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Commit | Line | Data |
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846e33c7 | 1 | /* |
a28d06f3 | 2 | * Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. |
aa8f3d76 | 3 | * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved |
3813046d | 4 | * |
2c18d164 | 5 | * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use |
846e33c7 RS |
6 | * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy |
7 | * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at | |
8 | * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html | |
3813046d | 9 | */ |
846e33c7 | 10 | |
48948d53 | 11 | #include <limits.h> |
f2d9a32c | 12 | #include <string.h> |
d02b48c6 | 13 | #include <stdio.h> |
706457b7 DMSP |
14 | #include "../ssl_local.h" |
15 | #include "statem_local.h" | |
67dc995e | 16 | #include "internal/cryptlib.h" |
ec577822 | 17 | #include <openssl/buffer.h> |
ec577822 BM |
18 | #include <openssl/objects.h> |
19 | #include <openssl/evp.h> | |
d7e498ac | 20 | #include <openssl/rsa.h> |
ec577822 | 21 | #include <openssl/x509.h> |
49b26f54 | 22 | #include <openssl/trace.h> |
d02b48c6 | 23 | |
c6d38183 RS |
24 | /* |
25 | * Map error codes to TLS/SSL alart types. | |
26 | */ | |
27 | typedef struct x509err2alert_st { | |
28 | int x509err; | |
29 | int alert; | |
30 | } X509ERR2ALERT; | |
31 | ||
597c51bc MC |
32 | /* Fixed value used in the ServerHello random field to identify an HRR */ |
33 | const unsigned char hrrrandom[] = { | |
34 | 0xcf, 0x21, 0xad, 0x74, 0xe5, 0x9a, 0x61, 0x11, 0xbe, 0x1d, 0x8c, 0x02, | |
35 | 0x1e, 0x65, 0xb8, 0x91, 0xc2, 0xa2, 0x11, 0x16, 0x7a, 0xbb, 0x8c, 0x5e, | |
36 | 0x07, 0x9e, 0x09, 0xe2, 0xc8, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x9c | |
37 | }; | |
38 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
39 | /* |
40 | * send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or | |
41 | * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) | |
42 | */ | |
e7ecc7d4 | 43 | int ssl3_do_write(SSL *s, int type) |
0f113f3e MC |
44 | { |
45 | int ret; | |
7ee8627f | 46 | size_t written = 0; |
0f113f3e MC |
47 | |
48 | ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, type, &s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], | |
7ee8627f | 49 | s->init_num, &written); |
0f113f3e | 50 | if (ret < 0) |
26a7d938 | 51 | return -1; |
0f113f3e MC |
52 | if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) |
53 | /* | |
54 | * should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case we'll | |
55 | * ignore the result anyway | |
9d75dce3 | 56 | * TLS1.3 KeyUpdate and NewSessionTicket do not need to be added |
0f113f3e | 57 | */ |
9d75dce3 TS |
58 | if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || (s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET |
59 | && s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE | |
60 | && s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE)) | |
61 | if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, | |
62 | (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], | |
63 | written)) | |
64 | return -1; | |
7ee8627f | 65 | if (written == s->init_num) { |
0f113f3e MC |
66 | if (s->msg_callback) |
67 | s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data, | |
68 | (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s, | |
69 | s->msg_callback_arg); | |
208fb891 | 70 | return 1; |
0f113f3e | 71 | } |
7ee8627f MC |
72 | s->init_off += written; |
73 | s->init_num -= written; | |
26a7d938 | 74 | return 0; |
0f113f3e | 75 | } |
e7ecc7d4 | 76 | |
4a01c59f | 77 | int tls_close_construct_packet(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int htype) |
2c7b4dbc MC |
78 | { |
79 | size_t msglen; | |
80 | ||
4a01c59f | 81 | if ((htype != SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) |
f1ec23c0 | 82 | || !WPACKET_get_length(pkt, &msglen) |
7cea05dc | 83 | || msglen > INT_MAX) |
2c7b4dbc MC |
84 | return 0; |
85 | s->init_num = (int)msglen; | |
86 | s->init_off = 0; | |
87 | ||
88 | return 1; | |
89 | } | |
90 | ||
1f5b44e9 MC |
91 | int tls_setup_handshake(SSL *s) |
92 | { | |
8e32ea63 MC |
93 | int ver_min, ver_max, ok; |
94 | ||
f63a17d6 MC |
95 | if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) { |
96 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
c7f47786 | 97 | return 0; |
f63a17d6 | 98 | } |
c7f47786 | 99 | |
b186a592 MC |
100 | /* Reset any extension flags */ |
101 | memset(s->ext.extflags, 0, sizeof(s->ext.extflags)); | |
102 | ||
8e32ea63 | 103 | if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max, NULL) != 0) { |
c48ffbcc | 104 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE); |
8e32ea63 MC |
105 | return 0; |
106 | } | |
107 | ||
108 | /* Sanity check that we have MD5-SHA1 if we need it */ | |
109 | if (s->ctx->ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX] == NULL) { | |
110 | int md5sha1_needed = 0; | |
111 | ||
112 | /* We don't have MD5-SHA1 - do we need it? */ | |
113 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
114 | if (DTLS_VERSION_LE(ver_max, DTLS1_VERSION)) | |
115 | md5sha1_needed = 1; | |
116 | } else { | |
117 | if (ver_max <= TLS1_1_VERSION) | |
118 | md5sha1_needed = 1; | |
119 | } | |
120 | if (md5sha1_needed) { | |
c48ffbcc RL |
121 | SSLfatal_data(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, |
122 | SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_DIGEST_ALGORITHM, | |
123 | "The max supported SSL/TLS version needs the" | |
124 | " MD5-SHA1 digest but it is not available" | |
125 | " in the loaded providers. Use (D)TLSv1.2 or" | |
126 | " above, or load different providers"); | |
8e32ea63 MC |
127 | return 0; |
128 | } | |
129 | ||
130 | ok = 1; | |
131 | /* Don't allow TLSv1.1 or below to be negotiated */ | |
132 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
133 | if (DTLS_VERSION_LT(ver_min, DTLS1_2_VERSION)) | |
134 | ok = SSL_set_min_proto_version(s, DTLS1_2_VERSION); | |
135 | } else { | |
136 | if (ver_min < TLS1_2_VERSION) | |
137 | ok = SSL_set_min_proto_version(s, TLS1_2_VERSION); | |
138 | } | |
139 | if (!ok) { | |
140 | /* Shouldn't happen */ | |
c48ffbcc | 141 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
8e32ea63 MC |
142 | return 0; |
143 | } | |
144 | } | |
145 | ||
146 | ok = 0; | |
c7f47786 | 147 | if (s->server) { |
38a73150 | 148 | STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = SSL_get_ciphers(s); |
8e32ea63 | 149 | int i; |
38a73150 MC |
150 | |
151 | /* | |
152 | * Sanity check that the maximum version we accept has ciphers | |
153 | * enabled. For clients we do this check during construction of the | |
154 | * ClientHello. | |
155 | */ | |
38a73150 MC |
156 | for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) { |
157 | const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i); | |
158 | ||
159 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
160 | if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(ver_max, c->min_dtls) && | |
161 | DTLS_VERSION_LE(ver_max, c->max_dtls)) | |
162 | ok = 1; | |
163 | } else if (ver_max >= c->min_tls && ver_max <= c->max_tls) { | |
164 | ok = 1; | |
165 | } | |
166 | if (ok) | |
167 | break; | |
168 | } | |
169 | if (!ok) { | |
c48ffbcc RL |
170 | SSLfatal_data(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, |
171 | SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE, | |
172 | "No ciphers enabled for max supported " | |
173 | "SSL/TLS version"); | |
38a73150 MC |
174 | return 0; |
175 | } | |
c7f47786 | 176 | if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) { |
0e6161bc | 177 | /* N.B. s->session_ctx == s->ctx here */ |
9ef9088c | 178 | tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_accept); |
c7f47786 | 179 | } else { |
0e6161bc | 180 | /* N.B. s->ctx may not equal s->session_ctx */ |
9ef9088c | 181 | tsan_counter(&s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate); |
c7f47786 | 182 | |
555cbb32 | 183 | s->s3.tmp.cert_request = 0; |
c7f47786 MC |
184 | } |
185 | } else { | |
186 | if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) | |
9ef9088c | 187 | tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect); |
c7f47786 | 188 | else |
9ef9088c | 189 | tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate); |
c7f47786 MC |
190 | |
191 | /* mark client_random uninitialized */ | |
555cbb32 | 192 | memset(s->s3.client_random, 0, sizeof(s->s3.client_random)); |
c7f47786 MC |
193 | s->hit = 0; |
194 | ||
555cbb32 | 195 | s->s3.tmp.cert_req = 0; |
c7f47786 | 196 | |
1f5b44e9 | 197 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) |
c7f47786 | 198 | s->statem.use_timer = 1; |
c7f47786 MC |
199 | } |
200 | ||
201 | return 1; | |
202 | } | |
203 | ||
2c5dfdc3 MC |
204 | /* |
205 | * Size of the to-be-signed TLS13 data, without the hash size itself: | |
206 | * 64 bytes of value 32, 33 context bytes, 1 byte separator | |
207 | */ | |
208 | #define TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE 64 | |
209 | #define TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE (TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE + 33 + 1) | |
210 | ||
211 | static int get_cert_verify_tbs_data(SSL *s, unsigned char *tls13tbs, | |
212 | void **hdata, size_t *hdatalen) | |
213 | { | |
48102247 | 214 | #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC |
99435164 | 215 | static const char servercontext[] = { 0x54, 0x4c, 0x53, 0x20, 0x31, 0x2e, |
48102247 | 216 | 0x33, 0x2c, 0x20, 0x73, 0x65, 0x72, 0x76, 0x65, 0x72, 0x20, 0x43, 0x65, |
217 | 0x72, 0x74, 0x69, 0x66, 0x69, 0x63, 0x61, 0x74, 0x65, 0x56, 0x65, 0x72, | |
218 | 0x69, 0x66, 0x79, 0x00 }; | |
99435164 | 219 | static const char clientcontext[] = { 0x54, 0x4c, 0x53, 0x20, 0x31, 0x2e, |
48102247 | 220 | 0x33, 0x2c, 0x20, 0x63, 0x6c, 0x69, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x74, 0x20, 0x43, 0x65, |
221 | 0x72, 0x74, 0x69, 0x66, 0x69, 0x63, 0x61, 0x74, 0x65, 0x56, 0x65, 0x72, | |
222 | 0x69, 0x66, 0x79, 0x00 }; | |
223 | #else | |
99435164 AV |
224 | static const char servercontext[] = "TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify"; |
225 | static const char clientcontext[] = "TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify"; | |
48102247 | 226 | #endif |
2c5dfdc3 MC |
227 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
228 | size_t hashlen; | |
229 | ||
230 | /* Set the first 64 bytes of to-be-signed data to octet 32 */ | |
231 | memset(tls13tbs, 32, TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE); | |
232 | /* This copies the 33 bytes of context plus the 0 separator byte */ | |
233 | if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY | |
234 | || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY) | |
235 | strcpy((char *)tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE, servercontext); | |
236 | else | |
237 | strcpy((char *)tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE, clientcontext); | |
238 | ||
239 | /* | |
240 | * If we're currently reading then we need to use the saved handshake | |
241 | * hash value. We can't use the current handshake hash state because | |
242 | * that includes the CertVerify itself. | |
243 | */ | |
244 | if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY | |
245 | || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY) { | |
246 | memcpy(tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE, s->cert_verify_hash, | |
247 | s->cert_verify_hash_len); | |
248 | hashlen = s->cert_verify_hash_len; | |
249 | } else if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE, | |
250 | EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &hashlen)) { | |
f63a17d6 | 251 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
2c5dfdc3 MC |
252 | return 0; |
253 | } | |
254 | ||
255 | *hdata = tls13tbs; | |
256 | *hdatalen = TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + hashlen; | |
257 | } else { | |
258 | size_t retlen; | |
60690b5b | 259 | long retlen_l; |
2c5dfdc3 | 260 | |
555cbb32 | 261 | retlen = retlen_l = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3.handshake_buffer, hdata); |
60690b5b | 262 | if (retlen_l <= 0) { |
c48ffbcc | 263 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
2c5dfdc3 | 264 | return 0; |
f63a17d6 | 265 | } |
2c5dfdc3 MC |
266 | *hdatalen = retlen; |
267 | } | |
268 | ||
269 | return 1; | |
270 | } | |
271 | ||
d8bc1399 MC |
272 | int tls_construct_cert_verify(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
273 | { | |
ad4dd362 DSH |
274 | EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; |
275 | const EVP_MD *md = NULL; | |
d8bc1399 | 276 | EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL; |
5f9b64a2 MC |
277 | EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; |
278 | size_t hdatalen = 0, siglen = 0; | |
d8bc1399 MC |
279 | void *hdata; |
280 | unsigned char *sig = NULL; | |
2c5dfdc3 | 281 | unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
555cbb32 | 282 | const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3.tmp.sigalg; |
2c5dfdc3 | 283 | |
555cbb32 | 284 | if (lu == NULL || s->s3.tmp.cert == NULL) { |
c48ffbcc | 285 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
ad4dd362 DSH |
286 | goto err; |
287 | } | |
555cbb32 | 288 | pkey = s->s3.tmp.cert->privatekey; |
ad4dd362 | 289 | |
c8f6c28a | 290 | if (pkey == NULL || !tls1_lookup_md(s->ctx, lu, &md)) { |
c48ffbcc | 291 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
ad4dd362 DSH |
292 | goto err; |
293 | } | |
d8bc1399 MC |
294 | |
295 | mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); | |
296 | if (mctx == NULL) { | |
c48ffbcc | 297 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
d8bc1399 MC |
298 | goto err; |
299 | } | |
d8bc1399 | 300 | |
2c5dfdc3 MC |
301 | /* Get the data to be signed */ |
302 | if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) { | |
f63a17d6 | 303 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
d8bc1399 MC |
304 | goto err; |
305 | } | |
306 | ||
ad4dd362 | 307 | if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg)) { |
c48ffbcc | 308 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
d8bc1399 MC |
309 | goto err; |
310 | } | |
5f9b64a2 | 311 | |
ed576acd TM |
312 | if (EVP_DigestSignInit_ex(mctx, &pctx, |
313 | md == NULL ? NULL : EVP_MD_get0_name(md), | |
d38b6ae9 P |
314 | s->ctx->libctx, s->ctx->propq, pkey, |
315 | NULL) <= 0) { | |
c48ffbcc | 316 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
5f9b64a2 MC |
317 | goto err; |
318 | } | |
319 | ||
ad4dd362 | 320 | if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) { |
5f9b64a2 | 321 | if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0 |
968ae5b3 DSH |
322 | || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, |
323 | RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) { | |
c48ffbcc | 324 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
5f9b64a2 MC |
325 | goto err; |
326 | } | |
caf2b6b5 DSH |
327 | } |
328 | if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { | |
bddbfae1 MC |
329 | /* |
330 | * Here we use EVP_DigestSignUpdate followed by EVP_DigestSignFinal | |
331 | * in order to add the EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET call between them. | |
332 | */ | |
caf2b6b5 | 333 | if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0 |
83b4a243 SL |
334 | || EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET, |
335 | (int)s->session->master_key_length, | |
336 | s->session->master_key) <= 0 | |
bddbfae1 | 337 | || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx, NULL, &siglen) <= 0) { |
caf2b6b5 | 338 | |
c48ffbcc | 339 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
5f9b64a2 MC |
340 | goto err; |
341 | } | |
bddbfae1 MC |
342 | sig = OPENSSL_malloc(siglen); |
343 | if (sig == NULL | |
344 | || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx, sig, &siglen) <= 0) { | |
c48ffbcc | 345 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
bddbfae1 MC |
346 | goto err; |
347 | } | |
348 | } else { | |
349 | /* | |
350 | * Here we *must* use EVP_DigestSign() because Ed25519/Ed448 does not | |
351 | * support streaming via EVP_DigestSignUpdate/EVP_DigestSignFinal | |
352 | */ | |
353 | if (EVP_DigestSign(mctx, NULL, &siglen, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0) { | |
c48ffbcc | 354 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
bddbfae1 MC |
355 | goto err; |
356 | } | |
357 | sig = OPENSSL_malloc(siglen); | |
358 | if (sig == NULL | |
359 | || EVP_DigestSign(mctx, sig, &siglen, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0) { | |
c48ffbcc | 360 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
bddbfae1 MC |
361 | goto err; |
362 | } | |
d8bc1399 | 363 | } |
5f9b64a2 | 364 | |
d8bc1399 MC |
365 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST |
366 | { | |
ad4dd362 DSH |
367 | int pktype = lu->sig; |
368 | ||
d8bc1399 MC |
369 | if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001 |
370 | || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256 | |
371 | || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) | |
5f9b64a2 | 372 | BUF_reverse(sig, NULL, siglen); |
d8bc1399 MC |
373 | } |
374 | #endif | |
375 | ||
5f9b64a2 | 376 | if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, sig, siglen)) { |
c48ffbcc | 377 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
d8bc1399 MC |
378 | goto err; |
379 | } | |
380 | ||
381 | /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */ | |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
382 | if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { |
383 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
d8bc1399 | 384 | goto err; |
d4d2f3a4 | 385 | } |
d8bc1399 MC |
386 | |
387 | OPENSSL_free(sig); | |
388 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); | |
389 | return 1; | |
390 | err: | |
391 | OPENSSL_free(sig); | |
392 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); | |
d8bc1399 MC |
393 | return 0; |
394 | } | |
395 | ||
396 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) | |
397 | { | |
398 | EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; | |
703bcee0 | 399 | const unsigned char *data; |
d8bc1399 MC |
400 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST |
401 | unsigned char *gost_data = NULL; | |
402 | #endif | |
eb5fd03b | 403 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
dd24857b | 404 | int j; |
d8bc1399 MC |
405 | unsigned int len; |
406 | X509 *peer; | |
407 | const EVP_MD *md = NULL; | |
2c5dfdc3 | 408 | size_t hdatalen = 0; |
d8bc1399 | 409 | void *hdata; |
2c5dfdc3 | 410 | unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
d8bc1399 | 411 | EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); |
5f9b64a2 | 412 | EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; |
d8bc1399 MC |
413 | |
414 | if (mctx == NULL) { | |
c48ffbcc | 415 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
f63a17d6 | 416 | goto err; |
d8bc1399 MC |
417 | } |
418 | ||
419 | peer = s->session->peer; | |
420 | pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(peer); | |
f63a17d6 | 421 | if (pkey == NULL) { |
c48ffbcc | 422 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
f63a17d6 MC |
423 | goto err; |
424 | } | |
83b4049a | 425 | |
dd24857b | 426 | if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, NULL) == NULL) { |
c48ffbcc | 427 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, |
f63a17d6 MC |
428 | SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE); |
429 | goto err; | |
d8bc1399 MC |
430 | } |
431 | ||
f464f9c0 | 432 | if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { |
f464f9c0 PD |
433 | unsigned int sigalg; |
434 | ||
435 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 436 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET); |
f63a17d6 | 437 | goto err; |
f464f9c0 | 438 | } |
f63a17d6 MC |
439 | if (tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey) <= 0) { |
440 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
441 | goto err; | |
f464f9c0 | 442 | } |
f464f9c0 | 443 | } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) { |
c48ffbcc | 444 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
f63a17d6 | 445 | goto err; |
f464f9c0 PD |
446 | } |
447 | ||
c8f6c28a | 448 | if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->ctx, s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg, &md)) { |
c48ffbcc | 449 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
f63a17d6 | 450 | goto err; |
168067b6 | 451 | } |
f464f9c0 | 452 | |
572fa024 | 453 | if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) |
49b26f54 | 454 | OSSL_TRACE1(TLS, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", |
ed576acd | 455 | md == NULL ? "n/a" : EVP_MD_get0_name(md)); |
572fa024 | 456 | |
d8bc1399 MC |
457 | /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */ |
458 | /* | |
f464f9c0 PD |
459 | * If key is GOST and len is exactly 64 or 128, it is signature without |
460 | * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till TLS 1.2) | |
d8bc1399 MC |
461 | */ |
462 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST | |
f464f9c0 PD |
463 | if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) |
464 | && ((PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 64 | |
ed576acd TM |
465 | && (EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001 |
466 | || EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256)) | |
f464f9c0 | 467 | || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 128 |
ed576acd | 468 | && EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512))) { |
f464f9c0 | 469 | len = PACKET_remaining(pkt); |
d8bc1399 MC |
470 | } else |
471 | #endif | |
f464f9c0 | 472 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len)) { |
c48ffbcc | 473 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
f63a17d6 | 474 | goto err; |
d8bc1399 | 475 | } |
f464f9c0 | 476 | |
d8bc1399 | 477 | if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, len)) { |
c48ffbcc | 478 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
f63a17d6 | 479 | goto err; |
d8bc1399 MC |
480 | } |
481 | ||
2c5dfdc3 | 482 | if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
483 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
484 | goto err; | |
d8bc1399 MC |
485 | } |
486 | ||
49b26f54 | 487 | OSSL_TRACE1(TLS, "Using client verify alg %s\n", |
ed576acd | 488 | md == NULL ? "n/a" : EVP_MD_get0_name(md)); |
49b26f54 | 489 | |
d8652be0 | 490 | if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit_ex(mctx, &pctx, |
ed576acd | 491 | md == NULL ? NULL : EVP_MD_get0_name(md), |
d38b6ae9 P |
492 | s->ctx->libctx, s->ctx->propq, pkey, |
493 | NULL) <= 0) { | |
c48ffbcc | 494 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
f63a17d6 | 495 | goto err; |
d8bc1399 MC |
496 | } |
497 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST | |
498 | { | |
ed576acd | 499 | int pktype = EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey); |
d8bc1399 MC |
500 | if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001 |
501 | || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256 | |
502 | || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) { | |
503 | if ((gost_data = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) { | |
c48ffbcc | 504 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
f63a17d6 | 505 | goto err; |
d8bc1399 MC |
506 | } |
507 | BUF_reverse(gost_data, data, len); | |
508 | data = gost_data; | |
509 | } | |
510 | } | |
511 | #endif | |
512 | ||
5554facb | 513 | if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) { |
5f9b64a2 | 514 | if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0 |
968ae5b3 DSH |
515 | || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, |
516 | RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) { | |
c48ffbcc | 517 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
f63a17d6 | 518 | goto err; |
5f9b64a2 | 519 | } |
d8bc1399 | 520 | } |
caf2b6b5 DSH |
521 | if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { |
522 | if (EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0 | |
83b4a243 SL |
523 | || EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET, |
524 | (int)s->session->master_key_length, | |
525 | s->session->master_key) <= 0) { | |
c48ffbcc | 526 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
f63a17d6 | 527 | goto err; |
caf2b6b5 DSH |
528 | } |
529 | if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(mctx, data, len) <= 0) { | |
c48ffbcc | 530 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); |
f63a17d6 | 531 | goto err; |
caf2b6b5 DSH |
532 | } |
533 | } else { | |
534 | j = EVP_DigestVerify(mctx, data, len, hdata, hdatalen); | |
25ffeb11 | 535 | if (j <= 0) { |
c48ffbcc | 536 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); |
f63a17d6 | 537 | goto err; |
caf2b6b5 | 538 | } |
d8bc1399 MC |
539 | } |
540 | ||
e4562014 MC |
541 | /* |
542 | * In TLSv1.3 on the client side we make sure we prepare the client | |
543 | * certificate after the CertVerify instead of when we get the | |
544 | * CertificateRequest. This is because in TLSv1.3 the CertificateRequest | |
545 | * comes *before* the Certificate message. In TLSv1.2 it comes after. We | |
8c2bfd25 | 546 | * want to make sure that SSL_get1_peer_certificate() will return the actual |
e4562014 MC |
547 | * server certificate from the client_cert_cb callback. |
548 | */ | |
555cbb32 | 549 | if (!s->server && SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 1) |
e4562014 MC |
550 | ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; |
551 | else | |
552 | ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; | |
f63a17d6 | 553 | err: |
555cbb32 TS |
554 | BIO_free(s->s3.handshake_buffer); |
555 | s->s3.handshake_buffer = NULL; | |
d8bc1399 MC |
556 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); |
557 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST | |
558 | OPENSSL_free(gost_data); | |
559 | #endif | |
560 | return ret; | |
561 | } | |
562 | ||
229185e6 | 563 | int tls_construct_finished(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
0f113f3e | 564 | { |
12472b45 | 565 | size_t finish_md_len; |
229185e6 | 566 | const char *sender; |
8b0e934a | 567 | size_t slen; |
229185e6 | 568 | |
f7e393be | 569 | /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */ |
9d75dce3 | 570 | if (!s->server && s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) |
f7e393be MC |
571 | s->statem.cleanuphand = 1; |
572 | ||
573 | /* | |
574 | * We only change the keys if we didn't already do this when we sent the | |
575 | * client certificate | |
576 | */ | |
577 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) | |
578 | && !s->server | |
555cbb32 | 579 | && s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 0 |
f7e393be | 580 | && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
581 | SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) {; |
582 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
b43c3765 | 583 | return 0; |
f7e393be MC |
584 | } |
585 | ||
229185e6 MC |
586 | if (s->server) { |
587 | sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label; | |
588 | slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len; | |
589 | } else { | |
590 | sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label; | |
591 | slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len; | |
592 | } | |
0f113f3e | 593 | |
12472b45 MC |
594 | finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, |
595 | sender, slen, | |
555cbb32 | 596 | s->s3.tmp.finish_md); |
12472b45 | 597 | if (finish_md_len == 0) { |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
598 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
599 | return 0; | |
4f89bfbf MC |
600 | } |
601 | ||
555cbb32 | 602 | s->s3.tmp.finish_md_len = finish_md_len; |
4f89bfbf | 603 | |
555cbb32 | 604 | if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3.tmp.finish_md, finish_md_len)) { |
c48ffbcc | 605 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
d4d2f3a4 | 606 | return 0; |
4f89bfbf | 607 | } |
0f113f3e | 608 | |
2c7bd692 CB |
609 | /* |
610 | * Log the master secret, if logging is enabled. We don't log it for | |
611 | * TLSv1.3: there's a different key schedule for that. | |
612 | */ | |
613 | if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl_log_secret(s, MASTER_SECRET_LABEL, | |
614 | s->session->master_key, | |
380a522f | 615 | s->session->master_key_length)) { |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
616 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
617 | return 0; | |
380a522f | 618 | } |
2faa1b48 | 619 | |
b9908bf9 MC |
620 | /* |
621 | * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks | |
622 | */ | |
380a522f | 623 | if (!ossl_assert(finish_md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) { |
c48ffbcc | 624 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
d4d2f3a4 | 625 | return 0; |
380a522f | 626 | } |
23a635c0 | 627 | if (!s->server) { |
555cbb32 | 628 | memcpy(s->s3.previous_client_finished, s->s3.tmp.finish_md, |
12472b45 | 629 | finish_md_len); |
555cbb32 | 630 | s->s3.previous_client_finished_len = finish_md_len; |
b9908bf9 | 631 | } else { |
555cbb32 | 632 | memcpy(s->s3.previous_server_finished, s->s3.tmp.finish_md, |
12472b45 | 633 | finish_md_len); |
555cbb32 | 634 | s->s3.previous_server_finished_len = finish_md_len; |
b9908bf9 | 635 | } |
0f113f3e | 636 | |
b9908bf9 | 637 | return 1; |
0f113f3e | 638 | } |
d02b48c6 | 639 | |
44c04a2e MC |
640 | int tls_construct_key_update(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
641 | { | |
642 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->key_update)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 643 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
d4d2f3a4 | 644 | return 0; |
44c04a2e MC |
645 | } |
646 | ||
9412b3ad | 647 | s->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE; |
44c04a2e | 648 | return 1; |
44c04a2e MC |
649 | } |
650 | ||
e1c3de44 MC |
651 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_update(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
652 | { | |
653 | unsigned int updatetype; | |
654 | ||
524420d8 MC |
655 | /* |
656 | * A KeyUpdate message signals a key change so the end of the message must | |
657 | * be on a record boundary. | |
658 | */ | |
659 | if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 660 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY); |
f63a17d6 | 661 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
524420d8 MC |
662 | } |
663 | ||
e1c3de44 | 664 | if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &updatetype) |
2d871227 | 665 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { |
c48ffbcc | 666 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE); |
f63a17d6 | 667 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
e1c3de44 MC |
668 | } |
669 | ||
9010b7bc MC |
670 | /* |
671 | * There are only two defined key update types. Fail if we get a value we | |
672 | * didn't recognise. | |
673 | */ | |
2d871227 MC |
674 | if (updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED |
675 | && updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED) { | |
c48ffbcc | 676 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE); |
f63a17d6 | 677 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
2d871227 MC |
678 | } |
679 | ||
5bf47933 MC |
680 | /* |
681 | * If we get a request for us to update our sending keys too then, we need | |
682 | * to additionally send a KeyUpdate message. However that message should | |
feb9e31c | 683 | * not also request an update (otherwise we get into an infinite loop). |
5bf47933 | 684 | */ |
feb9e31c | 685 | if (updatetype == SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED) |
5bf47933 MC |
686 | s->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED; |
687 | ||
57389a32 | 688 | if (!tls13_update_key(s, 0)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
689 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
690 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
57389a32 MC |
691 | } |
692 | ||
e1c3de44 MC |
693 | return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; |
694 | } | |
695 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
696 | /* |
697 | * ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen | |
698 | * to far. | |
699 | */ | |
5d671101 | 700 | int ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s) |
0f113f3e MC |
701 | { |
702 | const char *sender; | |
8b0e934a | 703 | size_t slen; |
5d671101 | 704 | |
49ae7423 | 705 | if (!s->server) { |
0f113f3e MC |
706 | sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label; |
707 | slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len; | |
708 | } else { | |
709 | sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label; | |
710 | slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len; | |
711 | } | |
712 | ||
555cbb32 | 713 | s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md_len = |
5d671101 | 714 | s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, sender, slen, |
555cbb32 | 715 | s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md); |
5d671101 | 716 | |
555cbb32 | 717 | if (s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md_len == 0) { |
5d671101 MC |
718 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
719 | return 0; | |
720 | } | |
721 | ||
722 | return 1; | |
0f113f3e | 723 | } |
ee2ffc27 | 724 | |
be3583fa | 725 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
b9908bf9 | 726 | { |
348240c6 | 727 | size_t remain; |
4fa52141 | 728 | |
73999b62 | 729 | remain = PACKET_remaining(pkt); |
657da85e MC |
730 | /* |
731 | * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, which should already have | |
c69f2adf MC |
732 | * been consumed by ssl_get_message() so there should be no bytes left, |
733 | * unless we're using DTLS1_BAD_VER, which has an extra 2 bytes | |
657da85e | 734 | */ |
c69f2adf | 735 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
73999b62 | 736 | if ((s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER |
a230b26e EK |
737 | && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH + 1) |
738 | || (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER | |
739 | && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH - 1)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 740 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); |
f63a17d6 | 741 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
c69f2adf MC |
742 | } |
743 | } else { | |
73999b62 | 744 | if (remain != 0) { |
c48ffbcc | 745 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); |
f63a17d6 | 746 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
c69f2adf | 747 | } |
657da85e MC |
748 | } |
749 | ||
750 | /* Check we have a cipher to change to */ | |
555cbb32 | 751 | if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher == NULL) { |
c48ffbcc | 752 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); |
f63a17d6 | 753 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
657da85e MC |
754 | } |
755 | ||
555cbb32 | 756 | s->s3.change_cipher_spec = 1; |
657da85e | 757 | if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) { |
c48ffbcc | 758 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
f63a17d6 | 759 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
657da85e MC |
760 | } |
761 | ||
c69f2adf MC |
762 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
763 | dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ); | |
764 | ||
765 | if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) | |
766 | s->d1->handshake_read_seq++; | |
767 | ||
768 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
769 | /* | |
770 | * Remember that a CCS has been received, so that an old key of | |
771 | * SCTP-Auth can be deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored if no | |
772 | * SCTP is used | |
773 | */ | |
774 | BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD, 1, NULL); | |
775 | #endif | |
776 | } | |
777 | ||
b9908bf9 | 778 | return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; |
657da85e MC |
779 | } |
780 | ||
be3583fa | 781 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_finished(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
b9908bf9 | 782 | { |
12472b45 | 783 | size_t md_len; |
b9908bf9 | 784 | |
d781d247 MC |
785 | |
786 | /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */ | |
9d75dce3 | 787 | if (s->server) { |
de9e884b MC |
788 | /* |
789 | * To get this far we must have read encrypted data from the client. We | |
790 | * no longer tolerate unencrypted alerts. This value is ignored if less | |
791 | * than TLSv1.3 | |
792 | */ | |
793 | s->statem.enc_read_state = ENC_READ_STATE_VALID; | |
9d75dce3 TS |
794 | if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) |
795 | s->statem.cleanuphand = 1; | |
796 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) { | |
797 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
798 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
799 | } | |
800 | } | |
d781d247 | 801 | |
524420d8 MC |
802 | /* |
803 | * In TLSv1.3 a Finished message signals a key change so the end of the | |
804 | * message must be on a record boundary. | |
805 | */ | |
806 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 807 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY); |
f63a17d6 | 808 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
524420d8 MC |
809 | } |
810 | ||
0f113f3e | 811 | /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */ |
555cbb32 | 812 | if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->s3.change_cipher_spec) { |
c48ffbcc | 813 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS); |
f63a17d6 | 814 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
0f113f3e | 815 | } |
555cbb32 | 816 | s->s3.change_cipher_spec = 0; |
0f113f3e | 817 | |
555cbb32 | 818 | md_len = s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md_len; |
0f113f3e | 819 | |
12472b45 | 820 | if (md_len != PACKET_remaining(pkt)) { |
c48ffbcc | 821 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH); |
f63a17d6 | 822 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
0f113f3e MC |
823 | } |
824 | ||
555cbb32 | 825 | if (CRYPTO_memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt), s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md, |
12472b45 | 826 | md_len) != 0) { |
c48ffbcc | 827 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED); |
f63a17d6 | 828 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
0f113f3e MC |
829 | } |
830 | ||
831 | /* | |
832 | * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks | |
833 | */ | |
380a522f | 834 | if (!ossl_assert(md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) { |
c48ffbcc | 835 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
f63a17d6 | 836 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
380a522f | 837 | } |
23a635c0 | 838 | if (s->server) { |
555cbb32 | 839 | memcpy(s->s3.previous_client_finished, s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md, |
12472b45 | 840 | md_len); |
555cbb32 | 841 | s->s3.previous_client_finished_len = md_len; |
0f113f3e | 842 | } else { |
555cbb32 | 843 | memcpy(s->s3.previous_server_finished, s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md, |
12472b45 | 844 | md_len); |
555cbb32 | 845 | s->s3.previous_server_finished_len = md_len; |
0f113f3e MC |
846 | } |
847 | ||
7776a36c MC |
848 | /* |
849 | * In TLS1.3 we also have to change cipher state and do any final processing | |
850 | * of the initial server flight (if we are a client) | |
851 | */ | |
92760c21 MC |
852 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
853 | if (s->server) { | |
9d75dce3 TS |
854 | if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED && |
855 | !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, | |
92760c21 | 856 | SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
857 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
858 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
92760c21 MC |
859 | } |
860 | } else { | |
d74014c4 BK |
861 | /* TLS 1.3 gets the secret size from the handshake md */ |
862 | size_t dummy; | |
92760c21 | 863 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, |
ec15acb6 | 864 | s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0, |
d74014c4 | 865 | &dummy)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
866 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
867 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
92760c21 MC |
868 | } |
869 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, | |
870 | SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
871 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
872 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
873 | } | |
874 | if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s)) { | |
875 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
876 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
92760c21 MC |
877 | } |
878 | } | |
879 | } | |
880 | ||
e6575156 | 881 | return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; |
0f113f3e | 882 | } |
d02b48c6 | 883 | |
7cea05dc | 884 | int tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
b9908bf9 | 885 | { |
7cea05dc | 886 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, SSL3_MT_CCS)) { |
c48ffbcc | 887 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
85a7a5e6 MC |
888 | return 0; |
889 | } | |
b9908bf9 | 890 | |
b9908bf9 MC |
891 | return 1; |
892 | } | |
893 | ||
e96e0f8e | 894 | /* Add a certificate to the WPACKET */ |
f63a17d6 | 895 | static int ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, int chain) |
0f113f3e | 896 | { |
e96e0f8e MC |
897 | int len; |
898 | unsigned char *outbytes; | |
899 | ||
900 | len = i2d_X509(x, NULL); | |
901 | if (len < 0) { | |
c48ffbcc | 902 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); |
e96e0f8e MC |
903 | return 0; |
904 | } | |
905 | if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u24(pkt, len, &outbytes) | |
906 | || i2d_X509(x, &outbytes) != len) { | |
c48ffbcc | 907 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
e96e0f8e MC |
908 | return 0; |
909 | } | |
910 | ||
911 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) | |
fe874d27 | 912 | && !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, x, |
f63a17d6 MC |
913 | chain)) { |
914 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
e96e0f8e | 915 | return 0; |
f63a17d6 | 916 | } |
e96e0f8e MC |
917 | |
918 | return 1; | |
919 | } | |
920 | ||
921 | /* Add certificate chain to provided WPACKET */ | |
f63a17d6 | 922 | static int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk) |
e96e0f8e MC |
923 | { |
924 | int i, chain_count; | |
925 | X509 *x; | |
926 | STACK_OF(X509) *extra_certs; | |
927 | STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL; | |
928 | X509_STORE *chain_store; | |
e96e0f8e MC |
929 | |
930 | if (cpk == NULL || cpk->x509 == NULL) | |
931 | return 1; | |
932 | ||
933 | x = cpk->x509; | |
934 | ||
935 | /* | |
936 | * If we have a certificate specific chain use it, else use parent ctx. | |
937 | */ | |
d805a57b | 938 | if (cpk->chain != NULL) |
e96e0f8e MC |
939 | extra_certs = cpk->chain; |
940 | else | |
941 | extra_certs = s->ctx->extra_certs; | |
942 | ||
943 | if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN) || extra_certs) | |
944 | chain_store = NULL; | |
945 | else if (s->cert->chain_store) | |
946 | chain_store = s->cert->chain_store; | |
947 | else | |
948 | chain_store = s->ctx->cert_store; | |
949 | ||
d805a57b | 950 | if (chain_store != NULL) { |
d8652be0 MC |
951 | X509_STORE_CTX *xs_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new_ex(s->ctx->libctx, |
952 | s->ctx->propq); | |
e96e0f8e MC |
953 | |
954 | if (xs_ctx == NULL) { | |
c48ffbcc | 955 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
f63a17d6 | 956 | return 0; |
e96e0f8e MC |
957 | } |
958 | if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(xs_ctx, chain_store, x, NULL)) { | |
959 | X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); | |
c48ffbcc | 960 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_X509_LIB); |
f63a17d6 | 961 | return 0; |
e96e0f8e MC |
962 | } |
963 | /* | |
964 | * It is valid for the chain not to be complete (because normally we | |
965 | * don't include the root cert in the chain). Therefore we deliberately | |
966 | * ignore the error return from this call. We're not actually verifying | |
967 | * the cert - we're just building as much of the chain as we can | |
968 | */ | |
969 | (void)X509_verify_cert(xs_ctx); | |
970 | /* Don't leave errors in the queue */ | |
971 | ERR_clear_error(); | |
972 | chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(xs_ctx); | |
973 | i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, chain, NULL, 0); | |
974 | if (i != 1) { | |
975 | #if 0 | |
976 | /* Dummy error calls so mkerr generates them */ | |
6849b73c RL |
977 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL); |
978 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL); | |
979 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK); | |
e96e0f8e MC |
980 | #endif |
981 | X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); | |
c48ffbcc | 982 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, i); |
f63a17d6 | 983 | return 0; |
e96e0f8e MC |
984 | } |
985 | chain_count = sk_X509_num(chain); | |
986 | for (i = 0; i < chain_count; i++) { | |
987 | x = sk_X509_value(chain, i); | |
988 | ||
f63a17d6 MC |
989 | if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i)) { |
990 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
e96e0f8e | 991 | X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); |
f63a17d6 | 992 | return 0; |
e96e0f8e MC |
993 | } |
994 | } | |
995 | X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); | |
996 | } else { | |
997 | i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, extra_certs, x, 0); | |
998 | if (i != 1) { | |
c48ffbcc | 999 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, i); |
f63a17d6 MC |
1000 | return 0; |
1001 | } | |
1002 | if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, 0)) { | |
1003 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
1004 | return 0; | |
e96e0f8e | 1005 | } |
e96e0f8e MC |
1006 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(extra_certs); i++) { |
1007 | x = sk_X509_value(extra_certs, i); | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1008 | if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i + 1)) { |
1009 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
1010 | return 0; | |
1011 | } | |
e96e0f8e MC |
1012 | } |
1013 | } | |
1014 | return 1; | |
e96e0f8e MC |
1015 | } |
1016 | ||
f63a17d6 | 1017 | unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk) |
e96e0f8e | 1018 | { |
f63a17d6 | 1019 | if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt)) { |
c48ffbcc | 1020 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
f63a17d6 MC |
1021 | return 0; |
1022 | } | |
e96e0f8e | 1023 | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1024 | if (!ssl_add_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk)) |
1025 | return 0; | |
1026 | ||
1027 | if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 1028 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
7cea05dc | 1029 | return 0; |
77d514c5 | 1030 | } |
f63a17d6 | 1031 | |
c49e1912 | 1032 | return 1; |
0f113f3e MC |
1033 | } |
1034 | ||
30f05b19 MC |
1035 | /* |
1036 | * Tidy up after the end of a handshake. In the case of SCTP this may result | |
1037 | * in NBIO events. If |clearbufs| is set then init_buf and the wbio buffer is | |
1038 | * freed up as well. | |
1039 | */ | |
a7e6a3d8 P |
1040 | WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, ossl_unused WORK_STATE wst, |
1041 | int clearbufs, int stop) | |
8723588e MC |
1042 | { |
1043 | void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL; | |
4af5836b | 1044 | int cleanuphand = s->statem.cleanuphand; |
8723588e | 1045 | |
30f05b19 | 1046 | if (clearbufs) { |
e7c27a6c N |
1047 | if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) |
1048 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
30f05b19 | 1049 | /* |
e7c27a6c N |
1050 | * RFC6083: SCTP provides a reliable and in-sequence transport service for DTLS |
1051 | * messages that require it. Therefore, DTLS procedures for retransmissions | |
1052 | * MUST NOT be used. | |
1053 | * Hence the init_buf can be cleared when DTLS over SCTP as transport is used. | |
1054 | */ | |
1055 | || BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)) | |
1056 | #endif | |
1057 | ) { | |
1058 | /* | |
1059 | * We don't do this in DTLS over UDP because we may still need the init_buf | |
30f05b19 MC |
1060 | * in case there are any unexpected retransmits |
1061 | */ | |
1062 | BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); | |
1063 | s->init_buf = NULL; | |
1064 | } | |
e7c27a6c | 1065 | |
a2c2e000 | 1066 | if (!ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s)) { |
c48ffbcc | 1067 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
b77f3ed1 | 1068 | return WORK_ERROR; |
a2c2e000 | 1069 | } |
30f05b19 | 1070 | s->init_num = 0; |
473483d4 | 1071 | } |
8723588e | 1072 | |
9d75dce3 TS |
1073 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->server |
1074 | && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) | |
1075 | s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT; | |
1076 | ||
c2c1d8a4 MC |
1077 | /* |
1078 | * Only set if there was a Finished message and this isn't after a TLSv1.3 | |
1079 | * post handshake exchange | |
1080 | */ | |
4af5836b | 1081 | if (cleanuphand) { |
8723588e MC |
1082 | /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */ |
1083 | s->renegotiate = 0; | |
1084 | s->new_session = 0; | |
c7f47786 | 1085 | s->statem.cleanuphand = 0; |
c0638ade | 1086 | s->ext.ticket_expected = 0; |
8723588e | 1087 | |
30f05b19 MC |
1088 | ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); |
1089 | ||
8723588e | 1090 | if (s->server) { |
16ff1342 MC |
1091 | /* |
1092 | * In TLSv1.3 we update the cache as part of constructing the | |
1093 | * NewSessionTicket | |
1094 | */ | |
1095 | if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) | |
1096 | ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER); | |
8723588e | 1097 | |
0e6161bc | 1098 | /* N.B. s->ctx may not equal s->session_ctx */ |
9ef9088c | 1099 | tsan_counter(&s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good); |
fe3a3291 | 1100 | s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_accept; |
8723588e | 1101 | } else { |
4cb00457 MC |
1102 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
1103 | /* | |
1104 | * We encourage applications to only use TLSv1.3 tickets once, | |
1105 | * so we remove this one from the cache. | |
1106 | */ | |
1107 | if ((s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode | |
1108 | & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) != 0) | |
1109 | SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session); | |
1110 | } else { | |
1111 | /* | |
1112 | * In TLSv1.3 we update the cache as part of processing the | |
1113 | * NewSessionTicket | |
1114 | */ | |
5d61491c | 1115 | ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT); |
4cb00457 | 1116 | } |
8723588e | 1117 | if (s->hit) |
9ef9088c | 1118 | tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_hit); |
8723588e | 1119 | |
fe3a3291 | 1120 | s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_connect; |
9ef9088c | 1121 | tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_good); |
8723588e MC |
1122 | } |
1123 | ||
8723588e MC |
1124 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
1125 | /* done with handshaking */ | |
1126 | s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0; | |
1127 | s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 0; | |
1128 | s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0; | |
f5c7f5df | 1129 | dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s); |
8723588e MC |
1130 | } |
1131 | } | |
1132 | ||
c2c1d8a4 MC |
1133 | if (s->info_callback != NULL) |
1134 | cb = s->info_callback; | |
1135 | else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) | |
1136 | cb = s->ctx->info_callback; | |
1137 | ||
4ce787b9 MC |
1138 | /* The callback may expect us to not be in init at handshake done */ |
1139 | ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0); | |
1140 | ||
4af5836b MC |
1141 | if (cb != NULL) { |
1142 | if (cleanuphand | |
1143 | || !SSL_IS_TLS13(s) | |
1144 | || SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) | |
1145 | cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1); | |
1146 | } | |
c2c1d8a4 | 1147 | |
4ce787b9 MC |
1148 | if (!stop) { |
1149 | /* If we've got more work to do we go back into init */ | |
1150 | ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1); | |
30f05b19 | 1151 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; |
4ce787b9 | 1152 | } |
30f05b19 | 1153 | |
8723588e MC |
1154 | return WORK_FINISHED_STOP; |
1155 | } | |
1156 | ||
9ab930b2 MC |
1157 | int tls_get_message_header(SSL *s, int *mt) |
1158 | { | |
1159 | /* s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */ | |
d4d2f3a4 | 1160 | int skip_message, i, recvd_type; |
9ab930b2 | 1161 | unsigned char *p; |
54105ddd | 1162 | size_t l, readbytes; |
9ab930b2 MC |
1163 | |
1164 | p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; | |
1165 | ||
1166 | do { | |
1167 | while (s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) { | |
1168 | i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, &recvd_type, | |
a230b26e EK |
1169 | &p[s->init_num], |
1170 | SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - s->init_num, | |
54105ddd | 1171 | 0, &readbytes); |
9ab930b2 MC |
1172 | if (i <= 0) { |
1173 | s->rwstate = SSL_READING; | |
1174 | return 0; | |
32ec4153 | 1175 | } |
9ab930b2 | 1176 | if (recvd_type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { |
1257adec | 1177 | /* |
a230b26e EK |
1178 | * A ChangeCipherSpec must be a single byte and may not occur |
1179 | * in the middle of a handshake message. | |
1180 | */ | |
54105ddd | 1181 | if (s->init_num != 0 || readbytes != 1 || p[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS) { |
d4d2f3a4 | 1182 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
1183 | SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); |
1184 | return 0; | |
1257adec | 1185 | } |
e9359719 | 1186 | if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_BEFORE |
555cbb32 | 1187 | && (s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) != 0) { |
e9359719 MC |
1188 | /* |
1189 | * We are stateless and we received a CCS. Probably this is | |
1190 | * from a client between the first and second ClientHellos. | |
1191 | * We should ignore this, but return an error because we do | |
1192 | * not return success until we see the second ClientHello | |
1193 | * with a valid cookie. | |
1194 | */ | |
1195 | return 0; | |
1196 | } | |
555cbb32 | 1197 | s->s3.tmp.message_type = *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; |
54105ddd | 1198 | s->init_num = readbytes - 1; |
c4377574 | 1199 | s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data; |
555cbb32 | 1200 | s->s3.tmp.message_size = readbytes; |
9ab930b2 MC |
1201 | return 1; |
1202 | } else if (recvd_type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { | |
d4d2f3a4 | 1203 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
1204 | SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); |
1205 | return 0; | |
32ec4153 | 1206 | } |
54105ddd | 1207 | s->init_num += readbytes; |
9ab930b2 MC |
1208 | } |
1209 | ||
1210 | skip_message = 0; | |
1211 | if (!s->server) | |
c7f47786 MC |
1212 | if (s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_OK |
1213 | && p[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) | |
9ab930b2 MC |
1214 | /* |
1215 | * The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages -- | |
1216 | * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if | |
1217 | * their format is correct. Does not count for 'Finished' | |
1218 | * MAC. | |
1219 | */ | |
1220 | if (p[1] == 0 && p[2] == 0 && p[3] == 0) { | |
1221 | s->init_num = 0; | |
1222 | skip_message = 1; | |
1223 | ||
1224 | if (s->msg_callback) | |
1225 | s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, | |
1226 | p, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s, | |
1227 | s->msg_callback_arg); | |
1228 | } | |
1229 | } while (skip_message); | |
1230 | /* s->init_num == SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */ | |
1231 | ||
1232 | *mt = *p; | |
555cbb32 | 1233 | s->s3.tmp.message_type = *(p++); |
32ec4153 | 1234 | |
e8aa8b6c | 1235 | if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) { |
9ab930b2 MC |
1236 | /* |
1237 | * Only happens with SSLv3+ in an SSLv2 backward compatible | |
1238 | * ClientHello | |
e8aa8b6c F |
1239 | * |
1240 | * Total message size is the remaining record bytes to read | |
1241 | * plus the SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH bytes that we already read | |
9ab930b2 | 1242 | */ |
9ab930b2 MC |
1243 | l = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(&s->rlayer) |
1244 | + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
555cbb32 | 1245 | s->s3.tmp.message_size = l; |
9ab930b2 MC |
1246 | |
1247 | s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data; | |
1248 | s->init_num = SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
1249 | } else { | |
1250 | n2l3(p, l); | |
1251 | /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */ | |
1252 | if (l > (INT_MAX - SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 1253 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
1254 | SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE); |
1255 | return 0; | |
32ec4153 | 1256 | } |
555cbb32 | 1257 | s->s3.tmp.message_size = l; |
9ab930b2 MC |
1258 | |
1259 | s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
1260 | s->init_num = 0; | |
1261 | } | |
1262 | ||
1263 | return 1; | |
9ab930b2 MC |
1264 | } |
1265 | ||
eda75751 | 1266 | int tls_get_message_body(SSL *s, size_t *len) |
9ab930b2 | 1267 | { |
54105ddd | 1268 | size_t n, readbytes; |
9ab930b2 MC |
1269 | unsigned char *p; |
1270 | int i; | |
1271 | ||
555cbb32 | 1272 | if (s->s3.tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { |
9ab930b2 MC |
1273 | /* We've already read everything in */ |
1274 | *len = (unsigned long)s->init_num; | |
1275 | return 1; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1276 | } |
1277 | ||
0f113f3e | 1278 | p = s->init_msg; |
555cbb32 | 1279 | n = s->s3.tmp.message_size - s->init_num; |
0f113f3e | 1280 | while (n > 0) { |
657da85e | 1281 | i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, NULL, |
54105ddd | 1282 | &p[s->init_num], n, 0, &readbytes); |
0f113f3e MC |
1283 | if (i <= 0) { |
1284 | s->rwstate = SSL_READING; | |
9ab930b2 MC |
1285 | *len = 0; |
1286 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e | 1287 | } |
54105ddd MC |
1288 | s->init_num += readbytes; |
1289 | n -= readbytes; | |
0f113f3e | 1290 | } |
ee2ffc27 | 1291 | |
0f113f3e MC |
1292 | /* |
1293 | * If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for | |
1294 | * Finished verification. | |
1295 | */ | |
5d671101 MC |
1296 | if (*(s->init_buf->data) == SSL3_MT_FINISHED && !ssl3_take_mac(s)) { |
1297 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
1298 | *len = 0; | |
1299 | return 0; | |
1300 | } | |
ee2ffc27 | 1301 | |
0f113f3e | 1302 | /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */ |
e8aa8b6c | 1303 | if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) { |
d166ed8c DSH |
1304 | if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, |
1305 | s->init_num)) { | |
d4d2f3a4 | 1306 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
d166ed8c DSH |
1307 | *len = 0; |
1308 | return 0; | |
1309 | } | |
32ec4153 | 1310 | if (s->msg_callback) |
a230b26e | 1311 | s->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION, 0, s->init_buf->data, |
32ec4153 MC |
1312 | (size_t)s->init_num, s, s->msg_callback_arg); |
1313 | } else { | |
11c67eea MC |
1314 | /* |
1315 | * We defer feeding in the HRR until later. We'll do it as part of | |
1316 | * processing the message | |
9d75dce3 TS |
1317 | * The TLsv1.3 handshake transcript stops at the ClientFinished |
1318 | * message. | |
11c67eea | 1319 | */ |
597c51bc | 1320 | #define SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET (SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 2) |
9d75dce3 | 1321 | /* KeyUpdate and NewSessionTicket do not need to be added */ |
555cbb32 TS |
1322 | if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || (s->s3.tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET |
1323 | && s->s3.tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE)) { | |
1324 | if (s->s3.tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO | |
9d75dce3 TS |
1325 | || s->init_num < SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE |
1326 | || memcmp(hrrrandom, | |
1327 | s->init_buf->data + SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET, | |
1328 | SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) != 0) { | |
1329 | if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, | |
1330 | s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { | |
1331 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
1332 | *len = 0; | |
1333 | return 0; | |
1334 | } | |
597c51bc | 1335 | } |
d166ed8c | 1336 | } |
32ec4153 MC |
1337 | if (s->msg_callback) |
1338 | s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data, | |
1339 | (size_t)s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s, | |
1340 | s->msg_callback_arg); | |
1341 | } | |
1342 | ||
eda75751 | 1343 | *len = s->init_num; |
9ab930b2 | 1344 | return 1; |
0f113f3e | 1345 | } |
d02b48c6 | 1346 | |
c6d38183 RS |
1347 | static const X509ERR2ALERT x509table[] = { |
1348 | {X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE}, | |
1349 | {X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
cccf532f | 1350 | {X509_V_ERR_EC_KEY_EXPLICIT_PARAMS, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, |
c6d38183 RS |
1351 | {X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, |
1352 | {X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, | |
1353 | {X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED}, | |
1354 | {X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1355 | {X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1356 | {X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED}, | |
1357 | {X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR}, | |
1358 | {X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1359 | {X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED}, | |
1360 | {X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1361 | {X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR}, | |
1362 | {X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1363 | {X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, | |
1364 | {X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1365 | {X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1366 | {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1367 | {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1368 | {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1369 | {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1370 | {X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1371 | {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, | |
1372 | {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR}, | |
1373 | {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1374 | {X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1375 | {X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR}, | |
1376 | {X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, | |
1377 | {X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, | |
1378 | {X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR}, | |
1379 | {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1380 | {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1381 | {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1382 | {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, | |
1383 | {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, | |
1384 | {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, | |
1385 | {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, | |
1386 | {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, | |
1387 | {X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR}, | |
1388 | ||
1389 | /* Last entry; return this if we don't find the value above. */ | |
1390 | {X509_V_OK, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN} | |
1391 | }; | |
1392 | ||
1393 | int ssl_x509err2alert(int x509err) | |
0f113f3e | 1394 | { |
c6d38183 RS |
1395 | const X509ERR2ALERT *tp; |
1396 | ||
1397 | for (tp = x509table; tp->x509err != X509_V_OK; ++tp) | |
1398 | if (tp->x509err == x509err) | |
1399 | break; | |
1400 | return tp->alert; | |
0f113f3e | 1401 | } |
d02b48c6 | 1402 | |
b362ccab | 1403 | int ssl_allow_compression(SSL *s) |
0f113f3e MC |
1404 | { |
1405 | if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) | |
1406 | return 0; | |
1407 | return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION, 0, 0, NULL); | |
1408 | } | |
4fa52141 | 1409 | |
068c358a | 1410 | static int version_cmp(const SSL *s, int a, int b) |
4fa52141 VD |
1411 | { |
1412 | int dtls = SSL_IS_DTLS(s); | |
1413 | ||
1414 | if (a == b) | |
1415 | return 0; | |
1416 | if (!dtls) | |
1417 | return a < b ? -1 : 1; | |
1418 | return DTLS_VERSION_LT(a, b) ? -1 : 1; | |
1419 | } | |
1420 | ||
1421 | typedef struct { | |
1422 | int version; | |
a230b26e EK |
1423 | const SSL_METHOD *(*cmeth) (void); |
1424 | const SSL_METHOD *(*smeth) (void); | |
4fa52141 VD |
1425 | } version_info; |
1426 | ||
5c587fb6 | 1427 | #if TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL != TLS1_3_VERSION |
582a17d6 | 1428 | # error Code needs update for TLS_method() support beyond TLS1_3_VERSION. |
4fa52141 VD |
1429 | #endif |
1430 | ||
f7f2a01d | 1431 | /* Must be in order high to low */ |
4fa52141 | 1432 | static const version_info tls_version_table[] = { |
582a17d6 MC |
1433 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 |
1434 | {TLS1_3_VERSION, tlsv1_3_client_method, tlsv1_3_server_method}, | |
1435 | #else | |
1436 | {TLS1_3_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, | |
1437 | #endif | |
6b01bed2 | 1438 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2 |
a230b26e | 1439 | {TLS1_2_VERSION, tlsv1_2_client_method, tlsv1_2_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 1440 | #else |
a230b26e | 1441 | {TLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
6b01bed2 VD |
1442 | #endif |
1443 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1 | |
a230b26e | 1444 | {TLS1_1_VERSION, tlsv1_1_client_method, tlsv1_1_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 1445 | #else |
a230b26e | 1446 | {TLS1_1_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
6b01bed2 VD |
1447 | #endif |
1448 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1 | |
a230b26e | 1449 | {TLS1_VERSION, tlsv1_client_method, tlsv1_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 1450 | #else |
a230b26e | 1451 | {TLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
6b01bed2 | 1452 | #endif |
4fa52141 | 1453 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3 |
a230b26e | 1454 | {SSL3_VERSION, sslv3_client_method, sslv3_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 1455 | #else |
a230b26e | 1456 | {SSL3_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
4fa52141 | 1457 | #endif |
a230b26e | 1458 | {0, NULL, NULL}, |
4fa52141 VD |
1459 | }; |
1460 | ||
5c587fb6 | 1461 | #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL != DTLS1_2_VERSION |
4fa52141 VD |
1462 | # error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_2_VERSION. |
1463 | #endif | |
1464 | ||
f7f2a01d | 1465 | /* Must be in order high to low */ |
4fa52141 | 1466 | static const version_info dtls_version_table[] = { |
6b01bed2 | 1467 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2 |
a230b26e | 1468 | {DTLS1_2_VERSION, dtlsv1_2_client_method, dtlsv1_2_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 1469 | #else |
a230b26e | 1470 | {DTLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
6b01bed2 VD |
1471 | #endif |
1472 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1 | |
a230b26e EK |
1473 | {DTLS1_VERSION, dtlsv1_client_method, dtlsv1_server_method}, |
1474 | {DTLS1_BAD_VER, dtls_bad_ver_client_method, NULL}, | |
6b01bed2 | 1475 | #else |
a230b26e EK |
1476 | {DTLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
1477 | {DTLS1_BAD_VER, NULL, NULL}, | |
6b01bed2 | 1478 | #endif |
a230b26e | 1479 | {0, NULL, NULL}, |
4fa52141 VD |
1480 | }; |
1481 | ||
1482 | /* | |
1483 | * ssl_method_error - Check whether an SSL_METHOD is enabled. | |
1484 | * | |
1485 | * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method | |
1486 | * @method: the intended method. | |
1487 | * | |
1488 | * Returns 0 on success, or an SSL error reason on failure. | |
1489 | */ | |
068c358a | 1490 | static int ssl_method_error(const SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *method) |
4fa52141 VD |
1491 | { |
1492 | int version = method->version; | |
1493 | ||
1494 | if ((s->min_proto_version != 0 && | |
1495 | version_cmp(s, version, s->min_proto_version) < 0) || | |
1496 | ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, version, NULL) == 0) | |
1497 | return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW; | |
1498 | ||
1499 | if (s->max_proto_version != 0 && | |
a230b26e | 1500 | version_cmp(s, version, s->max_proto_version) > 0) |
4fa52141 VD |
1501 | return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_HIGH; |
1502 | ||
1503 | if ((s->options & method->mask) != 0) | |
1504 | return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; | |
1505 | if ((method->flags & SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB) != 0 && tls1_suiteb(s)) | |
1506 | return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_2_NEEDED_IN_SUITEB_MODE; | |
4fa52141 VD |
1507 | |
1508 | return 0; | |
1509 | } | |
1510 | ||
baa45c3e MC |
1511 | /* |
1512 | * Only called by servers. Returns 1 if the server has a TLSv1.3 capable | |
ebda646d MC |
1513 | * certificate type, or has PSK or a certificate callback configured, or has |
1514 | * a servername callback configure. Otherwise returns 0. | |
baa45c3e MC |
1515 | */ |
1516 | static int is_tls13_capable(const SSL *s) | |
1517 | { | |
65d2c16c | 1518 | int i; |
65d2c16c | 1519 | int curve; |
baa45c3e | 1520 | |
ebda646d MC |
1521 | if (!ossl_assert(s->ctx != NULL) || !ossl_assert(s->session_ctx != NULL)) |
1522 | return 0; | |
1523 | ||
1524 | /* | |
1525 | * A servername callback can change the available certs, so if a servername | |
1526 | * cb is set then we just assume TLSv1.3 will be ok | |
1527 | */ | |
1528 | if (s->ctx->ext.servername_cb != NULL | |
1529 | || s->session_ctx->ext.servername_cb != NULL) | |
1530 | return 1; | |
1531 | ||
d162340d MC |
1532 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK |
1533 | if (s->psk_server_callback != NULL) | |
1534 | return 1; | |
1535 | #endif | |
1536 | ||
cd3b53b8 | 1537 | if (s->psk_find_session_cb != NULL || s->cert->cert_cb != NULL) |
baa45c3e MC |
1538 | return 1; |
1539 | ||
1540 | for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) { | |
1541 | /* Skip over certs disallowed for TLSv1.3 */ | |
1542 | switch (i) { | |
1543 | case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN: | |
1544 | case SSL_PKEY_GOST01: | |
1545 | case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256: | |
1546 | case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512: | |
1547 | continue; | |
1548 | default: | |
1549 | break; | |
1550 | } | |
de4dc598 MC |
1551 | if (!ssl_has_cert(s, i)) |
1552 | continue; | |
1553 | if (i != SSL_PKEY_ECC) | |
1554 | return 1; | |
1555 | /* | |
1556 | * Prior to TLSv1.3 sig algs allowed any curve to be used. TLSv1.3 is | |
1557 | * more restrictive so check that our sig algs are consistent with this | |
1558 | * EC cert. See section 4.2.3 of RFC8446. | |
1559 | */ | |
d8975dec | 1560 | curve = ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey); |
de4dc598 | 1561 | if (tls_check_sigalg_curve(s, curve)) |
baa45c3e MC |
1562 | return 1; |
1563 | } | |
1564 | ||
1565 | return 0; | |
1566 | } | |
1567 | ||
ccae4a15 FI |
1568 | /* |
1569 | * ssl_version_supported - Check that the specified `version` is supported by | |
1570 | * `SSL *` instance | |
1571 | * | |
1572 | * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method | |
1573 | * @version: Protocol version to test against | |
1574 | * | |
1575 | * Returns 1 when supported, otherwise 0 | |
1576 | */ | |
4fd12788 | 1577 | int ssl_version_supported(const SSL *s, int version, const SSL_METHOD **meth) |
ccae4a15 FI |
1578 | { |
1579 | const version_info *vent; | |
1580 | const version_info *table; | |
1581 | ||
1582 | switch (s->method->version) { | |
1583 | default: | |
1584 | /* Version should match method version for non-ANY method */ | |
1585 | return version_cmp(s, version, s->version) == 0; | |
1586 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1587 | table = tls_version_table; | |
1588 | break; | |
1589 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1590 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
1591 | break; | |
1592 | } | |
1593 | ||
1594 | for (vent = table; | |
1595 | vent->version != 0 && version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) <= 0; | |
1596 | ++vent) { | |
baa45c3e MC |
1597 | if (vent->cmeth != NULL |
1598 | && version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) == 0 | |
1599 | && ssl_method_error(s, vent->cmeth()) == 0 | |
1600 | && (!s->server | |
1601 | || version != TLS1_3_VERSION | |
1602 | || is_tls13_capable(s))) { | |
4fd12788 MC |
1603 | if (meth != NULL) |
1604 | *meth = vent->cmeth(); | |
ccae4a15 FI |
1605 | return 1; |
1606 | } | |
1607 | } | |
1608 | return 0; | |
1609 | } | |
1610 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1611 | /* |
1612 | * ssl_check_version_downgrade - In response to RFC7507 SCSV version | |
1613 | * fallback indication from a client check whether we're using the highest | |
1614 | * supported protocol version. | |
1615 | * | |
1616 | * @s server SSL handle. | |
1617 | * | |
1618 | * Returns 1 when using the highest enabled version, 0 otherwise. | |
1619 | */ | |
1620 | int ssl_check_version_downgrade(SSL *s) | |
1621 | { | |
1622 | const version_info *vent; | |
1623 | const version_info *table; | |
1624 | ||
1625 | /* | |
1626 | * Check that the current protocol is the highest enabled version | |
1627 | * (according to s->ctx->method, as version negotiation may have changed | |
1628 | * s->method). | |
1629 | */ | |
1630 | if (s->version == s->ctx->method->version) | |
1631 | return 1; | |
1632 | ||
1633 | /* | |
1634 | * Apparently we're using a version-flexible SSL_METHOD (not at its | |
1635 | * highest protocol version). | |
1636 | */ | |
1637 | if (s->ctx->method->version == TLS_method()->version) | |
1638 | table = tls_version_table; | |
1639 | else if (s->ctx->method->version == DTLS_method()->version) | |
1640 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
1641 | else { | |
1642 | /* Unexpected state; fail closed. */ | |
1643 | return 0; | |
1644 | } | |
1645 | ||
1646 | for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { | |
a230b26e | 1647 | if (vent->smeth != NULL && ssl_method_error(s, vent->smeth()) == 0) |
4fa52141 VD |
1648 | return s->version == vent->version; |
1649 | } | |
1650 | return 0; | |
1651 | } | |
1652 | ||
1653 | /* | |
1654 | * ssl_set_version_bound - set an upper or lower bound on the supported (D)TLS | |
1655 | * protocols, provided the initial (D)TLS method is version-flexible. This | |
1656 | * function sanity-checks the proposed value and makes sure the method is | |
1657 | * version-flexible, then sets the limit if all is well. | |
1658 | * | |
1659 | * @method_version: The version of the current SSL_METHOD. | |
1660 | * @version: the intended limit. | |
1661 | * @bound: pointer to limit to be updated. | |
1662 | * | |
1663 | * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure. | |
1664 | */ | |
1665 | int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version, int version, int *bound) | |
1666 | { | |
77174598 VD |
1667 | int valid_tls; |
1668 | int valid_dtls; | |
1669 | ||
869e978c KR |
1670 | if (version == 0) { |
1671 | *bound = version; | |
1672 | return 1; | |
1673 | } | |
1674 | ||
77174598 VD |
1675 | valid_tls = version >= SSL3_VERSION && version <= TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL; |
1676 | valid_dtls = | |
1677 | DTLS_VERSION_LE(version, DTLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL) && | |
1678 | DTLS_VERSION_GE(version, DTLS1_BAD_VER); | |
1679 | ||
1680 | if (!valid_tls && !valid_dtls) | |
1681 | return 0; | |
1682 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1683 | /*- |
1684 | * Restrict TLS methods to TLS protocol versions. | |
1685 | * Restrict DTLS methods to DTLS protocol versions. | |
1686 | * Note, DTLS version numbers are decreasing, use comparison macros. | |
1687 | * | |
1688 | * Note that for both lower-bounds we use explicit versions, not | |
1689 | * (D)TLS_MIN_VERSION. This is because we don't want to break user | |
1690 | * configurations. If the MIN (supported) version ever rises, the user's | |
1691 | * "floor" remains valid even if no longer available. We don't expect the | |
1692 | * MAX ceiling to ever get lower, so making that variable makes sense. | |
77174598 VD |
1693 | * |
1694 | * We ignore attempts to set bounds on version-inflexible methods, | |
1695 | * returning success. | |
4fa52141 VD |
1696 | */ |
1697 | switch (method_version) { | |
1698 | default: | |
77174598 | 1699 | break; |
4fa52141 VD |
1700 | |
1701 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
77174598 VD |
1702 | if (valid_tls) |
1703 | *bound = version; | |
4fa52141 VD |
1704 | break; |
1705 | ||
1706 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
77174598 VD |
1707 | if (valid_dtls) |
1708 | *bound = version; | |
4fa52141 VD |
1709 | break; |
1710 | } | |
4fa52141 VD |
1711 | return 1; |
1712 | } | |
1713 | ||
f7f2a01d MC |
1714 | static void check_for_downgrade(SSL *s, int vers, DOWNGRADE *dgrd) |
1715 | { | |
1716 | if (vers == TLS1_2_VERSION | |
4fd12788 | 1717 | && ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_3_VERSION, NULL)) { |
f7f2a01d | 1718 | *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_TO_1_2; |
5627f9f2 MC |
1719 | } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) |
1720 | && vers < TLS1_2_VERSION | |
1721 | /* | |
1722 | * We need to ensure that a server that disables TLSv1.2 | |
1723 | * (creating a hole between TLSv1.3 and TLSv1.1) can still | |
1724 | * complete handshakes with clients that support TLSv1.2 and | |
1725 | * below. Therefore we do not enable the sentinel if TLSv1.3 is | |
1726 | * enabled and TLSv1.2 is not. | |
1727 | */ | |
1728 | && ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_2_VERSION, NULL)) { | |
f7f2a01d MC |
1729 | *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_TO_1_1; |
1730 | } else { | |
1731 | *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE; | |
1732 | } | |
1733 | } | |
1734 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1735 | /* |
1736 | * ssl_choose_server_version - Choose server (D)TLS version. Called when the | |
1737 | * client HELLO is received to select the final server protocol version and | |
1738 | * the version specific method. | |
1739 | * | |
1740 | * @s: server SSL handle. | |
1741 | * | |
1742 | * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. | |
1743 | */ | |
f7f2a01d | 1744 | int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello, DOWNGRADE *dgrd) |
4fa52141 VD |
1745 | { |
1746 | /*- | |
1747 | * With version-flexible methods we have an initial state with: | |
1748 | * | |
1749 | * s->method->version == (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION, | |
5c587fb6 | 1750 | * s->version == (D)TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL. |
4fa52141 VD |
1751 | * |
1752 | * So we detect version-flexible methods via the method version, not the | |
1753 | * handle version. | |
1754 | */ | |
1755 | int server_version = s->method->version; | |
df7ce507 | 1756 | int client_version = hello->legacy_version; |
4fa52141 VD |
1757 | const version_info *vent; |
1758 | const version_info *table; | |
1759 | int disabled = 0; | |
cd998837 | 1760 | RAW_EXTENSION *suppversions; |
4fa52141 | 1761 | |
1ab3836b MC |
1762 | s->client_version = client_version; |
1763 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1764 | switch (server_version) { |
1765 | default: | |
7d061fce MC |
1766 | if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
1767 | if (version_cmp(s, client_version, s->version) < 0) | |
1768 | return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION; | |
f7f2a01d | 1769 | *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE; |
7d061fce MC |
1770 | /* |
1771 | * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't | |
1772 | * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope | |
1773 | * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol | |
1774 | * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return | |
1775 | * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) | |
1776 | */ | |
1777 | return 0; | |
1778 | } | |
d2f42576 | 1779 | /* |
7d061fce MC |
1780 | * Fall through if we are TLSv1.3 already (this means we must be after |
1781 | * a HelloRetryRequest | |
4fa52141 | 1782 | */ |
018fcbec | 1783 | /* fall thru */ |
4fa52141 VD |
1784 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: |
1785 | table = tls_version_table; | |
1786 | break; | |
1787 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1788 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
1789 | break; | |
1790 | } | |
1791 | ||
70af3d8e | 1792 | suppversions = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions]; |
cd998837 | 1793 | |
6f40214f | 1794 | /* If we did an HRR then supported versions is mandatory */ |
fc7129dc | 1795 | if (!suppversions->present && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) |
6f40214f MC |
1796 | return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; |
1797 | ||
70af3d8e | 1798 | if (suppversions->present && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
cd998837 MC |
1799 | unsigned int candidate_vers = 0; |
1800 | unsigned int best_vers = 0; | |
1801 | const SSL_METHOD *best_method = NULL; | |
1802 | PACKET versionslist; | |
1803 | ||
6b473aca MC |
1804 | suppversions->parsed = 1; |
1805 | ||
16bce0e0 | 1806 | if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&suppversions->data, &versionslist)) { |
cd998837 MC |
1807 | /* Trailing or invalid data? */ |
1808 | return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH; | |
1809 | } | |
1810 | ||
d8434cf8 MC |
1811 | /* |
1812 | * The TLSv1.3 spec says the client MUST set this to TLS1_2_VERSION. | |
1813 | * The spec only requires servers to check that it isn't SSLv3: | |
1814 | * "Any endpoint receiving a Hello message with | |
1815 | * ClientHello.legacy_version or ServerHello.legacy_version set to | |
1816 | * 0x0300 MUST abort the handshake with a "protocol_version" alert." | |
1817 | * We are slightly stricter and require that it isn't SSLv3 or lower. | |
1818 | * We tolerate TLSv1 and TLSv1.1. | |
1819 | */ | |
1820 | if (client_version <= SSL3_VERSION) | |
1821 | return SSL_R_BAD_LEGACY_VERSION; | |
1822 | ||
cd998837 | 1823 | while (PACKET_get_net_2(&versionslist, &candidate_vers)) { |
cd998837 MC |
1824 | if (version_cmp(s, candidate_vers, best_vers) <= 0) |
1825 | continue; | |
4fd12788 MC |
1826 | if (ssl_version_supported(s, candidate_vers, &best_method)) |
1827 | best_vers = candidate_vers; | |
cd998837 MC |
1828 | } |
1829 | if (PACKET_remaining(&versionslist) != 0) { | |
1830 | /* Trailing data? */ | |
1831 | return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH; | |
1832 | } | |
1833 | ||
1834 | if (best_vers > 0) { | |
fc7129dc | 1835 | if (s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) { |
7d061fce | 1836 | /* |
6f40214f MC |
1837 | * This is after a HelloRetryRequest so we better check that we |
1838 | * negotiated TLSv1.3 | |
7d061fce MC |
1839 | */ |
1840 | if (best_vers != TLS1_3_VERSION) | |
1841 | return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; | |
1842 | return 0; | |
1843 | } | |
f7f2a01d | 1844 | check_for_downgrade(s, best_vers, dgrd); |
cd998837 MC |
1845 | s->version = best_vers; |
1846 | s->method = best_method; | |
1847 | return 0; | |
1848 | } | |
1849 | return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; | |
1850 | } | |
1851 | ||
1852 | /* | |
1853 | * If the supported versions extension isn't present, then the highest | |
1854 | * version we can negotiate is TLSv1.2 | |
1855 | */ | |
1856 | if (version_cmp(s, client_version, TLS1_3_VERSION) >= 0) | |
1857 | client_version = TLS1_2_VERSION; | |
1858 | ||
1859 | /* | |
1860 | * No supported versions extension, so we just use the version supplied in | |
1861 | * the ClientHello. | |
1862 | */ | |
4fa52141 VD |
1863 | for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { |
1864 | const SSL_METHOD *method; | |
1865 | ||
1866 | if (vent->smeth == NULL || | |
1867 | version_cmp(s, client_version, vent->version) < 0) | |
1868 | continue; | |
1869 | method = vent->smeth(); | |
1870 | if (ssl_method_error(s, method) == 0) { | |
f7f2a01d | 1871 | check_for_downgrade(s, vent->version, dgrd); |
4fa52141 VD |
1872 | s->version = vent->version; |
1873 | s->method = method; | |
1874 | return 0; | |
1875 | } | |
1876 | disabled = 1; | |
1877 | } | |
1878 | return disabled ? SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL : SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW; | |
1879 | } | |
1880 | ||
1881 | /* | |
1882 | * ssl_choose_client_version - Choose client (D)TLS version. Called when the | |
1883 | * server HELLO is received to select the final client protocol version and | |
1884 | * the version specific method. | |
1885 | * | |
1886 | * @s: client SSL handle. | |
1887 | * @version: The proposed version from the server's HELLO. | |
88050dd1 | 1888 | * @extensions: The extensions received |
4fa52141 | 1889 | * |
29bfd5b7 | 1890 | * Returns 1 on success or 0 on error. |
4fa52141 | 1891 | */ |
88050dd1 | 1892 | int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version, RAW_EXTENSION *extensions) |
4fa52141 VD |
1893 | { |
1894 | const version_info *vent; | |
1895 | const version_info *table; | |
b5b993b2 | 1896 | int ret, ver_min, ver_max, real_max, origv; |
4fa52141 | 1897 | |
88050dd1 MC |
1898 | origv = s->version; |
1899 | s->version = version; | |
b97667ce | 1900 | |
88050dd1 MC |
1901 | /* This will overwrite s->version if the extension is present */ |
1902 | if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions, | |
1903 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO | |
1904 | | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO, extensions, | |
1905 | NULL, 0)) { | |
1906 | s->version = origv; | |
1907 | return 0; | |
1908 | } | |
1909 | ||
fc7129dc MC |
1910 | if (s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE |
1911 | && s->version != TLS1_3_VERSION) { | |
88050dd1 | 1912 | s->version = origv; |
c48ffbcc | 1913 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION); |
29bfd5b7 | 1914 | return 0; |
c3043dcd MC |
1915 | } |
1916 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1917 | switch (s->method->version) { |
1918 | default: | |
88050dd1 MC |
1919 | if (s->version != s->method->version) { |
1920 | s->version = origv; | |
c48ffbcc | 1921 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION); |
29bfd5b7 | 1922 | return 0; |
c3043dcd | 1923 | } |
4fa52141 VD |
1924 | /* |
1925 | * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't | |
1926 | * (and never did) check min/max, FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope | |
1927 | * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol | |
1928 | * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return | |
1929 | * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) | |
1930 | */ | |
29bfd5b7 | 1931 | return 1; |
4fa52141 VD |
1932 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: |
1933 | table = tls_version_table; | |
1934 | break; | |
1935 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1936 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
1937 | break; | |
1938 | } | |
1939 | ||
b5b993b2 MC |
1940 | ret = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max, &real_max); |
1941 | if (ret != 0) { | |
1942 | s->version = origv; | |
c48ffbcc | 1943 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, ret); |
b5b993b2 MC |
1944 | return 0; |
1945 | } | |
1946 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? DTLS_VERSION_LT(s->version, ver_min) | |
1947 | : s->version < ver_min) { | |
1948 | s->version = origv; | |
c48ffbcc | 1949 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL); |
b5b993b2 MC |
1950 | return 0; |
1951 | } else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? DTLS_VERSION_GT(s->version, ver_max) | |
1952 | : s->version > ver_max) { | |
1953 | s->version = origv; | |
c48ffbcc | 1954 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL); |
b5b993b2 MC |
1955 | return 0; |
1956 | } | |
5df22060 | 1957 | |
b5b993b2 MC |
1958 | if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) == 0) |
1959 | real_max = ver_max; | |
c3043dcd | 1960 | |
b5b993b2 MC |
1961 | /* Check for downgrades */ |
1962 | if (s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION && real_max > s->version) { | |
1963 | if (memcmp(tls12downgrade, | |
555cbb32 | 1964 | s->s3.server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE |
b5b993b2 MC |
1965 | - sizeof(tls12downgrade), |
1966 | sizeof(tls12downgrade)) == 0) { | |
1967 | s->version = origv; | |
1968 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, | |
b5b993b2 MC |
1969 | SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); |
1970 | return 0; | |
1971 | } | |
1972 | } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) | |
1973 | && s->version < TLS1_2_VERSION | |
1974 | && real_max > s->version) { | |
1975 | if (memcmp(tls11downgrade, | |
555cbb32 | 1976 | s->s3.server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE |
b5b993b2 MC |
1977 | - sizeof(tls11downgrade), |
1978 | sizeof(tls11downgrade)) == 0) { | |
1979 | s->version = origv; | |
1980 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, | |
b5b993b2 MC |
1981 | SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); |
1982 | return 0; | |
c3043dcd | 1983 | } |
b5b993b2 | 1984 | } |
c3043dcd | 1985 | |
b5b993b2 MC |
1986 | for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { |
1987 | if (vent->cmeth == NULL || s->version != vent->version) | |
c3043dcd MC |
1988 | continue; |
1989 | ||
b5b993b2 | 1990 | s->method = vent->cmeth(); |
29bfd5b7 | 1991 | return 1; |
4fa52141 VD |
1992 | } |
1993 | ||
88050dd1 | 1994 | s->version = origv; |
c48ffbcc | 1995 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL); |
29bfd5b7 | 1996 | return 0; |
4fa52141 VD |
1997 | } |
1998 | ||
068c358a | 1999 | /* |
38a73150 | 2000 | * ssl_get_min_max_version - get minimum and maximum protocol version |
068c358a KR |
2001 | * @s: The SSL connection |
2002 | * @min_version: The minimum supported version | |
2003 | * @max_version: The maximum supported version | |
b5b993b2 MC |
2004 | * @real_max: The highest version below the lowest compile time version hole |
2005 | * where that hole lies above at least one run-time enabled | |
2006 | * protocol. | |
068c358a KR |
2007 | * |
2008 | * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if the | |
2009 | * version is initially (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION. We apply any explicit SSL_OP_NO_xxx | |
2010 | * options, the MinProtocol and MaxProtocol configuration commands, any Suite B | |
b53338cb | 2011 | * constraints and any floor imposed by the security level here, |
068c358a | 2012 | * so we don't advertise the wrong protocol version to only reject the outcome later. |
4fa52141 | 2013 | * |
0485d540 | 2014 | * Computing the right floor matters. If, e.g., TLS 1.0 and 1.2 are enabled, |
4fa52141 VD |
2015 | * TLS 1.1 is disabled, but the security level, Suite-B and/or MinProtocol |
2016 | * only allow TLS 1.2, we want to advertise TLS1.2, *not* TLS1. | |
2017 | * | |
068c358a KR |
2018 | * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. On failure |
2019 | * min_version and max_version will also be set to 0. | |
4fa52141 | 2020 | */ |
b5b993b2 MC |
2021 | int ssl_get_min_max_version(const SSL *s, int *min_version, int *max_version, |
2022 | int *real_max) | |
4fa52141 | 2023 | { |
b5b993b2 | 2024 | int version, tmp_real_max; |
4fa52141 VD |
2025 | int hole; |
2026 | const SSL_METHOD *single = NULL; | |
2027 | const SSL_METHOD *method; | |
2028 | const version_info *table; | |
2029 | const version_info *vent; | |
2030 | ||
2031 | switch (s->method->version) { | |
2032 | default: | |
2033 | /* | |
2034 | * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't | |
2035 | * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope | |
2036 | * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol | |
2037 | * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return | |
2038 | * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) | |
2039 | */ | |
068c358a | 2040 | *min_version = *max_version = s->version; |
b5b993b2 MC |
2041 | /* |
2042 | * Providing a real_max only makes sense where we're using a version | |
2043 | * flexible method. | |
2044 | */ | |
2045 | if (!ossl_assert(real_max == NULL)) | |
2046 | return ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
4fa52141 VD |
2047 | return 0; |
2048 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
2049 | table = tls_version_table; | |
2050 | break; | |
2051 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
2052 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
2053 | break; | |
2054 | } | |
2055 | ||
2056 | /* | |
2057 | * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are some protocols | |
2058 | * below X enabled. This is required in order to maintain the "version | |
2059 | * capability" vector contiguous. Any versions with a NULL client method | |
2060 | * (protocol version client is disabled at compile-time) is also a "hole". | |
2061 | * | |
2062 | * Our initial state is hole == 1, version == 0. That is, versions above | |
2063 | * the first version in the method table are disabled (a "hole" above | |
2064 | * the valid protocol entries) and we don't have a selected version yet. | |
2065 | * | |
2066 | * Whenever "hole == 1", and we hit an enabled method, its version becomes | |
2067 | * the selected version, and the method becomes a candidate "single" | |
2068 | * method. We're no longer in a hole, so "hole" becomes 0. | |
2069 | * | |
2070 | * If "hole == 0" and we hit an enabled method, then "single" is cleared, | |
2071 | * as we support a contiguous range of at least two methods. If we hit | |
2072 | * a disabled method, then hole becomes true again, but nothing else | |
2073 | * changes yet, because all the remaining methods may be disabled too. | |
2074 | * If we again hit an enabled method after the new hole, it becomes | |
2075 | * selected, as we start from scratch. | |
2076 | */ | |
068c358a | 2077 | *min_version = version = 0; |
4fa52141 | 2078 | hole = 1; |
b5b993b2 MC |
2079 | if (real_max != NULL) |
2080 | *real_max = 0; | |
2081 | tmp_real_max = 0; | |
4fa52141 VD |
2082 | for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { |
2083 | /* | |
2084 | * A table entry with a NULL client method is still a hole in the | |
2085 | * "version capability" vector. | |
2086 | */ | |
2087 | if (vent->cmeth == NULL) { | |
2088 | hole = 1; | |
b5b993b2 | 2089 | tmp_real_max = 0; |
4fa52141 VD |
2090 | continue; |
2091 | } | |
2092 | method = vent->cmeth(); | |
b5b993b2 MC |
2093 | |
2094 | if (hole == 1 && tmp_real_max == 0) | |
2095 | tmp_real_max = vent->version; | |
2096 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
2097 | if (ssl_method_error(s, method) != 0) { |
2098 | hole = 1; | |
2099 | } else if (!hole) { | |
2100 | single = NULL; | |
068c358a | 2101 | *min_version = method->version; |
4fa52141 | 2102 | } else { |
b5b993b2 MC |
2103 | if (real_max != NULL && tmp_real_max != 0) |
2104 | *real_max = tmp_real_max; | |
4fa52141 | 2105 | version = (single = method)->version; |
068c358a | 2106 | *min_version = version; |
4fa52141 VD |
2107 | hole = 0; |
2108 | } | |
2109 | } | |
2110 | ||
068c358a KR |
2111 | *max_version = version; |
2112 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
2113 | /* Fail if everything is disabled */ |
2114 | if (version == 0) | |
2115 | return SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE; | |
2116 | ||
068c358a KR |
2117 | return 0; |
2118 | } | |
2119 | ||
2120 | /* | |
2121 | * ssl_set_client_hello_version - Work out what version we should be using for | |
7acb8b64 | 2122 | * the initial ClientHello.legacy_version field. |
068c358a KR |
2123 | * |
2124 | * @s: client SSL handle. | |
2125 | * | |
2126 | * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. | |
2127 | */ | |
2128 | int ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL *s) | |
2129 | { | |
3eb2aff4 | 2130 | int ver_min, ver_max, ret; |
068c358a | 2131 | |
447cc0ad MC |
2132 | /* |
2133 | * In a renegotiation we always send the same client_version that we sent | |
2134 | * last time, regardless of which version we eventually negotiated. | |
2135 | */ | |
2136 | if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) | |
2137 | return 0; | |
2138 | ||
b5b993b2 | 2139 | ret = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max, NULL); |
068c358a KR |
2140 | |
2141 | if (ret != 0) | |
2142 | return ret; | |
2143 | ||
7acb8b64 MC |
2144 | s->version = ver_max; |
2145 | ||
2146 | /* TLS1.3 always uses TLS1.2 in the legacy_version field */ | |
2147 | if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ver_max > TLS1_2_VERSION) | |
2148 | ver_max = TLS1_2_VERSION; | |
2149 | ||
2150 | s->client_version = ver_max; | |
4fa52141 VD |
2151 | return 0; |
2152 | } | |
aff9929b MC |
2153 | |
2154 | /* | |
2155 | * Checks a list of |groups| to determine if the |group_id| is in it. If it is | |
2156 | * and |checkallow| is 1 then additionally check if the group is allowed to be | |
2157 | * used. Returns 1 if the group is in the list (and allowed if |checkallow| is | |
2158 | * 1) or 0 otherwise. | |
2159 | */ | |
9e84a42d | 2160 | int check_in_list(SSL *s, uint16_t group_id, const uint16_t *groups, |
aff9929b MC |
2161 | size_t num_groups, int checkallow) |
2162 | { | |
2163 | size_t i; | |
2164 | ||
2165 | if (groups == NULL || num_groups == 0) | |
2166 | return 0; | |
2167 | ||
9e84a42d DSH |
2168 | for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) { |
2169 | uint16_t group = groups[i]; | |
2170 | ||
2171 | if (group_id == group | |
aff9929b | 2172 | && (!checkallow |
dbc6268f | 2173 | || tls_group_allowed(s, group, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))) { |
0acee504 | 2174 | return 1; |
aff9929b MC |
2175 | } |
2176 | } | |
2177 | ||
0acee504 | 2178 | return 0; |
aff9929b | 2179 | } |
11c67eea MC |
2180 | |
2181 | /* Replace ClientHello1 in the transcript hash with a synthetic message */ | |
43054d3d MC |
2182 | int create_synthetic_message_hash(SSL *s, const unsigned char *hashval, |
2183 | size_t hashlen, const unsigned char *hrr, | |
2184 | size_t hrrlen) | |
11c67eea | 2185 | { |
43054d3d | 2186 | unsigned char hashvaltmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
635b7d3f MC |
2187 | unsigned char msghdr[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]; |
2188 | ||
2189 | memset(msghdr, 0, sizeof(msghdr)); | |
11c67eea | 2190 | |
43054d3d MC |
2191 | if (hashval == NULL) { |
2192 | hashval = hashvaltmp; | |
2193 | hashlen = 0; | |
2194 | /* Get the hash of the initial ClientHello */ | |
2195 | if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0) | |
2196 | || !ssl_handshake_hash(s, hashvaltmp, sizeof(hashvaltmp), | |
2197 | &hashlen)) { | |
2198 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
2199 | return 0; | |
2200 | } | |
11c67eea MC |
2201 | } |
2202 | ||
2203 | /* Reinitialise the transcript hash */ | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2204 | if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) { |
2205 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
11c67eea | 2206 | return 0; |
f63a17d6 | 2207 | } |
11c67eea MC |
2208 | |
2209 | /* Inject the synthetic message_hash message */ | |
635b7d3f | 2210 | msghdr[0] = SSL3_MT_MESSAGE_HASH; |
3a63c0ed | 2211 | msghdr[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - 1] = (unsigned char)hashlen; |
11c67eea MC |
2212 | if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, msghdr, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) |
2213 | || !ssl3_finish_mac(s, hashval, hashlen)) { | |
f63a17d6 | 2214 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
11c67eea MC |
2215 | return 0; |
2216 | } | |
2217 | ||
43054d3d MC |
2218 | /* |
2219 | * Now re-inject the HRR and current message if appropriate (we just deleted | |
2220 | * it when we reinitialised the transcript hash above). Only necessary after | |
2221 | * receiving a ClientHello2 with a cookie. | |
2222 | */ | |
2223 | if (hrr != NULL | |
2224 | && (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, hrr, hrrlen) | |
2225 | || !ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, | |
555cbb32 | 2226 | s->s3.tmp.message_size |
43054d3d MC |
2227 | + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH))) { |
2228 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
2229 | return 0; | |
2230 | } | |
2231 | ||
11c67eea MC |
2232 | return 1; |
2233 | } | |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2234 | |
2235 | static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b) | |
2236 | { | |
2237 | return X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b); | |
2238 | } | |
2239 | ||
f63a17d6 | 2240 | int parse_ca_names(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2241 | { |
2242 | STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp); | |
2243 | X509_NAME *xn = NULL; | |
2244 | PACKET cadns; | |
2245 | ||
2246 | if (ca_sk == NULL) { | |
c48ffbcc | 2247 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
f63a17d6 | 2248 | goto err; |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2249 | } |
2250 | /* get the CA RDNs */ | |
2251 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cadns)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 2252 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
f63a17d6 | 2253 | goto err; |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2254 | } |
2255 | ||
2256 | while (PACKET_remaining(&cadns)) { | |
2257 | const unsigned char *namestart, *namebytes; | |
2258 | unsigned int name_len; | |
2259 | ||
2260 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cadns, &name_len) | |
2261 | || !PACKET_get_bytes(&cadns, &namebytes, name_len)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 2262 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
f63a17d6 | 2263 | goto err; |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2264 | } |
2265 | ||
2266 | namestart = namebytes; | |
2267 | if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &namebytes, name_len)) == NULL) { | |
c48ffbcc | 2268 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); |
f63a17d6 | 2269 | goto err; |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2270 | } |
2271 | if (namebytes != (namestart + name_len)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 2272 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
f63a17d6 | 2273 | goto err; |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2274 | } |
2275 | ||
2276 | if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 2277 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2278 | goto err; |
2279 | } | |
2280 | xn = NULL; | |
2281 | } | |
2282 | ||
555cbb32 TS |
2283 | sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3.tmp.peer_ca_names, X509_NAME_free); |
2284 | s->s3.tmp.peer_ca_names = ca_sk; | |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2285 | |
2286 | return 1; | |
2287 | ||
5d6cca05 DSH |
2288 | err: |
2289 | sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free); | |
2290 | X509_NAME_free(xn); | |
2291 | return 0; | |
2292 | } | |
2293 | ||
98732979 | 2294 | const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *get_ca_names(SSL *s) |
5d6cca05 | 2295 | { |
98732979 | 2296 | const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL;; |
5d6cca05 | 2297 | |
98732979 MC |
2298 | if (s->server) { |
2299 | ca_sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s); | |
2300 | if (ca_sk != NULL && sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk) == 0) | |
2301 | ca_sk = NULL; | |
2302 | } | |
2303 | ||
2304 | if (ca_sk == NULL) | |
2305 | ca_sk = SSL_get0_CA_list(s); | |
2306 | ||
2307 | return ca_sk; | |
2308 | } | |
2309 | ||
2310 | int construct_ca_names(SSL *s, const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk, WPACKET *pkt) | |
2311 | { | |
5d6cca05 | 2312 | /* Start sub-packet for client CA list */ |
f63a17d6 | 2313 | if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { |
c48ffbcc | 2314 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
5d6cca05 | 2315 | return 0; |
f63a17d6 | 2316 | } |
5d6cca05 | 2317 | |
90fc2c26 | 2318 | if ((ca_sk != NULL) && !(s->options & SSL_OP_DISABLE_TLSEXT_CA_NAMES)) { |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2319 | int i; |
2320 | ||
2321 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk); i++) { | |
2322 | unsigned char *namebytes; | |
2323 | X509_NAME *name = sk_X509_NAME_value(ca_sk, i); | |
2324 | int namelen; | |
2325 | ||
2326 | if (name == NULL | |
2327 | || (namelen = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL)) < 0 | |
2328 | || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, namelen, | |
2329 | &namebytes) | |
2330 | || i2d_X509_NAME(name, &namebytes) != namelen) { | |
c48ffbcc | 2331 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2332 | return 0; |
2333 | } | |
2334 | } | |
2335 | } | |
2336 | ||
f63a17d6 | 2337 | if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) { |
c48ffbcc | 2338 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
5d6cca05 | 2339 | return 0; |
f63a17d6 | 2340 | } |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2341 | |
2342 | return 1; | |
2343 | } | |
72ceb6a6 DSH |
2344 | |
2345 | /* Create a buffer containing data to be signed for server key exchange */ | |
f63a17d6 | 2346 | size_t construct_key_exchange_tbs(SSL *s, unsigned char **ptbs, |
72ceb6a6 DSH |
2347 | const void *param, size_t paramlen) |
2348 | { | |
2349 | size_t tbslen = 2 * SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + paramlen; | |
2350 | unsigned char *tbs = OPENSSL_malloc(tbslen); | |
2351 | ||
f63a17d6 | 2352 | if (tbs == NULL) { |
c48ffbcc | 2353 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
72ceb6a6 | 2354 | return 0; |
f63a17d6 | 2355 | } |
555cbb32 TS |
2356 | memcpy(tbs, s->s3.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); |
2357 | memcpy(tbs + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, s->s3.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); | |
72ceb6a6 DSH |
2358 | |
2359 | memcpy(tbs + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE * 2, param, paramlen); | |
2360 | ||
2361 | *ptbs = tbs; | |
2362 | return tbslen; | |
2363 | } | |
9d75dce3 TS |
2364 | |
2365 | /* | |
2366 | * Saves the current handshake digest for Post-Handshake Auth, | |
2367 | * Done after ClientFinished is processed, done exactly once | |
2368 | */ | |
2369 | int tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(SSL *s) | |
2370 | { | |
2371 | if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) { | |
2372 | if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) | |
2373 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
2374 | return 0; | |
2375 | ||
2376 | s->pha_dgst = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); | |
2377 | if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) { | |
c48ffbcc | 2378 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
9d75dce3 TS |
2379 | return 0; |
2380 | } | |
2381 | if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(s->pha_dgst, | |
555cbb32 | 2382 | s->s3.handshake_dgst)) { |
c48ffbcc | 2383 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
963eb12d | 2384 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(s->pha_dgst); |
2385 | s->pha_dgst = NULL; | |
9d75dce3 TS |
2386 | return 0; |
2387 | } | |
2388 | } | |
2389 | return 1; | |
2390 | } | |
2391 | ||
2392 | /* | |
2393 | * Restores the Post-Handshake Auth handshake digest | |
2394 | * Done just before sending/processing the Cert Request | |
2395 | */ | |
2396 | int tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(SSL *s) | |
2397 | { | |
2398 | if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) { | |
c48ffbcc | 2399 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
9d75dce3 TS |
2400 | return 0; |
2401 | } | |
555cbb32 | 2402 | if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(s->s3.handshake_dgst, |
9d75dce3 | 2403 | s->pha_dgst)) { |
c48ffbcc | 2404 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
9d75dce3 TS |
2405 | return 0; |
2406 | } | |
2407 | return 1; | |
2408 | } |