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846e33c7 | 1 | /* |
fecb3aae | 2 | * Copyright 1995-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. |
aa8f3d76 | 3 | * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved |
3813046d | 4 | * |
2c18d164 | 5 | * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use |
846e33c7 RS |
6 | * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy |
7 | * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at | |
8 | * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html | |
3813046d | 9 | */ |
846e33c7 | 10 | |
48948d53 | 11 | #include <limits.h> |
f2d9a32c | 12 | #include <string.h> |
d02b48c6 | 13 | #include <stdio.h> |
706457b7 DMSP |
14 | #include "../ssl_local.h" |
15 | #include "statem_local.h" | |
67dc995e | 16 | #include "internal/cryptlib.h" |
ec577822 | 17 | #include <openssl/buffer.h> |
ec577822 BM |
18 | #include <openssl/objects.h> |
19 | #include <openssl/evp.h> | |
d7e498ac | 20 | #include <openssl/rsa.h> |
ec577822 | 21 | #include <openssl/x509.h> |
49b26f54 | 22 | #include <openssl/trace.h> |
d02b48c6 | 23 | |
c6d38183 RS |
24 | /* |
25 | * Map error codes to TLS/SSL alart types. | |
26 | */ | |
27 | typedef struct x509err2alert_st { | |
28 | int x509err; | |
29 | int alert; | |
30 | } X509ERR2ALERT; | |
31 | ||
597c51bc MC |
32 | /* Fixed value used in the ServerHello random field to identify an HRR */ |
33 | const unsigned char hrrrandom[] = { | |
34 | 0xcf, 0x21, 0xad, 0x74, 0xe5, 0x9a, 0x61, 0x11, 0xbe, 0x1d, 0x8c, 0x02, | |
35 | 0x1e, 0x65, 0xb8, 0x91, 0xc2, 0xa2, 0x11, 0x16, 0x7a, 0xbb, 0x8c, 0x5e, | |
36 | 0x07, 0x9e, 0x09, 0xe2, 0xc8, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x9c | |
37 | }; | |
38 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
39 | /* |
40 | * send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or | |
41 | * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) | |
42 | */ | |
e7ecc7d4 | 43 | int ssl3_do_write(SSL *s, int type) |
0f113f3e MC |
44 | { |
45 | int ret; | |
7ee8627f | 46 | size_t written = 0; |
0f113f3e MC |
47 | |
48 | ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, type, &s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], | |
7ee8627f | 49 | s->init_num, &written); |
0f113f3e | 50 | if (ret < 0) |
26a7d938 | 51 | return -1; |
0f113f3e MC |
52 | if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) |
53 | /* | |
54 | * should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case we'll | |
55 | * ignore the result anyway | |
9d75dce3 | 56 | * TLS1.3 KeyUpdate and NewSessionTicket do not need to be added |
0f113f3e | 57 | */ |
9d75dce3 TS |
58 | if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || (s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET |
59 | && s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE | |
60 | && s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE)) | |
61 | if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, | |
62 | (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], | |
63 | written)) | |
64 | return -1; | |
7ee8627f | 65 | if (written == s->init_num) { |
0f113f3e MC |
66 | if (s->msg_callback) |
67 | s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data, | |
68 | (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s, | |
69 | s->msg_callback_arg); | |
208fb891 | 70 | return 1; |
0f113f3e | 71 | } |
7ee8627f MC |
72 | s->init_off += written; |
73 | s->init_num -= written; | |
26a7d938 | 74 | return 0; |
0f113f3e | 75 | } |
e7ecc7d4 | 76 | |
4a01c59f | 77 | int tls_close_construct_packet(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int htype) |
2c7b4dbc MC |
78 | { |
79 | size_t msglen; | |
80 | ||
4a01c59f | 81 | if ((htype != SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) |
f1ec23c0 | 82 | || !WPACKET_get_length(pkt, &msglen) |
7cea05dc | 83 | || msglen > INT_MAX) |
2c7b4dbc MC |
84 | return 0; |
85 | s->init_num = (int)msglen; | |
86 | s->init_off = 0; | |
87 | ||
88 | return 1; | |
89 | } | |
90 | ||
1f5b44e9 MC |
91 | int tls_setup_handshake(SSL *s) |
92 | { | |
8e32ea63 MC |
93 | int ver_min, ver_max, ok; |
94 | ||
f63a17d6 MC |
95 | if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) { |
96 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
c7f47786 | 97 | return 0; |
f63a17d6 | 98 | } |
c7f47786 | 99 | |
b186a592 MC |
100 | /* Reset any extension flags */ |
101 | memset(s->ext.extflags, 0, sizeof(s->ext.extflags)); | |
102 | ||
8e32ea63 | 103 | if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max, NULL) != 0) { |
c48ffbcc | 104 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE); |
8e32ea63 MC |
105 | return 0; |
106 | } | |
107 | ||
108 | /* Sanity check that we have MD5-SHA1 if we need it */ | |
109 | if (s->ctx->ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX] == NULL) { | |
110 | int md5sha1_needed = 0; | |
111 | ||
112 | /* We don't have MD5-SHA1 - do we need it? */ | |
113 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
114 | if (DTLS_VERSION_LE(ver_max, DTLS1_VERSION)) | |
115 | md5sha1_needed = 1; | |
116 | } else { | |
117 | if (ver_max <= TLS1_1_VERSION) | |
118 | md5sha1_needed = 1; | |
119 | } | |
120 | if (md5sha1_needed) { | |
c48ffbcc RL |
121 | SSLfatal_data(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, |
122 | SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_DIGEST_ALGORITHM, | |
123 | "The max supported SSL/TLS version needs the" | |
124 | " MD5-SHA1 digest but it is not available" | |
125 | " in the loaded providers. Use (D)TLSv1.2 or" | |
126 | " above, or load different providers"); | |
8e32ea63 MC |
127 | return 0; |
128 | } | |
129 | ||
130 | ok = 1; | |
131 | /* Don't allow TLSv1.1 or below to be negotiated */ | |
132 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
133 | if (DTLS_VERSION_LT(ver_min, DTLS1_2_VERSION)) | |
134 | ok = SSL_set_min_proto_version(s, DTLS1_2_VERSION); | |
135 | } else { | |
136 | if (ver_min < TLS1_2_VERSION) | |
137 | ok = SSL_set_min_proto_version(s, TLS1_2_VERSION); | |
138 | } | |
139 | if (!ok) { | |
140 | /* Shouldn't happen */ | |
c48ffbcc | 141 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
8e32ea63 MC |
142 | return 0; |
143 | } | |
144 | } | |
145 | ||
146 | ok = 0; | |
c7f47786 | 147 | if (s->server) { |
38a73150 | 148 | STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = SSL_get_ciphers(s); |
8e32ea63 | 149 | int i; |
38a73150 MC |
150 | |
151 | /* | |
152 | * Sanity check that the maximum version we accept has ciphers | |
153 | * enabled. For clients we do this check during construction of the | |
154 | * ClientHello. | |
155 | */ | |
38a73150 MC |
156 | for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) { |
157 | const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i); | |
158 | ||
159 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
160 | if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(ver_max, c->min_dtls) && | |
161 | DTLS_VERSION_LE(ver_max, c->max_dtls)) | |
162 | ok = 1; | |
163 | } else if (ver_max >= c->min_tls && ver_max <= c->max_tls) { | |
164 | ok = 1; | |
165 | } | |
166 | if (ok) | |
167 | break; | |
168 | } | |
169 | if (!ok) { | |
c48ffbcc RL |
170 | SSLfatal_data(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, |
171 | SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE, | |
172 | "No ciphers enabled for max supported " | |
173 | "SSL/TLS version"); | |
38a73150 MC |
174 | return 0; |
175 | } | |
c7f47786 | 176 | if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) { |
0e6161bc | 177 | /* N.B. s->session_ctx == s->ctx here */ |
acce0557 | 178 | ssl_tsan_counter(s->session_ctx, &s->session_ctx->stats.sess_accept); |
c7f47786 | 179 | } else { |
0e6161bc | 180 | /* N.B. s->ctx may not equal s->session_ctx */ |
acce0557 | 181 | ssl_tsan_counter(s->ctx, &s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate); |
c7f47786 | 182 | |
555cbb32 | 183 | s->s3.tmp.cert_request = 0; |
c7f47786 MC |
184 | } |
185 | } else { | |
186 | if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) | |
acce0557 | 187 | ssl_tsan_counter(s->session_ctx, &s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect); |
c7f47786 | 188 | else |
acce0557 P |
189 | ssl_tsan_counter(s->session_ctx, |
190 | &s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate); | |
c7f47786 MC |
191 | |
192 | /* mark client_random uninitialized */ | |
555cbb32 | 193 | memset(s->s3.client_random, 0, sizeof(s->s3.client_random)); |
c7f47786 MC |
194 | s->hit = 0; |
195 | ||
555cbb32 | 196 | s->s3.tmp.cert_req = 0; |
c7f47786 | 197 | |
1f5b44e9 | 198 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) |
c7f47786 | 199 | s->statem.use_timer = 1; |
c7f47786 MC |
200 | } |
201 | ||
202 | return 1; | |
203 | } | |
204 | ||
2c5dfdc3 MC |
205 | /* |
206 | * Size of the to-be-signed TLS13 data, without the hash size itself: | |
207 | * 64 bytes of value 32, 33 context bytes, 1 byte separator | |
208 | */ | |
209 | #define TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE 64 | |
210 | #define TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE (TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE + 33 + 1) | |
211 | ||
212 | static int get_cert_verify_tbs_data(SSL *s, unsigned char *tls13tbs, | |
213 | void **hdata, size_t *hdatalen) | |
214 | { | |
48102247 | 215 | #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC |
99435164 | 216 | static const char servercontext[] = { 0x54, 0x4c, 0x53, 0x20, 0x31, 0x2e, |
48102247 | 217 | 0x33, 0x2c, 0x20, 0x73, 0x65, 0x72, 0x76, 0x65, 0x72, 0x20, 0x43, 0x65, |
218 | 0x72, 0x74, 0x69, 0x66, 0x69, 0x63, 0x61, 0x74, 0x65, 0x56, 0x65, 0x72, | |
219 | 0x69, 0x66, 0x79, 0x00 }; | |
99435164 | 220 | static const char clientcontext[] = { 0x54, 0x4c, 0x53, 0x20, 0x31, 0x2e, |
48102247 | 221 | 0x33, 0x2c, 0x20, 0x63, 0x6c, 0x69, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x74, 0x20, 0x43, 0x65, |
222 | 0x72, 0x74, 0x69, 0x66, 0x69, 0x63, 0x61, 0x74, 0x65, 0x56, 0x65, 0x72, | |
223 | 0x69, 0x66, 0x79, 0x00 }; | |
224 | #else | |
99435164 AV |
225 | static const char servercontext[] = "TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify"; |
226 | static const char clientcontext[] = "TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify"; | |
48102247 | 227 | #endif |
2c5dfdc3 MC |
228 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
229 | size_t hashlen; | |
230 | ||
231 | /* Set the first 64 bytes of to-be-signed data to octet 32 */ | |
232 | memset(tls13tbs, 32, TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE); | |
233 | /* This copies the 33 bytes of context plus the 0 separator byte */ | |
234 | if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY | |
235 | || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY) | |
236 | strcpy((char *)tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE, servercontext); | |
237 | else | |
238 | strcpy((char *)tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE, clientcontext); | |
239 | ||
240 | /* | |
241 | * If we're currently reading then we need to use the saved handshake | |
242 | * hash value. We can't use the current handshake hash state because | |
243 | * that includes the CertVerify itself. | |
244 | */ | |
245 | if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY | |
246 | || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY) { | |
247 | memcpy(tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE, s->cert_verify_hash, | |
248 | s->cert_verify_hash_len); | |
249 | hashlen = s->cert_verify_hash_len; | |
250 | } else if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE, | |
251 | EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &hashlen)) { | |
f63a17d6 | 252 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
2c5dfdc3 MC |
253 | return 0; |
254 | } | |
255 | ||
256 | *hdata = tls13tbs; | |
257 | *hdatalen = TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + hashlen; | |
258 | } else { | |
259 | size_t retlen; | |
60690b5b | 260 | long retlen_l; |
2c5dfdc3 | 261 | |
555cbb32 | 262 | retlen = retlen_l = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3.handshake_buffer, hdata); |
60690b5b | 263 | if (retlen_l <= 0) { |
c48ffbcc | 264 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
2c5dfdc3 | 265 | return 0; |
f63a17d6 | 266 | } |
2c5dfdc3 MC |
267 | *hdatalen = retlen; |
268 | } | |
269 | ||
270 | return 1; | |
271 | } | |
272 | ||
d8bc1399 MC |
273 | int tls_construct_cert_verify(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
274 | { | |
ad4dd362 DSH |
275 | EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; |
276 | const EVP_MD *md = NULL; | |
d8bc1399 | 277 | EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL; |
5f9b64a2 MC |
278 | EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; |
279 | size_t hdatalen = 0, siglen = 0; | |
d8bc1399 MC |
280 | void *hdata; |
281 | unsigned char *sig = NULL; | |
2c5dfdc3 | 282 | unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
555cbb32 | 283 | const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3.tmp.sigalg; |
2c5dfdc3 | 284 | |
555cbb32 | 285 | if (lu == NULL || s->s3.tmp.cert == NULL) { |
c48ffbcc | 286 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
ad4dd362 DSH |
287 | goto err; |
288 | } | |
555cbb32 | 289 | pkey = s->s3.tmp.cert->privatekey; |
ad4dd362 | 290 | |
c8f6c28a | 291 | if (pkey == NULL || !tls1_lookup_md(s->ctx, lu, &md)) { |
c48ffbcc | 292 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
ad4dd362 DSH |
293 | goto err; |
294 | } | |
d8bc1399 MC |
295 | |
296 | mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); | |
297 | if (mctx == NULL) { | |
c48ffbcc | 298 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
d8bc1399 MC |
299 | goto err; |
300 | } | |
d8bc1399 | 301 | |
2c5dfdc3 MC |
302 | /* Get the data to be signed */ |
303 | if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) { | |
f63a17d6 | 304 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
d8bc1399 MC |
305 | goto err; |
306 | } | |
307 | ||
ad4dd362 | 308 | if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg)) { |
c48ffbcc | 309 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
d8bc1399 MC |
310 | goto err; |
311 | } | |
5f9b64a2 | 312 | |
ed576acd TM |
313 | if (EVP_DigestSignInit_ex(mctx, &pctx, |
314 | md == NULL ? NULL : EVP_MD_get0_name(md), | |
d38b6ae9 P |
315 | s->ctx->libctx, s->ctx->propq, pkey, |
316 | NULL) <= 0) { | |
c48ffbcc | 317 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
5f9b64a2 MC |
318 | goto err; |
319 | } | |
320 | ||
ad4dd362 | 321 | if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) { |
5f9b64a2 | 322 | if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0 |
968ae5b3 DSH |
323 | || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, |
324 | RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) { | |
c48ffbcc | 325 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
5f9b64a2 MC |
326 | goto err; |
327 | } | |
caf2b6b5 DSH |
328 | } |
329 | if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { | |
bddbfae1 MC |
330 | /* |
331 | * Here we use EVP_DigestSignUpdate followed by EVP_DigestSignFinal | |
332 | * in order to add the EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET call between them. | |
333 | */ | |
caf2b6b5 | 334 | if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0 |
83b4a243 SL |
335 | || EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET, |
336 | (int)s->session->master_key_length, | |
337 | s->session->master_key) <= 0 | |
bddbfae1 | 338 | || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx, NULL, &siglen) <= 0) { |
caf2b6b5 | 339 | |
c48ffbcc | 340 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
5f9b64a2 MC |
341 | goto err; |
342 | } | |
bddbfae1 MC |
343 | sig = OPENSSL_malloc(siglen); |
344 | if (sig == NULL | |
345 | || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx, sig, &siglen) <= 0) { | |
c48ffbcc | 346 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
bddbfae1 MC |
347 | goto err; |
348 | } | |
349 | } else { | |
350 | /* | |
351 | * Here we *must* use EVP_DigestSign() because Ed25519/Ed448 does not | |
352 | * support streaming via EVP_DigestSignUpdate/EVP_DigestSignFinal | |
353 | */ | |
354 | if (EVP_DigestSign(mctx, NULL, &siglen, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0) { | |
c48ffbcc | 355 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
bddbfae1 MC |
356 | goto err; |
357 | } | |
358 | sig = OPENSSL_malloc(siglen); | |
359 | if (sig == NULL | |
360 | || EVP_DigestSign(mctx, sig, &siglen, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0) { | |
c48ffbcc | 361 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
bddbfae1 MC |
362 | goto err; |
363 | } | |
d8bc1399 | 364 | } |
5f9b64a2 | 365 | |
d8bc1399 MC |
366 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST |
367 | { | |
ad4dd362 DSH |
368 | int pktype = lu->sig; |
369 | ||
d8bc1399 MC |
370 | if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001 |
371 | || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256 | |
372 | || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) | |
5f9b64a2 | 373 | BUF_reverse(sig, NULL, siglen); |
d8bc1399 MC |
374 | } |
375 | #endif | |
376 | ||
5f9b64a2 | 377 | if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, sig, siglen)) { |
c48ffbcc | 378 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
d8bc1399 MC |
379 | goto err; |
380 | } | |
381 | ||
382 | /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */ | |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
383 | if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { |
384 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
d8bc1399 | 385 | goto err; |
d4d2f3a4 | 386 | } |
d8bc1399 MC |
387 | |
388 | OPENSSL_free(sig); | |
389 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); | |
390 | return 1; | |
391 | err: | |
392 | OPENSSL_free(sig); | |
393 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); | |
d8bc1399 MC |
394 | return 0; |
395 | } | |
396 | ||
397 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) | |
398 | { | |
399 | EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; | |
703bcee0 | 400 | const unsigned char *data; |
d8bc1399 MC |
401 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST |
402 | unsigned char *gost_data = NULL; | |
403 | #endif | |
eb5fd03b | 404 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
dd24857b | 405 | int j; |
d8bc1399 MC |
406 | unsigned int len; |
407 | X509 *peer; | |
408 | const EVP_MD *md = NULL; | |
2c5dfdc3 | 409 | size_t hdatalen = 0; |
d8bc1399 | 410 | void *hdata; |
2c5dfdc3 | 411 | unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
d8bc1399 | 412 | EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); |
5f9b64a2 | 413 | EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; |
d8bc1399 MC |
414 | |
415 | if (mctx == NULL) { | |
c48ffbcc | 416 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
f63a17d6 | 417 | goto err; |
d8bc1399 MC |
418 | } |
419 | ||
420 | peer = s->session->peer; | |
421 | pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(peer); | |
f63a17d6 | 422 | if (pkey == NULL) { |
c48ffbcc | 423 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
f63a17d6 MC |
424 | goto err; |
425 | } | |
83b4049a | 426 | |
dd24857b | 427 | if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, NULL) == NULL) { |
c48ffbcc | 428 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, |
f63a17d6 MC |
429 | SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE); |
430 | goto err; | |
d8bc1399 MC |
431 | } |
432 | ||
f464f9c0 | 433 | if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { |
f464f9c0 PD |
434 | unsigned int sigalg; |
435 | ||
436 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 437 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET); |
f63a17d6 | 438 | goto err; |
f464f9c0 | 439 | } |
f63a17d6 MC |
440 | if (tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey) <= 0) { |
441 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
442 | goto err; | |
f464f9c0 | 443 | } |
f464f9c0 | 444 | } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) { |
c48ffbcc | 445 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
f63a17d6 | 446 | goto err; |
f464f9c0 PD |
447 | } |
448 | ||
c8f6c28a | 449 | if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->ctx, s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg, &md)) { |
c48ffbcc | 450 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
f63a17d6 | 451 | goto err; |
168067b6 | 452 | } |
f464f9c0 | 453 | |
572fa024 | 454 | if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) |
49b26f54 | 455 | OSSL_TRACE1(TLS, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", |
ed576acd | 456 | md == NULL ? "n/a" : EVP_MD_get0_name(md)); |
572fa024 | 457 | |
d8bc1399 MC |
458 | /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */ |
459 | /* | |
f464f9c0 PD |
460 | * If key is GOST and len is exactly 64 or 128, it is signature without |
461 | * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till TLS 1.2) | |
d8bc1399 MC |
462 | */ |
463 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST | |
f464f9c0 PD |
464 | if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) |
465 | && ((PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 64 | |
ed576acd TM |
466 | && (EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001 |
467 | || EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256)) | |
f464f9c0 | 468 | || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 128 |
ed576acd | 469 | && EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512))) { |
f464f9c0 | 470 | len = PACKET_remaining(pkt); |
d8bc1399 MC |
471 | } else |
472 | #endif | |
f464f9c0 | 473 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len)) { |
c48ffbcc | 474 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
f63a17d6 | 475 | goto err; |
d8bc1399 | 476 | } |
f464f9c0 | 477 | |
d8bc1399 | 478 | if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, len)) { |
c48ffbcc | 479 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
f63a17d6 | 480 | goto err; |
d8bc1399 MC |
481 | } |
482 | ||
2c5dfdc3 | 483 | if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
484 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
485 | goto err; | |
d8bc1399 MC |
486 | } |
487 | ||
49b26f54 | 488 | OSSL_TRACE1(TLS, "Using client verify alg %s\n", |
ed576acd | 489 | md == NULL ? "n/a" : EVP_MD_get0_name(md)); |
49b26f54 | 490 | |
d8652be0 | 491 | if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit_ex(mctx, &pctx, |
ed576acd | 492 | md == NULL ? NULL : EVP_MD_get0_name(md), |
d38b6ae9 P |
493 | s->ctx->libctx, s->ctx->propq, pkey, |
494 | NULL) <= 0) { | |
c48ffbcc | 495 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
f63a17d6 | 496 | goto err; |
d8bc1399 MC |
497 | } |
498 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST | |
499 | { | |
ed576acd | 500 | int pktype = EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey); |
d8bc1399 MC |
501 | if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001 |
502 | || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256 | |
503 | || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) { | |
504 | if ((gost_data = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) { | |
c48ffbcc | 505 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
f63a17d6 | 506 | goto err; |
d8bc1399 MC |
507 | } |
508 | BUF_reverse(gost_data, data, len); | |
509 | data = gost_data; | |
510 | } | |
511 | } | |
512 | #endif | |
513 | ||
5554facb | 514 | if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) { |
5f9b64a2 | 515 | if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0 |
968ae5b3 DSH |
516 | || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, |
517 | RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) { | |
c48ffbcc | 518 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
f63a17d6 | 519 | goto err; |
5f9b64a2 | 520 | } |
d8bc1399 | 521 | } |
caf2b6b5 DSH |
522 | if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { |
523 | if (EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0 | |
83b4a243 SL |
524 | || EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET, |
525 | (int)s->session->master_key_length, | |
526 | s->session->master_key) <= 0) { | |
c48ffbcc | 527 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
f63a17d6 | 528 | goto err; |
caf2b6b5 DSH |
529 | } |
530 | if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(mctx, data, len) <= 0) { | |
c48ffbcc | 531 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); |
f63a17d6 | 532 | goto err; |
caf2b6b5 DSH |
533 | } |
534 | } else { | |
535 | j = EVP_DigestVerify(mctx, data, len, hdata, hdatalen); | |
25ffeb11 | 536 | if (j <= 0) { |
c48ffbcc | 537 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); |
f63a17d6 | 538 | goto err; |
caf2b6b5 | 539 | } |
d8bc1399 MC |
540 | } |
541 | ||
e4562014 MC |
542 | /* |
543 | * In TLSv1.3 on the client side we make sure we prepare the client | |
544 | * certificate after the CertVerify instead of when we get the | |
545 | * CertificateRequest. This is because in TLSv1.3 the CertificateRequest | |
546 | * comes *before* the Certificate message. In TLSv1.2 it comes after. We | |
8c2bfd25 | 547 | * want to make sure that SSL_get1_peer_certificate() will return the actual |
e4562014 MC |
548 | * server certificate from the client_cert_cb callback. |
549 | */ | |
555cbb32 | 550 | if (!s->server && SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 1) |
e4562014 MC |
551 | ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; |
552 | else | |
553 | ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; | |
f63a17d6 | 554 | err: |
555cbb32 TS |
555 | BIO_free(s->s3.handshake_buffer); |
556 | s->s3.handshake_buffer = NULL; | |
d8bc1399 MC |
557 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); |
558 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST | |
559 | OPENSSL_free(gost_data); | |
560 | #endif | |
561 | return ret; | |
562 | } | |
563 | ||
229185e6 | 564 | int tls_construct_finished(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
0f113f3e | 565 | { |
12472b45 | 566 | size_t finish_md_len; |
229185e6 | 567 | const char *sender; |
8b0e934a | 568 | size_t slen; |
229185e6 | 569 | |
f7e393be | 570 | /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */ |
9d75dce3 | 571 | if (!s->server && s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) |
f7e393be MC |
572 | s->statem.cleanuphand = 1; |
573 | ||
574 | /* | |
575 | * We only change the keys if we didn't already do this when we sent the | |
576 | * client certificate | |
577 | */ | |
578 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) | |
579 | && !s->server | |
555cbb32 | 580 | && s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 0 |
f7e393be | 581 | && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
582 | SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) {; |
583 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
b43c3765 | 584 | return 0; |
f7e393be MC |
585 | } |
586 | ||
229185e6 MC |
587 | if (s->server) { |
588 | sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label; | |
589 | slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len; | |
590 | } else { | |
591 | sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label; | |
592 | slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len; | |
593 | } | |
0f113f3e | 594 | |
12472b45 MC |
595 | finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, |
596 | sender, slen, | |
555cbb32 | 597 | s->s3.tmp.finish_md); |
12472b45 | 598 | if (finish_md_len == 0) { |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
599 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
600 | return 0; | |
4f89bfbf MC |
601 | } |
602 | ||
555cbb32 | 603 | s->s3.tmp.finish_md_len = finish_md_len; |
4f89bfbf | 604 | |
555cbb32 | 605 | if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3.tmp.finish_md, finish_md_len)) { |
c48ffbcc | 606 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
d4d2f3a4 | 607 | return 0; |
4f89bfbf | 608 | } |
0f113f3e | 609 | |
2c7bd692 CB |
610 | /* |
611 | * Log the master secret, if logging is enabled. We don't log it for | |
612 | * TLSv1.3: there's a different key schedule for that. | |
613 | */ | |
614 | if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl_log_secret(s, MASTER_SECRET_LABEL, | |
615 | s->session->master_key, | |
380a522f | 616 | s->session->master_key_length)) { |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
617 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
618 | return 0; | |
380a522f | 619 | } |
2faa1b48 | 620 | |
b9908bf9 MC |
621 | /* |
622 | * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks | |
623 | */ | |
380a522f | 624 | if (!ossl_assert(finish_md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) { |
c48ffbcc | 625 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
d4d2f3a4 | 626 | return 0; |
380a522f | 627 | } |
23a635c0 | 628 | if (!s->server) { |
555cbb32 | 629 | memcpy(s->s3.previous_client_finished, s->s3.tmp.finish_md, |
12472b45 | 630 | finish_md_len); |
555cbb32 | 631 | s->s3.previous_client_finished_len = finish_md_len; |
b9908bf9 | 632 | } else { |
555cbb32 | 633 | memcpy(s->s3.previous_server_finished, s->s3.tmp.finish_md, |
12472b45 | 634 | finish_md_len); |
555cbb32 | 635 | s->s3.previous_server_finished_len = finish_md_len; |
b9908bf9 | 636 | } |
0f113f3e | 637 | |
b9908bf9 | 638 | return 1; |
0f113f3e | 639 | } |
d02b48c6 | 640 | |
44c04a2e MC |
641 | int tls_construct_key_update(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
642 | { | |
643 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->key_update)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 644 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
d4d2f3a4 | 645 | return 0; |
44c04a2e MC |
646 | } |
647 | ||
9412b3ad | 648 | s->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE; |
44c04a2e | 649 | return 1; |
44c04a2e MC |
650 | } |
651 | ||
e1c3de44 MC |
652 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_update(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
653 | { | |
654 | unsigned int updatetype; | |
655 | ||
524420d8 MC |
656 | /* |
657 | * A KeyUpdate message signals a key change so the end of the message must | |
658 | * be on a record boundary. | |
659 | */ | |
660 | if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 661 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY); |
f63a17d6 | 662 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
524420d8 MC |
663 | } |
664 | ||
e1c3de44 | 665 | if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &updatetype) |
2d871227 | 666 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { |
c48ffbcc | 667 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE); |
f63a17d6 | 668 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
e1c3de44 MC |
669 | } |
670 | ||
9010b7bc MC |
671 | /* |
672 | * There are only two defined key update types. Fail if we get a value we | |
673 | * didn't recognise. | |
674 | */ | |
2d871227 MC |
675 | if (updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED |
676 | && updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED) { | |
c48ffbcc | 677 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE); |
f63a17d6 | 678 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
2d871227 MC |
679 | } |
680 | ||
5bf47933 MC |
681 | /* |
682 | * If we get a request for us to update our sending keys too then, we need | |
683 | * to additionally send a KeyUpdate message. However that message should | |
feb9e31c | 684 | * not also request an update (otherwise we get into an infinite loop). |
5bf47933 | 685 | */ |
feb9e31c | 686 | if (updatetype == SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED) |
5bf47933 MC |
687 | s->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED; |
688 | ||
57389a32 | 689 | if (!tls13_update_key(s, 0)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
690 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
691 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
57389a32 MC |
692 | } |
693 | ||
e1c3de44 MC |
694 | return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; |
695 | } | |
696 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
697 | /* |
698 | * ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen | |
699 | * to far. | |
700 | */ | |
5d671101 | 701 | int ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s) |
0f113f3e MC |
702 | { |
703 | const char *sender; | |
8b0e934a | 704 | size_t slen; |
5d671101 | 705 | |
49ae7423 | 706 | if (!s->server) { |
0f113f3e MC |
707 | sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label; |
708 | slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len; | |
709 | } else { | |
710 | sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label; | |
711 | slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len; | |
712 | } | |
713 | ||
555cbb32 | 714 | s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md_len = |
5d671101 | 715 | s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, sender, slen, |
555cbb32 | 716 | s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md); |
5d671101 | 717 | |
555cbb32 | 718 | if (s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md_len == 0) { |
5d671101 MC |
719 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
720 | return 0; | |
721 | } | |
722 | ||
723 | return 1; | |
0f113f3e | 724 | } |
ee2ffc27 | 725 | |
be3583fa | 726 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
b9908bf9 | 727 | { |
348240c6 | 728 | size_t remain; |
4fa52141 | 729 | |
73999b62 | 730 | remain = PACKET_remaining(pkt); |
657da85e MC |
731 | /* |
732 | * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, which should already have | |
c69f2adf MC |
733 | * been consumed by ssl_get_message() so there should be no bytes left, |
734 | * unless we're using DTLS1_BAD_VER, which has an extra 2 bytes | |
657da85e | 735 | */ |
c69f2adf | 736 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
73999b62 | 737 | if ((s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER |
a230b26e EK |
738 | && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH + 1) |
739 | || (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER | |
740 | && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH - 1)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 741 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); |
f63a17d6 | 742 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
c69f2adf MC |
743 | } |
744 | } else { | |
73999b62 | 745 | if (remain != 0) { |
c48ffbcc | 746 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); |
f63a17d6 | 747 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
c69f2adf | 748 | } |
657da85e MC |
749 | } |
750 | ||
751 | /* Check we have a cipher to change to */ | |
555cbb32 | 752 | if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher == NULL) { |
c48ffbcc | 753 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); |
f63a17d6 | 754 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
657da85e MC |
755 | } |
756 | ||
555cbb32 | 757 | s->s3.change_cipher_spec = 1; |
657da85e | 758 | if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) { |
c48ffbcc | 759 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
f63a17d6 | 760 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
657da85e MC |
761 | } |
762 | ||
c69f2adf MC |
763 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
764 | dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ); | |
765 | ||
766 | if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) | |
767 | s->d1->handshake_read_seq++; | |
768 | ||
769 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
770 | /* | |
771 | * Remember that a CCS has been received, so that an old key of | |
772 | * SCTP-Auth can be deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored if no | |
773 | * SCTP is used | |
774 | */ | |
775 | BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD, 1, NULL); | |
776 | #endif | |
777 | } | |
778 | ||
b9908bf9 | 779 | return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; |
657da85e MC |
780 | } |
781 | ||
be3583fa | 782 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_finished(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
b9908bf9 | 783 | { |
12472b45 | 784 | size_t md_len; |
b9908bf9 | 785 | |
d781d247 MC |
786 | |
787 | /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */ | |
9d75dce3 | 788 | if (s->server) { |
de9e884b MC |
789 | /* |
790 | * To get this far we must have read encrypted data from the client. We | |
791 | * no longer tolerate unencrypted alerts. This value is ignored if less | |
792 | * than TLSv1.3 | |
793 | */ | |
794 | s->statem.enc_read_state = ENC_READ_STATE_VALID; | |
9d75dce3 TS |
795 | if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) |
796 | s->statem.cleanuphand = 1; | |
797 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) { | |
798 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
799 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
800 | } | |
801 | } | |
d781d247 | 802 | |
524420d8 MC |
803 | /* |
804 | * In TLSv1.3 a Finished message signals a key change so the end of the | |
805 | * message must be on a record boundary. | |
806 | */ | |
807 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 808 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY); |
f63a17d6 | 809 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
524420d8 MC |
810 | } |
811 | ||
0f113f3e | 812 | /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */ |
555cbb32 | 813 | if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->s3.change_cipher_spec) { |
c48ffbcc | 814 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS); |
f63a17d6 | 815 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
0f113f3e | 816 | } |
555cbb32 | 817 | s->s3.change_cipher_spec = 0; |
0f113f3e | 818 | |
555cbb32 | 819 | md_len = s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md_len; |
0f113f3e | 820 | |
12472b45 | 821 | if (md_len != PACKET_remaining(pkt)) { |
c48ffbcc | 822 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH); |
f63a17d6 | 823 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
0f113f3e MC |
824 | } |
825 | ||
555cbb32 | 826 | if (CRYPTO_memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt), s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md, |
12472b45 | 827 | md_len) != 0) { |
c48ffbcc | 828 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED); |
f63a17d6 | 829 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
0f113f3e MC |
830 | } |
831 | ||
832 | /* | |
833 | * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks | |
834 | */ | |
380a522f | 835 | if (!ossl_assert(md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) { |
c48ffbcc | 836 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
f63a17d6 | 837 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
380a522f | 838 | } |
23a635c0 | 839 | if (s->server) { |
555cbb32 | 840 | memcpy(s->s3.previous_client_finished, s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md, |
12472b45 | 841 | md_len); |
555cbb32 | 842 | s->s3.previous_client_finished_len = md_len; |
0f113f3e | 843 | } else { |
555cbb32 | 844 | memcpy(s->s3.previous_server_finished, s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md, |
12472b45 | 845 | md_len); |
555cbb32 | 846 | s->s3.previous_server_finished_len = md_len; |
0f113f3e MC |
847 | } |
848 | ||
7776a36c MC |
849 | /* |
850 | * In TLS1.3 we also have to change cipher state and do any final processing | |
851 | * of the initial server flight (if we are a client) | |
852 | */ | |
92760c21 MC |
853 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
854 | if (s->server) { | |
9d75dce3 TS |
855 | if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED && |
856 | !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, | |
92760c21 | 857 | SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
858 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
859 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
92760c21 MC |
860 | } |
861 | } else { | |
d74014c4 BK |
862 | /* TLS 1.3 gets the secret size from the handshake md */ |
863 | size_t dummy; | |
92760c21 | 864 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, |
ec15acb6 | 865 | s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0, |
d74014c4 | 866 | &dummy)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
867 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
868 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
92760c21 MC |
869 | } |
870 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, | |
871 | SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
872 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
873 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
874 | } | |
875 | if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s)) { | |
876 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
877 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
92760c21 MC |
878 | } |
879 | } | |
880 | } | |
881 | ||
e6575156 | 882 | return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; |
0f113f3e | 883 | } |
d02b48c6 | 884 | |
7cea05dc | 885 | int tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
b9908bf9 | 886 | { |
7cea05dc | 887 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, SSL3_MT_CCS)) { |
c48ffbcc | 888 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
85a7a5e6 MC |
889 | return 0; |
890 | } | |
b9908bf9 | 891 | |
b9908bf9 MC |
892 | return 1; |
893 | } | |
894 | ||
e96e0f8e | 895 | /* Add a certificate to the WPACKET */ |
f63a17d6 | 896 | static int ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, int chain) |
0f113f3e | 897 | { |
e96e0f8e MC |
898 | int len; |
899 | unsigned char *outbytes; | |
900 | ||
901 | len = i2d_X509(x, NULL); | |
902 | if (len < 0) { | |
c48ffbcc | 903 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); |
e96e0f8e MC |
904 | return 0; |
905 | } | |
906 | if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u24(pkt, len, &outbytes) | |
907 | || i2d_X509(x, &outbytes) != len) { | |
c48ffbcc | 908 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
e96e0f8e MC |
909 | return 0; |
910 | } | |
911 | ||
912 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) | |
fe874d27 | 913 | && !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, x, |
f63a17d6 MC |
914 | chain)) { |
915 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
e96e0f8e | 916 | return 0; |
f63a17d6 | 917 | } |
e96e0f8e MC |
918 | |
919 | return 1; | |
920 | } | |
921 | ||
922 | /* Add certificate chain to provided WPACKET */ | |
f63a17d6 | 923 | static int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk) |
e96e0f8e MC |
924 | { |
925 | int i, chain_count; | |
926 | X509 *x; | |
927 | STACK_OF(X509) *extra_certs; | |
928 | STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL; | |
929 | X509_STORE *chain_store; | |
e96e0f8e MC |
930 | |
931 | if (cpk == NULL || cpk->x509 == NULL) | |
932 | return 1; | |
933 | ||
934 | x = cpk->x509; | |
935 | ||
936 | /* | |
937 | * If we have a certificate specific chain use it, else use parent ctx. | |
938 | */ | |
d805a57b | 939 | if (cpk->chain != NULL) |
e96e0f8e MC |
940 | extra_certs = cpk->chain; |
941 | else | |
942 | extra_certs = s->ctx->extra_certs; | |
943 | ||
944 | if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN) || extra_certs) | |
945 | chain_store = NULL; | |
946 | else if (s->cert->chain_store) | |
947 | chain_store = s->cert->chain_store; | |
948 | else | |
949 | chain_store = s->ctx->cert_store; | |
950 | ||
d805a57b | 951 | if (chain_store != NULL) { |
d8652be0 MC |
952 | X509_STORE_CTX *xs_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new_ex(s->ctx->libctx, |
953 | s->ctx->propq); | |
e96e0f8e MC |
954 | |
955 | if (xs_ctx == NULL) { | |
c48ffbcc | 956 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
f63a17d6 | 957 | return 0; |
e96e0f8e MC |
958 | } |
959 | if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(xs_ctx, chain_store, x, NULL)) { | |
960 | X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); | |
c48ffbcc | 961 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_X509_LIB); |
f63a17d6 | 962 | return 0; |
e96e0f8e MC |
963 | } |
964 | /* | |
965 | * It is valid for the chain not to be complete (because normally we | |
966 | * don't include the root cert in the chain). Therefore we deliberately | |
967 | * ignore the error return from this call. We're not actually verifying | |
968 | * the cert - we're just building as much of the chain as we can | |
969 | */ | |
970 | (void)X509_verify_cert(xs_ctx); | |
971 | /* Don't leave errors in the queue */ | |
972 | ERR_clear_error(); | |
973 | chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(xs_ctx); | |
974 | i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, chain, NULL, 0); | |
975 | if (i != 1) { | |
976 | #if 0 | |
977 | /* Dummy error calls so mkerr generates them */ | |
6849b73c RL |
978 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL); |
979 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL); | |
980 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK); | |
e96e0f8e MC |
981 | #endif |
982 | X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); | |
c48ffbcc | 983 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, i); |
f63a17d6 | 984 | return 0; |
e96e0f8e MC |
985 | } |
986 | chain_count = sk_X509_num(chain); | |
987 | for (i = 0; i < chain_count; i++) { | |
988 | x = sk_X509_value(chain, i); | |
989 | ||
f63a17d6 MC |
990 | if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i)) { |
991 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
e96e0f8e | 992 | X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); |
f63a17d6 | 993 | return 0; |
e96e0f8e MC |
994 | } |
995 | } | |
996 | X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); | |
997 | } else { | |
998 | i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, extra_certs, x, 0); | |
999 | if (i != 1) { | |
c48ffbcc | 1000 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, i); |
f63a17d6 MC |
1001 | return 0; |
1002 | } | |
1003 | if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, 0)) { | |
1004 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
1005 | return 0; | |
e96e0f8e | 1006 | } |
e96e0f8e MC |
1007 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(extra_certs); i++) { |
1008 | x = sk_X509_value(extra_certs, i); | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1009 | if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i + 1)) { |
1010 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
1011 | return 0; | |
1012 | } | |
e96e0f8e MC |
1013 | } |
1014 | } | |
1015 | return 1; | |
e96e0f8e MC |
1016 | } |
1017 | ||
f63a17d6 | 1018 | unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk) |
e96e0f8e | 1019 | { |
f63a17d6 | 1020 | if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt)) { |
c48ffbcc | 1021 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
f63a17d6 MC |
1022 | return 0; |
1023 | } | |
e96e0f8e | 1024 | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1025 | if (!ssl_add_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk)) |
1026 | return 0; | |
1027 | ||
1028 | if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 1029 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
7cea05dc | 1030 | return 0; |
77d514c5 | 1031 | } |
f63a17d6 | 1032 | |
c49e1912 | 1033 | return 1; |
0f113f3e MC |
1034 | } |
1035 | ||
30f05b19 MC |
1036 | /* |
1037 | * Tidy up after the end of a handshake. In the case of SCTP this may result | |
1038 | * in NBIO events. If |clearbufs| is set then init_buf and the wbio buffer is | |
1039 | * freed up as well. | |
1040 | */ | |
a7e6a3d8 P |
1041 | WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, ossl_unused WORK_STATE wst, |
1042 | int clearbufs, int stop) | |
8723588e MC |
1043 | { |
1044 | void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL; | |
4af5836b | 1045 | int cleanuphand = s->statem.cleanuphand; |
8723588e | 1046 | |
30f05b19 | 1047 | if (clearbufs) { |
e7c27a6c N |
1048 | if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) |
1049 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
30f05b19 | 1050 | /* |
e7c27a6c N |
1051 | * RFC6083: SCTP provides a reliable and in-sequence transport service for DTLS |
1052 | * messages that require it. Therefore, DTLS procedures for retransmissions | |
1053 | * MUST NOT be used. | |
1054 | * Hence the init_buf can be cleared when DTLS over SCTP as transport is used. | |
1055 | */ | |
1056 | || BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)) | |
1057 | #endif | |
1058 | ) { | |
1059 | /* | |
1060 | * We don't do this in DTLS over UDP because we may still need the init_buf | |
30f05b19 MC |
1061 | * in case there are any unexpected retransmits |
1062 | */ | |
1063 | BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); | |
1064 | s->init_buf = NULL; | |
1065 | } | |
e7c27a6c | 1066 | |
a2c2e000 | 1067 | if (!ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s)) { |
c48ffbcc | 1068 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
b77f3ed1 | 1069 | return WORK_ERROR; |
a2c2e000 | 1070 | } |
30f05b19 | 1071 | s->init_num = 0; |
473483d4 | 1072 | } |
8723588e | 1073 | |
9d75dce3 TS |
1074 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->server |
1075 | && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) | |
1076 | s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT; | |
1077 | ||
c2c1d8a4 MC |
1078 | /* |
1079 | * Only set if there was a Finished message and this isn't after a TLSv1.3 | |
1080 | * post handshake exchange | |
1081 | */ | |
4af5836b | 1082 | if (cleanuphand) { |
8723588e MC |
1083 | /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */ |
1084 | s->renegotiate = 0; | |
1085 | s->new_session = 0; | |
c7f47786 | 1086 | s->statem.cleanuphand = 0; |
c0638ade | 1087 | s->ext.ticket_expected = 0; |
8723588e | 1088 | |
30f05b19 MC |
1089 | ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); |
1090 | ||
8723588e | 1091 | if (s->server) { |
16ff1342 MC |
1092 | /* |
1093 | * In TLSv1.3 we update the cache as part of constructing the | |
1094 | * NewSessionTicket | |
1095 | */ | |
1096 | if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) | |
1097 | ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER); | |
8723588e | 1098 | |
0e6161bc | 1099 | /* N.B. s->ctx may not equal s->session_ctx */ |
acce0557 | 1100 | ssl_tsan_counter(s->ctx, &s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good); |
fe3a3291 | 1101 | s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_accept; |
8723588e | 1102 | } else { |
4cb00457 MC |
1103 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
1104 | /* | |
1105 | * We encourage applications to only use TLSv1.3 tickets once, | |
1106 | * so we remove this one from the cache. | |
1107 | */ | |
1108 | if ((s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode | |
1109 | & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) != 0) | |
1110 | SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session); | |
1111 | } else { | |
1112 | /* | |
1113 | * In TLSv1.3 we update the cache as part of processing the | |
1114 | * NewSessionTicket | |
1115 | */ | |
5d61491c | 1116 | ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT); |
4cb00457 | 1117 | } |
8723588e | 1118 | if (s->hit) |
acce0557 P |
1119 | ssl_tsan_counter(s->session_ctx, |
1120 | &s->session_ctx->stats.sess_hit); | |
8723588e | 1121 | |
fe3a3291 | 1122 | s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_connect; |
acce0557 P |
1123 | ssl_tsan_counter(s->session_ctx, |
1124 | &s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_good); | |
8723588e MC |
1125 | } |
1126 | ||
8723588e MC |
1127 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
1128 | /* done with handshaking */ | |
1129 | s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0; | |
1130 | s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 0; | |
1131 | s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0; | |
f5c7f5df | 1132 | dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s); |
8723588e MC |
1133 | } |
1134 | } | |
1135 | ||
c2c1d8a4 MC |
1136 | if (s->info_callback != NULL) |
1137 | cb = s->info_callback; | |
1138 | else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) | |
1139 | cb = s->ctx->info_callback; | |
1140 | ||
4ce787b9 MC |
1141 | /* The callback may expect us to not be in init at handshake done */ |
1142 | ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0); | |
1143 | ||
4af5836b MC |
1144 | if (cb != NULL) { |
1145 | if (cleanuphand | |
1146 | || !SSL_IS_TLS13(s) | |
1147 | || SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) | |
1148 | cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1); | |
1149 | } | |
c2c1d8a4 | 1150 | |
4ce787b9 MC |
1151 | if (!stop) { |
1152 | /* If we've got more work to do we go back into init */ | |
1153 | ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1); | |
30f05b19 | 1154 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; |
4ce787b9 | 1155 | } |
30f05b19 | 1156 | |
8723588e MC |
1157 | return WORK_FINISHED_STOP; |
1158 | } | |
1159 | ||
9ab930b2 MC |
1160 | int tls_get_message_header(SSL *s, int *mt) |
1161 | { | |
1162 | /* s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */ | |
d4d2f3a4 | 1163 | int skip_message, i, recvd_type; |
9ab930b2 | 1164 | unsigned char *p; |
54105ddd | 1165 | size_t l, readbytes; |
9ab930b2 MC |
1166 | |
1167 | p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; | |
1168 | ||
1169 | do { | |
1170 | while (s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) { | |
1171 | i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, &recvd_type, | |
a230b26e EK |
1172 | &p[s->init_num], |
1173 | SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - s->init_num, | |
54105ddd | 1174 | 0, &readbytes); |
9ab930b2 MC |
1175 | if (i <= 0) { |
1176 | s->rwstate = SSL_READING; | |
1177 | return 0; | |
32ec4153 | 1178 | } |
9ab930b2 | 1179 | if (recvd_type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { |
1257adec | 1180 | /* |
a230b26e EK |
1181 | * A ChangeCipherSpec must be a single byte and may not occur |
1182 | * in the middle of a handshake message. | |
1183 | */ | |
54105ddd | 1184 | if (s->init_num != 0 || readbytes != 1 || p[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS) { |
d4d2f3a4 | 1185 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
1186 | SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); |
1187 | return 0; | |
1257adec | 1188 | } |
e9359719 | 1189 | if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_BEFORE |
555cbb32 | 1190 | && (s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) != 0) { |
e9359719 MC |
1191 | /* |
1192 | * We are stateless and we received a CCS. Probably this is | |
1193 | * from a client between the first and second ClientHellos. | |
1194 | * We should ignore this, but return an error because we do | |
1195 | * not return success until we see the second ClientHello | |
1196 | * with a valid cookie. | |
1197 | */ | |
1198 | return 0; | |
1199 | } | |
555cbb32 | 1200 | s->s3.tmp.message_type = *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; |
54105ddd | 1201 | s->init_num = readbytes - 1; |
c4377574 | 1202 | s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data; |
555cbb32 | 1203 | s->s3.tmp.message_size = readbytes; |
9ab930b2 MC |
1204 | return 1; |
1205 | } else if (recvd_type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { | |
d4d2f3a4 | 1206 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
1207 | SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); |
1208 | return 0; | |
32ec4153 | 1209 | } |
54105ddd | 1210 | s->init_num += readbytes; |
9ab930b2 MC |
1211 | } |
1212 | ||
1213 | skip_message = 0; | |
1214 | if (!s->server) | |
c7f47786 MC |
1215 | if (s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_OK |
1216 | && p[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) | |
9ab930b2 MC |
1217 | /* |
1218 | * The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages -- | |
1219 | * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if | |
1220 | * their format is correct. Does not count for 'Finished' | |
1221 | * MAC. | |
1222 | */ | |
1223 | if (p[1] == 0 && p[2] == 0 && p[3] == 0) { | |
1224 | s->init_num = 0; | |
1225 | skip_message = 1; | |
1226 | ||
1227 | if (s->msg_callback) | |
1228 | s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, | |
1229 | p, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s, | |
1230 | s->msg_callback_arg); | |
1231 | } | |
1232 | } while (skip_message); | |
1233 | /* s->init_num == SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */ | |
1234 | ||
1235 | *mt = *p; | |
555cbb32 | 1236 | s->s3.tmp.message_type = *(p++); |
32ec4153 | 1237 | |
e8aa8b6c | 1238 | if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) { |
9ab930b2 MC |
1239 | /* |
1240 | * Only happens with SSLv3+ in an SSLv2 backward compatible | |
1241 | * ClientHello | |
e8aa8b6c F |
1242 | * |
1243 | * Total message size is the remaining record bytes to read | |
1244 | * plus the SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH bytes that we already read | |
9ab930b2 | 1245 | */ |
9ab930b2 MC |
1246 | l = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(&s->rlayer) |
1247 | + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
555cbb32 | 1248 | s->s3.tmp.message_size = l; |
9ab930b2 MC |
1249 | |
1250 | s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data; | |
1251 | s->init_num = SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
1252 | } else { | |
1253 | n2l3(p, l); | |
1254 | /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */ | |
1255 | if (l > (INT_MAX - SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 1256 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
1257 | SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE); |
1258 | return 0; | |
32ec4153 | 1259 | } |
555cbb32 | 1260 | s->s3.tmp.message_size = l; |
9ab930b2 MC |
1261 | |
1262 | s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
1263 | s->init_num = 0; | |
1264 | } | |
1265 | ||
1266 | return 1; | |
9ab930b2 MC |
1267 | } |
1268 | ||
eda75751 | 1269 | int tls_get_message_body(SSL *s, size_t *len) |
9ab930b2 | 1270 | { |
54105ddd | 1271 | size_t n, readbytes; |
9ab930b2 MC |
1272 | unsigned char *p; |
1273 | int i; | |
1274 | ||
555cbb32 | 1275 | if (s->s3.tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { |
9ab930b2 MC |
1276 | /* We've already read everything in */ |
1277 | *len = (unsigned long)s->init_num; | |
1278 | return 1; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1279 | } |
1280 | ||
0f113f3e | 1281 | p = s->init_msg; |
555cbb32 | 1282 | n = s->s3.tmp.message_size - s->init_num; |
0f113f3e | 1283 | while (n > 0) { |
657da85e | 1284 | i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, NULL, |
54105ddd | 1285 | &p[s->init_num], n, 0, &readbytes); |
0f113f3e MC |
1286 | if (i <= 0) { |
1287 | s->rwstate = SSL_READING; | |
9ab930b2 MC |
1288 | *len = 0; |
1289 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e | 1290 | } |
54105ddd MC |
1291 | s->init_num += readbytes; |
1292 | n -= readbytes; | |
0f113f3e | 1293 | } |
ee2ffc27 | 1294 | |
0f113f3e MC |
1295 | /* |
1296 | * If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for | |
1297 | * Finished verification. | |
1298 | */ | |
5d671101 MC |
1299 | if (*(s->init_buf->data) == SSL3_MT_FINISHED && !ssl3_take_mac(s)) { |
1300 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
1301 | *len = 0; | |
1302 | return 0; | |
1303 | } | |
ee2ffc27 | 1304 | |
0f113f3e | 1305 | /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */ |
e8aa8b6c | 1306 | if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) { |
d166ed8c DSH |
1307 | if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, |
1308 | s->init_num)) { | |
d4d2f3a4 | 1309 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
d166ed8c DSH |
1310 | *len = 0; |
1311 | return 0; | |
1312 | } | |
32ec4153 | 1313 | if (s->msg_callback) |
a230b26e | 1314 | s->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION, 0, s->init_buf->data, |
32ec4153 MC |
1315 | (size_t)s->init_num, s, s->msg_callback_arg); |
1316 | } else { | |
11c67eea MC |
1317 | /* |
1318 | * We defer feeding in the HRR until later. We'll do it as part of | |
1319 | * processing the message | |
9d75dce3 TS |
1320 | * The TLsv1.3 handshake transcript stops at the ClientFinished |
1321 | * message. | |
11c67eea | 1322 | */ |
597c51bc | 1323 | #define SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET (SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 2) |
9d75dce3 | 1324 | /* KeyUpdate and NewSessionTicket do not need to be added */ |
555cbb32 TS |
1325 | if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || (s->s3.tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET |
1326 | && s->s3.tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE)) { | |
1327 | if (s->s3.tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO | |
9d75dce3 TS |
1328 | || s->init_num < SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE |
1329 | || memcmp(hrrrandom, | |
1330 | s->init_buf->data + SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET, | |
1331 | SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) != 0) { | |
1332 | if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, | |
1333 | s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { | |
1334 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
1335 | *len = 0; | |
1336 | return 0; | |
1337 | } | |
597c51bc | 1338 | } |
d166ed8c | 1339 | } |
32ec4153 MC |
1340 | if (s->msg_callback) |
1341 | s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data, | |
1342 | (size_t)s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s, | |
1343 | s->msg_callback_arg); | |
1344 | } | |
1345 | ||
eda75751 | 1346 | *len = s->init_num; |
9ab930b2 | 1347 | return 1; |
0f113f3e | 1348 | } |
d02b48c6 | 1349 | |
c6d38183 RS |
1350 | static const X509ERR2ALERT x509table[] = { |
1351 | {X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE}, | |
1352 | {X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
cccf532f | 1353 | {X509_V_ERR_EC_KEY_EXPLICIT_PARAMS, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, |
c6d38183 RS |
1354 | {X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, |
1355 | {X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, | |
1356 | {X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED}, | |
1357 | {X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1358 | {X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1359 | {X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED}, | |
1360 | {X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR}, | |
1361 | {X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1362 | {X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED}, | |
1363 | {X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1364 | {X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR}, | |
1365 | {X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1366 | {X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, | |
1367 | {X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1368 | {X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1369 | {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1370 | {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1371 | {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1372 | {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1373 | {X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1374 | {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, | |
1375 | {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR}, | |
1376 | {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1377 | {X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1378 | {X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR}, | |
1379 | {X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, | |
1380 | {X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, | |
1381 | {X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR}, | |
1382 | {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1383 | {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1384 | {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1385 | {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, | |
1386 | {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, | |
1387 | {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, | |
1388 | {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, | |
1389 | {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, | |
1390 | {X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR}, | |
1391 | ||
1392 | /* Last entry; return this if we don't find the value above. */ | |
1393 | {X509_V_OK, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN} | |
1394 | }; | |
1395 | ||
1396 | int ssl_x509err2alert(int x509err) | |
0f113f3e | 1397 | { |
c6d38183 RS |
1398 | const X509ERR2ALERT *tp; |
1399 | ||
1400 | for (tp = x509table; tp->x509err != X509_V_OK; ++tp) | |
1401 | if (tp->x509err == x509err) | |
1402 | break; | |
1403 | return tp->alert; | |
0f113f3e | 1404 | } |
d02b48c6 | 1405 | |
b362ccab | 1406 | int ssl_allow_compression(SSL *s) |
0f113f3e MC |
1407 | { |
1408 | if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) | |
1409 | return 0; | |
1410 | return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION, 0, 0, NULL); | |
1411 | } | |
4fa52141 | 1412 | |
068c358a | 1413 | static int version_cmp(const SSL *s, int a, int b) |
4fa52141 VD |
1414 | { |
1415 | int dtls = SSL_IS_DTLS(s); | |
1416 | ||
1417 | if (a == b) | |
1418 | return 0; | |
1419 | if (!dtls) | |
1420 | return a < b ? -1 : 1; | |
1421 | return DTLS_VERSION_LT(a, b) ? -1 : 1; | |
1422 | } | |
1423 | ||
1424 | typedef struct { | |
1425 | int version; | |
a230b26e EK |
1426 | const SSL_METHOD *(*cmeth) (void); |
1427 | const SSL_METHOD *(*smeth) (void); | |
4fa52141 VD |
1428 | } version_info; |
1429 | ||
5c587fb6 | 1430 | #if TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL != TLS1_3_VERSION |
582a17d6 | 1431 | # error Code needs update for TLS_method() support beyond TLS1_3_VERSION. |
4fa52141 VD |
1432 | #endif |
1433 | ||
f7f2a01d | 1434 | /* Must be in order high to low */ |
4fa52141 | 1435 | static const version_info tls_version_table[] = { |
582a17d6 MC |
1436 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 |
1437 | {TLS1_3_VERSION, tlsv1_3_client_method, tlsv1_3_server_method}, | |
1438 | #else | |
1439 | {TLS1_3_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, | |
1440 | #endif | |
6b01bed2 | 1441 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2 |
a230b26e | 1442 | {TLS1_2_VERSION, tlsv1_2_client_method, tlsv1_2_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 1443 | #else |
a230b26e | 1444 | {TLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
6b01bed2 VD |
1445 | #endif |
1446 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1 | |
a230b26e | 1447 | {TLS1_1_VERSION, tlsv1_1_client_method, tlsv1_1_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 1448 | #else |
a230b26e | 1449 | {TLS1_1_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
6b01bed2 VD |
1450 | #endif |
1451 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1 | |
a230b26e | 1452 | {TLS1_VERSION, tlsv1_client_method, tlsv1_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 1453 | #else |
a230b26e | 1454 | {TLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
6b01bed2 | 1455 | #endif |
4fa52141 | 1456 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3 |
a230b26e | 1457 | {SSL3_VERSION, sslv3_client_method, sslv3_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 1458 | #else |
a230b26e | 1459 | {SSL3_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
4fa52141 | 1460 | #endif |
a230b26e | 1461 | {0, NULL, NULL}, |
4fa52141 VD |
1462 | }; |
1463 | ||
5c587fb6 | 1464 | #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL != DTLS1_2_VERSION |
4fa52141 VD |
1465 | # error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_2_VERSION. |
1466 | #endif | |
1467 | ||
f7f2a01d | 1468 | /* Must be in order high to low */ |
4fa52141 | 1469 | static const version_info dtls_version_table[] = { |
6b01bed2 | 1470 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2 |
a230b26e | 1471 | {DTLS1_2_VERSION, dtlsv1_2_client_method, dtlsv1_2_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 1472 | #else |
a230b26e | 1473 | {DTLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
6b01bed2 VD |
1474 | #endif |
1475 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1 | |
a230b26e EK |
1476 | {DTLS1_VERSION, dtlsv1_client_method, dtlsv1_server_method}, |
1477 | {DTLS1_BAD_VER, dtls_bad_ver_client_method, NULL}, | |
6b01bed2 | 1478 | #else |
a230b26e EK |
1479 | {DTLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
1480 | {DTLS1_BAD_VER, NULL, NULL}, | |
6b01bed2 | 1481 | #endif |
a230b26e | 1482 | {0, NULL, NULL}, |
4fa52141 VD |
1483 | }; |
1484 | ||
1485 | /* | |
1486 | * ssl_method_error - Check whether an SSL_METHOD is enabled. | |
1487 | * | |
1488 | * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method | |
1489 | * @method: the intended method. | |
1490 | * | |
1491 | * Returns 0 on success, or an SSL error reason on failure. | |
1492 | */ | |
068c358a | 1493 | static int ssl_method_error(const SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *method) |
4fa52141 VD |
1494 | { |
1495 | int version = method->version; | |
1496 | ||
1497 | if ((s->min_proto_version != 0 && | |
1498 | version_cmp(s, version, s->min_proto_version) < 0) || | |
1499 | ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, version, NULL) == 0) | |
1500 | return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW; | |
1501 | ||
1502 | if (s->max_proto_version != 0 && | |
a230b26e | 1503 | version_cmp(s, version, s->max_proto_version) > 0) |
4fa52141 VD |
1504 | return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_HIGH; |
1505 | ||
1506 | if ((s->options & method->mask) != 0) | |
1507 | return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; | |
1508 | if ((method->flags & SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB) != 0 && tls1_suiteb(s)) | |
1509 | return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_2_NEEDED_IN_SUITEB_MODE; | |
4fa52141 VD |
1510 | |
1511 | return 0; | |
1512 | } | |
1513 | ||
baa45c3e MC |
1514 | /* |
1515 | * Only called by servers. Returns 1 if the server has a TLSv1.3 capable | |
ebda646d MC |
1516 | * certificate type, or has PSK or a certificate callback configured, or has |
1517 | * a servername callback configure. Otherwise returns 0. | |
baa45c3e MC |
1518 | */ |
1519 | static int is_tls13_capable(const SSL *s) | |
1520 | { | |
65d2c16c | 1521 | int i; |
65d2c16c | 1522 | int curve; |
baa45c3e | 1523 | |
ebda646d MC |
1524 | if (!ossl_assert(s->ctx != NULL) || !ossl_assert(s->session_ctx != NULL)) |
1525 | return 0; | |
1526 | ||
1527 | /* | |
1528 | * A servername callback can change the available certs, so if a servername | |
1529 | * cb is set then we just assume TLSv1.3 will be ok | |
1530 | */ | |
1531 | if (s->ctx->ext.servername_cb != NULL | |
1532 | || s->session_ctx->ext.servername_cb != NULL) | |
1533 | return 1; | |
1534 | ||
d162340d MC |
1535 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK |
1536 | if (s->psk_server_callback != NULL) | |
1537 | return 1; | |
1538 | #endif | |
1539 | ||
cd3b53b8 | 1540 | if (s->psk_find_session_cb != NULL || s->cert->cert_cb != NULL) |
baa45c3e MC |
1541 | return 1; |
1542 | ||
1543 | for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) { | |
1544 | /* Skip over certs disallowed for TLSv1.3 */ | |
1545 | switch (i) { | |
1546 | case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN: | |
1547 | case SSL_PKEY_GOST01: | |
1548 | case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256: | |
1549 | case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512: | |
1550 | continue; | |
1551 | default: | |
1552 | break; | |
1553 | } | |
de4dc598 MC |
1554 | if (!ssl_has_cert(s, i)) |
1555 | continue; | |
1556 | if (i != SSL_PKEY_ECC) | |
1557 | return 1; | |
1558 | /* | |
1559 | * Prior to TLSv1.3 sig algs allowed any curve to be used. TLSv1.3 is | |
1560 | * more restrictive so check that our sig algs are consistent with this | |
1561 | * EC cert. See section 4.2.3 of RFC8446. | |
1562 | */ | |
d8975dec | 1563 | curve = ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey); |
de4dc598 | 1564 | if (tls_check_sigalg_curve(s, curve)) |
baa45c3e MC |
1565 | return 1; |
1566 | } | |
1567 | ||
1568 | return 0; | |
1569 | } | |
1570 | ||
ccae4a15 FI |
1571 | /* |
1572 | * ssl_version_supported - Check that the specified `version` is supported by | |
1573 | * `SSL *` instance | |
1574 | * | |
1575 | * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method | |
1576 | * @version: Protocol version to test against | |
1577 | * | |
1578 | * Returns 1 when supported, otherwise 0 | |
1579 | */ | |
4fd12788 | 1580 | int ssl_version_supported(const SSL *s, int version, const SSL_METHOD **meth) |
ccae4a15 FI |
1581 | { |
1582 | const version_info *vent; | |
1583 | const version_info *table; | |
1584 | ||
1585 | switch (s->method->version) { | |
1586 | default: | |
1587 | /* Version should match method version for non-ANY method */ | |
1588 | return version_cmp(s, version, s->version) == 0; | |
1589 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1590 | table = tls_version_table; | |
1591 | break; | |
1592 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1593 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
1594 | break; | |
1595 | } | |
1596 | ||
1597 | for (vent = table; | |
1598 | vent->version != 0 && version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) <= 0; | |
1599 | ++vent) { | |
baa45c3e MC |
1600 | if (vent->cmeth != NULL |
1601 | && version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) == 0 | |
1602 | && ssl_method_error(s, vent->cmeth()) == 0 | |
1603 | && (!s->server | |
1604 | || version != TLS1_3_VERSION | |
1605 | || is_tls13_capable(s))) { | |
4fd12788 MC |
1606 | if (meth != NULL) |
1607 | *meth = vent->cmeth(); | |
ccae4a15 FI |
1608 | return 1; |
1609 | } | |
1610 | } | |
1611 | return 0; | |
1612 | } | |
1613 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1614 | /* |
1615 | * ssl_check_version_downgrade - In response to RFC7507 SCSV version | |
1616 | * fallback indication from a client check whether we're using the highest | |
1617 | * supported protocol version. | |
1618 | * | |
1619 | * @s server SSL handle. | |
1620 | * | |
1621 | * Returns 1 when using the highest enabled version, 0 otherwise. | |
1622 | */ | |
1623 | int ssl_check_version_downgrade(SSL *s) | |
1624 | { | |
1625 | const version_info *vent; | |
1626 | const version_info *table; | |
1627 | ||
1628 | /* | |
1629 | * Check that the current protocol is the highest enabled version | |
1630 | * (according to s->ctx->method, as version negotiation may have changed | |
1631 | * s->method). | |
1632 | */ | |
1633 | if (s->version == s->ctx->method->version) | |
1634 | return 1; | |
1635 | ||
1636 | /* | |
1637 | * Apparently we're using a version-flexible SSL_METHOD (not at its | |
1638 | * highest protocol version). | |
1639 | */ | |
1640 | if (s->ctx->method->version == TLS_method()->version) | |
1641 | table = tls_version_table; | |
1642 | else if (s->ctx->method->version == DTLS_method()->version) | |
1643 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
1644 | else { | |
1645 | /* Unexpected state; fail closed. */ | |
1646 | return 0; | |
1647 | } | |
1648 | ||
1649 | for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { | |
a230b26e | 1650 | if (vent->smeth != NULL && ssl_method_error(s, vent->smeth()) == 0) |
4fa52141 VD |
1651 | return s->version == vent->version; |
1652 | } | |
1653 | return 0; | |
1654 | } | |
1655 | ||
1656 | /* | |
1657 | * ssl_set_version_bound - set an upper or lower bound on the supported (D)TLS | |
1658 | * protocols, provided the initial (D)TLS method is version-flexible. This | |
1659 | * function sanity-checks the proposed value and makes sure the method is | |
1660 | * version-flexible, then sets the limit if all is well. | |
1661 | * | |
1662 | * @method_version: The version of the current SSL_METHOD. | |
1663 | * @version: the intended limit. | |
1664 | * @bound: pointer to limit to be updated. | |
1665 | * | |
1666 | * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure. | |
1667 | */ | |
1668 | int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version, int version, int *bound) | |
1669 | { | |
77174598 VD |
1670 | int valid_tls; |
1671 | int valid_dtls; | |
1672 | ||
869e978c KR |
1673 | if (version == 0) { |
1674 | *bound = version; | |
1675 | return 1; | |
1676 | } | |
1677 | ||
77174598 VD |
1678 | valid_tls = version >= SSL3_VERSION && version <= TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL; |
1679 | valid_dtls = | |
1680 | DTLS_VERSION_LE(version, DTLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL) && | |
1681 | DTLS_VERSION_GE(version, DTLS1_BAD_VER); | |
1682 | ||
1683 | if (!valid_tls && !valid_dtls) | |
1684 | return 0; | |
1685 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1686 | /*- |
1687 | * Restrict TLS methods to TLS protocol versions. | |
1688 | * Restrict DTLS methods to DTLS protocol versions. | |
1689 | * Note, DTLS version numbers are decreasing, use comparison macros. | |
1690 | * | |
1691 | * Note that for both lower-bounds we use explicit versions, not | |
1692 | * (D)TLS_MIN_VERSION. This is because we don't want to break user | |
1693 | * configurations. If the MIN (supported) version ever rises, the user's | |
1694 | * "floor" remains valid even if no longer available. We don't expect the | |
1695 | * MAX ceiling to ever get lower, so making that variable makes sense. | |
77174598 VD |
1696 | * |
1697 | * We ignore attempts to set bounds on version-inflexible methods, | |
1698 | * returning success. | |
4fa52141 VD |
1699 | */ |
1700 | switch (method_version) { | |
1701 | default: | |
77174598 | 1702 | break; |
4fa52141 VD |
1703 | |
1704 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
77174598 VD |
1705 | if (valid_tls) |
1706 | *bound = version; | |
4fa52141 VD |
1707 | break; |
1708 | ||
1709 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
77174598 VD |
1710 | if (valid_dtls) |
1711 | *bound = version; | |
4fa52141 VD |
1712 | break; |
1713 | } | |
4fa52141 VD |
1714 | return 1; |
1715 | } | |
1716 | ||
f7f2a01d MC |
1717 | static void check_for_downgrade(SSL *s, int vers, DOWNGRADE *dgrd) |
1718 | { | |
1719 | if (vers == TLS1_2_VERSION | |
4fd12788 | 1720 | && ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_3_VERSION, NULL)) { |
f7f2a01d | 1721 | *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_TO_1_2; |
5627f9f2 MC |
1722 | } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) |
1723 | && vers < TLS1_2_VERSION | |
1724 | /* | |
1725 | * We need to ensure that a server that disables TLSv1.2 | |
1726 | * (creating a hole between TLSv1.3 and TLSv1.1) can still | |
1727 | * complete handshakes with clients that support TLSv1.2 and | |
1728 | * below. Therefore we do not enable the sentinel if TLSv1.3 is | |
1729 | * enabled and TLSv1.2 is not. | |
1730 | */ | |
1731 | && ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_2_VERSION, NULL)) { | |
f7f2a01d MC |
1732 | *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_TO_1_1; |
1733 | } else { | |
1734 | *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE; | |
1735 | } | |
1736 | } | |
1737 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1738 | /* |
1739 | * ssl_choose_server_version - Choose server (D)TLS version. Called when the | |
1740 | * client HELLO is received to select the final server protocol version and | |
1741 | * the version specific method. | |
1742 | * | |
1743 | * @s: server SSL handle. | |
1744 | * | |
1745 | * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. | |
1746 | */ | |
f7f2a01d | 1747 | int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello, DOWNGRADE *dgrd) |
4fa52141 VD |
1748 | { |
1749 | /*- | |
1750 | * With version-flexible methods we have an initial state with: | |
1751 | * | |
1752 | * s->method->version == (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION, | |
5c587fb6 | 1753 | * s->version == (D)TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL. |
4fa52141 VD |
1754 | * |
1755 | * So we detect version-flexible methods via the method version, not the | |
1756 | * handle version. | |
1757 | */ | |
1758 | int server_version = s->method->version; | |
df7ce507 | 1759 | int client_version = hello->legacy_version; |
4fa52141 VD |
1760 | const version_info *vent; |
1761 | const version_info *table; | |
1762 | int disabled = 0; | |
cd998837 | 1763 | RAW_EXTENSION *suppversions; |
4fa52141 | 1764 | |
1ab3836b MC |
1765 | s->client_version = client_version; |
1766 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1767 | switch (server_version) { |
1768 | default: | |
7d061fce MC |
1769 | if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
1770 | if (version_cmp(s, client_version, s->version) < 0) | |
1771 | return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION; | |
f7f2a01d | 1772 | *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE; |
7d061fce MC |
1773 | /* |
1774 | * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't | |
1775 | * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope | |
1776 | * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol | |
1777 | * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return | |
1778 | * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) | |
1779 | */ | |
1780 | return 0; | |
1781 | } | |
d2f42576 | 1782 | /* |
7d061fce MC |
1783 | * Fall through if we are TLSv1.3 already (this means we must be after |
1784 | * a HelloRetryRequest | |
4fa52141 | 1785 | */ |
018fcbec | 1786 | /* fall thru */ |
4fa52141 VD |
1787 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: |
1788 | table = tls_version_table; | |
1789 | break; | |
1790 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1791 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
1792 | break; | |
1793 | } | |
1794 | ||
70af3d8e | 1795 | suppversions = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions]; |
cd998837 | 1796 | |
6f40214f | 1797 | /* If we did an HRR then supported versions is mandatory */ |
fc7129dc | 1798 | if (!suppversions->present && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) |
6f40214f MC |
1799 | return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; |
1800 | ||
70af3d8e | 1801 | if (suppversions->present && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
cd998837 MC |
1802 | unsigned int candidate_vers = 0; |
1803 | unsigned int best_vers = 0; | |
1804 | const SSL_METHOD *best_method = NULL; | |
1805 | PACKET versionslist; | |
1806 | ||
6b473aca MC |
1807 | suppversions->parsed = 1; |
1808 | ||
16bce0e0 | 1809 | if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&suppversions->data, &versionslist)) { |
cd998837 MC |
1810 | /* Trailing or invalid data? */ |
1811 | return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH; | |
1812 | } | |
1813 | ||
d8434cf8 MC |
1814 | /* |
1815 | * The TLSv1.3 spec says the client MUST set this to TLS1_2_VERSION. | |
1816 | * The spec only requires servers to check that it isn't SSLv3: | |
1817 | * "Any endpoint receiving a Hello message with | |
1818 | * ClientHello.legacy_version or ServerHello.legacy_version set to | |
1819 | * 0x0300 MUST abort the handshake with a "protocol_version" alert." | |
1820 | * We are slightly stricter and require that it isn't SSLv3 or lower. | |
1821 | * We tolerate TLSv1 and TLSv1.1. | |
1822 | */ | |
1823 | if (client_version <= SSL3_VERSION) | |
1824 | return SSL_R_BAD_LEGACY_VERSION; | |
1825 | ||
cd998837 | 1826 | while (PACKET_get_net_2(&versionslist, &candidate_vers)) { |
cd998837 MC |
1827 | if (version_cmp(s, candidate_vers, best_vers) <= 0) |
1828 | continue; | |
4fd12788 MC |
1829 | if (ssl_version_supported(s, candidate_vers, &best_method)) |
1830 | best_vers = candidate_vers; | |
cd998837 MC |
1831 | } |
1832 | if (PACKET_remaining(&versionslist) != 0) { | |
1833 | /* Trailing data? */ | |
1834 | return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH; | |
1835 | } | |
1836 | ||
1837 | if (best_vers > 0) { | |
fc7129dc | 1838 | if (s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) { |
7d061fce | 1839 | /* |
6f40214f MC |
1840 | * This is after a HelloRetryRequest so we better check that we |
1841 | * negotiated TLSv1.3 | |
7d061fce MC |
1842 | */ |
1843 | if (best_vers != TLS1_3_VERSION) | |
1844 | return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; | |
1845 | return 0; | |
1846 | } | |
f7f2a01d | 1847 | check_for_downgrade(s, best_vers, dgrd); |
cd998837 MC |
1848 | s->version = best_vers; |
1849 | s->method = best_method; | |
1850 | return 0; | |
1851 | } | |
1852 | return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; | |
1853 | } | |
1854 | ||
1855 | /* | |
1856 | * If the supported versions extension isn't present, then the highest | |
1857 | * version we can negotiate is TLSv1.2 | |
1858 | */ | |
1859 | if (version_cmp(s, client_version, TLS1_3_VERSION) >= 0) | |
1860 | client_version = TLS1_2_VERSION; | |
1861 | ||
1862 | /* | |
1863 | * No supported versions extension, so we just use the version supplied in | |
1864 | * the ClientHello. | |
1865 | */ | |
4fa52141 VD |
1866 | for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { |
1867 | const SSL_METHOD *method; | |
1868 | ||
1869 | if (vent->smeth == NULL || | |
1870 | version_cmp(s, client_version, vent->version) < 0) | |
1871 | continue; | |
1872 | method = vent->smeth(); | |
1873 | if (ssl_method_error(s, method) == 0) { | |
f7f2a01d | 1874 | check_for_downgrade(s, vent->version, dgrd); |
4fa52141 VD |
1875 | s->version = vent->version; |
1876 | s->method = method; | |
1877 | return 0; | |
1878 | } | |
1879 | disabled = 1; | |
1880 | } | |
1881 | return disabled ? SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL : SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW; | |
1882 | } | |
1883 | ||
1884 | /* | |
1885 | * ssl_choose_client_version - Choose client (D)TLS version. Called when the | |
1886 | * server HELLO is received to select the final client protocol version and | |
1887 | * the version specific method. | |
1888 | * | |
1889 | * @s: client SSL handle. | |
1890 | * @version: The proposed version from the server's HELLO. | |
88050dd1 | 1891 | * @extensions: The extensions received |
4fa52141 | 1892 | * |
29bfd5b7 | 1893 | * Returns 1 on success or 0 on error. |
4fa52141 | 1894 | */ |
88050dd1 | 1895 | int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version, RAW_EXTENSION *extensions) |
4fa52141 VD |
1896 | { |
1897 | const version_info *vent; | |
1898 | const version_info *table; | |
b5b993b2 | 1899 | int ret, ver_min, ver_max, real_max, origv; |
4fa52141 | 1900 | |
88050dd1 MC |
1901 | origv = s->version; |
1902 | s->version = version; | |
b97667ce | 1903 | |
88050dd1 MC |
1904 | /* This will overwrite s->version if the extension is present */ |
1905 | if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions, | |
1906 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO | |
1907 | | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO, extensions, | |
1908 | NULL, 0)) { | |
1909 | s->version = origv; | |
1910 | return 0; | |
1911 | } | |
1912 | ||
fc7129dc MC |
1913 | if (s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE |
1914 | && s->version != TLS1_3_VERSION) { | |
88050dd1 | 1915 | s->version = origv; |
c48ffbcc | 1916 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION); |
29bfd5b7 | 1917 | return 0; |
c3043dcd MC |
1918 | } |
1919 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1920 | switch (s->method->version) { |
1921 | default: | |
88050dd1 MC |
1922 | if (s->version != s->method->version) { |
1923 | s->version = origv; | |
c48ffbcc | 1924 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION); |
29bfd5b7 | 1925 | return 0; |
c3043dcd | 1926 | } |
4fa52141 VD |
1927 | /* |
1928 | * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't | |
1929 | * (and never did) check min/max, FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope | |
1930 | * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol | |
1931 | * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return | |
1932 | * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) | |
1933 | */ | |
29bfd5b7 | 1934 | return 1; |
4fa52141 VD |
1935 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: |
1936 | table = tls_version_table; | |
1937 | break; | |
1938 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1939 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
1940 | break; | |
1941 | } | |
1942 | ||
b5b993b2 MC |
1943 | ret = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max, &real_max); |
1944 | if (ret != 0) { | |
1945 | s->version = origv; | |
c48ffbcc | 1946 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, ret); |
b5b993b2 MC |
1947 | return 0; |
1948 | } | |
1949 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? DTLS_VERSION_LT(s->version, ver_min) | |
1950 | : s->version < ver_min) { | |
1951 | s->version = origv; | |
c48ffbcc | 1952 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL); |
b5b993b2 MC |
1953 | return 0; |
1954 | } else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? DTLS_VERSION_GT(s->version, ver_max) | |
1955 | : s->version > ver_max) { | |
1956 | s->version = origv; | |
c48ffbcc | 1957 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL); |
b5b993b2 MC |
1958 | return 0; |
1959 | } | |
5df22060 | 1960 | |
b5b993b2 MC |
1961 | if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) == 0) |
1962 | real_max = ver_max; | |
c3043dcd | 1963 | |
b5b993b2 MC |
1964 | /* Check for downgrades */ |
1965 | if (s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION && real_max > s->version) { | |
1966 | if (memcmp(tls12downgrade, | |
555cbb32 | 1967 | s->s3.server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE |
b5b993b2 MC |
1968 | - sizeof(tls12downgrade), |
1969 | sizeof(tls12downgrade)) == 0) { | |
1970 | s->version = origv; | |
1971 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, | |
b5b993b2 MC |
1972 | SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); |
1973 | return 0; | |
1974 | } | |
1975 | } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) | |
1976 | && s->version < TLS1_2_VERSION | |
1977 | && real_max > s->version) { | |
1978 | if (memcmp(tls11downgrade, | |
555cbb32 | 1979 | s->s3.server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE |
b5b993b2 MC |
1980 | - sizeof(tls11downgrade), |
1981 | sizeof(tls11downgrade)) == 0) { | |
1982 | s->version = origv; | |
1983 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, | |
b5b993b2 MC |
1984 | SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); |
1985 | return 0; | |
c3043dcd | 1986 | } |
b5b993b2 | 1987 | } |
c3043dcd | 1988 | |
b5b993b2 MC |
1989 | for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { |
1990 | if (vent->cmeth == NULL || s->version != vent->version) | |
c3043dcd MC |
1991 | continue; |
1992 | ||
b5b993b2 | 1993 | s->method = vent->cmeth(); |
29bfd5b7 | 1994 | return 1; |
4fa52141 VD |
1995 | } |
1996 | ||
88050dd1 | 1997 | s->version = origv; |
c48ffbcc | 1998 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL); |
29bfd5b7 | 1999 | return 0; |
4fa52141 VD |
2000 | } |
2001 | ||
068c358a | 2002 | /* |
38a73150 | 2003 | * ssl_get_min_max_version - get minimum and maximum protocol version |
068c358a KR |
2004 | * @s: The SSL connection |
2005 | * @min_version: The minimum supported version | |
2006 | * @max_version: The maximum supported version | |
b5b993b2 MC |
2007 | * @real_max: The highest version below the lowest compile time version hole |
2008 | * where that hole lies above at least one run-time enabled | |
2009 | * protocol. | |
068c358a KR |
2010 | * |
2011 | * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if the | |
2012 | * version is initially (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION. We apply any explicit SSL_OP_NO_xxx | |
2013 | * options, the MinProtocol and MaxProtocol configuration commands, any Suite B | |
b53338cb | 2014 | * constraints and any floor imposed by the security level here, |
068c358a | 2015 | * so we don't advertise the wrong protocol version to only reject the outcome later. |
4fa52141 | 2016 | * |
0485d540 | 2017 | * Computing the right floor matters. If, e.g., TLS 1.0 and 1.2 are enabled, |
4fa52141 VD |
2018 | * TLS 1.1 is disabled, but the security level, Suite-B and/or MinProtocol |
2019 | * only allow TLS 1.2, we want to advertise TLS1.2, *not* TLS1. | |
2020 | * | |
068c358a KR |
2021 | * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. On failure |
2022 | * min_version and max_version will also be set to 0. | |
4fa52141 | 2023 | */ |
b5b993b2 MC |
2024 | int ssl_get_min_max_version(const SSL *s, int *min_version, int *max_version, |
2025 | int *real_max) | |
4fa52141 | 2026 | { |
b5b993b2 | 2027 | int version, tmp_real_max; |
4fa52141 VD |
2028 | int hole; |
2029 | const SSL_METHOD *single = NULL; | |
2030 | const SSL_METHOD *method; | |
2031 | const version_info *table; | |
2032 | const version_info *vent; | |
2033 | ||
2034 | switch (s->method->version) { | |
2035 | default: | |
2036 | /* | |
2037 | * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't | |
2038 | * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope | |
2039 | * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol | |
2040 | * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return | |
2041 | * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) | |
2042 | */ | |
068c358a | 2043 | *min_version = *max_version = s->version; |
b5b993b2 MC |
2044 | /* |
2045 | * Providing a real_max only makes sense where we're using a version | |
2046 | * flexible method. | |
2047 | */ | |
2048 | if (!ossl_assert(real_max == NULL)) | |
2049 | return ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
4fa52141 VD |
2050 | return 0; |
2051 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
2052 | table = tls_version_table; | |
2053 | break; | |
2054 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
2055 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
2056 | break; | |
2057 | } | |
2058 | ||
2059 | /* | |
2060 | * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are some protocols | |
2061 | * below X enabled. This is required in order to maintain the "version | |
2062 | * capability" vector contiguous. Any versions with a NULL client method | |
2063 | * (protocol version client is disabled at compile-time) is also a "hole". | |
2064 | * | |
2065 | * Our initial state is hole == 1, version == 0. That is, versions above | |
2066 | * the first version in the method table are disabled (a "hole" above | |
2067 | * the valid protocol entries) and we don't have a selected version yet. | |
2068 | * | |
2069 | * Whenever "hole == 1", and we hit an enabled method, its version becomes | |
2070 | * the selected version, and the method becomes a candidate "single" | |
2071 | * method. We're no longer in a hole, so "hole" becomes 0. | |
2072 | * | |
2073 | * If "hole == 0" and we hit an enabled method, then "single" is cleared, | |
2074 | * as we support a contiguous range of at least two methods. If we hit | |
2075 | * a disabled method, then hole becomes true again, but nothing else | |
2076 | * changes yet, because all the remaining methods may be disabled too. | |
2077 | * If we again hit an enabled method after the new hole, it becomes | |
2078 | * selected, as we start from scratch. | |
2079 | */ | |
068c358a | 2080 | *min_version = version = 0; |
4fa52141 | 2081 | hole = 1; |
b5b993b2 MC |
2082 | if (real_max != NULL) |
2083 | *real_max = 0; | |
2084 | tmp_real_max = 0; | |
4fa52141 VD |
2085 | for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { |
2086 | /* | |
2087 | * A table entry with a NULL client method is still a hole in the | |
2088 | * "version capability" vector. | |
2089 | */ | |
2090 | if (vent->cmeth == NULL) { | |
2091 | hole = 1; | |
b5b993b2 | 2092 | tmp_real_max = 0; |
4fa52141 VD |
2093 | continue; |
2094 | } | |
2095 | method = vent->cmeth(); | |
b5b993b2 MC |
2096 | |
2097 | if (hole == 1 && tmp_real_max == 0) | |
2098 | tmp_real_max = vent->version; | |
2099 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
2100 | if (ssl_method_error(s, method) != 0) { |
2101 | hole = 1; | |
2102 | } else if (!hole) { | |
2103 | single = NULL; | |
068c358a | 2104 | *min_version = method->version; |
4fa52141 | 2105 | } else { |
b5b993b2 MC |
2106 | if (real_max != NULL && tmp_real_max != 0) |
2107 | *real_max = tmp_real_max; | |
4fa52141 | 2108 | version = (single = method)->version; |
068c358a | 2109 | *min_version = version; |
4fa52141 VD |
2110 | hole = 0; |
2111 | } | |
2112 | } | |
2113 | ||
068c358a KR |
2114 | *max_version = version; |
2115 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
2116 | /* Fail if everything is disabled */ |
2117 | if (version == 0) | |
2118 | return SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE; | |
2119 | ||
068c358a KR |
2120 | return 0; |
2121 | } | |
2122 | ||
2123 | /* | |
2124 | * ssl_set_client_hello_version - Work out what version we should be using for | |
7acb8b64 | 2125 | * the initial ClientHello.legacy_version field. |
068c358a KR |
2126 | * |
2127 | * @s: client SSL handle. | |
2128 | * | |
2129 | * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. | |
2130 | */ | |
2131 | int ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL *s) | |
2132 | { | |
3eb2aff4 | 2133 | int ver_min, ver_max, ret; |
068c358a | 2134 | |
447cc0ad MC |
2135 | /* |
2136 | * In a renegotiation we always send the same client_version that we sent | |
2137 | * last time, regardless of which version we eventually negotiated. | |
2138 | */ | |
2139 | if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) | |
2140 | return 0; | |
2141 | ||
b5b993b2 | 2142 | ret = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max, NULL); |
068c358a KR |
2143 | |
2144 | if (ret != 0) | |
2145 | return ret; | |
2146 | ||
7acb8b64 MC |
2147 | s->version = ver_max; |
2148 | ||
2149 | /* TLS1.3 always uses TLS1.2 in the legacy_version field */ | |
2150 | if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ver_max > TLS1_2_VERSION) | |
2151 | ver_max = TLS1_2_VERSION; | |
2152 | ||
2153 | s->client_version = ver_max; | |
4fa52141 VD |
2154 | return 0; |
2155 | } | |
aff9929b MC |
2156 | |
2157 | /* | |
2158 | * Checks a list of |groups| to determine if the |group_id| is in it. If it is | |
2159 | * and |checkallow| is 1 then additionally check if the group is allowed to be | |
2160 | * used. Returns 1 if the group is in the list (and allowed if |checkallow| is | |
2161 | * 1) or 0 otherwise. | |
2162 | */ | |
9e84a42d | 2163 | int check_in_list(SSL *s, uint16_t group_id, const uint16_t *groups, |
aff9929b MC |
2164 | size_t num_groups, int checkallow) |
2165 | { | |
2166 | size_t i; | |
2167 | ||
2168 | if (groups == NULL || num_groups == 0) | |
2169 | return 0; | |
2170 | ||
0a10825a BE |
2171 | if (checkallow == 1) |
2172 | group_id = ssl_group_id_tls13_to_internal(group_id); | |
2173 | ||
9e84a42d DSH |
2174 | for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) { |
2175 | uint16_t group = groups[i]; | |
2176 | ||
0a10825a BE |
2177 | if (checkallow == 2) |
2178 | group = ssl_group_id_tls13_to_internal(group); | |
2179 | ||
9e84a42d | 2180 | if (group_id == group |
aff9929b | 2181 | && (!checkallow |
dbc6268f | 2182 | || tls_group_allowed(s, group, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))) { |
0acee504 | 2183 | return 1; |
aff9929b MC |
2184 | } |
2185 | } | |
2186 | ||
0acee504 | 2187 | return 0; |
aff9929b | 2188 | } |
11c67eea MC |
2189 | |
2190 | /* Replace ClientHello1 in the transcript hash with a synthetic message */ | |
43054d3d MC |
2191 | int create_synthetic_message_hash(SSL *s, const unsigned char *hashval, |
2192 | size_t hashlen, const unsigned char *hrr, | |
2193 | size_t hrrlen) | |
11c67eea | 2194 | { |
43054d3d | 2195 | unsigned char hashvaltmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
635b7d3f MC |
2196 | unsigned char msghdr[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]; |
2197 | ||
2198 | memset(msghdr, 0, sizeof(msghdr)); | |
11c67eea | 2199 | |
43054d3d MC |
2200 | if (hashval == NULL) { |
2201 | hashval = hashvaltmp; | |
2202 | hashlen = 0; | |
2203 | /* Get the hash of the initial ClientHello */ | |
2204 | if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0) | |
2205 | || !ssl_handshake_hash(s, hashvaltmp, sizeof(hashvaltmp), | |
2206 | &hashlen)) { | |
2207 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
2208 | return 0; | |
2209 | } | |
11c67eea MC |
2210 | } |
2211 | ||
2212 | /* Reinitialise the transcript hash */ | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2213 | if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) { |
2214 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
11c67eea | 2215 | return 0; |
f63a17d6 | 2216 | } |
11c67eea MC |
2217 | |
2218 | /* Inject the synthetic message_hash message */ | |
635b7d3f | 2219 | msghdr[0] = SSL3_MT_MESSAGE_HASH; |
3a63c0ed | 2220 | msghdr[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - 1] = (unsigned char)hashlen; |
11c67eea MC |
2221 | if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, msghdr, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) |
2222 | || !ssl3_finish_mac(s, hashval, hashlen)) { | |
f63a17d6 | 2223 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
11c67eea MC |
2224 | return 0; |
2225 | } | |
2226 | ||
43054d3d MC |
2227 | /* |
2228 | * Now re-inject the HRR and current message if appropriate (we just deleted | |
2229 | * it when we reinitialised the transcript hash above). Only necessary after | |
2230 | * receiving a ClientHello2 with a cookie. | |
2231 | */ | |
2232 | if (hrr != NULL | |
2233 | && (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, hrr, hrrlen) | |
2234 | || !ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, | |
555cbb32 | 2235 | s->s3.tmp.message_size |
43054d3d MC |
2236 | + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH))) { |
2237 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
2238 | return 0; | |
2239 | } | |
2240 | ||
11c67eea MC |
2241 | return 1; |
2242 | } | |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2243 | |
2244 | static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b) | |
2245 | { | |
2246 | return X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b); | |
2247 | } | |
2248 | ||
f63a17d6 | 2249 | int parse_ca_names(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2250 | { |
2251 | STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp); | |
2252 | X509_NAME *xn = NULL; | |
2253 | PACKET cadns; | |
2254 | ||
2255 | if (ca_sk == NULL) { | |
c48ffbcc | 2256 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
f63a17d6 | 2257 | goto err; |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2258 | } |
2259 | /* get the CA RDNs */ | |
2260 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cadns)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 2261 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
f63a17d6 | 2262 | goto err; |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2263 | } |
2264 | ||
2265 | while (PACKET_remaining(&cadns)) { | |
2266 | const unsigned char *namestart, *namebytes; | |
2267 | unsigned int name_len; | |
2268 | ||
2269 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cadns, &name_len) | |
2270 | || !PACKET_get_bytes(&cadns, &namebytes, name_len)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 2271 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
f63a17d6 | 2272 | goto err; |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2273 | } |
2274 | ||
2275 | namestart = namebytes; | |
2276 | if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &namebytes, name_len)) == NULL) { | |
c48ffbcc | 2277 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); |
f63a17d6 | 2278 | goto err; |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2279 | } |
2280 | if (namebytes != (namestart + name_len)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 2281 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
f63a17d6 | 2282 | goto err; |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2283 | } |
2284 | ||
2285 | if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 2286 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2287 | goto err; |
2288 | } | |
2289 | xn = NULL; | |
2290 | } | |
2291 | ||
555cbb32 TS |
2292 | sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3.tmp.peer_ca_names, X509_NAME_free); |
2293 | s->s3.tmp.peer_ca_names = ca_sk; | |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2294 | |
2295 | return 1; | |
2296 | ||
5d6cca05 DSH |
2297 | err: |
2298 | sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free); | |
2299 | X509_NAME_free(xn); | |
2300 | return 0; | |
2301 | } | |
2302 | ||
98732979 | 2303 | const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *get_ca_names(SSL *s) |
5d6cca05 | 2304 | { |
1e331727 | 2305 | const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL; |
5d6cca05 | 2306 | |
98732979 MC |
2307 | if (s->server) { |
2308 | ca_sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s); | |
2309 | if (ca_sk != NULL && sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk) == 0) | |
2310 | ca_sk = NULL; | |
2311 | } | |
2312 | ||
2313 | if (ca_sk == NULL) | |
2314 | ca_sk = SSL_get0_CA_list(s); | |
2315 | ||
2316 | return ca_sk; | |
2317 | } | |
2318 | ||
2319 | int construct_ca_names(SSL *s, const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk, WPACKET *pkt) | |
2320 | { | |
5d6cca05 | 2321 | /* Start sub-packet for client CA list */ |
f63a17d6 | 2322 | if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { |
c48ffbcc | 2323 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
5d6cca05 | 2324 | return 0; |
f63a17d6 | 2325 | } |
5d6cca05 | 2326 | |
90fc2c26 | 2327 | if ((ca_sk != NULL) && !(s->options & SSL_OP_DISABLE_TLSEXT_CA_NAMES)) { |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2328 | int i; |
2329 | ||
2330 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk); i++) { | |
2331 | unsigned char *namebytes; | |
2332 | X509_NAME *name = sk_X509_NAME_value(ca_sk, i); | |
2333 | int namelen; | |
2334 | ||
2335 | if (name == NULL | |
2336 | || (namelen = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL)) < 0 | |
2337 | || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, namelen, | |
2338 | &namebytes) | |
2339 | || i2d_X509_NAME(name, &namebytes) != namelen) { | |
c48ffbcc | 2340 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2341 | return 0; |
2342 | } | |
2343 | } | |
2344 | } | |
2345 | ||
f63a17d6 | 2346 | if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) { |
c48ffbcc | 2347 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
5d6cca05 | 2348 | return 0; |
f63a17d6 | 2349 | } |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2350 | |
2351 | return 1; | |
2352 | } | |
72ceb6a6 DSH |
2353 | |
2354 | /* Create a buffer containing data to be signed for server key exchange */ | |
f63a17d6 | 2355 | size_t construct_key_exchange_tbs(SSL *s, unsigned char **ptbs, |
72ceb6a6 DSH |
2356 | const void *param, size_t paramlen) |
2357 | { | |
2358 | size_t tbslen = 2 * SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + paramlen; | |
2359 | unsigned char *tbs = OPENSSL_malloc(tbslen); | |
2360 | ||
f63a17d6 | 2361 | if (tbs == NULL) { |
c48ffbcc | 2362 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
72ceb6a6 | 2363 | return 0; |
f63a17d6 | 2364 | } |
555cbb32 TS |
2365 | memcpy(tbs, s->s3.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); |
2366 | memcpy(tbs + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, s->s3.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); | |
72ceb6a6 DSH |
2367 | |
2368 | memcpy(tbs + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE * 2, param, paramlen); | |
2369 | ||
2370 | *ptbs = tbs; | |
2371 | return tbslen; | |
2372 | } | |
9d75dce3 TS |
2373 | |
2374 | /* | |
2375 | * Saves the current handshake digest for Post-Handshake Auth, | |
2376 | * Done after ClientFinished is processed, done exactly once | |
2377 | */ | |
2378 | int tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(SSL *s) | |
2379 | { | |
2380 | if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) { | |
2381 | if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) | |
2382 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
2383 | return 0; | |
2384 | ||
2385 | s->pha_dgst = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); | |
2386 | if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) { | |
c48ffbcc | 2387 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
9d75dce3 TS |
2388 | return 0; |
2389 | } | |
2390 | if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(s->pha_dgst, | |
555cbb32 | 2391 | s->s3.handshake_dgst)) { |
c48ffbcc | 2392 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
963eb12d | 2393 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(s->pha_dgst); |
2394 | s->pha_dgst = NULL; | |
9d75dce3 TS |
2395 | return 0; |
2396 | } | |
2397 | } | |
2398 | return 1; | |
2399 | } | |
2400 | ||
2401 | /* | |
2402 | * Restores the Post-Handshake Auth handshake digest | |
2403 | * Done just before sending/processing the Cert Request | |
2404 | */ | |
2405 | int tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(SSL *s) | |
2406 | { | |
2407 | if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) { | |
c48ffbcc | 2408 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
9d75dce3 TS |
2409 | return 0; |
2410 | } | |
555cbb32 | 2411 | if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(s->s3.handshake_dgst, |
9d75dce3 | 2412 | s->pha_dgst)) { |
c48ffbcc | 2413 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
9d75dce3 TS |
2414 | return 0; |
2415 | } | |
2416 | return 1; | |
2417 | } |