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846e33c7 | 1 | /* |
4333b89f | 2 | * Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. |
aa8f3d76 | 3 | * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved |
c80149d9 | 4 | * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. |
8e2f6b79 | 5 | * |
2c18d164 | 6 | * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use |
846e33c7 RS |
7 | * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy |
8 | * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at | |
9 | * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html | |
8e2f6b79 | 10 | */ |
846e33c7 | 11 | |
d02b48c6 | 12 | #include <stdio.h> |
706457b7 DMSP |
13 | #include "../ssl_local.h" |
14 | #include "statem_local.h" | |
15 | #include "internal/constant_time.h" | |
3faa07b5 | 16 | #include "internal/cryptlib.h" |
ec577822 BM |
17 | #include <openssl/buffer.h> |
18 | #include <openssl/rand.h> | |
19 | #include <openssl/objects.h> | |
20 | #include <openssl/evp.h> | |
21 | #include <openssl/x509.h> | |
3c27208f | 22 | #include <openssl/dh.h> |
d7e498ac | 23 | #include <openssl/rsa.h> |
d095b68d | 24 | #include <openssl/bn.h> |
dbad1690 | 25 | #include <openssl/md5.h> |
77359d22 | 26 | #include <openssl/trace.h> |
e7db9680 | 27 | #include <openssl/core_names.h> |
4e3ee452 | 28 | #include <openssl/asn1t.h> |
f9b3bff6 | 29 | |
4ff1a526 MC |
30 | #define TICKET_NONCE_SIZE 8 |
31 | ||
4e3ee452 DB |
32 | typedef struct { |
33 | ASN1_TYPE *kxBlob; | |
34 | ASN1_TYPE *opaqueBlob; | |
35 | } GOST_KX_MESSAGE; | |
36 | ||
37 | DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(GOST_KX_MESSAGE) | |
38 | ||
39 | ASN1_SEQUENCE(GOST_KX_MESSAGE) = { | |
40 | ASN1_SIMPLE(GOST_KX_MESSAGE, kxBlob, ASN1_ANY), | |
41 | ASN1_OPT(GOST_KX_MESSAGE, opaqueBlob, ASN1_ANY), | |
42 | } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(GOST_KX_MESSAGE) | |
43 | ||
44 | IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(GOST_KX_MESSAGE) | |
45 | ||
e46f2334 | 46 | static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt); |
d45ba43d | 47 | |
61ae935a | 48 | /* |
0f1e51ea MC |
49 | * ossl_statem_server13_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed |
50 | * handshake state transitions when a TLSv1.3 server is reading messages from | |
51 | * the client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. | |
52 | * The current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|. | |
53 | * | |
94ed2c67 MC |
54 | * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error |
55 | * (transition not allowed) | |
0f1e51ea MC |
56 | */ |
57 | static int ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt) | |
58 | { | |
59 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; | |
60 | ||
61 | /* | |
62 | * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_BEFORE because at that stage we have | |
63 | * not negotiated TLSv1.3 yet, so that case is handled by | |
64 | * ossl_statem_server_read_transition() | |
65 | */ | |
66 | switch (st->hand_state) { | |
67 | default: | |
68 | break; | |
69 | ||
d7f8783f | 70 | case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA: |
fc7129dc | 71 | if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) { |
d4504fe5 MC |
72 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) { |
73 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO; | |
74 | return 1; | |
75 | } | |
76 | break; | |
77 | } else if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) { | |
ef6c191b MC |
78 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA) { |
79 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA; | |
80 | return 1; | |
81 | } | |
82 | break; | |
83 | } | |
84 | /* Fall through */ | |
85 | ||
86 | case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA: | |
92760c21 | 87 | case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED: |
555cbb32 | 88 | if (s->s3.tmp.cert_request) { |
0f1e51ea MC |
89 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) { |
90 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT; | |
91 | return 1; | |
92 | } | |
93 | } else { | |
92760c21 MC |
94 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { |
95 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED; | |
0f1e51ea MC |
96 | return 1; |
97 | } | |
98 | } | |
99 | break; | |
100 | ||
101 | case TLS_ST_SR_CERT: | |
102 | if (s->session->peer == NULL) { | |
92760c21 MC |
103 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { |
104 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED; | |
0f1e51ea MC |
105 | return 1; |
106 | } | |
107 | } else { | |
108 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) { | |
109 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY; | |
110 | return 1; | |
111 | } | |
112 | } | |
113 | break; | |
114 | ||
115 | case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY: | |
0f1e51ea MC |
116 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { |
117 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED; | |
118 | return 1; | |
119 | } | |
120 | break; | |
8cdc8c51 MC |
121 | |
122 | case TLS_ST_OK: | |
10109364 MC |
123 | /* |
124 | * Its never ok to start processing handshake messages in the middle of | |
125 | * early data (i.e. before we've received the end of early data alert) | |
126 | */ | |
127 | if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING) | |
128 | break; | |
9d75dce3 TS |
129 | |
130 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE | |
131 | && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) { | |
132 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT; | |
133 | return 1; | |
134 | } | |
135 | ||
8cdc8c51 MC |
136 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) { |
137 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE; | |
138 | return 1; | |
139 | } | |
140 | break; | |
0f1e51ea MC |
141 | } |
142 | ||
143 | /* No valid transition found */ | |
0f1e51ea MC |
144 | return 0; |
145 | } | |
146 | ||
147 | /* | |
148 | * ossl_statem_server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed | |
149 | * handshake state transitions when the server is reading messages from the | |
150 | * client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The | |
151 | * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|. | |
61ae935a | 152 | * |
94ed2c67 MC |
153 | * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error |
154 | * (transition not allowed) | |
61ae935a | 155 | */ |
8481f583 | 156 | int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt) |
61ae935a | 157 | { |
d6f1a6e9 | 158 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; |
61ae935a | 159 | |
f5ca0b04 | 160 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
5abeaf35 MC |
161 | if (!ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(s, mt)) |
162 | goto err; | |
163 | return 1; | |
164 | } | |
0f1e51ea | 165 | |
e8aa8b6c | 166 | switch (st->hand_state) { |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
167 | default: |
168 | break; | |
169 | ||
61ae935a | 170 | case TLS_ST_BEFORE: |
0386aad1 | 171 | case TLS_ST_OK: |
61ae935a MC |
172 | case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: |
173 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) { | |
174 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO; | |
175 | return 1; | |
176 | } | |
177 | break; | |
178 | ||
179 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE: | |
180 | /* | |
181 | * If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either | |
182 | * 1) We didn't request a Certificate | |
183 | * OR | |
184 | * 2) If we did request one then | |
185 | * a) We allow no Certificate to be returned | |
186 | * AND | |
187 | * b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0 | |
188 | * list if we requested a certificate) | |
189 | */ | |
0f512756 | 190 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) { |
555cbb32 | 191 | if (s->s3.tmp.cert_request) { |
0f512756 | 192 | if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { |
23dd09b5 MC |
193 | if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) |
194 | && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) { | |
0f512756 MC |
195 | /* |
196 | * This isn't an unexpected message as such - we're just | |
23dd09b5 MC |
197 | * not going to accept it because we require a client |
198 | * cert. | |
0f512756 | 199 | */ |
3ec8d113 | 200 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, |
3ec8d113 | 201 | SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); |
0f512756 MC |
202 | return 0; |
203 | } | |
204 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH; | |
205 | return 1; | |
206 | } | |
207 | } else { | |
208 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH; | |
209 | return 1; | |
210 | } | |
555cbb32 | 211 | } else if (s->s3.tmp.cert_request) { |
61ae935a MC |
212 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) { |
213 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT; | |
214 | return 1; | |
f100b031 | 215 | } |
61ae935a MC |
216 | } |
217 | break; | |
218 | ||
219 | case TLS_ST_SR_CERT: | |
220 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) { | |
221 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH; | |
222 | return 1; | |
223 | } | |
224 | break; | |
225 | ||
226 | case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH: | |
227 | /* | |
228 | * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have | |
229 | * received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer| | |
230 | * will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is | |
231 | * not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in | |
a71a4966 | 232 | * the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be |
61ae935a MC |
233 | * set. |
234 | */ | |
a71a4966 | 235 | if (s->session->peer == NULL || st->no_cert_verify) { |
61ae935a MC |
236 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { |
237 | /* | |
238 | * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH | |
239 | * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is | |
240 | * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses | |
241 | * its key from the certificate for key exchange. | |
242 | */ | |
243 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE; | |
244 | return 1; | |
245 | } | |
246 | } else { | |
247 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) { | |
248 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY; | |
249 | return 1; | |
250 | } | |
251 | } | |
252 | break; | |
253 | ||
254 | case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY: | |
255 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { | |
256 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE; | |
257 | return 1; | |
258 | } | |
259 | break; | |
260 | ||
261 | case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE: | |
262 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG | |
555cbb32 | 263 | if (s->s3.npn_seen) { |
61ae935a MC |
264 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) { |
265 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO; | |
266 | return 1; | |
267 | } | |
268 | } else { | |
269 | #endif | |
270 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { | |
271 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED; | |
272 | return 1; | |
273 | } | |
274 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG | |
275 | } | |
276 | #endif | |
277 | break; | |
278 | ||
279 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG | |
280 | case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO: | |
281 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { | |
282 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED; | |
283 | return 1; | |
284 | } | |
285 | break; | |
286 | #endif | |
287 | ||
288 | case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED: | |
289 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { | |
290 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE; | |
291 | return 1; | |
292 | } | |
293 | break; | |
61ae935a MC |
294 | } |
295 | ||
5abeaf35 | 296 | err: |
61ae935a | 297 | /* No valid transition found */ |
f20404fc MC |
298 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { |
299 | BIO *rbio; | |
300 | ||
301 | /* | |
302 | * CCS messages don't have a message sequence number so this is probably | |
303 | * because of an out-of-order CCS. We'll just drop it. | |
304 | */ | |
305 | s->init_num = 0; | |
306 | s->rwstate = SSL_READING; | |
307 | rbio = SSL_get_rbio(s); | |
308 | BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio); | |
309 | BIO_set_retry_read(rbio); | |
310 | return 0; | |
311 | } | |
c48ffbcc | 312 | SSLfatal(s, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); |
61ae935a MC |
313 | return 0; |
314 | } | |
315 | ||
316 | /* | |
317 | * Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message? | |
318 | * | |
319 | * Valid return values are: | |
320 | * 1: Yes | |
321 | * 0: No | |
322 | */ | |
bb3e20cf | 323 | static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) |
61ae935a | 324 | { |
555cbb32 | 325 | unsigned long alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; |
61ae935a MC |
326 | |
327 | /* | |
361a1191 | 328 | * only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a |
61ae935a MC |
329 | * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For |
330 | * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if | |
331 | * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, | |
332 | * the server certificate contains the server's public key for | |
333 | * key exchange. | |
334 | */ | |
a230b26e | 335 | if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE) |
61ae935a MC |
336 | /* |
337 | * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if | |
338 | * provided | |
339 | */ | |
340 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK | |
341 | /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */ | |
342 | || ((alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) | |
343 | && s->cert->psk_identity_hint) | |
344 | /* For other PSK always send SKE */ | |
345 | || (alg_k & (SSL_PSK & (SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK))) | |
346 | #endif | |
347 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP | |
348 | /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */ | |
349 | || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) | |
350 | #endif | |
a230b26e | 351 | ) { |
61ae935a MC |
352 | return 1; |
353 | } | |
354 | ||
355 | return 0; | |
356 | } | |
357 | ||
358 | /* | |
359 | * Should we send a CertificateRequest message? | |
360 | * | |
361 | * Valid return values are: | |
362 | * 1: Yes | |
363 | * 0: No | |
364 | */ | |
9d75dce3 | 365 | int send_certificate_request(SSL *s) |
61ae935a MC |
366 | { |
367 | if ( | |
368 | /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */ | |
369 | s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER | |
9d75dce3 TS |
370 | /* |
371 | * don't request if post-handshake-only unless doing | |
372 | * post-handshake in TLSv1.3: | |
373 | */ | |
374 | && (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE) | |
375 | || s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) | |
61ae935a MC |
376 | /* |
377 | * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert | |
9d75dce3 | 378 | * a second time: |
61ae935a | 379 | */ |
9d75dce3 | 380 | && (s->certreqs_sent < 1 || |
61ae935a MC |
381 | !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) |
382 | /* | |
383 | * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see | |
384 | * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in | |
385 | * RFC 2246): | |
386 | */ | |
555cbb32 | 387 | && (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) |
a230b26e EK |
388 | /* |
389 | * ... except when the application insists on | |
390 | * verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts | |
391 | * this for SSL 3) | |
392 | */ | |
61ae935a MC |
393 | || (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) |
394 | /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */ | |
555cbb32 | 395 | && !(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP) |
61ae935a MC |
396 | /* |
397 | * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests | |
398 | * are omitted | |
399 | */ | |
555cbb32 | 400 | && !(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) { |
61ae935a MC |
401 | return 1; |
402 | } | |
403 | ||
404 | return 0; | |
405 | } | |
406 | ||
407 | /* | |
0f1e51ea MC |
408 | * ossl_statem_server13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to |
409 | * move to next when a TLSv1.3 server is writing messages to be sent to the | |
410 | * client. | |
0f1e51ea MC |
411 | */ |
412 | static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(SSL *s) | |
413 | { | |
414 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; | |
415 | ||
416 | /* | |
417 | * No case for TLS_ST_BEFORE, because at that stage we have not negotiated | |
418 | * TLSv1.3 yet, so that is handled by ossl_statem_server_write_transition() | |
419 | */ | |
420 | ||
421 | switch (st->hand_state) { | |
422 | default: | |
423 | /* Shouldn't happen */ | |
c48ffbcc | 424 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
0f1e51ea MC |
425 | return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR; |
426 | ||
44c04a2e MC |
427 | case TLS_ST_OK: |
428 | if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) { | |
429 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE; | |
430 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
431 | } | |
9d75dce3 TS |
432 | if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) { |
433 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ; | |
434 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
435 | } | |
3bfacb5f BK |
436 | if (s->ext.extra_tickets_expected > 0) { |
437 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET; | |
438 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
439 | } | |
8cdc8c51 MC |
440 | /* Try to read from the client instead */ |
441 | return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; | |
44c04a2e | 442 | |
0f1e51ea | 443 | case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO: |
597c51bc | 444 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO; |
d4504fe5 | 445 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
7d061fce | 446 | |
0f1e51ea | 447 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO: |
fc7129dc MC |
448 | if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0 |
449 | && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_COMPLETE) | |
db37d32c | 450 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE; |
fc7129dc MC |
451 | else if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) |
452 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA; | |
db37d32c MC |
453 | else |
454 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS; | |
455 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
456 | ||
457 | case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE: | |
fc7129dc MC |
458 | if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) |
459 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA; | |
460 | else | |
461 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS; | |
e46f2334 MC |
462 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
463 | ||
464 | case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS: | |
94ed2c67 | 465 | if (s->hit) |
92760c21 MC |
466 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED; |
467 | else if (send_certificate_request(s)) | |
468 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ; | |
94ed2c67 | 469 | else |
0f1e51ea | 470 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT; |
94ed2c67 | 471 | |
0f1e51ea MC |
472 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
473 | ||
0f1e51ea | 474 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ: |
9d75dce3 TS |
475 | if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) { |
476 | s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_REQUESTED; | |
477 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; | |
478 | } else { | |
479 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT; | |
480 | } | |
0f1e51ea MC |
481 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
482 | ||
92760c21 | 483 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT: |
2c5dfdc3 MC |
484 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY; |
485 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
486 | ||
487 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY: | |
d805a57b | 488 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED; |
0f1e51ea MC |
489 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
490 | ||
491 | case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED: | |
f7e393be MC |
492 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA; |
493 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
94ed2c67 | 494 | |
d7f8783f MC |
495 | case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA: |
496 | return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; | |
497 | ||
92760c21 | 498 | case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED: |
30f05b19 MC |
499 | /* |
500 | * Technically we have finished the handshake at this point, but we're | |
9d0a8bb7 | 501 | * going to remain "in_init" for now and write out any session tickets |
30f05b19 | 502 | * immediately. |
30f05b19 | 503 | */ |
c0638ade MC |
504 | if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) { |
505 | s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_RECEIVED; | |
61fb5923 | 506 | } else if (!s->ext.ticket_expected) { |
c0638ade | 507 | /* |
61fb5923 MC |
508 | * If we're not going to renew the ticket then we just finish the |
509 | * handshake at this point. | |
c0638ade MC |
510 | */ |
511 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; | |
9d0a8bb7 | 512 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
c0638ade | 513 | } |
9d0a8bb7 MC |
514 | if (s->num_tickets > s->sent_tickets) |
515 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET; | |
516 | else | |
517 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; | |
30f05b19 MC |
518 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
519 | ||
8cdc8c51 | 520 | case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE: |
44c04a2e | 521 | case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE: |
36ff232c MC |
522 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; |
523 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
524 | ||
30f05b19 | 525 | case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET: |
9d0a8bb7 MC |
526 | /* In a resumption we only ever send a maximum of one new ticket. |
527 | * Following an initial handshake we send the number of tickets we have | |
528 | * been configured for. | |
529 | */ | |
3bfacb5f BK |
530 | if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s) && s->ext.extra_tickets_expected > 0) { |
531 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
532 | } else if (s->hit || s->num_tickets <= s->sent_tickets) { | |
9d0a8bb7 MC |
533 | /* We've written enough tickets out. */ |
534 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; | |
535 | } | |
0f1e51ea MC |
536 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
537 | } | |
538 | } | |
539 | ||
540 | /* | |
541 | * ossl_statem_server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move | |
542 | * to next when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client. | |
61ae935a | 543 | */ |
8481f583 | 544 | WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL *s) |
61ae935a | 545 | { |
d6f1a6e9 | 546 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; |
61ae935a | 547 | |
0f1e51ea MC |
548 | /* |
549 | * Note that before the ClientHello we don't know what version we are going | |
550 | * to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later | |
551 | */ | |
552 | ||
f5ca0b04 | 553 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) |
0f1e51ea MC |
554 | return ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(s); |
555 | ||
e8aa8b6c | 556 | switch (st->hand_state) { |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
557 | default: |
558 | /* Shouldn't happen */ | |
c48ffbcc | 559 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
560 | return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR; |
561 | ||
0386aad1 MC |
562 | case TLS_ST_OK: |
563 | if (st->request_state == TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ) { | |
564 | /* We must be trying to renegotiate */ | |
565 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ; | |
566 | st->request_state = TLS_ST_BEFORE; | |
567 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
568 | } | |
c7f47786 MC |
569 | /* Must be an incoming ClientHello */ |
570 | if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) { | |
f63a17d6 | 571 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
c7f47786 MC |
572 | return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR; |
573 | } | |
0386aad1 MC |
574 | /* Fall through */ |
575 | ||
e8aa8b6c | 576 | case TLS_ST_BEFORE: |
a230b26e | 577 | /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */ |
e8aa8b6c | 578 | return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; |
61ae935a | 579 | |
e8aa8b6c F |
580 | case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ: |
581 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; | |
e8aa8b6c | 582 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
61ae935a | 583 | |
e8aa8b6c F |
584 | case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO: |
585 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->d1->cookie_verified | |
3faa07b5 | 586 | && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)) { |
e8aa8b6c | 587 | st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST; |
3faa07b5 MC |
588 | } else if (s->renegotiate == 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) { |
589 | /* We must have rejected the renegotiation */ | |
590 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; | |
591 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
592 | } else { | |
e8aa8b6c | 593 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO; |
3faa07b5 | 594 | } |
e8aa8b6c | 595 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
61ae935a | 596 | |
e8aa8b6c F |
597 | case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: |
598 | return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; | |
61ae935a | 599 | |
e8aa8b6c F |
600 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO: |
601 | if (s->hit) { | |
aff8c126 | 602 | if (s->ext.ticket_expected) |
e8aa8b6c F |
603 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET; |
604 | else | |
605 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE; | |
606 | } else { | |
607 | /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */ | |
608 | /* normal PSK or SRP */ | |
555cbb32 | 609 | if (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & |
a230b26e | 610 | (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) { |
e8aa8b6c F |
611 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT; |
612 | } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) { | |
61ae935a | 613 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH; |
e8aa8b6c | 614 | } else if (send_certificate_request(s)) { |
61ae935a | 615 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ; |
e8aa8b6c F |
616 | } else { |
617 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE; | |
61ae935a | 618 | } |
e8aa8b6c F |
619 | } |
620 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
61ae935a | 621 | |
e8aa8b6c | 622 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT: |
aff8c126 | 623 | if (s->ext.status_expected) { |
e8aa8b6c | 624 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS; |
61ae935a | 625 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
e8aa8b6c F |
626 | } |
627 | /* Fall through */ | |
61ae935a | 628 | |
e8aa8b6c F |
629 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS: |
630 | if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) { | |
631 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH; | |
61ae935a | 632 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
e8aa8b6c F |
633 | } |
634 | /* Fall through */ | |
61ae935a | 635 | |
e8aa8b6c F |
636 | case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH: |
637 | if (send_certificate_request(s)) { | |
638 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ; | |
61ae935a | 639 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
e8aa8b6c F |
640 | } |
641 | /* Fall through */ | |
61ae935a | 642 | |
e8aa8b6c F |
643 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ: |
644 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE; | |
645 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
61ae935a | 646 | |
e8aa8b6c F |
647 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE: |
648 | return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; | |
649 | ||
650 | case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED: | |
651 | if (s->hit) { | |
61ae935a | 652 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; |
61ae935a | 653 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
aff8c126 | 654 | } else if (s->ext.ticket_expected) { |
e8aa8b6c F |
655 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET; |
656 | } else { | |
657 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE; | |
658 | } | |
659 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
660 | ||
661 | case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET: | |
662 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE; | |
663 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
61ae935a | 664 | |
e8aa8b6c F |
665 | case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE: |
666 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED; | |
667 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
668 | ||
669 | case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED: | |
670 | if (s->hit) { | |
671 | return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; | |
672 | } | |
673 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; | |
e8aa8b6c | 674 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
61ae935a MC |
675 | } |
676 | } | |
677 | ||
678 | /* | |
679 | * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from | |
680 | * the server to the client. | |
681 | */ | |
8481f583 | 682 | WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) |
61ae935a | 683 | { |
d6f1a6e9 | 684 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; |
61ae935a | 685 | |
e8aa8b6c | 686 | switch (st->hand_state) { |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
687 | default: |
688 | /* No pre work to be done */ | |
689 | break; | |
690 | ||
61ae935a MC |
691 | case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ: |
692 | s->shutdown = 0; | |
693 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) | |
f5c7f5df | 694 | dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s); |
61ae935a MC |
695 | break; |
696 | ||
697 | case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: | |
698 | s->shutdown = 0; | |
699 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
f5c7f5df | 700 | dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s); |
61ae935a MC |
701 | /* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */ |
702 | st->use_timer = 0; | |
703 | } | |
704 | break; | |
705 | ||
706 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO: | |
707 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
708 | /* | |
69687aa8 | 709 | * Messages we write from now on should be buffered and |
61ae935a MC |
710 | * retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now |
711 | */ | |
712 | st->use_timer = 1; | |
713 | } | |
714 | break; | |
715 | ||
716 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE: | |
717 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
3ec8d113 MC |
718 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) { |
719 | /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */ | |
61ae935a | 720 | return dtls_wait_for_dry(s); |
3ec8d113 | 721 | } |
61ae935a MC |
722 | #endif |
723 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; | |
724 | ||
725 | case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET: | |
3bfacb5f BK |
726 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->sent_tickets == 0 |
727 | && s->ext.extra_tickets_expected == 0) { | |
30f05b19 MC |
728 | /* |
729 | * Actually this is the end of the handshake, but we're going | |
730 | * straight into writing the session ticket out. So we finish off | |
731 | * the handshake, but keep the various buffers active. | |
56d36288 | 732 | * |
3ec8d113 | 733 | * Calls SSLfatal as required. |
30f05b19 | 734 | */ |
2a8db717 | 735 | return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 0, 0); |
6250282f BK |
736 | } |
737 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
61ae935a MC |
738 | /* |
739 | * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight | |
740 | * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer | |
741 | */ | |
742 | st->use_timer = 0; | |
743 | } | |
744 | break; | |
745 | ||
746 | case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE: | |
fc7129dc MC |
747 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) |
748 | break; | |
2e3ec2e1 BK |
749 | /* Writes to s->session are only safe for initial handshakes */ |
750 | if (s->session->cipher == NULL) { | |
751 | s->session->cipher = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher; | |
752 | } else if (s->session->cipher != s->s3.tmp.new_cipher) { | |
c48ffbcc | 753 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
2e3ec2e1 BK |
754 | return WORK_ERROR; |
755 | } | |
61ae935a | 756 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) { |
f63a17d6 | 757 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
61ae935a MC |
758 | return WORK_ERROR; |
759 | } | |
760 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
761 | /* | |
762 | * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight | |
763 | * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have | |
764 | * already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message, | |
765 | * but we'll set it again here in case we didn't. | |
766 | */ | |
767 | st->use_timer = 0; | |
768 | } | |
769 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; | |
770 | ||
d7f8783f | 771 | case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA: |
c36001c3 | 772 | if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTING |
555cbb32 | 773 | && (s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) == 0) |
f7e393be MC |
774 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; |
775 | /* Fall through */ | |
776 | ||
61ae935a | 777 | case TLS_ST_OK: |
3ec8d113 | 778 | /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */ |
2a8db717 | 779 | return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1, 1); |
61ae935a MC |
780 | } |
781 | ||
782 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; | |
783 | } | |
784 | ||
f273ff95 MC |
785 | static ossl_inline int conn_is_closed(void) |
786 | { | |
787 | switch (get_last_sys_error()) { | |
788 | #if defined(EPIPE) | |
789 | case EPIPE: | |
790 | return 1; | |
791 | #endif | |
792 | #if defined(ECONNRESET) | |
793 | case ECONNRESET: | |
794 | return 1; | |
795 | #endif | |
0b885f72 PM |
796 | #if defined(WSAECONNRESET) |
797 | case WSAECONNRESET: | |
798 | return 1; | |
799 | #endif | |
f273ff95 MC |
800 | default: |
801 | return 0; | |
802 | } | |
803 | } | |
804 | ||
61ae935a MC |
805 | /* |
806 | * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the | |
807 | * server to the client. | |
808 | */ | |
8481f583 | 809 | WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) |
61ae935a | 810 | { |
d6f1a6e9 | 811 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; |
61ae935a MC |
812 | |
813 | s->init_num = 0; | |
814 | ||
e8aa8b6c | 815 | switch (st->hand_state) { |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
816 | default: |
817 | /* No post work to be done */ | |
818 | break; | |
819 | ||
61ae935a MC |
820 | case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ: |
821 | if (statem_flush(s) != 1) | |
822 | return WORK_MORE_A; | |
2c4a056f | 823 | if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) { |
f63a17d6 | 824 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
2c4a056f MC |
825 | return WORK_ERROR; |
826 | } | |
61ae935a MC |
827 | break; |
828 | ||
829 | case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: | |
830 | if (statem_flush(s) != 1) | |
831 | return WORK_MORE_A; | |
832 | /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */ | |
2c4a056f | 833 | if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER && !ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) { |
f63a17d6 | 834 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
2c4a056f MC |
835 | return WORK_ERROR; |
836 | } | |
61ae935a MC |
837 | /* |
838 | * The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to | |
839 | * treat like it was the first packet | |
840 | */ | |
841 | s->first_packet = 1; | |
842 | break; | |
843 | ||
844 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO: | |
fc7129dc | 845 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) { |
75259b43 MC |
846 | if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) == 0 |
847 | && statem_flush(s) != 1) | |
597c51bc MC |
848 | return WORK_MORE_A; |
849 | break; | |
850 | } | |
61ae935a MC |
851 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP |
852 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) { | |
853 | unsigned char sctpauthkey[64]; | |
854 | char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)]; | |
09d62b33 | 855 | size_t labellen; |
61ae935a MC |
856 | |
857 | /* | |
858 | * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no | |
859 | * SCTP used. | |
860 | */ | |
141eb8c6 MC |
861 | memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL, |
862 | sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)); | |
61ae935a | 863 | |
09d62b33 MT |
864 | /* Don't include the terminating zero. */ |
865 | labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1; | |
866 | if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG) | |
867 | labellen += 1; | |
868 | ||
61ae935a | 869 | if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey, |
a230b26e | 870 | sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer, |
09d62b33 | 871 | labellen, NULL, 0, |
a230b26e | 872 | 0) <= 0) { |
c48ffbcc | 873 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
61ae935a MC |
874 | return WORK_ERROR; |
875 | } | |
876 | ||
877 | BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY, | |
878 | sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey); | |
879 | } | |
880 | #endif | |
db37d32c | 881 | if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) |
fc7129dc MC |
882 | || ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0 |
883 | && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_COMPLETE)) | |
db37d32c MC |
884 | break; |
885 | /* Fall through */ | |
886 | ||
887 | case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE: | |
75259b43 MC |
888 | if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) { |
889 | if (!statem_flush(s)) | |
890 | return WORK_MORE_A; | |
fc7129dc | 891 | break; |
75259b43 | 892 | } |
de9e884b | 893 | |
92760c21 MC |
894 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
895 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s) | |
896 | || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, | |
3ec8d113 MC |
897 | SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) { |
898 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
fe5e20fd | 899 | return WORK_ERROR; |
3ec8d113 | 900 | } |
fe5e20fd MC |
901 | |
902 | if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED | |
903 | && !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, | |
3ec8d113 MC |
904 | SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE |SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) { |
905 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
fe5e20fd | 906 | return WORK_ERROR; |
3ec8d113 | 907 | } |
de9e884b MC |
908 | /* |
909 | * We don't yet know whether the next record we are going to receive | |
910 | * is an unencrypted alert, an encrypted alert, or an encrypted | |
911 | * handshake message. We temporarily tolerate unencrypted alerts. | |
912 | */ | |
913 | s->statem.enc_read_state = ENC_READ_STATE_ALLOW_PLAIN_ALERTS; | |
db37d32c | 914 | break; |
92760c21 | 915 | } |
61ae935a | 916 | |
61ae935a MC |
917 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP |
918 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->hit) { | |
919 | /* | |
920 | * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if | |
921 | * no SCTP used. | |
922 | */ | |
923 | BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY, | |
924 | 0, NULL); | |
925 | } | |
926 | #endif | |
927 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, | |
a230b26e EK |
928 | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) |
929 | { | |
f63a17d6 | 930 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
61ae935a MC |
931 | return WORK_ERROR; |
932 | } | |
933 | ||
934 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) | |
935 | dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE); | |
936 | break; | |
937 | ||
938 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE: | |
939 | if (statem_flush(s) != 1) | |
940 | return WORK_MORE_A; | |
941 | break; | |
942 | ||
943 | case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED: | |
944 | if (statem_flush(s) != 1) | |
945 | return WORK_MORE_A; | |
946 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
947 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) { | |
948 | /* | |
949 | * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if | |
950 | * no SCTP used. | |
951 | */ | |
952 | BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY, | |
953 | 0, NULL); | |
954 | } | |
955 | #endif | |
92760c21 | 956 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
d74014c4 BK |
957 | /* TLS 1.3 gets the secret size from the handshake md */ |
958 | size_t dummy; | |
92760c21 | 959 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, |
ec15acb6 | 960 | s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0, |
d74014c4 | 961 | &dummy) |
92760c21 MC |
962 | || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, |
963 | SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) | |
f63a17d6 | 964 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
92760c21 MC |
965 | return WORK_ERROR; |
966 | } | |
61ae935a | 967 | break; |
30f05b19 | 968 | |
9d75dce3 TS |
969 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ: |
970 | if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) { | |
971 | if (statem_flush(s) != 1) | |
972 | return WORK_MORE_A; | |
973 | } | |
974 | break; | |
975 | ||
44c04a2e | 976 | case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE: |
57389a32 MC |
977 | if (statem_flush(s) != 1) |
978 | return WORK_MORE_A; | |
3ec8d113 MC |
979 | if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1)) { |
980 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
57389a32 | 981 | return WORK_ERROR; |
3ec8d113 | 982 | } |
57389a32 MC |
983 | break; |
984 | ||
30f05b19 | 985 | case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET: |
f273ff95 MC |
986 | clear_sys_error(); |
987 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && statem_flush(s) != 1) { | |
988 | if (SSL_get_error(s, 0) == SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL | |
989 | && conn_is_closed()) { | |
990 | /* | |
991 | * We ignore connection closed errors in TLSv1.3 when sending a | |
992 | * NewSessionTicket and behave as if we were successful. This is | |
993 | * so that we are still able to read data sent to us by a client | |
994 | * that closes soon after the end of the handshake without | |
995 | * waiting to read our post-handshake NewSessionTickets. | |
996 | */ | |
997 | s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; | |
998 | break; | |
999 | } | |
1000 | ||
30f05b19 | 1001 | return WORK_MORE_A; |
f273ff95 | 1002 | } |
30f05b19 | 1003 | break; |
61ae935a MC |
1004 | } |
1005 | ||
1006 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; | |
1007 | } | |
1008 | ||
1009 | /* | |
6392fb8e MC |
1010 | * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the |
1011 | * server | |
61ae935a MC |
1012 | * |
1013 | * Valid return values are: | |
1014 | * 1: Success | |
1015 | * 0: Error | |
1016 | */ | |
6392fb8e | 1017 | int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, |
a15c953f | 1018 | confunc_f *confunc, int *mt) |
61ae935a | 1019 | { |
d6f1a6e9 | 1020 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; |
61ae935a | 1021 | |
4a01c59f MC |
1022 | switch (st->hand_state) { |
1023 | default: | |
1024 | /* Shouldn't happen */ | |
c48ffbcc | 1025 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE); |
4a01c59f MC |
1026 | return 0; |
1027 | ||
1028 | case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE: | |
5923ad4b | 1029 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) |
6392fb8e | 1030 | *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec; |
4a01c59f | 1031 | else |
6392fb8e MC |
1032 | *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec; |
1033 | *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; | |
4a01c59f | 1034 | break; |
f3b3d7f0 | 1035 | |
4a01c59f | 1036 | case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: |
6392fb8e MC |
1037 | *confunc = dtls_construct_hello_verify_request; |
1038 | *mt = DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST; | |
4a01c59f | 1039 | break; |
61ae935a | 1040 | |
4a01c59f MC |
1041 | case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ: |
1042 | /* No construction function needed */ | |
6392fb8e MC |
1043 | *confunc = NULL; |
1044 | *mt = SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST; | |
4a01c59f | 1045 | break; |
61ae935a | 1046 | |
4a01c59f | 1047 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO: |
6392fb8e MC |
1048 | *confunc = tls_construct_server_hello; |
1049 | *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO; | |
4a01c59f | 1050 | break; |
61ae935a | 1051 | |
4a01c59f | 1052 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT: |
6392fb8e MC |
1053 | *confunc = tls_construct_server_certificate; |
1054 | *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE; | |
4a01c59f | 1055 | break; |
61ae935a | 1056 | |
2c5dfdc3 MC |
1057 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY: |
1058 | *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify; | |
1059 | *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY; | |
1060 | break; | |
1061 | ||
1062 | ||
4a01c59f | 1063 | case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH: |
6392fb8e MC |
1064 | *confunc = tls_construct_server_key_exchange; |
1065 | *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; | |
4a01c59f | 1066 | break; |
61ae935a | 1067 | |
4a01c59f | 1068 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ: |
6392fb8e MC |
1069 | *confunc = tls_construct_certificate_request; |
1070 | *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST; | |
4a01c59f | 1071 | break; |
61ae935a | 1072 | |
4a01c59f | 1073 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE: |
6392fb8e MC |
1074 | *confunc = tls_construct_server_done; |
1075 | *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE; | |
4a01c59f | 1076 | break; |
61ae935a | 1077 | |
4a01c59f | 1078 | case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET: |
6392fb8e MC |
1079 | *confunc = tls_construct_new_session_ticket; |
1080 | *mt = SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET; | |
4a01c59f | 1081 | break; |
61ae935a | 1082 | |
4a01c59f | 1083 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS: |
6392fb8e MC |
1084 | *confunc = tls_construct_cert_status; |
1085 | *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS; | |
4a01c59f | 1086 | break; |
61ae935a | 1087 | |
4a01c59f | 1088 | case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED: |
6392fb8e MC |
1089 | *confunc = tls_construct_finished; |
1090 | *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED; | |
4a01c59f | 1091 | break; |
e46f2334 | 1092 | |
f7e393be MC |
1093 | case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA: |
1094 | *confunc = NULL; | |
1095 | *mt = SSL3_MT_DUMMY; | |
1096 | break; | |
1097 | ||
e46f2334 MC |
1098 | case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS: |
1099 | *confunc = tls_construct_encrypted_extensions; | |
1100 | *mt = SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS; | |
1101 | break; | |
7d061fce | 1102 | |
44c04a2e MC |
1103 | case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE: |
1104 | *confunc = tls_construct_key_update; | |
1105 | *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE; | |
1106 | break; | |
4a01c59f | 1107 | } |
61ae935a | 1108 | |
5923ad4b | 1109 | return 1; |
61ae935a MC |
1110 | } |
1111 | ||
8a18bc25 AG |
1112 | /* |
1113 | * Maximum size (excluding the Handshake header) of a ClientHello message, | |
1114 | * calculated as follows: | |
1115 | * | |
1116 | * 2 + # client_version | |
1117 | * 32 + # only valid length for random | |
1118 | * 1 + # length of session_id | |
1119 | * 32 + # maximum size for session_id | |
1120 | * 2 + # length of cipher suites | |
1121 | * 2^16-2 + # maximum length of cipher suites array | |
1122 | * 1 + # length of compression_methods | |
1123 | * 2^8-1 + # maximum length of compression methods | |
1124 | * 2 + # length of extensions | |
1125 | * 2^16-1 # maximum length of extensions | |
1126 | */ | |
1127 | #define CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH 131396 | |
1128 | ||
61ae935a MC |
1129 | #define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048 |
1130 | #define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514 | |
1131 | ||
1132 | /* | |
1133 | * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are | |
1134 | * reading. Excludes the message header. | |
1135 | */ | |
eda75751 | 1136 | size_t ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL *s) |
61ae935a | 1137 | { |
d6f1a6e9 | 1138 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; |
61ae935a | 1139 | |
e8aa8b6c | 1140 | switch (st->hand_state) { |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
1141 | default: |
1142 | /* Shouldn't happen */ | |
1143 | return 0; | |
1144 | ||
61ae935a | 1145 | case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO: |
8a18bc25 | 1146 | return CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH; |
61ae935a | 1147 | |
ef6c191b MC |
1148 | case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA: |
1149 | return END_OF_EARLY_DATA_MAX_LENGTH; | |
1150 | ||
61ae935a MC |
1151 | case TLS_ST_SR_CERT: |
1152 | return s->max_cert_list; | |
1153 | ||
1154 | case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH: | |
1155 | return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH; | |
1156 | ||
1157 | case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY: | |
1158 | return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH; | |
1159 | ||
1160 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG | |
1161 | case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO: | |
1162 | return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH; | |
1163 | #endif | |
1164 | ||
1165 | case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE: | |
1166 | return CCS_MAX_LENGTH; | |
1167 | ||
1168 | case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED: | |
1169 | return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH; | |
8cdc8c51 MC |
1170 | |
1171 | case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE: | |
1172 | return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH; | |
61ae935a | 1173 | } |
61ae935a MC |
1174 | } |
1175 | ||
1176 | /* | |
1177 | * Process a message that the server has received from the client. | |
1178 | */ | |
8481f583 | 1179 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
61ae935a | 1180 | { |
d6f1a6e9 | 1181 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; |
61ae935a | 1182 | |
e8aa8b6c | 1183 | switch (st->hand_state) { |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
1184 | default: |
1185 | /* Shouldn't happen */ | |
c48ffbcc | 1186 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
1187 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
1188 | ||
61ae935a MC |
1189 | case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO: |
1190 | return tls_process_client_hello(s, pkt); | |
1191 | ||
ef6c191b MC |
1192 | case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA: |
1193 | return tls_process_end_of_early_data(s, pkt); | |
1194 | ||
61ae935a MC |
1195 | case TLS_ST_SR_CERT: |
1196 | return tls_process_client_certificate(s, pkt); | |
1197 | ||
1198 | case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH: | |
1199 | return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s, pkt); | |
1200 | ||
1201 | case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY: | |
1202 | return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt); | |
1203 | ||
1204 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG | |
1205 | case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO: | |
1206 | return tls_process_next_proto(s, pkt); | |
1207 | #endif | |
1208 | ||
1209 | case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE: | |
1210 | return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt); | |
1211 | ||
1212 | case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED: | |
1213 | return tls_process_finished(s, pkt); | |
8cdc8c51 MC |
1214 | |
1215 | case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE: | |
1216 | return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt); | |
1217 | ||
61ae935a | 1218 | } |
61ae935a MC |
1219 | } |
1220 | ||
1221 | /* | |
1222 | * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message | |
1223 | * from the client | |
1224 | */ | |
8481f583 | 1225 | WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) |
61ae935a | 1226 | { |
d6f1a6e9 | 1227 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; |
61ae935a | 1228 | |
e8aa8b6c | 1229 | switch (st->hand_state) { |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
1230 | default: |
1231 | /* Shouldn't happen */ | |
c48ffbcc | 1232 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
1233 | return WORK_ERROR; |
1234 | ||
61ae935a MC |
1235 | case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO: |
1236 | return tls_post_process_client_hello(s, wst); | |
1237 | ||
1238 | case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH: | |
1239 | return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s, wst); | |
61ae935a | 1240 | } |
61ae935a MC |
1241 | } |
1242 | ||
edc032b5 | 1243 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP |
29bfd5b7 MC |
1244 | /* Returns 1 on success, 0 for retryable error, -1 for fatal error */ |
1245 | static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s) | |
0f113f3e | 1246 | { |
29bfd5b7 MC |
1247 | int ret; |
1248 | int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; | |
0f113f3e | 1249 | |
555cbb32 | 1250 | if ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) && |
0f113f3e MC |
1251 | (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) { |
1252 | if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) { | |
1253 | /* | |
1254 | * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp | |
1255 | * login name | |
1256 | */ | |
29bfd5b7 | 1257 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY, |
29bfd5b7 MC |
1258 | SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND); |
1259 | return -1; | |
0f113f3e | 1260 | } else { |
29bfd5b7 MC |
1261 | ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, &al); |
1262 | if (ret < 0) | |
1263 | return 0; | |
1264 | if (ret == SSL3_AL_FATAL) { | |
c48ffbcc | 1265 | SSLfatal(s, al, |
29bfd5b7 MC |
1266 | al == SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY |
1267 | ? SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND | |
1268 | : SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); | |
1269 | return -1; | |
1270 | } | |
0f113f3e MC |
1271 | } |
1272 | } | |
29bfd5b7 | 1273 | return 1; |
0f113f3e | 1274 | } |
edc032b5 BL |
1275 | #endif |
1276 | ||
c536b6be | 1277 | int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(WPACKET *pkt, unsigned char *cookie, |
cb150cbc | 1278 | size_t cookie_len) |
8ba708e5 | 1279 | { |
8ba708e5 | 1280 | /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */ |
c536b6be MC |
1281 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, DTLS1_VERSION) |
1282 | || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, cookie, cookie_len)) | |
1283 | return 0; | |
8ba708e5 | 1284 | |
c536b6be | 1285 | return 1; |
8ba708e5 MC |
1286 | } |
1287 | ||
7cea05dc | 1288 | int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
8ba708e5 | 1289 | { |
cb150cbc | 1290 | unsigned int cookie_leni; |
8ba708e5 MC |
1291 | if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL || |
1292 | s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie, | |
cb150cbc | 1293 | &cookie_leni) == 0 || |
cfbe41ea | 1294 | cookie_leni > DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH) { |
c48ffbcc | 1295 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE); |
8ba708e5 MC |
1296 | return 0; |
1297 | } | |
cb150cbc | 1298 | s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_leni; |
8ba708e5 | 1299 | |
4a01c59f MC |
1300 | if (!dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(pkt, s->d1->cookie, |
1301 | s->d1->cookie_len)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 1302 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
c536b6be MC |
1303 | return 0; |
1304 | } | |
8ba708e5 | 1305 | |
8ba708e5 MC |
1306 | return 1; |
1307 | } | |
1308 | ||
805a2e9e MC |
1309 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
1310 | /*- | |
1311 | * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X | |
1312 | * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |hello|. | |
1313 | * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order: | |
1314 | * SNI, | |
1315 | * elliptic_curves | |
1316 | * ec_point_formats | |
33564cb7 | 1317 | * signature_algorithms (for TLSv1.2 only) |
805a2e9e MC |
1318 | * |
1319 | * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8, | |
1320 | * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them. | |
1321 | * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from | |
1322 | * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work). | |
1323 | */ | |
1324 | static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello) | |
1325 | { | |
805a2e9e MC |
1326 | static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = { |
1327 | 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */ | |
1328 | 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */ | |
1329 | 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */ | |
1330 | 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */ | |
1331 | 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */ | |
1332 | 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */ | |
1333 | ||
1334 | 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */ | |
1335 | 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */ | |
1336 | 0x01, /* 1 point format */ | |
1337 | 0x00, /* uncompressed */ | |
1338 | /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */ | |
1339 | 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */ | |
1340 | 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */ | |
1341 | 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */ | |
1342 | 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */ | |
1343 | 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */ | |
1344 | 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */ | |
1345 | 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */ | |
1346 | 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */ | |
1347 | }; | |
805a2e9e MC |
1348 | /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */ |
1349 | static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18; | |
1266eefd MC |
1350 | unsigned int type; |
1351 | PACKET sni, tmppkt; | |
1352 | size_t ext_len; | |
805a2e9e MC |
1353 | |
1354 | tmppkt = hello->extensions; | |
1355 | ||
1356 | if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2) | |
1357 | || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type) | |
1358 | || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) { | |
1359 | return; | |
6b473aca MC |
1360 | } |
1361 | ||
805a2e9e MC |
1362 | if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) |
1363 | return; | |
1364 | ||
1365 | ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ? | |
1366 | sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength; | |
1367 | ||
555cbb32 | 1368 | s->s3.is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock, |
805a2e9e | 1369 | ext_len); |
6b473aca | 1370 | } |
805a2e9e | 1371 | #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ |
6b473aca | 1372 | |
be3583fa | 1373 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
e27f234a | 1374 | { |
e27f234a | 1375 | /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */ |
1ab3836b | 1376 | PACKET session_id, compression, extensions, cookie; |
6e3ff632 | 1377 | static const unsigned char null_compression = 0; |
3faa07b5 | 1378 | CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello = NULL; |
e27f234a | 1379 | |
c7f47786 MC |
1380 | /* Check if this is actually an unexpected renegotiation ClientHello */ |
1381 | if (s->renegotiate == 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) { | |
3faa07b5 | 1382 | if (!ossl_assert(!SSL_IS_TLS13(s))) { |
c48ffbcc | 1383 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
db0f35dd TS |
1384 | goto err; |
1385 | } | |
3faa07b5 | 1386 | if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION) != 0 |
555cbb32 | 1387 | || (!s->s3.send_connection_binding |
3faa07b5 MC |
1388 | && (s->options |
1389 | & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION) == 0)) { | |
1390 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION); | |
1391 | return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; | |
1392 | } | |
c7f47786 MC |
1393 | s->renegotiate = 1; |
1394 | s->new_session = 1; | |
1395 | } | |
1396 | ||
3faa07b5 MC |
1397 | clienthello = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*clienthello)); |
1398 | if (clienthello == NULL) { | |
c48ffbcc | 1399 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
3faa07b5 MC |
1400 | goto err; |
1401 | } | |
1402 | ||
1ab3836b | 1403 | /* |
b1b4b543 | 1404 | * First, parse the raw ClientHello data into the CLIENTHELLO_MSG structure. |
1ab3836b | 1405 | */ |
6b1bb98f | 1406 | clienthello->isv2 = RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer); |
bbafa47b | 1407 | PACKET_null_init(&cookie); |
1ab3836b | 1408 | |
6b1bb98f | 1409 | if (clienthello->isv2) { |
9ceb2426 | 1410 | unsigned int mt; |
b1b4b543 | 1411 | |
fc7129dc MC |
1412 | if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s) |
1413 | || s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) { | |
c48ffbcc | 1414 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); |
f63a17d6 | 1415 | goto err; |
7d061fce MC |
1416 | } |
1417 | ||
32ec4153 MC |
1418 | /*- |
1419 | * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2 | |
1420 | * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS | |
1421 | * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes | |
1422 | * the rest right through. Its format is: | |
1423 | * Byte Content | |
1424 | * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer | |
1425 | * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here | |
1426 | * 3-4 version | |
1427 | * 5-6 cipher_spec_length | |
1428 | * 7-8 session_id_length | |
1429 | * 9-10 challenge_length | |
1430 | * ... ... | |
1431 | */ | |
1432 | ||
73999b62 | 1433 | if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mt) |
a230b26e | 1434 | || mt != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) { |
32ec4153 MC |
1435 | /* |
1436 | * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record | |
1437 | * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record | |
1438 | * in the first place | |
1439 | */ | |
c48ffbcc | 1440 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
d45ba43d | 1441 | goto err; |
32ec4153 | 1442 | } |
32ec4153 MC |
1443 | } |
1444 | ||
6b1bb98f | 1445 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &clienthello->legacy_version)) { |
c48ffbcc | 1446 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); |
1ab3836b | 1447 | goto err; |
0f113f3e MC |
1448 | } |
1449 | ||
b3e2272c | 1450 | /* Parse the message and load client random. */ |
6b1bb98f | 1451 | if (clienthello->isv2) { |
32ec4153 MC |
1452 | /* |
1453 | * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello | |
1454 | * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format. | |
e2994cf0 | 1455 | * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected below. |
32ec4153 | 1456 | */ |
1ab3836b | 1457 | unsigned int ciphersuite_len, session_id_len, challenge_len; |
b3e2272c | 1458 | PACKET challenge; |
0f113f3e | 1459 | |
1ab3836b | 1460 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ciphersuite_len) |
a230b26e EK |
1461 | || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &session_id_len) |
1462 | || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &challenge_len)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 1463 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
f63a17d6 | 1464 | goto err; |
5e9f0eeb | 1465 | } |
0f113f3e | 1466 | |
293b5ca4 | 1467 | if (session_id_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) { |
c48ffbcc | 1468 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
f63a17d6 | 1469 | goto err; |
293b5ca4 AG |
1470 | } |
1471 | ||
6b1bb98f | 1472 | if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites, |
1ab3836b | 1473 | ciphersuite_len) |
6b1bb98f | 1474 | || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->session_id, session_id_len) |
73999b62 | 1475 | || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &challenge, challenge_len) |
b3e2272c | 1476 | /* No extensions. */ |
73999b62 | 1477 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { |
c48ffbcc | 1478 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
f63a17d6 | 1479 | goto err; |
9ceb2426 | 1480 | } |
6b1bb98f | 1481 | clienthello->session_id_len = session_id_len; |
9ceb2426 | 1482 | |
fba7b84c | 1483 | /* Load the client random and compression list. We use SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE |
6b1bb98f | 1484 | * here rather than sizeof(clienthello->random) because that is the limit |
fba7b84c | 1485 | * for SSLv3 and it is fixed. It won't change even if |
6b1bb98f | 1486 | * sizeof(clienthello->random) does. |
fba7b84c MC |
1487 | */ |
1488 | challenge_len = challenge_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE | |
1489 | ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE : challenge_len; | |
6b1bb98f | 1490 | memset(clienthello->random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); |
b3e2272c | 1491 | if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge, |
6b1bb98f | 1492 | clienthello->random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE - |
cb21df32 DB |
1493 | challenge_len, challenge_len) |
1494 | /* Advertise only null compression. */ | |
1495 | || !PACKET_buf_init(&compression, &null_compression, 1)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 1496 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
f63a17d6 | 1497 | goto err; |
9ceb2426 | 1498 | } |
b3e2272c | 1499 | |
6b1bb98f | 1500 | PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions); |
0f113f3e | 1501 | } else { |
b3e2272c | 1502 | /* Regular ClientHello. */ |
6b1bb98f | 1503 | if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) |
e2994cf0 | 1504 | || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id) |
6b1bb98f | 1505 | || !PACKET_copy_all(&session_id, clienthello->session_id, |
e2994cf0 | 1506 | SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH, |
6b1bb98f | 1507 | &clienthello->session_id_len)) { |
c48ffbcc | 1508 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
f63a17d6 | 1509 | goto err; |
9ceb2426 | 1510 | } |
32ec4153 | 1511 | |
b3e2272c | 1512 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
73999b62 | 1513 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookie)) { |
c48ffbcc | 1514 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
f63a17d6 | 1515 | goto err; |
32ec4153 | 1516 | } |
6b1bb98f | 1517 | if (!PACKET_copy_all(&cookie, clienthello->dtls_cookie, |
1ab3836b | 1518 | DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH, |
6b1bb98f | 1519 | &clienthello->dtls_cookie_len)) { |
c48ffbcc | 1520 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
f63a17d6 | 1521 | goto err; |
1ab3836b | 1522 | } |
b3e2272c EK |
1523 | /* |
1524 | * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one, | |
1525 | * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet. | |
1526 | * So check cookie length... | |
1527 | */ | |
1528 | if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) { | |
01666a8c MC |
1529 | if (clienthello->dtls_cookie_len == 0) { |
1530 | OPENSSL_free(clienthello); | |
eb5fd03b | 1531 | return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; |
01666a8c | 1532 | } |
b3e2272c | 1533 | } |
5e9f0eeb | 1534 | } |
0f113f3e | 1535 | |
6b1bb98f | 1536 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites)) { |
c48ffbcc | 1537 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
f63a17d6 | 1538 | goto err; |
1ab3836b MC |
1539 | } |
1540 | ||
4bfe1432 | 1541 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &compression)) { |
c48ffbcc | 1542 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
f63a17d6 | 1543 | goto err; |
b3e2272c | 1544 | } |
1ab3836b | 1545 | |
b3e2272c | 1546 | /* Could be empty. */ |
1ab3836b | 1547 | if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) { |
6b1bb98f | 1548 | PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions); |
1ab3836b | 1549 | } else { |
ef57a475 MC |
1550 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->extensions) |
1551 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { | |
c48ffbcc | 1552 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
f63a17d6 | 1553 | goto err; |
1ab3836b MC |
1554 | } |
1555 | } | |
1556 | } | |
1557 | ||
6b1bb98f | 1558 | if (!PACKET_copy_all(&compression, clienthello->compressions, |
e2994cf0 | 1559 | MAX_COMPRESSIONS_SIZE, |
6b1bb98f | 1560 | &clienthello->compressions_len)) { |
c48ffbcc | 1561 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
f63a17d6 | 1562 | goto err; |
1ab3836b MC |
1563 | } |
1564 | ||
b1b4b543 | 1565 | /* Preserve the raw extensions PACKET for later use */ |
6b1bb98f | 1566 | extensions = clienthello->extensions; |
fe874d27 | 1567 | if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, |
f63a17d6 | 1568 | &clienthello->pre_proc_exts, |
735d5b59 | 1569 | &clienthello->pre_proc_exts_len, 1)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
1570 | /* SSLfatal already been called */ |
1571 | goto err; | |
1ab3836b | 1572 | } |
6b1bb98f | 1573 | s->clienthello = clienthello; |
1ab3836b | 1574 | |
6b1bb98f | 1575 | return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; |
6b1bb98f | 1576 | |
f63a17d6 | 1577 | err: |
fbaf2857 RS |
1578 | if (clienthello != NULL) |
1579 | OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts); | |
6b1bb98f BK |
1580 | OPENSSL_free(clienthello); |
1581 | ||
1582 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
1583 | } | |
1584 | ||
f63a17d6 | 1585 | static int tls_early_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s) |
6b1bb98f BK |
1586 | { |
1587 | unsigned int j; | |
bf846a6d | 1588 | int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
6b1bb98f BK |
1589 | int protverr; |
1590 | size_t loop; | |
1591 | unsigned long id; | |
1592 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP | |
1593 | SSL_COMP *comp = NULL; | |
1594 | #endif | |
1595 | const SSL_CIPHER *c; | |
1596 | STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL; | |
1597 | STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *scsvs = NULL; | |
1598 | CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello = s->clienthello; | |
f7f2a01d | 1599 | DOWNGRADE dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE; |
6b1bb98f | 1600 | |
1ab3836b | 1601 | /* Finished parsing the ClientHello, now we can start processing it */ |
a9c0d8be DB |
1602 | /* Give the ClientHello callback a crack at things */ |
1603 | if (s->ctx->client_hello_cb != NULL) { | |
a9c0d8be | 1604 | /* A failure in the ClientHello callback terminates the connection. */ |
f1b97da1 DB |
1605 | switch (s->ctx->client_hello_cb(s, &al, s->ctx->client_hello_cb_arg)) { |
1606 | case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_SUCCESS: | |
1607 | break; | |
1608 | case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_RETRY: | |
a9c0d8be | 1609 | s->rwstate = SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_CB; |
f1b97da1 DB |
1610 | return -1; |
1611 | case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_ERROR: | |
1612 | default: | |
c48ffbcc | 1613 | SSLfatal(s, al, SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED); |
f1b97da1 | 1614 | goto err; |
6b1bb98f BK |
1615 | } |
1616 | } | |
1ab3836b MC |
1617 | |
1618 | /* Set up the client_random */ | |
555cbb32 | 1619 | memcpy(s->s3.client_random, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); |
1ab3836b MC |
1620 | |
1621 | /* Choose the version */ | |
1622 | ||
6b1bb98f BK |
1623 | if (clienthello->isv2) { |
1624 | if (clienthello->legacy_version == SSL2_VERSION | |
1625 | || (clienthello->legacy_version & 0xff00) | |
b1b4b543 MC |
1626 | != (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)) { |
1627 | /* | |
f63a17d6 | 1628 | * This is real SSLv2 or something completely unknown. We don't |
b1b4b543 MC |
1629 | * support it. |
1630 | */ | |
c48ffbcc | 1631 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL); |
1ab3836b MC |
1632 | goto err; |
1633 | } | |
b1b4b543 | 1634 | /* SSLv3/TLS */ |
6b1bb98f | 1635 | s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version; |
1ab3836b MC |
1636 | } |
1637 | /* | |
1638 | * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check | |
1639 | * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later. | |
1640 | */ | |
1641 | if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
f7f2a01d | 1642 | protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello, &dgrd); |
1ab3836b | 1643 | } else if (s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION && |
6b1bb98f | 1644 | DTLS_VERSION_LT((int)clienthello->legacy_version, s->version)) { |
1ab3836b MC |
1645 | protverr = SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW; |
1646 | } else { | |
1647 | protverr = 0; | |
1648 | } | |
1649 | ||
1650 | if (protverr) { | |
7d061fce | 1651 | if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) { |
b1b4b543 | 1652 | /* like ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */ |
6b1bb98f | 1653 | s->version = s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version; |
1ab3836b | 1654 | } |
c48ffbcc | 1655 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, protverr); |
6b1bb98f | 1656 | goto err; |
b3e2272c EK |
1657 | } |
1658 | ||
635b7d3f | 1659 | /* TLSv1.3 specifies that a ClientHello must end on a record boundary */ |
9e0ac6a2 | 1660 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) { |
c48ffbcc | 1661 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY); |
9e0ac6a2 MC |
1662 | goto err; |
1663 | } | |
1664 | ||
1ed65871 DB |
1665 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
1666 | /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */ | |
1667 | if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) { | |
1668 | if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) { | |
6b1bb98f BK |
1669 | if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, clienthello->dtls_cookie, |
1670 | clienthello->dtls_cookie_len) == 0) { | |
f63a17d6 | 1671 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, |
f63a17d6 | 1672 | SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); |
6b1bb98f | 1673 | goto err; |
1ed65871 DB |
1674 | /* else cookie verification succeeded */ |
1675 | } | |
a230b26e | 1676 | /* default verification */ |
6b1bb98f BK |
1677 | } else if (s->d1->cookie_len != clienthello->dtls_cookie_len |
1678 | || memcmp(clienthello->dtls_cookie, s->d1->cookie, | |
1ab3836b | 1679 | s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) { |
c48ffbcc | 1680 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); |
6b1bb98f | 1681 | goto err; |
1ed65871 DB |
1682 | } |
1683 | s->d1->cookie_verified = 1; | |
1684 | } | |
1685 | if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) { | |
f7f2a01d | 1686 | protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello, &dgrd); |
1ed65871 | 1687 | if (protverr != 0) { |
1ed65871 | 1688 | s->version = s->client_version; |
c48ffbcc | 1689 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, protverr); |
6b1bb98f | 1690 | goto err; |
1ed65871 DB |
1691 | } |
1692 | } | |
1693 | } | |
1694 | ||
b3e2272c EK |
1695 | s->hit = 0; |
1696 | ||
0de6d66d | 1697 | if (!ssl_cache_cipherlist(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites, |
f63a17d6 | 1698 | clienthello->isv2) || |
0de6d66d | 1699 | !bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites, &ciphers, &scsvs, |
dd5a4279 | 1700 | clienthello->isv2, 1)) { |
f63a17d6 | 1701 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
0de6d66d MC |
1702 | goto err; |
1703 | } | |
1704 | ||
555cbb32 | 1705 | s->s3.send_connection_binding = 0; |
0de6d66d MC |
1706 | /* Check what signalling cipher-suite values were received. */ |
1707 | if (scsvs != NULL) { | |
1708 | for(i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(scsvs); i++) { | |
1709 | c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(scsvs, i); | |
1710 | if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_SCSV) { | |
1711 | if (s->renegotiate) { | |
1712 | /* SCSV is fatal if renegotiating */ | |
f63a17d6 | 1713 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, |
f63a17d6 | 1714 | SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING); |
0de6d66d MC |
1715 | goto err; |
1716 | } | |
555cbb32 | 1717 | s->s3.send_connection_binding = 1; |
0de6d66d MC |
1718 | } else if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV && |
1719 | !ssl_check_version_downgrade(s)) { | |
1720 | /* | |
1721 | * This SCSV indicates that the client previously tried | |
1722 | * a higher version. We should fail if the current version | |
1723 | * is an unexpected downgrade, as that indicates that the first | |
1724 | * connection may have been tampered with in order to trigger | |
1725 | * an insecure downgrade. | |
1726 | */ | |
f63a17d6 | 1727 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK, |
f63a17d6 | 1728 | SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); |
0de6d66d MC |
1729 | goto err; |
1730 | } | |
1731 | } | |
1732 | } | |
1733 | ||
1734 | /* For TLSv1.3 we must select the ciphersuite *before* session resumption */ | |
1735 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { | |
1736 | const SSL_CIPHER *cipher = | |
1737 | ssl3_choose_cipher(s, ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s)); | |
1738 | ||
1739 | if (cipher == NULL) { | |
c48ffbcc | 1740 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); |
0de6d66d MC |
1741 | goto err; |
1742 | } | |
fc7129dc | 1743 | if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING |
555cbb32 TS |
1744 | && (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher == NULL |
1745 | || s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id != cipher->id)) { | |
0de6d66d MC |
1746 | /* |
1747 | * A previous HRR picked a different ciphersuite to the one we | |
1748 | * just selected. Something must have changed. | |
1749 | */ | |
c48ffbcc | 1750 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_CIPHER); |
0de6d66d MC |
1751 | goto err; |
1752 | } | |
555cbb32 | 1753 | s->s3.tmp.new_cipher = cipher; |
0de6d66d MC |
1754 | } |
1755 | ||
1ab3836b | 1756 | /* We need to do this before getting the session */ |
70af3d8e | 1757 | if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_extended_master_secret, |
fe874d27 | 1758 | SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, |
f63a17d6 MC |
1759 | clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0)) { |
1760 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
6b1bb98f | 1761 | goto err; |
1ab3836b MC |
1762 | } |
1763 | ||
b3e2272c EK |
1764 | /* |
1765 | * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello. | |
1766 | * TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty. | |
1767 | * | |
1768 | * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in | |
1769 | * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally | |
1770 | * ignore resumption requests with flag | |
1771 | * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather | |
1772 | * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on | |
1773 | * this for security won't even compile against older library versions). | |
1774 | * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to | |
1775 | * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains | |
1776 | * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the | |
1777 | * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be | |
1778 | * ignored. | |
1779 | */ | |
6b1bb98f | 1780 | if (clienthello->isv2 || |
b3e2272c EK |
1781 | (s->new_session && |
1782 | (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1783 | if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) { |
1784 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
b3e2272c | 1785 | goto err; |
f63a17d6 | 1786 | } |
b3e2272c | 1787 | } else { |
f63a17d6 | 1788 | i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, clienthello); |
128ae276 | 1789 | if (i == 1) { |
b3e2272c EK |
1790 | /* previous session */ |
1791 | s->hit = 1; | |
1792 | } else if (i == -1) { | |
f63a17d6 | 1793 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
6b1bb98f | 1794 | goto err; |
32ec4153 | 1795 | } else { |
b3e2272c | 1796 | /* i == 0 */ |
f63a17d6 MC |
1797 | if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) { |
1798 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
32ec4153 | 1799 | goto err; |
f63a17d6 | 1800 | } |
0f113f3e | 1801 | } |
b3e2272c | 1802 | } |
0f113f3e | 1803 | |
a5816a5a MC |
1804 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
1805 | memcpy(s->tmp_session_id, s->clienthello->session_id, | |
1806 | s->clienthello->session_id_len); | |
1807 | s->tmp_session_id_len = s->clienthello->session_id_len; | |
1808 | } | |
1809 | ||
a055a881 | 1810 | /* |
0de6d66d MC |
1811 | * If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list. In TLSv1.3 we check |
1812 | * ciphersuite compatibility with the session as part of resumption. | |
a055a881 MC |
1813 | */ |
1814 | if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->hit) { | |
b3e2272c EK |
1815 | j = 0; |
1816 | id = s->session->cipher->id; | |
d02b48c6 | 1817 | |
77359d22 RL |
1818 | OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS_CIPHER) { |
1819 | BIO_printf(trc_out, "client sent %d ciphers\n", | |
1820 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers)); | |
1821 | } | |
b3e2272c EK |
1822 | for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) { |
1823 | c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i); | |
77359d22 RL |
1824 | if (trc_out != NULL) |
1825 | BIO_printf(trc_out, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n", i, | |
1826 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c)); | |
b3e2272c EK |
1827 | if (c->id == id) { |
1828 | j = 1; | |
1829 | break; | |
32ec4153 | 1830 | } |
0f113f3e | 1831 | } |
b3e2272c | 1832 | if (j == 0) { |
ec30e856 | 1833 | /* |
b3e2272c EK |
1834 | * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked |
1835 | * to reuse it | |
ec30e856 | 1836 | */ |
f63a17d6 | 1837 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, |
f63a17d6 | 1838 | SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING); |
77359d22 | 1839 | OSSL_TRACE_CANCEL(TLS_CIPHER); |
6b1bb98f | 1840 | goto err; |
32ec4153 | 1841 | } |
77359d22 | 1842 | OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS_CIPHER); |
b3e2272c | 1843 | } |
9ceb2426 | 1844 | |
6b1bb98f BK |
1845 | for (loop = 0; loop < clienthello->compressions_len; loop++) { |
1846 | if (clienthello->compressions[loop] == 0) | |
b3e2272c | 1847 | break; |
0f113f3e | 1848 | } |
32ec4153 | 1849 | |
6b1bb98f | 1850 | if (loop >= clienthello->compressions_len) { |
b3e2272c | 1851 | /* no compress */ |
c48ffbcc | 1852 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED); |
6b1bb98f | 1853 | goto err; |
b3e2272c | 1854 | } |
f100b031 | 1855 | |
805a2e9e MC |
1856 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
1857 | if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG) | |
6b1bb98f | 1858 | ssl_check_for_safari(s, clienthello); |
805a2e9e MC |
1859 | #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ |
1860 | ||
0f113f3e | 1861 | /* TLS extensions */ |
fe874d27 | 1862 | if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, |
f63a17d6 MC |
1863 | clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0, 1)) { |
1864 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
6b1bb98f | 1865 | goto err; |
0f113f3e MC |
1866 | } |
1867 | ||
1868 | /* | |
1869 | * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake | |
1870 | * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before | |
1871 | * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket | |
1872 | * processing to use it in key derivation. | |
1873 | */ | |
1874 | { | |
1875 | unsigned char *pos; | |
555cbb32 | 1876 | pos = s->s3.server_random; |
f7f2a01d | 1877 | if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, dgrd) <= 0) { |
c48ffbcc | 1878 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
6b1bb98f | 1879 | goto err; |
0f113f3e MC |
1880 | } |
1881 | } | |
1882 | ||
0de6d66d MC |
1883 | if (!s->hit |
1884 | && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION | |
1885 | && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s) | |
1886 | && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s) | |
1887 | && s->ext.session_secret_cb) { | |
4a640fb6 | 1888 | const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL; |
8c1a5343 MC |
1889 | /* |
1890 | * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for | |
1891 | * backwards compat reasons | |
1892 | */ | |
1893 | int master_key_length; | |
0f113f3e | 1894 | |
8c1a5343 | 1895 | master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key); |
aff8c126 | 1896 | if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, |
8c1a5343 | 1897 | &master_key_length, ciphers, |
0f113f3e | 1898 | &pref_cipher, |
aff8c126 | 1899 | s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg) |
8c1a5343 MC |
1900 | && master_key_length > 0) { |
1901 | s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length; | |
0f113f3e | 1902 | s->hit = 1; |
eee2a6a7 | 1903 | s->peer_ciphers = ciphers; |
0f113f3e MC |
1904 | s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK; |
1905 | ||
1906 | ciphers = NULL; | |
1907 | ||
1908 | /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */ | |
3f4bf115 | 1909 | if (pref_cipher == NULL) |
eee2a6a7 | 1910 | pref_cipher = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->peer_ciphers, |
3f4bf115 | 1911 | SSL_get_ciphers(s)); |
0f113f3e | 1912 | if (pref_cipher == NULL) { |
c48ffbcc | 1913 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); |
6b1bb98f | 1914 | goto err; |
0f113f3e MC |
1915 | } |
1916 | ||
1917 | s->session->cipher = pref_cipher; | |
25aaa98a | 1918 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list); |
eee2a6a7 | 1919 | s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->peer_ciphers); |
25aaa98a | 1920 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id); |
eee2a6a7 | 1921 | s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->peer_ciphers); |
0f113f3e MC |
1922 | } |
1923 | } | |
58ece833 | 1924 | |
0f113f3e MC |
1925 | /* |
1926 | * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other | |
b2ce0337 | 1927 | * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression |
0f113f3e MC |
1928 | * algorithms from the client, starting at q. |
1929 | */ | |
555cbb32 | 1930 | s->s3.tmp.new_compression = NULL; |
1fe35494 MC |
1931 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
1932 | /* | |
1933 | * We already checked above that the NULL compression method appears in | |
1934 | * the list. Now we check there aren't any others (which is illegal in | |
1935 | * a TLSv1.3 ClientHello. | |
1936 | */ | |
1937 | if (clienthello->compressions_len != 1) { | |
f63a17d6 | 1938 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, |
f63a17d6 | 1939 | SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); |
1fe35494 MC |
1940 | goto err; |
1941 | } | |
1942 | } | |
09b6c2ef | 1943 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP |
0f113f3e | 1944 | /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */ |
1fe35494 | 1945 | else if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) { |
0f113f3e | 1946 | int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth; |
9ceb2426 | 1947 | unsigned int k; |
0f113f3e MC |
1948 | /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */ |
1949 | /* Can't disable compression */ | |
1950 | if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) { | |
f63a17d6 | 1951 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, |
f63a17d6 | 1952 | SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); |
6b1bb98f | 1953 | goto err; |
0f113f3e MC |
1954 | } |
1955 | /* Look for resumed compression method */ | |
1956 | for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) { | |
1957 | comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m); | |
1958 | if (comp_id == comp->id) { | |
555cbb32 | 1959 | s->s3.tmp.new_compression = comp; |
0f113f3e MC |
1960 | break; |
1961 | } | |
1962 | } | |
555cbb32 | 1963 | if (s->s3.tmp.new_compression == NULL) { |
f63a17d6 | 1964 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, |
f63a17d6 | 1965 | SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); |
6b1bb98f | 1966 | goto err; |
0f113f3e MC |
1967 | } |
1968 | /* Look for resumed method in compression list */ | |
6b1bb98f BK |
1969 | for (k = 0; k < clienthello->compressions_len; k++) { |
1970 | if (clienthello->compressions[k] == comp_id) | |
0f113f3e MC |
1971 | break; |
1972 | } | |
6b1bb98f | 1973 | if (k >= clienthello->compressions_len) { |
f63a17d6 | 1974 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, |
f63a17d6 | 1975 | SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING); |
6b1bb98f | 1976 | goto err; |
0f113f3e | 1977 | } |
c19602b5 | 1978 | } else if (s->hit) { |
0f113f3e | 1979 | comp = NULL; |
1fe35494 | 1980 | } else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) { |
df6741c9 | 1981 | /* See if we have a match */ |
9ceb2426 MC |
1982 | int m, nn, v, done = 0; |
1983 | unsigned int o; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1984 | |
1985 | nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); | |
1986 | for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) { | |
1987 | comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m); | |
1988 | v = comp->id; | |
6b1bb98f BK |
1989 | for (o = 0; o < clienthello->compressions_len; o++) { |
1990 | if (v == clienthello->compressions[o]) { | |
0f113f3e MC |
1991 | done = 1; |
1992 | break; | |
1993 | } | |
1994 | } | |
1995 | if (done) | |
1996 | break; | |
1997 | } | |
1998 | if (done) | |
555cbb32 | 1999 | s->s3.tmp.new_compression = comp; |
0f113f3e MC |
2000 | else |
2001 | comp = NULL; | |
2002 | } | |
e6f418bc | 2003 | #else |
0f113f3e MC |
2004 | /* |
2005 | * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session | |
2006 | * using compression. | |
2007 | */ | |
2008 | if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) { | |
c48ffbcc | 2009 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); |
6b1bb98f | 2010 | goto err; |
0f113f3e | 2011 | } |
09b6c2ef | 2012 | #endif |
413c4f45 | 2013 | |
0f113f3e | 2014 | /* |
eee2a6a7 | 2015 | * Given s->peer_ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher |
0f113f3e | 2016 | */ |
d02b48c6 | 2017 | |
a055a881 | 2018 | if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
eee2a6a7 MC |
2019 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->peer_ciphers); |
2020 | s->peer_ciphers = ciphers; | |
0f113f3e | 2021 | if (ciphers == NULL) { |
c48ffbcc | 2022 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
6b1bb98f | 2023 | goto err; |
0f113f3e MC |
2024 | } |
2025 | ciphers = NULL; | |
69b2d393 MC |
2026 | } |
2027 | ||
2028 | if (!s->hit) { | |
2029 | #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP | |
2030 | s->session->compress_meth = 0; | |
2031 | #else | |
2032 | s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id; | |
2033 | #endif | |
6f34d7bc BK |
2034 | if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) { |
2035 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
2036 | goto err; | |
2037 | } | |
e27f234a MC |
2038 | } |
2039 | ||
2040 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers); | |
6b1bb98f BK |
2041 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs); |
2042 | OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts); | |
2043 | OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello); | |
2044 | s->clienthello = NULL; | |
2045 | return 1; | |
e27f234a | 2046 | err: |
e27f234a | 2047 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers); |
6b1bb98f BK |
2048 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs); |
2049 | OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts); | |
2050 | OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello); | |
2051 | s->clienthello = NULL; | |
e27f234a | 2052 | |
6b1bb98f | 2053 | return 0; |
e27f234a MC |
2054 | } |
2055 | ||
24b8e4b2 MC |
2056 | /* |
2057 | * Call the status request callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1. | |
f63a17d6 | 2058 | * Upon failure, returns 0. |
24b8e4b2 | 2059 | */ |
f63a17d6 | 2060 | static int tls_handle_status_request(SSL *s) |
24b8e4b2 | 2061 | { |
aff8c126 | 2062 | s->ext.status_expected = 0; |
24b8e4b2 MC |
2063 | |
2064 | /* | |
2065 | * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be | |
2066 | * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed, | |
2067 | * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may | |
2068 | * influence which certificate is sent | |
2069 | */ | |
aff8c126 RS |
2070 | if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing && s->ctx != NULL |
2071 | && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) { | |
24b8e4b2 | 2072 | int ret; |
1266eefd | 2073 | |
24b8e4b2 | 2074 | /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */ |
555cbb32 | 2075 | if (s->s3.tmp.cert != NULL) { |
24b8e4b2 MC |
2076 | /* |
2077 | * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate | |
2078 | * et al can pick it up. | |
2079 | */ | |
555cbb32 | 2080 | s->cert->key = s->s3.tmp.cert; |
aff8c126 | 2081 | ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg); |
24b8e4b2 MC |
2082 | switch (ret) { |
2083 | /* We don't want to send a status request response */ | |
2084 | case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: | |
aff8c126 | 2085 | s->ext.status_expected = 0; |
24b8e4b2 MC |
2086 | break; |
2087 | /* status request response should be sent */ | |
2088 | case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK: | |
aff8c126 RS |
2089 | if (s->ext.ocsp.resp) |
2090 | s->ext.status_expected = 1; | |
24b8e4b2 MC |
2091 | break; |
2092 | /* something bad happened */ | |
2093 | case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: | |
2094 | default: | |
c48ffbcc | 2095 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); |
24b8e4b2 MC |
2096 | return 0; |
2097 | } | |
2098 | } | |
2099 | } | |
2100 | ||
2101 | return 1; | |
2102 | } | |
2103 | ||
5626f634 BK |
2104 | /* |
2105 | * Call the alpn_select callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1. | |
29bfd5b7 | 2106 | * Upon failure, returns 0. |
5626f634 | 2107 | */ |
f63a17d6 | 2108 | int tls_handle_alpn(SSL *s) |
5626f634 BK |
2109 | { |
2110 | const unsigned char *selected = NULL; | |
2111 | unsigned char selected_len = 0; | |
2112 | ||
555cbb32 | 2113 | if (s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3.alpn_proposed != NULL) { |
5626f634 | 2114 | int r = s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, |
555cbb32 TS |
2115 | s->s3.alpn_proposed, |
2116 | (unsigned int)s->s3.alpn_proposed_len, | |
5626f634 BK |
2117 | s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb_arg); |
2118 | ||
2119 | if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) { | |
555cbb32 TS |
2120 | OPENSSL_free(s->s3.alpn_selected); |
2121 | s->s3.alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len); | |
2122 | if (s->s3.alpn_selected == NULL) { | |
c48ffbcc | 2123 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
5626f634 BK |
2124 | return 0; |
2125 | } | |
555cbb32 | 2126 | s->s3.alpn_selected_len = selected_len; |
5626f634 BK |
2127 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG |
2128 | /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */ | |
555cbb32 | 2129 | s->s3.npn_seen = 0; |
5626f634 | 2130 | #endif |
630369d9 | 2131 | |
4be3a7c7 MC |
2132 | /* Check ALPN is consistent with session */ |
2133 | if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL | |
630369d9 MC |
2134 | || selected_len != s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len |
2135 | || memcmp(selected, s->session->ext.alpn_selected, | |
4be3a7c7 MC |
2136 | selected_len) != 0) { |
2137 | /* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */ | |
630369d9 MC |
2138 | s->ext.early_data_ok = 0; |
2139 | ||
4be3a7c7 | 2140 | if (!s->hit) { |
9d5db9c9 MC |
2141 | /* |
2142 | * This is a new session and so alpn_selected should have | |
2143 | * been initialised to NULL. We should update it with the | |
2144 | * selected ALPN. | |
2145 | */ | |
2146 | if (!ossl_assert(s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL)) { | |
2147 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, | |
9d5db9c9 MC |
2148 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
2149 | return 0; | |
2150 | } | |
4be3a7c7 MC |
2151 | s->session->ext.alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, |
2152 | selected_len); | |
2153 | if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) { | |
f63a17d6 | 2154 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
f63a17d6 | 2155 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
4be3a7c7 MC |
2156 | return 0; |
2157 | } | |
2158 | s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = selected_len; | |
2159 | } | |
2160 | } | |
2161 | ||
5626f634 | 2162 | return 1; |
630369d9 | 2163 | } else if (r != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK) { |
c48ffbcc | 2164 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL, |
f63a17d6 | 2165 | SSL_R_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL); |
5626f634 BK |
2166 | return 0; |
2167 | } | |
630369d9 MC |
2168 | /* |
2169 | * If r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK then behave as if no callback was | |
2170 | * present. | |
2171 | */ | |
5626f634 BK |
2172 | } |
2173 | ||
4be3a7c7 MC |
2174 | /* Check ALPN is consistent with session */ |
2175 | if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected != NULL) { | |
2176 | /* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */ | |
630369d9 | 2177 | s->ext.early_data_ok = 0; |
4be3a7c7 | 2178 | } |
630369d9 | 2179 | |
5626f634 BK |
2180 | return 1; |
2181 | } | |
2182 | ||
be3583fa | 2183 | WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) |
e27f234a | 2184 | { |
4a640fb6 | 2185 | const SSL_CIPHER *cipher; |
e27f234a MC |
2186 | |
2187 | if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) { | |
f63a17d6 | 2188 | int rv = tls_early_post_process_client_hello(s); |
6b1bb98f | 2189 | if (rv == 0) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
2190 | /* SSLfatal() was already called */ |
2191 | goto err; | |
6b1bb98f BK |
2192 | } |
2193 | if (rv < 0) | |
2194 | return WORK_MORE_A; | |
2195 | wst = WORK_MORE_B; | |
2196 | } | |
2197 | if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) { | |
a055a881 | 2198 | if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
e27f234a | 2199 | /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */ |
6f34d7bc BK |
2200 | if (!s->hit && s->cert->cert_cb != NULL) { |
2201 | int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg); | |
2202 | if (rv == 0) { | |
c48ffbcc | 2203 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR); |
524006dd | 2204 | goto err; |
e27f234a | 2205 | } |
6f34d7bc BK |
2206 | if (rv < 0) { |
2207 | s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; | |
2208 | return WORK_MORE_B; | |
2209 | } | |
2210 | s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; | |
0f113f3e | 2211 | } |
e27f234a | 2212 | |
0de6d66d MC |
2213 | /* In TLSv1.3 we selected the ciphersuite before resumption */ |
2214 | if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { | |
2215 | cipher = | |
eee2a6a7 | 2216 | ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->peer_ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s)); |
0de6d66d MC |
2217 | |
2218 | if (cipher == NULL) { | |
f63a17d6 | 2219 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, |
f63a17d6 MC |
2220 | SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); |
2221 | goto err; | |
0de6d66d | 2222 | } |
555cbb32 | 2223 | s->s3.tmp.new_cipher = cipher; |
11c67eea | 2224 | } |
69b2d393 | 2225 | if (!s->hit) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
2226 | if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, 1)) { |
2227 | /* SSLfatal already called */ | |
2228 | goto err; | |
2229 | } | |
69b2d393 MC |
2230 | /* check whether we should disable session resumption */ |
2231 | if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL) | |
2232 | s->session->not_resumable = | |
8acc2799 | 2233 | s->not_resumable_session_cb(s, |
555cbb32 | 2234 | ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey |
8acc2799 | 2235 | & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) != 0)); |
69b2d393 MC |
2236 | if (s->session->not_resumable) |
2237 | /* do not send a session ticket */ | |
2238 | s->ext.ticket_expected = 0; | |
2239 | } | |
e27f234a MC |
2240 | } else { |
2241 | /* Session-id reuse */ | |
555cbb32 | 2242 | s->s3.tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher; |
0f113f3e | 2243 | } |
0f113f3e | 2244 | |
e27f234a MC |
2245 | /*- |
2246 | * we now have the following setup. | |
2247 | * client_random | |
60250017 | 2248 | * cipher_list - our preferred list of ciphers |
2249 | * ciphers - the clients preferred list of ciphers | |
e27f234a MC |
2250 | * compression - basically ignored right now |
2251 | * ssl version is set - sslv3 | |
2252 | * s->session - The ssl session has been setup. | |
2253 | * s->hit - session reuse flag | |
555cbb32 | 2254 | * s->s3.tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use. |
e27f234a | 2255 | */ |
0f113f3e | 2256 | |
24b8e4b2 MC |
2257 | /* |
2258 | * Call status_request callback if needed. Has to be done after the | |
2259 | * certificate callbacks etc above. | |
2260 | */ | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2261 | if (!tls_handle_status_request(s)) { |
2262 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
2263 | goto err; | |
e27f234a | 2264 | } |
5626f634 BK |
2265 | /* |
2266 | * Call alpn_select callback if needed. Has to be done after SNI and | |
630369d9 MC |
2267 | * cipher negotiation (HTTP/2 restricts permitted ciphers). In TLSv1.3 |
2268 | * we already did this because cipher negotiation happens earlier, and | |
2269 | * we must handle ALPN before we decide whether to accept early_data. | |
5626f634 | 2270 | */ |
f63a17d6 MC |
2271 | if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !tls_handle_alpn(s)) { |
2272 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
2273 | goto err; | |
5626f634 | 2274 | } |
0f113f3e | 2275 | |
6b1bb98f | 2276 | wst = WORK_MORE_C; |
e27f234a MC |
2277 | } |
2278 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP | |
6b1bb98f | 2279 | if (wst == WORK_MORE_C) { |
e27f234a | 2280 | int ret; |
29bfd5b7 | 2281 | if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s)) == 0) { |
e27f234a MC |
2282 | /* |
2283 | * callback indicates further work to be done | |
2284 | */ | |
2285 | s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; | |
6b1bb98f | 2286 | return WORK_MORE_C; |
e27f234a | 2287 | } |
29bfd5b7 MC |
2288 | if (ret < 0) { |
2289 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
f63a17d6 | 2290 | goto err; |
0f113f3e MC |
2291 | } |
2292 | } | |
e27f234a | 2293 | #endif |
0f113f3e | 2294 | |
e27f234a | 2295 | return WORK_FINISHED_STOP; |
f63a17d6 | 2296 | err: |
e27f234a MC |
2297 | return WORK_ERROR; |
2298 | } | |
2299 | ||
7cea05dc | 2300 | int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
0f113f3e | 2301 | { |
f63a17d6 | 2302 | int compm; |
ec60ccc1 | 2303 | size_t sl, len; |
f2342b7a | 2304 | int version; |
a5816a5a | 2305 | unsigned char *session_id; |
fc7129dc | 2306 | int usetls13 = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING; |
0f113f3e | 2307 | |
597c51bc | 2308 | version = usetls13 ? TLS1_2_VERSION : s->version; |
f2342b7a | 2309 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, version) |
8157d44b MC |
2310 | /* |
2311 | * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in | |
2312 | * tls_process_client_hello() | |
2313 | */ | |
597c51bc | 2314 | || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, |
fc7129dc | 2315 | s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING |
555cbb32 | 2316 | ? hrrrandom : s->s3.server_random, |
597c51bc | 2317 | SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) { |
c48ffbcc | 2318 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
f63a17d6 | 2319 | return 0; |
8157d44b | 2320 | } |
0f113f3e | 2321 | |
e27f234a MC |
2322 | /*- |
2323 | * There are several cases for the session ID to send | |
2324 | * back in the server hello: | |
2325 | * - For session reuse from the session cache, | |
2326 | * we send back the old session ID. | |
2327 | * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket) | |
2328 | * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID" | |
2329 | * (which doesn't actually identify the session). | |
2330 | * - If it is a new session, we send back the new | |
2331 | * session ID. | |
2332 | * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use, | |
2333 | * we send back a 0-length session ID. | |
a5816a5a MC |
2334 | * - In TLSv1.3 we echo back the session id sent to us by the client |
2335 | * regardless | |
e27f234a MC |
2336 | * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse, |
2337 | * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed | |
2338 | * to send back. | |
2339 | */ | |
2340 | if (s->session->not_resumable || | |
2341 | (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER) | |
2342 | && !s->hit)) | |
2343 | s->session->session_id_length = 0; | |
2344 | ||
597c51bc | 2345 | if (usetls13) { |
a5816a5a MC |
2346 | sl = s->tmp_session_id_len; |
2347 | session_id = s->tmp_session_id; | |
2348 | } else { | |
2349 | sl = s->session->session_id_length; | |
2350 | session_id = s->session->session_id; | |
2351 | } | |
2352 | ||
ec60ccc1 | 2353 | if (sl > sizeof(s->session->session_id)) { |
c48ffbcc | 2354 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
f63a17d6 | 2355 | return 0; |
e27f234a | 2356 | } |
0f113f3e | 2357 | |
8157d44b | 2358 | /* set up the compression method */ |
09b6c2ef | 2359 | #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP |
8157d44b | 2360 | compm = 0; |
09b6c2ef | 2361 | #else |
555cbb32 | 2362 | if (usetls13 || s->s3.tmp.new_compression == NULL) |
8157d44b | 2363 | compm = 0; |
e27f234a | 2364 | else |
555cbb32 | 2365 | compm = s->s3.tmp.new_compression->id; |
09b6c2ef | 2366 | #endif |
e481f9b9 | 2367 | |
426dfc9f | 2368 | if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, session_id, sl) |
555cbb32 | 2369 | || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher, pkt, &len) |
b4f001eb | 2370 | || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, compm)) { |
c48ffbcc | 2371 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
b4f001eb MC |
2372 | return 0; |
2373 | } | |
2374 | ||
2375 | if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, | |
2376 | s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING | |
2377 | ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST | |
2378 | : (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) | |
2379 | ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO | |
2380 | : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO), | |
2381 | NULL, 0)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2382 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
2383 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e | 2384 | } |
d02b48c6 | 2385 | |
fc7129dc | 2386 | if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) { |
597c51bc MC |
2387 | /* Ditch the session. We'll create a new one next time around */ |
2388 | SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); | |
2389 | s->session = NULL; | |
2390 | s->hit = 0; | |
2391 | ||
2392 | /* | |
2393 | * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with | |
2394 | * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1. | |
2395 | */ | |
43054d3d | 2396 | if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s, NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) { |
597c51bc MC |
2397 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
2398 | return 0; | |
2399 | } | |
2400 | } else if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) | |
2401 | && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2402 | /* SSLfatal() already called */; |
2403 | return 0; | |
aff9929b MC |
2404 | } |
2405 | ||
e27f234a | 2406 | return 1; |
0f113f3e | 2407 | } |
d02b48c6 | 2408 | |
7cea05dc | 2409 | int tls_construct_server_done(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
e27f234a | 2410 | { |
555cbb32 | 2411 | if (!s->s3.tmp.cert_request) { |
5923ad4b | 2412 | if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { |
f63a17d6 | 2413 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
5923ad4b MC |
2414 | return 0; |
2415 | } | |
e27f234a | 2416 | } |
e27f234a MC |
2417 | return 1; |
2418 | } | |
2419 | ||
7cea05dc | 2420 | int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
0f113f3e | 2421 | { |
e2b420fd | 2422 | EVP_PKEY *pkdh = NULL; |
10bf4fc2 | 2423 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
0f113f3e | 2424 | unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL; |
348240c6 | 2425 | size_t encodedlen = 0; |
0f113f3e | 2426 | int curve_id = 0; |
d02b48c6 | 2427 | #endif |
555cbb32 | 2428 | const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3.tmp.sigalg; |
f63a17d6 | 2429 | int i; |
0f113f3e | 2430 | unsigned long type; |
18428097 | 2431 | BIGNUM *r[4]; |
bfb0641f | 2432 | EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); |
fe3066ee | 2433 | EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; |
c13d2a5b | 2434 | size_t paramlen, paramoffset; |
18428097 | 2435 | int freer = 0, ret = 0; |
c13d2a5b | 2436 | |
5923ad4b | 2437 | if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, ¶moffset)) { |
c48ffbcc | 2438 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
f63a17d6 | 2439 | goto err; |
c13d2a5b | 2440 | } |
0f113f3e | 2441 | |
6e59a892 | 2442 | if (md_ctx == NULL) { |
c48ffbcc | 2443 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
f63a17d6 | 2444 | goto err; |
6e59a892 | 2445 | } |
0f113f3e | 2446 | |
555cbb32 | 2447 | type = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; |
e27f234a | 2448 | |
e27f234a | 2449 | r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL; |
85269210 | 2450 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK |
e27f234a MC |
2451 | /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */ |
2452 | if (type & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) { | |
2453 | } else | |
85269210 | 2454 | #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ |
e27f234a | 2455 | if (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) { |
94d61512 | 2456 | CERT *cert = s->cert; |
e2b420fd | 2457 | EVP_PKEY *pkdhp = NULL; |
e2b420fd | 2458 | |
e27f234a | 2459 | if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) { |
091f6074 MC |
2460 | pkdh = ssl_get_auto_dh(s); |
2461 | if (pkdh == NULL) { | |
c48ffbcc | 2462 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
f63a17d6 | 2463 | goto err; |
0f113f3e | 2464 | } |
e2b420fd DSH |
2465 | pkdhp = pkdh; |
2466 | } else { | |
2467 | pkdhp = cert->dh_tmp; | |
2468 | } | |
5b64ce89 | 2469 | #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0) |
e2b420fd | 2470 | if ((pkdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) { |
1b2b4755 | 2471 | pkdh = ssl_dh_to_pkey(s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0, 1024)); |
e2b420fd | 2472 | if (pkdh == NULL) { |
c48ffbcc | 2473 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
f63a17d6 | 2474 | goto err; |
e2b420fd DSH |
2475 | } |
2476 | pkdhp = pkdh; | |
2477 | } | |
1b2b4755 | 2478 | #endif |
e2b420fd | 2479 | if (pkdhp == NULL) { |
c48ffbcc | 2480 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); |
f63a17d6 | 2481 | goto err; |
e27f234a MC |
2482 | } |
2483 | if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, | |
e2b420fd | 2484 | EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkdhp), 0, pkdhp)) { |
c48ffbcc | 2485 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL); |
f63a17d6 | 2486 | goto err; |
e27f234a | 2487 | } |
555cbb32 | 2488 | if (s->s3.tmp.pkey != NULL) { |
c48ffbcc | 2489 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
e27f234a MC |
2490 | goto err; |
2491 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2492 | |
0f00ed77 | 2493 | s->s3.tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(s, pkdhp); |
555cbb32 | 2494 | if (s->s3.tmp.pkey == NULL) { |
c48ffbcc | 2495 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
ffaef3f1 | 2496 | goto err; |
e27f234a | 2497 | } |
e2b420fd | 2498 | |
e2b420fd DSH |
2499 | EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh); |
2500 | pkdh = NULL; | |
2501 | ||
18428097 MC |
2502 | /* These BIGNUMs need to be freed when we're finished */ |
2503 | freer = 1; | |
2504 | if (!EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(s->s3.tmp.pkey, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P, | |
2505 | &r[0]) | |
2506 | || !EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(s->s3.tmp.pkey, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G, | |
2507 | &r[1]) | |
2508 | || !EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(s->s3.tmp.pkey, | |
2509 | OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY, &r[2])) { | |
2510 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2511 | goto err; | |
2512 | } | |
e27f234a | 2513 | } else |
10bf4fc2 | 2514 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
e27f234a | 2515 | if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) { |
e27f234a | 2516 | |
555cbb32 | 2517 | if (s->s3.tmp.pkey != NULL) { |
c48ffbcc | 2518 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
e27f234a MC |
2519 | goto err; |
2520 | } | |
2521 | ||
57be4444 | 2522 | /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */ |
8841154a | 2523 | curve_id = tls1_shared_group(s, -2); |
57be4444 | 2524 | if (curve_id == 0) { |
f63a17d6 | 2525 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, |
f63a17d6 | 2526 | SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE); |
e27f234a MC |
2527 | goto err; |
2528 | } | |
555cbb32 | 2529 | s->s3.tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey_group(s, curve_id); |
880d9d86 | 2530 | /* Generate a new key for this curve */ |
555cbb32 | 2531 | if (s->s3.tmp.pkey == NULL) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
2532 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
2533 | goto err; | |
57be4444 DSH |
2534 | } |
2535 | ||
880d9d86 | 2536 | /* Encode the public key. */ |
5ac8fb58 MC |
2537 | encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_encoded_public_key(s->s3.tmp.pkey, |
2538 | &encodedPoint); | |
e27f234a | 2539 | if (encodedlen == 0) { |
c48ffbcc | 2540 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EC_LIB); |
e27f234a MC |
2541 | goto err; |
2542 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2543 | |
e27f234a MC |
2544 | /* |
2545 | * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we | |
2546 | * can set these to NULLs | |
2547 | */ | |
2548 | r[0] = NULL; | |
2549 | r[1] = NULL; | |
2550 | r[2] = NULL; | |
2551 | r[3] = NULL; | |
2552 | } else | |
10bf4fc2 | 2553 | #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ |
edc032b5 | 2554 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP |
e27f234a MC |
2555 | if (type & SSL_kSRP) { |
2556 | if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) || | |
2557 | (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) || | |
2558 | (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 2559 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM); |
e27f234a | 2560 | goto err; |
0f113f3e | 2561 | } |
e27f234a MC |
2562 | r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N; |
2563 | r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g; | |
2564 | r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s; | |
2565 | r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B; | |
2566 | } else | |
2567 | #endif | |
2568 | { | |
c48ffbcc | 2569 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE); |
f63a17d6 | 2570 | goto err; |
e27f234a | 2571 | } |
0f113f3e | 2572 | |
555cbb32 TS |
2573 | if (((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) != 0) |
2574 | || ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) != 0) { | |
f695571e DSH |
2575 | lu = NULL; |
2576 | } else if (lu == NULL) { | |
c48ffbcc | 2577 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
f63a17d6 | 2578 | goto err; |
e27f234a | 2579 | } |
0f113f3e | 2580 | |
85269210 | 2581 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK |
e27f234a | 2582 | if (type & SSL_PSK) { |
c13d2a5b MC |
2583 | size_t len = (s->cert->psk_identity_hint == NULL) |
2584 | ? 0 : strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint); | |
2585 | ||
2586 | /* | |
2587 | * It should not happen that len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN - we already | |
2588 | * checked this when we set the identity hint - but just in case | |
2589 | */ | |
2590 | if (len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN | |
7cea05dc | 2591 | || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->cert->psk_identity_hint, |
c13d2a5b | 2592 | len)) { |
c48ffbcc | 2593 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
f63a17d6 | 2594 | goto err; |
85269210 | 2595 | } |
e27f234a | 2596 | } |
85269210 DSH |
2597 | #endif |
2598 | ||
e27f234a | 2599 | for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) { |
c13d2a5b MC |
2600 | unsigned char *binval; |
2601 | int res; | |
2602 | ||
edc032b5 | 2603 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP |
e27f234a | 2604 | if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) { |
7cea05dc | 2605 | res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt); |
e27f234a | 2606 | } else |
78a01b3f | 2607 | #endif |
7cea05dc | 2608 | res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt); |
c13d2a5b MC |
2609 | |
2610 | if (!res) { | |
c48ffbcc | 2611 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
f63a17d6 | 2612 | goto err; |
c13d2a5b MC |
2613 | } |
2614 | ||
a230b26e | 2615 | /*- |
78a01b3f | 2616 | * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS |
2617 | * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length | |
2618 | * as the prime | |
2619 | */ | |
2620 | if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK))) { | |
c13d2a5b | 2621 | size_t len = BN_num_bytes(r[0]) - BN_num_bytes(r[2]); |
ff819477 | 2622 | |
c13d2a5b | 2623 | if (len > 0) { |
7cea05dc | 2624 | if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &binval)) { |
c48ffbcc | 2625 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
f63a17d6 | 2626 | goto err; |
c13d2a5b MC |
2627 | } |
2628 | memset(binval, 0, len); | |
78a01b3f | 2629 | } |
c13d2a5b | 2630 | } |
18428097 | 2631 | |
7cea05dc MC |
2632 | if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, BN_num_bytes(r[i]), &binval) |
2633 | || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 2634 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
f63a17d6 | 2635 | goto err; |
c13d2a5b MC |
2636 | } |
2637 | ||
2638 | BN_bn2bin(r[i], binval); | |
e27f234a | 2639 | } |
d02b48c6 | 2640 | |
10bf4fc2 | 2641 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
e27f234a MC |
2642 | if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) { |
2643 | /* | |
c13d2a5b MC |
2644 | * We only support named (not generic) curves. In this situation, the |
2645 | * ServerKeyExchange message has: [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] | |
2646 | * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by the actual encoded | |
2647 | * point itself | |
e27f234a | 2648 | */ |
7cea05dc MC |
2649 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE) |
2650 | || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) | |
2651 | || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, curve_id) | |
2652 | || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encodedlen)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 2653 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
f63a17d6 | 2654 | goto err; |
c13d2a5b | 2655 | } |
e27f234a MC |
2656 | OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); |
2657 | encodedPoint = NULL; | |
e27f234a | 2658 | } |
ea262260 BM |
2659 | #endif |
2660 | ||
e27f234a | 2661 | /* not anonymous */ |
f695571e | 2662 | if (lu != NULL) { |
555cbb32 | 2663 | EVP_PKEY *pkey = s->s3.tmp.cert->privatekey; |
72ceb6a6 DSH |
2664 | const EVP_MD *md; |
2665 | unsigned char *sigbytes1, *sigbytes2, *tbs; | |
bddbfae1 | 2666 | size_t siglen = 0, tbslen; |
f695571e | 2667 | |
c8f6c28a | 2668 | if (pkey == NULL || !tls1_lookup_md(s->ctx, lu, &md)) { |
f695571e | 2669 | /* Should never happen */ |
c48ffbcc | 2670 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
f63a17d6 | 2671 | goto err; |
f695571e | 2672 | } |
f695571e DSH |
2673 | /* Get length of the parameters we have written above */ |
2674 | if (!WPACKET_get_length(pkt, ¶mlen)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 2675 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
f63a17d6 | 2676 | goto err; |
f695571e DSH |
2677 | } |
2678 | /* send signature algorithm */ | |
f63a17d6 | 2679 | if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg)) { |
c48ffbcc | 2680 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
f63a17d6 MC |
2681 | goto err; |
2682 | } | |
bddbfae1 | 2683 | |
d8652be0 MC |
2684 | if (EVP_DigestSignInit_ex(md_ctx, &pctx, |
2685 | md == NULL ? NULL : EVP_MD_name(md), | |
2686 | s->ctx->libctx, s->ctx->propq, pkey) <= 0) { | |
c48ffbcc | 2687 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
f63a17d6 | 2688 | goto err; |
f695571e DSH |
2689 | } |
2690 | if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) { | |
2691 | if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0 | |
2692 | || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) { | |
c48ffbcc | 2693 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
f63a17d6 | 2694 | goto err; |
0f113f3e | 2695 | } |
f695571e | 2696 | } |
72ceb6a6 DSH |
2697 | tbslen = construct_key_exchange_tbs(s, &tbs, |
2698 | s->init_buf->data + paramoffset, | |
2699 | paramlen); | |
2700 | if (tbslen == 0) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2701 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
2702 | goto err; | |
72ceb6a6 | 2703 | } |
bddbfae1 MC |
2704 | |
2705 | if (EVP_DigestSign(md_ctx, NULL, &siglen, tbs, tbslen) <=0 | |
2706 | || !WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes1) | |
2707 | || EVP_DigestSign(md_ctx, sigbytes1, &siglen, tbs, tbslen) <= 0 | |
2708 | || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes2) | |
2709 | || sigbytes1 != sigbytes2) { | |
2710 | OPENSSL_free(tbs); | |
c48ffbcc | 2711 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
f63a17d6 | 2712 | goto err; |
77d514c5 | 2713 | } |
bddbfae1 | 2714 | OPENSSL_free(tbs); |
0f113f3e MC |
2715 | } |
2716 | ||
18428097 | 2717 | ret = 1; |
0f113f3e | 2718 | err: |
e2b420fd | 2719 | EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh); |
556efe79 | 2720 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
b548a1f1 | 2721 | OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); |
ea262260 | 2722 | #endif |
bfb0641f | 2723 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); |
18428097 MC |
2724 | if (freer) { |
2725 | BN_free(r[0]); | |
2726 | BN_free(r[1]); | |
2727 | BN_free(r[2]); | |
2728 | BN_free(r[3]); | |
2729 | } | |
2730 | return ret; | |
0f113f3e | 2731 | } |
d02b48c6 | 2732 | |
7cea05dc | 2733 | int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
0f113f3e | 2734 | { |
03f44b97 | 2735 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
9d75dce3 TS |
2736 | /* Send random context when doing post-handshake auth */ |
2737 | if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) { | |
2738 | OPENSSL_free(s->pha_context); | |
2739 | s->pha_context_len = 32; | |
2740 | if ((s->pha_context = OPENSSL_malloc(s->pha_context_len)) == NULL | |
8f21260b MC |
2741 | || RAND_bytes_ex(s->ctx->libctx, s->pha_context, |
2742 | s->pha_context_len) <= 0 | |
9d75dce3 | 2743 | || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len)) { |
c48ffbcc | 2744 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
9d75dce3 TS |
2745 | return 0; |
2746 | } | |
2747 | /* reset the handshake hash back to just after the ClientFinished */ | |
2748 | if (!tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) { | |
2749 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
2750 | return 0; | |
2751 | } | |
2752 | } else { | |
2753 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 2754 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
9d75dce3 TS |
2755 | return 0; |
2756 | } | |
03f44b97 | 2757 | } |
32f66107 | 2758 | |
fe874d27 MC |
2759 | if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, |
2760 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, NULL, | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2761 | 0)) { |
2762 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
2763 | return 0; | |
03f44b97 | 2764 | } |
32f66107 DSH |
2765 | goto done; |
2766 | } | |
2767 | ||
2768 | /* get the list of acceptable cert types */ | |
2769 | if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt) | |
2770 | || !ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 2771 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
f63a17d6 | 2772 | return 0; |
28ff8ef3 | 2773 | } |
0f113f3e | 2774 | |
e27f234a | 2775 | if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { |
98c792d1 | 2776 | const uint16_t *psigs; |
a9669ddc | 2777 | size_t nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &psigs); |
703bcee0 | 2778 | |
7cea05dc | 2779 | if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) |
8f12296e | 2780 | || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH) |
7cea05dc MC |
2781 | || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, psigs, nl) |
2782 | || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 2783 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
f63a17d6 | 2784 | return 0; |
28ff8ef3 | 2785 | } |
e27f234a | 2786 | } |
0f113f3e | 2787 | |
98732979 | 2788 | if (!construct_ca_names(s, get_ca_names(s), pkt)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
2789 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
2790 | return 0; | |
28ff8ef3 | 2791 | } |
e27f234a | 2792 | |
32f66107 | 2793 | done: |
9d75dce3 | 2794 | s->certreqs_sent++; |
555cbb32 | 2795 | s->s3.tmp.cert_request = 1; |
e27f234a | 2796 | return 1; |
0f113f3e | 2797 | } |
d02b48c6 | 2798 | |
f63a17d6 | 2799 | static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
e27f234a | 2800 | { |
85269210 | 2801 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK |
0907d710 MC |
2802 | unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN]; |
2803 | size_t psklen; | |
2804 | PACKET psk_identity; | |
efcdbcbe | 2805 | |
0907d710 | 2806 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity)) { |
c48ffbcc | 2807 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
0907d710 MC |
2808 | return 0; |
2809 | } | |
2810 | if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { | |
c48ffbcc | 2811 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); |
0907d710 MC |
2812 | return 0; |
2813 | } | |
2814 | if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) { | |
c48ffbcc | 2815 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB); |
0907d710 MC |
2816 | return 0; |
2817 | } | |
85269210 | 2818 | |
0907d710 | 2819 | if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity)) { |
c48ffbcc | 2820 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
0907d710 MC |
2821 | return 0; |
2822 | } | |
85269210 | 2823 | |
0907d710 | 2824 | psklen = s->psk_server_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity, |
a230b26e | 2825 | psk, sizeof(psk)); |
85269210 | 2826 | |
0907d710 | 2827 | if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) { |
c48ffbcc | 2828 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
0907d710 MC |
2829 | return 0; |
2830 | } else if (psklen == 0) { | |
2831 | /* | |
2832 | * PSK related to the given identity not found | |
2833 | */ | |
c48ffbcc | 2834 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY, SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND); |
0907d710 MC |
2835 | return 0; |
2836 | } | |
85269210 | 2837 | |
555cbb32 TS |
2838 | OPENSSL_free(s->s3.tmp.psk); |
2839 | s->s3.tmp.psk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen); | |
0907d710 | 2840 | OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen); |
85269210 | 2841 | |
555cbb32 | 2842 | if (s->s3.tmp.psk == NULL) { |
c48ffbcc | 2843 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
0907d710 | 2844 | return 0; |
85269210 | 2845 | } |
0907d710 | 2846 | |
555cbb32 | 2847 | s->s3.tmp.psklen = psklen; |
0907d710 MC |
2848 | |
2849 | return 1; | |
2850 | #else | |
2851 | /* Should never happen */ | |
c48ffbcc | 2852 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
0907d710 | 2853 | return 0; |
85269210 | 2854 | #endif |
0907d710 MC |
2855 | } |
2856 | ||
f63a17d6 | 2857 | static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
0907d710 | 2858 | { |
e7db9680 | 2859 | size_t outlen; |
0907d710 | 2860 | PACKET enc_premaster; |
e7db9680 | 2861 | EVP_PKEY *rsa = NULL; |
0907d710 MC |
2862 | unsigned char *rsa_decrypt = NULL; |
2863 | int ret = 0; | |
e7db9680 MC |
2864 | EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL; |
2865 | OSSL_PARAM params[3], *p = params; | |
0907d710 | 2866 | |
e7db9680 | 2867 | rsa = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA].privatekey; |
0907d710 | 2868 | if (rsa == NULL) { |
c48ffbcc | 2869 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE); |
0907d710 MC |
2870 | return 0; |
2871 | } | |
2872 | ||
2873 | /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */ | |
2874 | if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) { | |
2875 | enc_premaster = *pkt; | |
2876 | } else { | |
2877 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &enc_premaster) | |
2878 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { | |
c48ffbcc | 2879 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
0907d710 | 2880 | return 0; |
0f113f3e | 2881 | } |
0907d710 | 2882 | } |
0f113f3e | 2883 | |
e7db9680 MC |
2884 | outlen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH; |
2885 | rsa_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(outlen); | |
0907d710 | 2886 | if (rsa_decrypt == NULL) { |
c48ffbcc | 2887 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
0907d710 MC |
2888 | return 0; |
2889 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2890 | |
0f00ed77 | 2891 | ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(s->ctx->libctx, rsa, s->ctx->propq); |
e7db9680 | 2892 | if (ctx == NULL) { |
c48ffbcc | 2893 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
0907d710 | 2894 | goto err; |
f63a17d6 | 2895 | } |
0f113f3e | 2896 | |
0907d710 | 2897 | /* |
e7db9680 MC |
2898 | * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of |
2899 | * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246, | |
2900 | * section 7.4.7.1). We use the special padding type | |
2901 | * RSA_PKCS1_WITH_TLS_PADDING to do that. It will automaticaly decrypt the | |
2902 | * RSA, check the padding and check that the client version is as expected | |
2903 | * in the premaster secret. If any of that fails then the function appears | |
2904 | * to return successfully but with a random result. The call below could | |
2905 | * still fail if the input is publicly invalid. | |
2906 | * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1 | |
0907d710 | 2907 | */ |
e7db9680 MC |
2908 | if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(ctx) <= 0 |
2909 | || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx, RSA_PKCS1_WITH_TLS_PADDING) <= 0) { | |
c48ffbcc | 2910 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); |
0907d710 | 2911 | goto err; |
f63a17d6 | 2912 | } |
20ca916d | 2913 | |
e7db9680 MC |
2914 | *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_CLIENT_VERSION, |
2915 | (unsigned int *)&s->client_version); | |
2916 | if ((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) != 0) | |
2917 | *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint( | |
2918 | OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_NEGOTIATED_VERSION, | |
2919 | (unsigned int *)&s->version); | |
2920 | *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end(); | |
5b8fa431 | 2921 | |
e7db9680 MC |
2922 | if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(ctx, params) |
2923 | || EVP_PKEY_decrypt(ctx, rsa_decrypt, &outlen, | |
2924 | PACKET_data(&enc_premaster), | |
2925 | PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster)) <= 0) { | |
c48ffbcc | 2926 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); |
0907d710 MC |
2927 | goto err; |
2928 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2929 | |
0907d710 | 2930 | /* |
e7db9680 MC |
2931 | * This test should never fail (otherwise we should have failed above) but |
2932 | * we double check anyway. | |
0907d710 | 2933 | */ |
e7db9680 MC |
2934 | if (outlen != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) { |
2935 | OPENSSL_cleanse(rsa_decrypt, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH); | |
c48ffbcc | 2936 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); |
e7db9680 | 2937 | goto err; |
0907d710 | 2938 | } |
0f113f3e | 2939 | |
e7db9680 MC |
2940 | /* Also cleanses rsa_decrypt (on success or failure) */ |
2941 | if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, rsa_decrypt, | |
2942 | SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH, 0)) { | |
f63a17d6 | 2943 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
0907d710 MC |
2944 | goto err; |
2945 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2946 | |
0907d710 MC |
2947 | ret = 1; |
2948 | err: | |
2949 | OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt); | |
e7db9680 | 2950 | EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx); |
0907d710 | 2951 | return ret; |
0907d710 MC |
2952 | } |
2953 | ||
f63a17d6 | 2954 | static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
642360f9 | 2955 | { |
642360f9 | 2956 | EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL; |
642360f9 | 2957 | unsigned int i; |
642360f9 MC |
2958 | const unsigned char *data; |
2959 | EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL; | |
2960 | int ret = 0; | |
2961 | ||
31a7d80d | 2962 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != i) { |
c48ffbcc | 2963 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); |
642360f9 MC |
2964 | goto err; |
2965 | } | |
555cbb32 | 2966 | skey = s->s3.tmp.pkey; |
642360f9 | 2967 | if (skey == NULL) { |
c48ffbcc | 2968 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); |
642360f9 MC |
2969 | goto err; |
2970 | } | |
2971 | ||
2972 | if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) { | |
c48ffbcc | 2973 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); |
642360f9 MC |
2974 | goto err; |
2975 | } | |
2976 | if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) { | |
2977 | /* We already checked we have enough data */ | |
c48ffbcc | 2978 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
642360f9 MC |
2979 | goto err; |
2980 | } | |
2981 | ckey = EVP_PKEY_new(); | |
2982 | if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) == 0) { | |
c48ffbcc | 2983 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_COPY_PARAMETERS_FAILED); |
642360f9 MC |
2984 | goto err; |
2985 | } | |
b6ff436f | 2986 | |
936d5657 | 2987 | if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_encoded_public_key(ckey, data, i)) { |
c48ffbcc | 2988 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
642360f9 MC |
2989 | goto err; |
2990 | } | |
2991 | ||
0f1e51ea | 2992 | if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) { |
f63a17d6 | 2993 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
642360f9 MC |
2994 | goto err; |
2995 | } | |
2996 | ||
2997 | ret = 1; | |
555cbb32 TS |
2998 | EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3.tmp.pkey); |
2999 | s->s3.tmp.pkey = NULL; | |
642360f9 MC |
3000 | err: |
3001 | EVP_PKEY_free(ckey); | |
3002 | return ret; | |
642360f9 MC |
3003 | } |
3004 | ||
f63a17d6 | 3005 | static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
19ed1ec1 MC |
3006 | { |
3007 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC | |
555cbb32 | 3008 | EVP_PKEY *skey = s->s3.tmp.pkey; |
19ed1ec1 MC |
3009 | EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL; |
3010 | int ret = 0; | |
3011 | ||
3012 | if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) { | |
3013 | /* We don't support ECDH client auth */ | |
c48ffbcc | 3014 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY); |
19ed1ec1 MC |
3015 | goto err; |
3016 | } else { | |
3017 | unsigned int i; | |
3018 | const unsigned char *data; | |
3019 | ||
3020 | /* | |
3021 | * Get client's public key from encoded point in the | |
3022 | * ClientKeyExchange message. | |
3023 | */ | |
3024 | ||
3025 | /* Get encoded point length */ | |
fb933982 DSH |
3026 | if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &i) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i) |
3027 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { | |
c48ffbcc | 3028 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
19ed1ec1 MC |
3029 | goto err; |
3030 | } | |
61bef9bd | 3031 | if (skey == NULL) { |
c48ffbcc | 3032 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY); |
61bef9bd MA |
3033 | goto err; |
3034 | } | |
3035 | ||
19ed1ec1 MC |
3036 | ckey = EVP_PKEY_new(); |
3037 | if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) <= 0) { | |
c48ffbcc | 3038 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_COPY_PARAMETERS_FAILED); |
19ed1ec1 MC |
3039 | goto err; |
3040 | } | |
afce590b | 3041 | |
5ac8fb58 | 3042 | if (EVP_PKEY_set1_encoded_public_key(ckey, data, i) <= 0) { |
c48ffbcc | 3043 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EC_LIB); |
19ed1ec1 MC |
3044 | goto err; |
3045 | } | |
3046 | } | |
3047 | ||
0f1e51ea | 3048 | if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) { |
f63a17d6 | 3049 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
19ed1ec1 MC |
3050 | goto err; |
3051 | } | |
3052 | ||
3053 | ret = 1; | |
555cbb32 TS |
3054 | EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3.tmp.pkey); |
3055 | s->s3.tmp.pkey = NULL; | |
19ed1ec1 MC |
3056 | err: |
3057 | EVP_PKEY_free(ckey); | |
3058 | ||
3059 | return ret; | |
3060 | #else | |
3061 | /* Should never happen */ | |
c48ffbcc | 3062 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
19ed1ec1 MC |
3063 | return 0; |
3064 | #endif | |
3065 | } | |
3066 | ||
f63a17d6 | 3067 | static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
c437eef6 MC |
3068 | { |
3069 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP | |
3070 | unsigned int i; | |
3071 | const unsigned char *data; | |
3072 | ||
3073 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i) | |
a230b26e | 3074 | || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) { |
c48ffbcc | 3075 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH); |
c437eef6 MC |
3076 | return 0; |
3077 | } | |
3078 | if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL)) == NULL) { | |
c48ffbcc | 3079 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_BN_LIB); |
c437eef6 MC |
3080 | return 0; |
3081 | } | |
a230b26e | 3082 | if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) { |
c48ffbcc | 3083 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS); |
c437eef6 MC |
3084 | return 0; |
3085 | } | |
3086 | OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username); | |
3087 | s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login); | |
3088 | if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) { | |
c48ffbcc | 3089 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
c437eef6 MC |
3090 | return 0; |
3091 | } | |
3092 | ||
3093 | if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s)) { | |
f63a17d6 | 3094 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
c437eef6 MC |
3095 | return 0; |
3096 | } | |
3097 | ||
3098 | return 1; | |
3099 | #else | |
3100 | /* Should never happen */ | |
c48ffbcc | 3101 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
c437eef6 MC |
3102 | return 0; |
3103 | #endif | |
3104 | } | |
3105 | ||
f63a17d6 | 3106 | static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
c437eef6 MC |
3107 | { |
3108 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST | |
3109 | EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx; | |
3110 | EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL; | |
3111 | unsigned char premaster_secret[32]; | |
3112 | const unsigned char *start; | |
3113 | size_t outlen = 32, inlen; | |
3114 | unsigned long alg_a; | |
4e3ee452 DB |
3115 | GOST_KX_MESSAGE *pKX = NULL; |
3116 | const unsigned char *ptr; | |
c437eef6 MC |
3117 | int ret = 0; |
3118 | ||
3119 | /* Get our certificate private key */ | |
555cbb32 | 3120 | alg_a = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; |
c437eef6 MC |
3121 | if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST12) { |
3122 | /* | |
3123 | * New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too | |
3124 | */ | |
3125 | pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey; | |
3126 | if (pk == NULL) { | |
3127 | pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].privatekey; | |
3128 | } | |
3129 | if (pk == NULL) { | |
3130 | pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey; | |
3131 | } | |
3132 | } else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) { | |
3133 | pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey; | |
3134 | } | |
3135 | ||
0f00ed77 | 3136 | pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(s->ctx->libctx, pk, s->ctx->propq); |
c437eef6 | 3137 | if (pkey_ctx == NULL) { |
c48ffbcc | 3138 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
c437eef6 MC |
3139 | return 0; |
3140 | } | |
3141 | if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) { | |
c48ffbcc | 3142 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
c437eef6 MC |
3143 | return 0; |
3144 | } | |
3145 | /* | |
3146 | * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe | |
3147 | * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from | |
3148 | * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a | |
3149 | * client certificate for authorization only. | |
3150 | */ | |
3151 | client_pub_pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer); | |
3152 | if (client_pub_pkey) { | |
3153 | if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0) | |
3154 | ERR_clear_error(); | |
3155 | } | |
4e3ee452 DB |
3156 | |
3157 | ptr = PACKET_data(pkt); | |
3158 | /* Some implementations provide extra data in the opaqueBlob | |
3159 | * We have nothing to do with this blob so we just skip it */ | |
3160 | pKX = d2i_GOST_KX_MESSAGE(NULL, &ptr, PACKET_remaining(pkt)); | |
3161 | if (pKX == NULL | |
3162 | || pKX->kxBlob == NULL | |
3163 | || ASN1_TYPE_get(pKX->kxBlob) != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) { | |
c48ffbcc | 3164 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); |
4e3ee452 | 3165 | goto err; |
c437eef6 | 3166 | } |
4e3ee452 DB |
3167 | |
3168 | if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, ptr - PACKET_data(pkt))) { | |
c48ffbcc | 3169 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); |
803cc8c7 | 3170 | goto err; |
4e3ee452 | 3171 | } |
803cc8c7 | 3172 | |
4e3ee452 | 3173 | if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { |
c48ffbcc | 3174 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); |
c437eef6 MC |
3175 | goto err; |
3176 | } | |
4e3ee452 DB |
3177 | |
3178 | inlen = pKX->kxBlob->value.sequence->length; | |
3179 | start = pKX->kxBlob->value.sequence->data; | |
803cc8c7 | 3180 | |
f63a17d6 MC |
3181 | if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, |
3182 | inlen) <= 0) { | |
c48ffbcc | 3183 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); |
c437eef6 MC |
3184 | goto err; |
3185 | } | |
3186 | /* Generate master secret */ | |
3187 | if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret, | |
3188 | sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) { | |
f63a17d6 | 3189 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
c437eef6 MC |
3190 | goto err; |
3191 | } | |
3192 | /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */ | |
f63a17d6 MC |
3193 | if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, |
3194 | NULL) > 0) | |
c437eef6 MC |
3195 | s->statem.no_cert_verify = 1; |
3196 | ||
3197 | ret = 1; | |
3198 | err: | |
3199 | EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); | |
4e3ee452 | 3200 | GOST_KX_MESSAGE_free(pKX); |
c437eef6 MC |
3201 | return ret; |
3202 | #else | |
3203 | /* Should never happen */ | |
c48ffbcc | 3204 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
c437eef6 MC |
3205 | return 0; |
3206 | #endif | |
3207 | } | |
3208 | ||
5a5530a2 DB |
3209 | static int tls_process_cke_gost18(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
3210 | { | |
3211 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST | |
3212 | unsigned char rnd_dgst[32]; | |
3213 | EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL; | |
3214 | EVP_PKEY *pk = NULL; | |
3215 | unsigned char premaster_secret[32]; | |
3216 | const unsigned char *start = NULL; | |
3217 | size_t outlen = 32, inlen = 0; | |
3218 | int ret = 0; | |
3219 | int cipher_nid = gost18_cke_cipher_nid(s); | |
3220 | ||
3221 | if (cipher_nid == NID_undef) { | |
c48ffbcc | 3222 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
5a5530a2 DB |
3223 | return 0; |
3224 | } | |
3225 | ||
3226 | if (gost_ukm(s, rnd_dgst) <= 0) { | |
c48ffbcc | 3227 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
5a5530a2 DB |
3228 | goto err; |
3229 | } | |
3230 | ||
3231 | /* Get our certificate private key */ | |
3232 | pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey != NULL ? | |
3233 | s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey : | |
3234 | s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].privatekey; | |
3235 | if (pk == NULL) { | |
c48ffbcc | 3236 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE); |
5a5530a2 DB |
3237 | goto err; |
3238 | } | |
3239 | ||
3240 | pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(s->ctx->libctx, pk, s->ctx->propq); | |
3241 | if (pkey_ctx == NULL) { | |
c48ffbcc | 3242 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
5a5530a2 DB |
3243 | goto err; |
3244 | } | |
3245 | if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) { | |
c48ffbcc | 3246 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
5a5530a2 DB |
3247 | goto err; |
3248 | } | |
3249 | ||
3250 | /* Reuse EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, make choice in engine code depending on size */ | |
3251 | if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_DECRYPT, | |
3252 | EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 32, rnd_dgst) < 0) { | |
c48ffbcc | 3253 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG); |
5a5530a2 DB |
3254 | goto err; |
3255 | } | |
3256 | ||
3257 | if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_DECRYPT, | |
3258 | EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CIPHER, cipher_nid, NULL) < 0) { | |
c48ffbcc | 3259 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG); |
5a5530a2 DB |
3260 | goto err; |
3261 | } | |
3262 | inlen = PACKET_remaining(pkt); | |
3263 | start = PACKET_data(pkt); | |
3264 | ||
3265 | if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) { | |
c48ffbcc | 3266 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); |
5a5530a2 DB |
3267 | goto err; |
3268 | } | |
3269 | /* Generate master secret */ | |
3270 | if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret, | |
3271 | sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) { | |
3272 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
3273 | goto err; | |
3274 | } | |
3275 | ret = 1; | |
3276 | ||
3277 | err: | |
3278 | EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); | |
3279 | return ret; | |
3280 | #else | |
3281 | /* Should never happen */ | |
c48ffbcc | 3282 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
5a5530a2 DB |
3283 | return 0; |
3284 | #endif | |
3285 | } | |
3286 | ||
0907d710 MC |
3287 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
3288 | { | |
0907d710 MC |
3289 | unsigned long alg_k; |
3290 | ||
555cbb32 | 3291 | alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; |
0907d710 MC |
3292 | |
3293 | /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */ | |
f63a17d6 MC |
3294 | if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt)) { |
3295 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
0907d710 | 3296 | goto err; |
f63a17d6 | 3297 | } |
0907d710 MC |
3298 | |
3299 | if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) { | |
3300 | /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */ | |
3301 | if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { | |
c48ffbcc | 3302 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
9059eb71 | 3303 | goto err; |
0907d710 MC |
3304 | } |
3305 | /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */ | |
3306 | if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, NULL, 0, 0)) { | |
f63a17d6 | 3307 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
9059eb71 | 3308 | goto err; |
69f68237 | 3309 | } |
0907d710 | 3310 | } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
3311 | if (!tls_process_cke_rsa(s, pkt)) { |
3312 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
0907d710 | 3313 | goto err; |
f63a17d6 | 3314 | } |
642360f9 | 3315 | } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
3316 | if (!tls_process_cke_dhe(s, pkt)) { |
3317 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
0f113f3e | 3318 | goto err; |
f63a17d6 | 3319 | } |
19ed1ec1 | 3320 | } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
3321 | if (!tls_process_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt)) { |
3322 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
19ed1ec1 | 3323 | goto err; |
f63a17d6 | 3324 | } |
c437eef6 | 3325 | } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
3326 | if (!tls_process_cke_srp(s, pkt)) { |
3327 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
0f113f3e | 3328 | goto err; |
f63a17d6 | 3329 | } |
c437eef6 | 3330 | } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
3331 | if (!tls_process_cke_gost(s, pkt)) { |
3332 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
0f113f3e | 3333 | goto err; |
f63a17d6 | 3334 | } |
5a5530a2 DB |
3335 | } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST18) { |
3336 | if (!tls_process_cke_gost18(s, pkt)) { | |
3337 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
3338 | goto err; | |
3339 | } | |
c437eef6 | 3340 | } else { |
c48ffbcc | 3341 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE); |
9059eb71 | 3342 | goto err; |
0f113f3e MC |
3343 | } |
3344 | ||
e27f234a | 3345 | return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; |
0f113f3e | 3346 | err: |
85269210 | 3347 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK |
555cbb32 TS |
3348 | OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3.tmp.psk, s->s3.tmp.psklen); |
3349 | s->s3.tmp.psk = NULL; | |
58964a49 | 3350 | #endif |
e27f234a | 3351 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
0f113f3e | 3352 | } |
d02b48c6 | 3353 | |
be3583fa | 3354 | WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) |
94836de2 | 3355 | { |
94836de2 | 3356 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP |
c130dd8e MC |
3357 | if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) { |
3358 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
3359 | unsigned char sctpauthkey[64]; | |
3360 | char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)]; | |
09d62b33 | 3361 | size_t labellen; |
c130dd8e MC |
3362 | /* |
3363 | * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP | |
3364 | * used. | |
3365 | */ | |
141eb8c6 MC |
3366 | memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL, |
3367 | sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)); | |
c130dd8e | 3368 | |
09d62b33 MT |
3369 | /* Don't include the terminating zero. */ |
3370 | labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1; | |
3371 | if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG) | |
3372 | labellen += 1; | |
3373 | ||
c130dd8e | 3374 | if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey, |
a230b26e | 3375 | sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer, |
09d62b33 | 3376 | labellen, NULL, 0, |
a230b26e | 3377 | 0) <= 0) { |
c48ffbcc | 3378 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
0fe2a0af | 3379 | return WORK_ERROR; |
c130dd8e | 3380 | } |
94836de2 | 3381 | |
c130dd8e MC |
3382 | BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY, |
3383 | sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey); | |
94836de2 | 3384 | } |
94836de2 MC |
3385 | } |
3386 | #endif | |
3387 | ||
149c2ef5 | 3388 | if (s->statem.no_cert_verify || !s->session->peer) { |
a230b26e EK |
3389 | /* |
3390 | * No certificate verify or no peer certificate so we no longer need | |
3391 | * the handshake_buffer | |
149c2ef5 MC |
3392 | */ |
3393 | if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { | |
f63a17d6 | 3394 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
149c2ef5 MC |
3395 | return WORK_ERROR; |
3396 | } | |
94836de2 | 3397 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; |
28f4580c | 3398 | } else { |
555cbb32 | 3399 | if (!s->s3.handshake_buffer) { |
c48ffbcc | 3400 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
94836de2 MC |
3401 | return WORK_ERROR; |
3402 | } | |
3403 | /* | |
3404 | * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support | |
3405 | * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op | |
3406 | */ | |
3407 | if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) { | |
f63a17d6 | 3408 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
94836de2 MC |
3409 | return WORK_ERROR; |
3410 | } | |
94836de2 MC |
3411 | } |
3412 | ||
3413 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; | |
3414 | } | |
3415 | ||
be3583fa | 3416 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
e27f234a | 3417 | { |
f63a17d6 | 3418 | int i; |
eb5fd03b | 3419 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
e27f234a | 3420 | X509 *x = NULL; |
9d75dce3 | 3421 | unsigned long l; |
b6981744 | 3422 | const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes; |
e27f234a | 3423 | STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL; |
e96e0f8e | 3424 | PACKET spkt, context; |
d805a57b | 3425 | size_t chainidx; |
9d75dce3 | 3426 | SSL_SESSION *new_sess = NULL; |
0f113f3e | 3427 | |
de9e884b MC |
3428 | /* |
3429 | * To get this far we must have read encrypted data from the client. We no | |
3430 | * longer tolerate unencrypted alerts. This value is ignored if less than | |
3431 | * TLSv1.3 | |
3432 | */ | |
3433 | s->statem.enc_read_state = ENC_READ_STATE_VALID; | |
3434 | ||
0f113f3e | 3435 | if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) { |
c48ffbcc | 3436 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
f63a17d6 | 3437 | goto err; |
0f113f3e MC |
3438 | } |
3439 | ||
9d75dce3 TS |
3440 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &context) |
3441 | || (s->pha_context == NULL && PACKET_remaining(&context) != 0) | |
3442 | || (s->pha_context != NULL && | |
3443 | !PACKET_equal(&context, s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len)))) { | |
c48ffbcc | 3444 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_INVALID_CONTEXT); |
9d75dce3 TS |
3445 | goto err; |
3446 | } | |
3447 | ||
3448 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_3(pkt, &spkt) | |
e96e0f8e | 3449 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { |
c48ffbcc | 3450 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
f63a17d6 | 3451 | goto err; |
0f113f3e | 3452 | } |
0bc09ecd | 3453 | |
d805a57b | 3454 | for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0; chainidx++) { |
0bc09ecd | 3455 | if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l) |
a230b26e | 3456 | || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) { |
c48ffbcc | 3457 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
f63a17d6 | 3458 | goto err; |
0f113f3e MC |
3459 | } |
3460 | ||
0bc09ecd | 3461 | certstart = certbytes; |
d8652be0 | 3462 | x = X509_new_ex(s->ctx->libctx, s->ctx->propq); |
0f113f3e | 3463 | if (x == NULL) { |
c48ffbcc | 3464 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
6725682d SL |
3465 | goto err; |
3466 | } | |
3467 | if (d2i_X509(&x, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, l) == NULL) { | |
c48ffbcc | 3468 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); |
f63a17d6 | 3469 | goto err; |
0f113f3e | 3470 | } |
6725682d | 3471 | |
0bc09ecd | 3472 | if (certbytes != (certstart + l)) { |
c48ffbcc | 3473 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
f63a17d6 | 3474 | goto err; |
0f113f3e | 3475 | } |
e96e0f8e MC |
3476 | |
3477 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { | |
3478 | RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL; | |
3479 | PACKET extensions; | |
3480 | ||
3481 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&spkt, &extensions)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 3482 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); |
f63a17d6 | 3483 | goto err; |
e96e0f8e | 3484 | } |
fe874d27 MC |
3485 | if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, |
3486 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts, | |
f63a17d6 | 3487 | NULL, chainidx == 0) |
8e1634ec | 3488 | || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, |
f63a17d6 | 3489 | rawexts, x, chainidx, |
8e1634ec | 3490 | PACKET_remaining(&spkt) == 0)) { |
5ee289ea | 3491 | OPENSSL_free(rawexts); |
f63a17d6 | 3492 | goto err; |
5ee289ea MC |
3493 | } |
3494 | OPENSSL_free(rawexts); | |
e96e0f8e MC |
3495 | } |
3496 | ||
0f113f3e | 3497 | if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) { |
c48ffbcc | 3498 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
f63a17d6 | 3499 | goto err; |
0f113f3e MC |
3500 | } |
3501 | x = NULL; | |
0f113f3e MC |
3502 | } |
3503 | ||
3504 | if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) { | |
3505 | /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */ | |
3506 | if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { | |
f63a17d6 | 3507 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, |
f63a17d6 MC |
3508 | SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED); |
3509 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e MC |
3510 | } |
3511 | /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */ | |
3512 | else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && | |
3513 | (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) { | |
f63a17d6 | 3514 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED, |
f63a17d6 MC |
3515 | SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); |
3516 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e MC |
3517 | } |
3518 | /* No client certificate so digest cached records */ | |
555cbb32 | 3519 | if (s->s3.handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
3520 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
3521 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e MC |
3522 | } |
3523 | } else { | |
3524 | EVP_PKEY *pkey; | |
3525 | i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk); | |
3526 | if (i <= 0) { | |
c6d38183 | 3527 | SSLfatal(s, ssl_x509err2alert(s->verify_result), |
f63a17d6 MC |
3528 | SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED); |
3529 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e MC |
3530 | } |
3531 | if (i > 1) { | |
c48ffbcc | 3532 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, i); |
f63a17d6 | 3533 | goto err; |
0f113f3e | 3534 | } |
8382fd3a | 3535 | pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0)); |
0f113f3e | 3536 | if (pkey == NULL) { |
f63a17d6 | 3537 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, |
f63a17d6 MC |
3538 | SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE); |
3539 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e | 3540 | } |
0f113f3e MC |
3541 | } |
3542 | ||
9d75dce3 TS |
3543 | /* |
3544 | * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise | |
3545 | * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions, | |
3546 | * we replace them with a duplicate. Here, we need to do this every time | |
3547 | * a new certificate is received via post-handshake authentication, as the | |
3548 | * session may have already gone into the session cache. | |
3549 | */ | |
3550 | ||
3551 | if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) { | |
9d75dce3 | 3552 | if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) { |
c48ffbcc | 3553 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
9d75dce3 TS |
3554 | goto err; |
3555 | } | |
3556 | ||
9d75dce3 TS |
3557 | SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); |
3558 | s->session = new_sess; | |
3559 | } | |
3560 | ||
222561fe | 3561 | X509_free(s->session->peer); |
0f113f3e MC |
3562 | s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk); |
3563 | s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result; | |
3564 | ||
c34b0f99 DSH |
3565 | sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->peer_chain, X509_free); |
3566 | s->session->peer_chain = sk; | |
0f1e51ea MC |
3567 | |
3568 | /* | |
3569 | * Freeze the handshake buffer. For <TLS1.3 we do this after the CKE | |
3570 | * message | |
3571 | */ | |
94ed2c67 | 3572 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
3573 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
3574 | goto err; | |
0f1e51ea MC |
3575 | } |
3576 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
3577 | /* |
3578 | * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own | |
d4d78943 | 3579 | * certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c |
0f113f3e | 3580 | */ |
0f113f3e | 3581 | sk = NULL; |
2c5dfdc3 MC |
3582 | |
3583 | /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */ | |
36ff232c MC |
3584 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
3585 | if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash, | |
3586 | sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash), | |
3587 | &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) { | |
3588 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
3589 | goto err; | |
3590 | } | |
3591 | ||
3592 | /* Resend session tickets */ | |
3593 | s->sent_tickets = 0; | |
2c5dfdc3 MC |
3594 | } |
3595 | ||
e27f234a | 3596 | ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; |
66696478 | 3597 | |
f63a17d6 | 3598 | err: |
222561fe RS |
3599 | X509_free(x); |
3600 | sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free); | |
e27f234a | 3601 | return ret; |
0f113f3e | 3602 | } |
d02b48c6 | 3603 | |
7cea05dc | 3604 | int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
e27f234a | 3605 | { |
555cbb32 | 3606 | CERT_PKEY *cpk = s->s3.tmp.cert; |
e27f234a | 3607 | |
a497cf25 | 3608 | if (cpk == NULL) { |
c48ffbcc | 3609 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
e27f234a MC |
3610 | return 0; |
3611 | } | |
3612 | ||
e96e0f8e MC |
3613 | /* |
3614 | * In TLSv1.3 the certificate chain is always preceded by a 0 length context | |
3615 | * for the server Certificate message | |
3616 | */ | |
f63a17d6 | 3617 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) { |
c48ffbcc | 3618 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
f63a17d6 MC |
3619 | return 0; |
3620 | } | |
3621 | if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk)) { | |
3622 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
e27f234a MC |
3623 | return 0; |
3624 | } | |
3625 | ||
3626 | return 1; | |
3627 | } | |
3628 | ||
6a11d5c5 MC |
3629 | static int create_ticket_prequel(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, uint32_t age_add, |
3630 | unsigned char *tick_nonce) | |
3631 | { | |
3632 | /* | |
3633 | * Ticket lifetime hint: For TLSv1.2 this is advisory only and we leave this | |
3634 | * unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity). | |
3635 | * In TLSv1.3 we reset the "time" field above, and always specify the | |
3636 | * timeout. | |
3637 | */ | |
3638 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, | |
3639 | (s->hit && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) | |
3640 | ? 0 : s->session->timeout)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 3641 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
6a11d5c5 MC |
3642 | return 0; |
3643 | } | |
3644 | ||
3645 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { | |
3646 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, age_add) | |
3647 | || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tick_nonce, TICKET_NONCE_SIZE)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 3648 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
6a11d5c5 MC |
3649 | return 0; |
3650 | } | |
3651 | } | |
3652 | ||
3653 | /* Start the sub-packet for the actual ticket data */ | |
3654 | if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 3655 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
6a11d5c5 MC |
3656 | return 0; |
3657 | } | |
3658 | ||
3659 | return 1; | |
3660 | } | |
3661 | ||
3662 | static int construct_stateless_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, uint32_t age_add, | |
3663 | unsigned char *tick_nonce) | |
e27f234a MC |
3664 | { |
3665 | unsigned char *senc = NULL; | |
83ae4661 | 3666 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL; |
a76ce286 | 3667 | SSL_HMAC *hctx = NULL; |
a00d75e1 | 3668 | unsigned char *p, *encdata1, *encdata2, *macdata1, *macdata2; |
e27f234a | 3669 | const unsigned char *const_p; |
a00d75e1 | 3670 | int len, slen_full, slen, lenfinal; |
e27f234a | 3671 | SSL_SESSION *sess; |
a76ce286 | 3672 | size_t hlen; |
222da979 | 3673 | SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx; |
e27f234a | 3674 | unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; |
d139723b | 3675 | unsigned char key_name[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH]; |
6a11d5c5 | 3676 | int iv_len, ok = 0; |
a00d75e1 | 3677 | size_t macoffset, macendoffset; |
df0fed9a | 3678 | |
e27f234a MC |
3679 | /* get session encoding length */ |
3680 | slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL); | |
3681 | /* | |
3682 | * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too | |
3683 | * long | |
3684 | */ | |
3685 | if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) { | |
c48ffbcc | 3686 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
f6370040 | 3687 | goto err; |
e27f234a MC |
3688 | } |
3689 | senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full); | |
a71edf3b | 3690 | if (senc == NULL) { |
c48ffbcc | 3691 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
f6370040 | 3692 | goto err; |
e27f234a | 3693 | } |
0f113f3e | 3694 | |
846ec07d | 3695 | ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); |
a76ce286 | 3696 | hctx = ssl_hmac_new(tctx); |
83ae4661 | 3697 | if (ctx == NULL || hctx == NULL) { |
c48ffbcc | 3698 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
83ae4661 MC |
3699 | goto err; |
3700 | } | |
0f113f3e | 3701 | |
e27f234a | 3702 | p = senc; |
f63a17d6 | 3703 | if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p)) { |
c48ffbcc | 3704 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
e27f234a | 3705 | goto err; |
f63a17d6 | 3706 | } |
687eaf27 | 3707 | |
e27f234a MC |
3708 | /* |
3709 | * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up | |
3710 | */ | |
3711 | const_p = senc; | |
3712 | sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full); | |
f63a17d6 | 3713 | if (sess == NULL) { |
c48ffbcc | 3714 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
e27f234a | 3715 | goto err; |
f63a17d6 | 3716 | } |
0f113f3e | 3717 | |
e27f234a | 3718 | slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL); |
f63a17d6 MC |
3719 | if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { |
3720 | /* shouldn't ever happen */ | |
c48ffbcc | 3721 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
e27f234a MC |
3722 | SSL_SESSION_free(sess); |
3723 | goto err; | |
3724 | } | |
3725 | p = senc; | |
3726 | if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 3727 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
e27f234a MC |
3728 | SSL_SESSION_free(sess); |
3729 | goto err; | |
3730 | } | |
3731 | SSL_SESSION_free(sess); | |
0f113f3e | 3732 | |
e27f234a MC |
3733 | /* |
3734 | * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does | |
3735 | * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx. | |
3736 | */ | |
a76ce286 P |
3737 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0 |
3738 | if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL || tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL) | |
3739 | #else | |
3740 | if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL) | |
3741 | #endif | |
3742 | { | |
3743 | int ret = 0; | |
3744 | ||
3745 | if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL) | |
3746 | ret = tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx, | |
3747 | ssl_hmac_get0_EVP_MAC_CTX(hctx), | |
3748 | 1); | |
3749 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0 | |
3750 | else if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL) | |
3751 | /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */ | |
3752 | ret = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx, | |
3753 | ssl_hmac_get0_HMAC_CTX(hctx), 1); | |
3754 | #endif | |
5c753de6 TS |
3755 | |
3756 | if (ret == 0) { | |
a00d75e1 MC |
3757 | |
3758 | /* Put timeout and length */ | |
7cea05dc | 3759 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, 0) |
4a01c59f | 3760 | || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) { |
c48ffbcc | 3761 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
5c753de6 | 3762 | goto err; |
a00d75e1 | 3763 | } |
5c753de6 TS |
3764 | OPENSSL_free(senc); |
3765 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); | |
a76ce286 | 3766 | ssl_hmac_free(hctx); |
5c753de6 TS |
3767 | return 1; |
3768 | } | |
f63a17d6 | 3769 | if (ret < 0) { |
c48ffbcc | 3770 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED); |
e27f234a | 3771 | goto err; |
f63a17d6 | 3772 | } |
d139723b | 3773 | iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx); |
e27f234a | 3774 | } else { |
6f829f58 MC |
3775 | EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(s->ctx->libctx, "AES-256-CBC", |
3776 | s->ctx->propq); | |
3777 | ||
3778 | if (cipher == NULL) { | |
5a2d0ef3 RL |
3779 | /* Error is already recorded */ |
3780 | SSLfatal_alert(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
6f829f58 MC |
3781 | goto err; |
3782 | } | |
d139723b KR |
3783 | |
3784 | iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher); | |
8f21260b | 3785 | if (RAND_bytes_ex(s->ctx->libctx, iv, iv_len) <= 0 |
f63a17d6 | 3786 | || !EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL, |
4bfb96f2 | 3787 | tctx->ext.secure->tick_aes_key, iv) |
a76ce286 P |
3788 | || !ssl_hmac_init(hctx, tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key, |
3789 | sizeof(tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key), | |
3790 | "SHA256")) { | |
6f829f58 | 3791 | EVP_CIPHER_free(cipher); |
c48ffbcc | 3792 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
4f9fab6b | 3793 | goto err; |
f63a17d6 | 3794 | } |
6f829f58 | 3795 | EVP_CIPHER_free(cipher); |
aff8c126 RS |
3796 | memcpy(key_name, tctx->ext.tick_key_name, |
3797 | sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name)); | |
0f113f3e MC |
3798 | } |
3799 | ||
6a11d5c5 MC |
3800 | if (!create_ticket_prequel(s, pkt, age_add, tick_nonce)) { |
3801 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
3802 | goto err; | |
3803 | } | |
3804 | ||
3805 | if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macoffset) | |
a00d75e1 | 3806 | /* Output key name */ |
7cea05dc | 3807 | || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, key_name, sizeof(key_name)) |
a00d75e1 | 3808 | /* output IV */ |
7cea05dc MC |
3809 | || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, iv, iv_len) |
3810 | || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH, | |
a00d75e1 MC |
3811 | &encdata1) |
3812 | /* Encrypt session data */ | |
3813 | || !EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, encdata1, &len, senc, slen) | |
7cea05dc | 3814 | || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &encdata2) |
a00d75e1 MC |
3815 | || encdata1 != encdata2 |
3816 | || !EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx, encdata1 + len, &lenfinal) | |
7cea05dc | 3817 | || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, lenfinal, &encdata2) |
a00d75e1 MC |
3818 | || encdata1 + len != encdata2 |
3819 | || len + lenfinal > slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH | |
7cea05dc | 3820 | || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macendoffset) |
a76ce286 P |
3821 | || !ssl_hmac_update(hctx, |
3822 | (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + macoffset, | |
3823 | macendoffset - macoffset) | |
7cea05dc | 3824 | || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &macdata1) |
a76ce286 | 3825 | || !ssl_hmac_final(hctx, macdata1, &hlen, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE) |
a00d75e1 | 3826 | || hlen > EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE |
7cea05dc | 3827 | || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hlen, &macdata2) |
6a11d5c5 | 3828 | || macdata1 != macdata2) { |
c48ffbcc | 3829 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
6a11d5c5 MC |
3830 | goto err; |
3831 | } | |
3832 | ||
3833 | /* Close the sub-packet created by create_ticket_prequel() */ | |
3834 | if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 3835 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
e27f234a | 3836 | goto err; |
a00d75e1 | 3837 | } |
6a11d5c5 MC |
3838 | |
3839 | ok = 1; | |
3840 | err: | |
3841 | OPENSSL_free(senc); | |
3842 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); | |
a76ce286 | 3843 | ssl_hmac_free(hctx); |
6a11d5c5 MC |
3844 | return ok; |
3845 | } | |
3846 | ||
6cc0b3c2 MC |
3847 | static int construct_stateful_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, uint32_t age_add, |
3848 | unsigned char *tick_nonce) | |
3849 | { | |
3850 | if (!create_ticket_prequel(s, pkt, age_add, tick_nonce)) { | |
3851 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
3852 | return 0; | |
3853 | } | |
3854 | ||
3855 | if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->session->session_id, | |
3856 | s->session->session_id_length) | |
3857 | || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 3858 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
6cc0b3c2 MC |
3859 | return 0; |
3860 | } | |
3861 | ||
3862 | return 1; | |
3863 | } | |
3864 | ||
6a11d5c5 MC |
3865 | int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
3866 | { | |
3867 | SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx; | |
3868 | unsigned char tick_nonce[TICKET_NONCE_SIZE]; | |
3869 | union { | |
3870 | unsigned char age_add_c[sizeof(uint32_t)]; | |
3871 | uint32_t age_add; | |
3872 | } age_add_u; | |
3873 | ||
3874 | age_add_u.age_add = 0; | |
3875 | ||
3876 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { | |
3877 | size_t i, hashlen; | |
3878 | uint64_t nonce; | |
3879 | static const unsigned char nonce_label[] = "resumption"; | |
3880 | const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s); | |
6a11d5c5 MC |
3881 | int hashleni = EVP_MD_size(md); |
3882 | ||
3883 | /* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */ | |
3884 | if (!ossl_assert(hashleni >= 0)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 3885 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
6a11d5c5 MC |
3886 | goto err; |
3887 | } | |
3888 | hashlen = (size_t)hashleni; | |
3889 | ||
6a11d5c5 MC |
3890 | /* |
3891 | * If we already sent one NewSessionTicket, or we resumed then | |
3892 | * s->session may already be in a cache and so we must not modify it. | |
3893 | * Instead we need to take a copy of it and modify that. | |
3894 | */ | |
3895 | if (s->sent_tickets != 0 || s->hit) { | |
3896 | SSL_SESSION *new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0); | |
3897 | ||
3898 | if (new_sess == NULL) { | |
3899 | /* SSLfatal already called */ | |
3900 | goto err; | |
3901 | } | |
3902 | ||
3903 | SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); | |
3904 | s->session = new_sess; | |
3905 | } | |
3906 | ||
3907 | if (!ssl_generate_session_id(s, s->session)) { | |
3908 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
3909 | goto err; | |
3910 | } | |
8f21260b MC |
3911 | if (RAND_bytes_ex(s->ctx->libctx, age_add_u.age_add_c, |
3912 | sizeof(age_add_u)) <= 0) { | |
c48ffbcc | 3913 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
6a11d5c5 MC |
3914 | goto err; |
3915 | } | |
3916 | s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add_u.age_add; | |
3917 | ||
3918 | nonce = s->next_ticket_nonce; | |
3919 | for (i = TICKET_NONCE_SIZE; i > 0; i--) { | |
3920 | tick_nonce[i - 1] = (unsigned char)(nonce & 0xff); | |
3921 | nonce >>= 8; | |
3922 | } | |
3923 | ||
3924 | if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, s->resumption_master_secret, | |
3925 | nonce_label, | |
3926 | sizeof(nonce_label) - 1, | |
3927 | tick_nonce, | |
3928 | TICKET_NONCE_SIZE, | |
3929 | s->session->master_key, | |
0fb2815b | 3930 | hashlen, 1)) { |
6a11d5c5 MC |
3931 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
3932 | goto err; | |
3933 | } | |
3934 | s->session->master_key_length = hashlen; | |
3935 | ||
3936 | s->session->time = (long)time(NULL); | |
555cbb32 | 3937 | if (s->s3.alpn_selected != NULL) { |
6a11d5c5 MC |
3938 | OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.alpn_selected); |
3939 | s->session->ext.alpn_selected = | |
555cbb32 | 3940 | OPENSSL_memdup(s->s3.alpn_selected, s->s3.alpn_selected_len); |
6a11d5c5 | 3941 | if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) { |
c48ffbcc | 3942 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
6a11d5c5 MC |
3943 | goto err; |
3944 | } | |
555cbb32 | 3945 | s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = s->s3.alpn_selected_len; |
6a11d5c5 MC |
3946 | } |
3947 | s->session->ext.max_early_data = s->max_early_data; | |
3948 | } | |
3949 | ||
3950 | if (tctx->generate_ticket_cb != NULL && | |
3951 | tctx->generate_ticket_cb(s, tctx->ticket_cb_data) == 0) | |
3952 | goto err; | |
3953 | ||
e880d4e5 MC |
3954 | /* |
3955 | * If we are using anti-replay protection then we behave as if | |
3956 | * SSL_OP_NO_TICKET is set - we are caching tickets anyway so there | |
3957 | * is no point in using full stateless tickets. | |
3958 | */ | |
5d263fb7 MC |
3959 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) |
3960 | && ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) != 0 | |
3961 | || (s->max_early_data > 0 | |
3962 | && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ANTI_REPLAY) == 0))) { | |
6cc0b3c2 MC |
3963 | if (!construct_stateful_ticket(s, pkt, age_add_u.age_add, tick_nonce)) { |
3964 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
3965 | goto err; | |
3966 | } | |
3967 | } else if (!construct_stateless_ticket(s, pkt, age_add_u.age_add, | |
3968 | tick_nonce)) { | |
6a11d5c5 MC |
3969 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
3970 | goto err; | |
3971 | } | |
3972 | ||
16ff1342 | 3973 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
16ff1342 MC |
3974 | if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, |
3975 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, | |
3976 | NULL, 0)) { | |
3977 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
3978 | goto err; | |
3979 | } | |
4ff1a526 MC |
3980 | /* |
3981 | * Increment both |sent_tickets| and |next_ticket_nonce|. |sent_tickets| | |
3982 | * gets reset to 0 if we send more tickets following a post-handshake | |
3bfacb5f BK |
3983 | * auth, but |next_ticket_nonce| does not. If we're sending extra |
3984 | * tickets, decrement the count of pending extra tickets. | |
4ff1a526 | 3985 | */ |
9d0a8bb7 | 3986 | s->sent_tickets++; |
4ff1a526 | 3987 | s->next_ticket_nonce++; |
3bfacb5f BK |
3988 | if (s->ext.extra_tickets_expected > 0) |
3989 | s->ext.extra_tickets_expected--; | |
36ff232c | 3990 | ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER); |
f63a17d6 | 3991 | } |
e27f234a MC |
3992 | |
3993 | return 1; | |
687eaf27 | 3994 | err: |
e27f234a | 3995 | return 0; |
0f113f3e | 3996 | } |
67c8e7f4 | 3997 | |
f63e4288 MC |
3998 | /* |
3999 | * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to | |
4000 | * create a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure. | |
4001 | */ | |
4002 | int tls_construct_cert_status_body(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) | |
e27f234a | 4003 | { |
8cbfcc70 RS |
4004 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->ext.status_type) |
4005 | || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp, | |
4006 | s->ext.ocsp.resp_len)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 4007 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
f63e4288 MC |
4008 | return 0; |
4009 | } | |
4010 | ||
4011 | return 1; | |
4012 | } | |
4013 | ||
4014 | int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) | |
4015 | { | |
4016 | if (!tls_construct_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) { | |
3ec8d113 | 4017 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
cc59ad10 MC |
4018 | return 0; |
4019 | } | |
e27f234a MC |
4020 | |
4021 | return 1; | |
4022 | } | |
4023 | ||
e481f9b9 | 4024 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG |
e27f234a MC |
4025 | /* |
4026 | * tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. | |
4027 | * It sets the next_proto member in s if found | |
4028 | */ | |
be3583fa | 4029 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_next_proto(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
e27f234a | 4030 | { |
73999b62 | 4031 | PACKET next_proto, padding; |
e27f234a MC |
4032 | size_t next_proto_len; |
4033 | ||
50e735f9 MC |
4034 | /*- |
4035 | * The payload looks like: | |
4036 | * uint8 proto_len; | |
4037 | * uint8 proto[proto_len]; | |
4038 | * uint8 padding_len; | |
4039 | * uint8 padding[padding_len]; | |
4040 | */ | |
73999b62 MC |
4041 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &next_proto) |
4042 | || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &padding) | |
4043 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) { | |
c48ffbcc | 4044 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
f63a17d6 | 4045 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
cf9b0b6f | 4046 | } |
0f113f3e | 4047 | |
aff8c126 RS |
4048 | if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->ext.npn, &next_proto_len)) { |
4049 | s->ext.npn_len = 0; | |
c48ffbcc | 4050 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
f63a17d6 | 4051 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
c3fc7eea MC |
4052 | } |
4053 | ||
aff8c126 | 4054 | s->ext.npn_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len; |
0f113f3e | 4055 | |
e27f234a | 4056 | return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; |
0f113f3e | 4057 | } |
6434abbf | 4058 | #endif |
d45ba43d | 4059 | |
e46f2334 MC |
4060 | static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
4061 | { | |
fe874d27 | 4062 | if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, |
f63a17d6 MC |
4063 | NULL, 0)) { |
4064 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
e46f2334 MC |
4065 | return 0; |
4066 | } | |
4067 | ||
4068 | return 1; | |
4069 | } | |
4070 | ||
ef6c191b MC |
4071 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_end_of_early_data(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
4072 | { | |
ef6c191b | 4073 | if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { |
c48ffbcc | 4074 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
ef6c191b MC |
4075 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
4076 | } | |
4077 | ||
4078 | if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING | |
4079 | && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READ_RETRY) { | |
c48ffbcc | 4080 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
f63a17d6 | 4081 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
ef6c191b MC |
4082 | } |
4083 | ||
4084 | /* | |
4085 | * EndOfEarlyData signals a key change so the end of the message must be on | |
4086 | * a record boundary. | |
4087 | */ | |
4088 | if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 4089 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY); |
f63a17d6 | 4090 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
ef6c191b MC |
4091 | } |
4092 | ||
4093 | s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_READING; | |
4094 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, | |
4095 | SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
4096 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
4097 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
ef6c191b MC |
4098 | } |
4099 | ||
4100 | return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; | |
ef6c191b | 4101 | } |