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846e33c7 | 1 | /* |
fecb3aae | 2 | * Copyright 1995-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. |
aa8f3d76 | 3 | * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved |
3813046d | 4 | * |
2c18d164 | 5 | * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use |
846e33c7 RS |
6 | * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy |
7 | * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at | |
8 | * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html | |
3813046d | 9 | */ |
846e33c7 | 10 | |
48948d53 | 11 | #include <limits.h> |
f2d9a32c | 12 | #include <string.h> |
d02b48c6 | 13 | #include <stdio.h> |
706457b7 DMSP |
14 | #include "../ssl_local.h" |
15 | #include "statem_local.h" | |
67dc995e | 16 | #include "internal/cryptlib.h" |
ec577822 | 17 | #include <openssl/buffer.h> |
ec577822 BM |
18 | #include <openssl/objects.h> |
19 | #include <openssl/evp.h> | |
d7e498ac | 20 | #include <openssl/rsa.h> |
ec577822 | 21 | #include <openssl/x509.h> |
49b26f54 | 22 | #include <openssl/trace.h> |
d02b48c6 | 23 | |
c6d38183 RS |
24 | /* |
25 | * Map error codes to TLS/SSL alart types. | |
26 | */ | |
27 | typedef struct x509err2alert_st { | |
28 | int x509err; | |
29 | int alert; | |
30 | } X509ERR2ALERT; | |
31 | ||
597c51bc MC |
32 | /* Fixed value used in the ServerHello random field to identify an HRR */ |
33 | const unsigned char hrrrandom[] = { | |
34 | 0xcf, 0x21, 0xad, 0x74, 0xe5, 0x9a, 0x61, 0x11, 0xbe, 0x1d, 0x8c, 0x02, | |
35 | 0x1e, 0x65, 0xb8, 0x91, 0xc2, 0xa2, 0x11, 0x16, 0x7a, 0xbb, 0x8c, 0x5e, | |
36 | 0x07, 0x9e, 0x09, 0xe2, 0xc8, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x9c | |
37 | }; | |
38 | ||
d03fe5de MC |
39 | int ossl_statem_set_mutator(SSL *s, |
40 | ossl_statem_mutate_handshake_cb mutate_handshake_cb, | |
41 | ossl_statem_finish_mutate_handshake_cb finish_mutate_handshake_cb, | |
42 | void *mutatearg) | |
43 | { | |
44 | SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s); | |
45 | ||
46 | if (sc == NULL) | |
47 | return 0; | |
48 | ||
49 | sc->statem.mutate_handshake_cb = mutate_handshake_cb; | |
50 | sc->statem.mutatearg = mutatearg; | |
51 | sc->statem.finish_mutate_handshake_cb = finish_mutate_handshake_cb; | |
52 | ||
53 | return 1; | |
54 | } | |
55 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
56 | /* |
57 | * send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or | |
58 | * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) | |
59 | */ | |
38b051a1 | 60 | int ssl3_do_write(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int type) |
0f113f3e MC |
61 | { |
62 | int ret; | |
7ee8627f | 63 | size_t written = 0; |
38b051a1 | 64 | SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s); |
0f113f3e | 65 | |
d03fe5de MC |
66 | /* |
67 | * If we're running the test suite then we may need to mutate the message | |
68 | * we've been asked to write. Does not happen in normal operation. | |
69 | */ | |
70 | if (s->statem.mutate_handshake_cb != NULL | |
71 | && !s->statem.write_in_progress | |
72 | && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE | |
73 | && s->init_num >= SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) { | |
74 | unsigned char *msg; | |
75 | size_t msglen; | |
76 | ||
77 | if (!s->statem.mutate_handshake_cb((unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, | |
78 | s->init_num, | |
79 | &msg, &msglen, | |
80 | s->statem.mutatearg)) | |
81 | return -1; | |
82 | if (msglen < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH | |
83 | || !BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, msglen)) | |
84 | return -1; | |
85 | memcpy(s->init_buf->data, msg, msglen); | |
86 | s->init_num = msglen; | |
87 | s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
88 | s->statem.finish_mutate_handshake_cb(s->statem.mutatearg); | |
89 | s->statem.write_in_progress = 1; | |
90 | } | |
91 | ||
38b051a1 | 92 | ret = ssl3_write_bytes(ssl, type, &s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], |
7ee8627f | 93 | s->init_num, &written); |
0f113f3e | 94 | if (ret < 0) |
26a7d938 | 95 | return -1; |
0f113f3e MC |
96 | if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) |
97 | /* | |
98 | * should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case we'll | |
99 | * ignore the result anyway | |
9d75dce3 | 100 | * TLS1.3 KeyUpdate and NewSessionTicket do not need to be added |
0f113f3e | 101 | */ |
38b051a1 TM |
102 | if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) |
103 | || (s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET | |
9d75dce3 TS |
104 | && s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE |
105 | && s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE)) | |
106 | if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, | |
107 | (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], | |
108 | written)) | |
109 | return -1; | |
7ee8627f | 110 | if (written == s->init_num) { |
d03fe5de | 111 | s->statem.write_in_progress = 0; |
0f113f3e MC |
112 | if (s->msg_callback) |
113 | s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data, | |
38b051a1 | 114 | (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), ssl, |
0f113f3e | 115 | s->msg_callback_arg); |
208fb891 | 116 | return 1; |
0f113f3e | 117 | } |
7ee8627f MC |
118 | s->init_off += written; |
119 | s->init_num -= written; | |
26a7d938 | 120 | return 0; |
0f113f3e | 121 | } |
e7ecc7d4 | 122 | |
38b051a1 | 123 | int tls_close_construct_packet(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt, int htype) |
2c7b4dbc MC |
124 | { |
125 | size_t msglen; | |
126 | ||
4a01c59f | 127 | if ((htype != SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) |
f1ec23c0 | 128 | || !WPACKET_get_length(pkt, &msglen) |
7cea05dc | 129 | || msglen > INT_MAX) |
2c7b4dbc MC |
130 | return 0; |
131 | s->init_num = (int)msglen; | |
132 | s->init_off = 0; | |
133 | ||
134 | return 1; | |
135 | } | |
136 | ||
38b051a1 | 137 | int tls_setup_handshake(SSL_CONNECTION *s) |
1f5b44e9 | 138 | { |
8e32ea63 | 139 | int ver_min, ver_max, ok; |
38b051a1 TM |
140 | SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s); |
141 | SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s); | |
8e32ea63 | 142 | |
f63a17d6 MC |
143 | if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) { |
144 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
c7f47786 | 145 | return 0; |
f63a17d6 | 146 | } |
c7f47786 | 147 | |
b186a592 MC |
148 | /* Reset any extension flags */ |
149 | memset(s->ext.extflags, 0, sizeof(s->ext.extflags)); | |
150 | ||
8e32ea63 | 151 | if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max, NULL) != 0) { |
c48ffbcc | 152 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE); |
8e32ea63 MC |
153 | return 0; |
154 | } | |
155 | ||
156 | /* Sanity check that we have MD5-SHA1 if we need it */ | |
38b051a1 | 157 | if (sctx->ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX] == NULL) { |
8e32ea63 MC |
158 | int md5sha1_needed = 0; |
159 | ||
160 | /* We don't have MD5-SHA1 - do we need it? */ | |
38b051a1 | 161 | if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
8e32ea63 MC |
162 | if (DTLS_VERSION_LE(ver_max, DTLS1_VERSION)) |
163 | md5sha1_needed = 1; | |
164 | } else { | |
165 | if (ver_max <= TLS1_1_VERSION) | |
166 | md5sha1_needed = 1; | |
167 | } | |
168 | if (md5sha1_needed) { | |
c48ffbcc RL |
169 | SSLfatal_data(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, |
170 | SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_DIGEST_ALGORITHM, | |
171 | "The max supported SSL/TLS version needs the" | |
172 | " MD5-SHA1 digest but it is not available" | |
173 | " in the loaded providers. Use (D)TLSv1.2 or" | |
174 | " above, or load different providers"); | |
8e32ea63 MC |
175 | return 0; |
176 | } | |
177 | ||
178 | ok = 1; | |
179 | /* Don't allow TLSv1.1 or below to be negotiated */ | |
38b051a1 | 180 | if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
8e32ea63 | 181 | if (DTLS_VERSION_LT(ver_min, DTLS1_2_VERSION)) |
38b051a1 | 182 | ok = SSL_set_min_proto_version(ssl, DTLS1_2_VERSION); |
8e32ea63 MC |
183 | } else { |
184 | if (ver_min < TLS1_2_VERSION) | |
38b051a1 | 185 | ok = SSL_set_min_proto_version(ssl, TLS1_2_VERSION); |
8e32ea63 MC |
186 | } |
187 | if (!ok) { | |
188 | /* Shouldn't happen */ | |
c48ffbcc | 189 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
8e32ea63 MC |
190 | return 0; |
191 | } | |
192 | } | |
193 | ||
194 | ok = 0; | |
c7f47786 | 195 | if (s->server) { |
38b051a1 | 196 | STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = SSL_get_ciphers(ssl); |
8e32ea63 | 197 | int i; |
38a73150 MC |
198 | |
199 | /* | |
200 | * Sanity check that the maximum version we accept has ciphers | |
201 | * enabled. For clients we do this check during construction of the | |
202 | * ClientHello. | |
203 | */ | |
38a73150 MC |
204 | for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) { |
205 | const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i); | |
206 | ||
38b051a1 | 207 | if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
38a73150 MC |
208 | if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(ver_max, c->min_dtls) && |
209 | DTLS_VERSION_LE(ver_max, c->max_dtls)) | |
210 | ok = 1; | |
211 | } else if (ver_max >= c->min_tls && ver_max <= c->max_tls) { | |
212 | ok = 1; | |
213 | } | |
214 | if (ok) | |
215 | break; | |
216 | } | |
217 | if (!ok) { | |
c48ffbcc RL |
218 | SSLfatal_data(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, |
219 | SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE, | |
220 | "No ciphers enabled for max supported " | |
221 | "SSL/TLS version"); | |
38a73150 MC |
222 | return 0; |
223 | } | |
c7f47786 | 224 | if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) { |
0e6161bc | 225 | /* N.B. s->session_ctx == s->ctx here */ |
acce0557 | 226 | ssl_tsan_counter(s->session_ctx, &s->session_ctx->stats.sess_accept); |
c7f47786 | 227 | } else { |
0e6161bc | 228 | /* N.B. s->ctx may not equal s->session_ctx */ |
38b051a1 | 229 | ssl_tsan_counter(sctx, &sctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate); |
c7f47786 | 230 | |
555cbb32 | 231 | s->s3.tmp.cert_request = 0; |
c7f47786 MC |
232 | } |
233 | } else { | |
234 | if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) | |
acce0557 | 235 | ssl_tsan_counter(s->session_ctx, &s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect); |
c7f47786 | 236 | else |
acce0557 P |
237 | ssl_tsan_counter(s->session_ctx, |
238 | &s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate); | |
c7f47786 MC |
239 | |
240 | /* mark client_random uninitialized */ | |
555cbb32 | 241 | memset(s->s3.client_random, 0, sizeof(s->s3.client_random)); |
c7f47786 MC |
242 | s->hit = 0; |
243 | ||
555cbb32 | 244 | s->s3.tmp.cert_req = 0; |
c7f47786 | 245 | |
38b051a1 | 246 | if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) |
c7f47786 | 247 | s->statem.use_timer = 1; |
c7f47786 MC |
248 | } |
249 | ||
250 | return 1; | |
251 | } | |
252 | ||
2c5dfdc3 MC |
253 | /* |
254 | * Size of the to-be-signed TLS13 data, without the hash size itself: | |
255 | * 64 bytes of value 32, 33 context bytes, 1 byte separator | |
256 | */ | |
257 | #define TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE 64 | |
258 | #define TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE (TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE + 33 + 1) | |
259 | ||
38b051a1 | 260 | static int get_cert_verify_tbs_data(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned char *tls13tbs, |
2c5dfdc3 MC |
261 | void **hdata, size_t *hdatalen) |
262 | { | |
44e47328 TS |
263 | /* ASCII: "TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */ |
264 | static const char servercontext[] = "\x54\x4c\x53\x20\x31\x2e\x33\x2c\x20\x73\x65\x72" | |
265 | "\x76\x65\x72\x20\x43\x65\x72\x74\x69\x66\x69\x63\x61\x74\x65\x56\x65\x72\x69\x66\x79"; | |
266 | /* ASCII: "TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */ | |
267 | static const char clientcontext[] = "\x54\x4c\x53\x20\x31\x2e\x33\x2c\x20\x63\x6c\x69" | |
268 | "\x65\x6e\x74\x20\x43\x65\x72\x74\x69\x66\x69\x63\x61\x74\x65\x56\x65\x72\x69\x66\x79"; | |
38b051a1 TM |
269 | |
270 | if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) { | |
2c5dfdc3 MC |
271 | size_t hashlen; |
272 | ||
273 | /* Set the first 64 bytes of to-be-signed data to octet 32 */ | |
274 | memset(tls13tbs, 32, TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE); | |
275 | /* This copies the 33 bytes of context plus the 0 separator byte */ | |
276 | if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY | |
277 | || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY) | |
278 | strcpy((char *)tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE, servercontext); | |
279 | else | |
280 | strcpy((char *)tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE, clientcontext); | |
281 | ||
282 | /* | |
283 | * If we're currently reading then we need to use the saved handshake | |
284 | * hash value. We can't use the current handshake hash state because | |
285 | * that includes the CertVerify itself. | |
286 | */ | |
287 | if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY | |
288 | || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY) { | |
289 | memcpy(tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE, s->cert_verify_hash, | |
290 | s->cert_verify_hash_len); | |
291 | hashlen = s->cert_verify_hash_len; | |
292 | } else if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE, | |
293 | EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &hashlen)) { | |
f63a17d6 | 294 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
2c5dfdc3 MC |
295 | return 0; |
296 | } | |
297 | ||
298 | *hdata = tls13tbs; | |
299 | *hdatalen = TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + hashlen; | |
300 | } else { | |
301 | size_t retlen; | |
60690b5b | 302 | long retlen_l; |
2c5dfdc3 | 303 | |
555cbb32 | 304 | retlen = retlen_l = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3.handshake_buffer, hdata); |
60690b5b | 305 | if (retlen_l <= 0) { |
c48ffbcc | 306 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
2c5dfdc3 | 307 | return 0; |
f63a17d6 | 308 | } |
2c5dfdc3 MC |
309 | *hdatalen = retlen; |
310 | } | |
311 | ||
312 | return 1; | |
313 | } | |
314 | ||
67ec6d2b | 315 | CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_cert_verify(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
d8bc1399 | 316 | { |
ad4dd362 DSH |
317 | EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; |
318 | const EVP_MD *md = NULL; | |
d8bc1399 | 319 | EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL; |
5f9b64a2 MC |
320 | EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; |
321 | size_t hdatalen = 0, siglen = 0; | |
d8bc1399 MC |
322 | void *hdata; |
323 | unsigned char *sig = NULL; | |
2c5dfdc3 | 324 | unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
555cbb32 | 325 | const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3.tmp.sigalg; |
38b051a1 | 326 | SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s); |
2c5dfdc3 | 327 | |
555cbb32 | 328 | if (lu == NULL || s->s3.tmp.cert == NULL) { |
c48ffbcc | 329 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
ad4dd362 DSH |
330 | goto err; |
331 | } | |
555cbb32 | 332 | pkey = s->s3.tmp.cert->privatekey; |
ad4dd362 | 333 | |
38b051a1 | 334 | if (pkey == NULL || !tls1_lookup_md(sctx, lu, &md)) { |
c48ffbcc | 335 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
ad4dd362 DSH |
336 | goto err; |
337 | } | |
d8bc1399 MC |
338 | |
339 | mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); | |
340 | if (mctx == NULL) { | |
e077455e | 341 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
d8bc1399 MC |
342 | goto err; |
343 | } | |
d8bc1399 | 344 | |
2c5dfdc3 MC |
345 | /* Get the data to be signed */ |
346 | if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) { | |
f63a17d6 | 347 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
d8bc1399 MC |
348 | goto err; |
349 | } | |
350 | ||
ad4dd362 | 351 | if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg)) { |
c48ffbcc | 352 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
d8bc1399 MC |
353 | goto err; |
354 | } | |
5f9b64a2 | 355 | |
ed576acd TM |
356 | if (EVP_DigestSignInit_ex(mctx, &pctx, |
357 | md == NULL ? NULL : EVP_MD_get0_name(md), | |
38b051a1 | 358 | sctx->libctx, sctx->propq, pkey, |
d38b6ae9 | 359 | NULL) <= 0) { |
c48ffbcc | 360 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
5f9b64a2 MC |
361 | goto err; |
362 | } | |
363 | ||
ad4dd362 | 364 | if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) { |
5f9b64a2 | 365 | if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0 |
968ae5b3 DSH |
366 | || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, |
367 | RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) { | |
c48ffbcc | 368 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
5f9b64a2 MC |
369 | goto err; |
370 | } | |
caf2b6b5 DSH |
371 | } |
372 | if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { | |
bddbfae1 MC |
373 | /* |
374 | * Here we use EVP_DigestSignUpdate followed by EVP_DigestSignFinal | |
375 | * in order to add the EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET call between them. | |
376 | */ | |
caf2b6b5 | 377 | if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0 |
83b4a243 SL |
378 | || EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET, |
379 | (int)s->session->master_key_length, | |
380 | s->session->master_key) <= 0 | |
bddbfae1 | 381 | || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx, NULL, &siglen) <= 0) { |
caf2b6b5 | 382 | |
c48ffbcc | 383 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
5f9b64a2 MC |
384 | goto err; |
385 | } | |
bddbfae1 MC |
386 | sig = OPENSSL_malloc(siglen); |
387 | if (sig == NULL | |
388 | || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx, sig, &siglen) <= 0) { | |
c48ffbcc | 389 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
bddbfae1 MC |
390 | goto err; |
391 | } | |
392 | } else { | |
393 | /* | |
394 | * Here we *must* use EVP_DigestSign() because Ed25519/Ed448 does not | |
395 | * support streaming via EVP_DigestSignUpdate/EVP_DigestSignFinal | |
396 | */ | |
397 | if (EVP_DigestSign(mctx, NULL, &siglen, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0) { | |
c48ffbcc | 398 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
bddbfae1 MC |
399 | goto err; |
400 | } | |
401 | sig = OPENSSL_malloc(siglen); | |
402 | if (sig == NULL | |
403 | || EVP_DigestSign(mctx, sig, &siglen, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0) { | |
c48ffbcc | 404 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
bddbfae1 MC |
405 | goto err; |
406 | } | |
d8bc1399 | 407 | } |
5f9b64a2 | 408 | |
d8bc1399 MC |
409 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST |
410 | { | |
ad4dd362 DSH |
411 | int pktype = lu->sig; |
412 | ||
d8bc1399 MC |
413 | if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001 |
414 | || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256 | |
415 | || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) | |
5f9b64a2 | 416 | BUF_reverse(sig, NULL, siglen); |
d8bc1399 MC |
417 | } |
418 | #endif | |
419 | ||
5f9b64a2 | 420 | if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, sig, siglen)) { |
c48ffbcc | 421 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
d8bc1399 MC |
422 | goto err; |
423 | } | |
424 | ||
425 | /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */ | |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
426 | if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { |
427 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
d8bc1399 | 428 | goto err; |
d4d2f3a4 | 429 | } |
d8bc1399 MC |
430 | |
431 | OPENSSL_free(sig); | |
432 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); | |
67ec6d2b | 433 | return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS; |
d8bc1399 MC |
434 | err: |
435 | OPENSSL_free(sig); | |
436 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); | |
67ec6d2b | 437 | return CON_FUNC_ERROR; |
d8bc1399 MC |
438 | } |
439 | ||
38b051a1 | 440 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt) |
d8bc1399 MC |
441 | { |
442 | EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; | |
703bcee0 | 443 | const unsigned char *data; |
d8bc1399 MC |
444 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST |
445 | unsigned char *gost_data = NULL; | |
446 | #endif | |
eb5fd03b | 447 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
dd24857b | 448 | int j; |
d8bc1399 MC |
449 | unsigned int len; |
450 | X509 *peer; | |
451 | const EVP_MD *md = NULL; | |
2c5dfdc3 | 452 | size_t hdatalen = 0; |
d8bc1399 | 453 | void *hdata; |
2c5dfdc3 | 454 | unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
d8bc1399 | 455 | EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); |
5f9b64a2 | 456 | EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; |
38b051a1 | 457 | SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s); |
d8bc1399 MC |
458 | |
459 | if (mctx == NULL) { | |
e077455e | 460 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
f63a17d6 | 461 | goto err; |
d8bc1399 MC |
462 | } |
463 | ||
464 | peer = s->session->peer; | |
465 | pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(peer); | |
f63a17d6 | 466 | if (pkey == NULL) { |
c48ffbcc | 467 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
f63a17d6 MC |
468 | goto err; |
469 | } | |
83b4049a | 470 | |
ee58915c | 471 | if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, NULL, sctx) == NULL) { |
c48ffbcc | 472 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, |
f63a17d6 MC |
473 | SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE); |
474 | goto err; | |
d8bc1399 MC |
475 | } |
476 | ||
f464f9c0 | 477 | if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { |
f464f9c0 PD |
478 | unsigned int sigalg; |
479 | ||
480 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 481 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET); |
f63a17d6 | 482 | goto err; |
f464f9c0 | 483 | } |
f63a17d6 MC |
484 | if (tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey) <= 0) { |
485 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
486 | goto err; | |
f464f9c0 | 487 | } |
f464f9c0 | 488 | } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) { |
97b8db1a TM |
489 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
490 | SSL_R_LEGACY_SIGALG_DISALLOWED_OR_UNSUPPORTED); | |
f63a17d6 | 491 | goto err; |
f464f9c0 PD |
492 | } |
493 | ||
38b051a1 | 494 | if (!tls1_lookup_md(sctx, s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg, &md)) { |
c48ffbcc | 495 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
f63a17d6 | 496 | goto err; |
168067b6 | 497 | } |
f464f9c0 | 498 | |
572fa024 | 499 | if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) |
49b26f54 | 500 | OSSL_TRACE1(TLS, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", |
ed576acd | 501 | md == NULL ? "n/a" : EVP_MD_get0_name(md)); |
572fa024 | 502 | |
d8bc1399 MC |
503 | /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */ |
504 | /* | |
f464f9c0 PD |
505 | * If key is GOST and len is exactly 64 or 128, it is signature without |
506 | * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till TLS 1.2) | |
d8bc1399 MC |
507 | */ |
508 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST | |
f464f9c0 PD |
509 | if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) |
510 | && ((PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 64 | |
ed576acd TM |
511 | && (EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001 |
512 | || EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256)) | |
f464f9c0 | 513 | || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 128 |
ed576acd | 514 | && EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512))) { |
f464f9c0 | 515 | len = PACKET_remaining(pkt); |
d8bc1399 MC |
516 | } else |
517 | #endif | |
f464f9c0 | 518 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len)) { |
c48ffbcc | 519 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
f63a17d6 | 520 | goto err; |
d8bc1399 | 521 | } |
f464f9c0 | 522 | |
d8bc1399 | 523 | if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, len)) { |
c48ffbcc | 524 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
f63a17d6 | 525 | goto err; |
d8bc1399 MC |
526 | } |
527 | ||
2c5dfdc3 | 528 | if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
529 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
530 | goto err; | |
d8bc1399 MC |
531 | } |
532 | ||
49b26f54 | 533 | OSSL_TRACE1(TLS, "Using client verify alg %s\n", |
ed576acd | 534 | md == NULL ? "n/a" : EVP_MD_get0_name(md)); |
49b26f54 | 535 | |
d8652be0 | 536 | if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit_ex(mctx, &pctx, |
ed576acd | 537 | md == NULL ? NULL : EVP_MD_get0_name(md), |
38b051a1 | 538 | sctx->libctx, sctx->propq, pkey, |
d38b6ae9 | 539 | NULL) <= 0) { |
c48ffbcc | 540 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
f63a17d6 | 541 | goto err; |
d8bc1399 MC |
542 | } |
543 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST | |
544 | { | |
ed576acd | 545 | int pktype = EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey); |
d8bc1399 MC |
546 | if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001 |
547 | || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256 | |
548 | || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) { | |
e077455e | 549 | if ((gost_data = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) |
f63a17d6 | 550 | goto err; |
d8bc1399 MC |
551 | BUF_reverse(gost_data, data, len); |
552 | data = gost_data; | |
553 | } | |
554 | } | |
555 | #endif | |
556 | ||
5554facb | 557 | if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) { |
5f9b64a2 | 558 | if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0 |
968ae5b3 DSH |
559 | || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, |
560 | RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) { | |
c48ffbcc | 561 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
f63a17d6 | 562 | goto err; |
5f9b64a2 | 563 | } |
d8bc1399 | 564 | } |
caf2b6b5 DSH |
565 | if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { |
566 | if (EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0 | |
83b4a243 SL |
567 | || EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET, |
568 | (int)s->session->master_key_length, | |
569 | s->session->master_key) <= 0) { | |
c48ffbcc | 570 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
f63a17d6 | 571 | goto err; |
caf2b6b5 DSH |
572 | } |
573 | if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(mctx, data, len) <= 0) { | |
c48ffbcc | 574 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); |
f63a17d6 | 575 | goto err; |
caf2b6b5 DSH |
576 | } |
577 | } else { | |
578 | j = EVP_DigestVerify(mctx, data, len, hdata, hdatalen); | |
25ffeb11 | 579 | if (j <= 0) { |
c48ffbcc | 580 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); |
f63a17d6 | 581 | goto err; |
caf2b6b5 | 582 | } |
d8bc1399 MC |
583 | } |
584 | ||
e4562014 MC |
585 | /* |
586 | * In TLSv1.3 on the client side we make sure we prepare the client | |
587 | * certificate after the CertVerify instead of when we get the | |
588 | * CertificateRequest. This is because in TLSv1.3 the CertificateRequest | |
589 | * comes *before* the Certificate message. In TLSv1.2 it comes after. We | |
8c2bfd25 | 590 | * want to make sure that SSL_get1_peer_certificate() will return the actual |
e4562014 MC |
591 | * server certificate from the client_cert_cb callback. |
592 | */ | |
38b051a1 | 593 | if (!s->server && SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 1) |
e4562014 MC |
594 | ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; |
595 | else | |
596 | ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; | |
f63a17d6 | 597 | err: |
555cbb32 TS |
598 | BIO_free(s->s3.handshake_buffer); |
599 | s->s3.handshake_buffer = NULL; | |
d8bc1399 MC |
600 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); |
601 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST | |
602 | OPENSSL_free(gost_data); | |
603 | #endif | |
604 | return ret; | |
605 | } | |
606 | ||
67ec6d2b | 607 | CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_finished(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
0f113f3e | 608 | { |
12472b45 | 609 | size_t finish_md_len; |
229185e6 | 610 | const char *sender; |
8b0e934a | 611 | size_t slen; |
38b051a1 | 612 | SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s); |
229185e6 | 613 | |
f7e393be | 614 | /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */ |
9d75dce3 | 615 | if (!s->server && s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) |
f7e393be MC |
616 | s->statem.cleanuphand = 1; |
617 | ||
618 | /* | |
619 | * We only change the keys if we didn't already do this when we sent the | |
620 | * client certificate | |
621 | */ | |
38b051a1 | 622 | if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) |
f7e393be | 623 | && !s->server |
555cbb32 | 624 | && s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 0 |
38b051a1 | 625 | && (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
626 | SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) {; |
627 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
67ec6d2b | 628 | return CON_FUNC_ERROR; |
f7e393be MC |
629 | } |
630 | ||
229185e6 | 631 | if (s->server) { |
38b051a1 TM |
632 | sender = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label; |
633 | slen = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len; | |
229185e6 | 634 | } else { |
38b051a1 TM |
635 | sender = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label; |
636 | slen = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len; | |
229185e6 | 637 | } |
0f113f3e | 638 | |
38b051a1 TM |
639 | finish_md_len = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, |
640 | sender, slen, | |
641 | s->s3.tmp.finish_md); | |
12472b45 | 642 | if (finish_md_len == 0) { |
d4d2f3a4 | 643 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
67ec6d2b | 644 | return CON_FUNC_ERROR; |
4f89bfbf MC |
645 | } |
646 | ||
555cbb32 | 647 | s->s3.tmp.finish_md_len = finish_md_len; |
4f89bfbf | 648 | |
555cbb32 | 649 | if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3.tmp.finish_md, finish_md_len)) { |
c48ffbcc | 650 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
67ec6d2b | 651 | return CON_FUNC_ERROR; |
4f89bfbf | 652 | } |
0f113f3e | 653 | |
2c7bd692 CB |
654 | /* |
655 | * Log the master secret, if logging is enabled. We don't log it for | |
656 | * TLSv1.3: there's a different key schedule for that. | |
657 | */ | |
38b051a1 TM |
658 | if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) |
659 | && !ssl_log_secret(s, MASTER_SECRET_LABEL, s->session->master_key, | |
660 | s->session->master_key_length)) { | |
d4d2f3a4 | 661 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
67ec6d2b | 662 | return CON_FUNC_ERROR; |
380a522f | 663 | } |
2faa1b48 | 664 | |
b9908bf9 MC |
665 | /* |
666 | * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks | |
667 | */ | |
380a522f | 668 | if (!ossl_assert(finish_md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) { |
c48ffbcc | 669 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
67ec6d2b | 670 | return CON_FUNC_ERROR; |
380a522f | 671 | } |
23a635c0 | 672 | if (!s->server) { |
555cbb32 | 673 | memcpy(s->s3.previous_client_finished, s->s3.tmp.finish_md, |
12472b45 | 674 | finish_md_len); |
555cbb32 | 675 | s->s3.previous_client_finished_len = finish_md_len; |
b9908bf9 | 676 | } else { |
555cbb32 | 677 | memcpy(s->s3.previous_server_finished, s->s3.tmp.finish_md, |
12472b45 | 678 | finish_md_len); |
555cbb32 | 679 | s->s3.previous_server_finished_len = finish_md_len; |
b9908bf9 | 680 | } |
0f113f3e | 681 | |
67ec6d2b | 682 | return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS; |
0f113f3e | 683 | } |
d02b48c6 | 684 | |
67ec6d2b | 685 | CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_key_update(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
44c04a2e MC |
686 | { |
687 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->key_update)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 688 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
67ec6d2b | 689 | return CON_FUNC_ERROR; |
44c04a2e MC |
690 | } |
691 | ||
9412b3ad | 692 | s->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE; |
67ec6d2b | 693 | return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS; |
44c04a2e MC |
694 | } |
695 | ||
38b051a1 | 696 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_update(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt) |
e1c3de44 MC |
697 | { |
698 | unsigned int updatetype; | |
699 | ||
524420d8 MC |
700 | /* |
701 | * A KeyUpdate message signals a key change so the end of the message must | |
702 | * be on a record boundary. | |
703 | */ | |
704 | if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 705 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY); |
f63a17d6 | 706 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
524420d8 MC |
707 | } |
708 | ||
e1c3de44 | 709 | if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &updatetype) |
2d871227 | 710 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { |
c48ffbcc | 711 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE); |
f63a17d6 | 712 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
e1c3de44 MC |
713 | } |
714 | ||
9010b7bc MC |
715 | /* |
716 | * There are only two defined key update types. Fail if we get a value we | |
717 | * didn't recognise. | |
718 | */ | |
2d871227 MC |
719 | if (updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED |
720 | && updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED) { | |
c48ffbcc | 721 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE); |
f63a17d6 | 722 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
2d871227 MC |
723 | } |
724 | ||
5bf47933 MC |
725 | /* |
726 | * If we get a request for us to update our sending keys too then, we need | |
727 | * to additionally send a KeyUpdate message. However that message should | |
feb9e31c | 728 | * not also request an update (otherwise we get into an infinite loop). |
5bf47933 | 729 | */ |
feb9e31c | 730 | if (updatetype == SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED) |
5bf47933 MC |
731 | s->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED; |
732 | ||
57389a32 | 733 | if (!tls13_update_key(s, 0)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
734 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
735 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
57389a32 MC |
736 | } |
737 | ||
e1c3de44 MC |
738 | return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; |
739 | } | |
740 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
741 | /* |
742 | * ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen | |
743 | * to far. | |
744 | */ | |
38b051a1 | 745 | int ssl3_take_mac(SSL_CONNECTION *s) |
0f113f3e MC |
746 | { |
747 | const char *sender; | |
8b0e934a | 748 | size_t slen; |
38b051a1 | 749 | SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s); |
5d671101 | 750 | |
49ae7423 | 751 | if (!s->server) { |
38b051a1 TM |
752 | sender = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label; |
753 | slen = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len; | |
0f113f3e | 754 | } else { |
38b051a1 TM |
755 | sender = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label; |
756 | slen = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len; | |
0f113f3e MC |
757 | } |
758 | ||
555cbb32 | 759 | s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md_len = |
38b051a1 TM |
760 | ssl->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, sender, slen, |
761 | s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md); | |
5d671101 | 762 | |
555cbb32 | 763 | if (s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md_len == 0) { |
5d671101 MC |
764 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
765 | return 0; | |
766 | } | |
767 | ||
768 | return 1; | |
0f113f3e | 769 | } |
ee2ffc27 | 770 | |
38b051a1 TM |
771 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL_CONNECTION *s, |
772 | PACKET *pkt) | |
b9908bf9 | 773 | { |
348240c6 | 774 | size_t remain; |
4fa52141 | 775 | |
73999b62 | 776 | remain = PACKET_remaining(pkt); |
657da85e MC |
777 | /* |
778 | * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, which should already have | |
c69f2adf MC |
779 | * been consumed by ssl_get_message() so there should be no bytes left, |
780 | * unless we're using DTLS1_BAD_VER, which has an extra 2 bytes | |
657da85e | 781 | */ |
38b051a1 | 782 | if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
73999b62 | 783 | if ((s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER |
a230b26e EK |
784 | && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH + 1) |
785 | || (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER | |
786 | && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH - 1)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 787 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); |
f63a17d6 | 788 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
c69f2adf MC |
789 | } |
790 | } else { | |
73999b62 | 791 | if (remain != 0) { |
c48ffbcc | 792 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); |
f63a17d6 | 793 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
c69f2adf | 794 | } |
657da85e MC |
795 | } |
796 | ||
797 | /* Check we have a cipher to change to */ | |
555cbb32 | 798 | if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher == NULL) { |
c48ffbcc | 799 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); |
f63a17d6 | 800 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
657da85e MC |
801 | } |
802 | ||
555cbb32 | 803 | s->s3.change_cipher_spec = 1; |
657da85e | 804 | if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) { |
c48ffbcc | 805 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
f63a17d6 | 806 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
657da85e MC |
807 | } |
808 | ||
38b051a1 | 809 | if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
b92fc4ae | 810 | dtls1_increment_epoch(s, SSL3_CC_READ); |
c69f2adf MC |
811 | |
812 | if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) | |
813 | s->d1->handshake_read_seq++; | |
814 | ||
815 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
816 | /* | |
817 | * Remember that a CCS has been received, so that an old key of | |
818 | * SCTP-Auth can be deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored if no | |
819 | * SCTP is used | |
820 | */ | |
38b051a1 TM |
821 | BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)), |
822 | BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD, 1, NULL); | |
c69f2adf MC |
823 | #endif |
824 | } | |
825 | ||
b9908bf9 | 826 | return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; |
657da85e MC |
827 | } |
828 | ||
38b051a1 | 829 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_finished(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt) |
b9908bf9 | 830 | { |
12472b45 | 831 | size_t md_len; |
38b051a1 | 832 | SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s); |
1853d20a | 833 | int was_first = SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s); |
2b9e2afc | 834 | int ok; |
b9908bf9 | 835 | |
d781d247 MC |
836 | |
837 | /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */ | |
9d75dce3 | 838 | if (s->server) { |
de9e884b MC |
839 | /* |
840 | * To get this far we must have read encrypted data from the client. We | |
1853d20a MC |
841 | * no longer tolerate unencrypted alerts. This is ignored if less than |
842 | * TLSv1.3 | |
de9e884b | 843 | */ |
cffafb5f MC |
844 | if (s->rlayer.rrlmethod->set_plain_alerts != NULL) |
845 | s->rlayer.rrlmethod->set_plain_alerts(s->rlayer.rrl, 0); | |
9d75dce3 TS |
846 | if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) |
847 | s->statem.cleanuphand = 1; | |
38b051a1 TM |
848 | if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) |
849 | && !tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) { | |
9d75dce3 TS |
850 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
851 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
852 | } | |
853 | } | |
d781d247 | 854 | |
524420d8 MC |
855 | /* |
856 | * In TLSv1.3 a Finished message signals a key change so the end of the | |
857 | * message must be on a record boundary. | |
858 | */ | |
38b051a1 TM |
859 | if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) |
860 | && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 861 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY); |
f63a17d6 | 862 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
524420d8 MC |
863 | } |
864 | ||
0f113f3e | 865 | /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */ |
38b051a1 | 866 | if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->s3.change_cipher_spec) { |
c48ffbcc | 867 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS); |
f63a17d6 | 868 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
0f113f3e | 869 | } |
555cbb32 | 870 | s->s3.change_cipher_spec = 0; |
0f113f3e | 871 | |
555cbb32 | 872 | md_len = s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md_len; |
0f113f3e | 873 | |
12472b45 | 874 | if (md_len != PACKET_remaining(pkt)) { |
c48ffbcc | 875 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH); |
f63a17d6 | 876 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
0f113f3e MC |
877 | } |
878 | ||
2b9e2afc PA |
879 | ok = CRYPTO_memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt), s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md, |
880 | md_len); | |
881 | #ifdef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION | |
882 | if (ok != 0) { | |
1dbfd7fe | 883 | if ((PACKET_data(pkt)[0] ^ s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md[0]) != 0xFF) { |
2b9e2afc PA |
884 | ok = 0; |
885 | } | |
886 | } | |
887 | #endif | |
888 | if (ok != 0) { | |
c48ffbcc | 889 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED); |
f63a17d6 | 890 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
0f113f3e MC |
891 | } |
892 | ||
893 | /* | |
894 | * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks | |
895 | */ | |
380a522f | 896 | if (!ossl_assert(md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) { |
c48ffbcc | 897 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
f63a17d6 | 898 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
380a522f | 899 | } |
23a635c0 | 900 | if (s->server) { |
555cbb32 | 901 | memcpy(s->s3.previous_client_finished, s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md, |
12472b45 | 902 | md_len); |
555cbb32 | 903 | s->s3.previous_client_finished_len = md_len; |
0f113f3e | 904 | } else { |
555cbb32 | 905 | memcpy(s->s3.previous_server_finished, s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md, |
12472b45 | 906 | md_len); |
555cbb32 | 907 | s->s3.previous_server_finished_len = md_len; |
0f113f3e MC |
908 | } |
909 | ||
7776a36c MC |
910 | /* |
911 | * In TLS1.3 we also have to change cipher state and do any final processing | |
912 | * of the initial server flight (if we are a client) | |
913 | */ | |
38b051a1 | 914 | if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
92760c21 | 915 | if (s->server) { |
9d75dce3 | 916 | if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED && |
38b051a1 TM |
917 | !ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, |
918 | SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
919 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
920 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
92760c21 MC |
921 | } |
922 | } else { | |
d74014c4 BK |
923 | /* TLS 1.3 gets the secret size from the handshake md */ |
924 | size_t dummy; | |
38b051a1 | 925 | if (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, |
ec15acb6 | 926 | s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0, |
d74014c4 | 927 | &dummy)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
928 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
929 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
92760c21 | 930 | } |
38b051a1 | 931 | if (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, |
92760c21 | 932 | SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
933 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
934 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
935 | } | |
936 | if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s)) { | |
937 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
938 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
92760c21 MC |
939 | } |
940 | } | |
941 | } | |
942 | ||
1853d20a MC |
943 | if (was_first |
944 | && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s) | |
cffafb5f MC |
945 | && s->rlayer.rrlmethod->set_first_handshake != NULL) |
946 | s->rlayer.rrlmethod->set_first_handshake(s->rlayer.rrl, 0); | |
1853d20a | 947 | |
e6575156 | 948 | return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; |
0f113f3e | 949 | } |
d02b48c6 | 950 | |
67ec6d2b | 951 | CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
b9908bf9 | 952 | { |
7cea05dc | 953 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, SSL3_MT_CCS)) { |
c48ffbcc | 954 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
67ec6d2b | 955 | return CON_FUNC_ERROR; |
85a7a5e6 | 956 | } |
b9908bf9 | 957 | |
67ec6d2b | 958 | return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS; |
b9908bf9 MC |
959 | } |
960 | ||
e96e0f8e | 961 | /* Add a certificate to the WPACKET */ |
38b051a1 | 962 | static int ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt, |
72620ac7 | 963 | X509 *x, int chain, int for_comp) |
0f113f3e | 964 | { |
e96e0f8e MC |
965 | int len; |
966 | unsigned char *outbytes; | |
72620ac7 TS |
967 | int context = SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE; |
968 | ||
969 | if (for_comp) | |
970 | context |= SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_COMPRESSION; | |
e96e0f8e MC |
971 | |
972 | len = i2d_X509(x, NULL); | |
973 | if (len < 0) { | |
72620ac7 TS |
974 | if (!for_comp) |
975 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); | |
e96e0f8e MC |
976 | return 0; |
977 | } | |
978 | if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u24(pkt, len, &outbytes) | |
979 | || i2d_X509(x, &outbytes) != len) { | |
72620ac7 TS |
980 | if (!for_comp) |
981 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
e96e0f8e MC |
982 | return 0; |
983 | } | |
984 | ||
72620ac7 TS |
985 | if ((SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) || for_comp) |
986 | && !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, context, x, chain)) { | |
f63a17d6 | 987 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
e96e0f8e | 988 | return 0; |
f63a17d6 | 989 | } |
e96e0f8e MC |
990 | |
991 | return 1; | |
992 | } | |
993 | ||
994 | /* Add certificate chain to provided WPACKET */ | |
72620ac7 | 995 | static int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk, int for_comp) |
e96e0f8e MC |
996 | { |
997 | int i, chain_count; | |
998 | X509 *x; | |
999 | STACK_OF(X509) *extra_certs; | |
1000 | STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL; | |
1001 | X509_STORE *chain_store; | |
38b051a1 | 1002 | SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s); |
e96e0f8e MC |
1003 | |
1004 | if (cpk == NULL || cpk->x509 == NULL) | |
1005 | return 1; | |
1006 | ||
1007 | x = cpk->x509; | |
1008 | ||
1009 | /* | |
1010 | * If we have a certificate specific chain use it, else use parent ctx. | |
1011 | */ | |
d805a57b | 1012 | if (cpk->chain != NULL) |
e96e0f8e MC |
1013 | extra_certs = cpk->chain; |
1014 | else | |
38b051a1 | 1015 | extra_certs = sctx->extra_certs; |
e96e0f8e MC |
1016 | |
1017 | if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN) || extra_certs) | |
1018 | chain_store = NULL; | |
1019 | else if (s->cert->chain_store) | |
1020 | chain_store = s->cert->chain_store; | |
1021 | else | |
38b051a1 | 1022 | chain_store = sctx->cert_store; |
e96e0f8e | 1023 | |
d805a57b | 1024 | if (chain_store != NULL) { |
38b051a1 TM |
1025 | X509_STORE_CTX *xs_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new_ex(sctx->libctx, |
1026 | sctx->propq); | |
e96e0f8e MC |
1027 | |
1028 | if (xs_ctx == NULL) { | |
72620ac7 TS |
1029 | if (!for_comp) |
1030 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_X509_LIB); | |
f63a17d6 | 1031 | return 0; |
e96e0f8e MC |
1032 | } |
1033 | if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(xs_ctx, chain_store, x, NULL)) { | |
1034 | X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); | |
72620ac7 TS |
1035 | if (!for_comp) |
1036 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_X509_LIB); | |
f63a17d6 | 1037 | return 0; |
e96e0f8e MC |
1038 | } |
1039 | /* | |
1040 | * It is valid for the chain not to be complete (because normally we | |
1041 | * don't include the root cert in the chain). Therefore we deliberately | |
1042 | * ignore the error return from this call. We're not actually verifying | |
1043 | * the cert - we're just building as much of the chain as we can | |
1044 | */ | |
1045 | (void)X509_verify_cert(xs_ctx); | |
1046 | /* Don't leave errors in the queue */ | |
1047 | ERR_clear_error(); | |
1048 | chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(xs_ctx); | |
1049 | i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, chain, NULL, 0); | |
1050 | if (i != 1) { | |
1051 | #if 0 | |
1052 | /* Dummy error calls so mkerr generates them */ | |
6849b73c RL |
1053 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL); |
1054 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL); | |
1055 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK); | |
e96e0f8e MC |
1056 | #endif |
1057 | X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); | |
72620ac7 TS |
1058 | if (!for_comp) |
1059 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, i); | |
f63a17d6 | 1060 | return 0; |
e96e0f8e MC |
1061 | } |
1062 | chain_count = sk_X509_num(chain); | |
1063 | for (i = 0; i < chain_count; i++) { | |
1064 | x = sk_X509_value(chain, i); | |
1065 | ||
72620ac7 | 1066 | if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i, for_comp)) { |
f63a17d6 | 1067 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
e96e0f8e | 1068 | X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); |
f63a17d6 | 1069 | return 0; |
e96e0f8e MC |
1070 | } |
1071 | } | |
1072 | X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); | |
1073 | } else { | |
1074 | i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, extra_certs, x, 0); | |
1075 | if (i != 1) { | |
72620ac7 TS |
1076 | if (!for_comp) |
1077 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, i); | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1078 | return 0; |
1079 | } | |
72620ac7 | 1080 | if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, 0, for_comp)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
1081 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
1082 | return 0; | |
e96e0f8e | 1083 | } |
e96e0f8e MC |
1084 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(extra_certs); i++) { |
1085 | x = sk_X509_value(extra_certs, i); | |
72620ac7 | 1086 | if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i + 1, for_comp)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
1087 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
1088 | return 0; | |
1089 | } | |
e96e0f8e MC |
1090 | } |
1091 | } | |
1092 | return 1; | |
e96e0f8e MC |
1093 | } |
1094 | ||
38b051a1 | 1095 | unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt, |
72620ac7 | 1096 | CERT_PKEY *cpk, int for_comp) |
e96e0f8e | 1097 | { |
f63a17d6 | 1098 | if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt)) { |
72620ac7 TS |
1099 | if (!for_comp) |
1100 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1101 | return 0; |
1102 | } | |
e96e0f8e | 1103 | |
72620ac7 | 1104 | if (!ssl_add_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk, for_comp)) |
f63a17d6 MC |
1105 | return 0; |
1106 | ||
1107 | if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) { | |
72620ac7 TS |
1108 | if (!for_comp) |
1109 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
7cea05dc | 1110 | return 0; |
77d514c5 | 1111 | } |
f63a17d6 | 1112 | |
c49e1912 | 1113 | return 1; |
0f113f3e MC |
1114 | } |
1115 | ||
30f05b19 MC |
1116 | /* |
1117 | * Tidy up after the end of a handshake. In the case of SCTP this may result | |
1118 | * in NBIO events. If |clearbufs| is set then init_buf and the wbio buffer is | |
1119 | * freed up as well. | |
1120 | */ | |
38b051a1 | 1121 | WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL_CONNECTION *s, ossl_unused WORK_STATE wst, |
a7e6a3d8 | 1122 | int clearbufs, int stop) |
8723588e MC |
1123 | { |
1124 | void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL; | |
4af5836b | 1125 | int cleanuphand = s->statem.cleanuphand; |
38b051a1 TM |
1126 | SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s); |
1127 | SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s); | |
8723588e | 1128 | |
30f05b19 | 1129 | if (clearbufs) { |
38b051a1 | 1130 | if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) |
e7c27a6c | 1131 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP |
30f05b19 | 1132 | /* |
e7c27a6c N |
1133 | * RFC6083: SCTP provides a reliable and in-sequence transport service for DTLS |
1134 | * messages that require it. Therefore, DTLS procedures for retransmissions | |
1135 | * MUST NOT be used. | |
1136 | * Hence the init_buf can be cleared when DTLS over SCTP as transport is used. | |
1137 | */ | |
38b051a1 | 1138 | || BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(ssl)) |
e7c27a6c N |
1139 | #endif |
1140 | ) { | |
1141 | /* | |
1142 | * We don't do this in DTLS over UDP because we may still need the init_buf | |
30f05b19 MC |
1143 | * in case there are any unexpected retransmits |
1144 | */ | |
1145 | BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); | |
1146 | s->init_buf = NULL; | |
1147 | } | |
e7c27a6c | 1148 | |
a2c2e000 | 1149 | if (!ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s)) { |
c48ffbcc | 1150 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
b77f3ed1 | 1151 | return WORK_ERROR; |
a2c2e000 | 1152 | } |
30f05b19 | 1153 | s->init_num = 0; |
473483d4 | 1154 | } |
8723588e | 1155 | |
38b051a1 | 1156 | if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->server |
9d75dce3 TS |
1157 | && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) |
1158 | s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT; | |
1159 | ||
c2c1d8a4 MC |
1160 | /* |
1161 | * Only set if there was a Finished message and this isn't after a TLSv1.3 | |
1162 | * post handshake exchange | |
1163 | */ | |
4af5836b | 1164 | if (cleanuphand) { |
8723588e MC |
1165 | /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */ |
1166 | s->renegotiate = 0; | |
1167 | s->new_session = 0; | |
c7f47786 | 1168 | s->statem.cleanuphand = 0; |
c0638ade | 1169 | s->ext.ticket_expected = 0; |
8723588e | 1170 | |
30f05b19 MC |
1171 | ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); |
1172 | ||
8723588e | 1173 | if (s->server) { |
16ff1342 MC |
1174 | /* |
1175 | * In TLSv1.3 we update the cache as part of constructing the | |
1176 | * NewSessionTicket | |
1177 | */ | |
38b051a1 | 1178 | if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) |
16ff1342 | 1179 | ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER); |
8723588e | 1180 | |
0e6161bc | 1181 | /* N.B. s->ctx may not equal s->session_ctx */ |
38b051a1 | 1182 | ssl_tsan_counter(sctx, &sctx->stats.sess_accept_good); |
fe3a3291 | 1183 | s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_accept; |
8723588e | 1184 | } else { |
38b051a1 | 1185 | if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
4cb00457 MC |
1186 | /* |
1187 | * We encourage applications to only use TLSv1.3 tickets once, | |
1188 | * so we remove this one from the cache. | |
1189 | */ | |
1190 | if ((s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode | |
1191 | & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) != 0) | |
1192 | SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session); | |
1193 | } else { | |
1194 | /* | |
1195 | * In TLSv1.3 we update the cache as part of processing the | |
1196 | * NewSessionTicket | |
1197 | */ | |
5d61491c | 1198 | ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT); |
4cb00457 | 1199 | } |
8723588e | 1200 | if (s->hit) |
acce0557 P |
1201 | ssl_tsan_counter(s->session_ctx, |
1202 | &s->session_ctx->stats.sess_hit); | |
8723588e | 1203 | |
fe3a3291 | 1204 | s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_connect; |
acce0557 P |
1205 | ssl_tsan_counter(s->session_ctx, |
1206 | &s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_good); | |
8723588e MC |
1207 | } |
1208 | ||
38b051a1 | 1209 | if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
8723588e MC |
1210 | /* done with handshaking */ |
1211 | s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0; | |
1212 | s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 0; | |
1213 | s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0; | |
f5c7f5df | 1214 | dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s); |
8723588e MC |
1215 | } |
1216 | } | |
1217 | ||
c2c1d8a4 MC |
1218 | if (s->info_callback != NULL) |
1219 | cb = s->info_callback; | |
38b051a1 TM |
1220 | else if (sctx->info_callback != NULL) |
1221 | cb = sctx->info_callback; | |
c2c1d8a4 | 1222 | |
4ce787b9 MC |
1223 | /* The callback may expect us to not be in init at handshake done */ |
1224 | ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0); | |
1225 | ||
4af5836b MC |
1226 | if (cb != NULL) { |
1227 | if (cleanuphand | |
38b051a1 | 1228 | || !SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) |
4af5836b | 1229 | || SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) |
38b051a1 | 1230 | cb(ssl, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1); |
4af5836b | 1231 | } |
c2c1d8a4 | 1232 | |
4ce787b9 MC |
1233 | if (!stop) { |
1234 | /* If we've got more work to do we go back into init */ | |
1235 | ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1); | |
30f05b19 | 1236 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; |
4ce787b9 | 1237 | } |
30f05b19 | 1238 | |
8723588e MC |
1239 | return WORK_FINISHED_STOP; |
1240 | } | |
1241 | ||
38b051a1 | 1242 | int tls_get_message_header(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int *mt) |
9ab930b2 MC |
1243 | { |
1244 | /* s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */ | |
d4d2f3a4 | 1245 | int skip_message, i, recvd_type; |
9ab930b2 | 1246 | unsigned char *p; |
54105ddd | 1247 | size_t l, readbytes; |
38b051a1 | 1248 | SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s); |
9ab930b2 MC |
1249 | |
1250 | p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; | |
1251 | ||
1252 | do { | |
1253 | while (s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) { | |
38b051a1 TM |
1254 | i = ssl->method->ssl_read_bytes(ssl, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, &recvd_type, |
1255 | &p[s->init_num], | |
1256 | SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - s->init_num, | |
1257 | 0, &readbytes); | |
9ab930b2 MC |
1258 | if (i <= 0) { |
1259 | s->rwstate = SSL_READING; | |
1260 | return 0; | |
32ec4153 | 1261 | } |
9ab930b2 | 1262 | if (recvd_type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { |
1257adec | 1263 | /* |
a230b26e EK |
1264 | * A ChangeCipherSpec must be a single byte and may not occur |
1265 | * in the middle of a handshake message. | |
1266 | */ | |
54105ddd | 1267 | if (s->init_num != 0 || readbytes != 1 || p[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS) { |
d4d2f3a4 | 1268 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
1269 | SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); |
1270 | return 0; | |
1257adec | 1271 | } |
e9359719 | 1272 | if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_BEFORE |
555cbb32 | 1273 | && (s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) != 0) { |
e9359719 MC |
1274 | /* |
1275 | * We are stateless and we received a CCS. Probably this is | |
1276 | * from a client between the first and second ClientHellos. | |
1277 | * We should ignore this, but return an error because we do | |
1278 | * not return success until we see the second ClientHello | |
1279 | * with a valid cookie. | |
1280 | */ | |
1281 | return 0; | |
1282 | } | |
555cbb32 | 1283 | s->s3.tmp.message_type = *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; |
54105ddd | 1284 | s->init_num = readbytes - 1; |
c4377574 | 1285 | s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data; |
555cbb32 | 1286 | s->s3.tmp.message_size = readbytes; |
9ab930b2 MC |
1287 | return 1; |
1288 | } else if (recvd_type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { | |
d4d2f3a4 | 1289 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
1290 | SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); |
1291 | return 0; | |
32ec4153 | 1292 | } |
54105ddd | 1293 | s->init_num += readbytes; |
9ab930b2 MC |
1294 | } |
1295 | ||
1296 | skip_message = 0; | |
1297 | if (!s->server) | |
c7f47786 MC |
1298 | if (s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_OK |
1299 | && p[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) | |
9ab930b2 MC |
1300 | /* |
1301 | * The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages -- | |
1302 | * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if | |
1303 | * their format is correct. Does not count for 'Finished' | |
1304 | * MAC. | |
1305 | */ | |
1306 | if (p[1] == 0 && p[2] == 0 && p[3] == 0) { | |
1307 | s->init_num = 0; | |
1308 | skip_message = 1; | |
1309 | ||
1310 | if (s->msg_callback) | |
1311 | s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, | |
38b051a1 | 1312 | p, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, ssl, |
9ab930b2 MC |
1313 | s->msg_callback_arg); |
1314 | } | |
1315 | } while (skip_message); | |
1316 | /* s->init_num == SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */ | |
1317 | ||
1318 | *mt = *p; | |
555cbb32 | 1319 | s->s3.tmp.message_type = *(p++); |
32ec4153 | 1320 | |
e8aa8b6c | 1321 | if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) { |
9ab930b2 MC |
1322 | /* |
1323 | * Only happens with SSLv3+ in an SSLv2 backward compatible | |
1324 | * ClientHello | |
e8aa8b6c F |
1325 | * |
1326 | * Total message size is the remaining record bytes to read | |
1327 | * plus the SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH bytes that we already read | |
9ab930b2 | 1328 | */ |
4030869d | 1329 | l = s->rlayer.tlsrecs[0].length + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; |
555cbb32 | 1330 | s->s3.tmp.message_size = l; |
9ab930b2 MC |
1331 | |
1332 | s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data; | |
1333 | s->init_num = SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
1334 | } else { | |
1335 | n2l3(p, l); | |
1336 | /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */ | |
1337 | if (l > (INT_MAX - SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 1338 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
1339 | SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE); |
1340 | return 0; | |
32ec4153 | 1341 | } |
555cbb32 | 1342 | s->s3.tmp.message_size = l; |
9ab930b2 MC |
1343 | |
1344 | s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
1345 | s->init_num = 0; | |
1346 | } | |
1347 | ||
1348 | return 1; | |
9ab930b2 MC |
1349 | } |
1350 | ||
38b051a1 | 1351 | int tls_get_message_body(SSL_CONNECTION *s, size_t *len) |
9ab930b2 | 1352 | { |
54105ddd | 1353 | size_t n, readbytes; |
9ab930b2 MC |
1354 | unsigned char *p; |
1355 | int i; | |
38b051a1 | 1356 | SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s); |
9ab930b2 | 1357 | |
555cbb32 | 1358 | if (s->s3.tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { |
9ab930b2 MC |
1359 | /* We've already read everything in */ |
1360 | *len = (unsigned long)s->init_num; | |
1361 | return 1; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1362 | } |
1363 | ||
0f113f3e | 1364 | p = s->init_msg; |
555cbb32 | 1365 | n = s->s3.tmp.message_size - s->init_num; |
0f113f3e | 1366 | while (n > 0) { |
38b051a1 TM |
1367 | i = ssl->method->ssl_read_bytes(ssl, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, NULL, |
1368 | &p[s->init_num], n, 0, &readbytes); | |
0f113f3e MC |
1369 | if (i <= 0) { |
1370 | s->rwstate = SSL_READING; | |
9ab930b2 MC |
1371 | *len = 0; |
1372 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e | 1373 | } |
54105ddd MC |
1374 | s->init_num += readbytes; |
1375 | n -= readbytes; | |
0f113f3e | 1376 | } |
ee2ffc27 | 1377 | |
0f113f3e MC |
1378 | /* |
1379 | * If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for | |
1380 | * Finished verification. | |
1381 | */ | |
5d671101 MC |
1382 | if (*(s->init_buf->data) == SSL3_MT_FINISHED && !ssl3_take_mac(s)) { |
1383 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
1384 | *len = 0; | |
1385 | return 0; | |
1386 | } | |
ee2ffc27 | 1387 | |
0f113f3e | 1388 | /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */ |
e8aa8b6c | 1389 | if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) { |
d166ed8c DSH |
1390 | if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, |
1391 | s->init_num)) { | |
d4d2f3a4 | 1392 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
d166ed8c DSH |
1393 | *len = 0; |
1394 | return 0; | |
1395 | } | |
32ec4153 | 1396 | if (s->msg_callback) |
a230b26e | 1397 | s->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION, 0, s->init_buf->data, |
38b051a1 | 1398 | (size_t)s->init_num, ssl, s->msg_callback_arg); |
32ec4153 | 1399 | } else { |
11c67eea MC |
1400 | /* |
1401 | * We defer feeding in the HRR until later. We'll do it as part of | |
1402 | * processing the message | |
9d75dce3 TS |
1403 | * The TLsv1.3 handshake transcript stops at the ClientFinished |
1404 | * message. | |
11c67eea | 1405 | */ |
597c51bc | 1406 | #define SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET (SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 2) |
9d75dce3 | 1407 | /* KeyUpdate and NewSessionTicket do not need to be added */ |
38b051a1 TM |
1408 | if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) |
1409 | || (s->s3.tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET | |
1410 | && s->s3.tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE)) { | |
555cbb32 | 1411 | if (s->s3.tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO |
9d75dce3 TS |
1412 | || s->init_num < SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE |
1413 | || memcmp(hrrrandom, | |
1414 | s->init_buf->data + SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET, | |
1415 | SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) != 0) { | |
1416 | if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, | |
1417 | s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { | |
1418 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
1419 | *len = 0; | |
1420 | return 0; | |
1421 | } | |
597c51bc | 1422 | } |
d166ed8c | 1423 | } |
32ec4153 MC |
1424 | if (s->msg_callback) |
1425 | s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data, | |
38b051a1 | 1426 | (size_t)s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, ssl, |
32ec4153 MC |
1427 | s->msg_callback_arg); |
1428 | } | |
1429 | ||
eda75751 | 1430 | *len = s->init_num; |
9ab930b2 | 1431 | return 1; |
0f113f3e | 1432 | } |
d02b48c6 | 1433 | |
c6d38183 RS |
1434 | static const X509ERR2ALERT x509table[] = { |
1435 | {X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE}, | |
1436 | {X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
cccf532f | 1437 | {X509_V_ERR_EC_KEY_EXPLICIT_PARAMS, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, |
c6d38183 RS |
1438 | {X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, |
1439 | {X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, | |
1440 | {X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED}, | |
1441 | {X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1442 | {X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1443 | {X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED}, | |
1444 | {X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR}, | |
1445 | {X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1446 | {X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED}, | |
1447 | {X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1448 | {X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR}, | |
1449 | {X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1450 | {X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, | |
1451 | {X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1452 | {X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1453 | {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1454 | {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1455 | {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1456 | {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1457 | {X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1458 | {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, | |
1459 | {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR}, | |
1460 | {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1461 | {X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1462 | {X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR}, | |
1463 | {X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, | |
1464 | {X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, | |
1465 | {X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR}, | |
1466 | {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1467 | {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1468 | {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1469 | {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, | |
1470 | {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, | |
1471 | {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, | |
1472 | {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, | |
1473 | {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, | |
1474 | {X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR}, | |
1475 | ||
1476 | /* Last entry; return this if we don't find the value above. */ | |
1477 | {X509_V_OK, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN} | |
1478 | }; | |
1479 | ||
1480 | int ssl_x509err2alert(int x509err) | |
0f113f3e | 1481 | { |
c6d38183 RS |
1482 | const X509ERR2ALERT *tp; |
1483 | ||
1484 | for (tp = x509table; tp->x509err != X509_V_OK; ++tp) | |
1485 | if (tp->x509err == x509err) | |
1486 | break; | |
1487 | return tp->alert; | |
0f113f3e | 1488 | } |
d02b48c6 | 1489 | |
38b051a1 | 1490 | int ssl_allow_compression(SSL_CONNECTION *s) |
0f113f3e MC |
1491 | { |
1492 | if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) | |
1493 | return 0; | |
1494 | return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION, 0, 0, NULL); | |
1495 | } | |
4fa52141 | 1496 | |
38b051a1 | 1497 | static int version_cmp(const SSL_CONNECTION *s, int a, int b) |
4fa52141 | 1498 | { |
38b051a1 | 1499 | int dtls = SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s); |
4fa52141 VD |
1500 | |
1501 | if (a == b) | |
1502 | return 0; | |
1503 | if (!dtls) | |
1504 | return a < b ? -1 : 1; | |
1505 | return DTLS_VERSION_LT(a, b) ? -1 : 1; | |
1506 | } | |
1507 | ||
1508 | typedef struct { | |
1509 | int version; | |
a230b26e EK |
1510 | const SSL_METHOD *(*cmeth) (void); |
1511 | const SSL_METHOD *(*smeth) (void); | |
4fa52141 VD |
1512 | } version_info; |
1513 | ||
5c587fb6 | 1514 | #if TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL != TLS1_3_VERSION |
582a17d6 | 1515 | # error Code needs update for TLS_method() support beyond TLS1_3_VERSION. |
4fa52141 VD |
1516 | #endif |
1517 | ||
f7f2a01d | 1518 | /* Must be in order high to low */ |
4fa52141 | 1519 | static const version_info tls_version_table[] = { |
582a17d6 MC |
1520 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 |
1521 | {TLS1_3_VERSION, tlsv1_3_client_method, tlsv1_3_server_method}, | |
1522 | #else | |
1523 | {TLS1_3_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, | |
1524 | #endif | |
6b01bed2 | 1525 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2 |
a230b26e | 1526 | {TLS1_2_VERSION, tlsv1_2_client_method, tlsv1_2_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 1527 | #else |
a230b26e | 1528 | {TLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
6b01bed2 VD |
1529 | #endif |
1530 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1 | |
a230b26e | 1531 | {TLS1_1_VERSION, tlsv1_1_client_method, tlsv1_1_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 1532 | #else |
a230b26e | 1533 | {TLS1_1_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
6b01bed2 VD |
1534 | #endif |
1535 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1 | |
a230b26e | 1536 | {TLS1_VERSION, tlsv1_client_method, tlsv1_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 1537 | #else |
a230b26e | 1538 | {TLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
6b01bed2 | 1539 | #endif |
4fa52141 | 1540 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3 |
a230b26e | 1541 | {SSL3_VERSION, sslv3_client_method, sslv3_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 1542 | #else |
a230b26e | 1543 | {SSL3_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
4fa52141 | 1544 | #endif |
a230b26e | 1545 | {0, NULL, NULL}, |
4fa52141 VD |
1546 | }; |
1547 | ||
5c587fb6 | 1548 | #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL != DTLS1_2_VERSION |
4fa52141 VD |
1549 | # error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_2_VERSION. |
1550 | #endif | |
1551 | ||
f7f2a01d | 1552 | /* Must be in order high to low */ |
4fa52141 | 1553 | static const version_info dtls_version_table[] = { |
6b01bed2 | 1554 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2 |
a230b26e | 1555 | {DTLS1_2_VERSION, dtlsv1_2_client_method, dtlsv1_2_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 1556 | #else |
a230b26e | 1557 | {DTLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
6b01bed2 VD |
1558 | #endif |
1559 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1 | |
a230b26e EK |
1560 | {DTLS1_VERSION, dtlsv1_client_method, dtlsv1_server_method}, |
1561 | {DTLS1_BAD_VER, dtls_bad_ver_client_method, NULL}, | |
6b01bed2 | 1562 | #else |
a230b26e EK |
1563 | {DTLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
1564 | {DTLS1_BAD_VER, NULL, NULL}, | |
6b01bed2 | 1565 | #endif |
a230b26e | 1566 | {0, NULL, NULL}, |
4fa52141 VD |
1567 | }; |
1568 | ||
1569 | /* | |
1570 | * ssl_method_error - Check whether an SSL_METHOD is enabled. | |
1571 | * | |
1572 | * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method | |
1573 | * @method: the intended method. | |
1574 | * | |
1575 | * Returns 0 on success, or an SSL error reason on failure. | |
1576 | */ | |
38b051a1 | 1577 | static int ssl_method_error(const SSL_CONNECTION *s, const SSL_METHOD *method) |
4fa52141 VD |
1578 | { |
1579 | int version = method->version; | |
1580 | ||
1581 | if ((s->min_proto_version != 0 && | |
1582 | version_cmp(s, version, s->min_proto_version) < 0) || | |
1583 | ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, version, NULL) == 0) | |
1584 | return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW; | |
1585 | ||
1586 | if (s->max_proto_version != 0 && | |
a230b26e | 1587 | version_cmp(s, version, s->max_proto_version) > 0) |
4fa52141 VD |
1588 | return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_HIGH; |
1589 | ||
1590 | if ((s->options & method->mask) != 0) | |
1591 | return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; | |
1592 | if ((method->flags & SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB) != 0 && tls1_suiteb(s)) | |
1593 | return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_2_NEEDED_IN_SUITEB_MODE; | |
4fa52141 VD |
1594 | |
1595 | return 0; | |
1596 | } | |
1597 | ||
baa45c3e MC |
1598 | /* |
1599 | * Only called by servers. Returns 1 if the server has a TLSv1.3 capable | |
ebda646d MC |
1600 | * certificate type, or has PSK or a certificate callback configured, or has |
1601 | * a servername callback configure. Otherwise returns 0. | |
baa45c3e | 1602 | */ |
38b051a1 | 1603 | static int is_tls13_capable(const SSL_CONNECTION *s) |
baa45c3e | 1604 | { |
ee58915c | 1605 | size_t i; |
65d2c16c | 1606 | int curve; |
38b051a1 | 1607 | SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s); |
baa45c3e | 1608 | |
38b051a1 | 1609 | if (!ossl_assert(sctx != NULL) || !ossl_assert(s->session_ctx != NULL)) |
ebda646d MC |
1610 | return 0; |
1611 | ||
1612 | /* | |
1613 | * A servername callback can change the available certs, so if a servername | |
1614 | * cb is set then we just assume TLSv1.3 will be ok | |
1615 | */ | |
38b051a1 | 1616 | if (sctx->ext.servername_cb != NULL |
ebda646d MC |
1617 | || s->session_ctx->ext.servername_cb != NULL) |
1618 | return 1; | |
1619 | ||
d162340d MC |
1620 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK |
1621 | if (s->psk_server_callback != NULL) | |
1622 | return 1; | |
1623 | #endif | |
1624 | ||
cd3b53b8 | 1625 | if (s->psk_find_session_cb != NULL || s->cert->cert_cb != NULL) |
baa45c3e MC |
1626 | return 1; |
1627 | ||
ee58915c MB |
1628 | /* All provider-based sig algs are required to support at least TLS1.3 */ |
1629 | for (i = 0; i < s->ssl_pkey_num; i++) { | |
baa45c3e MC |
1630 | /* Skip over certs disallowed for TLSv1.3 */ |
1631 | switch (i) { | |
1632 | case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN: | |
1633 | case SSL_PKEY_GOST01: | |
1634 | case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256: | |
1635 | case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512: | |
1636 | continue; | |
1637 | default: | |
1638 | break; | |
1639 | } | |
de4dc598 MC |
1640 | if (!ssl_has_cert(s, i)) |
1641 | continue; | |
1642 | if (i != SSL_PKEY_ECC) | |
1643 | return 1; | |
1644 | /* | |
1645 | * Prior to TLSv1.3 sig algs allowed any curve to be used. TLSv1.3 is | |
1646 | * more restrictive so check that our sig algs are consistent with this | |
1647 | * EC cert. See section 4.2.3 of RFC8446. | |
1648 | */ | |
d8975dec | 1649 | curve = ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey); |
de4dc598 | 1650 | if (tls_check_sigalg_curve(s, curve)) |
baa45c3e MC |
1651 | return 1; |
1652 | } | |
1653 | ||
1654 | return 0; | |
1655 | } | |
1656 | ||
ccae4a15 FI |
1657 | /* |
1658 | * ssl_version_supported - Check that the specified `version` is supported by | |
1659 | * `SSL *` instance | |
1660 | * | |
1661 | * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method | |
1662 | * @version: Protocol version to test against | |
1663 | * | |
1664 | * Returns 1 when supported, otherwise 0 | |
1665 | */ | |
38b051a1 TM |
1666 | int ssl_version_supported(const SSL_CONNECTION *s, int version, |
1667 | const SSL_METHOD **meth) | |
ccae4a15 FI |
1668 | { |
1669 | const version_info *vent; | |
1670 | const version_info *table; | |
1671 | ||
38b051a1 | 1672 | switch (SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)->method->version) { |
ccae4a15 FI |
1673 | default: |
1674 | /* Version should match method version for non-ANY method */ | |
1675 | return version_cmp(s, version, s->version) == 0; | |
1676 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1677 | table = tls_version_table; | |
1678 | break; | |
1679 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1680 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
1681 | break; | |
1682 | } | |
1683 | ||
1684 | for (vent = table; | |
1685 | vent->version != 0 && version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) <= 0; | |
1686 | ++vent) { | |
baa45c3e MC |
1687 | if (vent->cmeth != NULL |
1688 | && version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) == 0 | |
1689 | && ssl_method_error(s, vent->cmeth()) == 0 | |
1690 | && (!s->server | |
1691 | || version != TLS1_3_VERSION | |
1692 | || is_tls13_capable(s))) { | |
4fd12788 MC |
1693 | if (meth != NULL) |
1694 | *meth = vent->cmeth(); | |
ccae4a15 FI |
1695 | return 1; |
1696 | } | |
1697 | } | |
1698 | return 0; | |
1699 | } | |
1700 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1701 | /* |
1702 | * ssl_check_version_downgrade - In response to RFC7507 SCSV version | |
1703 | * fallback indication from a client check whether we're using the highest | |
1704 | * supported protocol version. | |
1705 | * | |
1706 | * @s server SSL handle. | |
1707 | * | |
1708 | * Returns 1 when using the highest enabled version, 0 otherwise. | |
1709 | */ | |
38b051a1 | 1710 | int ssl_check_version_downgrade(SSL_CONNECTION *s) |
4fa52141 VD |
1711 | { |
1712 | const version_info *vent; | |
1713 | const version_info *table; | |
a7f41885 | 1714 | SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s); |
4fa52141 VD |
1715 | |
1716 | /* | |
1717 | * Check that the current protocol is the highest enabled version | |
a7f41885 | 1718 | * (according to ssl->defltmethod, as version negotiation may have changed |
4fa52141 VD |
1719 | * s->method). |
1720 | */ | |
a7f41885 | 1721 | if (s->version == ssl->defltmeth->version) |
4fa52141 VD |
1722 | return 1; |
1723 | ||
1724 | /* | |
1725 | * Apparently we're using a version-flexible SSL_METHOD (not at its | |
1726 | * highest protocol version). | |
1727 | */ | |
a7f41885 | 1728 | if (ssl->defltmeth->version == TLS_method()->version) |
4fa52141 | 1729 | table = tls_version_table; |
a7f41885 | 1730 | else if (ssl->defltmeth->version == DTLS_method()->version) |
4fa52141 VD |
1731 | table = dtls_version_table; |
1732 | else { | |
1733 | /* Unexpected state; fail closed. */ | |
1734 | return 0; | |
1735 | } | |
1736 | ||
1737 | for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { | |
a230b26e | 1738 | if (vent->smeth != NULL && ssl_method_error(s, vent->smeth()) == 0) |
4fa52141 VD |
1739 | return s->version == vent->version; |
1740 | } | |
1741 | return 0; | |
1742 | } | |
1743 | ||
1744 | /* | |
1745 | * ssl_set_version_bound - set an upper or lower bound on the supported (D)TLS | |
1746 | * protocols, provided the initial (D)TLS method is version-flexible. This | |
1747 | * function sanity-checks the proposed value and makes sure the method is | |
1748 | * version-flexible, then sets the limit if all is well. | |
1749 | * | |
1750 | * @method_version: The version of the current SSL_METHOD. | |
1751 | * @version: the intended limit. | |
1752 | * @bound: pointer to limit to be updated. | |
1753 | * | |
1754 | * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure. | |
1755 | */ | |
1756 | int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version, int version, int *bound) | |
1757 | { | |
77174598 VD |
1758 | int valid_tls; |
1759 | int valid_dtls; | |
1760 | ||
869e978c KR |
1761 | if (version == 0) { |
1762 | *bound = version; | |
1763 | return 1; | |
1764 | } | |
1765 | ||
77174598 VD |
1766 | valid_tls = version >= SSL3_VERSION && version <= TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL; |
1767 | valid_dtls = | |
1768 | DTLS_VERSION_LE(version, DTLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL) && | |
1769 | DTLS_VERSION_GE(version, DTLS1_BAD_VER); | |
1770 | ||
1771 | if (!valid_tls && !valid_dtls) | |
1772 | return 0; | |
1773 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1774 | /*- |
1775 | * Restrict TLS methods to TLS protocol versions. | |
1776 | * Restrict DTLS methods to DTLS protocol versions. | |
1777 | * Note, DTLS version numbers are decreasing, use comparison macros. | |
1778 | * | |
1779 | * Note that for both lower-bounds we use explicit versions, not | |
1780 | * (D)TLS_MIN_VERSION. This is because we don't want to break user | |
1781 | * configurations. If the MIN (supported) version ever rises, the user's | |
1782 | * "floor" remains valid even if no longer available. We don't expect the | |
1783 | * MAX ceiling to ever get lower, so making that variable makes sense. | |
77174598 VD |
1784 | * |
1785 | * We ignore attempts to set bounds on version-inflexible methods, | |
1786 | * returning success. | |
4fa52141 VD |
1787 | */ |
1788 | switch (method_version) { | |
1789 | default: | |
77174598 | 1790 | break; |
4fa52141 VD |
1791 | |
1792 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
77174598 VD |
1793 | if (valid_tls) |
1794 | *bound = version; | |
4fa52141 VD |
1795 | break; |
1796 | ||
1797 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
77174598 VD |
1798 | if (valid_dtls) |
1799 | *bound = version; | |
4fa52141 VD |
1800 | break; |
1801 | } | |
4fa52141 VD |
1802 | return 1; |
1803 | } | |
1804 | ||
38b051a1 | 1805 | static void check_for_downgrade(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int vers, DOWNGRADE *dgrd) |
f7f2a01d MC |
1806 | { |
1807 | if (vers == TLS1_2_VERSION | |
4fd12788 | 1808 | && ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_3_VERSION, NULL)) { |
f7f2a01d | 1809 | *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_TO_1_2; |
38b051a1 | 1810 | } else if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) |
5627f9f2 MC |
1811 | && vers < TLS1_2_VERSION |
1812 | /* | |
1813 | * We need to ensure that a server that disables TLSv1.2 | |
1814 | * (creating a hole between TLSv1.3 and TLSv1.1) can still | |
1815 | * complete handshakes with clients that support TLSv1.2 and | |
1816 | * below. Therefore we do not enable the sentinel if TLSv1.3 is | |
1817 | * enabled and TLSv1.2 is not. | |
1818 | */ | |
1819 | && ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_2_VERSION, NULL)) { | |
f7f2a01d MC |
1820 | *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_TO_1_1; |
1821 | } else { | |
1822 | *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE; | |
1823 | } | |
1824 | } | |
1825 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1826 | /* |
1827 | * ssl_choose_server_version - Choose server (D)TLS version. Called when the | |
1828 | * client HELLO is received to select the final server protocol version and | |
1829 | * the version specific method. | |
1830 | * | |
1831 | * @s: server SSL handle. | |
1832 | * | |
1833 | * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. | |
1834 | */ | |
38b051a1 TM |
1835 | int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL_CONNECTION *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello, |
1836 | DOWNGRADE *dgrd) | |
4fa52141 VD |
1837 | { |
1838 | /*- | |
1839 | * With version-flexible methods we have an initial state with: | |
1840 | * | |
1841 | * s->method->version == (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION, | |
5c587fb6 | 1842 | * s->version == (D)TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL. |
4fa52141 VD |
1843 | * |
1844 | * So we detect version-flexible methods via the method version, not the | |
1845 | * handle version. | |
1846 | */ | |
38b051a1 TM |
1847 | SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s); |
1848 | int server_version = ssl->method->version; | |
df7ce507 | 1849 | int client_version = hello->legacy_version; |
4fa52141 VD |
1850 | const version_info *vent; |
1851 | const version_info *table; | |
1852 | int disabled = 0; | |
cd998837 | 1853 | RAW_EXTENSION *suppversions; |
4fa52141 | 1854 | |
1ab3836b MC |
1855 | s->client_version = client_version; |
1856 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1857 | switch (server_version) { |
1858 | default: | |
38b051a1 | 1859 | if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
7d061fce MC |
1860 | if (version_cmp(s, client_version, s->version) < 0) |
1861 | return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION; | |
f7f2a01d | 1862 | *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE; |
7d061fce MC |
1863 | /* |
1864 | * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't | |
1865 | * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope | |
1866 | * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol | |
1867 | * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return | |
1868 | * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) | |
1869 | */ | |
1870 | return 0; | |
1871 | } | |
d2f42576 | 1872 | /* |
7d061fce MC |
1873 | * Fall through if we are TLSv1.3 already (this means we must be after |
1874 | * a HelloRetryRequest | |
4fa52141 | 1875 | */ |
018fcbec | 1876 | /* fall thru */ |
4fa52141 VD |
1877 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: |
1878 | table = tls_version_table; | |
1879 | break; | |
1880 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1881 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
1882 | break; | |
1883 | } | |
1884 | ||
70af3d8e | 1885 | suppversions = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions]; |
cd998837 | 1886 | |
6f40214f | 1887 | /* If we did an HRR then supported versions is mandatory */ |
fc7129dc | 1888 | if (!suppversions->present && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) |
6f40214f MC |
1889 | return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; |
1890 | ||
38b051a1 | 1891 | if (suppversions->present && !SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
cd998837 MC |
1892 | unsigned int candidate_vers = 0; |
1893 | unsigned int best_vers = 0; | |
1894 | const SSL_METHOD *best_method = NULL; | |
1895 | PACKET versionslist; | |
1896 | ||
6b473aca MC |
1897 | suppversions->parsed = 1; |
1898 | ||
16bce0e0 | 1899 | if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&suppversions->data, &versionslist)) { |
cd998837 MC |
1900 | /* Trailing or invalid data? */ |
1901 | return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH; | |
1902 | } | |
1903 | ||
d8434cf8 MC |
1904 | /* |
1905 | * The TLSv1.3 spec says the client MUST set this to TLS1_2_VERSION. | |
1906 | * The spec only requires servers to check that it isn't SSLv3: | |
1907 | * "Any endpoint receiving a Hello message with | |
1908 | * ClientHello.legacy_version or ServerHello.legacy_version set to | |
1909 | * 0x0300 MUST abort the handshake with a "protocol_version" alert." | |
1910 | * We are slightly stricter and require that it isn't SSLv3 or lower. | |
1911 | * We tolerate TLSv1 and TLSv1.1. | |
1912 | */ | |
1913 | if (client_version <= SSL3_VERSION) | |
1914 | return SSL_R_BAD_LEGACY_VERSION; | |
1915 | ||
cd998837 | 1916 | while (PACKET_get_net_2(&versionslist, &candidate_vers)) { |
cd998837 MC |
1917 | if (version_cmp(s, candidate_vers, best_vers) <= 0) |
1918 | continue; | |
4fd12788 MC |
1919 | if (ssl_version_supported(s, candidate_vers, &best_method)) |
1920 | best_vers = candidate_vers; | |
cd998837 MC |
1921 | } |
1922 | if (PACKET_remaining(&versionslist) != 0) { | |
1923 | /* Trailing data? */ | |
1924 | return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH; | |
1925 | } | |
1926 | ||
1927 | if (best_vers > 0) { | |
fc7129dc | 1928 | if (s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) { |
7d061fce | 1929 | /* |
6f40214f MC |
1930 | * This is after a HelloRetryRequest so we better check that we |
1931 | * negotiated TLSv1.3 | |
7d061fce MC |
1932 | */ |
1933 | if (best_vers != TLS1_3_VERSION) | |
1934 | return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; | |
1935 | return 0; | |
1936 | } | |
f7f2a01d | 1937 | check_for_downgrade(s, best_vers, dgrd); |
cd998837 | 1938 | s->version = best_vers; |
38b051a1 | 1939 | ssl->method = best_method; |
1d367677 | 1940 | if (!ssl_set_record_protocol_version(s, best_vers)) |
1853d20a MC |
1941 | return ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
1942 | ||
cd998837 MC |
1943 | return 0; |
1944 | } | |
1945 | return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; | |
1946 | } | |
1947 | ||
1948 | /* | |
1949 | * If the supported versions extension isn't present, then the highest | |
1950 | * version we can negotiate is TLSv1.2 | |
1951 | */ | |
1952 | if (version_cmp(s, client_version, TLS1_3_VERSION) >= 0) | |
1953 | client_version = TLS1_2_VERSION; | |
1954 | ||
1955 | /* | |
1956 | * No supported versions extension, so we just use the version supplied in | |
1957 | * the ClientHello. | |
1958 | */ | |
4fa52141 VD |
1959 | for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { |
1960 | const SSL_METHOD *method; | |
1961 | ||
1962 | if (vent->smeth == NULL || | |
1963 | version_cmp(s, client_version, vent->version) < 0) | |
1964 | continue; | |
1965 | method = vent->smeth(); | |
1966 | if (ssl_method_error(s, method) == 0) { | |
f7f2a01d | 1967 | check_for_downgrade(s, vent->version, dgrd); |
4fa52141 | 1968 | s->version = vent->version; |
38b051a1 | 1969 | ssl->method = method; |
1d367677 | 1970 | if (!ssl_set_record_protocol_version(s, s->version)) |
1853d20a MC |
1971 | return ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
1972 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1973 | return 0; |
1974 | } | |
1975 | disabled = 1; | |
1976 | } | |
1977 | return disabled ? SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL : SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW; | |
1978 | } | |
1979 | ||
1980 | /* | |
1981 | * ssl_choose_client_version - Choose client (D)TLS version. Called when the | |
1982 | * server HELLO is received to select the final client protocol version and | |
1983 | * the version specific method. | |
1984 | * | |
1985 | * @s: client SSL handle. | |
1986 | * @version: The proposed version from the server's HELLO. | |
88050dd1 | 1987 | * @extensions: The extensions received |
4fa52141 | 1988 | * |
29bfd5b7 | 1989 | * Returns 1 on success or 0 on error. |
4fa52141 | 1990 | */ |
38b051a1 TM |
1991 | int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int version, |
1992 | RAW_EXTENSION *extensions) | |
4fa52141 VD |
1993 | { |
1994 | const version_info *vent; | |
1995 | const version_info *table; | |
b5b993b2 | 1996 | int ret, ver_min, ver_max, real_max, origv; |
38b051a1 | 1997 | SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s); |
4fa52141 | 1998 | |
88050dd1 MC |
1999 | origv = s->version; |
2000 | s->version = version; | |
b97667ce | 2001 | |
88050dd1 MC |
2002 | /* This will overwrite s->version if the extension is present */ |
2003 | if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions, | |
2004 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO | |
2005 | | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO, extensions, | |
2006 | NULL, 0)) { | |
2007 | s->version = origv; | |
2008 | return 0; | |
2009 | } | |
2010 | ||
fc7129dc MC |
2011 | if (s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE |
2012 | && s->version != TLS1_3_VERSION) { | |
88050dd1 | 2013 | s->version = origv; |
c48ffbcc | 2014 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION); |
29bfd5b7 | 2015 | return 0; |
c3043dcd MC |
2016 | } |
2017 | ||
38b051a1 | 2018 | switch (ssl->method->version) { |
4fa52141 | 2019 | default: |
38b051a1 | 2020 | if (s->version != ssl->method->version) { |
88050dd1 | 2021 | s->version = origv; |
c48ffbcc | 2022 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION); |
29bfd5b7 | 2023 | return 0; |
c3043dcd | 2024 | } |
4fa52141 VD |
2025 | /* |
2026 | * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't | |
2027 | * (and never did) check min/max, FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope | |
2028 | * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol | |
2029 | * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return | |
2030 | * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) | |
2031 | */ | |
1d367677 | 2032 | if (!ssl_set_record_protocol_version(s, s->version)) { |
1853d20a MC |
2033 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
2034 | return 0; | |
2035 | } | |
29bfd5b7 | 2036 | return 1; |
4fa52141 VD |
2037 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: |
2038 | table = tls_version_table; | |
2039 | break; | |
2040 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
2041 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
2042 | break; | |
2043 | } | |
2044 | ||
b5b993b2 MC |
2045 | ret = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max, &real_max); |
2046 | if (ret != 0) { | |
2047 | s->version = origv; | |
c48ffbcc | 2048 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, ret); |
b5b993b2 MC |
2049 | return 0; |
2050 | } | |
38b051a1 TM |
2051 | if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) ? DTLS_VERSION_LT(s->version, ver_min) |
2052 | : s->version < ver_min) { | |
b5b993b2 | 2053 | s->version = origv; |
c48ffbcc | 2054 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL); |
b5b993b2 | 2055 | return 0; |
38b051a1 TM |
2056 | } else if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) ? DTLS_VERSION_GT(s->version, ver_max) |
2057 | : s->version > ver_max) { | |
b5b993b2 | 2058 | s->version = origv; |
c48ffbcc | 2059 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL); |
b5b993b2 MC |
2060 | return 0; |
2061 | } | |
5df22060 | 2062 | |
b5b993b2 MC |
2063 | if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) == 0) |
2064 | real_max = ver_max; | |
c3043dcd | 2065 | |
b5b993b2 MC |
2066 | /* Check for downgrades */ |
2067 | if (s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION && real_max > s->version) { | |
2068 | if (memcmp(tls12downgrade, | |
555cbb32 | 2069 | s->s3.server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE |
b5b993b2 MC |
2070 | - sizeof(tls12downgrade), |
2071 | sizeof(tls12downgrade)) == 0) { | |
2072 | s->version = origv; | |
2073 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, | |
b5b993b2 MC |
2074 | SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); |
2075 | return 0; | |
2076 | } | |
38b051a1 | 2077 | } else if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) |
b5b993b2 MC |
2078 | && s->version < TLS1_2_VERSION |
2079 | && real_max > s->version) { | |
2080 | if (memcmp(tls11downgrade, | |
555cbb32 | 2081 | s->s3.server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE |
b5b993b2 MC |
2082 | - sizeof(tls11downgrade), |
2083 | sizeof(tls11downgrade)) == 0) { | |
2084 | s->version = origv; | |
2085 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, | |
b5b993b2 MC |
2086 | SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); |
2087 | return 0; | |
c3043dcd | 2088 | } |
b5b993b2 | 2089 | } |
c3043dcd | 2090 | |
b5b993b2 MC |
2091 | for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { |
2092 | if (vent->cmeth == NULL || s->version != vent->version) | |
c3043dcd MC |
2093 | continue; |
2094 | ||
38b051a1 | 2095 | ssl->method = vent->cmeth(); |
1d367677 | 2096 | if (!ssl_set_record_protocol_version(s, s->version)) { |
1853d20a MC |
2097 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
2098 | return 0; | |
2099 | } | |
29bfd5b7 | 2100 | return 1; |
4fa52141 VD |
2101 | } |
2102 | ||
88050dd1 | 2103 | s->version = origv; |
c48ffbcc | 2104 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL); |
29bfd5b7 | 2105 | return 0; |
4fa52141 VD |
2106 | } |
2107 | ||
068c358a | 2108 | /* |
38a73150 | 2109 | * ssl_get_min_max_version - get minimum and maximum protocol version |
068c358a KR |
2110 | * @s: The SSL connection |
2111 | * @min_version: The minimum supported version | |
2112 | * @max_version: The maximum supported version | |
b5b993b2 MC |
2113 | * @real_max: The highest version below the lowest compile time version hole |
2114 | * where that hole lies above at least one run-time enabled | |
2115 | * protocol. | |
068c358a KR |
2116 | * |
2117 | * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if the | |
2118 | * version is initially (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION. We apply any explicit SSL_OP_NO_xxx | |
2119 | * options, the MinProtocol and MaxProtocol configuration commands, any Suite B | |
b53338cb | 2120 | * constraints and any floor imposed by the security level here, |
068c358a | 2121 | * so we don't advertise the wrong protocol version to only reject the outcome later. |
4fa52141 | 2122 | * |
0485d540 | 2123 | * Computing the right floor matters. If, e.g., TLS 1.0 and 1.2 are enabled, |
4fa52141 VD |
2124 | * TLS 1.1 is disabled, but the security level, Suite-B and/or MinProtocol |
2125 | * only allow TLS 1.2, we want to advertise TLS1.2, *not* TLS1. | |
2126 | * | |
068c358a KR |
2127 | * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. On failure |
2128 | * min_version and max_version will also be set to 0. | |
4fa52141 | 2129 | */ |
38b051a1 TM |
2130 | int ssl_get_min_max_version(const SSL_CONNECTION *s, int *min_version, |
2131 | int *max_version, int *real_max) | |
4fa52141 | 2132 | { |
b5b993b2 | 2133 | int version, tmp_real_max; |
4fa52141 VD |
2134 | int hole; |
2135 | const SSL_METHOD *single = NULL; | |
2136 | const SSL_METHOD *method; | |
2137 | const version_info *table; | |
2138 | const version_info *vent; | |
38b051a1 | 2139 | const SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s); |
4fa52141 | 2140 | |
38b051a1 | 2141 | switch (ssl->method->version) { |
4fa52141 VD |
2142 | default: |
2143 | /* | |
2144 | * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't | |
2145 | * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope | |
2146 | * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol | |
2147 | * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return | |
2148 | * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) | |
2149 | */ | |
068c358a | 2150 | *min_version = *max_version = s->version; |
b5b993b2 MC |
2151 | /* |
2152 | * Providing a real_max only makes sense where we're using a version | |
2153 | * flexible method. | |
2154 | */ | |
2155 | if (!ossl_assert(real_max == NULL)) | |
2156 | return ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
4fa52141 VD |
2157 | return 0; |
2158 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
2159 | table = tls_version_table; | |
2160 | break; | |
2161 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
2162 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
2163 | break; | |
2164 | } | |
2165 | ||
2166 | /* | |
2167 | * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are some protocols | |
2168 | * below X enabled. This is required in order to maintain the "version | |
2169 | * capability" vector contiguous. Any versions with a NULL client method | |
2170 | * (protocol version client is disabled at compile-time) is also a "hole". | |
2171 | * | |
2172 | * Our initial state is hole == 1, version == 0. That is, versions above | |
2173 | * the first version in the method table are disabled (a "hole" above | |
2174 | * the valid protocol entries) and we don't have a selected version yet. | |
2175 | * | |
2176 | * Whenever "hole == 1", and we hit an enabled method, its version becomes | |
2177 | * the selected version, and the method becomes a candidate "single" | |
2178 | * method. We're no longer in a hole, so "hole" becomes 0. | |
2179 | * | |
2180 | * If "hole == 0" and we hit an enabled method, then "single" is cleared, | |
2181 | * as we support a contiguous range of at least two methods. If we hit | |
2182 | * a disabled method, then hole becomes true again, but nothing else | |
2183 | * changes yet, because all the remaining methods may be disabled too. | |
2184 | * If we again hit an enabled method after the new hole, it becomes | |
2185 | * selected, as we start from scratch. | |
2186 | */ | |
068c358a | 2187 | *min_version = version = 0; |
4fa52141 | 2188 | hole = 1; |
b5b993b2 MC |
2189 | if (real_max != NULL) |
2190 | *real_max = 0; | |
2191 | tmp_real_max = 0; | |
4fa52141 VD |
2192 | for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { |
2193 | /* | |
2194 | * A table entry with a NULL client method is still a hole in the | |
2195 | * "version capability" vector. | |
2196 | */ | |
2197 | if (vent->cmeth == NULL) { | |
2198 | hole = 1; | |
b5b993b2 | 2199 | tmp_real_max = 0; |
4fa52141 VD |
2200 | continue; |
2201 | } | |
2202 | method = vent->cmeth(); | |
b5b993b2 MC |
2203 | |
2204 | if (hole == 1 && tmp_real_max == 0) | |
2205 | tmp_real_max = vent->version; | |
2206 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
2207 | if (ssl_method_error(s, method) != 0) { |
2208 | hole = 1; | |
2209 | } else if (!hole) { | |
2210 | single = NULL; | |
068c358a | 2211 | *min_version = method->version; |
4fa52141 | 2212 | } else { |
b5b993b2 MC |
2213 | if (real_max != NULL && tmp_real_max != 0) |
2214 | *real_max = tmp_real_max; | |
4fa52141 | 2215 | version = (single = method)->version; |
068c358a | 2216 | *min_version = version; |
4fa52141 VD |
2217 | hole = 0; |
2218 | } | |
2219 | } | |
2220 | ||
068c358a KR |
2221 | *max_version = version; |
2222 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
2223 | /* Fail if everything is disabled */ |
2224 | if (version == 0) | |
2225 | return SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE; | |
2226 | ||
068c358a KR |
2227 | return 0; |
2228 | } | |
2229 | ||
2230 | /* | |
2231 | * ssl_set_client_hello_version - Work out what version we should be using for | |
7acb8b64 | 2232 | * the initial ClientHello.legacy_version field. |
068c358a KR |
2233 | * |
2234 | * @s: client SSL handle. | |
2235 | * | |
2236 | * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. | |
2237 | */ | |
38b051a1 | 2238 | int ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL_CONNECTION *s) |
068c358a | 2239 | { |
3eb2aff4 | 2240 | int ver_min, ver_max, ret; |
068c358a | 2241 | |
447cc0ad MC |
2242 | /* |
2243 | * In a renegotiation we always send the same client_version that we sent | |
2244 | * last time, regardless of which version we eventually negotiated. | |
2245 | */ | |
2246 | if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) | |
2247 | return 0; | |
2248 | ||
b5b993b2 | 2249 | ret = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max, NULL); |
068c358a KR |
2250 | |
2251 | if (ret != 0) | |
2252 | return ret; | |
2253 | ||
7acb8b64 MC |
2254 | s->version = ver_max; |
2255 | ||
222cf410 MC |
2256 | if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
2257 | if (ver_max == DTLS1_BAD_VER) { | |
2258 | /* | |
2259 | * Even though this is technically before version negotiation, | |
2260 | * because we have asked for DTLS1_BAD_VER we will never negotiate | |
2261 | * anything else, and this has impacts on the record layer for when | |
2262 | * we read the ServerHello. So we need to tell the record layer | |
2263 | * about this immediately. | |
2264 | */ | |
1d367677 MC |
2265 | if (!ssl_set_record_protocol_version(s, ver_max)) |
2266 | return 0; | |
222cf410 MC |
2267 | } |
2268 | } else if (ver_max > TLS1_2_VERSION) { | |
2269 | /* TLS1.3 always uses TLS1.2 in the legacy_version field */ | |
7acb8b64 | 2270 | ver_max = TLS1_2_VERSION; |
222cf410 | 2271 | } |
7acb8b64 MC |
2272 | |
2273 | s->client_version = ver_max; | |
4fa52141 VD |
2274 | return 0; |
2275 | } | |
aff9929b MC |
2276 | |
2277 | /* | |
2278 | * Checks a list of |groups| to determine if the |group_id| is in it. If it is | |
2279 | * and |checkallow| is 1 then additionally check if the group is allowed to be | |
2280 | * used. Returns 1 if the group is in the list (and allowed if |checkallow| is | |
2281 | * 1) or 0 otherwise. | |
2282 | */ | |
38b051a1 | 2283 | int check_in_list(SSL_CONNECTION *s, uint16_t group_id, const uint16_t *groups, |
aff9929b MC |
2284 | size_t num_groups, int checkallow) |
2285 | { | |
2286 | size_t i; | |
2287 | ||
2288 | if (groups == NULL || num_groups == 0) | |
2289 | return 0; | |
2290 | ||
9e84a42d DSH |
2291 | for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) { |
2292 | uint16_t group = groups[i]; | |
2293 | ||
2294 | if (group_id == group | |
aff9929b | 2295 | && (!checkallow |
dbc6268f | 2296 | || tls_group_allowed(s, group, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))) { |
0acee504 | 2297 | return 1; |
aff9929b MC |
2298 | } |
2299 | } | |
2300 | ||
0acee504 | 2301 | return 0; |
aff9929b | 2302 | } |
11c67eea MC |
2303 | |
2304 | /* Replace ClientHello1 in the transcript hash with a synthetic message */ | |
38b051a1 TM |
2305 | int create_synthetic_message_hash(SSL_CONNECTION *s, |
2306 | const unsigned char *hashval, | |
43054d3d MC |
2307 | size_t hashlen, const unsigned char *hrr, |
2308 | size_t hrrlen) | |
11c67eea | 2309 | { |
43054d3d | 2310 | unsigned char hashvaltmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
635b7d3f MC |
2311 | unsigned char msghdr[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]; |
2312 | ||
2313 | memset(msghdr, 0, sizeof(msghdr)); | |
11c67eea | 2314 | |
43054d3d MC |
2315 | if (hashval == NULL) { |
2316 | hashval = hashvaltmp; | |
2317 | hashlen = 0; | |
2318 | /* Get the hash of the initial ClientHello */ | |
2319 | if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0) | |
2320 | || !ssl_handshake_hash(s, hashvaltmp, sizeof(hashvaltmp), | |
2321 | &hashlen)) { | |
2322 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
2323 | return 0; | |
2324 | } | |
11c67eea MC |
2325 | } |
2326 | ||
2327 | /* Reinitialise the transcript hash */ | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2328 | if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) { |
2329 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
11c67eea | 2330 | return 0; |
f63a17d6 | 2331 | } |
11c67eea MC |
2332 | |
2333 | /* Inject the synthetic message_hash message */ | |
635b7d3f | 2334 | msghdr[0] = SSL3_MT_MESSAGE_HASH; |
3a63c0ed | 2335 | msghdr[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - 1] = (unsigned char)hashlen; |
11c67eea MC |
2336 | if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, msghdr, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) |
2337 | || !ssl3_finish_mac(s, hashval, hashlen)) { | |
f63a17d6 | 2338 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
11c67eea MC |
2339 | return 0; |
2340 | } | |
2341 | ||
43054d3d MC |
2342 | /* |
2343 | * Now re-inject the HRR and current message if appropriate (we just deleted | |
2344 | * it when we reinitialised the transcript hash above). Only necessary after | |
2345 | * receiving a ClientHello2 with a cookie. | |
2346 | */ | |
2347 | if (hrr != NULL | |
2348 | && (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, hrr, hrrlen) | |
2349 | || !ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, | |
555cbb32 | 2350 | s->s3.tmp.message_size |
43054d3d MC |
2351 | + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH))) { |
2352 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
2353 | return 0; | |
2354 | } | |
2355 | ||
11c67eea MC |
2356 | return 1; |
2357 | } | |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2358 | |
2359 | static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b) | |
2360 | { | |
2361 | return X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b); | |
2362 | } | |
2363 | ||
38b051a1 | 2364 | int parse_ca_names(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt) |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2365 | { |
2366 | STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp); | |
2367 | X509_NAME *xn = NULL; | |
2368 | PACKET cadns; | |
2369 | ||
2370 | if (ca_sk == NULL) { | |
e077455e | 2371 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB); |
f63a17d6 | 2372 | goto err; |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2373 | } |
2374 | /* get the CA RDNs */ | |
2375 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cadns)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 2376 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
f63a17d6 | 2377 | goto err; |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2378 | } |
2379 | ||
2380 | while (PACKET_remaining(&cadns)) { | |
2381 | const unsigned char *namestart, *namebytes; | |
2382 | unsigned int name_len; | |
2383 | ||
2384 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cadns, &name_len) | |
2385 | || !PACKET_get_bytes(&cadns, &namebytes, name_len)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 2386 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
f63a17d6 | 2387 | goto err; |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2388 | } |
2389 | ||
2390 | namestart = namebytes; | |
2391 | if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &namebytes, name_len)) == NULL) { | |
c48ffbcc | 2392 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); |
f63a17d6 | 2393 | goto err; |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2394 | } |
2395 | if (namebytes != (namestart + name_len)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 2396 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
f63a17d6 | 2397 | goto err; |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2398 | } |
2399 | ||
2400 | if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) { | |
e077455e | 2401 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB); |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2402 | goto err; |
2403 | } | |
2404 | xn = NULL; | |
2405 | } | |
2406 | ||
555cbb32 TS |
2407 | sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3.tmp.peer_ca_names, X509_NAME_free); |
2408 | s->s3.tmp.peer_ca_names = ca_sk; | |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2409 | |
2410 | return 1; | |
2411 | ||
5d6cca05 DSH |
2412 | err: |
2413 | sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free); | |
2414 | X509_NAME_free(xn); | |
2415 | return 0; | |
2416 | } | |
2417 | ||
38b051a1 | 2418 | const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *get_ca_names(SSL_CONNECTION *s) |
5d6cca05 | 2419 | { |
1e331727 | 2420 | const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL; |
38b051a1 | 2421 | SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s); |
5d6cca05 | 2422 | |
98732979 | 2423 | if (s->server) { |
38b051a1 | 2424 | ca_sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(ssl); |
98732979 MC |
2425 | if (ca_sk != NULL && sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk) == 0) |
2426 | ca_sk = NULL; | |
2427 | } | |
2428 | ||
2429 | if (ca_sk == NULL) | |
38b051a1 | 2430 | ca_sk = SSL_get0_CA_list(ssl); |
98732979 MC |
2431 | |
2432 | return ca_sk; | |
2433 | } | |
2434 | ||
38b051a1 TM |
2435 | int construct_ca_names(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk, |
2436 | WPACKET *pkt) | |
98732979 | 2437 | { |
5d6cca05 | 2438 | /* Start sub-packet for client CA list */ |
f63a17d6 | 2439 | if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { |
c48ffbcc | 2440 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
5d6cca05 | 2441 | return 0; |
f63a17d6 | 2442 | } |
5d6cca05 | 2443 | |
90fc2c26 | 2444 | if ((ca_sk != NULL) && !(s->options & SSL_OP_DISABLE_TLSEXT_CA_NAMES)) { |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2445 | int i; |
2446 | ||
2447 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk); i++) { | |
2448 | unsigned char *namebytes; | |
2449 | X509_NAME *name = sk_X509_NAME_value(ca_sk, i); | |
2450 | int namelen; | |
2451 | ||
2452 | if (name == NULL | |
2453 | || (namelen = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL)) < 0 | |
2454 | || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, namelen, | |
2455 | &namebytes) | |
2456 | || i2d_X509_NAME(name, &namebytes) != namelen) { | |
c48ffbcc | 2457 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2458 | return 0; |
2459 | } | |
2460 | } | |
2461 | } | |
2462 | ||
f63a17d6 | 2463 | if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) { |
c48ffbcc | 2464 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
5d6cca05 | 2465 | return 0; |
f63a17d6 | 2466 | } |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2467 | |
2468 | return 1; | |
2469 | } | |
72ceb6a6 DSH |
2470 | |
2471 | /* Create a buffer containing data to be signed for server key exchange */ | |
38b051a1 | 2472 | size_t construct_key_exchange_tbs(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned char **ptbs, |
72ceb6a6 DSH |
2473 | const void *param, size_t paramlen) |
2474 | { | |
2475 | size_t tbslen = 2 * SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + paramlen; | |
2476 | unsigned char *tbs = OPENSSL_malloc(tbslen); | |
2477 | ||
f63a17d6 | 2478 | if (tbs == NULL) { |
e077455e | 2479 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB); |
72ceb6a6 | 2480 | return 0; |
f63a17d6 | 2481 | } |
555cbb32 TS |
2482 | memcpy(tbs, s->s3.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); |
2483 | memcpy(tbs + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, s->s3.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); | |
72ceb6a6 DSH |
2484 | |
2485 | memcpy(tbs + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE * 2, param, paramlen); | |
2486 | ||
2487 | *ptbs = tbs; | |
2488 | return tbslen; | |
2489 | } | |
9d75dce3 TS |
2490 | |
2491 | /* | |
2492 | * Saves the current handshake digest for Post-Handshake Auth, | |
2493 | * Done after ClientFinished is processed, done exactly once | |
2494 | */ | |
38b051a1 | 2495 | int tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(SSL_CONNECTION *s) |
9d75dce3 TS |
2496 | { |
2497 | if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) { | |
2498 | if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) | |
2499 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
2500 | return 0; | |
2501 | ||
2502 | s->pha_dgst = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); | |
2503 | if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) { | |
c48ffbcc | 2504 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
9d75dce3 TS |
2505 | return 0; |
2506 | } | |
2507 | if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(s->pha_dgst, | |
555cbb32 | 2508 | s->s3.handshake_dgst)) { |
c48ffbcc | 2509 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
963eb12d | 2510 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(s->pha_dgst); |
2511 | s->pha_dgst = NULL; | |
9d75dce3 TS |
2512 | return 0; |
2513 | } | |
2514 | } | |
2515 | return 1; | |
2516 | } | |
2517 | ||
2518 | /* | |
2519 | * Restores the Post-Handshake Auth handshake digest | |
2520 | * Done just before sending/processing the Cert Request | |
2521 | */ | |
38b051a1 | 2522 | int tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(SSL_CONNECTION *s) |
9d75dce3 TS |
2523 | { |
2524 | if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) { | |
c48ffbcc | 2525 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
9d75dce3 TS |
2526 | return 0; |
2527 | } | |
555cbb32 | 2528 | if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(s->s3.handshake_dgst, |
9d75dce3 | 2529 | s->pha_dgst)) { |
c48ffbcc | 2530 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
9d75dce3 TS |
2531 | return 0; |
2532 | } | |
2533 | return 1; | |
2534 | } | |
b67cb09f TS |
2535 | |
2536 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG | |
2537 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls13_process_compressed_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *sc, | |
2538 | PACKET *pkt, | |
2539 | PACKET *tmppkt, | |
2540 | BUF_MEM *buf) | |
2541 | { | |
2542 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
2543 | int comp_alg; | |
2544 | COMP_METHOD *method = NULL; | |
2545 | COMP_CTX *comp = NULL; | |
2546 | size_t expected_length; | |
2547 | size_t comp_length; | |
2548 | int i; | |
2549 | int found = 0; | |
2550 | ||
2551 | if (buf == NULL) { | |
2552 | SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2553 | goto err; | |
2554 | } | |
2555 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, (unsigned int*)&comp_alg)) { | |
2556 | SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2557 | goto err; | |
2558 | } | |
2559 | /* If we have a prefs list, make sure the algorithm is in it */ | |
2560 | if (sc->cert_comp_prefs[0] != TLSEXT_comp_cert_none) { | |
2561 | for (i = 0; sc->cert_comp_prefs[i] != TLSEXT_comp_cert_none; i++) { | |
2562 | if (sc->cert_comp_prefs[i] == comp_alg) { | |
2563 | found = 1; | |
2564 | break; | |
2565 | } | |
2566 | } | |
2567 | if (!found) { | |
2568 | SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); | |
2569 | goto err; | |
2570 | } | |
2571 | } | |
2572 | if (!ossl_comp_has_alg(comp_alg)) { | |
2573 | SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); | |
2574 | goto err; | |
2575 | } | |
2576 | switch (comp_alg) { | |
2577 | case TLSEXT_comp_cert_zlib: | |
3840271e | 2578 | method = COMP_zlib_oneshot(); |
b67cb09f TS |
2579 | break; |
2580 | case TLSEXT_comp_cert_brotli: | |
2581 | method = COMP_brotli_oneshot(); | |
2582 | break; | |
2583 | case TLSEXT_comp_cert_zstd: | |
2584 | method = COMP_zstd_oneshot(); | |
2585 | break; | |
2586 | default: | |
2587 | SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); | |
2588 | goto err; | |
2589 | } | |
2590 | ||
7e3cacac TS |
2591 | if ((comp = COMP_CTX_new(method)) == NULL |
2592 | || !PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt, &expected_length) | |
b67cb09f TS |
2593 | || !PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt, &comp_length) |
2594 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != comp_length | |
2595 | || !BUF_MEM_grow(buf, expected_length) | |
2596 | || !PACKET_buf_init(tmppkt, (unsigned char *)buf->data, expected_length) | |
b67cb09f TS |
2597 | || COMP_expand_block(comp, (unsigned char *)buf->data, expected_length, |
2598 | (unsigned char*)PACKET_data(pkt), comp_length) != (int)expected_length) { | |
2599 | SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION); | |
2600 | goto err; | |
2601 | } | |
2602 | ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; | |
2603 | err: | |
2604 | COMP_CTX_free(comp); | |
2605 | return ret; | |
2606 | } | |
2607 | #endif |