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846e33c7 | 1 | /* |
4333b89f | 2 | * Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. |
aa8f3d76 | 3 | * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved |
c80149d9 | 4 | * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. |
8e2f6b79 | 5 | * |
2c18d164 | 6 | * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use |
846e33c7 RS |
7 | * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy |
8 | * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at | |
9 | * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html | |
8e2f6b79 | 10 | */ |
846e33c7 | 11 | |
d02b48c6 | 12 | #include <stdio.h> |
706457b7 DMSP |
13 | #include "../ssl_local.h" |
14 | #include "statem_local.h" | |
15 | #include "internal/constant_time.h" | |
3faa07b5 | 16 | #include "internal/cryptlib.h" |
ec577822 BM |
17 | #include <openssl/buffer.h> |
18 | #include <openssl/rand.h> | |
19 | #include <openssl/objects.h> | |
20 | #include <openssl/evp.h> | |
21 | #include <openssl/x509.h> | |
3c27208f | 22 | #include <openssl/dh.h> |
d7e498ac | 23 | #include <openssl/rsa.h> |
d095b68d | 24 | #include <openssl/bn.h> |
dbad1690 | 25 | #include <openssl/md5.h> |
77359d22 | 26 | #include <openssl/trace.h> |
e7db9680 | 27 | #include <openssl/core_names.h> |
4e3ee452 | 28 | #include <openssl/asn1t.h> |
f9b3bff6 | 29 | |
4ff1a526 MC |
30 | #define TICKET_NONCE_SIZE 8 |
31 | ||
4e3ee452 DB |
32 | typedef struct { |
33 | ASN1_TYPE *kxBlob; | |
34 | ASN1_TYPE *opaqueBlob; | |
35 | } GOST_KX_MESSAGE; | |
36 | ||
37 | DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(GOST_KX_MESSAGE) | |
38 | ||
39 | ASN1_SEQUENCE(GOST_KX_MESSAGE) = { | |
40 | ASN1_SIMPLE(GOST_KX_MESSAGE, kxBlob, ASN1_ANY), | |
41 | ASN1_OPT(GOST_KX_MESSAGE, opaqueBlob, ASN1_ANY), | |
42 | } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(GOST_KX_MESSAGE) | |
43 | ||
44 | IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(GOST_KX_MESSAGE) | |
45 | ||
e46f2334 | 46 | static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt); |
d45ba43d | 47 | |
61ae935a | 48 | /* |
0f1e51ea MC |
49 | * ossl_statem_server13_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed |
50 | * handshake state transitions when a TLSv1.3 server is reading messages from | |
51 | * the client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. | |
52 | * The current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|. | |
53 | * | |
94ed2c67 MC |
54 | * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error |
55 | * (transition not allowed) | |
0f1e51ea MC |
56 | */ |
57 | static int ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt) | |
58 | { | |
59 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; | |
60 | ||
61 | /* | |
62 | * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_BEFORE because at that stage we have | |
63 | * not negotiated TLSv1.3 yet, so that case is handled by | |
64 | * ossl_statem_server_read_transition() | |
65 | */ | |
66 | switch (st->hand_state) { | |
67 | default: | |
68 | break; | |
69 | ||
d7f8783f | 70 | case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA: |
fc7129dc | 71 | if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) { |
d4504fe5 MC |
72 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) { |
73 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO; | |
74 | return 1; | |
75 | } | |
76 | break; | |
77 | } else if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) { | |
ef6c191b MC |
78 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA) { |
79 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA; | |
80 | return 1; | |
81 | } | |
82 | break; | |
83 | } | |
84 | /* Fall through */ | |
85 | ||
86 | case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA: | |
92760c21 | 87 | case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED: |
555cbb32 | 88 | if (s->s3.tmp.cert_request) { |
0f1e51ea MC |
89 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) { |
90 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT; | |
91 | return 1; | |
92 | } | |
93 | } else { | |
92760c21 MC |
94 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { |
95 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED; | |
0f1e51ea MC |
96 | return 1; |
97 | } | |
98 | } | |
99 | break; | |
100 | ||
101 | case TLS_ST_SR_CERT: | |
102 | if (s->session->peer == NULL) { | |
92760c21 MC |
103 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { |
104 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED; | |
0f1e51ea MC |
105 | return 1; |
106 | } | |
107 | } else { | |
108 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) { | |
109 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY; | |
110 | return 1; | |
111 | } | |
112 | } | |
113 | break; | |
114 | ||
115 | case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY: | |
0f1e51ea MC |
116 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { |
117 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED; | |
118 | return 1; | |
119 | } | |
120 | break; | |
8cdc8c51 MC |
121 | |
122 | case TLS_ST_OK: | |
10109364 MC |
123 | /* |
124 | * Its never ok to start processing handshake messages in the middle of | |
125 | * early data (i.e. before we've received the end of early data alert) | |
126 | */ | |
127 | if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING) | |
128 | break; | |
9d75dce3 TS |
129 | |
130 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE | |
131 | && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) { | |
132 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT; | |
133 | return 1; | |
134 | } | |
135 | ||
8cdc8c51 MC |
136 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) { |
137 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE; | |
138 | return 1; | |
139 | } | |
140 | break; | |
0f1e51ea MC |
141 | } |
142 | ||
143 | /* No valid transition found */ | |
0f1e51ea MC |
144 | return 0; |
145 | } | |
146 | ||
147 | /* | |
148 | * ossl_statem_server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed | |
149 | * handshake state transitions when the server is reading messages from the | |
150 | * client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The | |
151 | * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|. | |
61ae935a | 152 | * |
94ed2c67 MC |
153 | * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error |
154 | * (transition not allowed) | |
61ae935a | 155 | */ |
8481f583 | 156 | int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt) |
61ae935a | 157 | { |
d6f1a6e9 | 158 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; |
61ae935a | 159 | |
f5ca0b04 | 160 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
5abeaf35 MC |
161 | if (!ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(s, mt)) |
162 | goto err; | |
163 | return 1; | |
164 | } | |
0f1e51ea | 165 | |
e8aa8b6c | 166 | switch (st->hand_state) { |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
167 | default: |
168 | break; | |
169 | ||
61ae935a | 170 | case TLS_ST_BEFORE: |
0386aad1 | 171 | case TLS_ST_OK: |
61ae935a MC |
172 | case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: |
173 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) { | |
174 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO; | |
175 | return 1; | |
176 | } | |
177 | break; | |
178 | ||
179 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE: | |
180 | /* | |
181 | * If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either | |
182 | * 1) We didn't request a Certificate | |
183 | * OR | |
184 | * 2) If we did request one then | |
185 | * a) We allow no Certificate to be returned | |
186 | * AND | |
187 | * b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0 | |
188 | * list if we requested a certificate) | |
189 | */ | |
0f512756 | 190 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) { |
555cbb32 | 191 | if (s->s3.tmp.cert_request) { |
0f512756 | 192 | if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { |
23dd09b5 MC |
193 | if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) |
194 | && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) { | |
0f512756 MC |
195 | /* |
196 | * This isn't an unexpected message as such - we're just | |
23dd09b5 MC |
197 | * not going to accept it because we require a client |
198 | * cert. | |
0f512756 | 199 | */ |
3ec8d113 | 200 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, |
3ec8d113 | 201 | SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); |
0f512756 MC |
202 | return 0; |
203 | } | |
204 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH; | |
205 | return 1; | |
206 | } | |
207 | } else { | |
208 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH; | |
209 | return 1; | |
210 | } | |
555cbb32 | 211 | } else if (s->s3.tmp.cert_request) { |
61ae935a MC |
212 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) { |
213 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT; | |
214 | return 1; | |
f100b031 | 215 | } |
61ae935a MC |
216 | } |
217 | break; | |
218 | ||
219 | case TLS_ST_SR_CERT: | |
220 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) { | |
221 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH; | |
222 | return 1; | |
223 | } | |
224 | break; | |
225 | ||
226 | case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH: | |
227 | /* | |
228 | * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have | |
229 | * received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer| | |
230 | * will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is | |
231 | * not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in | |
a71a4966 | 232 | * the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be |
61ae935a MC |
233 | * set. |
234 | */ | |
a71a4966 | 235 | if (s->session->peer == NULL || st->no_cert_verify) { |
61ae935a MC |
236 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { |
237 | /* | |
238 | * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH | |
239 | * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is | |
240 | * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses | |
241 | * its key from the certificate for key exchange. | |
242 | */ | |
243 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE; | |
244 | return 1; | |
245 | } | |
246 | } else { | |
247 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) { | |
248 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY; | |
249 | return 1; | |
250 | } | |
251 | } | |
252 | break; | |
253 | ||
254 | case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY: | |
255 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { | |
256 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE; | |
257 | return 1; | |
258 | } | |
259 | break; | |
260 | ||
261 | case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE: | |
262 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG | |
555cbb32 | 263 | if (s->s3.npn_seen) { |
61ae935a MC |
264 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) { |
265 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO; | |
266 | return 1; | |
267 | } | |
268 | } else { | |
269 | #endif | |
270 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { | |
271 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED; | |
272 | return 1; | |
273 | } | |
274 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG | |
275 | } | |
276 | #endif | |
277 | break; | |
278 | ||
279 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG | |
280 | case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO: | |
281 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { | |
282 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED; | |
283 | return 1; | |
284 | } | |
285 | break; | |
286 | #endif | |
287 | ||
288 | case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED: | |
289 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { | |
290 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE; | |
291 | return 1; | |
292 | } | |
293 | break; | |
61ae935a MC |
294 | } |
295 | ||
5abeaf35 | 296 | err: |
61ae935a | 297 | /* No valid transition found */ |
f20404fc MC |
298 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { |
299 | BIO *rbio; | |
300 | ||
301 | /* | |
302 | * CCS messages don't have a message sequence number so this is probably | |
303 | * because of an out-of-order CCS. We'll just drop it. | |
304 | */ | |
305 | s->init_num = 0; | |
306 | s->rwstate = SSL_READING; | |
307 | rbio = SSL_get_rbio(s); | |
308 | BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio); | |
309 | BIO_set_retry_read(rbio); | |
310 | return 0; | |
311 | } | |
c48ffbcc | 312 | SSLfatal(s, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); |
61ae935a MC |
313 | return 0; |
314 | } | |
315 | ||
316 | /* | |
317 | * Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message? | |
318 | * | |
319 | * Valid return values are: | |
320 | * 1: Yes | |
321 | * 0: No | |
322 | */ | |
bb3e20cf | 323 | static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) |
61ae935a | 324 | { |
555cbb32 | 325 | unsigned long alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; |
61ae935a MC |
326 | |
327 | /* | |
361a1191 | 328 | * only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a |
61ae935a MC |
329 | * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For |
330 | * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if | |
331 | * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, | |
332 | * the server certificate contains the server's public key for | |
333 | * key exchange. | |
334 | */ | |
a230b26e | 335 | if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE) |
61ae935a MC |
336 | /* |
337 | * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if | |
338 | * provided | |
339 | */ | |
340 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK | |
341 | /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */ | |
342 | || ((alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) | |
343 | && s->cert->psk_identity_hint) | |
344 | /* For other PSK always send SKE */ | |
345 | || (alg_k & (SSL_PSK & (SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK))) | |
346 | #endif | |
347 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP | |
348 | /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */ | |
349 | || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) | |
350 | #endif | |
a230b26e | 351 | ) { |
61ae935a MC |
352 | return 1; |
353 | } | |
354 | ||
355 | return 0; | |
356 | } | |
357 | ||
358 | /* | |
359 | * Should we send a CertificateRequest message? | |
360 | * | |
361 | * Valid return values are: | |
362 | * 1: Yes | |
363 | * 0: No | |
364 | */ | |
9d75dce3 | 365 | int send_certificate_request(SSL *s) |
61ae935a MC |
366 | { |
367 | if ( | |
368 | /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */ | |
369 | s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER | |
9d75dce3 TS |
370 | /* |
371 | * don't request if post-handshake-only unless doing | |
372 | * post-handshake in TLSv1.3: | |
373 | */ | |
374 | && (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE) | |
375 | || s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) | |
61ae935a MC |
376 | /* |
377 | * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert | |
9d75dce3 | 378 | * a second time: |
61ae935a | 379 | */ |
9d75dce3 | 380 | && (s->certreqs_sent < 1 || |
61ae935a MC |
381 | !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) |
382 | /* | |
383 | * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see | |
384 | * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in | |
385 | * RFC 2246): | |
386 | */ | |
555cbb32 | 387 | && (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) |
a230b26e EK |
388 | /* |
389 | * ... except when the application insists on | |
390 | * verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts | |
391 | * this for SSL 3) | |
392 | */ | |
61ae935a MC |
393 | || (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) |
394 | /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */ | |
555cbb32 | 395 | && !(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP) |
61ae935a MC |
396 | /* |
397 | * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests | |
398 | * are omitted | |
399 | */ | |
555cbb32 | 400 | && !(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) { |
61ae935a MC |
401 | return 1; |
402 | } | |
403 | ||
404 | return 0; | |
405 | } | |
406 | ||
407 | /* | |
0f1e51ea MC |
408 | * ossl_statem_server13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to |
409 | * move to next when a TLSv1.3 server is writing messages to be sent to the | |
410 | * client. | |
0f1e51ea MC |
411 | */ |
412 | static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(SSL *s) | |
413 | { | |
414 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; | |
415 | ||
416 | /* | |
417 | * No case for TLS_ST_BEFORE, because at that stage we have not negotiated | |
418 | * TLSv1.3 yet, so that is handled by ossl_statem_server_write_transition() | |
419 | */ | |
420 | ||
421 | switch (st->hand_state) { | |
422 | default: | |
423 | /* Shouldn't happen */ | |
c48ffbcc | 424 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
0f1e51ea MC |
425 | return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR; |
426 | ||
44c04a2e MC |
427 | case TLS_ST_OK: |
428 | if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) { | |
429 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE; | |
430 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
431 | } | |
9d75dce3 TS |
432 | if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) { |
433 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ; | |
434 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
435 | } | |
3bfacb5f BK |
436 | if (s->ext.extra_tickets_expected > 0) { |
437 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET; | |
438 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
439 | } | |
8cdc8c51 MC |
440 | /* Try to read from the client instead */ |
441 | return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; | |
44c04a2e | 442 | |
0f1e51ea | 443 | case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO: |
597c51bc | 444 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO; |
d4504fe5 | 445 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
7d061fce | 446 | |
0f1e51ea | 447 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO: |
fc7129dc MC |
448 | if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0 |
449 | && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_COMPLETE) | |
db37d32c | 450 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE; |
fc7129dc MC |
451 | else if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) |
452 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA; | |
db37d32c MC |
453 | else |
454 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS; | |
455 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
456 | ||
457 | case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE: | |
fc7129dc MC |
458 | if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) |
459 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA; | |
460 | else | |
461 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS; | |
e46f2334 MC |
462 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
463 | ||
464 | case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS: | |
94ed2c67 | 465 | if (s->hit) |
92760c21 MC |
466 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED; |
467 | else if (send_certificate_request(s)) | |
468 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ; | |
94ed2c67 | 469 | else |
0f1e51ea | 470 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT; |
94ed2c67 | 471 | |
0f1e51ea MC |
472 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
473 | ||
0f1e51ea | 474 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ: |
9d75dce3 TS |
475 | if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) { |
476 | s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_REQUESTED; | |
477 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; | |
478 | } else { | |
479 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT; | |
480 | } | |
0f1e51ea MC |
481 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
482 | ||
92760c21 | 483 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT: |
2c5dfdc3 MC |
484 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY; |
485 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
486 | ||
487 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY: | |
d805a57b | 488 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED; |
0f1e51ea MC |
489 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
490 | ||
491 | case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED: | |
f7e393be MC |
492 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA; |
493 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
94ed2c67 | 494 | |
d7f8783f MC |
495 | case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA: |
496 | return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; | |
497 | ||
92760c21 | 498 | case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED: |
30f05b19 MC |
499 | /* |
500 | * Technically we have finished the handshake at this point, but we're | |
9d0a8bb7 | 501 | * going to remain "in_init" for now and write out any session tickets |
30f05b19 | 502 | * immediately. |
30f05b19 | 503 | */ |
c0638ade MC |
504 | if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) { |
505 | s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_RECEIVED; | |
61fb5923 | 506 | } else if (!s->ext.ticket_expected) { |
c0638ade | 507 | /* |
61fb5923 MC |
508 | * If we're not going to renew the ticket then we just finish the |
509 | * handshake at this point. | |
c0638ade MC |
510 | */ |
511 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; | |
9d0a8bb7 | 512 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
c0638ade | 513 | } |
9d0a8bb7 MC |
514 | if (s->num_tickets > s->sent_tickets) |
515 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET; | |
516 | else | |
517 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; | |
30f05b19 MC |
518 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
519 | ||
8cdc8c51 | 520 | case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE: |
44c04a2e | 521 | case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE: |
36ff232c MC |
522 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; |
523 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
524 | ||
30f05b19 | 525 | case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET: |
9d0a8bb7 MC |
526 | /* In a resumption we only ever send a maximum of one new ticket. |
527 | * Following an initial handshake we send the number of tickets we have | |
528 | * been configured for. | |
529 | */ | |
3bfacb5f BK |
530 | if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s) && s->ext.extra_tickets_expected > 0) { |
531 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
532 | } else if (s->hit || s->num_tickets <= s->sent_tickets) { | |
9d0a8bb7 MC |
533 | /* We've written enough tickets out. */ |
534 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; | |
535 | } | |
0f1e51ea MC |
536 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
537 | } | |
538 | } | |
539 | ||
540 | /* | |
541 | * ossl_statem_server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move | |
542 | * to next when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client. | |
61ae935a | 543 | */ |
8481f583 | 544 | WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL *s) |
61ae935a | 545 | { |
d6f1a6e9 | 546 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; |
61ae935a | 547 | |
0f1e51ea MC |
548 | /* |
549 | * Note that before the ClientHello we don't know what version we are going | |
550 | * to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later | |
551 | */ | |
552 | ||
f5ca0b04 | 553 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) |
0f1e51ea MC |
554 | return ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(s); |
555 | ||
e8aa8b6c | 556 | switch (st->hand_state) { |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
557 | default: |
558 | /* Shouldn't happen */ | |
c48ffbcc | 559 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
560 | return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR; |
561 | ||
0386aad1 MC |
562 | case TLS_ST_OK: |
563 | if (st->request_state == TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ) { | |
564 | /* We must be trying to renegotiate */ | |
565 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ; | |
566 | st->request_state = TLS_ST_BEFORE; | |
567 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
568 | } | |
c7f47786 MC |
569 | /* Must be an incoming ClientHello */ |
570 | if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) { | |
f63a17d6 | 571 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
c7f47786 MC |
572 | return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR; |
573 | } | |
0386aad1 MC |
574 | /* Fall through */ |
575 | ||
e8aa8b6c | 576 | case TLS_ST_BEFORE: |
a230b26e | 577 | /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */ |
e8aa8b6c | 578 | return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; |
61ae935a | 579 | |
e8aa8b6c F |
580 | case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ: |
581 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; | |
e8aa8b6c | 582 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
61ae935a | 583 | |
e8aa8b6c F |
584 | case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO: |
585 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->d1->cookie_verified | |
3faa07b5 | 586 | && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)) { |
e8aa8b6c | 587 | st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST; |
3faa07b5 MC |
588 | } else if (s->renegotiate == 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) { |
589 | /* We must have rejected the renegotiation */ | |
590 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; | |
591 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
592 | } else { | |
e8aa8b6c | 593 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO; |
3faa07b5 | 594 | } |
e8aa8b6c | 595 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
61ae935a | 596 | |
e8aa8b6c F |
597 | case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: |
598 | return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; | |
61ae935a | 599 | |
e8aa8b6c F |
600 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO: |
601 | if (s->hit) { | |
aff8c126 | 602 | if (s->ext.ticket_expected) |
e8aa8b6c F |
603 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET; |
604 | else | |
605 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE; | |
606 | } else { | |
607 | /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */ | |
608 | /* normal PSK or SRP */ | |
555cbb32 | 609 | if (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & |
a230b26e | 610 | (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) { |
e8aa8b6c F |
611 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT; |
612 | } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) { | |
61ae935a | 613 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH; |
e8aa8b6c | 614 | } else if (send_certificate_request(s)) { |
61ae935a | 615 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ; |
e8aa8b6c F |
616 | } else { |
617 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE; | |
61ae935a | 618 | } |
e8aa8b6c F |
619 | } |
620 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
61ae935a | 621 | |
e8aa8b6c | 622 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT: |
aff8c126 | 623 | if (s->ext.status_expected) { |
e8aa8b6c | 624 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS; |
61ae935a | 625 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
e8aa8b6c F |
626 | } |
627 | /* Fall through */ | |
61ae935a | 628 | |
e8aa8b6c F |
629 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS: |
630 | if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) { | |
631 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH; | |
61ae935a | 632 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
e8aa8b6c F |
633 | } |
634 | /* Fall through */ | |
61ae935a | 635 | |
e8aa8b6c F |
636 | case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH: |
637 | if (send_certificate_request(s)) { | |
638 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ; | |
61ae935a | 639 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
e8aa8b6c F |
640 | } |
641 | /* Fall through */ | |
61ae935a | 642 | |
e8aa8b6c F |
643 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ: |
644 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE; | |
645 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
61ae935a | 646 | |
e8aa8b6c F |
647 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE: |
648 | return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; | |
649 | ||
650 | case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED: | |
651 | if (s->hit) { | |
61ae935a | 652 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; |
61ae935a | 653 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
aff8c126 | 654 | } else if (s->ext.ticket_expected) { |
e8aa8b6c F |
655 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET; |
656 | } else { | |
657 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE; | |
658 | } | |
659 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
660 | ||
661 | case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET: | |
662 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE; | |
663 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
61ae935a | 664 | |
e8aa8b6c F |
665 | case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE: |
666 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED; | |
667 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
668 | ||
669 | case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED: | |
670 | if (s->hit) { | |
671 | return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; | |
672 | } | |
673 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; | |
e8aa8b6c | 674 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
61ae935a MC |
675 | } |
676 | } | |
677 | ||
678 | /* | |
679 | * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from | |
680 | * the server to the client. | |
681 | */ | |
8481f583 | 682 | WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) |
61ae935a | 683 | { |
d6f1a6e9 | 684 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; |
61ae935a | 685 | |
e8aa8b6c | 686 | switch (st->hand_state) { |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
687 | default: |
688 | /* No pre work to be done */ | |
689 | break; | |
690 | ||
61ae935a MC |
691 | case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ: |
692 | s->shutdown = 0; | |
693 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) | |
f5c7f5df | 694 | dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s); |
61ae935a MC |
695 | break; |
696 | ||
697 | case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: | |
698 | s->shutdown = 0; | |
699 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
f5c7f5df | 700 | dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s); |
61ae935a MC |
701 | /* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */ |
702 | st->use_timer = 0; | |
703 | } | |
704 | break; | |
705 | ||
706 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO: | |
707 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
708 | /* | |
69687aa8 | 709 | * Messages we write from now on should be buffered and |
61ae935a MC |
710 | * retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now |
711 | */ | |
712 | st->use_timer = 1; | |
713 | } | |
714 | break; | |
715 | ||
716 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE: | |
717 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
3ec8d113 MC |
718 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) { |
719 | /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */ | |
61ae935a | 720 | return dtls_wait_for_dry(s); |
3ec8d113 | 721 | } |
61ae935a MC |
722 | #endif |
723 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; | |
724 | ||
725 | case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET: | |
3bfacb5f BK |
726 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->sent_tickets == 0 |
727 | && s->ext.extra_tickets_expected == 0) { | |
30f05b19 MC |
728 | /* |
729 | * Actually this is the end of the handshake, but we're going | |
730 | * straight into writing the session ticket out. So we finish off | |
731 | * the handshake, but keep the various buffers active. | |
56d36288 | 732 | * |
3ec8d113 | 733 | * Calls SSLfatal as required. |
30f05b19 | 734 | */ |
2a8db717 | 735 | return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 0, 0); |
6250282f BK |
736 | } |
737 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
61ae935a MC |
738 | /* |
739 | * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight | |
740 | * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer | |
741 | */ | |
742 | st->use_timer = 0; | |
743 | } | |
744 | break; | |
745 | ||
746 | case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE: | |
fc7129dc MC |
747 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) |
748 | break; | |
2e3ec2e1 BK |
749 | /* Writes to s->session are only safe for initial handshakes */ |
750 | if (s->session->cipher == NULL) { | |
751 | s->session->cipher = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher; | |
752 | } else if (s->session->cipher != s->s3.tmp.new_cipher) { | |
c48ffbcc | 753 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
2e3ec2e1 BK |
754 | return WORK_ERROR; |
755 | } | |
61ae935a | 756 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) { |
f63a17d6 | 757 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
61ae935a MC |
758 | return WORK_ERROR; |
759 | } | |
760 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
761 | /* | |
762 | * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight | |
763 | * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have | |
764 | * already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message, | |
765 | * but we'll set it again here in case we didn't. | |
766 | */ | |
767 | st->use_timer = 0; | |
768 | } | |
769 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; | |
770 | ||
d7f8783f | 771 | case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA: |
c36001c3 | 772 | if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTING |
555cbb32 | 773 | && (s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) == 0) |
f7e393be MC |
774 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; |
775 | /* Fall through */ | |
776 | ||
61ae935a | 777 | case TLS_ST_OK: |
3ec8d113 | 778 | /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */ |
2a8db717 | 779 | return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1, 1); |
61ae935a MC |
780 | } |
781 | ||
782 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; | |
783 | } | |
784 | ||
f273ff95 MC |
785 | static ossl_inline int conn_is_closed(void) |
786 | { | |
787 | switch (get_last_sys_error()) { | |
788 | #if defined(EPIPE) | |
789 | case EPIPE: | |
790 | return 1; | |
791 | #endif | |
792 | #if defined(ECONNRESET) | |
793 | case ECONNRESET: | |
794 | return 1; | |
795 | #endif | |
0b885f72 PM |
796 | #if defined(WSAECONNRESET) |
797 | case WSAECONNRESET: | |
798 | return 1; | |
799 | #endif | |
f273ff95 MC |
800 | default: |
801 | return 0; | |
802 | } | |
803 | } | |
804 | ||
61ae935a MC |
805 | /* |
806 | * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the | |
807 | * server to the client. | |
808 | */ | |
8481f583 | 809 | WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) |
61ae935a | 810 | { |
d6f1a6e9 | 811 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; |
61ae935a MC |
812 | |
813 | s->init_num = 0; | |
814 | ||
e8aa8b6c | 815 | switch (st->hand_state) { |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
816 | default: |
817 | /* No post work to be done */ | |
818 | break; | |
819 | ||
61ae935a MC |
820 | case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ: |
821 | if (statem_flush(s) != 1) | |
822 | return WORK_MORE_A; | |
2c4a056f | 823 | if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) { |
f63a17d6 | 824 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
2c4a056f MC |
825 | return WORK_ERROR; |
826 | } | |
61ae935a MC |
827 | break; |
828 | ||
829 | case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: | |
830 | if (statem_flush(s) != 1) | |
831 | return WORK_MORE_A; | |
832 | /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */ | |
2c4a056f | 833 | if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER && !ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) { |
f63a17d6 | 834 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
2c4a056f MC |
835 | return WORK_ERROR; |
836 | } | |
61ae935a MC |
837 | /* |
838 | * The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to | |
839 | * treat like it was the first packet | |
840 | */ | |
841 | s->first_packet = 1; | |
842 | break; | |
843 | ||
844 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO: | |
fc7129dc | 845 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) { |
75259b43 MC |
846 | if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) == 0 |
847 | && statem_flush(s) != 1) | |
597c51bc MC |
848 | return WORK_MORE_A; |
849 | break; | |
850 | } | |
61ae935a MC |
851 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP |
852 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) { | |
853 | unsigned char sctpauthkey[64]; | |
854 | char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)]; | |
09d62b33 | 855 | size_t labellen; |
61ae935a MC |
856 | |
857 | /* | |
858 | * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no | |
859 | * SCTP used. | |
860 | */ | |
141eb8c6 MC |
861 | memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL, |
862 | sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)); | |
61ae935a | 863 | |
09d62b33 MT |
864 | /* Don't include the terminating zero. */ |
865 | labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1; | |
866 | if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG) | |
867 | labellen += 1; | |
868 | ||
61ae935a | 869 | if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey, |
a230b26e | 870 | sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer, |
09d62b33 | 871 | labellen, NULL, 0, |
a230b26e | 872 | 0) <= 0) { |
c48ffbcc | 873 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
61ae935a MC |
874 | return WORK_ERROR; |
875 | } | |
876 | ||
877 | BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY, | |
878 | sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey); | |
879 | } | |
880 | #endif | |
db37d32c | 881 | if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) |
fc7129dc MC |
882 | || ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0 |
883 | && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_COMPLETE)) | |
db37d32c MC |
884 | break; |
885 | /* Fall through */ | |
886 | ||
887 | case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE: | |
75259b43 MC |
888 | if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) { |
889 | if (!statem_flush(s)) | |
890 | return WORK_MORE_A; | |
fc7129dc | 891 | break; |
75259b43 | 892 | } |
de9e884b | 893 | |
92760c21 MC |
894 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
895 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s) | |
896 | || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, | |
3ec8d113 MC |
897 | SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) { |
898 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
fe5e20fd | 899 | return WORK_ERROR; |
3ec8d113 | 900 | } |
fe5e20fd MC |
901 | |
902 | if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED | |
903 | && !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, | |
3ec8d113 MC |
904 | SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE |SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) { |
905 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
fe5e20fd | 906 | return WORK_ERROR; |
3ec8d113 | 907 | } |
de9e884b MC |
908 | /* |
909 | * We don't yet know whether the next record we are going to receive | |
910 | * is an unencrypted alert, an encrypted alert, or an encrypted | |
911 | * handshake message. We temporarily tolerate unencrypted alerts. | |
912 | */ | |
913 | s->statem.enc_read_state = ENC_READ_STATE_ALLOW_PLAIN_ALERTS; | |
db37d32c | 914 | break; |
92760c21 | 915 | } |
61ae935a | 916 | |
61ae935a MC |
917 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP |
918 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->hit) { | |
919 | /* | |
920 | * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if | |
921 | * no SCTP used. | |
922 | */ | |
923 | BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY, | |
924 | 0, NULL); | |
925 | } | |
926 | #endif | |
927 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, | |
a230b26e EK |
928 | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) |
929 | { | |
f63a17d6 | 930 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
61ae935a MC |
931 | return WORK_ERROR; |
932 | } | |
933 | ||
934 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) | |
935 | dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE); | |
936 | break; | |
937 | ||
938 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE: | |
939 | if (statem_flush(s) != 1) | |
940 | return WORK_MORE_A; | |
941 | break; | |
942 | ||
943 | case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED: | |
944 | if (statem_flush(s) != 1) | |
945 | return WORK_MORE_A; | |
946 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
947 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) { | |
948 | /* | |
949 | * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if | |
950 | * no SCTP used. | |
951 | */ | |
952 | BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY, | |
953 | 0, NULL); | |
954 | } | |
955 | #endif | |
92760c21 | 956 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
d74014c4 BK |
957 | /* TLS 1.3 gets the secret size from the handshake md */ |
958 | size_t dummy; | |
92760c21 | 959 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, |
ec15acb6 | 960 | s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0, |
d74014c4 | 961 | &dummy) |
92760c21 MC |
962 | || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, |
963 | SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) | |
f63a17d6 | 964 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
92760c21 MC |
965 | return WORK_ERROR; |
966 | } | |
61ae935a | 967 | break; |
30f05b19 | 968 | |
9d75dce3 TS |
969 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ: |
970 | if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) { | |
971 | if (statem_flush(s) != 1) | |
972 | return WORK_MORE_A; | |
973 | } | |
974 | break; | |
975 | ||
44c04a2e | 976 | case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE: |
57389a32 MC |
977 | if (statem_flush(s) != 1) |
978 | return WORK_MORE_A; | |
3ec8d113 MC |
979 | if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1)) { |
980 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
57389a32 | 981 | return WORK_ERROR; |
3ec8d113 | 982 | } |
57389a32 MC |
983 | break; |
984 | ||
30f05b19 | 985 | case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET: |
f273ff95 MC |
986 | clear_sys_error(); |
987 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && statem_flush(s) != 1) { | |
988 | if (SSL_get_error(s, 0) == SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL | |
989 | && conn_is_closed()) { | |
990 | /* | |
991 | * We ignore connection closed errors in TLSv1.3 when sending a | |
992 | * NewSessionTicket and behave as if we were successful. This is | |
993 | * so that we are still able to read data sent to us by a client | |
994 | * that closes soon after the end of the handshake without | |
995 | * waiting to read our post-handshake NewSessionTickets. | |
996 | */ | |
997 | s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; | |
998 | break; | |
999 | } | |
1000 | ||
30f05b19 | 1001 | return WORK_MORE_A; |
f273ff95 | 1002 | } |
30f05b19 | 1003 | break; |
61ae935a MC |
1004 | } |
1005 | ||
1006 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; | |
1007 | } | |
1008 | ||
1009 | /* | |
6392fb8e MC |
1010 | * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the |
1011 | * server | |
61ae935a MC |
1012 | * |
1013 | * Valid return values are: | |
1014 | * 1: Success | |
1015 | * 0: Error | |
1016 | */ | |
6392fb8e | 1017 | int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, |
a15c953f | 1018 | confunc_f *confunc, int *mt) |
61ae935a | 1019 | { |
d6f1a6e9 | 1020 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; |
61ae935a | 1021 | |
4a01c59f MC |
1022 | switch (st->hand_state) { |
1023 | default: | |
1024 | /* Shouldn't happen */ | |
c48ffbcc | 1025 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE); |
4a01c59f MC |
1026 | return 0; |
1027 | ||
1028 | case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE: | |
5923ad4b | 1029 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) |
6392fb8e | 1030 | *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec; |
4a01c59f | 1031 | else |
6392fb8e MC |
1032 | *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec; |
1033 | *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; | |
4a01c59f | 1034 | break; |
f3b3d7f0 | 1035 | |
4a01c59f | 1036 | case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: |
6392fb8e MC |
1037 | *confunc = dtls_construct_hello_verify_request; |
1038 | *mt = DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST; | |
4a01c59f | 1039 | break; |
61ae935a | 1040 | |
4a01c59f MC |
1041 | case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ: |
1042 | /* No construction function needed */ | |
6392fb8e MC |
1043 | *confunc = NULL; |
1044 | *mt = SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST; | |
4a01c59f | 1045 | break; |
61ae935a | 1046 | |
4a01c59f | 1047 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO: |
6392fb8e MC |
1048 | *confunc = tls_construct_server_hello; |
1049 | *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO; | |
4a01c59f | 1050 | break; |
61ae935a | 1051 | |
4a01c59f | 1052 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT: |
6392fb8e MC |
1053 | *confunc = tls_construct_server_certificate; |
1054 | *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE; | |
4a01c59f | 1055 | break; |
61ae935a | 1056 | |
2c5dfdc3 MC |
1057 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY: |
1058 | *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify; | |
1059 | *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY; | |
1060 | break; | |
1061 | ||
1062 | ||
4a01c59f | 1063 | case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH: |
6392fb8e MC |
1064 | *confunc = tls_construct_server_key_exchange; |
1065 | *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; | |
4a01c59f | 1066 | break; |
61ae935a | 1067 | |
4a01c59f | 1068 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ: |
6392fb8e MC |
1069 | *confunc = tls_construct_certificate_request; |
1070 | *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST; | |
4a01c59f | 1071 | break; |
61ae935a | 1072 | |
4a01c59f | 1073 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE: |
6392fb8e MC |
1074 | *confunc = tls_construct_server_done; |
1075 | *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE; | |
4a01c59f | 1076 | break; |
61ae935a | 1077 | |
4a01c59f | 1078 | case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET: |
6392fb8e MC |
1079 | *confunc = tls_construct_new_session_ticket; |
1080 | *mt = SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET; | |
4a01c59f | 1081 | break; |
61ae935a | 1082 | |
4a01c59f | 1083 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS: |
6392fb8e MC |
1084 | *confunc = tls_construct_cert_status; |
1085 | *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS; | |
4a01c59f | 1086 | break; |
61ae935a | 1087 | |
4a01c59f | 1088 | case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED: |
6392fb8e MC |
1089 | *confunc = tls_construct_finished; |
1090 | *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED; | |
4a01c59f | 1091 | break; |
e46f2334 | 1092 | |
f7e393be MC |
1093 | case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA: |
1094 | *confunc = NULL; | |
1095 | *mt = SSL3_MT_DUMMY; | |
1096 | break; | |
1097 | ||
e46f2334 MC |
1098 | case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS: |
1099 | *confunc = tls_construct_encrypted_extensions; | |
1100 | *mt = SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS; | |
1101 | break; | |
7d061fce | 1102 | |
44c04a2e MC |
1103 | case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE: |
1104 | *confunc = tls_construct_key_update; | |
1105 | *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE; | |
1106 | break; | |
4a01c59f | 1107 | } |
61ae935a | 1108 | |
5923ad4b | 1109 | return 1; |
61ae935a MC |
1110 | } |
1111 | ||
8a18bc25 AG |
1112 | /* |
1113 | * Maximum size (excluding the Handshake header) of a ClientHello message, | |
1114 | * calculated as follows: | |
1115 | * | |
1116 | * 2 + # client_version | |
1117 | * 32 + # only valid length for random | |
1118 | * 1 + # length of session_id | |
1119 | * 32 + # maximum size for session_id | |
1120 | * 2 + # length of cipher suites | |
1121 | * 2^16-2 + # maximum length of cipher suites array | |
1122 | * 1 + # length of compression_methods | |
1123 | * 2^8-1 + # maximum length of compression methods | |
1124 | * 2 + # length of extensions | |
1125 | * 2^16-1 # maximum length of extensions | |
1126 | */ | |
1127 | #define CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH 131396 | |
1128 | ||
61ae935a MC |
1129 | #define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048 |
1130 | #define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514 | |
1131 | ||
1132 | /* | |
1133 | * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are | |
1134 | * reading. Excludes the message header. | |
1135 | */ | |
eda75751 | 1136 | size_t ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL *s) |
61ae935a | 1137 | { |
d6f1a6e9 | 1138 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; |
61ae935a | 1139 | |
e8aa8b6c | 1140 | switch (st->hand_state) { |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
1141 | default: |
1142 | /* Shouldn't happen */ | |
1143 | return 0; | |
1144 | ||
61ae935a | 1145 | case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO: |
8a18bc25 | 1146 | return CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH; |
61ae935a | 1147 | |
ef6c191b MC |
1148 | case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA: |
1149 | return END_OF_EARLY_DATA_MAX_LENGTH; | |
1150 | ||
61ae935a MC |
1151 | case TLS_ST_SR_CERT: |
1152 | return s->max_cert_list; | |
1153 | ||
1154 | case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH: | |
1155 | return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH; | |
1156 | ||
1157 | case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY: | |
1158 | return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH; | |
1159 | ||
1160 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG | |
1161 | case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO: | |
1162 | return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH; | |
1163 | #endif | |
1164 | ||
1165 | case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE: | |
1166 | return CCS_MAX_LENGTH; | |
1167 | ||
1168 | case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED: | |
1169 | return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH; | |
8cdc8c51 MC |
1170 | |
1171 | case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE: | |
1172 | return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH; | |
61ae935a | 1173 | } |
61ae935a MC |
1174 | } |
1175 | ||
1176 | /* | |
1177 | * Process a message that the server has received from the client. | |
1178 | */ | |
8481f583 | 1179 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
61ae935a | 1180 | { |
d6f1a6e9 | 1181 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; |
61ae935a | 1182 | |
e8aa8b6c | 1183 | switch (st->hand_state) { |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
1184 | default: |
1185 | /* Shouldn't happen */ | |
c48ffbcc | 1186 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
1187 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
1188 | ||
61ae935a MC |
1189 | case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO: |
1190 | return tls_process_client_hello(s, pkt); | |
1191 | ||
ef6c191b MC |
1192 | case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA: |
1193 | return tls_process_end_of_early_data(s, pkt); | |
1194 | ||
61ae935a MC |
1195 | case TLS_ST_SR_CERT: |
1196 | return tls_process_client_certificate(s, pkt); | |
1197 | ||
1198 | case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH: | |
1199 | return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s, pkt); | |
1200 | ||
1201 | case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY: | |
1202 | return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt); | |
1203 | ||
1204 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG | |
1205 | case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO: | |
1206 | return tls_process_next_proto(s, pkt); | |
1207 | #endif | |
1208 | ||
1209 | case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE: | |
1210 | return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt); | |
1211 | ||
1212 | case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED: | |
1213 | return tls_process_finished(s, pkt); | |
8cdc8c51 MC |
1214 | |
1215 | case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE: | |
1216 | return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt); | |
1217 | ||
61ae935a | 1218 | } |
61ae935a MC |
1219 | } |
1220 | ||
1221 | /* | |
1222 | * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message | |
1223 | * from the client | |
1224 | */ | |
8481f583 | 1225 | WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) |
61ae935a | 1226 | { |
d6f1a6e9 | 1227 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; |
61ae935a | 1228 | |
e8aa8b6c | 1229 | switch (st->hand_state) { |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
1230 | default: |
1231 | /* Shouldn't happen */ | |
c48ffbcc | 1232 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
1233 | return WORK_ERROR; |
1234 | ||
61ae935a MC |
1235 | case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO: |
1236 | return tls_post_process_client_hello(s, wst); | |
1237 | ||
1238 | case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH: | |
1239 | return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s, wst); | |
61ae935a | 1240 | } |
61ae935a MC |
1241 | } |
1242 | ||
edc032b5 | 1243 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP |
29bfd5b7 MC |
1244 | /* Returns 1 on success, 0 for retryable error, -1 for fatal error */ |
1245 | static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s) | |
0f113f3e | 1246 | { |
29bfd5b7 MC |
1247 | int ret; |
1248 | int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; | |
0f113f3e | 1249 | |
555cbb32 | 1250 | if ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) && |
0f113f3e MC |
1251 | (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) { |
1252 | if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) { | |
1253 | /* | |
1254 | * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp | |
1255 | * login name | |
1256 | */ | |
29bfd5b7 | 1257 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY, |
29bfd5b7 MC |
1258 | SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND); |
1259 | return -1; | |
0f113f3e | 1260 | } else { |
29bfd5b7 MC |
1261 | ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, &al); |
1262 | if (ret < 0) | |
1263 | return 0; | |
1264 | if (ret == SSL3_AL_FATAL) { | |
c48ffbcc | 1265 | SSLfatal(s, al, |
29bfd5b7 MC |
1266 | al == SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY |
1267 | ? SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND | |
1268 | : SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); | |
1269 | return -1; | |
1270 | } | |
0f113f3e MC |
1271 | } |
1272 | } | |
29bfd5b7 | 1273 | return 1; |
0f113f3e | 1274 | } |
edc032b5 BL |
1275 | #endif |
1276 | ||
c536b6be | 1277 | int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(WPACKET *pkt, unsigned char *cookie, |
cb150cbc | 1278 | size_t cookie_len) |
8ba708e5 | 1279 | { |
8ba708e5 | 1280 | /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */ |
c536b6be MC |
1281 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, DTLS1_VERSION) |
1282 | || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, cookie, cookie_len)) | |
1283 | return 0; | |
8ba708e5 | 1284 | |
c536b6be | 1285 | return 1; |
8ba708e5 MC |
1286 | } |
1287 | ||
7cea05dc | 1288 | int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
8ba708e5 | 1289 | { |
cb150cbc | 1290 | unsigned int cookie_leni; |
8ba708e5 MC |
1291 | if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL || |
1292 | s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie, | |
cb150cbc | 1293 | &cookie_leni) == 0 || |
cfbe41ea | 1294 | cookie_leni > DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH) { |
c48ffbcc | 1295 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE); |
8ba708e5 MC |
1296 | return 0; |
1297 | } | |
cb150cbc | 1298 | s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_leni; |
8ba708e5 | 1299 | |
4a01c59f MC |
1300 | if (!dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(pkt, s->d1->cookie, |
1301 | s->d1->cookie_len)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 1302 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
c536b6be MC |
1303 | return 0; |
1304 | } | |
8ba708e5 | 1305 | |
8ba708e5 MC |
1306 | return 1; |
1307 | } | |
1308 | ||
805a2e9e MC |
1309 | /*- |
1310 | * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X | |
1311 | * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |hello|. | |
1312 | * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order: | |
1313 | * SNI, | |
1314 | * elliptic_curves | |
1315 | * ec_point_formats | |
33564cb7 | 1316 | * signature_algorithms (for TLSv1.2 only) |
805a2e9e MC |
1317 | * |
1318 | * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8, | |
1319 | * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them. | |
1320 | * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from | |
1321 | * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work). | |
1322 | */ | |
1323 | static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello) | |
1324 | { | |
805a2e9e MC |
1325 | static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = { |
1326 | 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */ | |
1327 | 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */ | |
1328 | 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */ | |
1329 | 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */ | |
1330 | 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */ | |
1331 | 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */ | |
1332 | ||
1333 | 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */ | |
1334 | 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */ | |
1335 | 0x01, /* 1 point format */ | |
1336 | 0x00, /* uncompressed */ | |
1337 | /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */ | |
1338 | 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */ | |
1339 | 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */ | |
1340 | 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */ | |
1341 | 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */ | |
1342 | 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */ | |
1343 | 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */ | |
1344 | 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */ | |
1345 | 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */ | |
1346 | }; | |
805a2e9e MC |
1347 | /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */ |
1348 | static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18; | |
1266eefd MC |
1349 | unsigned int type; |
1350 | PACKET sni, tmppkt; | |
1351 | size_t ext_len; | |
805a2e9e MC |
1352 | |
1353 | tmppkt = hello->extensions; | |
1354 | ||
1355 | if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2) | |
1356 | || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type) | |
1357 | || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) { | |
1358 | return; | |
6b473aca MC |
1359 | } |
1360 | ||
805a2e9e MC |
1361 | if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) |
1362 | return; | |
1363 | ||
1364 | ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ? | |
1365 | sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength; | |
1366 | ||
555cbb32 | 1367 | s->s3.is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock, |
805a2e9e | 1368 | ext_len); |
6b473aca MC |
1369 | } |
1370 | ||
be3583fa | 1371 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
e27f234a | 1372 | { |
e27f234a | 1373 | /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */ |
1ab3836b | 1374 | PACKET session_id, compression, extensions, cookie; |
6e3ff632 | 1375 | static const unsigned char null_compression = 0; |
3faa07b5 | 1376 | CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello = NULL; |
e27f234a | 1377 | |
c7f47786 MC |
1378 | /* Check if this is actually an unexpected renegotiation ClientHello */ |
1379 | if (s->renegotiate == 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) { | |
3faa07b5 | 1380 | if (!ossl_assert(!SSL_IS_TLS13(s))) { |
c48ffbcc | 1381 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
db0f35dd TS |
1382 | goto err; |
1383 | } | |
3faa07b5 | 1384 | if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION) != 0 |
555cbb32 | 1385 | || (!s->s3.send_connection_binding |
3faa07b5 MC |
1386 | && (s->options |
1387 | & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION) == 0)) { | |
1388 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION); | |
1389 | return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; | |
1390 | } | |
c7f47786 MC |
1391 | s->renegotiate = 1; |
1392 | s->new_session = 1; | |
1393 | } | |
1394 | ||
3faa07b5 MC |
1395 | clienthello = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*clienthello)); |
1396 | if (clienthello == NULL) { | |
c48ffbcc | 1397 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
3faa07b5 MC |
1398 | goto err; |
1399 | } | |
1400 | ||
1ab3836b | 1401 | /* |
b1b4b543 | 1402 | * First, parse the raw ClientHello data into the CLIENTHELLO_MSG structure. |
1ab3836b | 1403 | */ |
6b1bb98f | 1404 | clienthello->isv2 = RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer); |
bbafa47b | 1405 | PACKET_null_init(&cookie); |
1ab3836b | 1406 | |
6b1bb98f | 1407 | if (clienthello->isv2) { |
9ceb2426 | 1408 | unsigned int mt; |
b1b4b543 | 1409 | |
fc7129dc MC |
1410 | if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s) |
1411 | || s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) { | |
c48ffbcc | 1412 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); |
f63a17d6 | 1413 | goto err; |
7d061fce MC |
1414 | } |
1415 | ||
32ec4153 MC |
1416 | /*- |
1417 | * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2 | |
1418 | * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS | |
1419 | * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes | |
1420 | * the rest right through. Its format is: | |
1421 | * Byte Content | |
1422 | * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer | |
1423 | * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here | |
1424 | * 3-4 version | |
1425 | * 5-6 cipher_spec_length | |
1426 | * 7-8 session_id_length | |
1427 | * 9-10 challenge_length | |
1428 | * ... ... | |
1429 | */ | |
1430 | ||
73999b62 | 1431 | if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mt) |
a230b26e | 1432 | || mt != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) { |
32ec4153 MC |
1433 | /* |
1434 | * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record | |
1435 | * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record | |
1436 | * in the first place | |
1437 | */ | |
c48ffbcc | 1438 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
d45ba43d | 1439 | goto err; |
32ec4153 | 1440 | } |
32ec4153 MC |
1441 | } |
1442 | ||
6b1bb98f | 1443 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &clienthello->legacy_version)) { |
c48ffbcc | 1444 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); |
1ab3836b | 1445 | goto err; |
0f113f3e MC |
1446 | } |
1447 | ||
b3e2272c | 1448 | /* Parse the message and load client random. */ |
6b1bb98f | 1449 | if (clienthello->isv2) { |
32ec4153 MC |
1450 | /* |
1451 | * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello | |
1452 | * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format. | |
e2994cf0 | 1453 | * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected below. |
32ec4153 | 1454 | */ |
1ab3836b | 1455 | unsigned int ciphersuite_len, session_id_len, challenge_len; |
b3e2272c | 1456 | PACKET challenge; |
0f113f3e | 1457 | |
1ab3836b | 1458 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ciphersuite_len) |
a230b26e EK |
1459 | || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &session_id_len) |
1460 | || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &challenge_len)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 1461 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
f63a17d6 | 1462 | goto err; |
5e9f0eeb | 1463 | } |
0f113f3e | 1464 | |
293b5ca4 | 1465 | if (session_id_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) { |
c48ffbcc | 1466 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
f63a17d6 | 1467 | goto err; |
293b5ca4 AG |
1468 | } |
1469 | ||
6b1bb98f | 1470 | if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites, |
1ab3836b | 1471 | ciphersuite_len) |
6b1bb98f | 1472 | || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->session_id, session_id_len) |
73999b62 | 1473 | || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &challenge, challenge_len) |
b3e2272c | 1474 | /* No extensions. */ |
73999b62 | 1475 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { |
c48ffbcc | 1476 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
f63a17d6 | 1477 | goto err; |
9ceb2426 | 1478 | } |
6b1bb98f | 1479 | clienthello->session_id_len = session_id_len; |
9ceb2426 | 1480 | |
fba7b84c | 1481 | /* Load the client random and compression list. We use SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE |
6b1bb98f | 1482 | * here rather than sizeof(clienthello->random) because that is the limit |
fba7b84c | 1483 | * for SSLv3 and it is fixed. It won't change even if |
6b1bb98f | 1484 | * sizeof(clienthello->random) does. |
fba7b84c MC |
1485 | */ |
1486 | challenge_len = challenge_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE | |
1487 | ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE : challenge_len; | |
6b1bb98f | 1488 | memset(clienthello->random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); |
b3e2272c | 1489 | if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge, |
6b1bb98f | 1490 | clienthello->random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE - |
cb21df32 DB |
1491 | challenge_len, challenge_len) |
1492 | /* Advertise only null compression. */ | |
1493 | || !PACKET_buf_init(&compression, &null_compression, 1)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 1494 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
f63a17d6 | 1495 | goto err; |
9ceb2426 | 1496 | } |
b3e2272c | 1497 | |
6b1bb98f | 1498 | PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions); |
0f113f3e | 1499 | } else { |
b3e2272c | 1500 | /* Regular ClientHello. */ |
6b1bb98f | 1501 | if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) |
e2994cf0 | 1502 | || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id) |
6b1bb98f | 1503 | || !PACKET_copy_all(&session_id, clienthello->session_id, |
e2994cf0 | 1504 | SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH, |
6b1bb98f | 1505 | &clienthello->session_id_len)) { |
c48ffbcc | 1506 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
f63a17d6 | 1507 | goto err; |
9ceb2426 | 1508 | } |
32ec4153 | 1509 | |
b3e2272c | 1510 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
73999b62 | 1511 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookie)) { |
c48ffbcc | 1512 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
f63a17d6 | 1513 | goto err; |
32ec4153 | 1514 | } |
6b1bb98f | 1515 | if (!PACKET_copy_all(&cookie, clienthello->dtls_cookie, |
1ab3836b | 1516 | DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH, |
6b1bb98f | 1517 | &clienthello->dtls_cookie_len)) { |
c48ffbcc | 1518 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
f63a17d6 | 1519 | goto err; |
1ab3836b | 1520 | } |
b3e2272c EK |
1521 | /* |
1522 | * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one, | |
1523 | * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet. | |
1524 | * So check cookie length... | |
1525 | */ | |
1526 | if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) { | |
01666a8c MC |
1527 | if (clienthello->dtls_cookie_len == 0) { |
1528 | OPENSSL_free(clienthello); | |
eb5fd03b | 1529 | return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; |
01666a8c | 1530 | } |
b3e2272c | 1531 | } |
5e9f0eeb | 1532 | } |
0f113f3e | 1533 | |
6b1bb98f | 1534 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites)) { |
c48ffbcc | 1535 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
f63a17d6 | 1536 | goto err; |
1ab3836b MC |
1537 | } |
1538 | ||
4bfe1432 | 1539 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &compression)) { |
c48ffbcc | 1540 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
f63a17d6 | 1541 | goto err; |
b3e2272c | 1542 | } |
1ab3836b | 1543 | |
b3e2272c | 1544 | /* Could be empty. */ |
1ab3836b | 1545 | if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) { |
6b1bb98f | 1546 | PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions); |
1ab3836b | 1547 | } else { |
ef57a475 MC |
1548 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->extensions) |
1549 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { | |
c48ffbcc | 1550 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
f63a17d6 | 1551 | goto err; |
1ab3836b MC |
1552 | } |
1553 | } | |
1554 | } | |
1555 | ||
6b1bb98f | 1556 | if (!PACKET_copy_all(&compression, clienthello->compressions, |
e2994cf0 | 1557 | MAX_COMPRESSIONS_SIZE, |
6b1bb98f | 1558 | &clienthello->compressions_len)) { |
c48ffbcc | 1559 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
f63a17d6 | 1560 | goto err; |
1ab3836b MC |
1561 | } |
1562 | ||
b1b4b543 | 1563 | /* Preserve the raw extensions PACKET for later use */ |
6b1bb98f | 1564 | extensions = clienthello->extensions; |
fe874d27 | 1565 | if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, |
f63a17d6 | 1566 | &clienthello->pre_proc_exts, |
735d5b59 | 1567 | &clienthello->pre_proc_exts_len, 1)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
1568 | /* SSLfatal already been called */ |
1569 | goto err; | |
1ab3836b | 1570 | } |
6b1bb98f | 1571 | s->clienthello = clienthello; |
1ab3836b | 1572 | |
6b1bb98f | 1573 | return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; |
6b1bb98f | 1574 | |
f63a17d6 | 1575 | err: |
fbaf2857 RS |
1576 | if (clienthello != NULL) |
1577 | OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts); | |
6b1bb98f BK |
1578 | OPENSSL_free(clienthello); |
1579 | ||
1580 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
1581 | } | |
1582 | ||
f63a17d6 | 1583 | static int tls_early_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s) |
6b1bb98f BK |
1584 | { |
1585 | unsigned int j; | |
bf846a6d | 1586 | int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
6b1bb98f BK |
1587 | int protverr; |
1588 | size_t loop; | |
1589 | unsigned long id; | |
1590 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP | |
1591 | SSL_COMP *comp = NULL; | |
1592 | #endif | |
1593 | const SSL_CIPHER *c; | |
1594 | STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL; | |
1595 | STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *scsvs = NULL; | |
1596 | CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello = s->clienthello; | |
f7f2a01d | 1597 | DOWNGRADE dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE; |
6b1bb98f | 1598 | |
1ab3836b | 1599 | /* Finished parsing the ClientHello, now we can start processing it */ |
a9c0d8be DB |
1600 | /* Give the ClientHello callback a crack at things */ |
1601 | if (s->ctx->client_hello_cb != NULL) { | |
a9c0d8be | 1602 | /* A failure in the ClientHello callback terminates the connection. */ |
f1b97da1 DB |
1603 | switch (s->ctx->client_hello_cb(s, &al, s->ctx->client_hello_cb_arg)) { |
1604 | case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_SUCCESS: | |
1605 | break; | |
1606 | case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_RETRY: | |
a9c0d8be | 1607 | s->rwstate = SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_CB; |
f1b97da1 DB |
1608 | return -1; |
1609 | case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_ERROR: | |
1610 | default: | |
c48ffbcc | 1611 | SSLfatal(s, al, SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED); |
f1b97da1 | 1612 | goto err; |
6b1bb98f BK |
1613 | } |
1614 | } | |
1ab3836b MC |
1615 | |
1616 | /* Set up the client_random */ | |
555cbb32 | 1617 | memcpy(s->s3.client_random, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); |
1ab3836b MC |
1618 | |
1619 | /* Choose the version */ | |
1620 | ||
6b1bb98f BK |
1621 | if (clienthello->isv2) { |
1622 | if (clienthello->legacy_version == SSL2_VERSION | |
1623 | || (clienthello->legacy_version & 0xff00) | |
b1b4b543 MC |
1624 | != (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)) { |
1625 | /* | |
f63a17d6 | 1626 | * This is real SSLv2 or something completely unknown. We don't |
b1b4b543 MC |
1627 | * support it. |
1628 | */ | |
c48ffbcc | 1629 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL); |
1ab3836b MC |
1630 | goto err; |
1631 | } | |
b1b4b543 | 1632 | /* SSLv3/TLS */ |
6b1bb98f | 1633 | s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version; |
1ab3836b MC |
1634 | } |
1635 | /* | |
1636 | * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check | |
1637 | * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later. | |
1638 | */ | |
1639 | if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
f7f2a01d | 1640 | protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello, &dgrd); |
1ab3836b | 1641 | } else if (s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION && |
6b1bb98f | 1642 | DTLS_VERSION_LT((int)clienthello->legacy_version, s->version)) { |
1ab3836b MC |
1643 | protverr = SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW; |
1644 | } else { | |
1645 | protverr = 0; | |
1646 | } | |
1647 | ||
1648 | if (protverr) { | |
7d061fce | 1649 | if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) { |
b1b4b543 | 1650 | /* like ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */ |
6b1bb98f | 1651 | s->version = s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version; |
1ab3836b | 1652 | } |
c48ffbcc | 1653 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, protverr); |
6b1bb98f | 1654 | goto err; |
b3e2272c EK |
1655 | } |
1656 | ||
635b7d3f | 1657 | /* TLSv1.3 specifies that a ClientHello must end on a record boundary */ |
9e0ac6a2 | 1658 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) { |
c48ffbcc | 1659 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY); |
9e0ac6a2 MC |
1660 | goto err; |
1661 | } | |
1662 | ||
1ed65871 DB |
1663 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
1664 | /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */ | |
1665 | if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) { | |
1666 | if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) { | |
6b1bb98f BK |
1667 | if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, clienthello->dtls_cookie, |
1668 | clienthello->dtls_cookie_len) == 0) { | |
f63a17d6 | 1669 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, |
f63a17d6 | 1670 | SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); |
6b1bb98f | 1671 | goto err; |
1ed65871 DB |
1672 | /* else cookie verification succeeded */ |
1673 | } | |
a230b26e | 1674 | /* default verification */ |
6b1bb98f BK |
1675 | } else if (s->d1->cookie_len != clienthello->dtls_cookie_len |
1676 | || memcmp(clienthello->dtls_cookie, s->d1->cookie, | |
1ab3836b | 1677 | s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) { |
c48ffbcc | 1678 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); |
6b1bb98f | 1679 | goto err; |
1ed65871 DB |
1680 | } |
1681 | s->d1->cookie_verified = 1; | |
1682 | } | |
1683 | if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) { | |
f7f2a01d | 1684 | protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello, &dgrd); |
1ed65871 | 1685 | if (protverr != 0) { |
1ed65871 | 1686 | s->version = s->client_version; |
c48ffbcc | 1687 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, protverr); |
6b1bb98f | 1688 | goto err; |
1ed65871 DB |
1689 | } |
1690 | } | |
1691 | } | |
1692 | ||
b3e2272c EK |
1693 | s->hit = 0; |
1694 | ||
0de6d66d | 1695 | if (!ssl_cache_cipherlist(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites, |
f63a17d6 | 1696 | clienthello->isv2) || |
0de6d66d | 1697 | !bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites, &ciphers, &scsvs, |
dd5a4279 | 1698 | clienthello->isv2, 1)) { |
f63a17d6 | 1699 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
0de6d66d MC |
1700 | goto err; |
1701 | } | |
1702 | ||
555cbb32 | 1703 | s->s3.send_connection_binding = 0; |
0de6d66d MC |
1704 | /* Check what signalling cipher-suite values were received. */ |
1705 | if (scsvs != NULL) { | |
1706 | for(i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(scsvs); i++) { | |
1707 | c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(scsvs, i); | |
1708 | if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_SCSV) { | |
1709 | if (s->renegotiate) { | |
1710 | /* SCSV is fatal if renegotiating */ | |
f63a17d6 | 1711 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, |
f63a17d6 | 1712 | SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING); |
0de6d66d MC |
1713 | goto err; |
1714 | } | |
555cbb32 | 1715 | s->s3.send_connection_binding = 1; |
0de6d66d MC |
1716 | } else if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV && |
1717 | !ssl_check_version_downgrade(s)) { | |
1718 | /* | |
1719 | * This SCSV indicates that the client previously tried | |
1720 | * a higher version. We should fail if the current version | |
1721 | * is an unexpected downgrade, as that indicates that the first | |
1722 | * connection may have been tampered with in order to trigger | |
1723 | * an insecure downgrade. | |
1724 | */ | |
f63a17d6 | 1725 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK, |
f63a17d6 | 1726 | SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); |
0de6d66d MC |
1727 | goto err; |
1728 | } | |
1729 | } | |
1730 | } | |
1731 | ||
1732 | /* For TLSv1.3 we must select the ciphersuite *before* session resumption */ | |
1733 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { | |
1734 | const SSL_CIPHER *cipher = | |
1735 | ssl3_choose_cipher(s, ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s)); | |
1736 | ||
1737 | if (cipher == NULL) { | |
c48ffbcc | 1738 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); |
0de6d66d MC |
1739 | goto err; |
1740 | } | |
fc7129dc | 1741 | if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING |
555cbb32 TS |
1742 | && (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher == NULL |
1743 | || s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id != cipher->id)) { | |
0de6d66d MC |
1744 | /* |
1745 | * A previous HRR picked a different ciphersuite to the one we | |
1746 | * just selected. Something must have changed. | |
1747 | */ | |
c48ffbcc | 1748 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_CIPHER); |
0de6d66d MC |
1749 | goto err; |
1750 | } | |
555cbb32 | 1751 | s->s3.tmp.new_cipher = cipher; |
0de6d66d MC |
1752 | } |
1753 | ||
1ab3836b | 1754 | /* We need to do this before getting the session */ |
70af3d8e | 1755 | if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_extended_master_secret, |
fe874d27 | 1756 | SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, |
f63a17d6 MC |
1757 | clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0)) { |
1758 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
6b1bb98f | 1759 | goto err; |
1ab3836b MC |
1760 | } |
1761 | ||
b3e2272c EK |
1762 | /* |
1763 | * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello. | |
1764 | * TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty. | |
1765 | * | |
1766 | * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in | |
1767 | * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally | |
1768 | * ignore resumption requests with flag | |
1769 | * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather | |
1770 | * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on | |
1771 | * this for security won't even compile against older library versions). | |
1772 | * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to | |
1773 | * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains | |
1774 | * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the | |
1775 | * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be | |
1776 | * ignored. | |
1777 | */ | |
6b1bb98f | 1778 | if (clienthello->isv2 || |
b3e2272c EK |
1779 | (s->new_session && |
1780 | (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1781 | if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) { |
1782 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
b3e2272c | 1783 | goto err; |
f63a17d6 | 1784 | } |
b3e2272c | 1785 | } else { |
f63a17d6 | 1786 | i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, clienthello); |
128ae276 | 1787 | if (i == 1) { |
b3e2272c EK |
1788 | /* previous session */ |
1789 | s->hit = 1; | |
1790 | } else if (i == -1) { | |
f63a17d6 | 1791 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
6b1bb98f | 1792 | goto err; |
32ec4153 | 1793 | } else { |
b3e2272c | 1794 | /* i == 0 */ |
f63a17d6 MC |
1795 | if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) { |
1796 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
32ec4153 | 1797 | goto err; |
f63a17d6 | 1798 | } |
0f113f3e | 1799 | } |
b3e2272c | 1800 | } |
0f113f3e | 1801 | |
a5816a5a MC |
1802 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
1803 | memcpy(s->tmp_session_id, s->clienthello->session_id, | |
1804 | s->clienthello->session_id_len); | |
1805 | s->tmp_session_id_len = s->clienthello->session_id_len; | |
1806 | } | |
1807 | ||
a055a881 | 1808 | /* |
0de6d66d MC |
1809 | * If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list. In TLSv1.3 we check |
1810 | * ciphersuite compatibility with the session as part of resumption. | |
a055a881 MC |
1811 | */ |
1812 | if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->hit) { | |
b3e2272c EK |
1813 | j = 0; |
1814 | id = s->session->cipher->id; | |
d02b48c6 | 1815 | |
77359d22 RL |
1816 | OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS_CIPHER) { |
1817 | BIO_printf(trc_out, "client sent %d ciphers\n", | |
1818 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers)); | |
1819 | } | |
b3e2272c EK |
1820 | for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) { |
1821 | c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i); | |
77359d22 RL |
1822 | if (trc_out != NULL) |
1823 | BIO_printf(trc_out, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n", i, | |
1824 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c)); | |
b3e2272c EK |
1825 | if (c->id == id) { |
1826 | j = 1; | |
1827 | break; | |
32ec4153 | 1828 | } |
0f113f3e | 1829 | } |
b3e2272c | 1830 | if (j == 0) { |
ec30e856 | 1831 | /* |
b3e2272c EK |
1832 | * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked |
1833 | * to reuse it | |
ec30e856 | 1834 | */ |
f63a17d6 | 1835 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, |
f63a17d6 | 1836 | SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING); |
77359d22 | 1837 | OSSL_TRACE_CANCEL(TLS_CIPHER); |
6b1bb98f | 1838 | goto err; |
32ec4153 | 1839 | } |
77359d22 | 1840 | OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS_CIPHER); |
b3e2272c | 1841 | } |
9ceb2426 | 1842 | |
6b1bb98f BK |
1843 | for (loop = 0; loop < clienthello->compressions_len; loop++) { |
1844 | if (clienthello->compressions[loop] == 0) | |
b3e2272c | 1845 | break; |
0f113f3e | 1846 | } |
32ec4153 | 1847 | |
6b1bb98f | 1848 | if (loop >= clienthello->compressions_len) { |
b3e2272c | 1849 | /* no compress */ |
c48ffbcc | 1850 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED); |
6b1bb98f | 1851 | goto err; |
b3e2272c | 1852 | } |
f100b031 | 1853 | |
805a2e9e | 1854 | if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG) |
6b1bb98f | 1855 | ssl_check_for_safari(s, clienthello); |
805a2e9e | 1856 | |
0f113f3e | 1857 | /* TLS extensions */ |
fe874d27 | 1858 | if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, |
f63a17d6 MC |
1859 | clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0, 1)) { |
1860 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
6b1bb98f | 1861 | goto err; |
0f113f3e MC |
1862 | } |
1863 | ||
1864 | /* | |
1865 | * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake | |
1866 | * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before | |
1867 | * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket | |
1868 | * processing to use it in key derivation. | |
1869 | */ | |
1870 | { | |
1871 | unsigned char *pos; | |
555cbb32 | 1872 | pos = s->s3.server_random; |
f7f2a01d | 1873 | if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, dgrd) <= 0) { |
c48ffbcc | 1874 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
6b1bb98f | 1875 | goto err; |
0f113f3e MC |
1876 | } |
1877 | } | |
1878 | ||
0de6d66d MC |
1879 | if (!s->hit |
1880 | && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION | |
1881 | && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s) | |
1882 | && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s) | |
1883 | && s->ext.session_secret_cb) { | |
4a640fb6 | 1884 | const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL; |
8c1a5343 MC |
1885 | /* |
1886 | * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for | |
1887 | * backwards compat reasons | |
1888 | */ | |
1889 | int master_key_length; | |
0f113f3e | 1890 | |
8c1a5343 | 1891 | master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key); |
aff8c126 | 1892 | if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, |
8c1a5343 | 1893 | &master_key_length, ciphers, |
0f113f3e | 1894 | &pref_cipher, |
aff8c126 | 1895 | s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg) |
8c1a5343 MC |
1896 | && master_key_length > 0) { |
1897 | s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length; | |
0f113f3e | 1898 | s->hit = 1; |
eee2a6a7 | 1899 | s->peer_ciphers = ciphers; |
0f113f3e MC |
1900 | s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK; |
1901 | ||
1902 | ciphers = NULL; | |
1903 | ||
1904 | /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */ | |
3f4bf115 | 1905 | if (pref_cipher == NULL) |
eee2a6a7 | 1906 | pref_cipher = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->peer_ciphers, |
3f4bf115 | 1907 | SSL_get_ciphers(s)); |
0f113f3e | 1908 | if (pref_cipher == NULL) { |
c48ffbcc | 1909 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); |
6b1bb98f | 1910 | goto err; |
0f113f3e MC |
1911 | } |
1912 | ||
1913 | s->session->cipher = pref_cipher; | |
25aaa98a | 1914 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list); |
eee2a6a7 | 1915 | s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->peer_ciphers); |
25aaa98a | 1916 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id); |
eee2a6a7 | 1917 | s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->peer_ciphers); |
0f113f3e MC |
1918 | } |
1919 | } | |
58ece833 | 1920 | |
0f113f3e MC |
1921 | /* |
1922 | * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other | |
b2ce0337 | 1923 | * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression |
0f113f3e MC |
1924 | * algorithms from the client, starting at q. |
1925 | */ | |
555cbb32 | 1926 | s->s3.tmp.new_compression = NULL; |
1fe35494 MC |
1927 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
1928 | /* | |
1929 | * We already checked above that the NULL compression method appears in | |
1930 | * the list. Now we check there aren't any others (which is illegal in | |
1931 | * a TLSv1.3 ClientHello. | |
1932 | */ | |
1933 | if (clienthello->compressions_len != 1) { | |
f63a17d6 | 1934 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, |
f63a17d6 | 1935 | SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); |
1fe35494 MC |
1936 | goto err; |
1937 | } | |
1938 | } | |
09b6c2ef | 1939 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP |
0f113f3e | 1940 | /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */ |
1fe35494 | 1941 | else if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) { |
0f113f3e | 1942 | int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth; |
9ceb2426 | 1943 | unsigned int k; |
0f113f3e MC |
1944 | /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */ |
1945 | /* Can't disable compression */ | |
1946 | if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) { | |
f63a17d6 | 1947 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, |
f63a17d6 | 1948 | SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); |
6b1bb98f | 1949 | goto err; |
0f113f3e MC |
1950 | } |
1951 | /* Look for resumed compression method */ | |
1952 | for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) { | |
1953 | comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m); | |
1954 | if (comp_id == comp->id) { | |
555cbb32 | 1955 | s->s3.tmp.new_compression = comp; |
0f113f3e MC |
1956 | break; |
1957 | } | |
1958 | } | |
555cbb32 | 1959 | if (s->s3.tmp.new_compression == NULL) { |
f63a17d6 | 1960 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, |
f63a17d6 | 1961 | SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); |
6b1bb98f | 1962 | goto err; |
0f113f3e MC |
1963 | } |
1964 | /* Look for resumed method in compression list */ | |
6b1bb98f BK |
1965 | for (k = 0; k < clienthello->compressions_len; k++) { |
1966 | if (clienthello->compressions[k] == comp_id) | |
0f113f3e MC |
1967 | break; |
1968 | } | |
6b1bb98f | 1969 | if (k >= clienthello->compressions_len) { |
f63a17d6 | 1970 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, |
f63a17d6 | 1971 | SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING); |
6b1bb98f | 1972 | goto err; |
0f113f3e | 1973 | } |
c19602b5 | 1974 | } else if (s->hit) { |
0f113f3e | 1975 | comp = NULL; |
1fe35494 | 1976 | } else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) { |
df6741c9 | 1977 | /* See if we have a match */ |
9ceb2426 MC |
1978 | int m, nn, v, done = 0; |
1979 | unsigned int o; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1980 | |
1981 | nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); | |
1982 | for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) { | |
1983 | comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m); | |
1984 | v = comp->id; | |
6b1bb98f BK |
1985 | for (o = 0; o < clienthello->compressions_len; o++) { |
1986 | if (v == clienthello->compressions[o]) { | |
0f113f3e MC |
1987 | done = 1; |
1988 | break; | |
1989 | } | |
1990 | } | |
1991 | if (done) | |
1992 | break; | |
1993 | } | |
1994 | if (done) | |
555cbb32 | 1995 | s->s3.tmp.new_compression = comp; |
0f113f3e MC |
1996 | else |
1997 | comp = NULL; | |
1998 | } | |
e6f418bc | 1999 | #else |
0f113f3e MC |
2000 | /* |
2001 | * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session | |
2002 | * using compression. | |
2003 | */ | |
2004 | if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) { | |
c48ffbcc | 2005 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); |
6b1bb98f | 2006 | goto err; |
0f113f3e | 2007 | } |
09b6c2ef | 2008 | #endif |
413c4f45 | 2009 | |
0f113f3e | 2010 | /* |
eee2a6a7 | 2011 | * Given s->peer_ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher |
0f113f3e | 2012 | */ |
d02b48c6 | 2013 | |
a055a881 | 2014 | if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
eee2a6a7 MC |
2015 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->peer_ciphers); |
2016 | s->peer_ciphers = ciphers; | |
0f113f3e | 2017 | if (ciphers == NULL) { |
c48ffbcc | 2018 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
6b1bb98f | 2019 | goto err; |
0f113f3e MC |
2020 | } |
2021 | ciphers = NULL; | |
69b2d393 MC |
2022 | } |
2023 | ||
2024 | if (!s->hit) { | |
2025 | #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP | |
2026 | s->session->compress_meth = 0; | |
2027 | #else | |
2028 | s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id; | |
2029 | #endif | |
6f34d7bc BK |
2030 | if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) { |
2031 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
2032 | goto err; | |
2033 | } | |
e27f234a MC |
2034 | } |
2035 | ||
2036 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers); | |
6b1bb98f BK |
2037 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs); |
2038 | OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts); | |
2039 | OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello); | |
2040 | s->clienthello = NULL; | |
2041 | return 1; | |
e27f234a | 2042 | err: |
e27f234a | 2043 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers); |
6b1bb98f BK |
2044 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs); |
2045 | OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts); | |
2046 | OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello); | |
2047 | s->clienthello = NULL; | |
e27f234a | 2048 | |
6b1bb98f | 2049 | return 0; |
e27f234a MC |
2050 | } |
2051 | ||
24b8e4b2 MC |
2052 | /* |
2053 | * Call the status request callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1. | |
f63a17d6 | 2054 | * Upon failure, returns 0. |
24b8e4b2 | 2055 | */ |
f63a17d6 | 2056 | static int tls_handle_status_request(SSL *s) |
24b8e4b2 | 2057 | { |
aff8c126 | 2058 | s->ext.status_expected = 0; |
24b8e4b2 MC |
2059 | |
2060 | /* | |
2061 | * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be | |
2062 | * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed, | |
2063 | * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may | |
2064 | * influence which certificate is sent | |
2065 | */ | |
aff8c126 RS |
2066 | if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing && s->ctx != NULL |
2067 | && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) { | |
24b8e4b2 | 2068 | int ret; |
1266eefd | 2069 | |
24b8e4b2 | 2070 | /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */ |
555cbb32 | 2071 | if (s->s3.tmp.cert != NULL) { |
24b8e4b2 MC |
2072 | /* |
2073 | * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate | |
2074 | * et al can pick it up. | |
2075 | */ | |
555cbb32 | 2076 | s->cert->key = s->s3.tmp.cert; |
aff8c126 | 2077 | ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg); |
24b8e4b2 MC |
2078 | switch (ret) { |
2079 | /* We don't want to send a status request response */ | |
2080 | case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: | |
aff8c126 | 2081 | s->ext.status_expected = 0; |
24b8e4b2 MC |
2082 | break; |
2083 | /* status request response should be sent */ | |
2084 | case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK: | |
aff8c126 RS |
2085 | if (s->ext.ocsp.resp) |
2086 | s->ext.status_expected = 1; | |
24b8e4b2 MC |
2087 | break; |
2088 | /* something bad happened */ | |
2089 | case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: | |
2090 | default: | |
c48ffbcc | 2091 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); |
24b8e4b2 MC |
2092 | return 0; |
2093 | } | |
2094 | } | |
2095 | } | |
2096 | ||
2097 | return 1; | |
2098 | } | |
2099 | ||
5626f634 BK |
2100 | /* |
2101 | * Call the alpn_select callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1. | |
29bfd5b7 | 2102 | * Upon failure, returns 0. |
5626f634 | 2103 | */ |
f63a17d6 | 2104 | int tls_handle_alpn(SSL *s) |
5626f634 BK |
2105 | { |
2106 | const unsigned char *selected = NULL; | |
2107 | unsigned char selected_len = 0; | |
2108 | ||
555cbb32 | 2109 | if (s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3.alpn_proposed != NULL) { |
5626f634 | 2110 | int r = s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, |
555cbb32 TS |
2111 | s->s3.alpn_proposed, |
2112 | (unsigned int)s->s3.alpn_proposed_len, | |
5626f634 BK |
2113 | s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb_arg); |
2114 | ||
2115 | if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) { | |
555cbb32 TS |
2116 | OPENSSL_free(s->s3.alpn_selected); |
2117 | s->s3.alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len); | |
2118 | if (s->s3.alpn_selected == NULL) { | |
c48ffbcc | 2119 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
5626f634 BK |
2120 | return 0; |
2121 | } | |
555cbb32 | 2122 | s->s3.alpn_selected_len = selected_len; |
5626f634 BK |
2123 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG |
2124 | /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */ | |
555cbb32 | 2125 | s->s3.npn_seen = 0; |
5626f634 | 2126 | #endif |
630369d9 | 2127 | |
4be3a7c7 MC |
2128 | /* Check ALPN is consistent with session */ |
2129 | if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL | |
630369d9 MC |
2130 | || selected_len != s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len |
2131 | || memcmp(selected, s->session->ext.alpn_selected, | |
4be3a7c7 MC |
2132 | selected_len) != 0) { |
2133 | /* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */ | |
630369d9 MC |
2134 | s->ext.early_data_ok = 0; |
2135 | ||
4be3a7c7 | 2136 | if (!s->hit) { |
9d5db9c9 MC |
2137 | /* |
2138 | * This is a new session and so alpn_selected should have | |
2139 | * been initialised to NULL. We should update it with the | |
2140 | * selected ALPN. | |
2141 | */ | |
2142 | if (!ossl_assert(s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL)) { | |
2143 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, | |
9d5db9c9 MC |
2144 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
2145 | return 0; | |
2146 | } | |
4be3a7c7 MC |
2147 | s->session->ext.alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, |
2148 | selected_len); | |
2149 | if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) { | |
f63a17d6 | 2150 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
f63a17d6 | 2151 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
4be3a7c7 MC |
2152 | return 0; |
2153 | } | |
2154 | s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = selected_len; | |
2155 | } | |
2156 | } | |
2157 | ||
5626f634 | 2158 | return 1; |
630369d9 | 2159 | } else if (r != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK) { |
c48ffbcc | 2160 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL, |
f63a17d6 | 2161 | SSL_R_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL); |
5626f634 BK |
2162 | return 0; |
2163 | } | |
630369d9 MC |
2164 | /* |
2165 | * If r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK then behave as if no callback was | |
2166 | * present. | |
2167 | */ | |
5626f634 BK |
2168 | } |
2169 | ||
4be3a7c7 MC |
2170 | /* Check ALPN is consistent with session */ |
2171 | if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected != NULL) { | |
2172 | /* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */ | |
630369d9 | 2173 | s->ext.early_data_ok = 0; |
4be3a7c7 | 2174 | } |
630369d9 | 2175 | |
5626f634 BK |
2176 | return 1; |
2177 | } | |
2178 | ||
be3583fa | 2179 | WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) |
e27f234a | 2180 | { |
4a640fb6 | 2181 | const SSL_CIPHER *cipher; |
e27f234a MC |
2182 | |
2183 | if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) { | |
f63a17d6 | 2184 | int rv = tls_early_post_process_client_hello(s); |
6b1bb98f | 2185 | if (rv == 0) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
2186 | /* SSLfatal() was already called */ |
2187 | goto err; | |
6b1bb98f BK |
2188 | } |
2189 | if (rv < 0) | |
2190 | return WORK_MORE_A; | |
2191 | wst = WORK_MORE_B; | |
2192 | } | |
2193 | if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) { | |
a055a881 | 2194 | if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
e27f234a | 2195 | /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */ |
6f34d7bc BK |
2196 | if (!s->hit && s->cert->cert_cb != NULL) { |
2197 | int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg); | |
2198 | if (rv == 0) { | |
c48ffbcc | 2199 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR); |
524006dd | 2200 | goto err; |
e27f234a | 2201 | } |
6f34d7bc BK |
2202 | if (rv < 0) { |
2203 | s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; | |
2204 | return WORK_MORE_B; | |
2205 | } | |
2206 | s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; | |
0f113f3e | 2207 | } |
e27f234a | 2208 | |
0de6d66d MC |
2209 | /* In TLSv1.3 we selected the ciphersuite before resumption */ |
2210 | if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { | |
2211 | cipher = | |
eee2a6a7 | 2212 | ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->peer_ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s)); |
0de6d66d MC |
2213 | |
2214 | if (cipher == NULL) { | |
f63a17d6 | 2215 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, |
f63a17d6 MC |
2216 | SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); |
2217 | goto err; | |
0de6d66d | 2218 | } |
555cbb32 | 2219 | s->s3.tmp.new_cipher = cipher; |
11c67eea | 2220 | } |
69b2d393 | 2221 | if (!s->hit) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
2222 | if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, 1)) { |
2223 | /* SSLfatal already called */ | |
2224 | goto err; | |
2225 | } | |
69b2d393 MC |
2226 | /* check whether we should disable session resumption */ |
2227 | if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL) | |
2228 | s->session->not_resumable = | |
8acc2799 | 2229 | s->not_resumable_session_cb(s, |
555cbb32 | 2230 | ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey |
8acc2799 | 2231 | & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) != 0)); |
69b2d393 MC |
2232 | if (s->session->not_resumable) |
2233 | /* do not send a session ticket */ | |
2234 | s->ext.ticket_expected = 0; | |
2235 | } | |
e27f234a MC |
2236 | } else { |
2237 | /* Session-id reuse */ | |
555cbb32 | 2238 | s->s3.tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher; |
0f113f3e | 2239 | } |
0f113f3e | 2240 | |
e27f234a MC |
2241 | /*- |
2242 | * we now have the following setup. | |
2243 | * client_random | |
60250017 | 2244 | * cipher_list - our preferred list of ciphers |
2245 | * ciphers - the clients preferred list of ciphers | |
e27f234a MC |
2246 | * compression - basically ignored right now |
2247 | * ssl version is set - sslv3 | |
2248 | * s->session - The ssl session has been setup. | |
2249 | * s->hit - session reuse flag | |
555cbb32 | 2250 | * s->s3.tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use. |
e27f234a | 2251 | */ |
0f113f3e | 2252 | |
24b8e4b2 MC |
2253 | /* |
2254 | * Call status_request callback if needed. Has to be done after the | |
2255 | * certificate callbacks etc above. | |
2256 | */ | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2257 | if (!tls_handle_status_request(s)) { |
2258 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
2259 | goto err; | |
e27f234a | 2260 | } |
5626f634 BK |
2261 | /* |
2262 | * Call alpn_select callback if needed. Has to be done after SNI and | |
630369d9 MC |
2263 | * cipher negotiation (HTTP/2 restricts permitted ciphers). In TLSv1.3 |
2264 | * we already did this because cipher negotiation happens earlier, and | |
2265 | * we must handle ALPN before we decide whether to accept early_data. | |
5626f634 | 2266 | */ |
f63a17d6 MC |
2267 | if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !tls_handle_alpn(s)) { |
2268 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
2269 | goto err; | |
5626f634 | 2270 | } |
0f113f3e | 2271 | |
6b1bb98f | 2272 | wst = WORK_MORE_C; |
e27f234a MC |
2273 | } |
2274 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP | |
6b1bb98f | 2275 | if (wst == WORK_MORE_C) { |
e27f234a | 2276 | int ret; |
29bfd5b7 | 2277 | if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s)) == 0) { |
e27f234a MC |
2278 | /* |
2279 | * callback indicates further work to be done | |
2280 | */ | |
2281 | s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; | |
6b1bb98f | 2282 | return WORK_MORE_C; |
e27f234a | 2283 | } |
29bfd5b7 MC |
2284 | if (ret < 0) { |
2285 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
f63a17d6 | 2286 | goto err; |
0f113f3e MC |
2287 | } |
2288 | } | |
e27f234a | 2289 | #endif |
0f113f3e | 2290 | |
e27f234a | 2291 | return WORK_FINISHED_STOP; |
f63a17d6 | 2292 | err: |
e27f234a MC |
2293 | return WORK_ERROR; |
2294 | } | |
2295 | ||
7cea05dc | 2296 | int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
0f113f3e | 2297 | { |
f63a17d6 | 2298 | int compm; |
ec60ccc1 | 2299 | size_t sl, len; |
f2342b7a | 2300 | int version; |
a5816a5a | 2301 | unsigned char *session_id; |
fc7129dc | 2302 | int usetls13 = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING; |
0f113f3e | 2303 | |
597c51bc | 2304 | version = usetls13 ? TLS1_2_VERSION : s->version; |
f2342b7a | 2305 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, version) |
8157d44b MC |
2306 | /* |
2307 | * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in | |
2308 | * tls_process_client_hello() | |
2309 | */ | |
597c51bc | 2310 | || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, |
fc7129dc | 2311 | s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING |
555cbb32 | 2312 | ? hrrrandom : s->s3.server_random, |
597c51bc | 2313 | SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) { |
c48ffbcc | 2314 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
f63a17d6 | 2315 | return 0; |
8157d44b | 2316 | } |
0f113f3e | 2317 | |
e27f234a MC |
2318 | /*- |
2319 | * There are several cases for the session ID to send | |
2320 | * back in the server hello: | |
2321 | * - For session reuse from the session cache, | |
2322 | * we send back the old session ID. | |
2323 | * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket) | |
2324 | * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID" | |
2325 | * (which doesn't actually identify the session). | |
2326 | * - If it is a new session, we send back the new | |
2327 | * session ID. | |
2328 | * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use, | |
2329 | * we send back a 0-length session ID. | |
a5816a5a MC |
2330 | * - In TLSv1.3 we echo back the session id sent to us by the client |
2331 | * regardless | |
e27f234a MC |
2332 | * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse, |
2333 | * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed | |
2334 | * to send back. | |
2335 | */ | |
2336 | if (s->session->not_resumable || | |
2337 | (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER) | |
2338 | && !s->hit)) | |
2339 | s->session->session_id_length = 0; | |
2340 | ||
597c51bc | 2341 | if (usetls13) { |
a5816a5a MC |
2342 | sl = s->tmp_session_id_len; |
2343 | session_id = s->tmp_session_id; | |
2344 | } else { | |
2345 | sl = s->session->session_id_length; | |
2346 | session_id = s->session->session_id; | |
2347 | } | |
2348 | ||
ec60ccc1 | 2349 | if (sl > sizeof(s->session->session_id)) { |
c48ffbcc | 2350 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
f63a17d6 | 2351 | return 0; |
e27f234a | 2352 | } |
0f113f3e | 2353 | |
8157d44b | 2354 | /* set up the compression method */ |
09b6c2ef | 2355 | #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP |
8157d44b | 2356 | compm = 0; |
09b6c2ef | 2357 | #else |
555cbb32 | 2358 | if (usetls13 || s->s3.tmp.new_compression == NULL) |
8157d44b | 2359 | compm = 0; |
e27f234a | 2360 | else |
555cbb32 | 2361 | compm = s->s3.tmp.new_compression->id; |
09b6c2ef | 2362 | #endif |
e481f9b9 | 2363 | |
426dfc9f | 2364 | if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, session_id, sl) |
555cbb32 | 2365 | || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher, pkt, &len) |
b4f001eb | 2366 | || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, compm)) { |
c48ffbcc | 2367 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
b4f001eb MC |
2368 | return 0; |
2369 | } | |
2370 | ||
2371 | if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, | |
2372 | s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING | |
2373 | ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST | |
2374 | : (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) | |
2375 | ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO | |
2376 | : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO), | |
2377 | NULL, 0)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2378 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
2379 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e | 2380 | } |
d02b48c6 | 2381 | |
fc7129dc | 2382 | if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) { |
597c51bc MC |
2383 | /* Ditch the session. We'll create a new one next time around */ |
2384 | SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); | |
2385 | s->session = NULL; | |
2386 | s->hit = 0; | |
2387 | ||
2388 | /* | |
2389 | * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with | |
2390 | * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1. | |
2391 | */ | |
43054d3d | 2392 | if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s, NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) { |
597c51bc MC |
2393 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
2394 | return 0; | |
2395 | } | |
2396 | } else if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) | |
2397 | && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2398 | /* SSLfatal() already called */; |
2399 | return 0; | |
aff9929b MC |
2400 | } |
2401 | ||
e27f234a | 2402 | return 1; |
0f113f3e | 2403 | } |
d02b48c6 | 2404 | |
7cea05dc | 2405 | int tls_construct_server_done(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
e27f234a | 2406 | { |
555cbb32 | 2407 | if (!s->s3.tmp.cert_request) { |
5923ad4b | 2408 | if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { |
f63a17d6 | 2409 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
5923ad4b MC |
2410 | return 0; |
2411 | } | |
e27f234a | 2412 | } |
e27f234a MC |
2413 | return 1; |
2414 | } | |
2415 | ||
7cea05dc | 2416 | int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
0f113f3e | 2417 | { |
e2b420fd | 2418 | EVP_PKEY *pkdh = NULL; |
0f113f3e | 2419 | unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL; |
348240c6 | 2420 | size_t encodedlen = 0; |
0f113f3e | 2421 | int curve_id = 0; |
555cbb32 | 2422 | const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3.tmp.sigalg; |
f63a17d6 | 2423 | int i; |
0f113f3e | 2424 | unsigned long type; |
18428097 | 2425 | BIGNUM *r[4]; |
bfb0641f | 2426 | EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); |
fe3066ee | 2427 | EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; |
c13d2a5b | 2428 | size_t paramlen, paramoffset; |
18428097 | 2429 | int freer = 0, ret = 0; |
c13d2a5b | 2430 | |
5923ad4b | 2431 | if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, ¶moffset)) { |
c48ffbcc | 2432 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
f63a17d6 | 2433 | goto err; |
c13d2a5b | 2434 | } |
0f113f3e | 2435 | |
6e59a892 | 2436 | if (md_ctx == NULL) { |
c48ffbcc | 2437 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
f63a17d6 | 2438 | goto err; |
6e59a892 | 2439 | } |
0f113f3e | 2440 | |
555cbb32 | 2441 | type = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; |
e27f234a | 2442 | |
e27f234a | 2443 | r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL; |
85269210 | 2444 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK |
e27f234a MC |
2445 | /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */ |
2446 | if (type & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) { | |
2447 | } else | |
85269210 | 2448 | #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ |
e27f234a | 2449 | if (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) { |
94d61512 | 2450 | CERT *cert = s->cert; |
e2b420fd | 2451 | EVP_PKEY *pkdhp = NULL; |
e2b420fd | 2452 | |
e27f234a | 2453 | if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) { |
091f6074 MC |
2454 | pkdh = ssl_get_auto_dh(s); |
2455 | if (pkdh == NULL) { | |
c48ffbcc | 2456 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
f63a17d6 | 2457 | goto err; |
0f113f3e | 2458 | } |
e2b420fd DSH |
2459 | pkdhp = pkdh; |
2460 | } else { | |
2461 | pkdhp = cert->dh_tmp; | |
2462 | } | |
5b64ce89 | 2463 | #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0) |
e2b420fd | 2464 | if ((pkdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) { |
1b2b4755 | 2465 | pkdh = ssl_dh_to_pkey(s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0, 1024)); |
e2b420fd | 2466 | if (pkdh == NULL) { |
c48ffbcc | 2467 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
f63a17d6 | 2468 | goto err; |
e2b420fd DSH |
2469 | } |
2470 | pkdhp = pkdh; | |
2471 | } | |
1b2b4755 | 2472 | #endif |
e2b420fd | 2473 | if (pkdhp == NULL) { |
c48ffbcc | 2474 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); |
f63a17d6 | 2475 | goto err; |
e27f234a MC |
2476 | } |
2477 | if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, | |
e2b420fd | 2478 | EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkdhp), 0, pkdhp)) { |
c48ffbcc | 2479 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL); |
f63a17d6 | 2480 | goto err; |
e27f234a | 2481 | } |
555cbb32 | 2482 | if (s->s3.tmp.pkey != NULL) { |
c48ffbcc | 2483 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
e27f234a MC |
2484 | goto err; |
2485 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2486 | |
0f00ed77 | 2487 | s->s3.tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(s, pkdhp); |
555cbb32 | 2488 | if (s->s3.tmp.pkey == NULL) { |
c48ffbcc | 2489 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
ffaef3f1 | 2490 | goto err; |
e27f234a | 2491 | } |
e2b420fd | 2492 | |
e2b420fd DSH |
2493 | EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh); |
2494 | pkdh = NULL; | |
2495 | ||
18428097 MC |
2496 | /* These BIGNUMs need to be freed when we're finished */ |
2497 | freer = 1; | |
2498 | if (!EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(s->s3.tmp.pkey, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P, | |
2499 | &r[0]) | |
2500 | || !EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(s->s3.tmp.pkey, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G, | |
2501 | &r[1]) | |
2502 | || !EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(s->s3.tmp.pkey, | |
2503 | OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY, &r[2])) { | |
2504 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2505 | goto err; | |
2506 | } | |
462f4f4b | 2507 | } else if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) { |
e27f234a | 2508 | |
555cbb32 | 2509 | if (s->s3.tmp.pkey != NULL) { |
c48ffbcc | 2510 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
e27f234a MC |
2511 | goto err; |
2512 | } | |
2513 | ||
57be4444 | 2514 | /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */ |
8841154a | 2515 | curve_id = tls1_shared_group(s, -2); |
57be4444 | 2516 | if (curve_id == 0) { |
f63a17d6 | 2517 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, |
f63a17d6 | 2518 | SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE); |
e27f234a MC |
2519 | goto err; |
2520 | } | |
555cbb32 | 2521 | s->s3.tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey_group(s, curve_id); |
880d9d86 | 2522 | /* Generate a new key for this curve */ |
555cbb32 | 2523 | if (s->s3.tmp.pkey == NULL) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
2524 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
2525 | goto err; | |
57be4444 DSH |
2526 | } |
2527 | ||
880d9d86 | 2528 | /* Encode the public key. */ |
5ac8fb58 MC |
2529 | encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_encoded_public_key(s->s3.tmp.pkey, |
2530 | &encodedPoint); | |
e27f234a | 2531 | if (encodedlen == 0) { |
c48ffbcc | 2532 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EC_LIB); |
e27f234a MC |
2533 | goto err; |
2534 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2535 | |
e27f234a MC |
2536 | /* |
2537 | * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we | |
2538 | * can set these to NULLs | |
2539 | */ | |
2540 | r[0] = NULL; | |
2541 | r[1] = NULL; | |
2542 | r[2] = NULL; | |
2543 | r[3] = NULL; | |
2544 | } else | |
edc032b5 | 2545 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP |
e27f234a MC |
2546 | if (type & SSL_kSRP) { |
2547 | if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) || | |
2548 | (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) || | |
2549 | (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 2550 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM); |
e27f234a | 2551 | goto err; |
0f113f3e | 2552 | } |
e27f234a MC |
2553 | r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N; |
2554 | r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g; | |
2555 | r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s; | |
2556 | r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B; | |
2557 | } else | |
2558 | #endif | |
2559 | { | |
c48ffbcc | 2560 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE); |
f63a17d6 | 2561 | goto err; |
e27f234a | 2562 | } |
0f113f3e | 2563 | |
555cbb32 TS |
2564 | if (((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) != 0) |
2565 | || ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) != 0) { | |
f695571e DSH |
2566 | lu = NULL; |
2567 | } else if (lu == NULL) { | |
c48ffbcc | 2568 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
f63a17d6 | 2569 | goto err; |
e27f234a | 2570 | } |
0f113f3e | 2571 | |
85269210 | 2572 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK |
e27f234a | 2573 | if (type & SSL_PSK) { |
c13d2a5b MC |
2574 | size_t len = (s->cert->psk_identity_hint == NULL) |
2575 | ? 0 : strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint); | |
2576 | ||
2577 | /* | |
2578 | * It should not happen that len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN - we already | |
2579 | * checked this when we set the identity hint - but just in case | |
2580 | */ | |
2581 | if (len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN | |
7cea05dc | 2582 | || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->cert->psk_identity_hint, |
c13d2a5b | 2583 | len)) { |
c48ffbcc | 2584 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
f63a17d6 | 2585 | goto err; |
85269210 | 2586 | } |
e27f234a | 2587 | } |
85269210 DSH |
2588 | #endif |
2589 | ||
e27f234a | 2590 | for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) { |
c13d2a5b MC |
2591 | unsigned char *binval; |
2592 | int res; | |
2593 | ||
edc032b5 | 2594 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP |
e27f234a | 2595 | if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) { |
7cea05dc | 2596 | res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt); |
e27f234a | 2597 | } else |
78a01b3f | 2598 | #endif |
7cea05dc | 2599 | res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt); |
c13d2a5b MC |
2600 | |
2601 | if (!res) { | |
c48ffbcc | 2602 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
f63a17d6 | 2603 | goto err; |
c13d2a5b MC |
2604 | } |
2605 | ||
a230b26e | 2606 | /*- |
78a01b3f | 2607 | * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS |
2608 | * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length | |
2609 | * as the prime | |
2610 | */ | |
2611 | if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK))) { | |
c13d2a5b | 2612 | size_t len = BN_num_bytes(r[0]) - BN_num_bytes(r[2]); |
ff819477 | 2613 | |
c13d2a5b | 2614 | if (len > 0) { |
7cea05dc | 2615 | if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &binval)) { |
c48ffbcc | 2616 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
f63a17d6 | 2617 | goto err; |
c13d2a5b MC |
2618 | } |
2619 | memset(binval, 0, len); | |
78a01b3f | 2620 | } |
c13d2a5b | 2621 | } |
18428097 | 2622 | |
7cea05dc MC |
2623 | if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, BN_num_bytes(r[i]), &binval) |
2624 | || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 2625 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
f63a17d6 | 2626 | goto err; |
c13d2a5b MC |
2627 | } |
2628 | ||
2629 | BN_bn2bin(r[i], binval); | |
e27f234a | 2630 | } |
d02b48c6 | 2631 | |
e27f234a MC |
2632 | if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) { |
2633 | /* | |
c13d2a5b MC |
2634 | * We only support named (not generic) curves. In this situation, the |
2635 | * ServerKeyExchange message has: [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] | |
2636 | * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by the actual encoded | |
2637 | * point itself | |
e27f234a | 2638 | */ |
7cea05dc MC |
2639 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE) |
2640 | || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) | |
2641 | || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, curve_id) | |
2642 | || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encodedlen)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 2643 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
f63a17d6 | 2644 | goto err; |
c13d2a5b | 2645 | } |
e27f234a MC |
2646 | OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); |
2647 | encodedPoint = NULL; | |
e27f234a | 2648 | } |
ea262260 | 2649 | |
e27f234a | 2650 | /* not anonymous */ |
f695571e | 2651 | if (lu != NULL) { |
555cbb32 | 2652 | EVP_PKEY *pkey = s->s3.tmp.cert->privatekey; |
72ceb6a6 DSH |
2653 | const EVP_MD *md; |
2654 | unsigned char *sigbytes1, *sigbytes2, *tbs; | |
bddbfae1 | 2655 | size_t siglen = 0, tbslen; |
f695571e | 2656 | |
c8f6c28a | 2657 | if (pkey == NULL || !tls1_lookup_md(s->ctx, lu, &md)) { |
f695571e | 2658 | /* Should never happen */ |
c48ffbcc | 2659 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
f63a17d6 | 2660 | goto err; |
f695571e | 2661 | } |
f695571e DSH |
2662 | /* Get length of the parameters we have written above */ |
2663 | if (!WPACKET_get_length(pkt, ¶mlen)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 2664 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
f63a17d6 | 2665 | goto err; |
f695571e DSH |
2666 | } |
2667 | /* send signature algorithm */ | |
f63a17d6 | 2668 | if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg)) { |
c48ffbcc | 2669 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
f63a17d6 MC |
2670 | goto err; |
2671 | } | |
bddbfae1 | 2672 | |
d8652be0 MC |
2673 | if (EVP_DigestSignInit_ex(md_ctx, &pctx, |
2674 | md == NULL ? NULL : EVP_MD_name(md), | |
2675 | s->ctx->libctx, s->ctx->propq, pkey) <= 0) { | |
c48ffbcc | 2676 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
f63a17d6 | 2677 | goto err; |
f695571e DSH |
2678 | } |
2679 | if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) { | |
2680 | if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0 | |
2681 | || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) { | |
c48ffbcc | 2682 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
f63a17d6 | 2683 | goto err; |
0f113f3e | 2684 | } |
f695571e | 2685 | } |
72ceb6a6 DSH |
2686 | tbslen = construct_key_exchange_tbs(s, &tbs, |
2687 | s->init_buf->data + paramoffset, | |
2688 | paramlen); | |
2689 | if (tbslen == 0) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2690 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
2691 | goto err; | |
72ceb6a6 | 2692 | } |
bddbfae1 MC |
2693 | |
2694 | if (EVP_DigestSign(md_ctx, NULL, &siglen, tbs, tbslen) <=0 | |
2695 | || !WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes1) | |
2696 | || EVP_DigestSign(md_ctx, sigbytes1, &siglen, tbs, tbslen) <= 0 | |
2697 | || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes2) | |
2698 | || sigbytes1 != sigbytes2) { | |
2699 | OPENSSL_free(tbs); | |
c48ffbcc | 2700 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
f63a17d6 | 2701 | goto err; |
77d514c5 | 2702 | } |
bddbfae1 | 2703 | OPENSSL_free(tbs); |
0f113f3e MC |
2704 | } |
2705 | ||
18428097 | 2706 | ret = 1; |
0f113f3e | 2707 | err: |
e2b420fd | 2708 | EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh); |
b548a1f1 | 2709 | OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); |
bfb0641f | 2710 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); |
18428097 MC |
2711 | if (freer) { |
2712 | BN_free(r[0]); | |
2713 | BN_free(r[1]); | |
2714 | BN_free(r[2]); | |
2715 | BN_free(r[3]); | |
2716 | } | |
2717 | return ret; | |
0f113f3e | 2718 | } |
d02b48c6 | 2719 | |
7cea05dc | 2720 | int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
0f113f3e | 2721 | { |
03f44b97 | 2722 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
9d75dce3 TS |
2723 | /* Send random context when doing post-handshake auth */ |
2724 | if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) { | |
2725 | OPENSSL_free(s->pha_context); | |
2726 | s->pha_context_len = 32; | |
2727 | if ((s->pha_context = OPENSSL_malloc(s->pha_context_len)) == NULL | |
8f21260b MC |
2728 | || RAND_bytes_ex(s->ctx->libctx, s->pha_context, |
2729 | s->pha_context_len) <= 0 | |
9d75dce3 | 2730 | || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len)) { |
c48ffbcc | 2731 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
9d75dce3 TS |
2732 | return 0; |
2733 | } | |
2734 | /* reset the handshake hash back to just after the ClientFinished */ | |
2735 | if (!tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) { | |
2736 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
2737 | return 0; | |
2738 | } | |
2739 | } else { | |
2740 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 2741 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
9d75dce3 TS |
2742 | return 0; |
2743 | } | |
03f44b97 | 2744 | } |
32f66107 | 2745 | |
fe874d27 MC |
2746 | if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, |
2747 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, NULL, | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2748 | 0)) { |
2749 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
2750 | return 0; | |
03f44b97 | 2751 | } |
32f66107 DSH |
2752 | goto done; |
2753 | } | |
2754 | ||
2755 | /* get the list of acceptable cert types */ | |
2756 | if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt) | |
2757 | || !ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 2758 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
f63a17d6 | 2759 | return 0; |
28ff8ef3 | 2760 | } |
0f113f3e | 2761 | |
e27f234a | 2762 | if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { |
98c792d1 | 2763 | const uint16_t *psigs; |
a9669ddc | 2764 | size_t nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &psigs); |
703bcee0 | 2765 | |
7cea05dc | 2766 | if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) |
8f12296e | 2767 | || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH) |
7cea05dc MC |
2768 | || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, psigs, nl) |
2769 | || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 2770 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
f63a17d6 | 2771 | return 0; |
28ff8ef3 | 2772 | } |
e27f234a | 2773 | } |
0f113f3e | 2774 | |
98732979 | 2775 | if (!construct_ca_names(s, get_ca_names(s), pkt)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
2776 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
2777 | return 0; | |
28ff8ef3 | 2778 | } |
e27f234a | 2779 | |
32f66107 | 2780 | done: |
9d75dce3 | 2781 | s->certreqs_sent++; |
555cbb32 | 2782 | s->s3.tmp.cert_request = 1; |
e27f234a | 2783 | return 1; |
0f113f3e | 2784 | } |
d02b48c6 | 2785 | |
f63a17d6 | 2786 | static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
e27f234a | 2787 | { |
85269210 | 2788 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK |
0907d710 MC |
2789 | unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN]; |
2790 | size_t psklen; | |
2791 | PACKET psk_identity; | |
efcdbcbe | 2792 | |
0907d710 | 2793 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity)) { |
c48ffbcc | 2794 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
0907d710 MC |
2795 | return 0; |
2796 | } | |
2797 | if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { | |
c48ffbcc | 2798 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); |
0907d710 MC |
2799 | return 0; |
2800 | } | |
2801 | if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) { | |
c48ffbcc | 2802 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB); |
0907d710 MC |
2803 | return 0; |
2804 | } | |
85269210 | 2805 | |
0907d710 | 2806 | if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity)) { |
c48ffbcc | 2807 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
0907d710 MC |
2808 | return 0; |
2809 | } | |
85269210 | 2810 | |
0907d710 | 2811 | psklen = s->psk_server_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity, |
a230b26e | 2812 | psk, sizeof(psk)); |
85269210 | 2813 | |
0907d710 | 2814 | if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) { |
c48ffbcc | 2815 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
0907d710 MC |
2816 | return 0; |
2817 | } else if (psklen == 0) { | |
2818 | /* | |
2819 | * PSK related to the given identity not found | |
2820 | */ | |
c48ffbcc | 2821 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY, SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND); |
0907d710 MC |
2822 | return 0; |
2823 | } | |
85269210 | 2824 | |
555cbb32 TS |
2825 | OPENSSL_free(s->s3.tmp.psk); |
2826 | s->s3.tmp.psk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen); | |
0907d710 | 2827 | OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen); |
85269210 | 2828 | |
555cbb32 | 2829 | if (s->s3.tmp.psk == NULL) { |
c48ffbcc | 2830 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
0907d710 | 2831 | return 0; |
85269210 | 2832 | } |
0907d710 | 2833 | |
555cbb32 | 2834 | s->s3.tmp.psklen = psklen; |
0907d710 MC |
2835 | |
2836 | return 1; | |
2837 | #else | |
2838 | /* Should never happen */ | |
c48ffbcc | 2839 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
0907d710 | 2840 | return 0; |
85269210 | 2841 | #endif |
0907d710 MC |
2842 | } |
2843 | ||
f63a17d6 | 2844 | static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
0907d710 | 2845 | { |
e7db9680 | 2846 | size_t outlen; |
0907d710 | 2847 | PACKET enc_premaster; |
e7db9680 | 2848 | EVP_PKEY *rsa = NULL; |
0907d710 MC |
2849 | unsigned char *rsa_decrypt = NULL; |
2850 | int ret = 0; | |
e7db9680 MC |
2851 | EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL; |
2852 | OSSL_PARAM params[3], *p = params; | |
0907d710 | 2853 | |
e7db9680 | 2854 | rsa = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA].privatekey; |
0907d710 | 2855 | if (rsa == NULL) { |
c48ffbcc | 2856 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE); |
0907d710 MC |
2857 | return 0; |
2858 | } | |
2859 | ||
2860 | /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */ | |
2861 | if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) { | |
2862 | enc_premaster = *pkt; | |
2863 | } else { | |
2864 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &enc_premaster) | |
2865 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { | |
c48ffbcc | 2866 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
0907d710 | 2867 | return 0; |
0f113f3e | 2868 | } |
0907d710 | 2869 | } |
0f113f3e | 2870 | |
e7db9680 MC |
2871 | outlen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH; |
2872 | rsa_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(outlen); | |
0907d710 | 2873 | if (rsa_decrypt == NULL) { |
c48ffbcc | 2874 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
0907d710 MC |
2875 | return 0; |
2876 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2877 | |
0f00ed77 | 2878 | ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(s->ctx->libctx, rsa, s->ctx->propq); |
e7db9680 | 2879 | if (ctx == NULL) { |
c48ffbcc | 2880 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
0907d710 | 2881 | goto err; |
f63a17d6 | 2882 | } |
0f113f3e | 2883 | |
0907d710 | 2884 | /* |
e7db9680 MC |
2885 | * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of |
2886 | * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246, | |
2887 | * section 7.4.7.1). We use the special padding type | |
2888 | * RSA_PKCS1_WITH_TLS_PADDING to do that. It will automaticaly decrypt the | |
2889 | * RSA, check the padding and check that the client version is as expected | |
2890 | * in the premaster secret. If any of that fails then the function appears | |
2891 | * to return successfully but with a random result. The call below could | |
2892 | * still fail if the input is publicly invalid. | |
2893 | * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1 | |
0907d710 | 2894 | */ |
e7db9680 MC |
2895 | if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(ctx) <= 0 |
2896 | || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx, RSA_PKCS1_WITH_TLS_PADDING) <= 0) { | |
c48ffbcc | 2897 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); |
0907d710 | 2898 | goto err; |
f63a17d6 | 2899 | } |
20ca916d | 2900 | |
e7db9680 MC |
2901 | *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_CLIENT_VERSION, |
2902 | (unsigned int *)&s->client_version); | |
2903 | if ((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) != 0) | |
2904 | *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint( | |
2905 | OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_NEGOTIATED_VERSION, | |
2906 | (unsigned int *)&s->version); | |
2907 | *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end(); | |
5b8fa431 | 2908 | |
e7db9680 MC |
2909 | if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(ctx, params) |
2910 | || EVP_PKEY_decrypt(ctx, rsa_decrypt, &outlen, | |
2911 | PACKET_data(&enc_premaster), | |
2912 | PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster)) <= 0) { | |
c48ffbcc | 2913 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); |
0907d710 MC |
2914 | goto err; |
2915 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2916 | |
0907d710 | 2917 | /* |
e7db9680 MC |
2918 | * This test should never fail (otherwise we should have failed above) but |
2919 | * we double check anyway. | |
0907d710 | 2920 | */ |
e7db9680 MC |
2921 | if (outlen != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) { |
2922 | OPENSSL_cleanse(rsa_decrypt, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH); | |
c48ffbcc | 2923 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); |
e7db9680 | 2924 | goto err; |
0907d710 | 2925 | } |
0f113f3e | 2926 | |
e7db9680 MC |
2927 | /* Also cleanses rsa_decrypt (on success or failure) */ |
2928 | if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, rsa_decrypt, | |
2929 | SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH, 0)) { | |
f63a17d6 | 2930 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
0907d710 MC |
2931 | goto err; |
2932 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2933 | |
0907d710 MC |
2934 | ret = 1; |
2935 | err: | |
2936 | OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt); | |
e7db9680 | 2937 | EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx); |
0907d710 | 2938 | return ret; |
0907d710 MC |
2939 | } |
2940 | ||
f63a17d6 | 2941 | static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
642360f9 | 2942 | { |
642360f9 | 2943 | EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL; |
642360f9 | 2944 | unsigned int i; |
642360f9 MC |
2945 | const unsigned char *data; |
2946 | EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL; | |
2947 | int ret = 0; | |
2948 | ||
31a7d80d | 2949 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != i) { |
c48ffbcc | 2950 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); |
642360f9 MC |
2951 | goto err; |
2952 | } | |
555cbb32 | 2953 | skey = s->s3.tmp.pkey; |
642360f9 | 2954 | if (skey == NULL) { |
c48ffbcc | 2955 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); |
642360f9 MC |
2956 | goto err; |
2957 | } | |
2958 | ||
2959 | if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) { | |
c48ffbcc | 2960 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); |
642360f9 MC |
2961 | goto err; |
2962 | } | |
2963 | if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) { | |
2964 | /* We already checked we have enough data */ | |
c48ffbcc | 2965 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
642360f9 MC |
2966 | goto err; |
2967 | } | |
2968 | ckey = EVP_PKEY_new(); | |
2969 | if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) == 0) { | |
c48ffbcc | 2970 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_COPY_PARAMETERS_FAILED); |
642360f9 MC |
2971 | goto err; |
2972 | } | |
b6ff436f | 2973 | |
936d5657 | 2974 | if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_encoded_public_key(ckey, data, i)) { |
c48ffbcc | 2975 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
642360f9 MC |
2976 | goto err; |
2977 | } | |
2978 | ||
0f1e51ea | 2979 | if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) { |
f63a17d6 | 2980 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
642360f9 MC |
2981 | goto err; |
2982 | } | |
2983 | ||
2984 | ret = 1; | |
555cbb32 TS |
2985 | EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3.tmp.pkey); |
2986 | s->s3.tmp.pkey = NULL; | |
642360f9 MC |
2987 | err: |
2988 | EVP_PKEY_free(ckey); | |
2989 | return ret; | |
642360f9 MC |
2990 | } |
2991 | ||
f63a17d6 | 2992 | static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
19ed1ec1 | 2993 | { |
555cbb32 | 2994 | EVP_PKEY *skey = s->s3.tmp.pkey; |
19ed1ec1 MC |
2995 | EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL; |
2996 | int ret = 0; | |
2997 | ||
2998 | if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) { | |
2999 | /* We don't support ECDH client auth */ | |
c48ffbcc | 3000 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY); |
19ed1ec1 MC |
3001 | goto err; |
3002 | } else { | |
3003 | unsigned int i; | |
3004 | const unsigned char *data; | |
3005 | ||
3006 | /* | |
3007 | * Get client's public key from encoded point in the | |
3008 | * ClientKeyExchange message. | |
3009 | */ | |
3010 | ||
3011 | /* Get encoded point length */ | |
fb933982 DSH |
3012 | if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &i) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i) |
3013 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { | |
c48ffbcc | 3014 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
19ed1ec1 MC |
3015 | goto err; |
3016 | } | |
61bef9bd | 3017 | if (skey == NULL) { |
c48ffbcc | 3018 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY); |
61bef9bd MA |
3019 | goto err; |
3020 | } | |
3021 | ||
19ed1ec1 MC |
3022 | ckey = EVP_PKEY_new(); |
3023 | if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) <= 0) { | |
c48ffbcc | 3024 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_COPY_PARAMETERS_FAILED); |
19ed1ec1 MC |
3025 | goto err; |
3026 | } | |
afce590b | 3027 | |
5ac8fb58 | 3028 | if (EVP_PKEY_set1_encoded_public_key(ckey, data, i) <= 0) { |
c48ffbcc | 3029 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EC_LIB); |
19ed1ec1 MC |
3030 | goto err; |
3031 | } | |
3032 | } | |
3033 | ||
0f1e51ea | 3034 | if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) { |
f63a17d6 | 3035 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
19ed1ec1 MC |
3036 | goto err; |
3037 | } | |
3038 | ||
3039 | ret = 1; | |
555cbb32 TS |
3040 | EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3.tmp.pkey); |
3041 | s->s3.tmp.pkey = NULL; | |
19ed1ec1 MC |
3042 | err: |
3043 | EVP_PKEY_free(ckey); | |
3044 | ||
3045 | return ret; | |
19ed1ec1 MC |
3046 | } |
3047 | ||
f63a17d6 | 3048 | static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
c437eef6 MC |
3049 | { |
3050 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP | |
3051 | unsigned int i; | |
3052 | const unsigned char *data; | |
3053 | ||
3054 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i) | |
a230b26e | 3055 | || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) { |
c48ffbcc | 3056 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH); |
c437eef6 MC |
3057 | return 0; |
3058 | } | |
3059 | if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL)) == NULL) { | |
c48ffbcc | 3060 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_BN_LIB); |
c437eef6 MC |
3061 | return 0; |
3062 | } | |
a230b26e | 3063 | if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) { |
c48ffbcc | 3064 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS); |
c437eef6 MC |
3065 | return 0; |
3066 | } | |
3067 | OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username); | |
3068 | s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login); | |
3069 | if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) { | |
c48ffbcc | 3070 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
c437eef6 MC |
3071 | return 0; |
3072 | } | |
3073 | ||
3074 | if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s)) { | |
f63a17d6 | 3075 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
c437eef6 MC |
3076 | return 0; |
3077 | } | |
3078 | ||
3079 | return 1; | |
3080 | #else | |
3081 | /* Should never happen */ | |
c48ffbcc | 3082 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
c437eef6 MC |
3083 | return 0; |
3084 | #endif | |
3085 | } | |
3086 | ||
f63a17d6 | 3087 | static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
c437eef6 MC |
3088 | { |
3089 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST | |
3090 | EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx; | |
3091 | EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL; | |
3092 | unsigned char premaster_secret[32]; | |
3093 | const unsigned char *start; | |
3094 | size_t outlen = 32, inlen; | |
3095 | unsigned long alg_a; | |
4e3ee452 DB |
3096 | GOST_KX_MESSAGE *pKX = NULL; |
3097 | const unsigned char *ptr; | |
c437eef6 MC |
3098 | int ret = 0; |
3099 | ||
3100 | /* Get our certificate private key */ | |
555cbb32 | 3101 | alg_a = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; |
c437eef6 MC |
3102 | if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST12) { |
3103 | /* | |
3104 | * New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too | |
3105 | */ | |
3106 | pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey; | |
3107 | if (pk == NULL) { | |
3108 | pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].privatekey; | |
3109 | } | |
3110 | if (pk == NULL) { | |
3111 | pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey; | |
3112 | } | |
3113 | } else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) { | |
3114 | pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey; | |
3115 | } | |
3116 | ||
0f00ed77 | 3117 | pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(s->ctx->libctx, pk, s->ctx->propq); |
c437eef6 | 3118 | if (pkey_ctx == NULL) { |
c48ffbcc | 3119 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
c437eef6 MC |
3120 | return 0; |
3121 | } | |
3122 | if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) { | |
c48ffbcc | 3123 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
c437eef6 MC |
3124 | return 0; |
3125 | } | |
3126 | /* | |
3127 | * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe | |
3128 | * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from | |
3129 | * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a | |
3130 | * client certificate for authorization only. | |
3131 | */ | |
3132 | client_pub_pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer); | |
3133 | if (client_pub_pkey) { | |
3134 | if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0) | |
3135 | ERR_clear_error(); | |
3136 | } | |
4e3ee452 DB |
3137 | |
3138 | ptr = PACKET_data(pkt); | |
3139 | /* Some implementations provide extra data in the opaqueBlob | |
3140 | * We have nothing to do with this blob so we just skip it */ | |
3141 | pKX = d2i_GOST_KX_MESSAGE(NULL, &ptr, PACKET_remaining(pkt)); | |
3142 | if (pKX == NULL | |
3143 | || pKX->kxBlob == NULL | |
3144 | || ASN1_TYPE_get(pKX->kxBlob) != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) { | |
c48ffbcc | 3145 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); |
4e3ee452 | 3146 | goto err; |
c437eef6 | 3147 | } |
4e3ee452 DB |
3148 | |
3149 | if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, ptr - PACKET_data(pkt))) { | |
c48ffbcc | 3150 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); |
803cc8c7 | 3151 | goto err; |
4e3ee452 | 3152 | } |
803cc8c7 | 3153 | |
4e3ee452 | 3154 | if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { |
c48ffbcc | 3155 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); |
c437eef6 MC |
3156 | goto err; |
3157 | } | |
4e3ee452 DB |
3158 | |
3159 | inlen = pKX->kxBlob->value.sequence->length; | |
3160 | start = pKX->kxBlob->value.sequence->data; | |
803cc8c7 | 3161 | |
f63a17d6 MC |
3162 | if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, |
3163 | inlen) <= 0) { | |
c48ffbcc | 3164 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); |
c437eef6 MC |
3165 | goto err; |
3166 | } | |
3167 | /* Generate master secret */ | |
3168 | if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret, | |
3169 | sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) { | |
f63a17d6 | 3170 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
c437eef6 MC |
3171 | goto err; |
3172 | } | |
3173 | /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */ | |
f63a17d6 MC |
3174 | if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, |
3175 | NULL) > 0) | |
c437eef6 MC |
3176 | s->statem.no_cert_verify = 1; |
3177 | ||
3178 | ret = 1; | |
3179 | err: | |
3180 | EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); | |
4e3ee452 | 3181 | GOST_KX_MESSAGE_free(pKX); |
c437eef6 MC |
3182 | return ret; |
3183 | #else | |
3184 | /* Should never happen */ | |
c48ffbcc | 3185 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
c437eef6 MC |
3186 | return 0; |
3187 | #endif | |
3188 | } | |
3189 | ||
5a5530a2 DB |
3190 | static int tls_process_cke_gost18(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
3191 | { | |
3192 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST | |
3193 | unsigned char rnd_dgst[32]; | |
3194 | EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL; | |
3195 | EVP_PKEY *pk = NULL; | |
3196 | unsigned char premaster_secret[32]; | |
3197 | const unsigned char *start = NULL; | |
3198 | size_t outlen = 32, inlen = 0; | |
3199 | int ret = 0; | |
3200 | int cipher_nid = gost18_cke_cipher_nid(s); | |
3201 | ||
3202 | if (cipher_nid == NID_undef) { | |
c48ffbcc | 3203 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
5a5530a2 DB |
3204 | return 0; |
3205 | } | |
3206 | ||
3207 | if (gost_ukm(s, rnd_dgst) <= 0) { | |
c48ffbcc | 3208 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
5a5530a2 DB |
3209 | goto err; |
3210 | } | |
3211 | ||
3212 | /* Get our certificate private key */ | |
3213 | pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey != NULL ? | |
3214 | s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey : | |
3215 | s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].privatekey; | |
3216 | if (pk == NULL) { | |
c48ffbcc | 3217 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE); |
5a5530a2 DB |
3218 | goto err; |
3219 | } | |
3220 | ||
3221 | pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(s->ctx->libctx, pk, s->ctx->propq); | |
3222 | if (pkey_ctx == NULL) { | |
c48ffbcc | 3223 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
5a5530a2 DB |
3224 | goto err; |
3225 | } | |
3226 | if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) { | |
c48ffbcc | 3227 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
5a5530a2 DB |
3228 | goto err; |
3229 | } | |
3230 | ||
3231 | /* Reuse EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, make choice in engine code depending on size */ | |
3232 | if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_DECRYPT, | |
3233 | EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 32, rnd_dgst) < 0) { | |
c48ffbcc | 3234 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG); |
5a5530a2 DB |
3235 | goto err; |
3236 | } | |
3237 | ||
3238 | if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_DECRYPT, | |
3239 | EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CIPHER, cipher_nid, NULL) < 0) { | |
c48ffbcc | 3240 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG); |
5a5530a2 DB |
3241 | goto err; |
3242 | } | |
3243 | inlen = PACKET_remaining(pkt); | |
3244 | start = PACKET_data(pkt); | |
3245 | ||
3246 | if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) { | |
c48ffbcc | 3247 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); |
5a5530a2 DB |
3248 | goto err; |
3249 | } | |
3250 | /* Generate master secret */ | |
3251 | if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret, | |
3252 | sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) { | |
3253 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
3254 | goto err; | |
3255 | } | |
3256 | ret = 1; | |
3257 | ||
3258 | err: | |
3259 | EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); | |
3260 | return ret; | |
3261 | #else | |
3262 | /* Should never happen */ | |
c48ffbcc | 3263 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
5a5530a2 DB |
3264 | return 0; |
3265 | #endif | |
3266 | } | |
3267 | ||
0907d710 MC |
3268 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
3269 | { | |
0907d710 MC |
3270 | unsigned long alg_k; |
3271 | ||
555cbb32 | 3272 | alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; |
0907d710 MC |
3273 | |
3274 | /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */ | |
f63a17d6 MC |
3275 | if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt)) { |
3276 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
0907d710 | 3277 | goto err; |
f63a17d6 | 3278 | } |
0907d710 MC |
3279 | |
3280 | if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) { | |
3281 | /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */ | |
3282 | if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { | |
c48ffbcc | 3283 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
9059eb71 | 3284 | goto err; |
0907d710 MC |
3285 | } |
3286 | /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */ | |
3287 | if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, NULL, 0, 0)) { | |
f63a17d6 | 3288 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
9059eb71 | 3289 | goto err; |
69f68237 | 3290 | } |
0907d710 | 3291 | } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
3292 | if (!tls_process_cke_rsa(s, pkt)) { |
3293 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
0907d710 | 3294 | goto err; |
f63a17d6 | 3295 | } |
642360f9 | 3296 | } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
3297 | if (!tls_process_cke_dhe(s, pkt)) { |
3298 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
0f113f3e | 3299 | goto err; |
f63a17d6 | 3300 | } |
19ed1ec1 | 3301 | } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
3302 | if (!tls_process_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt)) { |
3303 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
19ed1ec1 | 3304 | goto err; |
f63a17d6 | 3305 | } |
c437eef6 | 3306 | } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
3307 | if (!tls_process_cke_srp(s, pkt)) { |
3308 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
0f113f3e | 3309 | goto err; |
f63a17d6 | 3310 | } |
c437eef6 | 3311 | } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
3312 | if (!tls_process_cke_gost(s, pkt)) { |
3313 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
0f113f3e | 3314 | goto err; |
f63a17d6 | 3315 | } |
5a5530a2 DB |
3316 | } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST18) { |
3317 | if (!tls_process_cke_gost18(s, pkt)) { | |
3318 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
3319 | goto err; | |
3320 | } | |
c437eef6 | 3321 | } else { |
c48ffbcc | 3322 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE); |
9059eb71 | 3323 | goto err; |
0f113f3e MC |
3324 | } |
3325 | ||
e27f234a | 3326 | return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; |
0f113f3e | 3327 | err: |
85269210 | 3328 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK |
555cbb32 TS |
3329 | OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3.tmp.psk, s->s3.tmp.psklen); |
3330 | s->s3.tmp.psk = NULL; | |
58964a49 | 3331 | #endif |
e27f234a | 3332 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
0f113f3e | 3333 | } |
d02b48c6 | 3334 | |
be3583fa | 3335 | WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) |
94836de2 | 3336 | { |
94836de2 | 3337 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP |
c130dd8e MC |
3338 | if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) { |
3339 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
3340 | unsigned char sctpauthkey[64]; | |
3341 | char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)]; | |
09d62b33 | 3342 | size_t labellen; |
c130dd8e MC |
3343 | /* |
3344 | * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP | |
3345 | * used. | |
3346 | */ | |
141eb8c6 MC |
3347 | memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL, |
3348 | sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)); | |
c130dd8e | 3349 | |
09d62b33 MT |
3350 | /* Don't include the terminating zero. */ |
3351 | labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1; | |
3352 | if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG) | |
3353 | labellen += 1; | |
3354 | ||
c130dd8e | 3355 | if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey, |
a230b26e | 3356 | sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer, |
09d62b33 | 3357 | labellen, NULL, 0, |
a230b26e | 3358 | 0) <= 0) { |
c48ffbcc | 3359 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
0fe2a0af | 3360 | return WORK_ERROR; |
c130dd8e | 3361 | } |
94836de2 | 3362 | |
c130dd8e MC |
3363 | BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY, |
3364 | sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey); | |
94836de2 | 3365 | } |
94836de2 MC |
3366 | } |
3367 | #endif | |
3368 | ||
149c2ef5 | 3369 | if (s->statem.no_cert_verify || !s->session->peer) { |
a230b26e EK |
3370 | /* |
3371 | * No certificate verify or no peer certificate so we no longer need | |
3372 | * the handshake_buffer | |
149c2ef5 MC |
3373 | */ |
3374 | if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { | |
f63a17d6 | 3375 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
149c2ef5 MC |
3376 | return WORK_ERROR; |
3377 | } | |
94836de2 | 3378 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; |
28f4580c | 3379 | } else { |
555cbb32 | 3380 | if (!s->s3.handshake_buffer) { |
c48ffbcc | 3381 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
94836de2 MC |
3382 | return WORK_ERROR; |
3383 | } | |
3384 | /* | |
3385 | * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support | |
3386 | * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op | |
3387 | */ | |
3388 | if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) { | |
f63a17d6 | 3389 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
94836de2 MC |
3390 | return WORK_ERROR; |
3391 | } | |
94836de2 MC |
3392 | } |
3393 | ||
3394 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; | |
3395 | } | |
3396 | ||
be3583fa | 3397 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
e27f234a | 3398 | { |
f63a17d6 | 3399 | int i; |
eb5fd03b | 3400 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
e27f234a | 3401 | X509 *x = NULL; |
9d75dce3 | 3402 | unsigned long l; |
b6981744 | 3403 | const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes; |
e27f234a | 3404 | STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL; |
e96e0f8e | 3405 | PACKET spkt, context; |
d805a57b | 3406 | size_t chainidx; |
9d75dce3 | 3407 | SSL_SESSION *new_sess = NULL; |
0f113f3e | 3408 | |
de9e884b MC |
3409 | /* |
3410 | * To get this far we must have read encrypted data from the client. We no | |
3411 | * longer tolerate unencrypted alerts. This value is ignored if less than | |
3412 | * TLSv1.3 | |
3413 | */ | |
3414 | s->statem.enc_read_state = ENC_READ_STATE_VALID; | |
3415 | ||
0f113f3e | 3416 | if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) { |
c48ffbcc | 3417 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
f63a17d6 | 3418 | goto err; |
0f113f3e MC |
3419 | } |
3420 | ||
9d75dce3 TS |
3421 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &context) |
3422 | || (s->pha_context == NULL && PACKET_remaining(&context) != 0) | |
3423 | || (s->pha_context != NULL && | |
3424 | !PACKET_equal(&context, s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len)))) { | |
c48ffbcc | 3425 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_INVALID_CONTEXT); |
9d75dce3 TS |
3426 | goto err; |
3427 | } | |
3428 | ||
3429 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_3(pkt, &spkt) | |
e96e0f8e | 3430 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { |
c48ffbcc | 3431 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
f63a17d6 | 3432 | goto err; |
0f113f3e | 3433 | } |
0bc09ecd | 3434 | |
d805a57b | 3435 | for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0; chainidx++) { |
0bc09ecd | 3436 | if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l) |
a230b26e | 3437 | || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) { |
c48ffbcc | 3438 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
f63a17d6 | 3439 | goto err; |
0f113f3e MC |
3440 | } |
3441 | ||
0bc09ecd | 3442 | certstart = certbytes; |
d8652be0 | 3443 | x = X509_new_ex(s->ctx->libctx, s->ctx->propq); |
0f113f3e | 3444 | if (x == NULL) { |
c48ffbcc | 3445 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
6725682d SL |
3446 | goto err; |
3447 | } | |
3448 | if (d2i_X509(&x, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, l) == NULL) { | |
c48ffbcc | 3449 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); |
f63a17d6 | 3450 | goto err; |
0f113f3e | 3451 | } |
6725682d | 3452 | |
0bc09ecd | 3453 | if (certbytes != (certstart + l)) { |
c48ffbcc | 3454 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
f63a17d6 | 3455 | goto err; |
0f113f3e | 3456 | } |
e96e0f8e MC |
3457 | |
3458 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { | |
3459 | RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL; | |
3460 | PACKET extensions; | |
3461 | ||
3462 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&spkt, &extensions)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 3463 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); |
f63a17d6 | 3464 | goto err; |
e96e0f8e | 3465 | } |
fe874d27 MC |
3466 | if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, |
3467 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts, | |
f63a17d6 | 3468 | NULL, chainidx == 0) |
8e1634ec | 3469 | || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, |
f63a17d6 | 3470 | rawexts, x, chainidx, |
8e1634ec | 3471 | PACKET_remaining(&spkt) == 0)) { |
5ee289ea | 3472 | OPENSSL_free(rawexts); |
f63a17d6 | 3473 | goto err; |
5ee289ea MC |
3474 | } |
3475 | OPENSSL_free(rawexts); | |
e96e0f8e MC |
3476 | } |
3477 | ||
0f113f3e | 3478 | if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) { |
c48ffbcc | 3479 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
f63a17d6 | 3480 | goto err; |
0f113f3e MC |
3481 | } |
3482 | x = NULL; | |
0f113f3e MC |
3483 | } |
3484 | ||
3485 | if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) { | |
3486 | /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */ | |
3487 | if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { | |
f63a17d6 | 3488 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, |
f63a17d6 MC |
3489 | SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED); |
3490 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e MC |
3491 | } |
3492 | /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */ | |
3493 | else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && | |
3494 | (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) { | |
f63a17d6 | 3495 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED, |
f63a17d6 MC |
3496 | SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); |
3497 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e MC |
3498 | } |
3499 | /* No client certificate so digest cached records */ | |
555cbb32 | 3500 | if (s->s3.handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
3501 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
3502 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e MC |
3503 | } |
3504 | } else { | |
3505 | EVP_PKEY *pkey; | |
3506 | i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk); | |
3507 | if (i <= 0) { | |
c6d38183 | 3508 | SSLfatal(s, ssl_x509err2alert(s->verify_result), |
f63a17d6 MC |
3509 | SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED); |
3510 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e MC |
3511 | } |
3512 | if (i > 1) { | |
c48ffbcc | 3513 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, i); |
f63a17d6 | 3514 | goto err; |
0f113f3e | 3515 | } |
8382fd3a | 3516 | pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0)); |
0f113f3e | 3517 | if (pkey == NULL) { |
f63a17d6 | 3518 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, |
f63a17d6 MC |
3519 | SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE); |
3520 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e | 3521 | } |
0f113f3e MC |
3522 | } |
3523 | ||
9d75dce3 TS |
3524 | /* |
3525 | * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise | |
3526 | * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions, | |
3527 | * we replace them with a duplicate. Here, we need to do this every time | |
3528 | * a new certificate is received via post-handshake authentication, as the | |
3529 | * session may have already gone into the session cache. | |
3530 | */ | |
3531 | ||
3532 | if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) { | |
9d75dce3 | 3533 | if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) { |
c48ffbcc | 3534 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
9d75dce3 TS |
3535 | goto err; |
3536 | } | |
3537 | ||
9d75dce3 TS |
3538 | SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); |
3539 | s->session = new_sess; | |
3540 | } | |
3541 | ||
222561fe | 3542 | X509_free(s->session->peer); |
0f113f3e MC |
3543 | s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk); |
3544 | s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result; | |
3545 | ||
c34b0f99 DSH |
3546 | sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->peer_chain, X509_free); |
3547 | s->session->peer_chain = sk; | |
0f1e51ea MC |
3548 | |
3549 | /* | |
3550 | * Freeze the handshake buffer. For <TLS1.3 we do this after the CKE | |
3551 | * message | |
3552 | */ | |
94ed2c67 | 3553 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
3554 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
3555 | goto err; | |
0f1e51ea MC |
3556 | } |
3557 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
3558 | /* |
3559 | * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own | |
d4d78943 | 3560 | * certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c |
0f113f3e | 3561 | */ |
0f113f3e | 3562 | sk = NULL; |
2c5dfdc3 MC |
3563 | |
3564 | /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */ | |
36ff232c MC |
3565 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
3566 | if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash, | |
3567 | sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash), | |
3568 | &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) { | |
3569 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
3570 | goto err; | |
3571 | } | |
3572 | ||
3573 | /* Resend session tickets */ | |
3574 | s->sent_tickets = 0; | |
2c5dfdc3 MC |
3575 | } |
3576 | ||
e27f234a | 3577 | ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; |
66696478 | 3578 | |
f63a17d6 | 3579 | err: |
222561fe RS |
3580 | X509_free(x); |
3581 | sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free); | |
e27f234a | 3582 | return ret; |
0f113f3e | 3583 | } |
d02b48c6 | 3584 | |
7cea05dc | 3585 | int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
e27f234a | 3586 | { |
555cbb32 | 3587 | CERT_PKEY *cpk = s->s3.tmp.cert; |
e27f234a | 3588 | |
a497cf25 | 3589 | if (cpk == NULL) { |
c48ffbcc | 3590 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
e27f234a MC |
3591 | return 0; |
3592 | } | |
3593 | ||
e96e0f8e MC |
3594 | /* |
3595 | * In TLSv1.3 the certificate chain is always preceded by a 0 length context | |
3596 | * for the server Certificate message | |
3597 | */ | |
f63a17d6 | 3598 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) { |
c48ffbcc | 3599 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
f63a17d6 MC |
3600 | return 0; |
3601 | } | |
3602 | if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk)) { | |
3603 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
e27f234a MC |
3604 | return 0; |
3605 | } | |
3606 | ||
3607 | return 1; | |
3608 | } | |
3609 | ||
6a11d5c5 MC |
3610 | static int create_ticket_prequel(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, uint32_t age_add, |
3611 | unsigned char *tick_nonce) | |
3612 | { | |
3613 | /* | |
3614 | * Ticket lifetime hint: For TLSv1.2 this is advisory only and we leave this | |
3615 | * unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity). | |
3616 | * In TLSv1.3 we reset the "time" field above, and always specify the | |
3617 | * timeout. | |
3618 | */ | |
3619 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, | |
3620 | (s->hit && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) | |
3621 | ? 0 : s->session->timeout)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 3622 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
6a11d5c5 MC |
3623 | return 0; |
3624 | } | |
3625 | ||
3626 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { | |
3627 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, age_add) | |
3628 | || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tick_nonce, TICKET_NONCE_SIZE)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 3629 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
6a11d5c5 MC |
3630 | return 0; |
3631 | } | |
3632 | } | |
3633 | ||
3634 | /* Start the sub-packet for the actual ticket data */ | |
3635 | if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 3636 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
6a11d5c5 MC |
3637 | return 0; |
3638 | } | |
3639 | ||
3640 | return 1; | |
3641 | } | |
3642 | ||
3643 | static int construct_stateless_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, uint32_t age_add, | |
3644 | unsigned char *tick_nonce) | |
e27f234a MC |
3645 | { |
3646 | unsigned char *senc = NULL; | |
83ae4661 | 3647 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL; |
a76ce286 | 3648 | SSL_HMAC *hctx = NULL; |
a00d75e1 | 3649 | unsigned char *p, *encdata1, *encdata2, *macdata1, *macdata2; |
e27f234a | 3650 | const unsigned char *const_p; |
a00d75e1 | 3651 | int len, slen_full, slen, lenfinal; |
e27f234a | 3652 | SSL_SESSION *sess; |
a76ce286 | 3653 | size_t hlen; |
222da979 | 3654 | SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx; |
e27f234a | 3655 | unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; |
d139723b | 3656 | unsigned char key_name[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH]; |
6a11d5c5 | 3657 | int iv_len, ok = 0; |
a00d75e1 | 3658 | size_t macoffset, macendoffset; |
df0fed9a | 3659 | |
e27f234a MC |
3660 | /* get session encoding length */ |
3661 | slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL); | |
3662 | /* | |
3663 | * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too | |
3664 | * long | |
3665 | */ | |
3666 | if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) { | |
c48ffbcc | 3667 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
f6370040 | 3668 | goto err; |
e27f234a MC |
3669 | } |
3670 | senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full); | |
a71edf3b | 3671 | if (senc == NULL) { |
c48ffbcc | 3672 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
f6370040 | 3673 | goto err; |
e27f234a | 3674 | } |
0f113f3e | 3675 | |
846ec07d | 3676 | ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); |
a76ce286 | 3677 | hctx = ssl_hmac_new(tctx); |
83ae4661 | 3678 | if (ctx == NULL || hctx == NULL) { |
c48ffbcc | 3679 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
83ae4661 MC |
3680 | goto err; |
3681 | } | |
0f113f3e | 3682 | |
e27f234a | 3683 | p = senc; |
f63a17d6 | 3684 | if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p)) { |
c48ffbcc | 3685 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
e27f234a | 3686 | goto err; |
f63a17d6 | 3687 | } |
687eaf27 | 3688 | |
e27f234a MC |
3689 | /* |
3690 | * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up | |
3691 | */ | |
3692 | const_p = senc; | |
3693 | sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full); | |
f63a17d6 | 3694 | if (sess == NULL) { |
c48ffbcc | 3695 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
e27f234a | 3696 | goto err; |
f63a17d6 | 3697 | } |
0f113f3e | 3698 | |
e27f234a | 3699 | slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL); |
f63a17d6 MC |
3700 | if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { |
3701 | /* shouldn't ever happen */ | |
c48ffbcc | 3702 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
e27f234a MC |
3703 | SSL_SESSION_free(sess); |
3704 | goto err; | |
3705 | } | |
3706 | p = senc; | |
3707 | if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 3708 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
e27f234a MC |
3709 | SSL_SESSION_free(sess); |
3710 | goto err; | |
3711 | } | |
3712 | SSL_SESSION_free(sess); | |
0f113f3e | 3713 | |
e27f234a MC |
3714 | /* |
3715 | * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does | |
3716 | * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx. | |
3717 | */ | |
a76ce286 P |
3718 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0 |
3719 | if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL || tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL) | |
3720 | #else | |
3721 | if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL) | |
3722 | #endif | |
3723 | { | |
3724 | int ret = 0; | |
3725 | ||
3726 | if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL) | |
3727 | ret = tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx, | |
3728 | ssl_hmac_get0_EVP_MAC_CTX(hctx), | |
3729 | 1); | |
3730 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0 | |
3731 | else if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL) | |
3732 | /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */ | |
3733 | ret = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx, | |
3734 | ssl_hmac_get0_HMAC_CTX(hctx), 1); | |
3735 | #endif | |
5c753de6 TS |
3736 | |
3737 | if (ret == 0) { | |
a00d75e1 MC |
3738 | |
3739 | /* Put timeout and length */ | |
7cea05dc | 3740 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, 0) |
4a01c59f | 3741 | || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) { |
c48ffbcc | 3742 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
5c753de6 | 3743 | goto err; |
a00d75e1 | 3744 | } |
5c753de6 TS |
3745 | OPENSSL_free(senc); |
3746 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); | |
a76ce286 | 3747 | ssl_hmac_free(hctx); |
5c753de6 TS |
3748 | return 1; |
3749 | } | |
f63a17d6 | 3750 | if (ret < 0) { |
c48ffbcc | 3751 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED); |
e27f234a | 3752 | goto err; |
f63a17d6 | 3753 | } |
d139723b | 3754 | iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx); |
e27f234a | 3755 | } else { |
6f829f58 MC |
3756 | EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(s->ctx->libctx, "AES-256-CBC", |
3757 | s->ctx->propq); | |
3758 | ||
3759 | if (cipher == NULL) { | |
5a2d0ef3 RL |
3760 | /* Error is already recorded */ |
3761 | SSLfatal_alert(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
6f829f58 MC |
3762 | goto err; |
3763 | } | |
d139723b KR |
3764 | |
3765 | iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher); | |
8f21260b | 3766 | if (RAND_bytes_ex(s->ctx->libctx, iv, iv_len) <= 0 |
f63a17d6 | 3767 | || !EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL, |
4bfb96f2 | 3768 | tctx->ext.secure->tick_aes_key, iv) |
a76ce286 P |
3769 | || !ssl_hmac_init(hctx, tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key, |
3770 | sizeof(tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key), | |
3771 | "SHA256")) { | |
6f829f58 | 3772 | EVP_CIPHER_free(cipher); |
c48ffbcc | 3773 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
4f9fab6b | 3774 | goto err; |
f63a17d6 | 3775 | } |
6f829f58 | 3776 | EVP_CIPHER_free(cipher); |
aff8c126 RS |
3777 | memcpy(key_name, tctx->ext.tick_key_name, |
3778 | sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name)); | |
0f113f3e MC |
3779 | } |
3780 | ||
6a11d5c5 MC |
3781 | if (!create_ticket_prequel(s, pkt, age_add, tick_nonce)) { |
3782 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
3783 | goto err; | |
3784 | } | |
3785 | ||
3786 | if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macoffset) | |
a00d75e1 | 3787 | /* Output key name */ |
7cea05dc | 3788 | || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, key_name, sizeof(key_name)) |
a00d75e1 | 3789 | /* output IV */ |
7cea05dc MC |
3790 | || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, iv, iv_len) |
3791 | || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH, | |
a00d75e1 MC |
3792 | &encdata1) |
3793 | /* Encrypt session data */ | |
3794 | || !EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, encdata1, &len, senc, slen) | |
7cea05dc | 3795 | || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &encdata2) |
a00d75e1 MC |
3796 | || encdata1 != encdata2 |
3797 | || !EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx, encdata1 + len, &lenfinal) | |
7cea05dc | 3798 | || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, lenfinal, &encdata2) |
a00d75e1 MC |
3799 | || encdata1 + len != encdata2 |
3800 | || len + lenfinal > slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH | |
7cea05dc | 3801 | || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macendoffset) |
a76ce286 P |
3802 | || !ssl_hmac_update(hctx, |
3803 | (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + macoffset, | |
3804 | macendoffset - macoffset) | |
7cea05dc | 3805 | || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &macdata1) |
a76ce286 | 3806 | || !ssl_hmac_final(hctx, macdata1, &hlen, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE) |
a00d75e1 | 3807 | || hlen > EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE |
7cea05dc | 3808 | || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hlen, &macdata2) |
6a11d5c5 | 3809 | || macdata1 != macdata2) { |
c48ffbcc | 3810 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
6a11d5c5 MC |
3811 | goto err; |
3812 | } | |
3813 | ||
3814 | /* Close the sub-packet created by create_ticket_prequel() */ | |
3815 | if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 3816 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
e27f234a | 3817 | goto err; |
a00d75e1 | 3818 | } |
6a11d5c5 MC |
3819 | |
3820 | ok = 1; | |
3821 | err: | |
3822 | OPENSSL_free(senc); | |
3823 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); | |
a76ce286 | 3824 | ssl_hmac_free(hctx); |
6a11d5c5 MC |
3825 | return ok; |
3826 | } | |
3827 | ||
6cc0b3c2 MC |
3828 | static int construct_stateful_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, uint32_t age_add, |
3829 | unsigned char *tick_nonce) | |
3830 | { | |
3831 | if (!create_ticket_prequel(s, pkt, age_add, tick_nonce)) { | |
3832 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
3833 | return 0; | |
3834 | } | |
3835 | ||
3836 | if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->session->session_id, | |
3837 | s->session->session_id_length) | |
3838 | || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 3839 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
6cc0b3c2 MC |
3840 | return 0; |
3841 | } | |
3842 | ||
3843 | return 1; | |
3844 | } | |
3845 | ||
6a11d5c5 MC |
3846 | int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
3847 | { | |
3848 | SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx; | |
3849 | unsigned char tick_nonce[TICKET_NONCE_SIZE]; | |
3850 | union { | |
3851 | unsigned char age_add_c[sizeof(uint32_t)]; | |
3852 | uint32_t age_add; | |
3853 | } age_add_u; | |
3854 | ||
3855 | age_add_u.age_add = 0; | |
3856 | ||
3857 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { | |
3858 | size_t i, hashlen; | |
3859 | uint64_t nonce; | |
3860 | static const unsigned char nonce_label[] = "resumption"; | |
3861 | const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s); | |
6a11d5c5 MC |
3862 | int hashleni = EVP_MD_size(md); |
3863 | ||
3864 | /* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */ | |
3865 | if (!ossl_assert(hashleni >= 0)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 3866 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
6a11d5c5 MC |
3867 | goto err; |
3868 | } | |
3869 | hashlen = (size_t)hashleni; | |
3870 | ||
6a11d5c5 MC |
3871 | /* |
3872 | * If we already sent one NewSessionTicket, or we resumed then | |
3873 | * s->session may already be in a cache and so we must not modify it. | |
3874 | * Instead we need to take a copy of it and modify that. | |
3875 | */ | |
3876 | if (s->sent_tickets != 0 || s->hit) { | |
3877 | SSL_SESSION *new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0); | |
3878 | ||
3879 | if (new_sess == NULL) { | |
3880 | /* SSLfatal already called */ | |
3881 | goto err; | |
3882 | } | |
3883 | ||
3884 | SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); | |
3885 | s->session = new_sess; | |
3886 | } | |
3887 | ||
3888 | if (!ssl_generate_session_id(s, s->session)) { | |
3889 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
3890 | goto err; | |
3891 | } | |
8f21260b MC |
3892 | if (RAND_bytes_ex(s->ctx->libctx, age_add_u.age_add_c, |
3893 | sizeof(age_add_u)) <= 0) { | |
c48ffbcc | 3894 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
6a11d5c5 MC |
3895 | goto err; |
3896 | } | |
3897 | s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add_u.age_add; | |
3898 | ||
3899 | nonce = s->next_ticket_nonce; | |
3900 | for (i = TICKET_NONCE_SIZE; i > 0; i--) { | |
3901 | tick_nonce[i - 1] = (unsigned char)(nonce & 0xff); | |
3902 | nonce >>= 8; | |
3903 | } | |
3904 | ||
3905 | if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, s->resumption_master_secret, | |
3906 | nonce_label, | |
3907 | sizeof(nonce_label) - 1, | |
3908 | tick_nonce, | |
3909 | TICKET_NONCE_SIZE, | |
3910 | s->session->master_key, | |
0fb2815b | 3911 | hashlen, 1)) { |
6a11d5c5 MC |
3912 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
3913 | goto err; | |
3914 | } | |
3915 | s->session->master_key_length = hashlen; | |
3916 | ||
3917 | s->session->time = (long)time(NULL); | |
555cbb32 | 3918 | if (s->s3.alpn_selected != NULL) { |
6a11d5c5 MC |
3919 | OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.alpn_selected); |
3920 | s->session->ext.alpn_selected = | |
555cbb32 | 3921 | OPENSSL_memdup(s->s3.alpn_selected, s->s3.alpn_selected_len); |
6a11d5c5 | 3922 | if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) { |
c48ffbcc | 3923 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
6a11d5c5 MC |
3924 | goto err; |
3925 | } | |
555cbb32 | 3926 | s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = s->s3.alpn_selected_len; |
6a11d5c5 MC |
3927 | } |
3928 | s->session->ext.max_early_data = s->max_early_data; | |
3929 | } | |
3930 | ||
3931 | if (tctx->generate_ticket_cb != NULL && | |
3932 | tctx->generate_ticket_cb(s, tctx->ticket_cb_data) == 0) | |
3933 | goto err; | |
3934 | ||
e880d4e5 MC |
3935 | /* |
3936 | * If we are using anti-replay protection then we behave as if | |
3937 | * SSL_OP_NO_TICKET is set - we are caching tickets anyway so there | |
3938 | * is no point in using full stateless tickets. | |
3939 | */ | |
5d263fb7 MC |
3940 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) |
3941 | && ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) != 0 | |
3942 | || (s->max_early_data > 0 | |
3943 | && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ANTI_REPLAY) == 0))) { | |
6cc0b3c2 MC |
3944 | if (!construct_stateful_ticket(s, pkt, age_add_u.age_add, tick_nonce)) { |
3945 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
3946 | goto err; | |
3947 | } | |
3948 | } else if (!construct_stateless_ticket(s, pkt, age_add_u.age_add, | |
3949 | tick_nonce)) { | |
6a11d5c5 MC |
3950 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
3951 | goto err; | |
3952 | } | |
3953 | ||
16ff1342 | 3954 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
16ff1342 MC |
3955 | if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, |
3956 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, | |
3957 | NULL, 0)) { | |
3958 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
3959 | goto err; | |
3960 | } | |
4ff1a526 MC |
3961 | /* |
3962 | * Increment both |sent_tickets| and |next_ticket_nonce|. |sent_tickets| | |
3963 | * gets reset to 0 if we send more tickets following a post-handshake | |
3bfacb5f BK |
3964 | * auth, but |next_ticket_nonce| does not. If we're sending extra |
3965 | * tickets, decrement the count of pending extra tickets. | |
4ff1a526 | 3966 | */ |
9d0a8bb7 | 3967 | s->sent_tickets++; |
4ff1a526 | 3968 | s->next_ticket_nonce++; |
3bfacb5f BK |
3969 | if (s->ext.extra_tickets_expected > 0) |
3970 | s->ext.extra_tickets_expected--; | |
36ff232c | 3971 | ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER); |
f63a17d6 | 3972 | } |
e27f234a MC |
3973 | |
3974 | return 1; | |
687eaf27 | 3975 | err: |
e27f234a | 3976 | return 0; |
0f113f3e | 3977 | } |
67c8e7f4 | 3978 | |
f63e4288 MC |
3979 | /* |
3980 | * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to | |
3981 | * create a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure. | |
3982 | */ | |
3983 | int tls_construct_cert_status_body(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) | |
e27f234a | 3984 | { |
8cbfcc70 RS |
3985 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->ext.status_type) |
3986 | || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp, | |
3987 | s->ext.ocsp.resp_len)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 3988 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
f63e4288 MC |
3989 | return 0; |
3990 | } | |
3991 | ||
3992 | return 1; | |
3993 | } | |
3994 | ||
3995 | int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) | |
3996 | { | |
3997 | if (!tls_construct_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) { | |
3ec8d113 | 3998 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
cc59ad10 MC |
3999 | return 0; |
4000 | } | |
e27f234a MC |
4001 | |
4002 | return 1; | |
4003 | } | |
4004 | ||
e481f9b9 | 4005 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG |
e27f234a MC |
4006 | /* |
4007 | * tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. | |
4008 | * It sets the next_proto member in s if found | |
4009 | */ | |
be3583fa | 4010 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_next_proto(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
e27f234a | 4011 | { |
73999b62 | 4012 | PACKET next_proto, padding; |
e27f234a MC |
4013 | size_t next_proto_len; |
4014 | ||
50e735f9 MC |
4015 | /*- |
4016 | * The payload looks like: | |
4017 | * uint8 proto_len; | |
4018 | * uint8 proto[proto_len]; | |
4019 | * uint8 padding_len; | |
4020 | * uint8 padding[padding_len]; | |
4021 | */ | |
73999b62 MC |
4022 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &next_proto) |
4023 | || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &padding) | |
4024 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) { | |
c48ffbcc | 4025 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
f63a17d6 | 4026 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
cf9b0b6f | 4027 | } |
0f113f3e | 4028 | |
aff8c126 RS |
4029 | if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->ext.npn, &next_proto_len)) { |
4030 | s->ext.npn_len = 0; | |
c48ffbcc | 4031 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
f63a17d6 | 4032 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
c3fc7eea MC |
4033 | } |
4034 | ||
aff8c126 | 4035 | s->ext.npn_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len; |
0f113f3e | 4036 | |
e27f234a | 4037 | return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; |
0f113f3e | 4038 | } |
6434abbf | 4039 | #endif |
d45ba43d | 4040 | |
e46f2334 MC |
4041 | static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
4042 | { | |
fe874d27 | 4043 | if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, |
f63a17d6 MC |
4044 | NULL, 0)) { |
4045 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
e46f2334 MC |
4046 | return 0; |
4047 | } | |
4048 | ||
4049 | return 1; | |
4050 | } | |
4051 | ||
ef6c191b MC |
4052 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_end_of_early_data(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
4053 | { | |
ef6c191b | 4054 | if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { |
c48ffbcc | 4055 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
ef6c191b MC |
4056 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
4057 | } | |
4058 | ||
4059 | if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING | |
4060 | && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READ_RETRY) { | |
c48ffbcc | 4061 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
f63a17d6 | 4062 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
ef6c191b MC |
4063 | } |
4064 | ||
4065 | /* | |
4066 | * EndOfEarlyData signals a key change so the end of the message must be on | |
4067 | * a record boundary. | |
4068 | */ | |
4069 | if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 4070 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY); |
f63a17d6 | 4071 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
ef6c191b MC |
4072 | } |
4073 | ||
4074 | s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_READING; | |
4075 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, | |
4076 | SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
4077 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
4078 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
ef6c191b MC |
4079 | } |
4080 | ||
4081 | return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; | |
ef6c191b | 4082 | } |