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846e33c7 RS |
1 | /* |
2 | * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. | |
8e2f6b79 | 3 | * |
846e33c7 RS |
4 | * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use |
5 | * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy | |
6 | * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at | |
7 | * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html | |
8e2f6b79 | 8 | */ |
846e33c7 | 9 | |
ea262260 BM |
10 | /* ==================================================================== |
11 | * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. | |
12 | * | |
0f113f3e | 13 | * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by |
ea262260 BM |
14 | * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project. |
15 | * | |
16 | * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source | |
17 | * license provided above. | |
18 | * | |
ea262260 BM |
19 | * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by |
20 | * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories. | |
21 | * | |
22 | */ | |
ddac1974 NL |
23 | /* ==================================================================== |
24 | * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. | |
25 | * | |
26 | * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by | |
27 | * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source | |
28 | * license. | |
29 | * | |
30 | * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of | |
31 | * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites | |
32 | * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. | |
33 | * | |
34 | * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in | |
35 | * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received | |
36 | * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. | |
37 | * | |
38 | * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not | |
39 | * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third | |
40 | * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights | |
41 | * to make use of the Contribution. | |
42 | * | |
43 | * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN | |
44 | * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA | |
45 | * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY | |
46 | * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR | |
47 | * OTHERWISE. | |
48 | */ | |
d02b48c6 | 49 | |
d02b48c6 | 50 | #include <stdio.h> |
8ba708e5 | 51 | #include "../ssl_locl.h" |
61ae935a | 52 | #include "statem_locl.h" |
68570797 | 53 | #include "internal/constant_time_locl.h" |
ec577822 BM |
54 | #include <openssl/buffer.h> |
55 | #include <openssl/rand.h> | |
56 | #include <openssl/objects.h> | |
57 | #include <openssl/evp.h> | |
6434abbf | 58 | #include <openssl/hmac.h> |
ec577822 | 59 | #include <openssl/x509.h> |
3c27208f | 60 | #include <openssl/dh.h> |
d095b68d | 61 | #include <openssl/bn.h> |
dbad1690 | 62 | #include <openssl/md5.h> |
f9b3bff6 | 63 | |
e46f2334 | 64 | static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt); |
38a3cbfb EK |
65 | static STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s, |
66 | PACKET *cipher_suites, | |
a230b26e EK |
67 | STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) |
68 | **skp, int sslv2format, | |
69 | int *al); | |
d45ba43d | 70 | |
61ae935a | 71 | /* |
0f1e51ea MC |
72 | * ossl_statem_server13_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed |
73 | * handshake state transitions when a TLSv1.3 server is reading messages from | |
74 | * the client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. | |
75 | * The current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|. | |
76 | * | |
94ed2c67 MC |
77 | * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error |
78 | * (transition not allowed) | |
0f1e51ea MC |
79 | */ |
80 | static int ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt) | |
81 | { | |
82 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; | |
83 | ||
94ed2c67 MC |
84 | /* |
85 | * TODO(TLS1.3): This is still based on the TLSv1.2 state machine. Over time | |
86 | * we will update this to look more like real TLSv1.3 | |
87 | */ | |
88 | ||
0f1e51ea MC |
89 | /* |
90 | * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_BEFORE because at that stage we have | |
91 | * not negotiated TLSv1.3 yet, so that case is handled by | |
92 | * ossl_statem_server_read_transition() | |
93 | */ | |
94 | switch (st->hand_state) { | |
95 | default: | |
96 | break; | |
97 | ||
92760c21 | 98 | case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED: |
0f1e51ea MC |
99 | if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) { |
100 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) { | |
101 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT; | |
102 | return 1; | |
103 | } | |
104 | } else { | |
92760c21 MC |
105 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { |
106 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED; | |
0f1e51ea MC |
107 | return 1; |
108 | } | |
109 | } | |
110 | break; | |
111 | ||
112 | case TLS_ST_SR_CERT: | |
113 | if (s->session->peer == NULL) { | |
92760c21 MC |
114 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { |
115 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED; | |
0f1e51ea MC |
116 | return 1; |
117 | } | |
118 | } else { | |
119 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) { | |
120 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY; | |
121 | return 1; | |
122 | } | |
123 | } | |
124 | break; | |
125 | ||
126 | case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY: | |
0f1e51ea MC |
127 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { |
128 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED; | |
129 | return 1; | |
130 | } | |
131 | break; | |
0f1e51ea MC |
132 | } |
133 | ||
134 | /* No valid transition found */ | |
135 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); | |
136 | SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER13_READ_TRANSITION, | |
137 | SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); | |
138 | return 0; | |
139 | } | |
140 | ||
141 | /* | |
142 | * ossl_statem_server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed | |
143 | * handshake state transitions when the server is reading messages from the | |
144 | * client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The | |
145 | * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|. | |
61ae935a | 146 | * |
94ed2c67 MC |
147 | * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error |
148 | * (transition not allowed) | |
61ae935a | 149 | */ |
8481f583 | 150 | int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt) |
61ae935a | 151 | { |
d6f1a6e9 | 152 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; |
61ae935a | 153 | |
f5ca0b04 | 154 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
5abeaf35 MC |
155 | if (!ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(s, mt)) |
156 | goto err; | |
157 | return 1; | |
158 | } | |
0f1e51ea | 159 | |
e8aa8b6c | 160 | switch (st->hand_state) { |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
161 | default: |
162 | break; | |
163 | ||
61ae935a MC |
164 | case TLS_ST_BEFORE: |
165 | case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: | |
166 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) { | |
167 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO; | |
168 | return 1; | |
169 | } | |
170 | break; | |
171 | ||
172 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE: | |
173 | /* | |
174 | * If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either | |
175 | * 1) We didn't request a Certificate | |
176 | * OR | |
177 | * 2) If we did request one then | |
178 | * a) We allow no Certificate to be returned | |
179 | * AND | |
180 | * b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0 | |
181 | * list if we requested a certificate) | |
182 | */ | |
0f512756 MC |
183 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) { |
184 | if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) { | |
185 | if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { | |
23dd09b5 MC |
186 | if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) |
187 | && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) { | |
0f512756 MC |
188 | /* |
189 | * This isn't an unexpected message as such - we're just | |
23dd09b5 MC |
190 | * not going to accept it because we require a client |
191 | * cert. | |
0f512756 MC |
192 | */ |
193 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, | |
194 | SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); | |
340a2828 | 195 | SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION, |
0f512756 MC |
196 | SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); |
197 | return 0; | |
198 | } | |
199 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH; | |
200 | return 1; | |
201 | } | |
202 | } else { | |
203 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH; | |
204 | return 1; | |
205 | } | |
61ae935a MC |
206 | } else if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) { |
207 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) { | |
208 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT; | |
209 | return 1; | |
f100b031 | 210 | } |
61ae935a MC |
211 | } |
212 | break; | |
213 | ||
214 | case TLS_ST_SR_CERT: | |
215 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) { | |
216 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH; | |
217 | return 1; | |
218 | } | |
219 | break; | |
220 | ||
221 | case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH: | |
222 | /* | |
223 | * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have | |
224 | * received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer| | |
225 | * will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is | |
226 | * not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in | |
a71a4966 | 227 | * the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be |
61ae935a MC |
228 | * set. |
229 | */ | |
a71a4966 | 230 | if (s->session->peer == NULL || st->no_cert_verify) { |
61ae935a MC |
231 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { |
232 | /* | |
233 | * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH | |
234 | * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is | |
235 | * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses | |
236 | * its key from the certificate for key exchange. | |
237 | */ | |
238 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE; | |
239 | return 1; | |
240 | } | |
241 | } else { | |
242 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) { | |
243 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY; | |
244 | return 1; | |
245 | } | |
246 | } | |
247 | break; | |
248 | ||
249 | case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY: | |
250 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { | |
251 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE; | |
252 | return 1; | |
253 | } | |
254 | break; | |
255 | ||
256 | case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE: | |
257 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG | |
258 | if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) { | |
259 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) { | |
260 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO; | |
261 | return 1; | |
262 | } | |
263 | } else { | |
264 | #endif | |
265 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { | |
266 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED; | |
267 | return 1; | |
268 | } | |
269 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG | |
270 | } | |
271 | #endif | |
272 | break; | |
273 | ||
274 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG | |
275 | case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO: | |
276 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { | |
277 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED; | |
278 | return 1; | |
279 | } | |
280 | break; | |
281 | #endif | |
282 | ||
283 | case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED: | |
284 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { | |
285 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE; | |
286 | return 1; | |
287 | } | |
288 | break; | |
61ae935a MC |
289 | } |
290 | ||
5abeaf35 | 291 | err: |
61ae935a | 292 | /* No valid transition found */ |
672f3337 | 293 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); |
340a2828 | 294 | SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); |
61ae935a MC |
295 | return 0; |
296 | } | |
297 | ||
298 | /* | |
299 | * Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message? | |
300 | * | |
301 | * Valid return values are: | |
302 | * 1: Yes | |
303 | * 0: No | |
304 | */ | |
bb3e20cf | 305 | static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) |
61ae935a MC |
306 | { |
307 | unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; | |
308 | ||
309 | /* | |
361a1191 | 310 | * only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a |
61ae935a MC |
311 | * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For |
312 | * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if | |
313 | * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, | |
314 | * the server certificate contains the server's public key for | |
315 | * key exchange. | |
316 | */ | |
a230b26e | 317 | if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE) |
61ae935a MC |
318 | /* |
319 | * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if | |
320 | * provided | |
321 | */ | |
322 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK | |
323 | /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */ | |
324 | || ((alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) | |
325 | && s->cert->psk_identity_hint) | |
326 | /* For other PSK always send SKE */ | |
327 | || (alg_k & (SSL_PSK & (SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK))) | |
328 | #endif | |
329 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP | |
330 | /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */ | |
331 | || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) | |
332 | #endif | |
a230b26e | 333 | ) { |
61ae935a MC |
334 | return 1; |
335 | } | |
336 | ||
337 | return 0; | |
338 | } | |
339 | ||
340 | /* | |
341 | * Should we send a CertificateRequest message? | |
342 | * | |
343 | * Valid return values are: | |
344 | * 1: Yes | |
345 | * 0: No | |
346 | */ | |
bb3e20cf | 347 | static int send_certificate_request(SSL *s) |
61ae935a MC |
348 | { |
349 | if ( | |
350 | /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */ | |
351 | s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER | |
352 | /* | |
353 | * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert | |
354 | * during re-negotiation: | |
355 | */ | |
356 | && ((s->session->peer == NULL) || | |
357 | !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) | |
358 | /* | |
359 | * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see | |
360 | * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in | |
361 | * RFC 2246): | |
362 | */ | |
363 | && (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) | |
a230b26e EK |
364 | /* |
365 | * ... except when the application insists on | |
366 | * verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts | |
367 | * this for SSL 3) | |
368 | */ | |
61ae935a MC |
369 | || (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) |
370 | /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */ | |
371 | && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP) | |
372 | /* | |
373 | * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests | |
374 | * are omitted | |
375 | */ | |
b7fa1f98 | 376 | && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) { |
61ae935a MC |
377 | return 1; |
378 | } | |
379 | ||
380 | return 0; | |
381 | } | |
382 | ||
383 | /* | |
0f1e51ea MC |
384 | * ossl_statem_server13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to |
385 | * move to next when a TLSv1.3 server is writing messages to be sent to the | |
386 | * client. | |
0f1e51ea MC |
387 | */ |
388 | static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(SSL *s) | |
389 | { | |
390 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; | |
391 | ||
94ed2c67 MC |
392 | /* |
393 | * TODO(TLS1.3): This is still based on the TLSv1.2 state machine. Over time | |
394 | * we will update this to look more like real TLSv1.3 | |
395 | */ | |
396 | ||
0f1e51ea MC |
397 | /* |
398 | * No case for TLS_ST_BEFORE, because at that stage we have not negotiated | |
399 | * TLSv1.3 yet, so that is handled by ossl_statem_server_write_transition() | |
400 | */ | |
401 | ||
402 | switch (st->hand_state) { | |
403 | default: | |
404 | /* Shouldn't happen */ | |
405 | return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR; | |
406 | ||
407 | case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO: | |
408 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO; | |
409 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
410 | ||
411 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO: | |
e46f2334 MC |
412 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS; |
413 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
414 | ||
415 | case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS: | |
94ed2c67 | 416 | if (s->hit) |
92760c21 MC |
417 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED; |
418 | else if (send_certificate_request(s)) | |
419 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ; | |
94ed2c67 | 420 | else |
0f1e51ea | 421 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT; |
94ed2c67 | 422 | |
0f1e51ea MC |
423 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
424 | ||
0f1e51ea | 425 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ: |
92760c21 | 426 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT; |
0f1e51ea MC |
427 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
428 | ||
92760c21 | 429 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT: |
f5ca0b04 MC |
430 | st->hand_state = s->tlsext_status_expected ? TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS |
431 | : TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED; | |
0f1e51ea MC |
432 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
433 | ||
92760c21 | 434 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS: |
0f1e51ea MC |
435 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED; |
436 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
437 | ||
438 | case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED: | |
92760c21 | 439 | return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; |
94ed2c67 | 440 | |
92760c21 | 441 | case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED: |
0f1e51ea MC |
442 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; |
443 | ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0); | |
444 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
445 | } | |
446 | } | |
447 | ||
448 | /* | |
449 | * ossl_statem_server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move | |
450 | * to next when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client. | |
61ae935a | 451 | */ |
8481f583 | 452 | WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL *s) |
61ae935a | 453 | { |
d6f1a6e9 | 454 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; |
61ae935a | 455 | |
0f1e51ea MC |
456 | /* |
457 | * Note that before the ClientHello we don't know what version we are going | |
458 | * to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later | |
459 | */ | |
460 | ||
f5ca0b04 | 461 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) |
0f1e51ea MC |
462 | return ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(s); |
463 | ||
e8aa8b6c | 464 | switch (st->hand_state) { |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
465 | default: |
466 | /* Shouldn't happen */ | |
467 | return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR; | |
468 | ||
e8aa8b6c | 469 | case TLS_ST_BEFORE: |
a230b26e | 470 | /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */ |
e8aa8b6c | 471 | return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; |
61ae935a | 472 | |
e8aa8b6c F |
473 | case TLS_ST_OK: |
474 | /* We must be trying to renegotiate */ | |
475 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ; | |
476 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
61ae935a | 477 | |
e8aa8b6c F |
478 | case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ: |
479 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; | |
480 | ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0); | |
481 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
61ae935a | 482 | |
e8aa8b6c F |
483 | case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO: |
484 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->d1->cookie_verified | |
a230b26e | 485 | && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)) |
e8aa8b6c F |
486 | st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST; |
487 | else | |
488 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO; | |
489 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
61ae935a | 490 | |
e8aa8b6c F |
491 | case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: |
492 | return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; | |
61ae935a | 493 | |
e8aa8b6c F |
494 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO: |
495 | if (s->hit) { | |
496 | if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) | |
497 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET; | |
498 | else | |
499 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE; | |
500 | } else { | |
501 | /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */ | |
502 | /* normal PSK or SRP */ | |
503 | if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & | |
a230b26e | 504 | (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) { |
e8aa8b6c F |
505 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT; |
506 | } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) { | |
61ae935a | 507 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH; |
e8aa8b6c | 508 | } else if (send_certificate_request(s)) { |
61ae935a | 509 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ; |
e8aa8b6c F |
510 | } else { |
511 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE; | |
61ae935a | 512 | } |
e8aa8b6c F |
513 | } |
514 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
61ae935a | 515 | |
e8aa8b6c F |
516 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT: |
517 | if (s->tlsext_status_expected) { | |
518 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS; | |
61ae935a | 519 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
e8aa8b6c F |
520 | } |
521 | /* Fall through */ | |
61ae935a | 522 | |
e8aa8b6c F |
523 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS: |
524 | if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) { | |
525 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH; | |
61ae935a | 526 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
e8aa8b6c F |
527 | } |
528 | /* Fall through */ | |
61ae935a | 529 | |
e8aa8b6c F |
530 | case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH: |
531 | if (send_certificate_request(s)) { | |
532 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ; | |
61ae935a | 533 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
e8aa8b6c F |
534 | } |
535 | /* Fall through */ | |
61ae935a | 536 | |
e8aa8b6c F |
537 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ: |
538 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE; | |
539 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
61ae935a | 540 | |
e8aa8b6c F |
541 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE: |
542 | return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; | |
543 | ||
544 | case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED: | |
545 | if (s->hit) { | |
61ae935a | 546 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; |
fe3a3291 | 547 | ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0); |
61ae935a | 548 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
e8aa8b6c F |
549 | } else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) { |
550 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET; | |
551 | } else { | |
552 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE; | |
553 | } | |
554 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
555 | ||
556 | case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET: | |
557 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE; | |
558 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
61ae935a | 559 | |
e8aa8b6c F |
560 | case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE: |
561 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED; | |
562 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
563 | ||
564 | case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED: | |
565 | if (s->hit) { | |
566 | return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; | |
567 | } | |
568 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; | |
569 | ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0); | |
570 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
61ae935a MC |
571 | } |
572 | } | |
573 | ||
574 | /* | |
575 | * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from | |
576 | * the server to the client. | |
577 | */ | |
8481f583 | 578 | WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) |
61ae935a | 579 | { |
d6f1a6e9 | 580 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; |
61ae935a | 581 | |
e8aa8b6c | 582 | switch (st->hand_state) { |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
583 | default: |
584 | /* No pre work to be done */ | |
585 | break; | |
586 | ||
61ae935a MC |
587 | case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ: |
588 | s->shutdown = 0; | |
589 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) | |
f5c7f5df | 590 | dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s); |
61ae935a MC |
591 | break; |
592 | ||
593 | case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: | |
594 | s->shutdown = 0; | |
595 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
f5c7f5df | 596 | dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s); |
61ae935a MC |
597 | /* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */ |
598 | st->use_timer = 0; | |
599 | } | |
600 | break; | |
601 | ||
602 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO: | |
603 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
604 | /* | |
605 | * Messages we write from now on should be bufferred and | |
606 | * retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now | |
607 | */ | |
608 | st->use_timer = 1; | |
609 | } | |
610 | break; | |
611 | ||
612 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE: | |
613 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
614 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) | |
615 | return dtls_wait_for_dry(s); | |
616 | #endif | |
617 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; | |
618 | ||
619 | case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET: | |
620 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
621 | /* | |
622 | * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight | |
623 | * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer | |
624 | */ | |
625 | st->use_timer = 0; | |
626 | } | |
627 | break; | |
628 | ||
629 | case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE: | |
630 | s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; | |
631 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) { | |
fe3a3291 | 632 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); |
61ae935a MC |
633 | return WORK_ERROR; |
634 | } | |
635 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
636 | /* | |
637 | * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight | |
638 | * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have | |
639 | * already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message, | |
640 | * but we'll set it again here in case we didn't. | |
641 | */ | |
642 | st->use_timer = 0; | |
643 | } | |
644 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; | |
645 | ||
646 | case TLS_ST_OK: | |
647 | return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst); | |
61ae935a MC |
648 | } |
649 | ||
650 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; | |
651 | } | |
652 | ||
653 | /* | |
654 | * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the | |
655 | * server to the client. | |
656 | */ | |
8481f583 | 657 | WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) |
61ae935a | 658 | { |
d6f1a6e9 | 659 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; |
61ae935a MC |
660 | |
661 | s->init_num = 0; | |
662 | ||
e8aa8b6c | 663 | switch (st->hand_state) { |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
664 | default: |
665 | /* No post work to be done */ | |
666 | break; | |
667 | ||
61ae935a MC |
668 | case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ: |
669 | if (statem_flush(s) != 1) | |
670 | return WORK_MORE_A; | |
2c4a056f MC |
671 | if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) { |
672 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); | |
673 | return WORK_ERROR; | |
674 | } | |
61ae935a MC |
675 | break; |
676 | ||
677 | case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: | |
678 | if (statem_flush(s) != 1) | |
679 | return WORK_MORE_A; | |
680 | /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */ | |
2c4a056f MC |
681 | if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER && !ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) { |
682 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); | |
683 | return WORK_ERROR; | |
684 | } | |
61ae935a MC |
685 | /* |
686 | * The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to | |
687 | * treat like it was the first packet | |
688 | */ | |
689 | s->first_packet = 1; | |
690 | break; | |
691 | ||
692 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO: | |
693 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
694 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) { | |
695 | unsigned char sctpauthkey[64]; | |
696 | char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)]; | |
697 | ||
698 | /* | |
699 | * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no | |
700 | * SCTP used. | |
701 | */ | |
141eb8c6 MC |
702 | memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL, |
703 | sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)); | |
61ae935a MC |
704 | |
705 | if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey, | |
a230b26e EK |
706 | sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer, |
707 | sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, | |
708 | 0) <= 0) { | |
fe3a3291 | 709 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); |
61ae935a MC |
710 | return WORK_ERROR; |
711 | } | |
712 | ||
713 | BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY, | |
714 | sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey); | |
715 | } | |
716 | #endif | |
92760c21 MC |
717 | /* |
718 | * TODO(TLS1.3): This actually causes a problem. We don't yet know | |
719 | * whether the next record we are going to receive is an unencrypted | |
720 | * alert, or an encrypted handshake message. We're going to need | |
721 | * something clever in the record layer for this. | |
722 | */ | |
723 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { | |
724 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s) | |
725 | || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, | |
726 | SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE) | |
727 | || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, | |
728 | SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE |SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) | |
729 | return WORK_ERROR; | |
730 | } | |
61ae935a MC |
731 | break; |
732 | ||
733 | case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE: | |
734 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
735 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->hit) { | |
736 | /* | |
737 | * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if | |
738 | * no SCTP used. | |
739 | */ | |
740 | BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY, | |
741 | 0, NULL); | |
742 | } | |
743 | #endif | |
744 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, | |
a230b26e EK |
745 | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) |
746 | { | |
fe3a3291 | 747 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); |
61ae935a MC |
748 | return WORK_ERROR; |
749 | } | |
750 | ||
751 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) | |
752 | dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE); | |
753 | break; | |
754 | ||
755 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE: | |
756 | if (statem_flush(s) != 1) | |
757 | return WORK_MORE_A; | |
758 | break; | |
759 | ||
760 | case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED: | |
761 | if (statem_flush(s) != 1) | |
762 | return WORK_MORE_A; | |
763 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
764 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) { | |
765 | /* | |
766 | * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if | |
767 | * no SCTP used. | |
768 | */ | |
769 | BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY, | |
770 | 0, NULL); | |
771 | } | |
772 | #endif | |
92760c21 MC |
773 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
774 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, | |
775 | s->session->master_key, s->handshake_secret, 0, | |
776 | &s->session->master_key_length) | |
777 | || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, | |
778 | SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) | |
779 | return WORK_ERROR; | |
780 | } | |
61ae935a | 781 | break; |
61ae935a MC |
782 | } |
783 | ||
784 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; | |
785 | } | |
786 | ||
787 | /* | |
6392fb8e MC |
788 | * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the |
789 | * server | |
61ae935a MC |
790 | * |
791 | * Valid return values are: | |
792 | * 1: Success | |
793 | * 0: Error | |
794 | */ | |
6392fb8e | 795 | int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, |
a15c953f | 796 | confunc_f *confunc, int *mt) |
61ae935a | 797 | { |
d6f1a6e9 | 798 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; |
61ae935a | 799 | |
4a01c59f MC |
800 | switch (st->hand_state) { |
801 | default: | |
802 | /* Shouldn't happen */ | |
803 | return 0; | |
804 | ||
805 | case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE: | |
5923ad4b | 806 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) |
6392fb8e | 807 | *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec; |
4a01c59f | 808 | else |
6392fb8e MC |
809 | *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec; |
810 | *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; | |
4a01c59f | 811 | break; |
f3b3d7f0 | 812 | |
4a01c59f | 813 | case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: |
6392fb8e MC |
814 | *confunc = dtls_construct_hello_verify_request; |
815 | *mt = DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST; | |
4a01c59f | 816 | break; |
61ae935a | 817 | |
4a01c59f MC |
818 | case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ: |
819 | /* No construction function needed */ | |
6392fb8e MC |
820 | *confunc = NULL; |
821 | *mt = SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST; | |
4a01c59f | 822 | break; |
61ae935a | 823 | |
4a01c59f | 824 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO: |
6392fb8e MC |
825 | *confunc = tls_construct_server_hello; |
826 | *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO; | |
4a01c59f | 827 | break; |
61ae935a | 828 | |
4a01c59f | 829 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT: |
6392fb8e MC |
830 | *confunc = tls_construct_server_certificate; |
831 | *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE; | |
4a01c59f | 832 | break; |
61ae935a | 833 | |
4a01c59f | 834 | case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH: |
6392fb8e MC |
835 | *confunc = tls_construct_server_key_exchange; |
836 | *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; | |
4a01c59f | 837 | break; |
61ae935a | 838 | |
4a01c59f | 839 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ: |
6392fb8e MC |
840 | *confunc = tls_construct_certificate_request; |
841 | *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST; | |
4a01c59f | 842 | break; |
61ae935a | 843 | |
4a01c59f | 844 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE: |
6392fb8e MC |
845 | *confunc = tls_construct_server_done; |
846 | *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE; | |
4a01c59f | 847 | break; |
61ae935a | 848 | |
4a01c59f | 849 | case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET: |
6392fb8e MC |
850 | *confunc = tls_construct_new_session_ticket; |
851 | *mt = SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET; | |
4a01c59f | 852 | break; |
61ae935a | 853 | |
4a01c59f | 854 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS: |
6392fb8e MC |
855 | *confunc = tls_construct_cert_status; |
856 | *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS; | |
4a01c59f | 857 | break; |
61ae935a | 858 | |
4a01c59f | 859 | case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED: |
6392fb8e MC |
860 | *confunc = tls_construct_finished; |
861 | *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED; | |
4a01c59f | 862 | break; |
e46f2334 MC |
863 | |
864 | case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS: | |
865 | *confunc = tls_construct_encrypted_extensions; | |
866 | *mt = SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS; | |
867 | break; | |
4a01c59f | 868 | } |
61ae935a | 869 | |
5923ad4b | 870 | return 1; |
61ae935a MC |
871 | } |
872 | ||
8a18bc25 AG |
873 | /* |
874 | * Maximum size (excluding the Handshake header) of a ClientHello message, | |
875 | * calculated as follows: | |
876 | * | |
877 | * 2 + # client_version | |
878 | * 32 + # only valid length for random | |
879 | * 1 + # length of session_id | |
880 | * 32 + # maximum size for session_id | |
881 | * 2 + # length of cipher suites | |
882 | * 2^16-2 + # maximum length of cipher suites array | |
883 | * 1 + # length of compression_methods | |
884 | * 2^8-1 + # maximum length of compression methods | |
885 | * 2 + # length of extensions | |
886 | * 2^16-1 # maximum length of extensions | |
887 | */ | |
888 | #define CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH 131396 | |
889 | ||
61ae935a MC |
890 | #define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048 |
891 | #define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514 | |
892 | ||
893 | /* | |
894 | * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are | |
895 | * reading. Excludes the message header. | |
896 | */ | |
eda75751 | 897 | size_t ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL *s) |
61ae935a | 898 | { |
d6f1a6e9 | 899 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; |
61ae935a | 900 | |
e8aa8b6c | 901 | switch (st->hand_state) { |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
902 | default: |
903 | /* Shouldn't happen */ | |
904 | return 0; | |
905 | ||
61ae935a | 906 | case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO: |
8a18bc25 | 907 | return CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH; |
61ae935a MC |
908 | |
909 | case TLS_ST_SR_CERT: | |
910 | return s->max_cert_list; | |
911 | ||
912 | case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH: | |
913 | return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH; | |
914 | ||
915 | case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY: | |
916 | return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH; | |
917 | ||
918 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG | |
919 | case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO: | |
920 | return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH; | |
921 | #endif | |
922 | ||
923 | case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE: | |
924 | return CCS_MAX_LENGTH; | |
925 | ||
926 | case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED: | |
927 | return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH; | |
61ae935a | 928 | } |
61ae935a MC |
929 | } |
930 | ||
931 | /* | |
932 | * Process a message that the server has received from the client. | |
933 | */ | |
8481f583 | 934 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
61ae935a | 935 | { |
d6f1a6e9 | 936 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; |
61ae935a | 937 | |
e8aa8b6c | 938 | switch (st->hand_state) { |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
939 | default: |
940 | /* Shouldn't happen */ | |
941 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
942 | ||
61ae935a MC |
943 | case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO: |
944 | return tls_process_client_hello(s, pkt); | |
945 | ||
946 | case TLS_ST_SR_CERT: | |
947 | return tls_process_client_certificate(s, pkt); | |
948 | ||
949 | case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH: | |
950 | return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s, pkt); | |
951 | ||
952 | case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY: | |
953 | return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt); | |
954 | ||
955 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG | |
956 | case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO: | |
957 | return tls_process_next_proto(s, pkt); | |
958 | #endif | |
959 | ||
960 | case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE: | |
961 | return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt); | |
962 | ||
963 | case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED: | |
964 | return tls_process_finished(s, pkt); | |
61ae935a | 965 | } |
61ae935a MC |
966 | } |
967 | ||
968 | /* | |
969 | * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message | |
970 | * from the client | |
971 | */ | |
8481f583 | 972 | WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) |
61ae935a | 973 | { |
d6f1a6e9 | 974 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; |
61ae935a | 975 | |
e8aa8b6c | 976 | switch (st->hand_state) { |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
977 | default: |
978 | /* Shouldn't happen */ | |
979 | return WORK_ERROR; | |
980 | ||
61ae935a MC |
981 | case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO: |
982 | return tls_post_process_client_hello(s, wst); | |
983 | ||
984 | case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH: | |
985 | return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s, wst); | |
986 | ||
987 | case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY: | |
988 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
a230b26e EK |
989 | if ( /* Is this SCTP? */ |
990 | BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)) | |
991 | /* Are we renegotiating? */ | |
992 | && s->renegotiate && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) { | |
61ae935a MC |
993 | s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2; |
994 | s->rwstate = SSL_READING; | |
995 | BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s)); | |
996 | BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s)); | |
d99b0691 | 997 | ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1); |
61ae935a MC |
998 | return WORK_MORE_A; |
999 | } else { | |
d99b0691 | 1000 | ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0); |
61ae935a MC |
1001 | } |
1002 | #endif | |
1003 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; | |
61ae935a | 1004 | } |
92760c21 | 1005 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; |
61ae935a MC |
1006 | } |
1007 | ||
edc032b5 | 1008 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP |
71fa4513 | 1009 | static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al) |
0f113f3e MC |
1010 | { |
1011 | int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE; | |
1012 | ||
1013 | *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; | |
1014 | ||
1015 | if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) && | |
1016 | (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) { | |
1017 | if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) { | |
1018 | /* | |
1019 | * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp | |
1020 | * login name | |
1021 | */ | |
1022 | ret = SSL3_AL_FATAL; | |
1023 | *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY; | |
1024 | } else { | |
1025 | ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, al); | |
1026 | } | |
1027 | } | |
1028 | return ret; | |
1029 | } | |
edc032b5 BL |
1030 | #endif |
1031 | ||
c536b6be | 1032 | int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(WPACKET *pkt, unsigned char *cookie, |
cb150cbc | 1033 | size_t cookie_len) |
8ba708e5 | 1034 | { |
8ba708e5 | 1035 | /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */ |
c536b6be MC |
1036 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, DTLS1_VERSION) |
1037 | || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, cookie, cookie_len)) | |
1038 | return 0; | |
8ba708e5 | 1039 | |
c536b6be | 1040 | return 1; |
8ba708e5 MC |
1041 | } |
1042 | ||
7cea05dc | 1043 | int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
8ba708e5 | 1044 | { |
cb150cbc | 1045 | unsigned int cookie_leni; |
8ba708e5 MC |
1046 | if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL || |
1047 | s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie, | |
cb150cbc MC |
1048 | &cookie_leni) == 0 || |
1049 | cookie_leni > 255) { | |
f0659bdb | 1050 | SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, |
8ba708e5 | 1051 | SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE); |
8ba708e5 MC |
1052 | return 0; |
1053 | } | |
cb150cbc | 1054 | s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_leni; |
8ba708e5 | 1055 | |
4a01c59f MC |
1056 | if (!dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(pkt, s->d1->cookie, |
1057 | s->d1->cookie_len)) { | |
c536b6be | 1058 | SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
c536b6be MC |
1059 | return 0; |
1060 | } | |
8ba708e5 | 1061 | |
8ba708e5 MC |
1062 | return 1; |
1063 | } | |
1064 | ||
6b473aca MC |
1065 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
1066 | /*- | |
1067 | * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X | |
1068 | * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |hello|. | |
1069 | * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order: | |
1070 | * SNI, | |
1071 | * elliptic_curves | |
1072 | * ec_point_formats | |
1073 | * | |
1074 | * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8, | |
1075 | * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them. | |
1076 | * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from | |
1077 | * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work). | |
1078 | */ | |
1079 | static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello) | |
1080 | { | |
1081 | unsigned int type; | |
1082 | PACKET sni, tmppkt; | |
1083 | size_t ext_len; | |
1084 | ||
1085 | static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = { | |
1086 | 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */ | |
1087 | 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */ | |
1088 | 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */ | |
1089 | 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */ | |
1090 | 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */ | |
1091 | 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */ | |
1092 | ||
1093 | 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */ | |
1094 | 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */ | |
1095 | 0x01, /* 1 point format */ | |
1096 | 0x00, /* uncompressed */ | |
1097 | /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */ | |
1098 | 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */ | |
1099 | 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */ | |
1100 | 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */ | |
1101 | 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */ | |
1102 | 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */ | |
1103 | 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */ | |
1104 | 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */ | |
1105 | 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */ | |
1106 | }; | |
1107 | ||
1108 | /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */ | |
1109 | static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18; | |
1110 | ||
1111 | tmppkt = hello->extensions; | |
1112 | ||
1113 | if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2) | |
1114 | || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type) | |
1115 | || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) { | |
1116 | return; | |
1117 | } | |
1118 | ||
1119 | if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) | |
1120 | return; | |
1121 | ||
1122 | ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ? | |
1123 | sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength; | |
1124 | ||
1125 | s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock, | |
1126 | ext_len); | |
1127 | } | |
1128 | #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ | |
1129 | ||
1130 | /* | |
1131 | * Process all remaining ClientHello extensions that we collected earlier and | |
1132 | * haven't already processed. | |
1133 | * | |
1134 | * Behaviour upon resumption is extension-specific. If the extension has no | |
1135 | * effect during resumption, it is parsed (to verify its format) but otherwise | |
1136 | * ignored. Returns 1 on success and 0 on failure. Upon failure, sets |al| to | |
1137 | * the appropriate alert. | |
1138 | */ | |
1139 | static int tls_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello, int *al) | |
1140 | { | |
1141 | /* Reset various flags that might get set by extensions during parsing */ | |
1142 | s->servername_done = 0; | |
1143 | s->tlsext_status_type = -1; | |
1144 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG | |
1145 | s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; | |
1146 | #endif | |
1147 | ||
1148 | OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected); | |
1149 | s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL; | |
1150 | s->s3->alpn_selected_len = 0; | |
1151 | OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_proposed); | |
1152 | s->s3->alpn_proposed = NULL; | |
1153 | s->s3->alpn_proposed_len = 0; | |
1154 | ||
1155 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC | |
1156 | if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG) | |
1157 | ssl_check_for_safari(s, hello); | |
1158 | #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ | |
1159 | ||
1160 | /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */ | |
1161 | OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs); | |
1162 | s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = NULL; | |
1163 | s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC; | |
1164 | ||
1165 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP | |
1166 | OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login); | |
1167 | s->srp_ctx.login = NULL; | |
1168 | #endif | |
1169 | ||
1170 | s->srtp_profile = NULL; | |
1171 | ||
1172 | /* | |
1173 | * We process the supported_groups extension first so that is done before | |
1174 | * we get to key_share which needs to use the information in it. | |
1175 | */ | |
4b299b8e | 1176 | if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups, EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, |
6b473aca MC |
1177 | hello->pre_proc_exts, hello->num_extensions, al)) { |
1178 | return 0; | |
1179 | } | |
1180 | ||
1181 | /* Need RI if renegotiating */ | |
1182 | if (s->renegotiate | |
1183 | && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION) | |
1184 | && tls_get_extension_by_type(hello->pre_proc_exts, | |
1185 | hello->num_extensions, | |
1186 | TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) == NULL) { | |
1187 | *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
4b299b8e | 1188 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, |
6b473aca MC |
1189 | SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); |
1190 | return 0; | |
1191 | } | |
1192 | ||
4b299b8e | 1193 | return tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, hello->pre_proc_exts, |
6b473aca MC |
1194 | hello->num_extensions, al); |
1195 | } | |
1196 | ||
1197 | /* | |
1198 | * Check the results of extension parsing. Currently just calls the servername | |
1199 | * callback. Returns 1 for success or 0 for failure. | |
1200 | */ | |
1201 | static int tls_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s) | |
1202 | { | |
1203 | int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; | |
1204 | int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; | |
1205 | ||
1206 | if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) | |
1207 | ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, | |
1208 | s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); | |
1209 | else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL | |
1210 | && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) | |
1211 | ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, | |
1212 | s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); | |
1213 | ||
1214 | switch (ret) { | |
1215 | case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: | |
1216 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
1217 | return 0; | |
1218 | ||
1219 | case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: | |
1220 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al); | |
1221 | return 1; | |
1222 | ||
1223 | case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: | |
1224 | s->servername_done = 0; | |
1225 | return 1; | |
1226 | ||
1227 | default: | |
1228 | return 1; | |
1229 | } | |
1230 | } | |
1231 | ||
1232 | /* | |
1233 | * Parse the extensions in the ClientHello that were collected earlier. Returns | |
1234 | * 1 for success or 0 for failure. | |
1235 | */ | |
1236 | static int tls_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello) | |
1237 | { | |
1238 | int al = -1; | |
1239 | ||
1240 | custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext); | |
1241 | ||
1242 | if (tls_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, hello, &al) <= 0) { | |
1243 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
1244 | return 0; | |
1245 | } | |
1246 | ||
1247 | if (!tls_check_clienthello_tlsext(s)) { | |
4b299b8e | 1248 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); |
6b473aca MC |
1249 | return 0; |
1250 | } | |
1251 | ||
1252 | return 1; | |
1253 | } | |
1254 | ||
be3583fa | 1255 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
e27f234a MC |
1256 | { |
1257 | int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
348240c6 | 1258 | unsigned int j; |
1ab3836b | 1259 | size_t loop; |
e27f234a | 1260 | unsigned long id; |
4a640fb6 | 1261 | const SSL_CIPHER *c; |
e27f234a MC |
1262 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP |
1263 | SSL_COMP *comp = NULL; | |
1264 | #endif | |
1265 | STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL; | |
4fa52141 | 1266 | int protverr; |
e27f234a | 1267 | /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */ |
1ab3836b | 1268 | PACKET session_id, compression, extensions, cookie; |
6e3ff632 | 1269 | static const unsigned char null_compression = 0; |
1ab3836b | 1270 | CLIENTHELLO_MSG clienthello; |
e27f234a | 1271 | |
1ab3836b | 1272 | /* |
b1b4b543 | 1273 | * First, parse the raw ClientHello data into the CLIENTHELLO_MSG structure. |
1ab3836b | 1274 | */ |
9529419d | 1275 | memset(&clienthello, 0, sizeof(clienthello)); |
1ab3836b | 1276 | clienthello.isv2 = RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer); |
bbafa47b | 1277 | PACKET_null_init(&cookie); |
1ab3836b MC |
1278 | |
1279 | if (clienthello.isv2) { | |
9ceb2426 | 1280 | unsigned int mt; |
b1b4b543 | 1281 | |
32ec4153 MC |
1282 | /*- |
1283 | * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2 | |
1284 | * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS | |
1285 | * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes | |
1286 | * the rest right through. Its format is: | |
1287 | * Byte Content | |
1288 | * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer | |
1289 | * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here | |
1290 | * 3-4 version | |
1291 | * 5-6 cipher_spec_length | |
1292 | * 7-8 session_id_length | |
1293 | * 9-10 challenge_length | |
1294 | * ... ... | |
1295 | */ | |
1296 | ||
73999b62 | 1297 | if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mt) |
a230b26e | 1298 | || mt != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) { |
32ec4153 MC |
1299 | /* |
1300 | * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record | |
1301 | * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record | |
1302 | * in the first place | |
1303 | */ | |
e27f234a | 1304 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
d45ba43d | 1305 | goto err; |
32ec4153 | 1306 | } |
32ec4153 MC |
1307 | } |
1308 | ||
df7ce507 | 1309 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &clienthello.legacy_version)) { |
1ab3836b MC |
1310 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
1311 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); | |
1312 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1313 | } |
1314 | ||
b3e2272c | 1315 | /* Parse the message and load client random. */ |
1ab3836b | 1316 | if (clienthello.isv2) { |
32ec4153 MC |
1317 | /* |
1318 | * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello | |
1319 | * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format. | |
e2994cf0 | 1320 | * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected below. |
32ec4153 | 1321 | */ |
1ab3836b | 1322 | unsigned int ciphersuite_len, session_id_len, challenge_len; |
b3e2272c | 1323 | PACKET challenge; |
0f113f3e | 1324 | |
1ab3836b | 1325 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ciphersuite_len) |
a230b26e EK |
1326 | || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &session_id_len) |
1327 | || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &challenge_len)) { | |
e27f234a MC |
1328 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, |
1329 | SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
6c3cca57 AE |
1330 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
1331 | goto f_err; | |
5e9f0eeb | 1332 | } |
0f113f3e | 1333 | |
293b5ca4 AG |
1334 | if (session_id_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) { |
1335 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
1336 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
1337 | goto f_err; | |
1338 | } | |
1339 | ||
1ab3836b MC |
1340 | if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &clienthello.ciphersuites, |
1341 | ciphersuite_len) | |
035b1e69 | 1342 | || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello.session_id, session_id_len) |
73999b62 | 1343 | || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &challenge, challenge_len) |
b3e2272c | 1344 | /* No extensions. */ |
73999b62 | 1345 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { |
f0659bdb MC |
1346 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, |
1347 | SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
9ceb2426 MC |
1348 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
1349 | goto f_err; | |
1350 | } | |
035b1e69 | 1351 | clienthello.session_id_len = session_id_len; |
9ceb2426 | 1352 | |
fba7b84c MC |
1353 | /* Load the client random and compression list. We use SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE |
1354 | * here rather than sizeof(clienthello.random) because that is the limit | |
1355 | * for SSLv3 and it is fixed. It won't change even if | |
1356 | * sizeof(clienthello.random) does. | |
1357 | */ | |
1358 | challenge_len = challenge_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE | |
1359 | ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE : challenge_len; | |
1360 | memset(clienthello.random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); | |
b3e2272c | 1361 | if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge, |
fba7b84c | 1362 | clienthello.random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE - |
cb21df32 DB |
1363 | challenge_len, challenge_len) |
1364 | /* Advertise only null compression. */ | |
1365 | || !PACKET_buf_init(&compression, &null_compression, 1)) { | |
f0659bdb | 1366 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
b3e2272c | 1367 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
9ceb2426 MC |
1368 | goto f_err; |
1369 | } | |
b3e2272c | 1370 | |
1ab3836b | 1371 | PACKET_null_init(&clienthello.extensions); |
0f113f3e | 1372 | } else { |
b3e2272c | 1373 | /* Regular ClientHello. */ |
1ab3836b | 1374 | if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello.random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) |
e2994cf0 MC |
1375 | || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id) |
1376 | || !PACKET_copy_all(&session_id, clienthello.session_id, | |
1377 | SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH, | |
1378 | &clienthello.session_id_len)) { | |
9ceb2426 | 1379 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
f0659bdb | 1380 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
9ceb2426 MC |
1381 | goto f_err; |
1382 | } | |
32ec4153 | 1383 | |
b3e2272c | 1384 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
73999b62 | 1385 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookie)) { |
32ec4153 | 1386 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
f0659bdb | 1387 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
32ec4153 MC |
1388 | goto f_err; |
1389 | } | |
1ab3836b MC |
1390 | if (!PACKET_copy_all(&cookie, clienthello.dtls_cookie, |
1391 | DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH, | |
1392 | &clienthello.dtls_cookie_len)) { | |
1393 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
1394 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
1395 | goto f_err; | |
1396 | } | |
b3e2272c EK |
1397 | /* |
1398 | * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one, | |
1399 | * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet. | |
1400 | * So check cookie length... | |
1401 | */ | |
1402 | if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) { | |
1ab3836b | 1403 | if (clienthello.dtls_cookie_len == 0) |
a230b26e | 1404 | return 1; |
b3e2272c | 1405 | } |
5e9f0eeb | 1406 | } |
0f113f3e | 1407 | |
1ab3836b MC |
1408 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello.ciphersuites)) { |
1409 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
1410 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
1411 | goto f_err; | |
1412 | } | |
1413 | ||
4bfe1432 | 1414 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &compression)) { |
a230b26e EK |
1415 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
1416 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
1417 | goto f_err; | |
b3e2272c | 1418 | } |
1ab3836b | 1419 | |
b3e2272c | 1420 | /* Could be empty. */ |
1ab3836b MC |
1421 | if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) { |
1422 | PACKET_null_init(&clienthello.extensions); | |
1423 | } else { | |
1424 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello.extensions)) { | |
1425 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
1426 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
1427 | goto f_err; | |
1428 | } | |
1429 | } | |
1430 | } | |
1431 | ||
4bfe1432 | 1432 | if (!PACKET_copy_all(&compression, clienthello.compressions, |
e2994cf0 MC |
1433 | MAX_COMPRESSIONS_SIZE, |
1434 | &clienthello.compressions_len)) { | |
1ab3836b MC |
1435 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
1436 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
1437 | goto f_err; | |
1438 | } | |
1439 | ||
b1b4b543 | 1440 | /* Preserve the raw extensions PACKET for later use */ |
1ab3836b | 1441 | extensions = clienthello.extensions; |
fadd9a1e MC |
1442 | if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, |
1443 | &clienthello.pre_proc_exts, | |
1444 | &clienthello.num_extensions, &al)) { | |
1ab3836b MC |
1445 | /* SSLerr already been called */ |
1446 | goto f_err; | |
1447 | } | |
1448 | ||
1449 | /* Finished parsing the ClientHello, now we can start processing it */ | |
1450 | ||
1451 | /* Set up the client_random */ | |
1452 | memcpy(s->s3->client_random, clienthello.random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); | |
1453 | ||
1454 | /* Choose the version */ | |
1455 | ||
1456 | if (clienthello.isv2) { | |
df7ce507 MC |
1457 | if (clienthello.legacy_version == SSL2_VERSION |
1458 | || (clienthello.legacy_version & 0xff00) | |
b1b4b543 MC |
1459 | != (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)) { |
1460 | /* | |
1461 | * This is real SSLv2 or something complete unknown. We don't | |
1462 | * support it. | |
1463 | */ | |
1ab3836b MC |
1464 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL); |
1465 | goto err; | |
1466 | } | |
b1b4b543 | 1467 | /* SSLv3/TLS */ |
df7ce507 | 1468 | s->client_version = clienthello.legacy_version; |
1ab3836b MC |
1469 | } |
1470 | /* | |
1471 | * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check | |
1472 | * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later. | |
1473 | */ | |
1474 | if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
1475 | protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, &clienthello); | |
1476 | } else if (s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION && | |
df7ce507 | 1477 | DTLS_VERSION_LT((int)clienthello.legacy_version, s->version)) { |
1ab3836b MC |
1478 | protverr = SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW; |
1479 | } else { | |
1480 | protverr = 0; | |
1481 | } | |
1482 | ||
1483 | if (protverr) { | |
1484 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr); | |
1485 | if ((!s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)) { | |
b1b4b543 | 1486 | /* like ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */ |
df7ce507 | 1487 | s->version = s->client_version = clienthello.legacy_version; |
1ab3836b MC |
1488 | } |
1489 | al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; | |
1490 | goto f_err; | |
b3e2272c EK |
1491 | } |
1492 | ||
1ed65871 DB |
1493 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
1494 | /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */ | |
1495 | if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) { | |
1496 | if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) { | |
1ab3836b MC |
1497 | if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, clienthello.dtls_cookie, |
1498 | clienthello.dtls_cookie_len) == 0) { | |
1ed65871 DB |
1499 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
1500 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, | |
1501 | SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); | |
1502 | goto f_err; | |
1503 | /* else cookie verification succeeded */ | |
1504 | } | |
a230b26e | 1505 | /* default verification */ |
1ab3836b MC |
1506 | } else if (s->d1->cookie_len != clienthello.dtls_cookie_len |
1507 | || memcmp(clienthello.dtls_cookie, s->d1->cookie, | |
1508 | s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) { | |
1ed65871 DB |
1509 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
1510 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); | |
1511 | goto f_err; | |
1512 | } | |
1513 | s->d1->cookie_verified = 1; | |
1514 | } | |
1515 | if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) { | |
1ab3836b | 1516 | protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, &clienthello); |
1ed65871 DB |
1517 | if (protverr != 0) { |
1518 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr); | |
1519 | s->version = s->client_version; | |
1520 | al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; | |
1521 | goto f_err; | |
1522 | } | |
1523 | } | |
1524 | } | |
1525 | ||
b3e2272c EK |
1526 | s->hit = 0; |
1527 | ||
1ab3836b | 1528 | /* We need to do this before getting the session */ |
6b473aca | 1529 | if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, |
4b299b8e | 1530 | EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, |
6b473aca MC |
1531 | clienthello.pre_proc_exts, |
1532 | clienthello.num_extensions, &al)) { | |
1ab3836b MC |
1533 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); |
1534 | goto f_err; | |
1535 | } | |
1536 | ||
b3e2272c EK |
1537 | /* |
1538 | * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello. | |
1539 | * TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty. | |
1540 | * | |
1541 | * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in | |
1542 | * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally | |
1543 | * ignore resumption requests with flag | |
1544 | * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather | |
1545 | * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on | |
1546 | * this for security won't even compile against older library versions). | |
1547 | * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to | |
1548 | * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains | |
1549 | * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the | |
1550 | * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be | |
1551 | * ignored. | |
1552 | */ | |
1ab3836b | 1553 | if (clienthello.isv2 || |
b3e2272c EK |
1554 | (s->new_session && |
1555 | (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) { | |
1556 | if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) | |
1557 | goto err; | |
1558 | } else { | |
1ab3836b | 1559 | i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, &clienthello); |
0f113f3e | 1560 | /* |
b3e2272c EK |
1561 | * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated |
1562 | * version. | |
1563 | * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption | |
1564 | * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but | |
1565 | * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable. | |
1566 | * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and | |
1567 | * will abort the handshake with an error. | |
0f113f3e | 1568 | */ |
b3e2272c EK |
1569 | if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version) { |
1570 | /* previous session */ | |
1571 | s->hit = 1; | |
1572 | } else if (i == -1) { | |
1573 | goto err; | |
32ec4153 | 1574 | } else { |
b3e2272c EK |
1575 | /* i == 0 */ |
1576 | if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) | |
32ec4153 | 1577 | goto err; |
0f113f3e | 1578 | } |
b3e2272c | 1579 | } |
0f113f3e | 1580 | |
b1b4b543 | 1581 | if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &clienthello.ciphersuites, &ciphers, |
1ab3836b | 1582 | clienthello.isv2, &al) == NULL) { |
b3e2272c EK |
1583 | goto f_err; |
1584 | } | |
5e9f0eeb | 1585 | |
b3e2272c EK |
1586 | /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */ |
1587 | if (s->hit) { | |
1588 | j = 0; | |
1589 | id = s->session->cipher->id; | |
d02b48c6 | 1590 | |
413c4f45 | 1591 | #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG |
a230b26e | 1592 | fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers)); |
413c4f45 | 1593 | #endif |
b3e2272c EK |
1594 | for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) { |
1595 | c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i); | |
413c4f45 | 1596 | #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG |
b3e2272c EK |
1597 | fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n", |
1598 | i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c)); | |
88f2a4cf | 1599 | #endif |
b3e2272c EK |
1600 | if (c->id == id) { |
1601 | j = 1; | |
1602 | break; | |
32ec4153 | 1603 | } |
0f113f3e | 1604 | } |
b3e2272c | 1605 | if (j == 0) { |
ec30e856 | 1606 | /* |
b3e2272c EK |
1607 | * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked |
1608 | * to reuse it | |
ec30e856 | 1609 | */ |
b3e2272c | 1610 | al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
f0659bdb | 1611 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, |
b3e2272c | 1612 | SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING); |
32ec4153 MC |
1613 | goto f_err; |
1614 | } | |
b3e2272c | 1615 | } |
9ceb2426 | 1616 | |
1ab3836b MC |
1617 | for (loop = 0; loop < clienthello.compressions_len; loop++) { |
1618 | if (clienthello.compressions[loop] == 0) | |
b3e2272c | 1619 | break; |
0f113f3e | 1620 | } |
32ec4153 | 1621 | |
1ab3836b | 1622 | if (loop >= clienthello.compressions_len) { |
b3e2272c EK |
1623 | /* no compress */ |
1624 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
f0659bdb | 1625 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED); |
b3e2272c EK |
1626 | goto f_err; |
1627 | } | |
f100b031 | 1628 | |
0f113f3e | 1629 | /* TLS extensions */ |
6b473aca | 1630 | if (!tls_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &clienthello)) { |
1ab3836b MC |
1631 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT); |
1632 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1633 | } |
1634 | ||
b1834ad7 | 1635 | /* Check we've got a key_share for TLSv1.3 */ |
657a43f6 | 1636 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL && !s->hit) { |
b1834ad7 | 1637 | /* No suitable share */ |
94ed2c67 | 1638 | /* TODO(TLS1.3): Send a HelloRetryRequest */ |
b1834ad7 MC |
1639 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
1640 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_KEY_SHARE); | |
1641 | goto f_err; | |
1642 | } | |
1643 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
1644 | /* |
1645 | * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake | |
1646 | * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before | |
1647 | * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket | |
1648 | * processing to use it in key derivation. | |
1649 | */ | |
1650 | { | |
1651 | unsigned char *pos; | |
1652 | pos = s->s3->server_random; | |
1653 | if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) { | |
1654 | goto f_err; | |
1655 | } | |
1656 | } | |
1657 | ||
1658 | if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) { | |
4a640fb6 | 1659 | const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL; |
8c1a5343 MC |
1660 | /* |
1661 | * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for | |
1662 | * backwards compat reasons | |
1663 | */ | |
1664 | int master_key_length; | |
0f113f3e | 1665 | |
8c1a5343 | 1666 | master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key); |
0f113f3e | 1667 | if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, |
8c1a5343 | 1668 | &master_key_length, ciphers, |
0f113f3e | 1669 | &pref_cipher, |
8c1a5343 MC |
1670 | s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg) |
1671 | && master_key_length > 0) { | |
1672 | s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1673 | s->hit = 1; |
1674 | s->session->ciphers = ciphers; | |
1675 | s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK; | |
1676 | ||
1677 | ciphers = NULL; | |
1678 | ||
1679 | /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */ | |
1680 | pref_cipher = | |
1681 | pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, | |
1682 | s-> | |
1683 | session->ciphers, | |
1684 | SSL_get_ciphers | |
1685 | (s)); | |
1686 | if (pref_cipher == NULL) { | |
1687 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
e27f234a | 1688 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); |
0f113f3e MC |
1689 | goto f_err; |
1690 | } | |
1691 | ||
1692 | s->session->cipher = pref_cipher; | |
25aaa98a | 1693 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list); |
0f113f3e | 1694 | s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers); |
25aaa98a | 1695 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id); |
0f113f3e MC |
1696 | s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers); |
1697 | } | |
1698 | } | |
58ece833 | 1699 | |
0f113f3e MC |
1700 | /* |
1701 | * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other | |
b2ce0337 | 1702 | * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression |
0f113f3e MC |
1703 | * algorithms from the client, starting at q. |
1704 | */ | |
1705 | s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL; | |
09b6c2ef | 1706 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP |
0f113f3e MC |
1707 | /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */ |
1708 | if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) { | |
1709 | int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth; | |
9ceb2426 | 1710 | unsigned int k; |
0f113f3e MC |
1711 | /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */ |
1712 | /* Can't disable compression */ | |
1713 | if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) { | |
e27f234a | 1714 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, |
0f113f3e MC |
1715 | SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); |
1716 | goto f_err; | |
1717 | } | |
1718 | /* Look for resumed compression method */ | |
1719 | for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) { | |
1720 | comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m); | |
1721 | if (comp_id == comp->id) { | |
1722 | s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp; | |
1723 | break; | |
1724 | } | |
1725 | } | |
1726 | if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) { | |
e27f234a | 1727 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, |
0f113f3e MC |
1728 | SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); |
1729 | goto f_err; | |
1730 | } | |
1731 | /* Look for resumed method in compression list */ | |
1ab3836b MC |
1732 | for (k = 0; k < clienthello.compressions_len; k++) { |
1733 | if (clienthello.compressions[k] == comp_id) | |
0f113f3e MC |
1734 | break; |
1735 | } | |
1ab3836b | 1736 | if (k >= clienthello.compressions_len) { |
0f113f3e | 1737 | al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
e27f234a | 1738 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, |
8fdc99cb | 1739 | SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING); |
0f113f3e MC |
1740 | goto f_err; |
1741 | } | |
1742 | } else if (s->hit) | |
1743 | comp = NULL; | |
1744 | else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) { | |
df6741c9 | 1745 | /* See if we have a match */ |
9ceb2426 MC |
1746 | int m, nn, v, done = 0; |
1747 | unsigned int o; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1748 | |
1749 | nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); | |
1750 | for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) { | |
1751 | comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m); | |
1752 | v = comp->id; | |
1ab3836b MC |
1753 | for (o = 0; o < clienthello.compressions_len; o++) { |
1754 | if (v == clienthello.compressions[o]) { | |
0f113f3e MC |
1755 | done = 1; |
1756 | break; | |
1757 | } | |
1758 | } | |
1759 | if (done) | |
1760 | break; | |
1761 | } | |
1762 | if (done) | |
1763 | s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp; | |
1764 | else | |
1765 | comp = NULL; | |
1766 | } | |
e6f418bc | 1767 | #else |
0f113f3e MC |
1768 | /* |
1769 | * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session | |
1770 | * using compression. | |
1771 | */ | |
1772 | if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) { | |
e27f234a | 1773 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); |
0f113f3e MC |
1774 | goto f_err; |
1775 | } | |
09b6c2ef | 1776 | #endif |
413c4f45 | 1777 | |
0f113f3e MC |
1778 | /* |
1779 | * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher | |
1780 | */ | |
d02b48c6 | 1781 | |
0f113f3e | 1782 | if (!s->hit) { |
09b6c2ef | 1783 | #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP |
0f113f3e | 1784 | s->session->compress_meth = 0; |
09b6c2ef | 1785 | #else |
0f113f3e | 1786 | s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id; |
09b6c2ef | 1787 | #endif |
25aaa98a | 1788 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers); |
0f113f3e MC |
1789 | s->session->ciphers = ciphers; |
1790 | if (ciphers == NULL) { | |
3ae91cfb | 1791 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
e27f234a | 1792 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
0f113f3e MC |
1793 | goto f_err; |
1794 | } | |
1795 | ciphers = NULL; | |
1796 | if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) { | |
e27f234a | 1797 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); |
0f113f3e MC |
1798 | goto err; |
1799 | } | |
e27f234a MC |
1800 | } |
1801 | ||
1802 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers); | |
9529419d | 1803 | OPENSSL_free(clienthello.pre_proc_exts); |
e27f234a MC |
1804 | return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; |
1805 | f_err: | |
1806 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
1807 | err: | |
fe3a3291 | 1808 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); |
e27f234a MC |
1809 | |
1810 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers); | |
9529419d | 1811 | OPENSSL_free(clienthello.pre_proc_exts); |
e27f234a | 1812 | |
58c9e32a | 1813 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
e27f234a MC |
1814 | } |
1815 | ||
be3583fa | 1816 | WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) |
e27f234a | 1817 | { |
d13dd4be | 1818 | int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
4a640fb6 | 1819 | const SSL_CIPHER *cipher; |
e27f234a MC |
1820 | |
1821 | if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) { | |
1822 | if (!s->hit) { | |
1823 | /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */ | |
1824 | if (s->cert->cert_cb) { | |
1825 | int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg); | |
1826 | if (rv == 0) { | |
1827 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
a230b26e EK |
1828 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, |
1829 | SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR); | |
e27f234a MC |
1830 | goto f_err; |
1831 | } | |
1832 | if (rv < 0) { | |
1833 | s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; | |
1834 | return WORK_MORE_A; | |
1835 | } | |
1836 | s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; | |
0f113f3e | 1837 | } |
a230b26e EK |
1838 | cipher = |
1839 | ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s)); | |
e27f234a MC |
1840 | |
1841 | if (cipher == NULL) { | |
a230b26e EK |
1842 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, |
1843 | SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); | |
e27f234a | 1844 | goto f_err; |
0f113f3e | 1845 | } |
e27f234a MC |
1846 | s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher; |
1847 | /* check whether we should disable session resumption */ | |
1848 | if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL) | |
1849 | s->session->not_resumable = s->not_resumable_session_cb(s, | |
a230b26e | 1850 | ((cipher->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) != 0)); |
e27f234a MC |
1851 | if (s->session->not_resumable) |
1852 | /* do not send a session ticket */ | |
1853 | s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0; | |
1854 | } else { | |
1855 | /* Session-id reuse */ | |
1856 | s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher; | |
0f113f3e | 1857 | } |
0f113f3e | 1858 | |
28f4580c | 1859 | if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) { |
d13dd4be MC |
1860 | if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { |
1861 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
e27f234a | 1862 | goto f_err; |
d13dd4be | 1863 | } |
0f113f3e | 1864 | } |
0f113f3e | 1865 | |
e27f234a MC |
1866 | /*- |
1867 | * we now have the following setup. | |
1868 | * client_random | |
60250017 | 1869 | * cipher_list - our preferred list of ciphers |
1870 | * ciphers - the clients preferred list of ciphers | |
e27f234a MC |
1871 | * compression - basically ignored right now |
1872 | * ssl version is set - sslv3 | |
1873 | * s->session - The ssl session has been setup. | |
1874 | * s->hit - session reuse flag | |
1875 | * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use. | |
1876 | */ | |
0f113f3e | 1877 | |
e27f234a MC |
1878 | /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */ |
1879 | if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) { | |
70c22888 | 1880 | if (!ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s, &al)) { |
d13dd4be MC |
1881 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, |
1882 | SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); | |
e27f234a MC |
1883 | goto f_err; |
1884 | } | |
1885 | } | |
0f113f3e | 1886 | |
e27f234a MC |
1887 | wst = WORK_MORE_B; |
1888 | } | |
1889 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP | |
1890 | if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) { | |
1891 | int ret; | |
1892 | if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s, &al)) < 0) { | |
1893 | /* | |
1894 | * callback indicates further work to be done | |
1895 | */ | |
1896 | s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; | |
1897 | return WORK_MORE_B; | |
1898 | } | |
1899 | if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) { | |
1900 | /* | |
1901 | * This is not really an error but the only means to for | |
1902 | * a client to detect whether srp is supported. | |
1903 | */ | |
1904 | if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY) | |
1905 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, | |
a230b26e | 1906 | SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); |
7bb37cb5 E |
1907 | else |
1908 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, | |
1909 | SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND); | |
e27f234a | 1910 | goto f_err; |
0f113f3e MC |
1911 | } |
1912 | } | |
e27f234a MC |
1913 | #endif |
1914 | s->renegotiate = 2; | |
0f113f3e | 1915 | |
e27f234a | 1916 | return WORK_FINISHED_STOP; |
0f113f3e | 1917 | f_err: |
e27f234a | 1918 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); |
fe3a3291 | 1919 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); |
e27f234a MC |
1920 | return WORK_ERROR; |
1921 | } | |
1922 | ||
7cea05dc | 1923 | int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
0f113f3e | 1924 | { |
ec60ccc1 MC |
1925 | int compm, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
1926 | size_t sl, len; | |
f2342b7a | 1927 | int version; |
0f113f3e | 1928 | |
b97667ce | 1929 | /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove the DRAFT conditional before release */ |
f2342b7a MC |
1930 | version = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT : s->version; |
1931 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, version) | |
8157d44b MC |
1932 | /* |
1933 | * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in | |
1934 | * tls_process_client_hello() | |
1935 | */ | |
7cea05dc | 1936 | || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) { |
8157d44b MC |
1937 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
1938 | goto err; | |
1939 | } | |
0f113f3e | 1940 | |
e27f234a MC |
1941 | /*- |
1942 | * There are several cases for the session ID to send | |
1943 | * back in the server hello: | |
1944 | * - For session reuse from the session cache, | |
1945 | * we send back the old session ID. | |
1946 | * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket) | |
1947 | * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID" | |
1948 | * (which doesn't actually identify the session). | |
1949 | * - If it is a new session, we send back the new | |
1950 | * session ID. | |
1951 | * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use, | |
1952 | * we send back a 0-length session ID. | |
1953 | * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse, | |
1954 | * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed | |
1955 | * to send back. | |
1956 | */ | |
1957 | if (s->session->not_resumable || | |
1958 | (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER) | |
1959 | && !s->hit)) | |
1960 | s->session->session_id_length = 0; | |
1961 | ||
1962 | sl = s->session->session_id_length; | |
ec60ccc1 | 1963 | if (sl > sizeof(s->session->session_id)) { |
e27f234a | 1964 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
8157d44b | 1965 | goto err; |
e27f234a | 1966 | } |
0f113f3e | 1967 | |
8157d44b | 1968 | /* set up the compression method */ |
09b6c2ef | 1969 | #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP |
8157d44b | 1970 | compm = 0; |
09b6c2ef | 1971 | #else |
e27f234a | 1972 | if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) |
8157d44b | 1973 | compm = 0; |
e27f234a | 1974 | else |
8157d44b | 1975 | compm = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id; |
09b6c2ef | 1976 | #endif |
e481f9b9 | 1977 | |
71728dd8 MC |
1978 | if ((!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) |
1979 | && !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->session->session_id, sl)) | |
7cea05dc | 1980 | || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, pkt, &len) |
71728dd8 MC |
1981 | || (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) |
1982 | && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, compm)) | |
8157d44b | 1983 | || !ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) |
5923ad4b | 1984 | || !ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al)) { |
e27f234a | 1985 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
8157d44b | 1986 | goto err; |
0f113f3e | 1987 | } |
d02b48c6 | 1988 | |
e27f234a | 1989 | return 1; |
8157d44b | 1990 | err: |
8157d44b | 1991 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
8157d44b | 1992 | return 0; |
0f113f3e | 1993 | } |
d02b48c6 | 1994 | |
7cea05dc | 1995 | int tls_construct_server_done(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
e27f234a | 1996 | { |
e27f234a | 1997 | if (!s->s3->tmp.cert_request) { |
5923ad4b MC |
1998 | if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { |
1999 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2000 | return 0; | |
2001 | } | |
e27f234a | 2002 | } |
e27f234a MC |
2003 | return 1; |
2004 | } | |
2005 | ||
7cea05dc | 2006 | int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
0f113f3e | 2007 | { |
bc36ee62 | 2008 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH |
e2b420fd | 2009 | EVP_PKEY *pkdh = NULL; |
ea262260 | 2010 | #endif |
10bf4fc2 | 2011 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
0f113f3e | 2012 | unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL; |
348240c6 | 2013 | size_t encodedlen = 0; |
0f113f3e | 2014 | int curve_id = 0; |
d02b48c6 | 2015 | #endif |
0f113f3e MC |
2016 | EVP_PKEY *pkey; |
2017 | const EVP_MD *md = NULL; | |
c13d2a5b | 2018 | int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, i; |
0f113f3e | 2019 | unsigned long type; |
2ac6115d | 2020 | const BIGNUM *r[4]; |
bfb0641f | 2021 | EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); |
c13d2a5b MC |
2022 | size_t paramlen, paramoffset; |
2023 | ||
5923ad4b | 2024 | if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, ¶moffset)) { |
e4e1aa90 | 2025 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
c13d2a5b MC |
2026 | goto f_err; |
2027 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2028 | |
6e59a892 RL |
2029 | if (md_ctx == NULL) { |
2030 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
6e59a892 RL |
2031 | goto f_err; |
2032 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2033 | |
e27f234a | 2034 | type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; |
e27f234a | 2035 | |
e27f234a | 2036 | r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL; |
85269210 | 2037 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK |
e27f234a MC |
2038 | /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */ |
2039 | if (type & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) { | |
2040 | } else | |
85269210 | 2041 | #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ |
bc36ee62 | 2042 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH |
e27f234a | 2043 | if (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) { |
94d61512 BL |
2044 | CERT *cert = s->cert; |
2045 | ||
e2b420fd DSH |
2046 | EVP_PKEY *pkdhp = NULL; |
2047 | DH *dh; | |
2048 | ||
e27f234a | 2049 | if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) { |
e2b420fd DSH |
2050 | DH *dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s); |
2051 | pkdh = EVP_PKEY_new(); | |
2052 | if (pkdh == NULL || dhp == NULL) { | |
2053 | DH_free(dhp); | |
e27f234a | 2054 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
0f113f3e | 2055 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
e27f234a | 2056 | goto f_err; |
0f113f3e | 2057 | } |
e2b420fd DSH |
2058 | EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkdh, dhp); |
2059 | pkdhp = pkdh; | |
2060 | } else { | |
2061 | pkdhp = cert->dh_tmp; | |
2062 | } | |
2063 | if ((pkdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) { | |
2064 | DH *dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0, 1024); | |
2065 | pkdh = ssl_dh_to_pkey(dhp); | |
2066 | if (pkdh == NULL) { | |
e2b420fd DSH |
2067 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
2068 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2069 | goto f_err; | |
2070 | } | |
2071 | pkdhp = pkdh; | |
2072 | } | |
2073 | if (pkdhp == NULL) { | |
e27f234a MC |
2074 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
2075 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2076 | SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); | |
2077 | goto f_err; | |
2078 | } | |
2079 | if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, | |
e2b420fd | 2080 | EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkdhp), 0, pkdhp)) { |
e27f234a MC |
2081 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
2082 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2083 | SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL); | |
2084 | goto f_err; | |
2085 | } | |
e2b420fd | 2086 | if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) { |
e27f234a MC |
2087 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
2088 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2089 | goto err; | |
2090 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2091 | |
0a699a07 | 2092 | s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(pkdhp); |
e27f234a | 2093 | |
e2b420fd DSH |
2094 | if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) { |
2095 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
ffaef3f1 | 2096 | goto err; |
e27f234a | 2097 | } |
e2b420fd DSH |
2098 | |
2099 | dh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(s->s3->tmp.pkey); | |
2100 | ||
2101 | EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh); | |
2102 | pkdh = NULL; | |
2103 | ||
0aeddcfa MC |
2104 | DH_get0_pqg(dh, &r[0], NULL, &r[1]); |
2105 | DH_get0_key(dh, &r[2], NULL); | |
e27f234a | 2106 | } else |
d02b48c6 | 2107 | #endif |
10bf4fc2 | 2108 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
e27f234a | 2109 | if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) { |
57be4444 | 2110 | int nid; |
e27f234a | 2111 | |
880d9d86 | 2112 | if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) { |
e27f234a MC |
2113 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
2114 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2115 | goto err; | |
2116 | } | |
2117 | ||
57be4444 | 2118 | /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */ |
de4d764e | 2119 | nid = tls1_shared_group(s, -2); |
57be4444 DSH |
2120 | curve_id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(nid); |
2121 | if (curve_id == 0) { | |
e27f234a MC |
2122 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
2123 | SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE); | |
2124 | goto err; | |
2125 | } | |
0a699a07 | 2126 | s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey_curve(curve_id); |
880d9d86 DSH |
2127 | /* Generate a new key for this curve */ |
2128 | if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) { | |
880d9d86 | 2129 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
57be4444 DSH |
2130 | goto f_err; |
2131 | } | |
2132 | ||
880d9d86 | 2133 | /* Encode the public key. */ |
ec24630a DSH |
2134 | encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->tmp.pkey, |
2135 | &encodedPoint); | |
e27f234a | 2136 | if (encodedlen == 0) { |
cae41364 | 2137 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); |
e27f234a MC |
2138 | goto err; |
2139 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2140 | |
e27f234a MC |
2141 | /* |
2142 | * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we | |
2143 | * can set these to NULLs | |
2144 | */ | |
2145 | r[0] = NULL; | |
2146 | r[1] = NULL; | |
2147 | r[2] = NULL; | |
2148 | r[3] = NULL; | |
2149 | } else | |
10bf4fc2 | 2150 | #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ |
edc032b5 | 2151 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP |
e27f234a MC |
2152 | if (type & SSL_kSRP) { |
2153 | if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) || | |
2154 | (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) || | |
2155 | (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) { | |
2156 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2157 | SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM); | |
2158 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e | 2159 | } |
e27f234a MC |
2160 | r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N; |
2161 | r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g; | |
2162 | r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s; | |
2163 | r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B; | |
2164 | } else | |
2165 | #endif | |
2166 | { | |
2167 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
2168 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2169 | SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE); | |
2170 | goto f_err; | |
2171 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2172 | |
a230b26e | 2173 | if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) |
e27f234a MC |
2174 | && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) { |
2175 | if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &md)) | |
2176 | == NULL) { | |
2177 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
2178 | goto f_err; | |
0f113f3e | 2179 | } |
e27f234a MC |
2180 | } else { |
2181 | pkey = NULL; | |
e27f234a | 2182 | } |
0f113f3e | 2183 | |
85269210 | 2184 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK |
e27f234a | 2185 | if (type & SSL_PSK) { |
c13d2a5b MC |
2186 | size_t len = (s->cert->psk_identity_hint == NULL) |
2187 | ? 0 : strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint); | |
2188 | ||
2189 | /* | |
2190 | * It should not happen that len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN - we already | |
2191 | * checked this when we set the identity hint - but just in case | |
2192 | */ | |
2193 | if (len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN | |
7cea05dc | 2194 | || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->cert->psk_identity_hint, |
c13d2a5b MC |
2195 | len)) { |
2196 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2197 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2198 | goto f_err; | |
85269210 | 2199 | } |
e27f234a | 2200 | } |
85269210 DSH |
2201 | #endif |
2202 | ||
e27f234a | 2203 | for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) { |
c13d2a5b MC |
2204 | unsigned char *binval; |
2205 | int res; | |
2206 | ||
edc032b5 | 2207 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP |
e27f234a | 2208 | if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) { |
7cea05dc | 2209 | res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt); |
e27f234a | 2210 | } else |
78a01b3f | 2211 | #endif |
7cea05dc | 2212 | res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt); |
c13d2a5b MC |
2213 | |
2214 | if (!res) { | |
2215 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2216 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2217 | goto f_err; | |
2218 | } | |
2219 | ||
78a01b3f | 2220 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH |
a230b26e | 2221 | /*- |
78a01b3f | 2222 | * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS |
2223 | * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length | |
2224 | * as the prime | |
2225 | */ | |
2226 | if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK))) { | |
c13d2a5b | 2227 | size_t len = BN_num_bytes(r[0]) - BN_num_bytes(r[2]); |
ff819477 | 2228 | |
c13d2a5b | 2229 | if (len > 0) { |
7cea05dc | 2230 | if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &binval)) { |
c13d2a5b MC |
2231 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
2232 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2233 | goto f_err; | |
2234 | } | |
2235 | memset(binval, 0, len); | |
78a01b3f | 2236 | } |
c13d2a5b | 2237 | } |
edc032b5 | 2238 | #endif |
7cea05dc MC |
2239 | if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, BN_num_bytes(r[i]), &binval) |
2240 | || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { | |
c13d2a5b MC |
2241 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
2242 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2243 | goto f_err; | |
2244 | } | |
2245 | ||
2246 | BN_bn2bin(r[i], binval); | |
e27f234a | 2247 | } |
d02b48c6 | 2248 | |
10bf4fc2 | 2249 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
e27f234a MC |
2250 | if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) { |
2251 | /* | |
c13d2a5b MC |
2252 | * We only support named (not generic) curves. In this situation, the |
2253 | * ServerKeyExchange message has: [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] | |
2254 | * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by the actual encoded | |
2255 | * point itself | |
e27f234a | 2256 | */ |
7cea05dc MC |
2257 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE) |
2258 | || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) | |
2259 | || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, curve_id) | |
2260 | || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encodedlen)) { | |
c13d2a5b MC |
2261 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
2262 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2263 | goto f_err; | |
2264 | } | |
e27f234a MC |
2265 | OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); |
2266 | encodedPoint = NULL; | |
e27f234a | 2267 | } |
ea262260 BM |
2268 | #endif |
2269 | ||
e27f234a MC |
2270 | /* not anonymous */ |
2271 | if (pkey != NULL) { | |
2272 | /* | |
2273 | * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p | |
2274 | * points to the space at the end. | |
2275 | */ | |
e27f234a | 2276 | if (md) { |
c13d2a5b MC |
2277 | unsigned char *sigbytes1, *sigbytes2; |
2278 | unsigned int siglen; | |
2279 | ||
2280 | /* Get length of the parameters we have written above */ | |
7cea05dc | 2281 | if (!WPACKET_get_length(pkt, ¶mlen)) { |
c13d2a5b MC |
2282 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
2283 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2284 | goto f_err; | |
2285 | } | |
e27f234a MC |
2286 | /* send signature algorithm */ |
2287 | if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { | |
7cea05dc | 2288 | if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(pkt, pkey, md)) { |
e27f234a | 2289 | /* Should never happen */ |
e27f234a MC |
2290 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
2291 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2292 | goto f_err; | |
0f113f3e | 2293 | } |
e27f234a | 2294 | } |
a2f9200f | 2295 | #ifdef SSL_DEBUG |
e27f234a | 2296 | fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); |
a2f9200f | 2297 | #endif |
c13d2a5b MC |
2298 | /* |
2299 | * Create the signature. We don't know the actual length of the sig | |
2300 | * until after we've created it, so we reserve enough bytes for it | |
2301 | * up front, and then properly allocate them in the WPACKET | |
2302 | * afterwards. | |
2303 | */ | |
7cea05dc | 2304 | if (!WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u16(pkt, EVP_PKEY_size(pkey), |
c13d2a5b MC |
2305 | &sigbytes1) |
2306 | || EVP_SignInit_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0 | |
2307 | || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]), | |
2308 | SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 | |
2309 | || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]), | |
2310 | SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 | |
2311 | || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, s->init_buf->data + paramoffset, | |
2312 | paramlen) <= 0 | |
2313 | || EVP_SignFinal(md_ctx, sigbytes1, &siglen, pkey) <= 0 | |
7cea05dc | 2314 | || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes2) |
c13d2a5b MC |
2315 | || sigbytes1 != sigbytes2) { |
2316 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2317 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
5f3d93e4 | 2318 | goto f_err; |
0f113f3e | 2319 | } |
e27f234a MC |
2320 | } else { |
2321 | /* Is this error check actually needed? */ | |
77d514c5 | 2322 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
e27f234a MC |
2323 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
2324 | SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE); | |
77d514c5 MC |
2325 | goto f_err; |
2326 | } | |
0f113f3e MC |
2327 | } |
2328 | ||
bfb0641f | 2329 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); |
e27f234a | 2330 | return 1; |
0f113f3e MC |
2331 | f_err: |
2332 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
2333 | err: | |
e2b420fd DSH |
2334 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH |
2335 | EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh); | |
2336 | #endif | |
556efe79 | 2337 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
b548a1f1 | 2338 | OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); |
ea262260 | 2339 | #endif |
bfb0641f | 2340 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); |
e27f234a | 2341 | return 0; |
0f113f3e | 2342 | } |
d02b48c6 | 2343 | |
7cea05dc | 2344 | int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
0f113f3e | 2345 | { |
348240c6 | 2346 | int i; |
0f113f3e | 2347 | STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL; |
0f113f3e | 2348 | |
e27f234a | 2349 | /* get the list of acceptable cert types */ |
7cea05dc MC |
2350 | if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt) |
2351 | || !ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, pkt) | |
2352 | || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { | |
28ff8ef3 MC |
2353 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
2354 | goto err; | |
2355 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2356 | |
e27f234a MC |
2357 | if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { |
2358 | const unsigned char *psigs; | |
348240c6 | 2359 | size_t nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &psigs); |
7cea05dc MC |
2360 | if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) |
2361 | || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, psigs, nl) | |
2362 | || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { | |
28ff8ef3 MC |
2363 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, |
2364 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2365 | goto err; | |
2366 | } | |
e27f234a | 2367 | } |
0f113f3e | 2368 | |
28ff8ef3 | 2369 | /* Start sub-packet for client CA list */ |
7cea05dc | 2370 | if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { |
28ff8ef3 MC |
2371 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
2372 | goto err; | |
2373 | } | |
e27f234a MC |
2374 | |
2375 | sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s); | |
e27f234a MC |
2376 | if (sk != NULL) { |
2377 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) { | |
28ff8ef3 MC |
2378 | unsigned char *namebytes; |
2379 | X509_NAME *name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i); | |
2380 | int namelen; | |
2381 | ||
2382 | if (name == NULL | |
2383 | || (namelen = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL)) < 0 | |
7cea05dc | 2384 | || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, namelen, |
28ff8ef3 MC |
2385 | &namebytes) |
2386 | || i2d_X509_NAME(name, &namebytes) != namelen) { | |
2387 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, | |
2388 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
e27f234a | 2389 | goto err; |
0f113f3e MC |
2390 | } |
2391 | } | |
e27f234a MC |
2392 | } |
2393 | /* else no CA names */ | |
d02b48c6 | 2394 | |
5923ad4b | 2395 | if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) { |
e27f234a MC |
2396 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
2397 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e | 2398 | } |
d02b48c6 | 2399 | |
e27f234a MC |
2400 | s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1; |
2401 | ||
2402 | return 1; | |
0f113f3e | 2403 | err: |
28ff8ef3 | 2404 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
e27f234a | 2405 | return 0; |
0f113f3e | 2406 | } |
d02b48c6 | 2407 | |
0907d710 | 2408 | static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) |
e27f234a | 2409 | { |
85269210 | 2410 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK |
0907d710 MC |
2411 | unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN]; |
2412 | size_t psklen; | |
2413 | PACKET psk_identity; | |
efcdbcbe | 2414 | |
0907d710 MC |
2415 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity)) { |
2416 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2417 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
0907d710 MC |
2418 | return 0; |
2419 | } | |
2420 | if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { | |
2421 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2422 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); |
0907d710 MC |
2423 | return 0; |
2424 | } | |
2425 | if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) { | |
2426 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
a230b26e | 2427 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB); |
0907d710 MC |
2428 | return 0; |
2429 | } | |
85269210 | 2430 | |
0907d710 MC |
2431 | if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity)) { |
2432 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2433 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
0907d710 MC |
2434 | return 0; |
2435 | } | |
85269210 | 2436 | |
0907d710 | 2437 | psklen = s->psk_server_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity, |
a230b26e | 2438 | psk, sizeof(psk)); |
85269210 | 2439 | |
0907d710 MC |
2440 | if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) { |
2441 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2442 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
0907d710 MC |
2443 | return 0; |
2444 | } else if (psklen == 0) { | |
2445 | /* | |
2446 | * PSK related to the given identity not found | |
2447 | */ | |
2448 | *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY; | |
c76a4aea | 2449 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, |
0907d710 MC |
2450 | SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND); |
2451 | return 0; | |
2452 | } | |
85269210 | 2453 | |
0907d710 MC |
2454 | OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk); |
2455 | s->s3->tmp.psk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen); | |
2456 | OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen); | |
85269210 | 2457 | |
0907d710 MC |
2458 | if (s->s3->tmp.psk == NULL) { |
2459 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2460 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
0907d710 | 2461 | return 0; |
85269210 | 2462 | } |
0907d710 MC |
2463 | |
2464 | s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen; | |
2465 | ||
2466 | return 1; | |
2467 | #else | |
2468 | /* Should never happen */ | |
2469 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2470 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
0907d710 | 2471 | return 0; |
85269210 | 2472 | #endif |
0907d710 MC |
2473 | } |
2474 | ||
0907d710 MC |
2475 | static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) |
2476 | { | |
bc36ee62 | 2477 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA |
0907d710 MC |
2478 | unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; |
2479 | int decrypt_len; | |
2480 | unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good; | |
2481 | size_t j, padding_len; | |
2482 | PACKET enc_premaster; | |
2483 | RSA *rsa = NULL; | |
2484 | unsigned char *rsa_decrypt = NULL; | |
2485 | int ret = 0; | |
2486 | ||
2487 | rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey); | |
2488 | if (rsa == NULL) { | |
2489 | *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
c76a4aea | 2490 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE); |
0907d710 MC |
2491 | return 0; |
2492 | } | |
2493 | ||
2494 | /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */ | |
2495 | if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) { | |
2496 | enc_premaster = *pkt; | |
2497 | } else { | |
2498 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &enc_premaster) | |
2499 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { | |
2500 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2501 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
0907d710 | 2502 | return 0; |
0f113f3e | 2503 | } |
0907d710 | 2504 | } |
0f113f3e | 2505 | |
0907d710 MC |
2506 | /* |
2507 | * We want to be sure that the plaintext buffer size makes it safe to | |
2508 | * iterate over the entire size of a premaster secret | |
2509 | * (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). Reject overly short RSA keys because | |
2510 | * their ciphertext cannot accommodate a premaster secret anyway. | |
2511 | */ | |
2512 | if (RSA_size(rsa) < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) { | |
2513 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2514 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL); |
0907d710 MC |
2515 | return 0; |
2516 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2517 | |
0907d710 MC |
2518 | rsa_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa)); |
2519 | if (rsa_decrypt == NULL) { | |
2520 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2521 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
0907d710 MC |
2522 | return 0; |
2523 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2524 | |
0907d710 MC |
2525 | /* |
2526 | * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of | |
2527 | * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246, | |
2528 | * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and | |
2529 | * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt | |
2530 | * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1 | |
2531 | */ | |
20ca916d | 2532 | |
a230b26e | 2533 | if (RAND_bytes(rand_premaster_secret, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0) |
0907d710 | 2534 | goto err; |
0f113f3e | 2535 | |
0907d710 MC |
2536 | /* |
2537 | * Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part of | |
2538 | * the timing-sensitive code below. | |
2539 | */ | |
348240c6 MC |
2540 | /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */ |
2541 | decrypt_len = (int)RSA_private_decrypt((int)PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster), | |
2542 | PACKET_data(&enc_premaster), | |
2543 | rsa_decrypt, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING); | |
0907d710 MC |
2544 | if (decrypt_len < 0) |
2545 | goto err; | |
20ca916d | 2546 | |
0907d710 | 2547 | /* Check the padding. See RFC 3447, section 7.2.2. */ |
5b8fa431 | 2548 | |
0907d710 MC |
2549 | /* |
2550 | * The smallest padded premaster is 11 bytes of overhead. Small keys | |
2551 | * are publicly invalid, so this may return immediately. This ensures | |
2552 | * PS is at least 8 bytes. | |
2553 | */ | |
2554 | if (decrypt_len < 11 + SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) { | |
2555 | *al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2556 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); |
0907d710 MC |
2557 | goto err; |
2558 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2559 | |
0907d710 MC |
2560 | padding_len = decrypt_len - SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH; |
2561 | decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[0], 0) & | |
a230b26e | 2562 | constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[1], 2); |
0907d710 MC |
2563 | for (j = 2; j < padding_len - 1; j++) { |
2564 | decrypt_good &= ~constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[j]); | |
2565 | } | |
2566 | decrypt_good &= constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len - 1]); | |
5b8fa431 | 2567 | |
0907d710 MC |
2568 | /* |
2569 | * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then | |
2570 | * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The | |
2571 | * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack | |
2572 | * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number | |
2573 | * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in | |
2574 | * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error. | |
2575 | */ | |
2576 | version_good = | |
2577 | constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len], | |
2578 | (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8)); | |
2579 | version_good &= | |
2580 | constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1], | |
2581 | (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff)); | |
0f113f3e | 2582 | |
0907d710 MC |
2583 | /* |
2584 | * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the | |
2585 | * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the | |
2586 | * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites). | |
2587 | * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol | |
2588 | * version instead if the server does not support the requested | |
2589 | * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such | |
2590 | * clients. | |
2591 | */ | |
2592 | if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) { | |
2593 | unsigned char workaround_good; | |
2594 | workaround_good = constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len], | |
2595 | (unsigned)(s->version >> 8)); | |
2596 | workaround_good &= | |
5b8fa431 | 2597 | constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1], |
0907d710 MC |
2598 | (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff)); |
2599 | version_good |= workaround_good; | |
2600 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2601 | |
0907d710 MC |
2602 | /* |
2603 | * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to | |
2604 | * remain non-zero (0xff). | |
2605 | */ | |
2606 | decrypt_good &= version_good; | |
0f113f3e | 2607 | |
0907d710 MC |
2608 | /* |
2609 | * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using | |
2610 | * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not | |
2611 | * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees | |
2612 | * it is still sufficiently large to read from. | |
2613 | */ | |
2614 | for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) { | |
2615 | rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j] = | |
2616 | constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, | |
2617 | rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j], | |
2618 | rand_premaster_secret[j]); | |
2619 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2620 | |
0907d710 MC |
2621 | if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, rsa_decrypt + padding_len, |
2622 | sizeof(rand_premaster_secret), 0)) { | |
2623 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2624 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
0907d710 MC |
2625 | goto err; |
2626 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2627 | |
0907d710 MC |
2628 | ret = 1; |
2629 | err: | |
2630 | OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt); | |
2631 | return ret; | |
2632 | #else | |
2633 | /* Should never happen */ | |
2634 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2635 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
0907d710 MC |
2636 | return 0; |
2637 | #endif | |
2638 | } | |
2639 | ||
642360f9 MC |
2640 | static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) |
2641 | { | |
2642 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH | |
2643 | EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL; | |
2644 | DH *cdh; | |
2645 | unsigned int i; | |
2646 | BIGNUM *pub_key; | |
2647 | const unsigned char *data; | |
2648 | EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL; | |
2649 | int ret = 0; | |
2650 | ||
31a7d80d | 2651 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != i) { |
642360f9 | 2652 | *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
c76a4aea | 2653 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, |
642360f9 MC |
2654 | SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); |
2655 | goto err; | |
2656 | } | |
642360f9 MC |
2657 | skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey; |
2658 | if (skey == NULL) { | |
2659 | *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
c76a4aea | 2660 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); |
642360f9 MC |
2661 | goto err; |
2662 | } | |
2663 | ||
2664 | if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) { | |
2665 | *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
c76a4aea | 2666 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); |
642360f9 MC |
2667 | goto err; |
2668 | } | |
2669 | if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) { | |
2670 | /* We already checked we have enough data */ | |
2671 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2672 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
642360f9 MC |
2673 | goto err; |
2674 | } | |
2675 | ckey = EVP_PKEY_new(); | |
2676 | if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) == 0) { | |
c76a4aea | 2677 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_BN_LIB); |
642360f9 MC |
2678 | goto err; |
2679 | } | |
2680 | cdh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey); | |
2681 | pub_key = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL); | |
2682 | ||
2683 | if (pub_key == NULL || !DH_set0_key(cdh, pub_key, NULL)) { | |
c76a4aea | 2684 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
642360f9 MC |
2685 | if (pub_key != NULL) |
2686 | BN_free(pub_key); | |
2687 | goto err; | |
2688 | } | |
2689 | ||
0f1e51ea | 2690 | if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) { |
642360f9 | 2691 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
c76a4aea | 2692 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
642360f9 MC |
2693 | goto err; |
2694 | } | |
2695 | ||
2696 | ret = 1; | |
2697 | EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey); | |
2698 | s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL; | |
2699 | err: | |
2700 | EVP_PKEY_free(ckey); | |
2701 | return ret; | |
2702 | #else | |
2703 | /* Should never happen */ | |
2704 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2705 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
642360f9 MC |
2706 | return 0; |
2707 | #endif | |
2708 | } | |
2709 | ||
19ed1ec1 MC |
2710 | static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) |
2711 | { | |
2712 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC | |
2713 | EVP_PKEY *skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey; | |
2714 | EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL; | |
2715 | int ret = 0; | |
2716 | ||
2717 | if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) { | |
2718 | /* We don't support ECDH client auth */ | |
2719 | *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
c76a4aea | 2720 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY); |
19ed1ec1 MC |
2721 | goto err; |
2722 | } else { | |
2723 | unsigned int i; | |
2724 | const unsigned char *data; | |
2725 | ||
2726 | /* | |
2727 | * Get client's public key from encoded point in the | |
2728 | * ClientKeyExchange message. | |
2729 | */ | |
2730 | ||
2731 | /* Get encoded point length */ | |
fb933982 DSH |
2732 | if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &i) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i) |
2733 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { | |
19ed1ec1 | 2734 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
c76a4aea | 2735 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
19ed1ec1 MC |
2736 | goto err; |
2737 | } | |
19ed1ec1 MC |
2738 | ckey = EVP_PKEY_new(); |
2739 | if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) <= 0) { | |
c76a4aea | 2740 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
19ed1ec1 MC |
2741 | goto err; |
2742 | } | |
ec24630a | 2743 | if (EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, data, i) == 0) { |
fb933982 | 2744 | *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
c76a4aea | 2745 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); |
19ed1ec1 MC |
2746 | goto err; |
2747 | } | |
2748 | } | |
2749 | ||
0f1e51ea | 2750 | if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) { |
19ed1ec1 | 2751 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
c76a4aea | 2752 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
19ed1ec1 MC |
2753 | goto err; |
2754 | } | |
2755 | ||
2756 | ret = 1; | |
2757 | EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey); | |
2758 | s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL; | |
2759 | err: | |
2760 | EVP_PKEY_free(ckey); | |
2761 | ||
2762 | return ret; | |
2763 | #else | |
2764 | /* Should never happen */ | |
2765 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2766 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
19ed1ec1 MC |
2767 | return 0; |
2768 | #endif | |
2769 | } | |
2770 | ||
c437eef6 MC |
2771 | static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) |
2772 | { | |
2773 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP | |
2774 | unsigned int i; | |
2775 | const unsigned char *data; | |
2776 | ||
2777 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i) | |
a230b26e | 2778 | || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) { |
c437eef6 | 2779 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
c76a4aea | 2780 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH); |
c437eef6 MC |
2781 | return 0; |
2782 | } | |
2783 | if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL)) == NULL) { | |
c76a4aea | 2784 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_BN_LIB); |
c437eef6 MC |
2785 | return 0; |
2786 | } | |
a230b26e | 2787 | if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) { |
c437eef6 | 2788 | *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
c76a4aea | 2789 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS); |
c437eef6 MC |
2790 | return 0; |
2791 | } | |
2792 | OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username); | |
2793 | s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login); | |
2794 | if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) { | |
c76a4aea | 2795 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
c437eef6 MC |
2796 | return 0; |
2797 | } | |
2798 | ||
2799 | if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s)) { | |
c76a4aea | 2800 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
c437eef6 MC |
2801 | return 0; |
2802 | } | |
2803 | ||
2804 | return 1; | |
2805 | #else | |
2806 | /* Should never happen */ | |
2807 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2808 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
c437eef6 MC |
2809 | return 0; |
2810 | #endif | |
2811 | } | |
2812 | ||
2813 | static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) | |
2814 | { | |
2815 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST | |
2816 | EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx; | |
2817 | EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL; | |
2818 | unsigned char premaster_secret[32]; | |
2819 | const unsigned char *start; | |
2820 | size_t outlen = 32, inlen; | |
2821 | unsigned long alg_a; | |
2822 | int Ttag, Tclass; | |
2823 | long Tlen; | |
348240c6 | 2824 | size_t sess_key_len; |
c437eef6 MC |
2825 | const unsigned char *data; |
2826 | int ret = 0; | |
2827 | ||
2828 | /* Get our certificate private key */ | |
2829 | alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; | |
2830 | if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST12) { | |
2831 | /* | |
2832 | * New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too | |
2833 | */ | |
2834 | pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey; | |
2835 | if (pk == NULL) { | |
2836 | pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].privatekey; | |
2837 | } | |
2838 | if (pk == NULL) { | |
2839 | pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey; | |
2840 | } | |
2841 | } else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) { | |
2842 | pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey; | |
2843 | } | |
2844 | ||
2845 | pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL); | |
2846 | if (pkey_ctx == NULL) { | |
2847 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2848 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
c437eef6 MC |
2849 | return 0; |
2850 | } | |
2851 | if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) { | |
2852 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2853 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
c437eef6 MC |
2854 | return 0; |
2855 | } | |
2856 | /* | |
2857 | * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe | |
2858 | * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from | |
2859 | * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a | |
2860 | * client certificate for authorization only. | |
2861 | */ | |
2862 | client_pub_pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer); | |
2863 | if (client_pub_pkey) { | |
2864 | if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0) | |
2865 | ERR_clear_error(); | |
2866 | } | |
2867 | /* Decrypt session key */ | |
2868 | sess_key_len = PACKET_remaining(pkt); | |
2869 | if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, sess_key_len)) { | |
2870 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2871 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
c437eef6 MC |
2872 | goto err; |
2873 | } | |
348240c6 | 2874 | /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */ |
a230b26e | 2875 | if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&data, &Tlen, &Ttag, |
348240c6 | 2876 | &Tclass, (long)sess_key_len) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED |
a230b26e | 2877 | || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) { |
c437eef6 | 2878 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
c76a4aea | 2879 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); |
c437eef6 MC |
2880 | goto err; |
2881 | } | |
2882 | start = data; | |
2883 | inlen = Tlen; | |
2884 | if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt | |
2885 | (pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) { | |
2886 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2887 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); |
c437eef6 MC |
2888 | goto err; |
2889 | } | |
2890 | /* Generate master secret */ | |
2891 | if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret, | |
2892 | sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) { | |
2893 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2894 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
c437eef6 MC |
2895 | goto err; |
2896 | } | |
2897 | /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */ | |
2898 | if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl | |
2899 | (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0) | |
2900 | s->statem.no_cert_verify = 1; | |
2901 | ||
2902 | ret = 1; | |
2903 | err: | |
2904 | EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); | |
2905 | return ret; | |
2906 | #else | |
2907 | /* Should never happen */ | |
2908 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2909 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
c437eef6 MC |
2910 | return 0; |
2911 | #endif | |
2912 | } | |
2913 | ||
0907d710 MC |
2914 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
2915 | { | |
2916 | int al = -1; | |
2917 | unsigned long alg_k; | |
2918 | ||
2919 | alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; | |
2920 | ||
2921 | /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */ | |
2922 | if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al)) | |
2923 | goto err; | |
2924 | ||
2925 | if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) { | |
2926 | /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */ | |
2927 | if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { | |
2928 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
a230b26e EK |
2929 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
2930 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
9059eb71 | 2931 | goto err; |
0907d710 MC |
2932 | } |
2933 | /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */ | |
2934 | if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, NULL, 0, 0)) { | |
69f68237 | 2935 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
e27f234a | 2936 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
9059eb71 | 2937 | goto err; |
69f68237 | 2938 | } |
0907d710 MC |
2939 | } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) { |
2940 | if (!tls_process_cke_rsa(s, pkt, &al)) | |
2941 | goto err; | |
642360f9 MC |
2942 | } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) { |
2943 | if (!tls_process_cke_dhe(s, pkt, &al)) | |
0f113f3e | 2944 | goto err; |
19ed1ec1 MC |
2945 | } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) { |
2946 | if (!tls_process_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt, &al)) | |
2947 | goto err; | |
c437eef6 MC |
2948 | } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) { |
2949 | if (!tls_process_cke_srp(s, pkt, &al)) | |
0f113f3e | 2950 | goto err; |
c437eef6 MC |
2951 | } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) { |
2952 | if (!tls_process_cke_gost(s, pkt, &al)) | |
0f113f3e | 2953 | goto err; |
c437eef6 | 2954 | } else { |
0f113f3e | 2955 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
a230b26e EK |
2956 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
2957 | SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE); | |
9059eb71 | 2958 | goto err; |
0f113f3e MC |
2959 | } |
2960 | ||
e27f234a | 2961 | return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; |
0f113f3e | 2962 | err: |
0907d710 MC |
2963 | if (al != -1) |
2964 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
85269210 DSH |
2965 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK |
2966 | OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen); | |
2967 | s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL; | |
58964a49 | 2968 | #endif |
fe3a3291 | 2969 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); |
e27f234a | 2970 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
0f113f3e | 2971 | } |
d02b48c6 | 2972 | |
be3583fa | 2973 | WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) |
94836de2 | 2974 | { |
94836de2 | 2975 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP |
c130dd8e MC |
2976 | if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) { |
2977 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
2978 | unsigned char sctpauthkey[64]; | |
2979 | char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)]; | |
2980 | /* | |
2981 | * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP | |
2982 | * used. | |
2983 | */ | |
141eb8c6 MC |
2984 | memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL, |
2985 | sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)); | |
c130dd8e MC |
2986 | |
2987 | if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey, | |
a230b26e EK |
2988 | sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer, |
2989 | sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, | |
2990 | 0) <= 0) { | |
fe3a3291 | 2991 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); |
c130dd8e MC |
2992 | return WORK_ERROR;; |
2993 | } | |
94836de2 | 2994 | |
c130dd8e MC |
2995 | BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY, |
2996 | sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey); | |
94836de2 | 2997 | } |
c130dd8e MC |
2998 | wst = WORK_MORE_B; |
2999 | } | |
94836de2 | 3000 | |
c130dd8e | 3001 | if ((wst == WORK_MORE_B) |
a230b26e EK |
3002 | /* Is this SCTP? */ |
3003 | && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)) | |
3004 | /* Are we renegotiating? */ | |
3005 | && s->renegotiate | |
3006 | /* Are we going to skip the CertificateVerify? */ | |
3007 | && (s->session->peer == NULL || s->statem.no_cert_verify) | |
3008 | && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) { | |
c130dd8e MC |
3009 | s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2; |
3010 | s->rwstate = SSL_READING; | |
3011 | BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s)); | |
3012 | BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s)); | |
d99b0691 | 3013 | ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1); |
c130dd8e MC |
3014 | return WORK_MORE_B; |
3015 | } else { | |
fe3a3291 | 3016 | ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0); |
94836de2 MC |
3017 | } |
3018 | #endif | |
3019 | ||
149c2ef5 | 3020 | if (s->statem.no_cert_verify || !s->session->peer) { |
a230b26e EK |
3021 | /* |
3022 | * No certificate verify or no peer certificate so we no longer need | |
3023 | * the handshake_buffer | |
149c2ef5 MC |
3024 | */ |
3025 | if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { | |
3026 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); | |
3027 | return WORK_ERROR; | |
3028 | } | |
94836de2 | 3029 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; |
28f4580c | 3030 | } else { |
94836de2 MC |
3031 | if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) { |
3032 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
3033 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
fe3a3291 | 3034 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); |
94836de2 MC |
3035 | return WORK_ERROR; |
3036 | } | |
3037 | /* | |
3038 | * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support | |
3039 | * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op | |
3040 | */ | |
3041 | if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) { | |
fe3a3291 | 3042 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); |
94836de2 MC |
3043 | return WORK_ERROR; |
3044 | } | |
94836de2 MC |
3045 | } |
3046 | ||
3047 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; | |
3048 | } | |
3049 | ||
be3583fa | 3050 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
e27f234a MC |
3051 | { |
3052 | EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; | |
b6981744 | 3053 | const unsigned char *sig, *data; |
5ca17d8c | 3054 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST |
b6981744 | 3055 | unsigned char *gost_data = NULL; |
5ca17d8c | 3056 | #endif |
e27f234a | 3057 | int al, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
28f4580c | 3058 | int type = 0, j; |
e27f234a MC |
3059 | unsigned int len; |
3060 | X509 *peer; | |
3061 | const EVP_MD *md = NULL; | |
28f4580c DSH |
3062 | long hdatalen = 0; |
3063 | void *hdata; | |
3064 | ||
bfb0641f | 3065 | EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); |
6e59a892 RL |
3066 | |
3067 | if (mctx == NULL) { | |
3068 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
3069 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
3070 | goto f_err; | |
3071 | } | |
e27f234a | 3072 | |
a0bd6493 | 3073 | peer = s->session->peer; |
8382fd3a | 3074 | pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(peer); |
a0bd6493 | 3075 | type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey); |
0f113f3e MC |
3076 | |
3077 | if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) { | |
e27f234a | 3078 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, |
0f113f3e MC |
3079 | SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE); |
3080 | al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
3081 | goto f_err; | |
3082 | } | |
3083 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
3084 | /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */ |
3085 | /* | |
3086 | * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without | |
e44380a9 | 3087 | * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till CSP 4.0) |
0f113f3e | 3088 | */ |
2a9b9654 | 3089 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST |
3aeb9348 DSH |
3090 | if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 64 |
3091 | && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) { | |
f532a35d | 3092 | len = 64; |
2a9b9654 MC |
3093 | } else |
3094 | #endif | |
3095 | { | |
0f113f3e | 3096 | if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { |
f532a35d MC |
3097 | int rv; |
3098 | ||
73999b62 | 3099 | if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &sig, 2)) { |
f532a35d MC |
3100 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
3101 | goto f_err; | |
3102 | } | |
3103 | rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, sig, pkey); | |
0f113f3e MC |
3104 | if (rv == -1) { |
3105 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
3106 | goto f_err; | |
3107 | } else if (rv == 0) { | |
3108 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
3109 | goto f_err; | |
3110 | } | |
f37f20ff | 3111 | #ifdef SSL_DEBUG |
0f113f3e | 3112 | fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); |
f37f20ff | 3113 | #endif |
28f4580c | 3114 | } else { |
aa430c74 DSH |
3115 | /* Use default digest for this key type */ |
3116 | int idx = ssl_cert_type(NULL, pkey); | |
3117 | if (idx >= 0) | |
3118 | md = s->s3->tmp.md[idx]; | |
3119 | if (md == NULL) { | |
3120 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
3121 | goto f_err; | |
3122 | } | |
0f113f3e | 3123 | } |
aa430c74 | 3124 | |
73999b62 | 3125 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len)) { |
e27f234a | 3126 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
0f113f3e MC |
3127 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
3128 | goto f_err; | |
3129 | } | |
3130 | } | |
3131 | j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); | |
73999b62 | 3132 | if (((int)len > j) || ((int)PACKET_remaining(pkt) > j) |
a230b26e | 3133 | || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) { |
e27f234a | 3134 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE); |
0f113f3e MC |
3135 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
3136 | goto f_err; | |
3137 | } | |
73999b62 | 3138 | if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, len)) { |
e27f234a | 3139 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
f532a35d MC |
3140 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
3141 | goto f_err; | |
3142 | } | |
0f113f3e | 3143 | |
28f4580c DSH |
3144 | hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata); |
3145 | if (hdatalen <= 0) { | |
3146 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
3147 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
3148 | goto f_err; | |
3149 | } | |
0f1e51ea | 3150 | |
f37f20ff | 3151 | #ifdef SSL_DEBUG |
28f4580c | 3152 | fprintf(stderr, "Using client verify alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); |
f37f20ff | 3153 | #endif |
6e59a892 RL |
3154 | if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(mctx, md, NULL) |
3155 | || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) { | |
28f4580c DSH |
3156 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
3157 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
3158 | goto f_err; | |
3159 | } | |
2a9b9654 | 3160 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST |
3aeb9348 DSH |
3161 | { |
3162 | int pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey); | |
3163 | if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001 | |
3164 | || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256 | |
b6981744 EK |
3165 | || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) { |
3166 | if ((gost_data = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) { | |
3167 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
3168 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
3169 | goto f_err; | |
3170 | } | |
3171 | BUF_reverse(gost_data, data, len); | |
3172 | data = gost_data; | |
3173 | } | |
28f4580c | 3174 | } |
2a9b9654 | 3175 | #endif |
e44380a9 | 3176 | |
28f4580c | 3177 | if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION |
6e59a892 | 3178 | && !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET, |
348240c6 | 3179 | (int)s->session->master_key_length, |
28f4580c DSH |
3180 | s->session->master_key)) { |
3181 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
3182 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
3183 | goto f_err; | |
3184 | } | |
3185 | ||
6e59a892 | 3186 | if (EVP_VerifyFinal(mctx, data, len, pkey) <= 0) { |
28f4580c DSH |
3187 | al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; |
3188 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); | |
0f113f3e MC |
3189 | goto f_err; |
3190 | } | |
3191 | ||
c130dd8e | 3192 | ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; |
0f113f3e MC |
3193 | if (0) { |
3194 | f_err: | |
3195 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
fe3a3291 | 3196 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); |
0f113f3e | 3197 | } |
25aaa98a RS |
3198 | BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer); |
3199 | s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL; | |
bfb0641f | 3200 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); |
5ca17d8c | 3201 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST |
b6981744 | 3202 | OPENSSL_free(gost_data); |
5ca17d8c | 3203 | #endif |
e27f234a | 3204 | return ret; |
0f113f3e | 3205 | } |
d02b48c6 | 3206 | |
be3583fa | 3207 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
e27f234a | 3208 | { |
20dbe585 | 3209 | int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
e27f234a MC |
3210 | X509 *x = NULL; |
3211 | unsigned long l, llen; | |
b6981744 | 3212 | const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes; |
e27f234a | 3213 | STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL; |
73999b62 | 3214 | PACKET spkt; |
0f113f3e MC |
3215 | |
3216 | if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) { | |
e27f234a MC |
3217 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
3218 | goto f_err; | |
0f113f3e MC |
3219 | } |
3220 | ||
73999b62 | 3221 | if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &llen) |
a230b26e EK |
3222 | || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, llen) |
3223 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { | |
0f113f3e | 3224 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
e27f234a | 3225 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
0f113f3e MC |
3226 | goto f_err; |
3227 | } | |
0bc09ecd MC |
3228 | |
3229 | while (PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0) { | |
3230 | if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l) | |
a230b26e | 3231 | || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) { |
0f113f3e | 3232 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
e27f234a | 3233 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, |
0f113f3e MC |
3234 | SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
3235 | goto f_err; | |
3236 | } | |
3237 | ||
0bc09ecd MC |
3238 | certstart = certbytes; |
3239 | x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, l); | |
0f113f3e | 3240 | if (x == NULL) { |
e27f234a MC |
3241 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); |
3242 | goto f_err; | |
0f113f3e | 3243 | } |
0bc09ecd | 3244 | if (certbytes != (certstart + l)) { |
0f113f3e | 3245 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
e27f234a | 3246 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, |
0f113f3e MC |
3247 | SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
3248 | goto f_err; | |
3249 | } | |
3250 | if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) { | |
e27f234a MC |
3251 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
3252 | goto f_err; | |
0f113f3e MC |
3253 | } |
3254 | x = NULL; | |
0f113f3e MC |
3255 | } |
3256 | ||
3257 | if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) { | |
3258 | /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */ | |
3259 | if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { | |
3260 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
e27f234a | 3261 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, |
0f113f3e MC |
3262 | SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED); |
3263 | goto f_err; | |
3264 | } | |
3265 | /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */ | |
3266 | else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && | |
3267 | (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) { | |
e27f234a | 3268 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, |
0f113f3e MC |
3269 | SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); |
3270 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
3271 | goto f_err; | |
3272 | } | |
3273 | /* No client certificate so digest cached records */ | |
124037fd | 3274 | if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { |
0f113f3e MC |
3275 | goto f_err; |
3276 | } | |
3277 | } else { | |
3278 | EVP_PKEY *pkey; | |
3279 | i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk); | |
3280 | if (i <= 0) { | |
3281 | al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result); | |
e27f234a | 3282 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, |
0f113f3e MC |
3283 | SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED); |
3284 | goto f_err; | |
3285 | } | |
3286 | if (i > 1) { | |
e27f234a | 3287 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i); |
0f113f3e MC |
3288 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
3289 | goto f_err; | |
3290 | } | |
8382fd3a | 3291 | pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0)); |
0f113f3e MC |
3292 | if (pkey == NULL) { |
3293 | al = SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
e27f234a | 3294 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, |
0f113f3e MC |
3295 | SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE); |
3296 | goto f_err; | |
3297 | } | |
0f113f3e MC |
3298 | } |
3299 | ||
222561fe | 3300 | X509_free(s->session->peer); |
0f113f3e MC |
3301 | s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk); |
3302 | s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result; | |
3303 | ||
c34b0f99 DSH |
3304 | sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->peer_chain, X509_free); |
3305 | s->session->peer_chain = sk; | |
0f1e51ea MC |
3306 | |
3307 | /* | |
3308 | * Freeze the handshake buffer. For <TLS1.3 we do this after the CKE | |
3309 | * message | |
3310 | */ | |
94ed2c67 | 3311 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) { |
0f1e51ea MC |
3312 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
3313 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
3314 | goto f_err; | |
3315 | } | |
3316 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
3317 | /* |
3318 | * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own | |
d4d78943 | 3319 | * certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c |
0f113f3e | 3320 | */ |
0f113f3e | 3321 | sk = NULL; |
e27f234a | 3322 | ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; |
66696478 RS |
3323 | goto done; |
3324 | ||
0f113f3e | 3325 | f_err: |
66696478 | 3326 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); |
fe3a3291 | 3327 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); |
66696478 | 3328 | done: |
222561fe RS |
3329 | X509_free(x); |
3330 | sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free); | |
e27f234a | 3331 | return ret; |
0f113f3e | 3332 | } |
d02b48c6 | 3333 | |
7cea05dc | 3334 | int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
e27f234a MC |
3335 | { |
3336 | CERT_PKEY *cpk; | |
3337 | ||
3338 | cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s); | |
3339 | if (cpk == NULL) { | |
3340 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
e27f234a MC |
3341 | return 0; |
3342 | } | |
3343 | ||
7cea05dc | 3344 | if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk)) { |
e27f234a | 3345 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
e27f234a MC |
3346 | return 0; |
3347 | } | |
3348 | ||
3349 | return 1; | |
3350 | } | |
3351 | ||
7cea05dc | 3352 | int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
e27f234a MC |
3353 | { |
3354 | unsigned char *senc = NULL; | |
83ae4661 | 3355 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL; |
bf7c6817 | 3356 | HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL; |
a00d75e1 | 3357 | unsigned char *p, *encdata1, *encdata2, *macdata1, *macdata2; |
e27f234a | 3358 | const unsigned char *const_p; |
a00d75e1 | 3359 | int len, slen_full, slen, lenfinal; |
e27f234a MC |
3360 | SSL_SESSION *sess; |
3361 | unsigned int hlen; | |
3362 | SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx; | |
3363 | unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; | |
d139723b KR |
3364 | unsigned char key_name[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH]; |
3365 | int iv_len; | |
a00d75e1 | 3366 | size_t macoffset, macendoffset; |
e27f234a MC |
3367 | |
3368 | /* get session encoding length */ | |
3369 | slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL); | |
3370 | /* | |
3371 | * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too | |
3372 | * long | |
3373 | */ | |
3374 | if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) { | |
fe3a3291 | 3375 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); |
e27f234a MC |
3376 | return 0; |
3377 | } | |
3378 | senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full); | |
a71edf3b | 3379 | if (senc == NULL) { |
fe3a3291 | 3380 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); |
e27f234a MC |
3381 | return 0; |
3382 | } | |
0f113f3e | 3383 | |
846ec07d | 3384 | ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); |
bf7c6817 | 3385 | hctx = HMAC_CTX_new(); |
83ae4661 MC |
3386 | if (ctx == NULL || hctx == NULL) { |
3387 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
3388 | goto err; | |
3389 | } | |
0f113f3e | 3390 | |
e27f234a MC |
3391 | p = senc; |
3392 | if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p)) | |
3393 | goto err; | |
687eaf27 | 3394 | |
e27f234a MC |
3395 | /* |
3396 | * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up | |
3397 | */ | |
3398 | const_p = senc; | |
3399 | sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full); | |
3400 | if (sess == NULL) | |
3401 | goto err; | |
3402 | sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */ | |
0f113f3e | 3403 | |
e27f234a MC |
3404 | slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL); |
3405 | if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { /* shouldn't ever happen */ | |
3406 | SSL_SESSION_free(sess); | |
3407 | goto err; | |
3408 | } | |
3409 | p = senc; | |
3410 | if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) { | |
3411 | SSL_SESSION_free(sess); | |
3412 | goto err; | |
3413 | } | |
3414 | SSL_SESSION_free(sess); | |
0f113f3e | 3415 | |
e27f234a MC |
3416 | /* |
3417 | * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does | |
3418 | * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx. | |
3419 | */ | |
3420 | if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) { | |
5c753de6 TS |
3421 | /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */ |
3422 | int ret = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx, | |
3423 | hctx, 1); | |
3424 | ||
3425 | if (ret == 0) { | |
a00d75e1 MC |
3426 | |
3427 | /* Put timeout and length */ | |
7cea05dc | 3428 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, 0) |
4a01c59f | 3429 | || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) { |
a00d75e1 MC |
3430 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, |
3431 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
5c753de6 | 3432 | goto err; |
a00d75e1 | 3433 | } |
5c753de6 TS |
3434 | OPENSSL_free(senc); |
3435 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); | |
3436 | HMAC_CTX_free(hctx); | |
3437 | return 1; | |
3438 | } | |
3439 | if (ret < 0) | |
e27f234a | 3440 | goto err; |
d139723b | 3441 | iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx); |
e27f234a | 3442 | } else { |
d139723b KR |
3443 | const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_aes_256_cbc(); |
3444 | ||
3445 | iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher); | |
3446 | if (RAND_bytes(iv, iv_len) <= 0) | |
687eaf27 | 3447 | goto err; |
d139723b | 3448 | if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL, |
e27f234a | 3449 | tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv)) |
687eaf27 | 3450 | goto err; |
4e2e1ec9 TS |
3451 | if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, |
3452 | sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key), | |
e27f234a | 3453 | EVP_sha256(), NULL)) |
4f9fab6b | 3454 | goto err; |
4e2e1ec9 TS |
3455 | memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, |
3456 | sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)); | |
0f113f3e MC |
3457 | } |
3458 | ||
e27f234a MC |
3459 | /* |
3460 | * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified | |
3461 | * for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for | |
3462 | * new sessions will live as long as their sessions. | |
3463 | */ | |
7cea05dc | 3464 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout) |
a00d75e1 | 3465 | /* Now the actual ticket data */ |
7cea05dc MC |
3466 | || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) |
3467 | || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macoffset) | |
a00d75e1 | 3468 | /* Output key name */ |
7cea05dc | 3469 | || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, key_name, sizeof(key_name)) |
a00d75e1 | 3470 | /* output IV */ |
7cea05dc MC |
3471 | || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, iv, iv_len) |
3472 | || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH, | |
a00d75e1 MC |
3473 | &encdata1) |
3474 | /* Encrypt session data */ | |
3475 | || !EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, encdata1, &len, senc, slen) | |
7cea05dc | 3476 | || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &encdata2) |
a00d75e1 MC |
3477 | || encdata1 != encdata2 |
3478 | || !EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx, encdata1 + len, &lenfinal) | |
7cea05dc | 3479 | || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, lenfinal, &encdata2) |
a00d75e1 MC |
3480 | || encdata1 + len != encdata2 |
3481 | || len + lenfinal > slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH | |
7cea05dc | 3482 | || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macendoffset) |
a00d75e1 MC |
3483 | || !HMAC_Update(hctx, |
3484 | (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + macoffset, | |
3485 | macendoffset - macoffset) | |
7cea05dc | 3486 | || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &macdata1) |
a00d75e1 MC |
3487 | || !HMAC_Final(hctx, macdata1, &hlen) |
3488 | || hlen > EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE | |
7cea05dc | 3489 | || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hlen, &macdata2) |
a00d75e1 | 3490 | || macdata1 != macdata2 |
5923ad4b | 3491 | || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { |
a00d75e1 | 3492 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
e27f234a | 3493 | goto err; |
a00d75e1 | 3494 | } |
bcaad809 DSH |
3495 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); |
3496 | HMAC_CTX_free(hctx); | |
e27f234a MC |
3497 | OPENSSL_free(senc); |
3498 | ||
3499 | return 1; | |
687eaf27 | 3500 | err: |
b548a1f1 | 3501 | OPENSSL_free(senc); |
846ec07d | 3502 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); |
bf7c6817 | 3503 | HMAC_CTX_free(hctx); |
a00d75e1 | 3504 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
e27f234a | 3505 | return 0; |
0f113f3e | 3506 | } |
67c8e7f4 | 3507 | |
7cea05dc | 3508 | int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
e27f234a | 3509 | { |
5923ad4b | 3510 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->tlsext_status_type) |
7cea05dc | 3511 | || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, |
5923ad4b | 3512 | s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen)) { |
cc59ad10 MC |
3513 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_STATUS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
3514 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
cc59ad10 MC |
3515 | return 0; |
3516 | } | |
e27f234a MC |
3517 | |
3518 | return 1; | |
3519 | } | |
3520 | ||
e481f9b9 | 3521 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG |
e27f234a MC |
3522 | /* |
3523 | * tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. | |
3524 | * It sets the next_proto member in s if found | |
3525 | */ | |
be3583fa | 3526 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_next_proto(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
e27f234a | 3527 | { |
73999b62 | 3528 | PACKET next_proto, padding; |
e27f234a MC |
3529 | size_t next_proto_len; |
3530 | ||
50e735f9 MC |
3531 | /*- |
3532 | * The payload looks like: | |
3533 | * uint8 proto_len; | |
3534 | * uint8 proto[proto_len]; | |
3535 | * uint8 padding_len; | |
3536 | * uint8 padding[padding_len]; | |
3537 | */ | |
73999b62 MC |
3538 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &next_proto) |
3539 | || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &padding) | |
3540 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) { | |
e27f234a | 3541 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
c3fc7eea | 3542 | goto err; |
cf9b0b6f | 3543 | } |
0f113f3e | 3544 | |
a230b26e | 3545 | if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->next_proto_negotiated, &next_proto_len)) { |
6d41fc80 | 3546 | s->next_proto_negotiated_len = 0; |
c3fc7eea MC |
3547 | goto err; |
3548 | } | |
3549 | ||
6d41fc80 | 3550 | s->next_proto_negotiated_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len; |
0f113f3e | 3551 | |
e27f234a | 3552 | return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; |
a230b26e | 3553 | err: |
fe3a3291 | 3554 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); |
e27f234a | 3555 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
0f113f3e | 3556 | } |
6434abbf | 3557 | #endif |
d45ba43d | 3558 | |
e46f2334 MC |
3559 | static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
3560 | { | |
3561 | /* TODO(TLS1.3): Zero length encrypted extensions message for now */ | |
3562 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) { | |
3563 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
3564 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
3565 | return 0; | |
3566 | } | |
3567 | ||
3568 | return 1; | |
3569 | } | |
3570 | ||
d45ba43d MC |
3571 | #define SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN 3 |
3572 | ||
38a3cbfb EK |
3573 | STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s, |
3574 | PACKET *cipher_suites, | |
d45ba43d | 3575 | STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp, |
a230b26e | 3576 | int sslv2format, int *al) |
d45ba43d MC |
3577 | { |
3578 | const SSL_CIPHER *c; | |
3579 | STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; | |
38a3cbfb EK |
3580 | int n; |
3581 | /* 3 = SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN > TLS_CIPHER_LEN = 2. */ | |
3582 | unsigned char cipher[SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN]; | |
d45ba43d | 3583 | |
38a3cbfb EK |
3584 | s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0; |
3585 | ||
3586 | n = sslv2format ? SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN : TLS_CIPHER_LEN; | |
3587 | ||
3588 | if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) == 0) { | |
3589 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED); | |
3590 | *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
3591 | return NULL; | |
d45ba43d | 3592 | } |
38a3cbfb EK |
3593 | |
3594 | if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) % n != 0) { | |
d45ba43d MC |
3595 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, |
3596 | SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST); | |
38a3cbfb EK |
3597 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
3598 | return NULL; | |
d45ba43d | 3599 | } |
38a3cbfb | 3600 | |
d45ba43d MC |
3601 | if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL)) { |
3602 | sk = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null(); /* change perhaps later */ | |
e8aa8b6c | 3603 | if (sk == NULL) { |
d45ba43d | 3604 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
38a3cbfb | 3605 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
d45ba43d MC |
3606 | return NULL; |
3607 | } | |
3608 | } else { | |
3609 | sk = *skp; | |
3610 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_zero(sk); | |
3611 | } | |
3612 | ||
38a3cbfb EK |
3613 | if (!PACKET_memdup(cipher_suites, &s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw, |
3614 | &s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen)) { | |
3615 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
d45ba43d MC |
3616 | goto err; |
3617 | } | |
d45ba43d | 3618 | |
38a3cbfb EK |
3619 | while (PACKET_copy_bytes(cipher_suites, cipher, n)) { |
3620 | /* | |
20218b58 EK |
3621 | * SSLv3 ciphers wrapped in an SSLv2-compatible ClientHello have the |
3622 | * first byte set to zero, while true SSLv2 ciphers have a non-zero | |
3623 | * first byte. We don't support any true SSLv2 ciphers, so skip them. | |
38a3cbfb EK |
3624 | */ |
3625 | if (sslv2format && cipher[0] != '\0') | |
a230b26e | 3626 | continue; |
38a3cbfb | 3627 | |
d45ba43d | 3628 | /* Check for TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV */ |
38a3cbfb EK |
3629 | if ((cipher[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) && |
3630 | (cipher[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xff))) { | |
d45ba43d MC |
3631 | /* SCSV fatal if renegotiating */ |
3632 | if (s->renegotiate) { | |
3633 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, | |
3634 | SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING); | |
38a3cbfb | 3635 | *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
d45ba43d MC |
3636 | goto err; |
3637 | } | |
3638 | s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1; | |
d45ba43d MC |
3639 | continue; |
3640 | } | |
3641 | ||
3642 | /* Check for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV */ | |
38a3cbfb EK |
3643 | if ((cipher[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) && |
3644 | (cipher[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV & 0xff))) { | |
d45ba43d MC |
3645 | /* |
3646 | * The SCSV indicates that the client previously tried a higher | |
3647 | * version. Fail if the current version is an unexpected | |
3648 | * downgrade. | |
3649 | */ | |
4fa52141 | 3650 | if (!ssl_check_version_downgrade(s)) { |
d45ba43d MC |
3651 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, |
3652 | SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); | |
38a3cbfb | 3653 | *al = SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK; |
d45ba43d MC |
3654 | goto err; |
3655 | } | |
d45ba43d MC |
3656 | continue; |
3657 | } | |
3658 | ||
38a3cbfb EK |
3659 | /* For SSLv2-compat, ignore leading 0-byte. */ |
3660 | c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, sslv2format ? &cipher[1] : cipher); | |
d45ba43d MC |
3661 | if (c != NULL) { |
3662 | if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(sk, c)) { | |
3663 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
38a3cbfb | 3664 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
d45ba43d MC |
3665 | goto err; |
3666 | } | |
3667 | } | |
3668 | } | |
38a3cbfb EK |
3669 | if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) > 0) { |
3670 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
3671 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
3672 | goto err; | |
3673 | } | |
d45ba43d MC |
3674 | |
3675 | if (skp != NULL) | |
3676 | *skp = sk; | |
3677 | return (sk); | |
3678 | err: | |
3679 | if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL)) | |
3680 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk); | |
38a3cbfb | 3681 | return NULL; |
d45ba43d | 3682 | } |