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846e33c7 | 1 | /* |
9d75dce3 | 2 | * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. |
aa8f3d76 | 3 | * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved |
3813046d | 4 | * |
2c18d164 | 5 | * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use |
846e33c7 RS |
6 | * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy |
7 | * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at | |
8 | * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html | |
3813046d | 9 | */ |
846e33c7 | 10 | |
48948d53 | 11 | #include <limits.h> |
f2d9a32c | 12 | #include <string.h> |
d02b48c6 | 13 | #include <stdio.h> |
706457b7 DMSP |
14 | #include "../ssl_local.h" |
15 | #include "statem_local.h" | |
67dc995e | 16 | #include "internal/cryptlib.h" |
c2041da8 | 17 | #include "internal/evp.h" |
ec577822 | 18 | #include <openssl/buffer.h> |
ec577822 BM |
19 | #include <openssl/objects.h> |
20 | #include <openssl/evp.h> | |
21 | #include <openssl/x509.h> | |
49b26f54 | 22 | #include <openssl/trace.h> |
d02b48c6 | 23 | |
c6d38183 RS |
24 | /* |
25 | * Map error codes to TLS/SSL alart types. | |
26 | */ | |
27 | typedef struct x509err2alert_st { | |
28 | int x509err; | |
29 | int alert; | |
30 | } X509ERR2ALERT; | |
31 | ||
597c51bc MC |
32 | /* Fixed value used in the ServerHello random field to identify an HRR */ |
33 | const unsigned char hrrrandom[] = { | |
34 | 0xcf, 0x21, 0xad, 0x74, 0xe5, 0x9a, 0x61, 0x11, 0xbe, 0x1d, 0x8c, 0x02, | |
35 | 0x1e, 0x65, 0xb8, 0x91, 0xc2, 0xa2, 0x11, 0x16, 0x7a, 0xbb, 0x8c, 0x5e, | |
36 | 0x07, 0x9e, 0x09, 0xe2, 0xc8, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x9c | |
37 | }; | |
38 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
39 | /* |
40 | * send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or | |
41 | * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) | |
42 | */ | |
e7ecc7d4 | 43 | int ssl3_do_write(SSL *s, int type) |
0f113f3e MC |
44 | { |
45 | int ret; | |
7ee8627f | 46 | size_t written = 0; |
0f113f3e MC |
47 | |
48 | ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, type, &s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], | |
7ee8627f | 49 | s->init_num, &written); |
0f113f3e | 50 | if (ret < 0) |
26a7d938 | 51 | return -1; |
0f113f3e MC |
52 | if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) |
53 | /* | |
54 | * should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case we'll | |
55 | * ignore the result anyway | |
9d75dce3 | 56 | * TLS1.3 KeyUpdate and NewSessionTicket do not need to be added |
0f113f3e | 57 | */ |
9d75dce3 TS |
58 | if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || (s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET |
59 | && s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE | |
60 | && s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE)) | |
61 | if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, | |
62 | (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], | |
63 | written)) | |
64 | return -1; | |
7ee8627f | 65 | if (written == s->init_num) { |
0f113f3e MC |
66 | if (s->msg_callback) |
67 | s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data, | |
68 | (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s, | |
69 | s->msg_callback_arg); | |
208fb891 | 70 | return 1; |
0f113f3e | 71 | } |
7ee8627f MC |
72 | s->init_off += written; |
73 | s->init_num -= written; | |
26a7d938 | 74 | return 0; |
0f113f3e | 75 | } |
e7ecc7d4 | 76 | |
4a01c59f | 77 | int tls_close_construct_packet(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int htype) |
2c7b4dbc MC |
78 | { |
79 | size_t msglen; | |
80 | ||
4a01c59f | 81 | if ((htype != SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) |
f1ec23c0 | 82 | || !WPACKET_get_length(pkt, &msglen) |
7cea05dc | 83 | || msglen > INT_MAX) |
2c7b4dbc MC |
84 | return 0; |
85 | s->init_num = (int)msglen; | |
86 | s->init_off = 0; | |
87 | ||
88 | return 1; | |
89 | } | |
90 | ||
1f5b44e9 MC |
91 | int tls_setup_handshake(SSL *s) |
92 | { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
93 | if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) { |
94 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
c7f47786 | 95 | return 0; |
f63a17d6 | 96 | } |
c7f47786 | 97 | |
b186a592 MC |
98 | /* Reset any extension flags */ |
99 | memset(s->ext.extflags, 0, sizeof(s->ext.extflags)); | |
100 | ||
c7f47786 | 101 | if (s->server) { |
38a73150 MC |
102 | STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = SSL_get_ciphers(s); |
103 | int i, ver_min, ver_max, ok = 0; | |
104 | ||
105 | /* | |
106 | * Sanity check that the maximum version we accept has ciphers | |
107 | * enabled. For clients we do this check during construction of the | |
108 | * ClientHello. | |
109 | */ | |
b5b993b2 | 110 | if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max, NULL) != 0) { |
4752c5de MC |
111 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE, |
112 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
38a73150 MC |
113 | return 0; |
114 | } | |
115 | for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) { | |
116 | const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i); | |
117 | ||
118 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
119 | if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(ver_max, c->min_dtls) && | |
120 | DTLS_VERSION_LE(ver_max, c->max_dtls)) | |
121 | ok = 1; | |
122 | } else if (ver_max >= c->min_tls && ver_max <= c->max_tls) { | |
123 | ok = 1; | |
124 | } | |
125 | if (ok) | |
126 | break; | |
127 | } | |
128 | if (!ok) { | |
4752c5de MC |
129 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE, |
130 | SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE); | |
38a73150 MC |
131 | ERR_add_error_data(1, "No ciphers enabled for max supported " |
132 | "SSL/TLS version"); | |
38a73150 MC |
133 | return 0; |
134 | } | |
c7f47786 | 135 | if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) { |
0e6161bc | 136 | /* N.B. s->session_ctx == s->ctx here */ |
9ef9088c | 137 | tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_accept); |
c7f47786 | 138 | } else { |
0e6161bc | 139 | /* N.B. s->ctx may not equal s->session_ctx */ |
9ef9088c | 140 | tsan_counter(&s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate); |
c7f47786 | 141 | |
555cbb32 | 142 | s->s3.tmp.cert_request = 0; |
c7f47786 MC |
143 | } |
144 | } else { | |
145 | if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) | |
9ef9088c | 146 | tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect); |
c7f47786 | 147 | else |
9ef9088c | 148 | tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate); |
c7f47786 MC |
149 | |
150 | /* mark client_random uninitialized */ | |
555cbb32 | 151 | memset(s->s3.client_random, 0, sizeof(s->s3.client_random)); |
c7f47786 MC |
152 | s->hit = 0; |
153 | ||
555cbb32 | 154 | s->s3.tmp.cert_req = 0; |
c7f47786 | 155 | |
1f5b44e9 | 156 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) |
c7f47786 | 157 | s->statem.use_timer = 1; |
c7f47786 MC |
158 | } |
159 | ||
160 | return 1; | |
161 | } | |
162 | ||
2c5dfdc3 MC |
163 | /* |
164 | * Size of the to-be-signed TLS13 data, without the hash size itself: | |
165 | * 64 bytes of value 32, 33 context bytes, 1 byte separator | |
166 | */ | |
167 | #define TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE 64 | |
168 | #define TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE (TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE + 33 + 1) | |
169 | ||
170 | static int get_cert_verify_tbs_data(SSL *s, unsigned char *tls13tbs, | |
171 | void **hdata, size_t *hdatalen) | |
172 | { | |
48102247 | 173 | #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC |
99435164 | 174 | static const char servercontext[] = { 0x54, 0x4c, 0x53, 0x20, 0x31, 0x2e, |
48102247 | 175 | 0x33, 0x2c, 0x20, 0x73, 0x65, 0x72, 0x76, 0x65, 0x72, 0x20, 0x43, 0x65, |
176 | 0x72, 0x74, 0x69, 0x66, 0x69, 0x63, 0x61, 0x74, 0x65, 0x56, 0x65, 0x72, | |
177 | 0x69, 0x66, 0x79, 0x00 }; | |
99435164 | 178 | static const char clientcontext[] = { 0x54, 0x4c, 0x53, 0x20, 0x31, 0x2e, |
48102247 | 179 | 0x33, 0x2c, 0x20, 0x63, 0x6c, 0x69, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x74, 0x20, 0x43, 0x65, |
180 | 0x72, 0x74, 0x69, 0x66, 0x69, 0x63, 0x61, 0x74, 0x65, 0x56, 0x65, 0x72, | |
181 | 0x69, 0x66, 0x79, 0x00 }; | |
182 | #else | |
99435164 AV |
183 | static const char servercontext[] = "TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify"; |
184 | static const char clientcontext[] = "TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify"; | |
48102247 | 185 | #endif |
2c5dfdc3 MC |
186 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
187 | size_t hashlen; | |
188 | ||
189 | /* Set the first 64 bytes of to-be-signed data to octet 32 */ | |
190 | memset(tls13tbs, 32, TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE); | |
191 | /* This copies the 33 bytes of context plus the 0 separator byte */ | |
192 | if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY | |
193 | || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY) | |
194 | strcpy((char *)tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE, servercontext); | |
195 | else | |
196 | strcpy((char *)tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE, clientcontext); | |
197 | ||
198 | /* | |
199 | * If we're currently reading then we need to use the saved handshake | |
200 | * hash value. We can't use the current handshake hash state because | |
201 | * that includes the CertVerify itself. | |
202 | */ | |
203 | if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY | |
204 | || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY) { | |
205 | memcpy(tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE, s->cert_verify_hash, | |
206 | s->cert_verify_hash_len); | |
207 | hashlen = s->cert_verify_hash_len; | |
208 | } else if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE, | |
209 | EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &hashlen)) { | |
f63a17d6 | 210 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
2c5dfdc3 MC |
211 | return 0; |
212 | } | |
213 | ||
214 | *hdata = tls13tbs; | |
215 | *hdatalen = TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + hashlen; | |
216 | } else { | |
217 | size_t retlen; | |
60690b5b | 218 | long retlen_l; |
2c5dfdc3 | 219 | |
555cbb32 | 220 | retlen = retlen_l = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3.handshake_buffer, hdata); |
60690b5b | 221 | if (retlen_l <= 0) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
222 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_GET_CERT_VERIFY_TBS_DATA, |
223 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2c5dfdc3 | 224 | return 0; |
f63a17d6 | 225 | } |
2c5dfdc3 MC |
226 | *hdatalen = retlen; |
227 | } | |
228 | ||
229 | return 1; | |
230 | } | |
231 | ||
d8bc1399 MC |
232 | int tls_construct_cert_verify(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
233 | { | |
ad4dd362 DSH |
234 | EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; |
235 | const EVP_MD *md = NULL; | |
d8bc1399 | 236 | EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL; |
5f9b64a2 MC |
237 | EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; |
238 | size_t hdatalen = 0, siglen = 0; | |
d8bc1399 MC |
239 | void *hdata; |
240 | unsigned char *sig = NULL; | |
2c5dfdc3 | 241 | unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
555cbb32 | 242 | const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3.tmp.sigalg; |
2c5dfdc3 | 243 | |
555cbb32 | 244 | if (lu == NULL || s->s3.tmp.cert == NULL) { |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
245 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, |
246 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
ad4dd362 DSH |
247 | goto err; |
248 | } | |
555cbb32 | 249 | pkey = s->s3.tmp.cert->privatekey; |
ad4dd362 | 250 | |
c8f6c28a | 251 | if (pkey == NULL || !tls1_lookup_md(s->ctx, lu, &md)) { |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
252 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, |
253 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
ad4dd362 DSH |
254 | goto err; |
255 | } | |
d8bc1399 MC |
256 | |
257 | mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); | |
258 | if (mctx == NULL) { | |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
259 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, |
260 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
d8bc1399 MC |
261 | goto err; |
262 | } | |
d8bc1399 | 263 | |
2c5dfdc3 MC |
264 | /* Get the data to be signed */ |
265 | if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) { | |
f63a17d6 | 266 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
d8bc1399 MC |
267 | goto err; |
268 | } | |
269 | ||
ad4dd362 | 270 | if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg)) { |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
271 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, |
272 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
d8bc1399 MC |
273 | goto err; |
274 | } | |
5f9b64a2 | 275 | |
fc69f32c MC |
276 | if (EVP_DigestSignInit_ex(mctx, &pctx, |
277 | md == NULL ? NULL : EVP_MD_name(md), | |
278 | s->ctx->propq, pkey, s->ctx->libctx) <= 0) { | |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
279 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, |
280 | ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
5f9b64a2 MC |
281 | goto err; |
282 | } | |
283 | ||
ad4dd362 | 284 | if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) { |
5f9b64a2 | 285 | if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0 |
968ae5b3 DSH |
286 | || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, |
287 | RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) { | |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
288 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, |
289 | ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
5f9b64a2 MC |
290 | goto err; |
291 | } | |
caf2b6b5 DSH |
292 | } |
293 | if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { | |
bddbfae1 MC |
294 | /* |
295 | * Here we use EVP_DigestSignUpdate followed by EVP_DigestSignFinal | |
296 | * in order to add the EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET call between them. | |
297 | */ | |
caf2b6b5 | 298 | if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0 |
83b4a243 SL |
299 | /* |
300 | * TODO(3.0) Replace this when EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl() is deprecated | |
301 | * with a call to ssl3_digest_master_key_set_params() | |
302 | */ | |
303 | || EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET, | |
304 | (int)s->session->master_key_length, | |
305 | s->session->master_key) <= 0 | |
bddbfae1 | 306 | || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx, NULL, &siglen) <= 0) { |
caf2b6b5 | 307 | |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
308 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, |
309 | ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
5f9b64a2 MC |
310 | goto err; |
311 | } | |
bddbfae1 MC |
312 | sig = OPENSSL_malloc(siglen); |
313 | if (sig == NULL | |
314 | || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx, sig, &siglen) <= 0) { | |
315 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, | |
316 | ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
317 | goto err; | |
318 | } | |
319 | } else { | |
320 | /* | |
321 | * Here we *must* use EVP_DigestSign() because Ed25519/Ed448 does not | |
322 | * support streaming via EVP_DigestSignUpdate/EVP_DigestSignFinal | |
323 | */ | |
324 | if (EVP_DigestSign(mctx, NULL, &siglen, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0) { | |
325 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, | |
326 | ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
327 | goto err; | |
328 | } | |
329 | sig = OPENSSL_malloc(siglen); | |
330 | if (sig == NULL | |
331 | || EVP_DigestSign(mctx, sig, &siglen, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0) { | |
332 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, | |
333 | ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
334 | goto err; | |
335 | } | |
d8bc1399 | 336 | } |
5f9b64a2 | 337 | |
d8bc1399 MC |
338 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST |
339 | { | |
ad4dd362 DSH |
340 | int pktype = lu->sig; |
341 | ||
d8bc1399 MC |
342 | if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001 |
343 | || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256 | |
344 | || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) | |
5f9b64a2 | 345 | BUF_reverse(sig, NULL, siglen); |
d8bc1399 MC |
346 | } |
347 | #endif | |
348 | ||
5f9b64a2 | 349 | if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, sig, siglen)) { |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
350 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, |
351 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
d8bc1399 MC |
352 | goto err; |
353 | } | |
354 | ||
355 | /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */ | |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
356 | if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { |
357 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
d8bc1399 | 358 | goto err; |
d4d2f3a4 | 359 | } |
d8bc1399 MC |
360 | |
361 | OPENSSL_free(sig); | |
362 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); | |
363 | return 1; | |
364 | err: | |
365 | OPENSSL_free(sig); | |
366 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); | |
d8bc1399 MC |
367 | return 0; |
368 | } | |
369 | ||
370 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) | |
371 | { | |
372 | EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; | |
703bcee0 | 373 | const unsigned char *data; |
d8bc1399 MC |
374 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST |
375 | unsigned char *gost_data = NULL; | |
376 | #endif | |
eb5fd03b | 377 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
dd24857b | 378 | int j; |
d8bc1399 MC |
379 | unsigned int len; |
380 | X509 *peer; | |
381 | const EVP_MD *md = NULL; | |
2c5dfdc3 | 382 | size_t hdatalen = 0; |
d8bc1399 | 383 | void *hdata; |
2c5dfdc3 | 384 | unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
d8bc1399 | 385 | EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); |
5f9b64a2 | 386 | EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; |
d8bc1399 MC |
387 | |
388 | if (mctx == NULL) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
389 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, |
390 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
391 | goto err; | |
d8bc1399 MC |
392 | } |
393 | ||
394 | peer = s->session->peer; | |
395 | pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(peer); | |
f63a17d6 MC |
396 | if (pkey == NULL) { |
397 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, | |
398 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
399 | goto err; | |
400 | } | |
83b4049a | 401 | |
dd24857b | 402 | if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, NULL) == NULL) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
403 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, |
404 | SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE); | |
405 | goto err; | |
d8bc1399 MC |
406 | } |
407 | ||
f464f9c0 | 408 | if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { |
f464f9c0 PD |
409 | unsigned int sigalg; |
410 | ||
411 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
412 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, |
413 | SSL_R_BAD_PACKET); | |
414 | goto err; | |
f464f9c0 | 415 | } |
f63a17d6 MC |
416 | if (tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey) <= 0) { |
417 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
418 | goto err; | |
f464f9c0 | 419 | } |
f464f9c0 | 420 | } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
421 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, |
422 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
423 | goto err; | |
f464f9c0 PD |
424 | } |
425 | ||
c8f6c28a | 426 | if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->ctx, s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg, &md)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
427 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, |
428 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
429 | goto err; | |
168067b6 | 430 | } |
f464f9c0 | 431 | |
572fa024 | 432 | if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) |
49b26f54 RL |
433 | OSSL_TRACE1(TLS, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", |
434 | md == NULL ? "n/a" : EVP_MD_name(md)); | |
572fa024 | 435 | |
d8bc1399 MC |
436 | /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */ |
437 | /* | |
f464f9c0 PD |
438 | * If key is GOST and len is exactly 64 or 128, it is signature without |
439 | * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till TLS 1.2) | |
d8bc1399 MC |
440 | */ |
441 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST | |
f464f9c0 PD |
442 | if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) |
443 | && ((PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 64 | |
444 | && (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001 | |
445 | || EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256)) | |
446 | || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 128 | |
447 | && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512))) { | |
448 | len = PACKET_remaining(pkt); | |
d8bc1399 MC |
449 | } else |
450 | #endif | |
f464f9c0 | 451 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
452 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, |
453 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
454 | goto err; | |
d8bc1399 | 455 | } |
f464f9c0 | 456 | |
d8bc1399 | 457 | if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, len)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
458 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, |
459 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
460 | goto err; | |
d8bc1399 MC |
461 | } |
462 | ||
2c5dfdc3 | 463 | if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
464 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
465 | goto err; | |
d8bc1399 MC |
466 | } |
467 | ||
49b26f54 RL |
468 | OSSL_TRACE1(TLS, "Using client verify alg %s\n", |
469 | md == NULL ? "n/a" : EVP_MD_name(md)); | |
470 | ||
fc69f32c MC |
471 | if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit_ex(mctx, &pctx, |
472 | md == NULL ? NULL : EVP_MD_name(md), | |
473 | s->ctx->propq, pkey, s->ctx->libctx) <= 0) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
474 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, |
475 | ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
476 | goto err; | |
d8bc1399 MC |
477 | } |
478 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST | |
479 | { | |
dc8da7b1 | 480 | int pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey); |
d8bc1399 MC |
481 | if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001 |
482 | || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256 | |
483 | || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) { | |
484 | if ((gost_data = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
485 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
486 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
487 | goto err; | |
d8bc1399 MC |
488 | } |
489 | BUF_reverse(gost_data, data, len); | |
490 | data = gost_data; | |
491 | } | |
492 | } | |
493 | #endif | |
494 | ||
5554facb | 495 | if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) { |
5f9b64a2 | 496 | if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0 |
968ae5b3 DSH |
497 | || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, |
498 | RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
499 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, |
500 | ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
501 | goto err; | |
5f9b64a2 | 502 | } |
d8bc1399 | 503 | } |
caf2b6b5 | 504 | if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { |
83b4a243 SL |
505 | /* |
506 | * TODO(3.0) Replace this when EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl() is deprecated | |
507 | * with a call to ssl3_digest_master_key_set_params() | |
508 | */ | |
caf2b6b5 | 509 | if (EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0 |
83b4a243 SL |
510 | || EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET, |
511 | (int)s->session->master_key_length, | |
512 | s->session->master_key) <= 0) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
513 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, |
514 | ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
515 | goto err; | |
caf2b6b5 DSH |
516 | } |
517 | if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(mctx, data, len) <= 0) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
518 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, |
519 | SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); | |
520 | goto err; | |
caf2b6b5 DSH |
521 | } |
522 | } else { | |
523 | j = EVP_DigestVerify(mctx, data, len, hdata, hdatalen); | |
25ffeb11 | 524 | if (j <= 0) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
525 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, |
526 | SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); | |
527 | goto err; | |
caf2b6b5 | 528 | } |
d8bc1399 MC |
529 | } |
530 | ||
e4562014 MC |
531 | /* |
532 | * In TLSv1.3 on the client side we make sure we prepare the client | |
533 | * certificate after the CertVerify instead of when we get the | |
534 | * CertificateRequest. This is because in TLSv1.3 the CertificateRequest | |
535 | * comes *before* the Certificate message. In TLSv1.2 it comes after. We | |
536 | * want to make sure that SSL_get_peer_certificate() will return the actual | |
537 | * server certificate from the client_cert_cb callback. | |
538 | */ | |
555cbb32 | 539 | if (!s->server && SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 1) |
e4562014 MC |
540 | ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; |
541 | else | |
542 | ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; | |
f63a17d6 | 543 | err: |
555cbb32 TS |
544 | BIO_free(s->s3.handshake_buffer); |
545 | s->s3.handshake_buffer = NULL; | |
d8bc1399 MC |
546 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); |
547 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST | |
548 | OPENSSL_free(gost_data); | |
549 | #endif | |
550 | return ret; | |
551 | } | |
552 | ||
229185e6 | 553 | int tls_construct_finished(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
0f113f3e | 554 | { |
12472b45 | 555 | size_t finish_md_len; |
229185e6 | 556 | const char *sender; |
8b0e934a | 557 | size_t slen; |
229185e6 | 558 | |
f7e393be | 559 | /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */ |
9d75dce3 | 560 | if (!s->server && s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) |
f7e393be MC |
561 | s->statem.cleanuphand = 1; |
562 | ||
563 | /* | |
564 | * We only change the keys if we didn't already do this when we sent the | |
565 | * client certificate | |
566 | */ | |
567 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) | |
568 | && !s->server | |
555cbb32 | 569 | && s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 0 |
f7e393be | 570 | && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
571 | SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) {; |
572 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
b43c3765 | 573 | return 0; |
f7e393be MC |
574 | } |
575 | ||
229185e6 MC |
576 | if (s->server) { |
577 | sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label; | |
578 | slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len; | |
579 | } else { | |
580 | sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label; | |
581 | slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len; | |
582 | } | |
0f113f3e | 583 | |
12472b45 MC |
584 | finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, |
585 | sender, slen, | |
555cbb32 | 586 | s->s3.tmp.finish_md); |
12472b45 | 587 | if (finish_md_len == 0) { |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
588 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
589 | return 0; | |
4f89bfbf MC |
590 | } |
591 | ||
555cbb32 | 592 | s->s3.tmp.finish_md_len = finish_md_len; |
4f89bfbf | 593 | |
555cbb32 | 594 | if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3.tmp.finish_md, finish_md_len)) { |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
595 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, |
596 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
597 | return 0; | |
4f89bfbf | 598 | } |
0f113f3e | 599 | |
2c7bd692 CB |
600 | /* |
601 | * Log the master secret, if logging is enabled. We don't log it for | |
602 | * TLSv1.3: there's a different key schedule for that. | |
603 | */ | |
604 | if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl_log_secret(s, MASTER_SECRET_LABEL, | |
605 | s->session->master_key, | |
380a522f | 606 | s->session->master_key_length)) { |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
607 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
608 | return 0; | |
380a522f | 609 | } |
2faa1b48 | 610 | |
b9908bf9 MC |
611 | /* |
612 | * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks | |
613 | */ | |
380a522f | 614 | if (!ossl_assert(finish_md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) { |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
615 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, |
616 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
617 | return 0; | |
380a522f | 618 | } |
23a635c0 | 619 | if (!s->server) { |
555cbb32 | 620 | memcpy(s->s3.previous_client_finished, s->s3.tmp.finish_md, |
12472b45 | 621 | finish_md_len); |
555cbb32 | 622 | s->s3.previous_client_finished_len = finish_md_len; |
b9908bf9 | 623 | } else { |
555cbb32 | 624 | memcpy(s->s3.previous_server_finished, s->s3.tmp.finish_md, |
12472b45 | 625 | finish_md_len); |
555cbb32 | 626 | s->s3.previous_server_finished_len = finish_md_len; |
b9908bf9 | 627 | } |
0f113f3e | 628 | |
b9908bf9 | 629 | return 1; |
0f113f3e | 630 | } |
d02b48c6 | 631 | |
44c04a2e MC |
632 | int tls_construct_key_update(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
633 | { | |
634 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->key_update)) { | |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
635 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_KEY_UPDATE, |
636 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
637 | return 0; | |
44c04a2e MC |
638 | } |
639 | ||
9412b3ad | 640 | s->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE; |
44c04a2e | 641 | return 1; |
44c04a2e MC |
642 | } |
643 | ||
e1c3de44 MC |
644 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_update(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
645 | { | |
646 | unsigned int updatetype; | |
647 | ||
524420d8 MC |
648 | /* |
649 | * A KeyUpdate message signals a key change so the end of the message must | |
650 | * be on a record boundary. | |
651 | */ | |
652 | if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
653 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, |
654 | SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY); | |
655 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
524420d8 MC |
656 | } |
657 | ||
e1c3de44 | 658 | if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &updatetype) |
2d871227 | 659 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
660 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, |
661 | SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE); | |
662 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
e1c3de44 MC |
663 | } |
664 | ||
9010b7bc MC |
665 | /* |
666 | * There are only two defined key update types. Fail if we get a value we | |
667 | * didn't recognise. | |
668 | */ | |
2d871227 MC |
669 | if (updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED |
670 | && updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
671 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, |
672 | SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE); | |
673 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
2d871227 MC |
674 | } |
675 | ||
5bf47933 MC |
676 | /* |
677 | * If we get a request for us to update our sending keys too then, we need | |
678 | * to additionally send a KeyUpdate message. However that message should | |
feb9e31c | 679 | * not also request an update (otherwise we get into an infinite loop). |
5bf47933 | 680 | */ |
feb9e31c | 681 | if (updatetype == SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED) |
5bf47933 MC |
682 | s->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED; |
683 | ||
57389a32 | 684 | if (!tls13_update_key(s, 0)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
685 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
686 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
57389a32 MC |
687 | } |
688 | ||
e1c3de44 MC |
689 | return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; |
690 | } | |
691 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
692 | /* |
693 | * ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen | |
694 | * to far. | |
695 | */ | |
5d671101 | 696 | int ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s) |
0f113f3e MC |
697 | { |
698 | const char *sender; | |
8b0e934a | 699 | size_t slen; |
5d671101 | 700 | |
49ae7423 | 701 | if (!s->server) { |
0f113f3e MC |
702 | sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label; |
703 | slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len; | |
704 | } else { | |
705 | sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label; | |
706 | slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len; | |
707 | } | |
708 | ||
555cbb32 | 709 | s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md_len = |
5d671101 | 710 | s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, sender, slen, |
555cbb32 | 711 | s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md); |
5d671101 | 712 | |
555cbb32 | 713 | if (s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md_len == 0) { |
5d671101 MC |
714 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
715 | return 0; | |
716 | } | |
717 | ||
718 | return 1; | |
0f113f3e | 719 | } |
ee2ffc27 | 720 | |
be3583fa | 721 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
b9908bf9 | 722 | { |
348240c6 | 723 | size_t remain; |
4fa52141 | 724 | |
73999b62 | 725 | remain = PACKET_remaining(pkt); |
657da85e MC |
726 | /* |
727 | * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, which should already have | |
c69f2adf MC |
728 | * been consumed by ssl_get_message() so there should be no bytes left, |
729 | * unless we're using DTLS1_BAD_VER, which has an extra 2 bytes | |
657da85e | 730 | */ |
c69f2adf | 731 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
73999b62 | 732 | if ((s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER |
a230b26e EK |
733 | && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH + 1) |
734 | || (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER | |
735 | && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH - 1)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
736 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, |
737 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, | |
738 | SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); | |
739 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
c69f2adf MC |
740 | } |
741 | } else { | |
73999b62 | 742 | if (remain != 0) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
743 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, |
744 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, | |
745 | SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); | |
746 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
c69f2adf | 747 | } |
657da85e MC |
748 | } |
749 | ||
750 | /* Check we have a cipher to change to */ | |
555cbb32 | 751 | if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher == NULL) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
752 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, |
753 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); | |
754 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
657da85e MC |
755 | } |
756 | ||
555cbb32 | 757 | s->s3.change_cipher_spec = 1; |
657da85e | 758 | if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
759 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, |
760 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
761 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
657da85e MC |
762 | } |
763 | ||
c69f2adf MC |
764 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
765 | dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ); | |
766 | ||
767 | if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) | |
768 | s->d1->handshake_read_seq++; | |
769 | ||
770 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
771 | /* | |
772 | * Remember that a CCS has been received, so that an old key of | |
773 | * SCTP-Auth can be deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored if no | |
774 | * SCTP is used | |
775 | */ | |
776 | BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD, 1, NULL); | |
777 | #endif | |
778 | } | |
779 | ||
b9908bf9 | 780 | return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; |
657da85e MC |
781 | } |
782 | ||
be3583fa | 783 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_finished(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
b9908bf9 | 784 | { |
12472b45 | 785 | size_t md_len; |
b9908bf9 | 786 | |
d781d247 MC |
787 | |
788 | /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */ | |
9d75dce3 | 789 | if (s->server) { |
de9e884b MC |
790 | /* |
791 | * To get this far we must have read encrypted data from the client. We | |
792 | * no longer tolerate unencrypted alerts. This value is ignored if less | |
793 | * than TLSv1.3 | |
794 | */ | |
795 | s->statem.enc_read_state = ENC_READ_STATE_VALID; | |
9d75dce3 TS |
796 | if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) |
797 | s->statem.cleanuphand = 1; | |
798 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) { | |
799 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
800 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
801 | } | |
802 | } | |
d781d247 | 803 | |
524420d8 MC |
804 | /* |
805 | * In TLSv1.3 a Finished message signals a key change so the end of the | |
806 | * message must be on a record boundary. | |
807 | */ | |
808 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
809 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, |
810 | SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY); | |
811 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
524420d8 MC |
812 | } |
813 | ||
0f113f3e | 814 | /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */ |
555cbb32 | 815 | if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->s3.change_cipher_spec) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
816 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, |
817 | SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS); | |
818 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
0f113f3e | 819 | } |
555cbb32 | 820 | s->s3.change_cipher_spec = 0; |
0f113f3e | 821 | |
555cbb32 | 822 | md_len = s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md_len; |
0f113f3e | 823 | |
12472b45 | 824 | if (md_len != PACKET_remaining(pkt)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
825 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, |
826 | SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH); | |
827 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
0f113f3e MC |
828 | } |
829 | ||
555cbb32 | 830 | if (CRYPTO_memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt), s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md, |
12472b45 | 831 | md_len) != 0) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
832 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, |
833 | SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED); | |
834 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
0f113f3e MC |
835 | } |
836 | ||
837 | /* | |
838 | * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks | |
839 | */ | |
380a522f | 840 | if (!ossl_assert(md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
841 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, |
842 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
843 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
380a522f | 844 | } |
23a635c0 | 845 | if (s->server) { |
555cbb32 | 846 | memcpy(s->s3.previous_client_finished, s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md, |
12472b45 | 847 | md_len); |
555cbb32 | 848 | s->s3.previous_client_finished_len = md_len; |
0f113f3e | 849 | } else { |
555cbb32 | 850 | memcpy(s->s3.previous_server_finished, s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md, |
12472b45 | 851 | md_len); |
555cbb32 | 852 | s->s3.previous_server_finished_len = md_len; |
0f113f3e MC |
853 | } |
854 | ||
7776a36c MC |
855 | /* |
856 | * In TLS1.3 we also have to change cipher state and do any final processing | |
857 | * of the initial server flight (if we are a client) | |
858 | */ | |
92760c21 MC |
859 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
860 | if (s->server) { | |
9d75dce3 TS |
861 | if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED && |
862 | !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, | |
92760c21 | 863 | SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
864 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
865 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
92760c21 MC |
866 | } |
867 | } else { | |
d74014c4 BK |
868 | /* TLS 1.3 gets the secret size from the handshake md */ |
869 | size_t dummy; | |
92760c21 | 870 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, |
ec15acb6 | 871 | s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0, |
d74014c4 | 872 | &dummy)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
873 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
874 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
92760c21 MC |
875 | } |
876 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, | |
877 | SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
878 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
879 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
880 | } | |
881 | if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s)) { | |
882 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
883 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
92760c21 MC |
884 | } |
885 | } | |
886 | } | |
887 | ||
e6575156 | 888 | return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; |
0f113f3e | 889 | } |
d02b48c6 | 890 | |
7cea05dc | 891 | int tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
b9908bf9 | 892 | { |
7cea05dc | 893 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, SSL3_MT_CCS)) { |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
894 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
895 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
85a7a5e6 MC |
896 | return 0; |
897 | } | |
b9908bf9 | 898 | |
b9908bf9 MC |
899 | return 1; |
900 | } | |
901 | ||
e96e0f8e | 902 | /* Add a certificate to the WPACKET */ |
f63a17d6 | 903 | static int ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, int chain) |
0f113f3e | 904 | { |
e96e0f8e MC |
905 | int len; |
906 | unsigned char *outbytes; | |
907 | ||
908 | len = i2d_X509(x, NULL); | |
909 | if (len < 0) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
910 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET, |
911 | ERR_R_BUF_LIB); | |
e96e0f8e MC |
912 | return 0; |
913 | } | |
914 | if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u24(pkt, len, &outbytes) | |
915 | || i2d_X509(x, &outbytes) != len) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
916 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET, |
917 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
e96e0f8e MC |
918 | return 0; |
919 | } | |
920 | ||
921 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) | |
fe874d27 | 922 | && !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, x, |
f63a17d6 MC |
923 | chain)) { |
924 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
e96e0f8e | 925 | return 0; |
f63a17d6 | 926 | } |
e96e0f8e MC |
927 | |
928 | return 1; | |
929 | } | |
930 | ||
931 | /* Add certificate chain to provided WPACKET */ | |
f63a17d6 | 932 | static int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk) |
e96e0f8e MC |
933 | { |
934 | int i, chain_count; | |
935 | X509 *x; | |
936 | STACK_OF(X509) *extra_certs; | |
937 | STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL; | |
938 | X509_STORE *chain_store; | |
e96e0f8e MC |
939 | |
940 | if (cpk == NULL || cpk->x509 == NULL) | |
941 | return 1; | |
942 | ||
943 | x = cpk->x509; | |
944 | ||
945 | /* | |
946 | * If we have a certificate specific chain use it, else use parent ctx. | |
947 | */ | |
d805a57b | 948 | if (cpk->chain != NULL) |
e96e0f8e MC |
949 | extra_certs = cpk->chain; |
950 | else | |
951 | extra_certs = s->ctx->extra_certs; | |
952 | ||
953 | if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN) || extra_certs) | |
954 | chain_store = NULL; | |
955 | else if (s->cert->chain_store) | |
956 | chain_store = s->cert->chain_store; | |
957 | else | |
958 | chain_store = s->ctx->cert_store; | |
959 | ||
d805a57b | 960 | if (chain_store != NULL) { |
a959b4fa MC |
961 | X509_STORE_CTX *xs_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new_with_libctx(s->ctx->libctx, |
962 | s->ctx->propq); | |
e96e0f8e MC |
963 | |
964 | if (xs_ctx == NULL) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
965 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, |
966 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
967 | return 0; | |
e96e0f8e MC |
968 | } |
969 | if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(xs_ctx, chain_store, x, NULL)) { | |
970 | X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); | |
f63a17d6 MC |
971 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, |
972 | ERR_R_X509_LIB); | |
973 | return 0; | |
e96e0f8e MC |
974 | } |
975 | /* | |
976 | * It is valid for the chain not to be complete (because normally we | |
977 | * don't include the root cert in the chain). Therefore we deliberately | |
978 | * ignore the error return from this call. We're not actually verifying | |
979 | * the cert - we're just building as much of the chain as we can | |
980 | */ | |
981 | (void)X509_verify_cert(xs_ctx); | |
982 | /* Don't leave errors in the queue */ | |
983 | ERR_clear_error(); | |
984 | chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(xs_ctx); | |
985 | i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, chain, NULL, 0); | |
986 | if (i != 1) { | |
987 | #if 0 | |
988 | /* Dummy error calls so mkerr generates them */ | |
989 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL); | |
990 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL); | |
991 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK); | |
992 | #endif | |
993 | X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); | |
f63a17d6 MC |
994 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i); |
995 | return 0; | |
e96e0f8e MC |
996 | } |
997 | chain_count = sk_X509_num(chain); | |
998 | for (i = 0; i < chain_count; i++) { | |
999 | x = sk_X509_value(chain, i); | |
1000 | ||
f63a17d6 MC |
1001 | if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i)) { |
1002 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
e96e0f8e | 1003 | X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); |
f63a17d6 | 1004 | return 0; |
e96e0f8e MC |
1005 | } |
1006 | } | |
1007 | X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); | |
1008 | } else { | |
1009 | i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, extra_certs, x, 0); | |
1010 | if (i != 1) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1011 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i); |
1012 | return 0; | |
1013 | } | |
1014 | if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, 0)) { | |
1015 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
1016 | return 0; | |
e96e0f8e | 1017 | } |
e96e0f8e MC |
1018 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(extra_certs); i++) { |
1019 | x = sk_X509_value(extra_certs, i); | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1020 | if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i + 1)) { |
1021 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
1022 | return 0; | |
1023 | } | |
e96e0f8e MC |
1024 | } |
1025 | } | |
1026 | return 1; | |
e96e0f8e MC |
1027 | } |
1028 | ||
f63a17d6 | 1029 | unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk) |
e96e0f8e | 1030 | { |
f63a17d6 MC |
1031 | if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt)) { |
1032 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN, | |
1033 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1034 | return 0; | |
1035 | } | |
e96e0f8e | 1036 | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1037 | if (!ssl_add_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk)) |
1038 | return 0; | |
1039 | ||
1040 | if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) { | |
1041 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN, | |
1042 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
7cea05dc | 1043 | return 0; |
77d514c5 | 1044 | } |
f63a17d6 | 1045 | |
c49e1912 | 1046 | return 1; |
0f113f3e MC |
1047 | } |
1048 | ||
30f05b19 MC |
1049 | /* |
1050 | * Tidy up after the end of a handshake. In the case of SCTP this may result | |
1051 | * in NBIO events. If |clearbufs| is set then init_buf and the wbio buffer is | |
1052 | * freed up as well. | |
1053 | */ | |
2a8db717 | 1054 | WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst, int clearbufs, int stop) |
8723588e MC |
1055 | { |
1056 | void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL; | |
4af5836b | 1057 | int cleanuphand = s->statem.cleanuphand; |
8723588e | 1058 | |
30f05b19 | 1059 | if (clearbufs) { |
e7c27a6c N |
1060 | if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) |
1061 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
30f05b19 | 1062 | /* |
e7c27a6c N |
1063 | * RFC6083: SCTP provides a reliable and in-sequence transport service for DTLS |
1064 | * messages that require it. Therefore, DTLS procedures for retransmissions | |
1065 | * MUST NOT be used. | |
1066 | * Hence the init_buf can be cleared when DTLS over SCTP as transport is used. | |
1067 | */ | |
1068 | || BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)) | |
1069 | #endif | |
1070 | ) { | |
1071 | /* | |
1072 | * We don't do this in DTLS over UDP because we may still need the init_buf | |
30f05b19 MC |
1073 | * in case there are any unexpected retransmits |
1074 | */ | |
1075 | BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); | |
1076 | s->init_buf = NULL; | |
1077 | } | |
e7c27a6c | 1078 | |
a2c2e000 MC |
1079 | if (!ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s)) { |
1080 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_FINISH_HANDSHAKE, | |
1081 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
b77f3ed1 | 1082 | return WORK_ERROR; |
a2c2e000 | 1083 | } |
30f05b19 | 1084 | s->init_num = 0; |
473483d4 | 1085 | } |
8723588e | 1086 | |
9d75dce3 TS |
1087 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->server |
1088 | && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) | |
1089 | s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT; | |
1090 | ||
c2c1d8a4 MC |
1091 | /* |
1092 | * Only set if there was a Finished message and this isn't after a TLSv1.3 | |
1093 | * post handshake exchange | |
1094 | */ | |
4af5836b | 1095 | if (cleanuphand) { |
8723588e MC |
1096 | /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */ |
1097 | s->renegotiate = 0; | |
1098 | s->new_session = 0; | |
c7f47786 | 1099 | s->statem.cleanuphand = 0; |
c0638ade | 1100 | s->ext.ticket_expected = 0; |
8723588e | 1101 | |
30f05b19 MC |
1102 | ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); |
1103 | ||
8723588e | 1104 | if (s->server) { |
16ff1342 MC |
1105 | /* |
1106 | * In TLSv1.3 we update the cache as part of constructing the | |
1107 | * NewSessionTicket | |
1108 | */ | |
1109 | if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) | |
1110 | ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER); | |
8723588e | 1111 | |
0e6161bc | 1112 | /* N.B. s->ctx may not equal s->session_ctx */ |
9ef9088c | 1113 | tsan_counter(&s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good); |
fe3a3291 | 1114 | s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_accept; |
8723588e | 1115 | } else { |
4cb00457 MC |
1116 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
1117 | /* | |
1118 | * We encourage applications to only use TLSv1.3 tickets once, | |
1119 | * so we remove this one from the cache. | |
1120 | */ | |
1121 | if ((s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode | |
1122 | & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) != 0) | |
1123 | SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session); | |
1124 | } else { | |
1125 | /* | |
1126 | * In TLSv1.3 we update the cache as part of processing the | |
1127 | * NewSessionTicket | |
1128 | */ | |
5d61491c | 1129 | ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT); |
4cb00457 | 1130 | } |
8723588e | 1131 | if (s->hit) |
9ef9088c | 1132 | tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_hit); |
8723588e | 1133 | |
fe3a3291 | 1134 | s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_connect; |
9ef9088c | 1135 | tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_good); |
8723588e MC |
1136 | } |
1137 | ||
8723588e MC |
1138 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
1139 | /* done with handshaking */ | |
1140 | s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0; | |
1141 | s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 0; | |
1142 | s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0; | |
f5c7f5df | 1143 | dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s); |
8723588e MC |
1144 | } |
1145 | } | |
1146 | ||
c2c1d8a4 MC |
1147 | if (s->info_callback != NULL) |
1148 | cb = s->info_callback; | |
1149 | else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) | |
1150 | cb = s->ctx->info_callback; | |
1151 | ||
4ce787b9 MC |
1152 | /* The callback may expect us to not be in init at handshake done */ |
1153 | ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0); | |
1154 | ||
4af5836b MC |
1155 | if (cb != NULL) { |
1156 | if (cleanuphand | |
1157 | || !SSL_IS_TLS13(s) | |
1158 | || SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) | |
1159 | cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1); | |
1160 | } | |
c2c1d8a4 | 1161 | |
4ce787b9 MC |
1162 | if (!stop) { |
1163 | /* If we've got more work to do we go back into init */ | |
1164 | ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1); | |
30f05b19 | 1165 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; |
4ce787b9 | 1166 | } |
30f05b19 | 1167 | |
8723588e MC |
1168 | return WORK_FINISHED_STOP; |
1169 | } | |
1170 | ||
9ab930b2 MC |
1171 | int tls_get_message_header(SSL *s, int *mt) |
1172 | { | |
1173 | /* s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */ | |
d4d2f3a4 | 1174 | int skip_message, i, recvd_type; |
9ab930b2 | 1175 | unsigned char *p; |
54105ddd | 1176 | size_t l, readbytes; |
9ab930b2 MC |
1177 | |
1178 | p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; | |
1179 | ||
1180 | do { | |
1181 | while (s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) { | |
1182 | i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, &recvd_type, | |
a230b26e EK |
1183 | &p[s->init_num], |
1184 | SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - s->init_num, | |
54105ddd | 1185 | 0, &readbytes); |
9ab930b2 MC |
1186 | if (i <= 0) { |
1187 | s->rwstate = SSL_READING; | |
1188 | return 0; | |
32ec4153 | 1189 | } |
9ab930b2 | 1190 | if (recvd_type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { |
1257adec | 1191 | /* |
a230b26e EK |
1192 | * A ChangeCipherSpec must be a single byte and may not occur |
1193 | * in the middle of a handshake message. | |
1194 | */ | |
54105ddd | 1195 | if (s->init_num != 0 || readbytes != 1 || p[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS) { |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
1196 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, |
1197 | SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, | |
1198 | SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); | |
1199 | return 0; | |
1257adec | 1200 | } |
e9359719 | 1201 | if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_BEFORE |
555cbb32 | 1202 | && (s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) != 0) { |
e9359719 MC |
1203 | /* |
1204 | * We are stateless and we received a CCS. Probably this is | |
1205 | * from a client between the first and second ClientHellos. | |
1206 | * We should ignore this, but return an error because we do | |
1207 | * not return success until we see the second ClientHello | |
1208 | * with a valid cookie. | |
1209 | */ | |
1210 | return 0; | |
1211 | } | |
555cbb32 | 1212 | s->s3.tmp.message_type = *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; |
54105ddd | 1213 | s->init_num = readbytes - 1; |
c4377574 | 1214 | s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data; |
555cbb32 | 1215 | s->s3.tmp.message_size = readbytes; |
9ab930b2 MC |
1216 | return 1; |
1217 | } else if (recvd_type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { | |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
1218 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, |
1219 | SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, | |
1220 | SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); | |
1221 | return 0; | |
32ec4153 | 1222 | } |
54105ddd | 1223 | s->init_num += readbytes; |
9ab930b2 MC |
1224 | } |
1225 | ||
1226 | skip_message = 0; | |
1227 | if (!s->server) | |
c7f47786 MC |
1228 | if (s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_OK |
1229 | && p[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) | |
9ab930b2 MC |
1230 | /* |
1231 | * The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages -- | |
1232 | * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if | |
1233 | * their format is correct. Does not count for 'Finished' | |
1234 | * MAC. | |
1235 | */ | |
1236 | if (p[1] == 0 && p[2] == 0 && p[3] == 0) { | |
1237 | s->init_num = 0; | |
1238 | skip_message = 1; | |
1239 | ||
1240 | if (s->msg_callback) | |
1241 | s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, | |
1242 | p, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s, | |
1243 | s->msg_callback_arg); | |
1244 | } | |
1245 | } while (skip_message); | |
1246 | /* s->init_num == SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */ | |
1247 | ||
1248 | *mt = *p; | |
555cbb32 | 1249 | s->s3.tmp.message_type = *(p++); |
32ec4153 | 1250 | |
e8aa8b6c | 1251 | if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) { |
9ab930b2 MC |
1252 | /* |
1253 | * Only happens with SSLv3+ in an SSLv2 backward compatible | |
1254 | * ClientHello | |
e8aa8b6c F |
1255 | * |
1256 | * Total message size is the remaining record bytes to read | |
1257 | * plus the SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH bytes that we already read | |
9ab930b2 | 1258 | */ |
9ab930b2 MC |
1259 | l = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(&s->rlayer) |
1260 | + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
555cbb32 | 1261 | s->s3.tmp.message_size = l; |
9ab930b2 MC |
1262 | |
1263 | s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data; | |
1264 | s->init_num = SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
1265 | } else { | |
1266 | n2l3(p, l); | |
1267 | /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */ | |
1268 | if (l > (INT_MAX - SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { | |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
1269 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, |
1270 | SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE); | |
1271 | return 0; | |
32ec4153 | 1272 | } |
555cbb32 | 1273 | s->s3.tmp.message_size = l; |
9ab930b2 MC |
1274 | |
1275 | s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
1276 | s->init_num = 0; | |
1277 | } | |
1278 | ||
1279 | return 1; | |
9ab930b2 MC |
1280 | } |
1281 | ||
eda75751 | 1282 | int tls_get_message_body(SSL *s, size_t *len) |
9ab930b2 | 1283 | { |
54105ddd | 1284 | size_t n, readbytes; |
9ab930b2 MC |
1285 | unsigned char *p; |
1286 | int i; | |
1287 | ||
555cbb32 | 1288 | if (s->s3.tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { |
9ab930b2 MC |
1289 | /* We've already read everything in */ |
1290 | *len = (unsigned long)s->init_num; | |
1291 | return 1; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1292 | } |
1293 | ||
0f113f3e | 1294 | p = s->init_msg; |
555cbb32 | 1295 | n = s->s3.tmp.message_size - s->init_num; |
0f113f3e | 1296 | while (n > 0) { |
657da85e | 1297 | i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, NULL, |
54105ddd | 1298 | &p[s->init_num], n, 0, &readbytes); |
0f113f3e MC |
1299 | if (i <= 0) { |
1300 | s->rwstate = SSL_READING; | |
9ab930b2 MC |
1301 | *len = 0; |
1302 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e | 1303 | } |
54105ddd MC |
1304 | s->init_num += readbytes; |
1305 | n -= readbytes; | |
0f113f3e | 1306 | } |
ee2ffc27 | 1307 | |
0f113f3e MC |
1308 | /* |
1309 | * If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for | |
1310 | * Finished verification. | |
1311 | */ | |
5d671101 MC |
1312 | if (*(s->init_buf->data) == SSL3_MT_FINISHED && !ssl3_take_mac(s)) { |
1313 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
1314 | *len = 0; | |
1315 | return 0; | |
1316 | } | |
ee2ffc27 | 1317 | |
0f113f3e | 1318 | /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */ |
e8aa8b6c | 1319 | if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) { |
d166ed8c DSH |
1320 | if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, |
1321 | s->init_num)) { | |
d4d2f3a4 | 1322 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
d166ed8c DSH |
1323 | *len = 0; |
1324 | return 0; | |
1325 | } | |
32ec4153 | 1326 | if (s->msg_callback) |
a230b26e | 1327 | s->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION, 0, s->init_buf->data, |
32ec4153 MC |
1328 | (size_t)s->init_num, s, s->msg_callback_arg); |
1329 | } else { | |
11c67eea MC |
1330 | /* |
1331 | * We defer feeding in the HRR until later. We'll do it as part of | |
1332 | * processing the message | |
9d75dce3 TS |
1333 | * The TLsv1.3 handshake transcript stops at the ClientFinished |
1334 | * message. | |
11c67eea | 1335 | */ |
597c51bc | 1336 | #define SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET (SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 2) |
9d75dce3 | 1337 | /* KeyUpdate and NewSessionTicket do not need to be added */ |
555cbb32 TS |
1338 | if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || (s->s3.tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET |
1339 | && s->s3.tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE)) { | |
1340 | if (s->s3.tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO | |
9d75dce3 TS |
1341 | || s->init_num < SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE |
1342 | || memcmp(hrrrandom, | |
1343 | s->init_buf->data + SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET, | |
1344 | SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) != 0) { | |
1345 | if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, | |
1346 | s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { | |
1347 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
1348 | *len = 0; | |
1349 | return 0; | |
1350 | } | |
597c51bc | 1351 | } |
d166ed8c | 1352 | } |
32ec4153 MC |
1353 | if (s->msg_callback) |
1354 | s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data, | |
1355 | (size_t)s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s, | |
1356 | s->msg_callback_arg); | |
1357 | } | |
1358 | ||
eda75751 | 1359 | *len = s->init_num; |
9ab930b2 | 1360 | return 1; |
0f113f3e | 1361 | } |
d02b48c6 | 1362 | |
c6d38183 RS |
1363 | static const X509ERR2ALERT x509table[] = { |
1364 | {X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE}, | |
1365 | {X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1366 | {X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1367 | {X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, | |
1368 | {X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED}, | |
1369 | {X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1370 | {X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1371 | {X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED}, | |
1372 | {X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR}, | |
1373 | {X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1374 | {X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED}, | |
1375 | {X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1376 | {X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR}, | |
1377 | {X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1378 | {X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, | |
1379 | {X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1380 | {X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1381 | {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1382 | {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1383 | {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1384 | {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1385 | {X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1386 | {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, | |
1387 | {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR}, | |
1388 | {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1389 | {X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1390 | {X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR}, | |
1391 | {X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, | |
1392 | {X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, | |
1393 | {X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR}, | |
1394 | {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1395 | {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1396 | {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1397 | {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, | |
1398 | {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, | |
1399 | {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, | |
1400 | {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, | |
1401 | {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, | |
1402 | {X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR}, | |
1403 | ||
1404 | /* Last entry; return this if we don't find the value above. */ | |
1405 | {X509_V_OK, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN} | |
1406 | }; | |
1407 | ||
1408 | int ssl_x509err2alert(int x509err) | |
0f113f3e | 1409 | { |
c6d38183 RS |
1410 | const X509ERR2ALERT *tp; |
1411 | ||
1412 | for (tp = x509table; tp->x509err != X509_V_OK; ++tp) | |
1413 | if (tp->x509err == x509err) | |
1414 | break; | |
1415 | return tp->alert; | |
0f113f3e | 1416 | } |
d02b48c6 | 1417 | |
b362ccab | 1418 | int ssl_allow_compression(SSL *s) |
0f113f3e MC |
1419 | { |
1420 | if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) | |
1421 | return 0; | |
1422 | return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION, 0, 0, NULL); | |
1423 | } | |
4fa52141 | 1424 | |
068c358a | 1425 | static int version_cmp(const SSL *s, int a, int b) |
4fa52141 VD |
1426 | { |
1427 | int dtls = SSL_IS_DTLS(s); | |
1428 | ||
1429 | if (a == b) | |
1430 | return 0; | |
1431 | if (!dtls) | |
1432 | return a < b ? -1 : 1; | |
1433 | return DTLS_VERSION_LT(a, b) ? -1 : 1; | |
1434 | } | |
1435 | ||
1436 | typedef struct { | |
1437 | int version; | |
a230b26e EK |
1438 | const SSL_METHOD *(*cmeth) (void); |
1439 | const SSL_METHOD *(*smeth) (void); | |
4fa52141 VD |
1440 | } version_info; |
1441 | ||
5c587fb6 | 1442 | #if TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL != TLS1_3_VERSION |
582a17d6 | 1443 | # error Code needs update for TLS_method() support beyond TLS1_3_VERSION. |
4fa52141 VD |
1444 | #endif |
1445 | ||
f7f2a01d | 1446 | /* Must be in order high to low */ |
4fa52141 | 1447 | static const version_info tls_version_table[] = { |
582a17d6 MC |
1448 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 |
1449 | {TLS1_3_VERSION, tlsv1_3_client_method, tlsv1_3_server_method}, | |
1450 | #else | |
1451 | {TLS1_3_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, | |
1452 | #endif | |
6b01bed2 | 1453 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2 |
a230b26e | 1454 | {TLS1_2_VERSION, tlsv1_2_client_method, tlsv1_2_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 1455 | #else |
a230b26e | 1456 | {TLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
6b01bed2 VD |
1457 | #endif |
1458 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1 | |
a230b26e | 1459 | {TLS1_1_VERSION, tlsv1_1_client_method, tlsv1_1_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 1460 | #else |
a230b26e | 1461 | {TLS1_1_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
6b01bed2 VD |
1462 | #endif |
1463 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1 | |
a230b26e | 1464 | {TLS1_VERSION, tlsv1_client_method, tlsv1_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 1465 | #else |
a230b26e | 1466 | {TLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
6b01bed2 | 1467 | #endif |
4fa52141 | 1468 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3 |
a230b26e | 1469 | {SSL3_VERSION, sslv3_client_method, sslv3_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 1470 | #else |
a230b26e | 1471 | {SSL3_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
4fa52141 | 1472 | #endif |
a230b26e | 1473 | {0, NULL, NULL}, |
4fa52141 VD |
1474 | }; |
1475 | ||
5c587fb6 | 1476 | #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL != DTLS1_2_VERSION |
4fa52141 VD |
1477 | # error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_2_VERSION. |
1478 | #endif | |
1479 | ||
f7f2a01d | 1480 | /* Must be in order high to low */ |
4fa52141 | 1481 | static const version_info dtls_version_table[] = { |
6b01bed2 | 1482 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2 |
a230b26e | 1483 | {DTLS1_2_VERSION, dtlsv1_2_client_method, dtlsv1_2_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 1484 | #else |
a230b26e | 1485 | {DTLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
6b01bed2 VD |
1486 | #endif |
1487 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1 | |
a230b26e EK |
1488 | {DTLS1_VERSION, dtlsv1_client_method, dtlsv1_server_method}, |
1489 | {DTLS1_BAD_VER, dtls_bad_ver_client_method, NULL}, | |
6b01bed2 | 1490 | #else |
a230b26e EK |
1491 | {DTLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
1492 | {DTLS1_BAD_VER, NULL, NULL}, | |
6b01bed2 | 1493 | #endif |
a230b26e | 1494 | {0, NULL, NULL}, |
4fa52141 VD |
1495 | }; |
1496 | ||
1497 | /* | |
1498 | * ssl_method_error - Check whether an SSL_METHOD is enabled. | |
1499 | * | |
1500 | * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method | |
1501 | * @method: the intended method. | |
1502 | * | |
1503 | * Returns 0 on success, or an SSL error reason on failure. | |
1504 | */ | |
068c358a | 1505 | static int ssl_method_error(const SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *method) |
4fa52141 VD |
1506 | { |
1507 | int version = method->version; | |
1508 | ||
1509 | if ((s->min_proto_version != 0 && | |
1510 | version_cmp(s, version, s->min_proto_version) < 0) || | |
1511 | ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, version, NULL) == 0) | |
1512 | return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW; | |
1513 | ||
1514 | if (s->max_proto_version != 0 && | |
a230b26e | 1515 | version_cmp(s, version, s->max_proto_version) > 0) |
4fa52141 VD |
1516 | return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_HIGH; |
1517 | ||
1518 | if ((s->options & method->mask) != 0) | |
1519 | return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; | |
1520 | if ((method->flags & SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB) != 0 && tls1_suiteb(s)) | |
1521 | return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_2_NEEDED_IN_SUITEB_MODE; | |
4fa52141 VD |
1522 | |
1523 | return 0; | |
1524 | } | |
1525 | ||
baa45c3e MC |
1526 | /* |
1527 | * Only called by servers. Returns 1 if the server has a TLSv1.3 capable | |
cd3b53b8 MC |
1528 | * certificate type, or has PSK or a certificate callback configured. Otherwise |
1529 | * returns 0. | |
baa45c3e MC |
1530 | */ |
1531 | static int is_tls13_capable(const SSL *s) | |
1532 | { | |
65d2c16c MC |
1533 | int i; |
1534 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC | |
1535 | int curve; | |
65d2c16c | 1536 | #endif |
baa45c3e | 1537 | |
d162340d MC |
1538 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK |
1539 | if (s->psk_server_callback != NULL) | |
1540 | return 1; | |
1541 | #endif | |
1542 | ||
cd3b53b8 | 1543 | if (s->psk_find_session_cb != NULL || s->cert->cert_cb != NULL) |
baa45c3e MC |
1544 | return 1; |
1545 | ||
1546 | for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) { | |
1547 | /* Skip over certs disallowed for TLSv1.3 */ | |
1548 | switch (i) { | |
1549 | case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN: | |
1550 | case SSL_PKEY_GOST01: | |
1551 | case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256: | |
1552 | case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512: | |
1553 | continue; | |
1554 | default: | |
1555 | break; | |
1556 | } | |
de4dc598 MC |
1557 | if (!ssl_has_cert(s, i)) |
1558 | continue; | |
65d2c16c | 1559 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
de4dc598 MC |
1560 | if (i != SSL_PKEY_ECC) |
1561 | return 1; | |
1562 | /* | |
1563 | * Prior to TLSv1.3 sig algs allowed any curve to be used. TLSv1.3 is | |
1564 | * more restrictive so check that our sig algs are consistent with this | |
1565 | * EC cert. See section 4.2.3 of RFC8446. | |
1566 | */ | |
c2041da8 RL |
1567 | curve = evp_pkey_get_EC_KEY_curve_nid(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC] |
1568 | .privatekey); | |
de4dc598 | 1569 | if (tls_check_sigalg_curve(s, curve)) |
baa45c3e | 1570 | return 1; |
65d2c16c MC |
1571 | #else |
1572 | return 1; | |
1573 | #endif | |
baa45c3e MC |
1574 | } |
1575 | ||
1576 | return 0; | |
1577 | } | |
1578 | ||
ccae4a15 FI |
1579 | /* |
1580 | * ssl_version_supported - Check that the specified `version` is supported by | |
1581 | * `SSL *` instance | |
1582 | * | |
1583 | * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method | |
1584 | * @version: Protocol version to test against | |
1585 | * | |
1586 | * Returns 1 when supported, otherwise 0 | |
1587 | */ | |
4fd12788 | 1588 | int ssl_version_supported(const SSL *s, int version, const SSL_METHOD **meth) |
ccae4a15 FI |
1589 | { |
1590 | const version_info *vent; | |
1591 | const version_info *table; | |
1592 | ||
1593 | switch (s->method->version) { | |
1594 | default: | |
1595 | /* Version should match method version for non-ANY method */ | |
1596 | return version_cmp(s, version, s->version) == 0; | |
1597 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1598 | table = tls_version_table; | |
1599 | break; | |
1600 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1601 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
1602 | break; | |
1603 | } | |
1604 | ||
1605 | for (vent = table; | |
1606 | vent->version != 0 && version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) <= 0; | |
1607 | ++vent) { | |
baa45c3e MC |
1608 | if (vent->cmeth != NULL |
1609 | && version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) == 0 | |
1610 | && ssl_method_error(s, vent->cmeth()) == 0 | |
1611 | && (!s->server | |
1612 | || version != TLS1_3_VERSION | |
1613 | || is_tls13_capable(s))) { | |
4fd12788 MC |
1614 | if (meth != NULL) |
1615 | *meth = vent->cmeth(); | |
ccae4a15 FI |
1616 | return 1; |
1617 | } | |
1618 | } | |
1619 | return 0; | |
1620 | } | |
1621 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1622 | /* |
1623 | * ssl_check_version_downgrade - In response to RFC7507 SCSV version | |
1624 | * fallback indication from a client check whether we're using the highest | |
1625 | * supported protocol version. | |
1626 | * | |
1627 | * @s server SSL handle. | |
1628 | * | |
1629 | * Returns 1 when using the highest enabled version, 0 otherwise. | |
1630 | */ | |
1631 | int ssl_check_version_downgrade(SSL *s) | |
1632 | { | |
1633 | const version_info *vent; | |
1634 | const version_info *table; | |
1635 | ||
1636 | /* | |
1637 | * Check that the current protocol is the highest enabled version | |
1638 | * (according to s->ctx->method, as version negotiation may have changed | |
1639 | * s->method). | |
1640 | */ | |
1641 | if (s->version == s->ctx->method->version) | |
1642 | return 1; | |
1643 | ||
1644 | /* | |
1645 | * Apparently we're using a version-flexible SSL_METHOD (not at its | |
1646 | * highest protocol version). | |
1647 | */ | |
1648 | if (s->ctx->method->version == TLS_method()->version) | |
1649 | table = tls_version_table; | |
1650 | else if (s->ctx->method->version == DTLS_method()->version) | |
1651 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
1652 | else { | |
1653 | /* Unexpected state; fail closed. */ | |
1654 | return 0; | |
1655 | } | |
1656 | ||
1657 | for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { | |
a230b26e | 1658 | if (vent->smeth != NULL && ssl_method_error(s, vent->smeth()) == 0) |
4fa52141 VD |
1659 | return s->version == vent->version; |
1660 | } | |
1661 | return 0; | |
1662 | } | |
1663 | ||
1664 | /* | |
1665 | * ssl_set_version_bound - set an upper or lower bound on the supported (D)TLS | |
1666 | * protocols, provided the initial (D)TLS method is version-flexible. This | |
1667 | * function sanity-checks the proposed value and makes sure the method is | |
1668 | * version-flexible, then sets the limit if all is well. | |
1669 | * | |
1670 | * @method_version: The version of the current SSL_METHOD. | |
1671 | * @version: the intended limit. | |
1672 | * @bound: pointer to limit to be updated. | |
1673 | * | |
1674 | * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure. | |
1675 | */ | |
1676 | int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version, int version, int *bound) | |
1677 | { | |
869e978c KR |
1678 | if (version == 0) { |
1679 | *bound = version; | |
1680 | return 1; | |
1681 | } | |
1682 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1683 | /*- |
1684 | * Restrict TLS methods to TLS protocol versions. | |
1685 | * Restrict DTLS methods to DTLS protocol versions. | |
1686 | * Note, DTLS version numbers are decreasing, use comparison macros. | |
1687 | * | |
1688 | * Note that for both lower-bounds we use explicit versions, not | |
1689 | * (D)TLS_MIN_VERSION. This is because we don't want to break user | |
1690 | * configurations. If the MIN (supported) version ever rises, the user's | |
1691 | * "floor" remains valid even if no longer available. We don't expect the | |
1692 | * MAX ceiling to ever get lower, so making that variable makes sense. | |
1693 | */ | |
1694 | switch (method_version) { | |
1695 | default: | |
1696 | /* | |
1697 | * XXX For fixed version methods, should we always fail and not set any | |
1698 | * bounds, always succeed and not set any bounds, or set the bounds and | |
1699 | * arrange to fail later if they are not met? At present fixed-version | |
1700 | * methods are not subject to controls that disable individual protocol | |
1701 | * versions. | |
1702 | */ | |
1703 | return 0; | |
1704 | ||
1705 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
5c587fb6 | 1706 | if (version < SSL3_VERSION || version > TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL) |
4fa52141 VD |
1707 | return 0; |
1708 | break; | |
1709 | ||
1710 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
5c587fb6 | 1711 | if (DTLS_VERSION_GT(version, DTLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL) || |
032924c4 | 1712 | DTLS_VERSION_LT(version, DTLS1_BAD_VER)) |
4fa52141 VD |
1713 | return 0; |
1714 | break; | |
1715 | } | |
1716 | ||
1717 | *bound = version; | |
1718 | return 1; | |
1719 | } | |
1720 | ||
f7f2a01d MC |
1721 | static void check_for_downgrade(SSL *s, int vers, DOWNGRADE *dgrd) |
1722 | { | |
1723 | if (vers == TLS1_2_VERSION | |
4fd12788 | 1724 | && ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_3_VERSION, NULL)) { |
f7f2a01d | 1725 | *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_TO_1_2; |
5627f9f2 MC |
1726 | } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) |
1727 | && vers < TLS1_2_VERSION | |
1728 | /* | |
1729 | * We need to ensure that a server that disables TLSv1.2 | |
1730 | * (creating a hole between TLSv1.3 and TLSv1.1) can still | |
1731 | * complete handshakes with clients that support TLSv1.2 and | |
1732 | * below. Therefore we do not enable the sentinel if TLSv1.3 is | |
1733 | * enabled and TLSv1.2 is not. | |
1734 | */ | |
1735 | && ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_2_VERSION, NULL)) { | |
f7f2a01d MC |
1736 | *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_TO_1_1; |
1737 | } else { | |
1738 | *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE; | |
1739 | } | |
1740 | } | |
1741 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1742 | /* |
1743 | * ssl_choose_server_version - Choose server (D)TLS version. Called when the | |
1744 | * client HELLO is received to select the final server protocol version and | |
1745 | * the version specific method. | |
1746 | * | |
1747 | * @s: server SSL handle. | |
1748 | * | |
1749 | * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. | |
1750 | */ | |
f7f2a01d | 1751 | int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello, DOWNGRADE *dgrd) |
4fa52141 VD |
1752 | { |
1753 | /*- | |
1754 | * With version-flexible methods we have an initial state with: | |
1755 | * | |
1756 | * s->method->version == (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION, | |
5c587fb6 | 1757 | * s->version == (D)TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL. |
4fa52141 VD |
1758 | * |
1759 | * So we detect version-flexible methods via the method version, not the | |
1760 | * handle version. | |
1761 | */ | |
1762 | int server_version = s->method->version; | |
df7ce507 | 1763 | int client_version = hello->legacy_version; |
4fa52141 VD |
1764 | const version_info *vent; |
1765 | const version_info *table; | |
1766 | int disabled = 0; | |
cd998837 | 1767 | RAW_EXTENSION *suppversions; |
4fa52141 | 1768 | |
1ab3836b MC |
1769 | s->client_version = client_version; |
1770 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1771 | switch (server_version) { |
1772 | default: | |
7d061fce MC |
1773 | if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
1774 | if (version_cmp(s, client_version, s->version) < 0) | |
1775 | return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION; | |
f7f2a01d | 1776 | *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE; |
7d061fce MC |
1777 | /* |
1778 | * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't | |
1779 | * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope | |
1780 | * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol | |
1781 | * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return | |
1782 | * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) | |
1783 | */ | |
1784 | return 0; | |
1785 | } | |
d2f42576 | 1786 | /* |
7d061fce MC |
1787 | * Fall through if we are TLSv1.3 already (this means we must be after |
1788 | * a HelloRetryRequest | |
4fa52141 | 1789 | */ |
018fcbec | 1790 | /* fall thru */ |
4fa52141 VD |
1791 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: |
1792 | table = tls_version_table; | |
1793 | break; | |
1794 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1795 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
1796 | break; | |
1797 | } | |
1798 | ||
70af3d8e | 1799 | suppversions = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions]; |
cd998837 | 1800 | |
6f40214f | 1801 | /* If we did an HRR then supported versions is mandatory */ |
fc7129dc | 1802 | if (!suppversions->present && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) |
6f40214f MC |
1803 | return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; |
1804 | ||
70af3d8e | 1805 | if (suppversions->present && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
cd998837 MC |
1806 | unsigned int candidate_vers = 0; |
1807 | unsigned int best_vers = 0; | |
1808 | const SSL_METHOD *best_method = NULL; | |
1809 | PACKET versionslist; | |
1810 | ||
6b473aca MC |
1811 | suppversions->parsed = 1; |
1812 | ||
16bce0e0 | 1813 | if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&suppversions->data, &versionslist)) { |
cd998837 MC |
1814 | /* Trailing or invalid data? */ |
1815 | return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH; | |
1816 | } | |
1817 | ||
d8434cf8 MC |
1818 | /* |
1819 | * The TLSv1.3 spec says the client MUST set this to TLS1_2_VERSION. | |
1820 | * The spec only requires servers to check that it isn't SSLv3: | |
1821 | * "Any endpoint receiving a Hello message with | |
1822 | * ClientHello.legacy_version or ServerHello.legacy_version set to | |
1823 | * 0x0300 MUST abort the handshake with a "protocol_version" alert." | |
1824 | * We are slightly stricter and require that it isn't SSLv3 or lower. | |
1825 | * We tolerate TLSv1 and TLSv1.1. | |
1826 | */ | |
1827 | if (client_version <= SSL3_VERSION) | |
1828 | return SSL_R_BAD_LEGACY_VERSION; | |
1829 | ||
cd998837 | 1830 | while (PACKET_get_net_2(&versionslist, &candidate_vers)) { |
cd998837 MC |
1831 | if (version_cmp(s, candidate_vers, best_vers) <= 0) |
1832 | continue; | |
4fd12788 MC |
1833 | if (ssl_version_supported(s, candidate_vers, &best_method)) |
1834 | best_vers = candidate_vers; | |
cd998837 MC |
1835 | } |
1836 | if (PACKET_remaining(&versionslist) != 0) { | |
1837 | /* Trailing data? */ | |
1838 | return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH; | |
1839 | } | |
1840 | ||
1841 | if (best_vers > 0) { | |
fc7129dc | 1842 | if (s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) { |
7d061fce | 1843 | /* |
6f40214f MC |
1844 | * This is after a HelloRetryRequest so we better check that we |
1845 | * negotiated TLSv1.3 | |
7d061fce MC |
1846 | */ |
1847 | if (best_vers != TLS1_3_VERSION) | |
1848 | return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; | |
1849 | return 0; | |
1850 | } | |
f7f2a01d | 1851 | check_for_downgrade(s, best_vers, dgrd); |
cd998837 MC |
1852 | s->version = best_vers; |
1853 | s->method = best_method; | |
1854 | return 0; | |
1855 | } | |
1856 | return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; | |
1857 | } | |
1858 | ||
1859 | /* | |
1860 | * If the supported versions extension isn't present, then the highest | |
1861 | * version we can negotiate is TLSv1.2 | |
1862 | */ | |
1863 | if (version_cmp(s, client_version, TLS1_3_VERSION) >= 0) | |
1864 | client_version = TLS1_2_VERSION; | |
1865 | ||
1866 | /* | |
1867 | * No supported versions extension, so we just use the version supplied in | |
1868 | * the ClientHello. | |
1869 | */ | |
4fa52141 VD |
1870 | for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { |
1871 | const SSL_METHOD *method; | |
1872 | ||
1873 | if (vent->smeth == NULL || | |
1874 | version_cmp(s, client_version, vent->version) < 0) | |
1875 | continue; | |
1876 | method = vent->smeth(); | |
1877 | if (ssl_method_error(s, method) == 0) { | |
f7f2a01d | 1878 | check_for_downgrade(s, vent->version, dgrd); |
4fa52141 VD |
1879 | s->version = vent->version; |
1880 | s->method = method; | |
1881 | return 0; | |
1882 | } | |
1883 | disabled = 1; | |
1884 | } | |
1885 | return disabled ? SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL : SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW; | |
1886 | } | |
1887 | ||
1888 | /* | |
1889 | * ssl_choose_client_version - Choose client (D)TLS version. Called when the | |
1890 | * server HELLO is received to select the final client protocol version and | |
1891 | * the version specific method. | |
1892 | * | |
1893 | * @s: client SSL handle. | |
1894 | * @version: The proposed version from the server's HELLO. | |
88050dd1 | 1895 | * @extensions: The extensions received |
4fa52141 | 1896 | * |
29bfd5b7 | 1897 | * Returns 1 on success or 0 on error. |
4fa52141 | 1898 | */ |
88050dd1 | 1899 | int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version, RAW_EXTENSION *extensions) |
4fa52141 VD |
1900 | { |
1901 | const version_info *vent; | |
1902 | const version_info *table; | |
b5b993b2 | 1903 | int ret, ver_min, ver_max, real_max, origv; |
4fa52141 | 1904 | |
88050dd1 MC |
1905 | origv = s->version; |
1906 | s->version = version; | |
b97667ce | 1907 | |
88050dd1 MC |
1908 | /* This will overwrite s->version if the extension is present */ |
1909 | if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions, | |
1910 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO | |
1911 | | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO, extensions, | |
1912 | NULL, 0)) { | |
1913 | s->version = origv; | |
1914 | return 0; | |
1915 | } | |
1916 | ||
fc7129dc MC |
1917 | if (s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE |
1918 | && s->version != TLS1_3_VERSION) { | |
88050dd1 | 1919 | s->version = origv; |
29bfd5b7 MC |
1920 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, |
1921 | SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION); | |
1922 | return 0; | |
c3043dcd MC |
1923 | } |
1924 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1925 | switch (s->method->version) { |
1926 | default: | |
88050dd1 MC |
1927 | if (s->version != s->method->version) { |
1928 | s->version = origv; | |
29bfd5b7 MC |
1929 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, |
1930 | SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, | |
1931 | SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION); | |
1932 | return 0; | |
c3043dcd | 1933 | } |
4fa52141 VD |
1934 | /* |
1935 | * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't | |
1936 | * (and never did) check min/max, FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope | |
1937 | * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol | |
1938 | * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return | |
1939 | * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) | |
1940 | */ | |
29bfd5b7 | 1941 | return 1; |
4fa52141 VD |
1942 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: |
1943 | table = tls_version_table; | |
1944 | break; | |
1945 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1946 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
1947 | break; | |
1948 | } | |
1949 | ||
b5b993b2 MC |
1950 | ret = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max, &real_max); |
1951 | if (ret != 0) { | |
1952 | s->version = origv; | |
1953 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, | |
1954 | SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, ret); | |
1955 | return 0; | |
1956 | } | |
1957 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? DTLS_VERSION_LT(s->version, ver_min) | |
1958 | : s->version < ver_min) { | |
1959 | s->version = origv; | |
1960 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, | |
1961 | SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL); | |
1962 | return 0; | |
1963 | } else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? DTLS_VERSION_GT(s->version, ver_max) | |
1964 | : s->version > ver_max) { | |
1965 | s->version = origv; | |
1966 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, | |
1967 | SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL); | |
1968 | return 0; | |
1969 | } | |
5df22060 | 1970 | |
b5b993b2 MC |
1971 | if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) == 0) |
1972 | real_max = ver_max; | |
c3043dcd | 1973 | |
b5b993b2 MC |
1974 | /* Check for downgrades */ |
1975 | if (s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION && real_max > s->version) { | |
1976 | if (memcmp(tls12downgrade, | |
555cbb32 | 1977 | s->s3.server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE |
b5b993b2 MC |
1978 | - sizeof(tls12downgrade), |
1979 | sizeof(tls12downgrade)) == 0) { | |
1980 | s->version = origv; | |
1981 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, | |
1982 | SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, | |
1983 | SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); | |
1984 | return 0; | |
1985 | } | |
1986 | } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) | |
1987 | && s->version < TLS1_2_VERSION | |
1988 | && real_max > s->version) { | |
1989 | if (memcmp(tls11downgrade, | |
555cbb32 | 1990 | s->s3.server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE |
b5b993b2 MC |
1991 | - sizeof(tls11downgrade), |
1992 | sizeof(tls11downgrade)) == 0) { | |
1993 | s->version = origv; | |
1994 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, | |
1995 | SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, | |
1996 | SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); | |
1997 | return 0; | |
c3043dcd | 1998 | } |
b5b993b2 | 1999 | } |
c3043dcd | 2000 | |
b5b993b2 MC |
2001 | for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { |
2002 | if (vent->cmeth == NULL || s->version != vent->version) | |
c3043dcd MC |
2003 | continue; |
2004 | ||
b5b993b2 | 2005 | s->method = vent->cmeth(); |
29bfd5b7 | 2006 | return 1; |
4fa52141 VD |
2007 | } |
2008 | ||
88050dd1 | 2009 | s->version = origv; |
29bfd5b7 MC |
2010 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, |
2011 | SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL); | |
2012 | return 0; | |
4fa52141 VD |
2013 | } |
2014 | ||
068c358a | 2015 | /* |
38a73150 | 2016 | * ssl_get_min_max_version - get minimum and maximum protocol version |
068c358a KR |
2017 | * @s: The SSL connection |
2018 | * @min_version: The minimum supported version | |
2019 | * @max_version: The maximum supported version | |
b5b993b2 MC |
2020 | * @real_max: The highest version below the lowest compile time version hole |
2021 | * where that hole lies above at least one run-time enabled | |
2022 | * protocol. | |
068c358a KR |
2023 | * |
2024 | * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if the | |
2025 | * version is initially (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION. We apply any explicit SSL_OP_NO_xxx | |
2026 | * options, the MinProtocol and MaxProtocol configuration commands, any Suite B | |
b53338cb | 2027 | * constraints and any floor imposed by the security level here, |
068c358a | 2028 | * so we don't advertise the wrong protocol version to only reject the outcome later. |
4fa52141 | 2029 | * |
0485d540 | 2030 | * Computing the right floor matters. If, e.g., TLS 1.0 and 1.2 are enabled, |
4fa52141 VD |
2031 | * TLS 1.1 is disabled, but the security level, Suite-B and/or MinProtocol |
2032 | * only allow TLS 1.2, we want to advertise TLS1.2, *not* TLS1. | |
2033 | * | |
068c358a KR |
2034 | * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. On failure |
2035 | * min_version and max_version will also be set to 0. | |
4fa52141 | 2036 | */ |
b5b993b2 MC |
2037 | int ssl_get_min_max_version(const SSL *s, int *min_version, int *max_version, |
2038 | int *real_max) | |
4fa52141 | 2039 | { |
b5b993b2 | 2040 | int version, tmp_real_max; |
4fa52141 VD |
2041 | int hole; |
2042 | const SSL_METHOD *single = NULL; | |
2043 | const SSL_METHOD *method; | |
2044 | const version_info *table; | |
2045 | const version_info *vent; | |
2046 | ||
2047 | switch (s->method->version) { | |
2048 | default: | |
2049 | /* | |
2050 | * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't | |
2051 | * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope | |
2052 | * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol | |
2053 | * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return | |
2054 | * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) | |
2055 | */ | |
068c358a | 2056 | *min_version = *max_version = s->version; |
b5b993b2 MC |
2057 | /* |
2058 | * Providing a real_max only makes sense where we're using a version | |
2059 | * flexible method. | |
2060 | */ | |
2061 | if (!ossl_assert(real_max == NULL)) | |
2062 | return ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
4fa52141 VD |
2063 | return 0; |
2064 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
2065 | table = tls_version_table; | |
2066 | break; | |
2067 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
2068 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
2069 | break; | |
2070 | } | |
2071 | ||
2072 | /* | |
2073 | * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are some protocols | |
2074 | * below X enabled. This is required in order to maintain the "version | |
2075 | * capability" vector contiguous. Any versions with a NULL client method | |
2076 | * (protocol version client is disabled at compile-time) is also a "hole". | |
2077 | * | |
2078 | * Our initial state is hole == 1, version == 0. That is, versions above | |
2079 | * the first version in the method table are disabled (a "hole" above | |
2080 | * the valid protocol entries) and we don't have a selected version yet. | |
2081 | * | |
2082 | * Whenever "hole == 1", and we hit an enabled method, its version becomes | |
2083 | * the selected version, and the method becomes a candidate "single" | |
2084 | * method. We're no longer in a hole, so "hole" becomes 0. | |
2085 | * | |
2086 | * If "hole == 0" and we hit an enabled method, then "single" is cleared, | |
2087 | * as we support a contiguous range of at least two methods. If we hit | |
2088 | * a disabled method, then hole becomes true again, but nothing else | |
2089 | * changes yet, because all the remaining methods may be disabled too. | |
2090 | * If we again hit an enabled method after the new hole, it becomes | |
2091 | * selected, as we start from scratch. | |
2092 | */ | |
068c358a | 2093 | *min_version = version = 0; |
4fa52141 | 2094 | hole = 1; |
b5b993b2 MC |
2095 | if (real_max != NULL) |
2096 | *real_max = 0; | |
2097 | tmp_real_max = 0; | |
4fa52141 VD |
2098 | for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { |
2099 | /* | |
2100 | * A table entry with a NULL client method is still a hole in the | |
2101 | * "version capability" vector. | |
2102 | */ | |
2103 | if (vent->cmeth == NULL) { | |
2104 | hole = 1; | |
b5b993b2 | 2105 | tmp_real_max = 0; |
4fa52141 VD |
2106 | continue; |
2107 | } | |
2108 | method = vent->cmeth(); | |
b5b993b2 MC |
2109 | |
2110 | if (hole == 1 && tmp_real_max == 0) | |
2111 | tmp_real_max = vent->version; | |
2112 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
2113 | if (ssl_method_error(s, method) != 0) { |
2114 | hole = 1; | |
2115 | } else if (!hole) { | |
2116 | single = NULL; | |
068c358a | 2117 | *min_version = method->version; |
4fa52141 | 2118 | } else { |
b5b993b2 MC |
2119 | if (real_max != NULL && tmp_real_max != 0) |
2120 | *real_max = tmp_real_max; | |
4fa52141 | 2121 | version = (single = method)->version; |
068c358a | 2122 | *min_version = version; |
4fa52141 VD |
2123 | hole = 0; |
2124 | } | |
2125 | } | |
2126 | ||
068c358a KR |
2127 | *max_version = version; |
2128 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
2129 | /* Fail if everything is disabled */ |
2130 | if (version == 0) | |
2131 | return SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE; | |
2132 | ||
068c358a KR |
2133 | return 0; |
2134 | } | |
2135 | ||
2136 | /* | |
2137 | * ssl_set_client_hello_version - Work out what version we should be using for | |
7acb8b64 | 2138 | * the initial ClientHello.legacy_version field. |
068c358a KR |
2139 | * |
2140 | * @s: client SSL handle. | |
2141 | * | |
2142 | * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. | |
2143 | */ | |
2144 | int ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL *s) | |
2145 | { | |
3eb2aff4 | 2146 | int ver_min, ver_max, ret; |
068c358a | 2147 | |
447cc0ad MC |
2148 | /* |
2149 | * In a renegotiation we always send the same client_version that we sent | |
2150 | * last time, regardless of which version we eventually negotiated. | |
2151 | */ | |
2152 | if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) | |
2153 | return 0; | |
2154 | ||
b5b993b2 | 2155 | ret = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max, NULL); |
068c358a KR |
2156 | |
2157 | if (ret != 0) | |
2158 | return ret; | |
2159 | ||
7acb8b64 MC |
2160 | s->version = ver_max; |
2161 | ||
2162 | /* TLS1.3 always uses TLS1.2 in the legacy_version field */ | |
2163 | if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ver_max > TLS1_2_VERSION) | |
2164 | ver_max = TLS1_2_VERSION; | |
2165 | ||
2166 | s->client_version = ver_max; | |
4fa52141 VD |
2167 | return 0; |
2168 | } | |
aff9929b MC |
2169 | |
2170 | /* | |
2171 | * Checks a list of |groups| to determine if the |group_id| is in it. If it is | |
2172 | * and |checkallow| is 1 then additionally check if the group is allowed to be | |
2173 | * used. Returns 1 if the group is in the list (and allowed if |checkallow| is | |
2174 | * 1) or 0 otherwise. | |
2175 | */ | |
9e84a42d | 2176 | int check_in_list(SSL *s, uint16_t group_id, const uint16_t *groups, |
aff9929b MC |
2177 | size_t num_groups, int checkallow) |
2178 | { | |
2179 | size_t i; | |
2180 | ||
2181 | if (groups == NULL || num_groups == 0) | |
2182 | return 0; | |
2183 | ||
9e84a42d DSH |
2184 | for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) { |
2185 | uint16_t group = groups[i]; | |
2186 | ||
2187 | if (group_id == group | |
aff9929b | 2188 | && (!checkallow |
dbc6268f | 2189 | || tls_group_allowed(s, group, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))) { |
0acee504 | 2190 | return 1; |
aff9929b MC |
2191 | } |
2192 | } | |
2193 | ||
0acee504 | 2194 | return 0; |
aff9929b | 2195 | } |
11c67eea MC |
2196 | |
2197 | /* Replace ClientHello1 in the transcript hash with a synthetic message */ | |
43054d3d MC |
2198 | int create_synthetic_message_hash(SSL *s, const unsigned char *hashval, |
2199 | size_t hashlen, const unsigned char *hrr, | |
2200 | size_t hrrlen) | |
11c67eea | 2201 | { |
43054d3d | 2202 | unsigned char hashvaltmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
635b7d3f MC |
2203 | unsigned char msghdr[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]; |
2204 | ||
2205 | memset(msghdr, 0, sizeof(msghdr)); | |
11c67eea | 2206 | |
43054d3d MC |
2207 | if (hashval == NULL) { |
2208 | hashval = hashvaltmp; | |
2209 | hashlen = 0; | |
2210 | /* Get the hash of the initial ClientHello */ | |
2211 | if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0) | |
2212 | || !ssl_handshake_hash(s, hashvaltmp, sizeof(hashvaltmp), | |
2213 | &hashlen)) { | |
2214 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
2215 | return 0; | |
2216 | } | |
11c67eea MC |
2217 | } |
2218 | ||
2219 | /* Reinitialise the transcript hash */ | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2220 | if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) { |
2221 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
11c67eea | 2222 | return 0; |
f63a17d6 | 2223 | } |
11c67eea MC |
2224 | |
2225 | /* Inject the synthetic message_hash message */ | |
635b7d3f | 2226 | msghdr[0] = SSL3_MT_MESSAGE_HASH; |
3a63c0ed | 2227 | msghdr[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - 1] = (unsigned char)hashlen; |
11c67eea MC |
2228 | if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, msghdr, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) |
2229 | || !ssl3_finish_mac(s, hashval, hashlen)) { | |
f63a17d6 | 2230 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
11c67eea MC |
2231 | return 0; |
2232 | } | |
2233 | ||
43054d3d MC |
2234 | /* |
2235 | * Now re-inject the HRR and current message if appropriate (we just deleted | |
2236 | * it when we reinitialised the transcript hash above). Only necessary after | |
2237 | * receiving a ClientHello2 with a cookie. | |
2238 | */ | |
2239 | if (hrr != NULL | |
2240 | && (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, hrr, hrrlen) | |
2241 | || !ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, | |
555cbb32 | 2242 | s->s3.tmp.message_size |
43054d3d MC |
2243 | + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH))) { |
2244 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
2245 | return 0; | |
2246 | } | |
2247 | ||
11c67eea MC |
2248 | return 1; |
2249 | } | |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2250 | |
2251 | static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b) | |
2252 | { | |
2253 | return X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b); | |
2254 | } | |
2255 | ||
f63a17d6 | 2256 | int parse_ca_names(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2257 | { |
2258 | STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp); | |
2259 | X509_NAME *xn = NULL; | |
2260 | PACKET cadns; | |
2261 | ||
2262 | if (ca_sk == NULL) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2263 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, |
2264 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
2265 | goto err; | |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2266 | } |
2267 | /* get the CA RDNs */ | |
2268 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cadns)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2269 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, |
2270 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
2271 | goto err; | |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2272 | } |
2273 | ||
2274 | while (PACKET_remaining(&cadns)) { | |
2275 | const unsigned char *namestart, *namebytes; | |
2276 | unsigned int name_len; | |
2277 | ||
2278 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cadns, &name_len) | |
2279 | || !PACKET_get_bytes(&cadns, &namebytes, name_len)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2280 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, |
2281 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
2282 | goto err; | |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2283 | } |
2284 | ||
2285 | namestart = namebytes; | |
2286 | if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &namebytes, name_len)) == NULL) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2287 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, |
2288 | ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); | |
2289 | goto err; | |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2290 | } |
2291 | if (namebytes != (namestart + name_len)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2292 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, |
2293 | SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
2294 | goto err; | |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2295 | } |
2296 | ||
2297 | if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2298 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, |
2299 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2300 | goto err; |
2301 | } | |
2302 | xn = NULL; | |
2303 | } | |
2304 | ||
555cbb32 TS |
2305 | sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3.tmp.peer_ca_names, X509_NAME_free); |
2306 | s->s3.tmp.peer_ca_names = ca_sk; | |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2307 | |
2308 | return 1; | |
2309 | ||
5d6cca05 DSH |
2310 | err: |
2311 | sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free); | |
2312 | X509_NAME_free(xn); | |
2313 | return 0; | |
2314 | } | |
2315 | ||
98732979 | 2316 | const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *get_ca_names(SSL *s) |
5d6cca05 | 2317 | { |
98732979 | 2318 | const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL;; |
5d6cca05 | 2319 | |
98732979 MC |
2320 | if (s->server) { |
2321 | ca_sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s); | |
2322 | if (ca_sk != NULL && sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk) == 0) | |
2323 | ca_sk = NULL; | |
2324 | } | |
2325 | ||
2326 | if (ca_sk == NULL) | |
2327 | ca_sk = SSL_get0_CA_list(s); | |
2328 | ||
2329 | return ca_sk; | |
2330 | } | |
2331 | ||
2332 | int construct_ca_names(SSL *s, const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk, WPACKET *pkt) | |
2333 | { | |
5d6cca05 | 2334 | /* Start sub-packet for client CA list */ |
f63a17d6 MC |
2335 | if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { |
2336 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_CA_NAMES, | |
2337 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
5d6cca05 | 2338 | return 0; |
f63a17d6 | 2339 | } |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2340 | |
2341 | if (ca_sk != NULL) { | |
2342 | int i; | |
2343 | ||
2344 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk); i++) { | |
2345 | unsigned char *namebytes; | |
2346 | X509_NAME *name = sk_X509_NAME_value(ca_sk, i); | |
2347 | int namelen; | |
2348 | ||
2349 | if (name == NULL | |
2350 | || (namelen = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL)) < 0 | |
2351 | || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, namelen, | |
2352 | &namebytes) | |
2353 | || i2d_X509_NAME(name, &namebytes) != namelen) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2354 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_CA_NAMES, |
2355 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2356 | return 0; |
2357 | } | |
2358 | } | |
2359 | } | |
2360 | ||
f63a17d6 MC |
2361 | if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) { |
2362 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_CA_NAMES, | |
2363 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
5d6cca05 | 2364 | return 0; |
f63a17d6 | 2365 | } |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2366 | |
2367 | return 1; | |
2368 | } | |
72ceb6a6 DSH |
2369 | |
2370 | /* Create a buffer containing data to be signed for server key exchange */ | |
f63a17d6 | 2371 | size_t construct_key_exchange_tbs(SSL *s, unsigned char **ptbs, |
72ceb6a6 DSH |
2372 | const void *param, size_t paramlen) |
2373 | { | |
2374 | size_t tbslen = 2 * SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + paramlen; | |
2375 | unsigned char *tbs = OPENSSL_malloc(tbslen); | |
2376 | ||
f63a17d6 MC |
2377 | if (tbs == NULL) { |
2378 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_KEY_EXCHANGE_TBS, | |
2379 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
72ceb6a6 | 2380 | return 0; |
f63a17d6 | 2381 | } |
555cbb32 TS |
2382 | memcpy(tbs, s->s3.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); |
2383 | memcpy(tbs + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, s->s3.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); | |
72ceb6a6 DSH |
2384 | |
2385 | memcpy(tbs + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE * 2, param, paramlen); | |
2386 | ||
2387 | *ptbs = tbs; | |
2388 | return tbslen; | |
2389 | } | |
9d75dce3 TS |
2390 | |
2391 | /* | |
2392 | * Saves the current handshake digest for Post-Handshake Auth, | |
2393 | * Done after ClientFinished is processed, done exactly once | |
2394 | */ | |
2395 | int tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(SSL *s) | |
2396 | { | |
2397 | if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) { | |
2398 | if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) | |
2399 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
2400 | return 0; | |
2401 | ||
2402 | s->pha_dgst = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); | |
2403 | if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) { | |
2404 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, | |
2405 | SSL_F_TLS13_SAVE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA, | |
2406 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2407 | return 0; | |
2408 | } | |
2409 | if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(s->pha_dgst, | |
555cbb32 | 2410 | s->s3.handshake_dgst)) { |
9d75dce3 TS |
2411 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
2412 | SSL_F_TLS13_SAVE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA, | |
2413 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2414 | return 0; | |
2415 | } | |
2416 | } | |
2417 | return 1; | |
2418 | } | |
2419 | ||
2420 | /* | |
2421 | * Restores the Post-Handshake Auth handshake digest | |
2422 | * Done just before sending/processing the Cert Request | |
2423 | */ | |
2424 | int tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(SSL *s) | |
2425 | { | |
2426 | if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) { | |
2427 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, | |
2428 | SSL_F_TLS13_RESTORE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA, | |
2429 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2430 | return 0; | |
2431 | } | |
555cbb32 | 2432 | if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(s->s3.handshake_dgst, |
9d75dce3 TS |
2433 | s->pha_dgst)) { |
2434 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, | |
2435 | SSL_F_TLS13_RESTORE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA, | |
2436 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2437 | return 0; | |
2438 | } | |
2439 | return 1; | |
2440 | } |