2360 | */ | |
2361 | int tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(SSL *s) | |
2362 | { | |
2363 | if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) { | |
2364 | if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) | |
2365 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
2366 | return 0; | |
2367 | ||
2368 | s->pha_dgst = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); | |
2369 | if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) { | |
2370 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, | |
2371 | SSL_F_TLS13_SAVE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA, | |
2372 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2373 | return 0; | |
2374 | } | |
2375 | if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(s->pha_dgst, | |
555cbb32 | 2376 | s->s3.handshake_dgst)) { |
9d75dce3 TS |
2377 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
2378 | SSL_F_TLS13_SAVE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA, | |
2379 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2380 | return 0; | |
2381 | } | |
2382 | } | |
2383 | return 1; | |
2384 | } | |
2385 | ||
2386 | /* | |
2387 | * Restores the Post-Handshake Auth handshake digest | |
2388 | * Done just before sending/processing the Cert Request | |
2389 | */ | |
2390 | int tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(SSL *s) | |
2391 | { | |
2392 | if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) { | |
2393 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, | |
2394 | SSL_F_TLS13_RESTORE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA, | |
2395 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2396 | return 0; | |
2397 | } | |
555cbb32 | 2398 | if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(s->s3.handshake_dgst, |
9d75dce3 TS |
2399 | s->pha_dgst)) { |
2400 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, | |
2401 | SSL_F_TLS13_RESTORE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA, | |
2402 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2403 | return 0; | |
2404 | } | |
2405 | return 1; | |
2406 | } |