]>
Commit | Line | Data |
---|---|---|
846e33c7 RS |
1 | /* |
2 | * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. | |
3813046d | 3 | * |
846e33c7 RS |
4 | * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use |
5 | * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy | |
6 | * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at | |
7 | * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html | |
3813046d | 8 | */ |
846e33c7 | 9 | |
ea262260 BM |
10 | /* ==================================================================== |
11 | * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. | |
0f113f3e | 12 | * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by |
ea262260 BM |
13 | * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. |
14 | */ | |
d02b48c6 | 15 | |
48948d53 | 16 | #include <limits.h> |
f2d9a32c | 17 | #include <string.h> |
d02b48c6 | 18 | #include <stdio.h> |
8ba708e5 | 19 | #include "../ssl_locl.h" |
61ae935a | 20 | #include "statem_locl.h" |
ec577822 | 21 | #include <openssl/buffer.h> |
ec577822 BM |
22 | #include <openssl/objects.h> |
23 | #include <openssl/evp.h> | |
24 | #include <openssl/x509.h> | |
d02b48c6 | 25 | |
0f113f3e MC |
26 | /* |
27 | * send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or | |
28 | * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) | |
29 | */ | |
e7ecc7d4 | 30 | int ssl3_do_write(SSL *s, int type) |
0f113f3e MC |
31 | { |
32 | int ret; | |
33 | ||
34 | ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, type, &s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], | |
35 | s->init_num); | |
36 | if (ret < 0) | |
37 | return (-1); | |
38 | if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) | |
39 | /* | |
40 | * should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case we'll | |
41 | * ignore the result anyway | |
42 | */ | |
d166ed8c DSH |
43 | if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, |
44 | (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], | |
45 | ret)) | |
46 | return -1; | |
0f113f3e MC |
47 | |
48 | if (ret == s->init_num) { | |
49 | if (s->msg_callback) | |
50 | s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data, | |
51 | (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s, | |
52 | s->msg_callback_arg); | |
53 | return (1); | |
54 | } | |
55 | s->init_off += ret; | |
56 | s->init_num -= ret; | |
57 | return (0); | |
58 | } | |
e7ecc7d4 | 59 | |
ae2f7b37 | 60 | int tls_close_construct_packet(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
2c7b4dbc MC |
61 | { |
62 | size_t msglen; | |
63 | ||
ae2f7b37 | 64 | if (!WPACKET_get_length(pkt, &msglen) |
2c7b4dbc | 65 | || msglen > INT_MAX |
ae2f7b37 | 66 | || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) |
2c7b4dbc MC |
67 | return 0; |
68 | s->init_num = (int)msglen; | |
69 | s->init_off = 0; | |
70 | ||
71 | return 1; | |
72 | } | |
73 | ||
b9908bf9 | 74 | int tls_construct_finished(SSL *s, const char *sender, int slen) |
0f113f3e MC |
75 | { |
76 | unsigned char *p; | |
77 | int i; | |
78 | unsigned long l; | |
79 | ||
b9908bf9 | 80 | p = ssl_handshake_start(s); |
0f113f3e | 81 | |
b9908bf9 MC |
82 | i = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, |
83 | sender, slen, | |
84 | s->s3->tmp.finish_md); | |
85 | if (i <= 0) | |
86 | return 0; | |
87 | s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = i; | |
88 | memcpy(p, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i); | |
89 | l = i; | |
0f113f3e | 90 | |
b9908bf9 MC |
91 | /* |
92 | * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks | |
93 | */ | |
23a635c0 | 94 | if (!s->server) { |
b9908bf9 MC |
95 | OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); |
96 | memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i); | |
97 | s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = i; | |
98 | } else { | |
99 | OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); | |
100 | memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i); | |
101 | s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = i; | |
102 | } | |
0f113f3e | 103 | |
b9908bf9 MC |
104 | if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_FINISHED, l)) { |
105 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
106 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e MC |
107 | } |
108 | ||
b9908bf9 | 109 | return 1; |
0f113f3e | 110 | } |
d02b48c6 | 111 | |
bf48836c | 112 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG |
0f113f3e MC |
113 | /* |
114 | * ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen | |
115 | * to far. | |
116 | */ | |
ee2ffc27 | 117 | static void ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s) |
0f113f3e MC |
118 | { |
119 | const char *sender; | |
120 | int slen; | |
121 | /* | |
122 | * If no new cipher setup return immediately: other functions will set | |
123 | * the appropriate error. | |
124 | */ | |
125 | if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) | |
126 | return; | |
49ae7423 | 127 | if (!s->server) { |
0f113f3e MC |
128 | sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label; |
129 | slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len; | |
130 | } else { | |
131 | sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label; | |
132 | slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len; | |
133 | } | |
134 | ||
135 | s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, | |
136 | sender, | |
137 | slen, | |
138 | s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md); | |
139 | } | |
ee2ffc27 BL |
140 | #endif |
141 | ||
be3583fa | 142 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
b9908bf9 MC |
143 | { |
144 | int al; | |
73999b62 | 145 | long remain; |
4fa52141 | 146 | |
73999b62 | 147 | remain = PACKET_remaining(pkt); |
657da85e MC |
148 | /* |
149 | * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, which should already have | |
c69f2adf MC |
150 | * been consumed by ssl_get_message() so there should be no bytes left, |
151 | * unless we're using DTLS1_BAD_VER, which has an extra 2 bytes | |
657da85e | 152 | */ |
c69f2adf | 153 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
73999b62 | 154 | if ((s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER |
a230b26e EK |
155 | && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH + 1) |
156 | || (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER | |
157 | && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH - 1)) { | |
158 | al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
159 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, | |
160 | SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); | |
161 | goto f_err; | |
c69f2adf MC |
162 | } |
163 | } else { | |
73999b62 | 164 | if (remain != 0) { |
c69f2adf | 165 | al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
b9908bf9 MC |
166 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, |
167 | SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); | |
c69f2adf MC |
168 | goto f_err; |
169 | } | |
657da85e MC |
170 | } |
171 | ||
172 | /* Check we have a cipher to change to */ | |
173 | if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) { | |
174 | al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; | |
b9908bf9 | 175 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); |
657da85e MC |
176 | goto f_err; |
177 | } | |
178 | ||
179 | s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 1; | |
180 | if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) { | |
181 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
b9908bf9 | 182 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
657da85e MC |
183 | goto f_err; |
184 | } | |
185 | ||
c69f2adf MC |
186 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
187 | dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ); | |
188 | ||
189 | if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) | |
190 | s->d1->handshake_read_seq++; | |
191 | ||
192 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
193 | /* | |
194 | * Remember that a CCS has been received, so that an old key of | |
195 | * SCTP-Auth can be deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored if no | |
196 | * SCTP is used | |
197 | */ | |
198 | BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD, 1, NULL); | |
199 | #endif | |
200 | } | |
201 | ||
b9908bf9 | 202 | return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; |
657da85e MC |
203 | f_err: |
204 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
fe3a3291 | 205 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); |
b9908bf9 | 206 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
657da85e MC |
207 | } |
208 | ||
be3583fa | 209 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_finished(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
b9908bf9 MC |
210 | { |
211 | int al, i; | |
b9908bf9 | 212 | |
0f113f3e MC |
213 | /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */ |
214 | if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) { | |
215 | al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; | |
b9908bf9 | 216 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS); |
0f113f3e MC |
217 | goto f_err; |
218 | } | |
219 | s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0; | |
220 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
221 | i = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len; |
222 | ||
956de7b2 | 223 | if ((unsigned long)i != PACKET_remaining(pkt)) { |
0f113f3e | 224 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
b9908bf9 | 225 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH); |
0f113f3e MC |
226 | goto f_err; |
227 | } | |
228 | ||
73999b62 | 229 | if (CRYPTO_memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt), s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, i) != 0) { |
0f113f3e | 230 | al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; |
b9908bf9 | 231 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED); |
0f113f3e MC |
232 | goto f_err; |
233 | } | |
234 | ||
235 | /* | |
236 | * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks | |
237 | */ | |
23a635c0 | 238 | if (s->server) { |
0f113f3e MC |
239 | OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); |
240 | memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, i); | |
241 | s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = i; | |
242 | } else { | |
243 | OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); | |
244 | memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, i); | |
245 | s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = i; | |
246 | } | |
247 | ||
e6575156 | 248 | return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; |
0f113f3e MC |
249 | f_err: |
250 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
fe3a3291 | 251 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); |
b9908bf9 | 252 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
0f113f3e | 253 | } |
d02b48c6 | 254 | |
b9908bf9 MC |
255 | int tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s) |
256 | { | |
257 | unsigned char *p; | |
258 | ||
259 | p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; | |
260 | *p = SSL3_MT_CCS; | |
261 | s->init_num = 1; | |
262 | s->init_off = 0; | |
263 | ||
264 | return 1; | |
265 | } | |
266 | ||
c526ed41 | 267 | unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, CERT_PKEY *cpk) |
0f113f3e MC |
268 | { |
269 | unsigned char *p; | |
270 | unsigned long l = 3 + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s); | |
271 | ||
272 | if (!ssl_add_cert_chain(s, cpk, &l)) | |
273 | return 0; | |
274 | ||
275 | l -= 3 + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s); | |
276 | p = ssl_handshake_start(s); | |
277 | l2n3(l, p); | |
278 | l += 3; | |
77d514c5 | 279 | |
61986d32 | 280 | if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE, l)) { |
77d514c5 MC |
281 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
282 | return 0; | |
283 | } | |
0f113f3e MC |
284 | return l + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s); |
285 | } | |
286 | ||
be3583fa | 287 | WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) |
8723588e MC |
288 | { |
289 | void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL; | |
290 | ||
291 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
292 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) { | |
be3583fa | 293 | WORK_STATE ret; |
8723588e MC |
294 | ret = dtls_wait_for_dry(s); |
295 | if (ret != WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE) | |
296 | return ret; | |
297 | } | |
298 | #endif | |
299 | ||
300 | /* clean a few things up */ | |
301 | ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); | |
473483d4 MC |
302 | |
303 | if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
304 | /* | |
305 | * We don't do this in DTLS because we may still need the init_buf | |
306 | * in case there are any unexpected retransmits | |
307 | */ | |
308 | BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); | |
309 | s->init_buf = NULL; | |
310 | } | |
8723588e MC |
311 | |
312 | ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s); | |
313 | ||
314 | s->init_num = 0; | |
315 | ||
316 | if (!s->server || s->renegotiate == 2) { | |
317 | /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */ | |
318 | s->renegotiate = 0; | |
319 | s->new_session = 0; | |
320 | ||
321 | if (s->server) { | |
8723588e MC |
322 | ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER); |
323 | ||
324 | s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++; | |
fe3a3291 | 325 | s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_accept; |
8723588e MC |
326 | } else { |
327 | ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT); | |
328 | if (s->hit) | |
329 | s->ctx->stats.sess_hit++; | |
330 | ||
fe3a3291 | 331 | s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_connect; |
8723588e MC |
332 | s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_good++; |
333 | } | |
334 | ||
335 | if (s->info_callback != NULL) | |
336 | cb = s->info_callback; | |
337 | else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) | |
338 | cb = s->ctx->info_callback; | |
339 | ||
340 | if (cb != NULL) | |
341 | cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1); | |
342 | ||
343 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
344 | /* done with handshaking */ | |
345 | s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0; | |
346 | s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 0; | |
347 | s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0; | |
f5c7f5df | 348 | dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s); |
8723588e MC |
349 | } |
350 | } | |
351 | ||
352 | return WORK_FINISHED_STOP; | |
353 | } | |
354 | ||
9ab930b2 MC |
355 | int tls_get_message_header(SSL *s, int *mt) |
356 | { | |
357 | /* s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */ | |
358 | int skip_message, i, recvd_type, al; | |
359 | unsigned char *p; | |
360 | unsigned long l; | |
361 | ||
362 | p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; | |
363 | ||
364 | do { | |
365 | while (s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) { | |
366 | i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, &recvd_type, | |
a230b26e EK |
367 | &p[s->init_num], |
368 | SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - s->init_num, | |
369 | 0); | |
9ab930b2 MC |
370 | if (i <= 0) { |
371 | s->rwstate = SSL_READING; | |
372 | return 0; | |
32ec4153 | 373 | } |
9ab930b2 | 374 | if (recvd_type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { |
1257adec | 375 | /* |
a230b26e EK |
376 | * A ChangeCipherSpec must be a single byte and may not occur |
377 | * in the middle of a handshake message. | |
378 | */ | |
1257adec DB |
379 | if (s->init_num != 0 || i != 1 || p[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS) { |
380 | al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; | |
381 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, | |
382 | SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); | |
383 | goto f_err; | |
384 | } | |
9ab930b2 MC |
385 | s->s3->tmp.message_type = *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; |
386 | s->init_num = i - 1; | |
387 | s->s3->tmp.message_size = i; | |
388 | return 1; | |
389 | } else if (recvd_type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { | |
390 | al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; | |
391 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); | |
32ec4153 MC |
392 | goto f_err; |
393 | } | |
9ab930b2 MC |
394 | s->init_num += i; |
395 | } | |
396 | ||
397 | skip_message = 0; | |
398 | if (!s->server) | |
399 | if (p[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) | |
400 | /* | |
401 | * The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages -- | |
402 | * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if | |
403 | * their format is correct. Does not count for 'Finished' | |
404 | * MAC. | |
405 | */ | |
406 | if (p[1] == 0 && p[2] == 0 && p[3] == 0) { | |
407 | s->init_num = 0; | |
408 | skip_message = 1; | |
409 | ||
410 | if (s->msg_callback) | |
411 | s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, | |
412 | p, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s, | |
413 | s->msg_callback_arg); | |
414 | } | |
415 | } while (skip_message); | |
416 | /* s->init_num == SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */ | |
417 | ||
418 | *mt = *p; | |
419 | s->s3->tmp.message_type = *(p++); | |
32ec4153 | 420 | |
e8aa8b6c | 421 | if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) { |
9ab930b2 MC |
422 | /* |
423 | * Only happens with SSLv3+ in an SSLv2 backward compatible | |
424 | * ClientHello | |
e8aa8b6c F |
425 | * |
426 | * Total message size is the remaining record bytes to read | |
427 | * plus the SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH bytes that we already read | |
9ab930b2 | 428 | */ |
9ab930b2 MC |
429 | l = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(&s->rlayer) |
430 | + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
431 | if (l && !BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf, (int)l)) { | |
432 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); | |
433 | goto err; | |
434 | } | |
435 | s->s3->tmp.message_size = l; | |
436 | ||
437 | s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data; | |
438 | s->init_num = SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
439 | } else { | |
440 | n2l3(p, l); | |
441 | /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */ | |
442 | if (l > (INT_MAX - SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { | |
443 | al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
444 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE); | |
445 | goto f_err; | |
32ec4153 | 446 | } |
9ab930b2 | 447 | if (l && !BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf, |
a230b26e | 448 | (int)l + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { |
9ab930b2 MC |
449 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); |
450 | goto err; | |
451 | } | |
452 | s->s3->tmp.message_size = l; | |
453 | ||
454 | s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
455 | s->init_num = 0; | |
456 | } | |
457 | ||
458 | return 1; | |
459 | f_err: | |
460 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
461 | err: | |
462 | return 0; | |
463 | } | |
464 | ||
465 | int tls_get_message_body(SSL *s, unsigned long *len) | |
466 | { | |
467 | long n; | |
468 | unsigned char *p; | |
469 | int i; | |
470 | ||
471 | if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { | |
472 | /* We've already read everything in */ | |
473 | *len = (unsigned long)s->init_num; | |
474 | return 1; | |
0f113f3e MC |
475 | } |
476 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
477 | p = s->init_msg; |
478 | n = s->s3->tmp.message_size - s->init_num; | |
479 | while (n > 0) { | |
657da85e MC |
480 | i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, NULL, |
481 | &p[s->init_num], n, 0); | |
0f113f3e MC |
482 | if (i <= 0) { |
483 | s->rwstate = SSL_READING; | |
9ab930b2 MC |
484 | *len = 0; |
485 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e MC |
486 | } |
487 | s->init_num += i; | |
488 | n -= i; | |
489 | } | |
ee2ffc27 | 490 | |
bf48836c | 491 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG |
0f113f3e MC |
492 | /* |
493 | * If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for | |
494 | * Finished verification. | |
495 | */ | |
496 | if (*s->init_buf->data == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) | |
497 | ssl3_take_mac(s); | |
ee2ffc27 BL |
498 | #endif |
499 | ||
0f113f3e | 500 | /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */ |
e8aa8b6c | 501 | if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) { |
d166ed8c DSH |
502 | if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, |
503 | s->init_num)) { | |
504 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
505 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
506 | *len = 0; | |
507 | return 0; | |
508 | } | |
32ec4153 | 509 | if (s->msg_callback) |
a230b26e | 510 | s->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION, 0, s->init_buf->data, |
32ec4153 MC |
511 | (size_t)s->init_num, s, s->msg_callback_arg); |
512 | } else { | |
d166ed8c | 513 | if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, |
a230b26e | 514 | s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { |
d166ed8c DSH |
515 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
516 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
517 | *len = 0; | |
518 | return 0; | |
519 | } | |
32ec4153 MC |
520 | if (s->msg_callback) |
521 | s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data, | |
522 | (size_t)s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s, | |
523 | s->msg_callback_arg); | |
524 | } | |
525 | ||
9ab930b2 MC |
526 | /* |
527 | * init_num should never be negative...should probably be declared | |
528 | * unsigned | |
529 | */ | |
530 | if (s->init_num < 0) { | |
531 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
532 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
533 | *len = 0; | |
534 | return 0; | |
535 | } | |
536 | *len = (unsigned long)s->init_num; | |
537 | return 1; | |
0f113f3e | 538 | } |
d02b48c6 | 539 | |
2e5ead83 | 540 | int ssl_cert_type(const X509 *x, const EVP_PKEY *pk) |
0f113f3e | 541 | { |
a230b26e | 542 | if (pk == NULL && (pk = X509_get0_pubkey(x)) == NULL) |
17a72388 VD |
543 | return -1; |
544 | ||
545 | switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) { | |
546 | default: | |
547 | return -1; | |
548 | case EVP_PKEY_RSA: | |
549 | return SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC; | |
550 | case EVP_PKEY_DSA: | |
551 | return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN; | |
ea262260 | 552 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
17a72388 VD |
553 | case EVP_PKEY_EC: |
554 | return SSL_PKEY_ECC; | |
ea262260 | 555 | #endif |
2a9b9654 | 556 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST |
17a72388 VD |
557 | case NID_id_GostR3410_2001: |
558 | return SSL_PKEY_GOST01; | |
559 | case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256: | |
560 | return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256; | |
561 | case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512: | |
562 | return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512; | |
2a9b9654 | 563 | #endif |
82049c54 | 564 | } |
0f113f3e | 565 | } |
d02b48c6 | 566 | |
6b691a5c | 567 | int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type) |
0f113f3e MC |
568 | { |
569 | int al; | |
570 | ||
571 | switch (type) { | |
572 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT: | |
573 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL: | |
574 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER: | |
575 | al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA; | |
576 | break; | |
577 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE: | |
578 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE: | |
579 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY: | |
580 | case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD: | |
581 | case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD: | |
582 | case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD: | |
583 | case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD: | |
584 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID: | |
585 | case X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID: | |
586 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED: | |
587 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED: | |
f3e235ed VD |
588 | case X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH: |
589 | case X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH: | |
590 | case X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH: | |
591 | case X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH: | |
592 | case X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL: | |
593 | case X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL: | |
594 | case X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK: | |
0f113f3e MC |
595 | al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE; |
596 | break; | |
597 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE: | |
598 | case X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE: | |
599 | al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; | |
600 | break; | |
601 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED: | |
602 | case X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED: | |
603 | al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED; | |
604 | break; | |
605 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED: | |
606 | al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED; | |
607 | break; | |
f3e235ed | 608 | case X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED: |
0f113f3e | 609 | case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM: |
f3e235ed VD |
610 | case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL: |
611 | case X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP: | |
0f113f3e MC |
612 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
613 | break; | |
614 | case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT: | |
615 | case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN: | |
616 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY: | |
617 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE: | |
618 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG: | |
619 | case X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED: | |
620 | case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA: | |
621 | al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA; | |
622 | break; | |
623 | case X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION: | |
624 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
625 | break; | |
626 | case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE: | |
627 | al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE; | |
628 | break; | |
629 | default: | |
630 | al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN; | |
631 | break; | |
632 | } | |
633 | return (al); | |
634 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 635 | |
b362ccab | 636 | int ssl_allow_compression(SSL *s) |
0f113f3e MC |
637 | { |
638 | if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) | |
639 | return 0; | |
640 | return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION, 0, 0, NULL); | |
641 | } | |
4fa52141 | 642 | |
068c358a | 643 | static int version_cmp(const SSL *s, int a, int b) |
4fa52141 VD |
644 | { |
645 | int dtls = SSL_IS_DTLS(s); | |
646 | ||
647 | if (a == b) | |
648 | return 0; | |
649 | if (!dtls) | |
650 | return a < b ? -1 : 1; | |
651 | return DTLS_VERSION_LT(a, b) ? -1 : 1; | |
652 | } | |
653 | ||
654 | typedef struct { | |
655 | int version; | |
a230b26e EK |
656 | const SSL_METHOD *(*cmeth) (void); |
657 | const SSL_METHOD *(*smeth) (void); | |
4fa52141 VD |
658 | } version_info; |
659 | ||
660 | #if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_2_VERSION | |
661 | # error Code needs update for TLS_method() support beyond TLS1_2_VERSION. | |
662 | #endif | |
663 | ||
664 | static const version_info tls_version_table[] = { | |
6b01bed2 | 665 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2 |
a230b26e | 666 | {TLS1_2_VERSION, tlsv1_2_client_method, tlsv1_2_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 667 | #else |
a230b26e | 668 | {TLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
6b01bed2 VD |
669 | #endif |
670 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1 | |
a230b26e | 671 | {TLS1_1_VERSION, tlsv1_1_client_method, tlsv1_1_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 672 | #else |
a230b26e | 673 | {TLS1_1_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
6b01bed2 VD |
674 | #endif |
675 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1 | |
a230b26e | 676 | {TLS1_VERSION, tlsv1_client_method, tlsv1_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 677 | #else |
a230b26e | 678 | {TLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
6b01bed2 | 679 | #endif |
4fa52141 | 680 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3 |
a230b26e | 681 | {SSL3_VERSION, sslv3_client_method, sslv3_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 682 | #else |
a230b26e | 683 | {SSL3_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
4fa52141 | 684 | #endif |
a230b26e | 685 | {0, NULL, NULL}, |
4fa52141 VD |
686 | }; |
687 | ||
688 | #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION != DTLS1_2_VERSION | |
689 | # error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_2_VERSION. | |
690 | #endif | |
691 | ||
692 | static const version_info dtls_version_table[] = { | |
6b01bed2 | 693 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2 |
a230b26e | 694 | {DTLS1_2_VERSION, dtlsv1_2_client_method, dtlsv1_2_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 695 | #else |
a230b26e | 696 | {DTLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
6b01bed2 VD |
697 | #endif |
698 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1 | |
a230b26e EK |
699 | {DTLS1_VERSION, dtlsv1_client_method, dtlsv1_server_method}, |
700 | {DTLS1_BAD_VER, dtls_bad_ver_client_method, NULL}, | |
6b01bed2 | 701 | #else |
a230b26e EK |
702 | {DTLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
703 | {DTLS1_BAD_VER, NULL, NULL}, | |
6b01bed2 | 704 | #endif |
a230b26e | 705 | {0, NULL, NULL}, |
4fa52141 VD |
706 | }; |
707 | ||
708 | /* | |
709 | * ssl_method_error - Check whether an SSL_METHOD is enabled. | |
710 | * | |
711 | * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method | |
712 | * @method: the intended method. | |
713 | * | |
714 | * Returns 0 on success, or an SSL error reason on failure. | |
715 | */ | |
068c358a | 716 | static int ssl_method_error(const SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *method) |
4fa52141 VD |
717 | { |
718 | int version = method->version; | |
719 | ||
720 | if ((s->min_proto_version != 0 && | |
721 | version_cmp(s, version, s->min_proto_version) < 0) || | |
722 | ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, version, NULL) == 0) | |
723 | return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW; | |
724 | ||
725 | if (s->max_proto_version != 0 && | |
a230b26e | 726 | version_cmp(s, version, s->max_proto_version) > 0) |
4fa52141 VD |
727 | return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_HIGH; |
728 | ||
729 | if ((s->options & method->mask) != 0) | |
730 | return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; | |
731 | if ((method->flags & SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB) != 0 && tls1_suiteb(s)) | |
732 | return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_2_NEEDED_IN_SUITEB_MODE; | |
733 | else if ((method->flags & SSL_METHOD_NO_FIPS) != 0 && FIPS_mode()) | |
734 | return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_0_NEEDED_IN_FIPS_MODE; | |
735 | ||
736 | return 0; | |
737 | } | |
738 | ||
ccae4a15 FI |
739 | /* |
740 | * ssl_version_supported - Check that the specified `version` is supported by | |
741 | * `SSL *` instance | |
742 | * | |
743 | * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method | |
744 | * @version: Protocol version to test against | |
745 | * | |
746 | * Returns 1 when supported, otherwise 0 | |
747 | */ | |
748 | int ssl_version_supported(const SSL *s, int version) | |
749 | { | |
750 | const version_info *vent; | |
751 | const version_info *table; | |
752 | ||
753 | switch (s->method->version) { | |
754 | default: | |
755 | /* Version should match method version for non-ANY method */ | |
756 | return version_cmp(s, version, s->version) == 0; | |
757 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
758 | table = tls_version_table; | |
759 | break; | |
760 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
761 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
762 | break; | |
763 | } | |
764 | ||
765 | for (vent = table; | |
766 | vent->version != 0 && version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) <= 0; | |
767 | ++vent) { | |
768 | if (vent->cmeth != NULL && | |
769 | version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) == 0 && | |
770 | ssl_method_error(s, vent->cmeth()) == 0) { | |
771 | return 1; | |
772 | } | |
773 | } | |
774 | return 0; | |
775 | } | |
776 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
777 | /* |
778 | * ssl_check_version_downgrade - In response to RFC7507 SCSV version | |
779 | * fallback indication from a client check whether we're using the highest | |
780 | * supported protocol version. | |
781 | * | |
782 | * @s server SSL handle. | |
783 | * | |
784 | * Returns 1 when using the highest enabled version, 0 otherwise. | |
785 | */ | |
786 | int ssl_check_version_downgrade(SSL *s) | |
787 | { | |
788 | const version_info *vent; | |
789 | const version_info *table; | |
790 | ||
791 | /* | |
792 | * Check that the current protocol is the highest enabled version | |
793 | * (according to s->ctx->method, as version negotiation may have changed | |
794 | * s->method). | |
795 | */ | |
796 | if (s->version == s->ctx->method->version) | |
797 | return 1; | |
798 | ||
799 | /* | |
800 | * Apparently we're using a version-flexible SSL_METHOD (not at its | |
801 | * highest protocol version). | |
802 | */ | |
803 | if (s->ctx->method->version == TLS_method()->version) | |
804 | table = tls_version_table; | |
805 | else if (s->ctx->method->version == DTLS_method()->version) | |
806 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
807 | else { | |
808 | /* Unexpected state; fail closed. */ | |
809 | return 0; | |
810 | } | |
811 | ||
812 | for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { | |
a230b26e | 813 | if (vent->smeth != NULL && ssl_method_error(s, vent->smeth()) == 0) |
4fa52141 VD |
814 | return s->version == vent->version; |
815 | } | |
816 | return 0; | |
817 | } | |
818 | ||
819 | /* | |
820 | * ssl_set_version_bound - set an upper or lower bound on the supported (D)TLS | |
821 | * protocols, provided the initial (D)TLS method is version-flexible. This | |
822 | * function sanity-checks the proposed value and makes sure the method is | |
823 | * version-flexible, then sets the limit if all is well. | |
824 | * | |
825 | * @method_version: The version of the current SSL_METHOD. | |
826 | * @version: the intended limit. | |
827 | * @bound: pointer to limit to be updated. | |
828 | * | |
829 | * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure. | |
830 | */ | |
831 | int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version, int version, int *bound) | |
832 | { | |
869e978c KR |
833 | if (version == 0) { |
834 | *bound = version; | |
835 | return 1; | |
836 | } | |
837 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
838 | /*- |
839 | * Restrict TLS methods to TLS protocol versions. | |
840 | * Restrict DTLS methods to DTLS protocol versions. | |
841 | * Note, DTLS version numbers are decreasing, use comparison macros. | |
842 | * | |
843 | * Note that for both lower-bounds we use explicit versions, not | |
844 | * (D)TLS_MIN_VERSION. This is because we don't want to break user | |
845 | * configurations. If the MIN (supported) version ever rises, the user's | |
846 | * "floor" remains valid even if no longer available. We don't expect the | |
847 | * MAX ceiling to ever get lower, so making that variable makes sense. | |
848 | */ | |
849 | switch (method_version) { | |
850 | default: | |
851 | /* | |
852 | * XXX For fixed version methods, should we always fail and not set any | |
853 | * bounds, always succeed and not set any bounds, or set the bounds and | |
854 | * arrange to fail later if they are not met? At present fixed-version | |
855 | * methods are not subject to controls that disable individual protocol | |
856 | * versions. | |
857 | */ | |
858 | return 0; | |
859 | ||
860 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
861 | if (version < SSL3_VERSION || version > TLS_MAX_VERSION) | |
862 | return 0; | |
863 | break; | |
864 | ||
865 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
866 | if (DTLS_VERSION_GT(version, DTLS_MAX_VERSION) || | |
032924c4 | 867 | DTLS_VERSION_LT(version, DTLS1_BAD_VER)) |
4fa52141 VD |
868 | return 0; |
869 | break; | |
870 | } | |
871 | ||
872 | *bound = version; | |
873 | return 1; | |
874 | } | |
875 | ||
876 | /* | |
877 | * ssl_choose_server_version - Choose server (D)TLS version. Called when the | |
878 | * client HELLO is received to select the final server protocol version and | |
879 | * the version specific method. | |
880 | * | |
881 | * @s: server SSL handle. | |
882 | * | |
883 | * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. | |
884 | */ | |
885 | int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s) | |
886 | { | |
887 | /*- | |
888 | * With version-flexible methods we have an initial state with: | |
889 | * | |
890 | * s->method->version == (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION, | |
891 | * s->version == (D)TLS_MAX_VERSION. | |
892 | * | |
893 | * So we detect version-flexible methods via the method version, not the | |
894 | * handle version. | |
895 | */ | |
896 | int server_version = s->method->version; | |
897 | int client_version = s->client_version; | |
898 | const version_info *vent; | |
899 | const version_info *table; | |
900 | int disabled = 0; | |
901 | ||
902 | switch (server_version) { | |
903 | default: | |
904 | if (version_cmp(s, client_version, s->version) < 0) | |
905 | return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION; | |
906 | /* | |
907 | * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't | |
908 | * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope | |
909 | * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol | |
910 | * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return | |
911 | * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) | |
912 | */ | |
913 | return 0; | |
914 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
915 | table = tls_version_table; | |
916 | break; | |
917 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
918 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
919 | break; | |
920 | } | |
921 | ||
922 | for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { | |
923 | const SSL_METHOD *method; | |
924 | ||
925 | if (vent->smeth == NULL || | |
926 | version_cmp(s, client_version, vent->version) < 0) | |
927 | continue; | |
928 | method = vent->smeth(); | |
929 | if (ssl_method_error(s, method) == 0) { | |
930 | s->version = vent->version; | |
931 | s->method = method; | |
932 | return 0; | |
933 | } | |
934 | disabled = 1; | |
935 | } | |
936 | return disabled ? SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL : SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW; | |
937 | } | |
938 | ||
939 | /* | |
940 | * ssl_choose_client_version - Choose client (D)TLS version. Called when the | |
941 | * server HELLO is received to select the final client protocol version and | |
942 | * the version specific method. | |
943 | * | |
944 | * @s: client SSL handle. | |
945 | * @version: The proposed version from the server's HELLO. | |
946 | * | |
947 | * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. | |
948 | */ | |
949 | int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version) | |
950 | { | |
951 | const version_info *vent; | |
952 | const version_info *table; | |
953 | ||
954 | switch (s->method->version) { | |
955 | default: | |
956 | if (version != s->version) | |
957 | return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION; | |
958 | /* | |
959 | * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't | |
960 | * (and never did) check min/max, FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope | |
961 | * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol | |
962 | * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return | |
963 | * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) | |
964 | */ | |
4fa52141 VD |
965 | return 0; |
966 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
967 | table = tls_version_table; | |
968 | break; | |
969 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
970 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
971 | break; | |
972 | } | |
973 | ||
974 | for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { | |
975 | const SSL_METHOD *method; | |
976 | int err; | |
977 | ||
978 | if (version != vent->version) | |
979 | continue; | |
980 | if (vent->cmeth == NULL) | |
981 | break; | |
982 | method = vent->cmeth(); | |
983 | err = ssl_method_error(s, method); | |
984 | if (err != 0) | |
985 | return err; | |
986 | s->method = method; | |
ccae4a15 | 987 | s->version = version; |
4fa52141 VD |
988 | return 0; |
989 | } | |
990 | ||
991 | return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; | |
992 | } | |
993 | ||
068c358a KR |
994 | /* |
995 | * ssl_get_client_min_max_version - get minimum and maximum client version | |
996 | * @s: The SSL connection | |
997 | * @min_version: The minimum supported version | |
998 | * @max_version: The maximum supported version | |
999 | * | |
1000 | * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if the | |
1001 | * version is initially (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION. We apply any explicit SSL_OP_NO_xxx | |
1002 | * options, the MinProtocol and MaxProtocol configuration commands, any Suite B | |
1003 | * or FIPS_mode() constraints and any floor imposed by the security level here, | |
1004 | * so we don't advertise the wrong protocol version to only reject the outcome later. | |
4fa52141 | 1005 | * |
0485d540 | 1006 | * Computing the right floor matters. If, e.g., TLS 1.0 and 1.2 are enabled, |
4fa52141 VD |
1007 | * TLS 1.1 is disabled, but the security level, Suite-B and/or MinProtocol |
1008 | * only allow TLS 1.2, we want to advertise TLS1.2, *not* TLS1. | |
1009 | * | |
068c358a KR |
1010 | * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. On failure |
1011 | * min_version and max_version will also be set to 0. | |
4fa52141 | 1012 | */ |
a230b26e EK |
1013 | int ssl_get_client_min_max_version(const SSL *s, int *min_version, |
1014 | int *max_version) | |
4fa52141 VD |
1015 | { |
1016 | int version; | |
1017 | int hole; | |
1018 | const SSL_METHOD *single = NULL; | |
1019 | const SSL_METHOD *method; | |
1020 | const version_info *table; | |
1021 | const version_info *vent; | |
1022 | ||
1023 | switch (s->method->version) { | |
1024 | default: | |
1025 | /* | |
1026 | * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't | |
1027 | * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope | |
1028 | * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol | |
1029 | * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return | |
1030 | * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) | |
1031 | */ | |
068c358a | 1032 | *min_version = *max_version = s->version; |
4fa52141 VD |
1033 | return 0; |
1034 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1035 | table = tls_version_table; | |
1036 | break; | |
1037 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1038 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
1039 | break; | |
1040 | } | |
1041 | ||
1042 | /* | |
1043 | * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are some protocols | |
1044 | * below X enabled. This is required in order to maintain the "version | |
1045 | * capability" vector contiguous. Any versions with a NULL client method | |
1046 | * (protocol version client is disabled at compile-time) is also a "hole". | |
1047 | * | |
1048 | * Our initial state is hole == 1, version == 0. That is, versions above | |
1049 | * the first version in the method table are disabled (a "hole" above | |
1050 | * the valid protocol entries) and we don't have a selected version yet. | |
1051 | * | |
1052 | * Whenever "hole == 1", and we hit an enabled method, its version becomes | |
1053 | * the selected version, and the method becomes a candidate "single" | |
1054 | * method. We're no longer in a hole, so "hole" becomes 0. | |
1055 | * | |
1056 | * If "hole == 0" and we hit an enabled method, then "single" is cleared, | |
1057 | * as we support a contiguous range of at least two methods. If we hit | |
1058 | * a disabled method, then hole becomes true again, but nothing else | |
1059 | * changes yet, because all the remaining methods may be disabled too. | |
1060 | * If we again hit an enabled method after the new hole, it becomes | |
1061 | * selected, as we start from scratch. | |
1062 | */ | |
068c358a | 1063 | *min_version = version = 0; |
4fa52141 VD |
1064 | hole = 1; |
1065 | for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { | |
1066 | /* | |
1067 | * A table entry with a NULL client method is still a hole in the | |
1068 | * "version capability" vector. | |
1069 | */ | |
1070 | if (vent->cmeth == NULL) { | |
1071 | hole = 1; | |
1072 | continue; | |
1073 | } | |
1074 | method = vent->cmeth(); | |
1075 | if (ssl_method_error(s, method) != 0) { | |
1076 | hole = 1; | |
1077 | } else if (!hole) { | |
1078 | single = NULL; | |
068c358a | 1079 | *min_version = method->version; |
4fa52141 VD |
1080 | } else { |
1081 | version = (single = method)->version; | |
068c358a | 1082 | *min_version = version; |
4fa52141 VD |
1083 | hole = 0; |
1084 | } | |
1085 | } | |
1086 | ||
068c358a KR |
1087 | *max_version = version; |
1088 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1089 | /* Fail if everything is disabled */ |
1090 | if (version == 0) | |
1091 | return SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE; | |
1092 | ||
068c358a KR |
1093 | return 0; |
1094 | } | |
1095 | ||
1096 | /* | |
1097 | * ssl_set_client_hello_version - Work out what version we should be using for | |
1098 | * the initial ClientHello. | |
1099 | * | |
1100 | * @s: client SSL handle. | |
1101 | * | |
1102 | * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. | |
1103 | */ | |
1104 | int ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL *s) | |
1105 | { | |
3eb2aff4 | 1106 | int ver_min, ver_max, ret; |
068c358a | 1107 | |
3eb2aff4 | 1108 | ret = ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max); |
068c358a KR |
1109 | |
1110 | if (ret != 0) | |
1111 | return ret; | |
1112 | ||
3eb2aff4 | 1113 | s->client_version = s->version = ver_max; |
4fa52141 VD |
1114 | return 0; |
1115 | } |