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846e33c7 RS |
1 | /* |
2 | * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. | |
8e2f6b79 | 3 | * |
846e33c7 RS |
4 | * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use |
5 | * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy | |
6 | * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at | |
7 | * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html | |
8e2f6b79 | 8 | */ |
846e33c7 | 9 | |
ea262260 BM |
10 | /* ==================================================================== |
11 | * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. | |
12 | * | |
0f113f3e | 13 | * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by |
ea262260 BM |
14 | * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project. |
15 | * | |
16 | * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source | |
17 | * license provided above. | |
18 | * | |
ea262260 BM |
19 | * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by |
20 | * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories. | |
21 | * | |
22 | */ | |
ddac1974 NL |
23 | /* ==================================================================== |
24 | * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. | |
25 | * | |
26 | * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by | |
27 | * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source | |
28 | * license. | |
29 | * | |
30 | * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of | |
31 | * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites | |
32 | * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. | |
33 | * | |
34 | * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in | |
35 | * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received | |
36 | * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. | |
37 | * | |
38 | * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not | |
39 | * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third | |
40 | * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights | |
41 | * to make use of the Contribution. | |
42 | * | |
43 | * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN | |
44 | * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA | |
45 | * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY | |
46 | * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR | |
47 | * OTHERWISE. | |
48 | */ | |
d02b48c6 | 49 | |
d02b48c6 | 50 | #include <stdio.h> |
8ba708e5 | 51 | #include "../ssl_locl.h" |
61ae935a | 52 | #include "statem_locl.h" |
68570797 | 53 | #include "internal/constant_time_locl.h" |
ec577822 BM |
54 | #include <openssl/buffer.h> |
55 | #include <openssl/rand.h> | |
56 | #include <openssl/objects.h> | |
57 | #include <openssl/evp.h> | |
6434abbf | 58 | #include <openssl/hmac.h> |
ec577822 | 59 | #include <openssl/x509.h> |
3c27208f | 60 | #include <openssl/dh.h> |
d095b68d | 61 | #include <openssl/bn.h> |
dbad1690 | 62 | #include <openssl/md5.h> |
f9b3bff6 | 63 | |
e46f2334 | 64 | static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt); |
7d061fce | 65 | static int tls_construct_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt); |
d45ba43d | 66 | |
61ae935a | 67 | /* |
0f1e51ea MC |
68 | * ossl_statem_server13_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed |
69 | * handshake state transitions when a TLSv1.3 server is reading messages from | |
70 | * the client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. | |
71 | * The current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|. | |
72 | * | |
94ed2c67 MC |
73 | * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error |
74 | * (transition not allowed) | |
0f1e51ea MC |
75 | */ |
76 | static int ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt) | |
77 | { | |
78 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; | |
79 | ||
80 | /* | |
81 | * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_BEFORE because at that stage we have | |
82 | * not negotiated TLSv1.3 yet, so that case is handled by | |
83 | * ossl_statem_server_read_transition() | |
84 | */ | |
85 | switch (st->hand_state) { | |
86 | default: | |
87 | break; | |
88 | ||
7d061fce MC |
89 | case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST: |
90 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) { | |
91 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO; | |
92 | return 1; | |
93 | } | |
94 | break; | |
95 | ||
92760c21 | 96 | case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED: |
0f1e51ea MC |
97 | if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) { |
98 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) { | |
99 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT; | |
100 | return 1; | |
101 | } | |
102 | } else { | |
92760c21 MC |
103 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { |
104 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED; | |
0f1e51ea MC |
105 | return 1; |
106 | } | |
107 | } | |
108 | break; | |
109 | ||
110 | case TLS_ST_SR_CERT: | |
111 | if (s->session->peer == NULL) { | |
92760c21 MC |
112 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { |
113 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED; | |
0f1e51ea MC |
114 | return 1; |
115 | } | |
116 | } else { | |
117 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) { | |
118 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY; | |
119 | return 1; | |
120 | } | |
121 | } | |
122 | break; | |
123 | ||
124 | case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY: | |
0f1e51ea MC |
125 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { |
126 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED; | |
127 | return 1; | |
128 | } | |
129 | break; | |
8cdc8c51 MC |
130 | |
131 | case TLS_ST_OK: | |
132 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) { | |
133 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE; | |
134 | return 1; | |
135 | } | |
136 | break; | |
0f1e51ea MC |
137 | } |
138 | ||
139 | /* No valid transition found */ | |
140 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); | |
141 | SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER13_READ_TRANSITION, | |
142 | SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); | |
143 | return 0; | |
144 | } | |
145 | ||
146 | /* | |
147 | * ossl_statem_server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed | |
148 | * handshake state transitions when the server is reading messages from the | |
149 | * client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The | |
150 | * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|. | |
61ae935a | 151 | * |
94ed2c67 MC |
152 | * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error |
153 | * (transition not allowed) | |
61ae935a | 154 | */ |
8481f583 | 155 | int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt) |
61ae935a | 156 | { |
d6f1a6e9 | 157 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; |
61ae935a | 158 | |
f5ca0b04 | 159 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
5abeaf35 MC |
160 | if (!ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(s, mt)) |
161 | goto err; | |
162 | return 1; | |
163 | } | |
0f1e51ea | 164 | |
e8aa8b6c | 165 | switch (st->hand_state) { |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
166 | default: |
167 | break; | |
168 | ||
61ae935a | 169 | case TLS_ST_BEFORE: |
0386aad1 | 170 | case TLS_ST_OK: |
61ae935a MC |
171 | case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: |
172 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) { | |
173 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO; | |
174 | return 1; | |
175 | } | |
176 | break; | |
177 | ||
178 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE: | |
179 | /* | |
180 | * If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either | |
181 | * 1) We didn't request a Certificate | |
182 | * OR | |
183 | * 2) If we did request one then | |
184 | * a) We allow no Certificate to be returned | |
185 | * AND | |
186 | * b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0 | |
187 | * list if we requested a certificate) | |
188 | */ | |
0f512756 MC |
189 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) { |
190 | if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) { | |
191 | if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { | |
23dd09b5 MC |
192 | if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) |
193 | && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) { | |
0f512756 MC |
194 | /* |
195 | * This isn't an unexpected message as such - we're just | |
23dd09b5 MC |
196 | * not going to accept it because we require a client |
197 | * cert. | |
0f512756 MC |
198 | */ |
199 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, | |
200 | SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); | |
340a2828 | 201 | SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION, |
0f512756 MC |
202 | SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); |
203 | return 0; | |
204 | } | |
205 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH; | |
206 | return 1; | |
207 | } | |
208 | } else { | |
209 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH; | |
210 | return 1; | |
211 | } | |
61ae935a MC |
212 | } else if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) { |
213 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) { | |
214 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT; | |
215 | return 1; | |
f100b031 | 216 | } |
61ae935a MC |
217 | } |
218 | break; | |
219 | ||
220 | case TLS_ST_SR_CERT: | |
221 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) { | |
222 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH; | |
223 | return 1; | |
224 | } | |
225 | break; | |
226 | ||
227 | case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH: | |
228 | /* | |
229 | * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have | |
230 | * received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer| | |
231 | * will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is | |
232 | * not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in | |
a71a4966 | 233 | * the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be |
61ae935a MC |
234 | * set. |
235 | */ | |
a71a4966 | 236 | if (s->session->peer == NULL || st->no_cert_verify) { |
61ae935a MC |
237 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { |
238 | /* | |
239 | * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH | |
240 | * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is | |
241 | * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses | |
242 | * its key from the certificate for key exchange. | |
243 | */ | |
244 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE; | |
245 | return 1; | |
246 | } | |
247 | } else { | |
248 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) { | |
249 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY; | |
250 | return 1; | |
251 | } | |
252 | } | |
253 | break; | |
254 | ||
255 | case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY: | |
256 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { | |
257 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE; | |
258 | return 1; | |
259 | } | |
260 | break; | |
261 | ||
262 | case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE: | |
263 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG | |
aff8c126 | 264 | if (s->s3->npn_seen) { |
61ae935a MC |
265 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) { |
266 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO; | |
267 | return 1; | |
268 | } | |
269 | } else { | |
270 | #endif | |
271 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { | |
272 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED; | |
273 | return 1; | |
274 | } | |
275 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG | |
276 | } | |
277 | #endif | |
278 | break; | |
279 | ||
280 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG | |
281 | case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO: | |
282 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { | |
283 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED; | |
284 | return 1; | |
285 | } | |
286 | break; | |
287 | #endif | |
288 | ||
289 | case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED: | |
290 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { | |
291 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE; | |
292 | return 1; | |
293 | } | |
294 | break; | |
61ae935a MC |
295 | } |
296 | ||
5abeaf35 | 297 | err: |
61ae935a | 298 | /* No valid transition found */ |
672f3337 | 299 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); |
340a2828 | 300 | SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); |
61ae935a MC |
301 | return 0; |
302 | } | |
303 | ||
304 | /* | |
305 | * Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message? | |
306 | * | |
307 | * Valid return values are: | |
308 | * 1: Yes | |
309 | * 0: No | |
310 | */ | |
bb3e20cf | 311 | static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) |
61ae935a MC |
312 | { |
313 | unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; | |
314 | ||
315 | /* | |
361a1191 | 316 | * only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a |
61ae935a MC |
317 | * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For |
318 | * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if | |
319 | * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, | |
320 | * the server certificate contains the server's public key for | |
321 | * key exchange. | |
322 | */ | |
a230b26e | 323 | if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE) |
61ae935a MC |
324 | /* |
325 | * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if | |
326 | * provided | |
327 | */ | |
328 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK | |
329 | /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */ | |
330 | || ((alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) | |
331 | && s->cert->psk_identity_hint) | |
332 | /* For other PSK always send SKE */ | |
333 | || (alg_k & (SSL_PSK & (SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK))) | |
334 | #endif | |
335 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP | |
336 | /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */ | |
337 | || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) | |
338 | #endif | |
a230b26e | 339 | ) { |
61ae935a MC |
340 | return 1; |
341 | } | |
342 | ||
343 | return 0; | |
344 | } | |
345 | ||
346 | /* | |
347 | * Should we send a CertificateRequest message? | |
348 | * | |
349 | * Valid return values are: | |
350 | * 1: Yes | |
351 | * 0: No | |
352 | */ | |
bb3e20cf | 353 | static int send_certificate_request(SSL *s) |
61ae935a MC |
354 | { |
355 | if ( | |
356 | /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */ | |
357 | s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER | |
358 | /* | |
359 | * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert | |
360 | * during re-negotiation: | |
361 | */ | |
a03a9dbe | 362 | && (s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 || |
61ae935a MC |
363 | !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) |
364 | /* | |
365 | * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see | |
366 | * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in | |
367 | * RFC 2246): | |
368 | */ | |
369 | && (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) | |
a230b26e EK |
370 | /* |
371 | * ... except when the application insists on | |
372 | * verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts | |
373 | * this for SSL 3) | |
374 | */ | |
61ae935a MC |
375 | || (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) |
376 | /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */ | |
377 | && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP) | |
378 | /* | |
379 | * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests | |
380 | * are omitted | |
381 | */ | |
b7fa1f98 | 382 | && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) { |
61ae935a MC |
383 | return 1; |
384 | } | |
385 | ||
386 | return 0; | |
387 | } | |
388 | ||
389 | /* | |
0f1e51ea MC |
390 | * ossl_statem_server13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to |
391 | * move to next when a TLSv1.3 server is writing messages to be sent to the | |
392 | * client. | |
0f1e51ea MC |
393 | */ |
394 | static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(SSL *s) | |
395 | { | |
396 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; | |
397 | ||
398 | /* | |
399 | * No case for TLS_ST_BEFORE, because at that stage we have not negotiated | |
400 | * TLSv1.3 yet, so that is handled by ossl_statem_server_write_transition() | |
401 | */ | |
402 | ||
403 | switch (st->hand_state) { | |
404 | default: | |
405 | /* Shouldn't happen */ | |
406 | return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR; | |
407 | ||
44c04a2e MC |
408 | case TLS_ST_OK: |
409 | if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) { | |
410 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE; | |
411 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
412 | } | |
8cdc8c51 MC |
413 | /* Try to read from the client instead */ |
414 | return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; | |
44c04a2e | 415 | |
0f1e51ea | 416 | case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO: |
7d061fce MC |
417 | if (s->hello_retry_request) |
418 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST; | |
419 | else | |
420 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO; | |
0f1e51ea MC |
421 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
422 | ||
7d061fce MC |
423 | case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST: |
424 | return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; | |
425 | ||
0f1e51ea | 426 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO: |
e46f2334 MC |
427 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS; |
428 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
429 | ||
430 | case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS: | |
94ed2c67 | 431 | if (s->hit) |
92760c21 MC |
432 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED; |
433 | else if (send_certificate_request(s)) | |
434 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ; | |
94ed2c67 | 435 | else |
0f1e51ea | 436 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT; |
94ed2c67 | 437 | |
0f1e51ea MC |
438 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
439 | ||
0f1e51ea | 440 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ: |
92760c21 | 441 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT; |
0f1e51ea MC |
442 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
443 | ||
92760c21 | 444 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT: |
2c5dfdc3 MC |
445 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY; |
446 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
447 | ||
448 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY: | |
d805a57b | 449 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED; |
0f1e51ea MC |
450 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
451 | ||
452 | case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED: | |
92760c21 | 453 | return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; |
94ed2c67 | 454 | |
92760c21 | 455 | case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED: |
30f05b19 MC |
456 | /* |
457 | * Technically we have finished the handshake at this point, but we're | |
458 | * going to remain "in_init" for now and write out the session ticket | |
459 | * immediately. | |
460 | * TODO(TLS1.3): Perhaps we need to be able to control this behaviour | |
461 | * and give the application the opportunity to delay sending the | |
462 | * session ticket? | |
463 | */ | |
464 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET; | |
465 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
466 | ||
8cdc8c51 | 467 | case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE: |
5bf47933 MC |
468 | if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) { |
469 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE; | |
470 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
471 | } | |
472 | /* Fall through */ | |
473 | ||
44c04a2e | 474 | case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE: |
30f05b19 | 475 | case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET: |
0f1e51ea MC |
476 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; |
477 | ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0); | |
478 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
479 | } | |
480 | } | |
481 | ||
482 | /* | |
483 | * ossl_statem_server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move | |
484 | * to next when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client. | |
61ae935a | 485 | */ |
8481f583 | 486 | WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL *s) |
61ae935a | 487 | { |
d6f1a6e9 | 488 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; |
61ae935a | 489 | |
0f1e51ea MC |
490 | /* |
491 | * Note that before the ClientHello we don't know what version we are going | |
492 | * to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later | |
493 | */ | |
494 | ||
f5ca0b04 | 495 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) |
0f1e51ea MC |
496 | return ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(s); |
497 | ||
e8aa8b6c | 498 | switch (st->hand_state) { |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
499 | default: |
500 | /* Shouldn't happen */ | |
501 | return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR; | |
502 | ||
0386aad1 MC |
503 | case TLS_ST_OK: |
504 | if (st->request_state == TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ) { | |
505 | /* We must be trying to renegotiate */ | |
506 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ; | |
507 | st->request_state = TLS_ST_BEFORE; | |
508 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
509 | } | |
c7f47786 MC |
510 | /* Must be an incoming ClientHello */ |
511 | if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) { | |
512 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); | |
513 | return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR; | |
514 | } | |
0386aad1 MC |
515 | /* Fall through */ |
516 | ||
e8aa8b6c | 517 | case TLS_ST_BEFORE: |
a230b26e | 518 | /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */ |
e8aa8b6c | 519 | return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; |
61ae935a | 520 | |
e8aa8b6c F |
521 | case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ: |
522 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; | |
523 | ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0); | |
524 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
61ae935a | 525 | |
e8aa8b6c F |
526 | case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO: |
527 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->d1->cookie_verified | |
a230b26e | 528 | && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)) |
e8aa8b6c F |
529 | st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST; |
530 | else | |
531 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO; | |
532 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
61ae935a | 533 | |
e8aa8b6c F |
534 | case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: |
535 | return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; | |
61ae935a | 536 | |
e8aa8b6c F |
537 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO: |
538 | if (s->hit) { | |
aff8c126 | 539 | if (s->ext.ticket_expected) |
e8aa8b6c F |
540 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET; |
541 | else | |
542 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE; | |
543 | } else { | |
544 | /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */ | |
545 | /* normal PSK or SRP */ | |
546 | if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & | |
a230b26e | 547 | (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) { |
e8aa8b6c F |
548 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT; |
549 | } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) { | |
61ae935a | 550 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH; |
e8aa8b6c | 551 | } else if (send_certificate_request(s)) { |
61ae935a | 552 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ; |
e8aa8b6c F |
553 | } else { |
554 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE; | |
61ae935a | 555 | } |
e8aa8b6c F |
556 | } |
557 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
61ae935a | 558 | |
e8aa8b6c | 559 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT: |
aff8c126 | 560 | if (s->ext.status_expected) { |
e8aa8b6c | 561 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS; |
61ae935a | 562 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
e8aa8b6c F |
563 | } |
564 | /* Fall through */ | |
61ae935a | 565 | |
e8aa8b6c F |
566 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS: |
567 | if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) { | |
568 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH; | |
61ae935a | 569 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
e8aa8b6c F |
570 | } |
571 | /* Fall through */ | |
61ae935a | 572 | |
e8aa8b6c F |
573 | case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH: |
574 | if (send_certificate_request(s)) { | |
575 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ; | |
61ae935a | 576 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
e8aa8b6c F |
577 | } |
578 | /* Fall through */ | |
61ae935a | 579 | |
e8aa8b6c F |
580 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ: |
581 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE; | |
582 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
61ae935a | 583 | |
e8aa8b6c F |
584 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE: |
585 | return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; | |
586 | ||
587 | case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED: | |
588 | if (s->hit) { | |
61ae935a | 589 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; |
fe3a3291 | 590 | ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0); |
61ae935a | 591 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
aff8c126 | 592 | } else if (s->ext.ticket_expected) { |
e8aa8b6c F |
593 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET; |
594 | } else { | |
595 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE; | |
596 | } | |
597 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
598 | ||
599 | case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET: | |
600 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE; | |
601 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
61ae935a | 602 | |
e8aa8b6c F |
603 | case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE: |
604 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED; | |
605 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
606 | ||
607 | case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED: | |
608 | if (s->hit) { | |
609 | return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; | |
610 | } | |
611 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; | |
612 | ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0); | |
613 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
61ae935a MC |
614 | } |
615 | } | |
616 | ||
617 | /* | |
618 | * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from | |
619 | * the server to the client. | |
620 | */ | |
8481f583 | 621 | WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) |
61ae935a | 622 | { |
d6f1a6e9 | 623 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; |
61ae935a | 624 | |
e8aa8b6c | 625 | switch (st->hand_state) { |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
626 | default: |
627 | /* No pre work to be done */ | |
628 | break; | |
629 | ||
61ae935a MC |
630 | case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ: |
631 | s->shutdown = 0; | |
632 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) | |
f5c7f5df | 633 | dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s); |
61ae935a MC |
634 | break; |
635 | ||
636 | case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: | |
637 | s->shutdown = 0; | |
638 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
f5c7f5df | 639 | dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s); |
61ae935a MC |
640 | /* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */ |
641 | st->use_timer = 0; | |
642 | } | |
643 | break; | |
644 | ||
645 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO: | |
646 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
647 | /* | |
648 | * Messages we write from now on should be bufferred and | |
649 | * retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now | |
650 | */ | |
651 | st->use_timer = 1; | |
652 | } | |
653 | break; | |
654 | ||
655 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE: | |
656 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
657 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) | |
658 | return dtls_wait_for_dry(s); | |
659 | #endif | |
660 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; | |
661 | ||
662 | case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET: | |
30f05b19 MC |
663 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
664 | /* | |
665 | * Actually this is the end of the handshake, but we're going | |
666 | * straight into writing the session ticket out. So we finish off | |
667 | * the handshake, but keep the various buffers active. | |
668 | */ | |
669 | return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 0); | |
670 | } if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
61ae935a MC |
671 | /* |
672 | * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight | |
673 | * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer | |
674 | */ | |
675 | st->use_timer = 0; | |
676 | } | |
677 | break; | |
678 | ||
679 | case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE: | |
680 | s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; | |
681 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) { | |
fe3a3291 | 682 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); |
61ae935a MC |
683 | return WORK_ERROR; |
684 | } | |
685 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
686 | /* | |
687 | * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight | |
688 | * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have | |
689 | * already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message, | |
690 | * but we'll set it again here in case we didn't. | |
691 | */ | |
692 | st->use_timer = 0; | |
693 | } | |
694 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; | |
695 | ||
696 | case TLS_ST_OK: | |
30f05b19 | 697 | return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1); |
61ae935a MC |
698 | } |
699 | ||
700 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; | |
701 | } | |
702 | ||
703 | /* | |
704 | * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the | |
705 | * server to the client. | |
706 | */ | |
8481f583 | 707 | WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) |
61ae935a | 708 | { |
d6f1a6e9 | 709 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; |
61ae935a MC |
710 | |
711 | s->init_num = 0; | |
712 | ||
e8aa8b6c | 713 | switch (st->hand_state) { |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
714 | default: |
715 | /* No post work to be done */ | |
716 | break; | |
717 | ||
7d061fce MC |
718 | case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST: |
719 | if (statem_flush(s) != 1) | |
720 | return WORK_MORE_A; | |
721 | break; | |
722 | ||
61ae935a MC |
723 | case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ: |
724 | if (statem_flush(s) != 1) | |
725 | return WORK_MORE_A; | |
2c4a056f MC |
726 | if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) { |
727 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); | |
728 | return WORK_ERROR; | |
729 | } | |
61ae935a MC |
730 | break; |
731 | ||
732 | case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: | |
733 | if (statem_flush(s) != 1) | |
734 | return WORK_MORE_A; | |
735 | /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */ | |
2c4a056f MC |
736 | if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER && !ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) { |
737 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); | |
738 | return WORK_ERROR; | |
739 | } | |
61ae935a MC |
740 | /* |
741 | * The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to | |
742 | * treat like it was the first packet | |
743 | */ | |
744 | s->first_packet = 1; | |
745 | break; | |
746 | ||
747 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO: | |
748 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
749 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) { | |
750 | unsigned char sctpauthkey[64]; | |
751 | char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)]; | |
752 | ||
753 | /* | |
754 | * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no | |
755 | * SCTP used. | |
756 | */ | |
141eb8c6 MC |
757 | memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL, |
758 | sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)); | |
61ae935a MC |
759 | |
760 | if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey, | |
a230b26e EK |
761 | sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer, |
762 | sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, | |
763 | 0) <= 0) { | |
fe3a3291 | 764 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); |
61ae935a MC |
765 | return WORK_ERROR; |
766 | } | |
767 | ||
768 | BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY, | |
769 | sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey); | |
770 | } | |
771 | #endif | |
92760c21 MC |
772 | /* |
773 | * TODO(TLS1.3): This actually causes a problem. We don't yet know | |
774 | * whether the next record we are going to receive is an unencrypted | |
775 | * alert, or an encrypted handshake message. We're going to need | |
776 | * something clever in the record layer for this. | |
777 | */ | |
778 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { | |
779 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s) | |
780 | || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, | |
781 | SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE) | |
782 | || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, | |
783 | SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE |SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) | |
784 | return WORK_ERROR; | |
785 | } | |
61ae935a MC |
786 | break; |
787 | ||
788 | case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE: | |
789 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
790 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->hit) { | |
791 | /* | |
792 | * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if | |
793 | * no SCTP used. | |
794 | */ | |
795 | BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY, | |
796 | 0, NULL); | |
797 | } | |
798 | #endif | |
799 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, | |
a230b26e EK |
800 | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) |
801 | { | |
fe3a3291 | 802 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); |
61ae935a MC |
803 | return WORK_ERROR; |
804 | } | |
805 | ||
806 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) | |
807 | dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE); | |
808 | break; | |
809 | ||
810 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE: | |
811 | if (statem_flush(s) != 1) | |
812 | return WORK_MORE_A; | |
813 | break; | |
814 | ||
815 | case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED: | |
816 | if (statem_flush(s) != 1) | |
817 | return WORK_MORE_A; | |
818 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
819 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) { | |
820 | /* | |
821 | * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if | |
822 | * no SCTP used. | |
823 | */ | |
824 | BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY, | |
825 | 0, NULL); | |
826 | } | |
827 | #endif | |
92760c21 MC |
828 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
829 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, | |
ec15acb6 | 830 | s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0, |
92760c21 MC |
831 | &s->session->master_key_length) |
832 | || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, | |
833 | SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) | |
834 | return WORK_ERROR; | |
835 | } | |
61ae935a | 836 | break; |
30f05b19 | 837 | |
44c04a2e | 838 | case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE: |
57389a32 MC |
839 | if (statem_flush(s) != 1) |
840 | return WORK_MORE_A; | |
57389a32 MC |
841 | if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1)) |
842 | return WORK_ERROR; | |
843 | break; | |
844 | ||
30f05b19 MC |
845 | case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET: |
846 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && statem_flush(s) != 1) | |
847 | return WORK_MORE_A; | |
848 | break; | |
61ae935a MC |
849 | } |
850 | ||
851 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; | |
852 | } | |
853 | ||
854 | /* | |
6392fb8e MC |
855 | * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the |
856 | * server | |
61ae935a MC |
857 | * |
858 | * Valid return values are: | |
859 | * 1: Success | |
860 | * 0: Error | |
861 | */ | |
6392fb8e | 862 | int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, |
a15c953f | 863 | confunc_f *confunc, int *mt) |
61ae935a | 864 | { |
d6f1a6e9 | 865 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; |
61ae935a | 866 | |
4a01c59f MC |
867 | switch (st->hand_state) { |
868 | default: | |
869 | /* Shouldn't happen */ | |
870 | return 0; | |
871 | ||
872 | case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE: | |
5923ad4b | 873 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) |
6392fb8e | 874 | *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec; |
4a01c59f | 875 | else |
6392fb8e MC |
876 | *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec; |
877 | *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; | |
4a01c59f | 878 | break; |
f3b3d7f0 | 879 | |
4a01c59f | 880 | case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: |
6392fb8e MC |
881 | *confunc = dtls_construct_hello_verify_request; |
882 | *mt = DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST; | |
4a01c59f | 883 | break; |
61ae935a | 884 | |
4a01c59f MC |
885 | case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ: |
886 | /* No construction function needed */ | |
6392fb8e MC |
887 | *confunc = NULL; |
888 | *mt = SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST; | |
4a01c59f | 889 | break; |
61ae935a | 890 | |
4a01c59f | 891 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO: |
6392fb8e MC |
892 | *confunc = tls_construct_server_hello; |
893 | *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO; | |
4a01c59f | 894 | break; |
61ae935a | 895 | |
4a01c59f | 896 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT: |
6392fb8e MC |
897 | *confunc = tls_construct_server_certificate; |
898 | *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE; | |
4a01c59f | 899 | break; |
61ae935a | 900 | |
2c5dfdc3 MC |
901 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY: |
902 | *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify; | |
903 | *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY; | |
904 | break; | |
905 | ||
906 | ||
4a01c59f | 907 | case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH: |
6392fb8e MC |
908 | *confunc = tls_construct_server_key_exchange; |
909 | *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; | |
4a01c59f | 910 | break; |
61ae935a | 911 | |
4a01c59f | 912 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ: |
6392fb8e MC |
913 | *confunc = tls_construct_certificate_request; |
914 | *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST; | |
4a01c59f | 915 | break; |
61ae935a | 916 | |
4a01c59f | 917 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE: |
6392fb8e MC |
918 | *confunc = tls_construct_server_done; |
919 | *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE; | |
4a01c59f | 920 | break; |
61ae935a | 921 | |
4a01c59f | 922 | case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET: |
6392fb8e MC |
923 | *confunc = tls_construct_new_session_ticket; |
924 | *mt = SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET; | |
4a01c59f | 925 | break; |
61ae935a | 926 | |
4a01c59f | 927 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS: |
6392fb8e MC |
928 | *confunc = tls_construct_cert_status; |
929 | *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS; | |
4a01c59f | 930 | break; |
61ae935a | 931 | |
4a01c59f | 932 | case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED: |
6392fb8e MC |
933 | *confunc = tls_construct_finished; |
934 | *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED; | |
4a01c59f | 935 | break; |
e46f2334 MC |
936 | |
937 | case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS: | |
938 | *confunc = tls_construct_encrypted_extensions; | |
939 | *mt = SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS; | |
940 | break; | |
7d061fce MC |
941 | |
942 | case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST: | |
943 | *confunc = tls_construct_hello_retry_request; | |
944 | *mt = SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST; | |
945 | break; | |
44c04a2e MC |
946 | |
947 | case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE: | |
948 | *confunc = tls_construct_key_update; | |
949 | *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE; | |
950 | break; | |
4a01c59f | 951 | } |
61ae935a | 952 | |
5923ad4b | 953 | return 1; |
61ae935a MC |
954 | } |
955 | ||
8a18bc25 AG |
956 | /* |
957 | * Maximum size (excluding the Handshake header) of a ClientHello message, | |
958 | * calculated as follows: | |
959 | * | |
960 | * 2 + # client_version | |
961 | * 32 + # only valid length for random | |
962 | * 1 + # length of session_id | |
963 | * 32 + # maximum size for session_id | |
964 | * 2 + # length of cipher suites | |
965 | * 2^16-2 + # maximum length of cipher suites array | |
966 | * 1 + # length of compression_methods | |
967 | * 2^8-1 + # maximum length of compression methods | |
968 | * 2 + # length of extensions | |
969 | * 2^16-1 # maximum length of extensions | |
970 | */ | |
971 | #define CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH 131396 | |
972 | ||
61ae935a MC |
973 | #define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048 |
974 | #define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514 | |
975 | ||
976 | /* | |
977 | * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are | |
978 | * reading. Excludes the message header. | |
979 | */ | |
eda75751 | 980 | size_t ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL *s) |
61ae935a | 981 | { |
d6f1a6e9 | 982 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; |
61ae935a | 983 | |
e8aa8b6c | 984 | switch (st->hand_state) { |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
985 | default: |
986 | /* Shouldn't happen */ | |
987 | return 0; | |
988 | ||
61ae935a | 989 | case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO: |
8a18bc25 | 990 | return CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH; |
61ae935a MC |
991 | |
992 | case TLS_ST_SR_CERT: | |
993 | return s->max_cert_list; | |
994 | ||
995 | case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH: | |
996 | return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH; | |
997 | ||
998 | case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY: | |
999 | return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH; | |
1000 | ||
1001 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG | |
1002 | case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO: | |
1003 | return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH; | |
1004 | #endif | |
1005 | ||
1006 | case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE: | |
1007 | return CCS_MAX_LENGTH; | |
1008 | ||
1009 | case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED: | |
1010 | return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH; | |
8cdc8c51 MC |
1011 | |
1012 | case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE: | |
1013 | return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH; | |
61ae935a | 1014 | } |
61ae935a MC |
1015 | } |
1016 | ||
1017 | /* | |
1018 | * Process a message that the server has received from the client. | |
1019 | */ | |
8481f583 | 1020 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
61ae935a | 1021 | { |
d6f1a6e9 | 1022 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; |
61ae935a | 1023 | |
e8aa8b6c | 1024 | switch (st->hand_state) { |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
1025 | default: |
1026 | /* Shouldn't happen */ | |
1027 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
1028 | ||
61ae935a MC |
1029 | case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO: |
1030 | return tls_process_client_hello(s, pkt); | |
1031 | ||
1032 | case TLS_ST_SR_CERT: | |
1033 | return tls_process_client_certificate(s, pkt); | |
1034 | ||
1035 | case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH: | |
1036 | return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s, pkt); | |
1037 | ||
1038 | case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY: | |
1039 | return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt); | |
1040 | ||
1041 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG | |
1042 | case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO: | |
1043 | return tls_process_next_proto(s, pkt); | |
1044 | #endif | |
1045 | ||
1046 | case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE: | |
1047 | return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt); | |
1048 | ||
1049 | case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED: | |
1050 | return tls_process_finished(s, pkt); | |
8cdc8c51 MC |
1051 | |
1052 | case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE: | |
1053 | return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt); | |
1054 | ||
61ae935a | 1055 | } |
61ae935a MC |
1056 | } |
1057 | ||
1058 | /* | |
1059 | * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message | |
1060 | * from the client | |
1061 | */ | |
8481f583 | 1062 | WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) |
61ae935a | 1063 | { |
d6f1a6e9 | 1064 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; |
61ae935a | 1065 | |
e8aa8b6c | 1066 | switch (st->hand_state) { |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
1067 | default: |
1068 | /* Shouldn't happen */ | |
1069 | return WORK_ERROR; | |
1070 | ||
61ae935a MC |
1071 | case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO: |
1072 | return tls_post_process_client_hello(s, wst); | |
1073 | ||
1074 | case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH: | |
1075 | return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s, wst); | |
1076 | ||
1077 | case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY: | |
1078 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
a230b26e EK |
1079 | if ( /* Is this SCTP? */ |
1080 | BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)) | |
1081 | /* Are we renegotiating? */ | |
1082 | && s->renegotiate && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) { | |
61ae935a MC |
1083 | s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2; |
1084 | s->rwstate = SSL_READING; | |
1085 | BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s)); | |
1086 | BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s)); | |
d99b0691 | 1087 | ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1); |
61ae935a MC |
1088 | return WORK_MORE_A; |
1089 | } else { | |
d99b0691 | 1090 | ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0); |
61ae935a MC |
1091 | } |
1092 | #endif | |
1093 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; | |
61ae935a | 1094 | } |
92760c21 | 1095 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; |
61ae935a MC |
1096 | } |
1097 | ||
edc032b5 | 1098 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP |
71fa4513 | 1099 | static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al) |
0f113f3e MC |
1100 | { |
1101 | int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE; | |
1102 | ||
1103 | *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; | |
1104 | ||
1105 | if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) && | |
1106 | (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) { | |
1107 | if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) { | |
1108 | /* | |
1109 | * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp | |
1110 | * login name | |
1111 | */ | |
1112 | ret = SSL3_AL_FATAL; | |
1113 | *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY; | |
1114 | } else { | |
1115 | ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, al); | |
1116 | } | |
1117 | } | |
1118 | return ret; | |
1119 | } | |
edc032b5 BL |
1120 | #endif |
1121 | ||
c536b6be | 1122 | int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(WPACKET *pkt, unsigned char *cookie, |
cb150cbc | 1123 | size_t cookie_len) |
8ba708e5 | 1124 | { |
8ba708e5 | 1125 | /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */ |
c536b6be MC |
1126 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, DTLS1_VERSION) |
1127 | || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, cookie, cookie_len)) | |
1128 | return 0; | |
8ba708e5 | 1129 | |
c536b6be | 1130 | return 1; |
8ba708e5 MC |
1131 | } |
1132 | ||
7cea05dc | 1133 | int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
8ba708e5 | 1134 | { |
cb150cbc | 1135 | unsigned int cookie_leni; |
8ba708e5 MC |
1136 | if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL || |
1137 | s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie, | |
cb150cbc MC |
1138 | &cookie_leni) == 0 || |
1139 | cookie_leni > 255) { | |
f0659bdb | 1140 | SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, |
8ba708e5 | 1141 | SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE); |
8ba708e5 MC |
1142 | return 0; |
1143 | } | |
cb150cbc | 1144 | s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_leni; |
8ba708e5 | 1145 | |
4a01c59f MC |
1146 | if (!dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(pkt, s->d1->cookie, |
1147 | s->d1->cookie_len)) { | |
c536b6be | 1148 | SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
c536b6be MC |
1149 | return 0; |
1150 | } | |
8ba708e5 | 1151 | |
8ba708e5 MC |
1152 | return 1; |
1153 | } | |
1154 | ||
805a2e9e MC |
1155 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
1156 | /*- | |
1157 | * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X | |
1158 | * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |hello|. | |
1159 | * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order: | |
1160 | * SNI, | |
1161 | * elliptic_curves | |
1162 | * ec_point_formats | |
1163 | * | |
1164 | * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8, | |
1165 | * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them. | |
1166 | * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from | |
1167 | * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work). | |
1168 | */ | |
1169 | static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello) | |
1170 | { | |
805a2e9e MC |
1171 | static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = { |
1172 | 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */ | |
1173 | 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */ | |
1174 | 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */ | |
1175 | 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */ | |
1176 | 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */ | |
1177 | 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */ | |
1178 | ||
1179 | 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */ | |
1180 | 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */ | |
1181 | 0x01, /* 1 point format */ | |
1182 | 0x00, /* uncompressed */ | |
1183 | /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */ | |
1184 | 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */ | |
1185 | 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */ | |
1186 | 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */ | |
1187 | 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */ | |
1188 | 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */ | |
1189 | 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */ | |
1190 | 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */ | |
1191 | 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */ | |
1192 | }; | |
805a2e9e MC |
1193 | /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */ |
1194 | static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18; | |
1266eefd MC |
1195 | unsigned int type; |
1196 | PACKET sni, tmppkt; | |
1197 | size_t ext_len; | |
805a2e9e MC |
1198 | |
1199 | tmppkt = hello->extensions; | |
1200 | ||
1201 | if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2) | |
1202 | || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type) | |
1203 | || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) { | |
1204 | return; | |
6b473aca MC |
1205 | } |
1206 | ||
805a2e9e MC |
1207 | if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) |
1208 | return; | |
1209 | ||
1210 | ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ? | |
1211 | sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength; | |
1212 | ||
1213 | s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock, | |
1214 | ext_len); | |
6b473aca | 1215 | } |
805a2e9e | 1216 | #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ |
6b473aca | 1217 | |
be3583fa | 1218 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
e27f234a | 1219 | { |
6b1bb98f | 1220 | int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
e27f234a | 1221 | /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */ |
1ab3836b | 1222 | PACKET session_id, compression, extensions, cookie; |
6e3ff632 | 1223 | static const unsigned char null_compression = 0; |
6b1bb98f | 1224 | CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello; |
e27f234a | 1225 | |
6b1bb98f BK |
1226 | clienthello = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*clienthello)); |
1227 | if (clienthello == NULL) { | |
1228 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1229 | goto err; | |
1230 | } | |
c7f47786 MC |
1231 | /* Check if this is actually an unexpected renegotiation ClientHello */ |
1232 | if (s->renegotiate == 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) { | |
1233 | s->renegotiate = 1; | |
1234 | s->new_session = 1; | |
1235 | } | |
1236 | ||
1237 | /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */ | |
1238 | s->statem.cleanuphand = 1; | |
1239 | ||
1ab3836b | 1240 | /* |
b1b4b543 | 1241 | * First, parse the raw ClientHello data into the CLIENTHELLO_MSG structure. |
1ab3836b | 1242 | */ |
6b1bb98f | 1243 | clienthello->isv2 = RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer); |
bbafa47b | 1244 | PACKET_null_init(&cookie); |
1ab3836b | 1245 | |
6b1bb98f | 1246 | if (clienthello->isv2) { |
9ceb2426 | 1247 | unsigned int mt; |
b1b4b543 | 1248 | |
7d061fce MC |
1249 | if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s) || s->hello_retry_request) { |
1250 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
1251 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); | |
1252 | goto f_err; | |
1253 | } | |
1254 | ||
32ec4153 MC |
1255 | /*- |
1256 | * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2 | |
1257 | * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS | |
1258 | * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes | |
1259 | * the rest right through. Its format is: | |
1260 | * Byte Content | |
1261 | * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer | |
1262 | * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here | |
1263 | * 3-4 version | |
1264 | * 5-6 cipher_spec_length | |
1265 | * 7-8 session_id_length | |
1266 | * 9-10 challenge_length | |
1267 | * ... ... | |
1268 | */ | |
1269 | ||
73999b62 | 1270 | if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mt) |
a230b26e | 1271 | || mt != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) { |
32ec4153 MC |
1272 | /* |
1273 | * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record | |
1274 | * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record | |
1275 | * in the first place | |
1276 | */ | |
e27f234a | 1277 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
d45ba43d | 1278 | goto err; |
32ec4153 | 1279 | } |
32ec4153 MC |
1280 | } |
1281 | ||
6b1bb98f | 1282 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &clienthello->legacy_version)) { |
1ab3836b MC |
1283 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
1284 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); | |
1285 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1286 | } |
1287 | ||
b3e2272c | 1288 | /* Parse the message and load client random. */ |
6b1bb98f | 1289 | if (clienthello->isv2) { |
32ec4153 MC |
1290 | /* |
1291 | * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello | |
1292 | * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format. | |
e2994cf0 | 1293 | * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected below. |
32ec4153 | 1294 | */ |
1ab3836b | 1295 | unsigned int ciphersuite_len, session_id_len, challenge_len; |
b3e2272c | 1296 | PACKET challenge; |
0f113f3e | 1297 | |
1ab3836b | 1298 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ciphersuite_len) |
a230b26e EK |
1299 | || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &session_id_len) |
1300 | || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &challenge_len)) { | |
e27f234a MC |
1301 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, |
1302 | SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
6c3cca57 AE |
1303 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
1304 | goto f_err; | |
5e9f0eeb | 1305 | } |
0f113f3e | 1306 | |
293b5ca4 AG |
1307 | if (session_id_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) { |
1308 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
1309 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
1310 | goto f_err; | |
1311 | } | |
1312 | ||
6b1bb98f | 1313 | if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites, |
1ab3836b | 1314 | ciphersuite_len) |
6b1bb98f | 1315 | || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->session_id, session_id_len) |
73999b62 | 1316 | || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &challenge, challenge_len) |
b3e2272c | 1317 | /* No extensions. */ |
73999b62 | 1318 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { |
f0659bdb MC |
1319 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, |
1320 | SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
9ceb2426 MC |
1321 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
1322 | goto f_err; | |
1323 | } | |
6b1bb98f | 1324 | clienthello->session_id_len = session_id_len; |
9ceb2426 | 1325 | |
fba7b84c | 1326 | /* Load the client random and compression list. We use SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE |
6b1bb98f | 1327 | * here rather than sizeof(clienthello->random) because that is the limit |
fba7b84c | 1328 | * for SSLv3 and it is fixed. It won't change even if |
6b1bb98f | 1329 | * sizeof(clienthello->random) does. |
fba7b84c MC |
1330 | */ |
1331 | challenge_len = challenge_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE | |
1332 | ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE : challenge_len; | |
6b1bb98f | 1333 | memset(clienthello->random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); |
b3e2272c | 1334 | if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge, |
6b1bb98f | 1335 | clienthello->random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE - |
cb21df32 DB |
1336 | challenge_len, challenge_len) |
1337 | /* Advertise only null compression. */ | |
1338 | || !PACKET_buf_init(&compression, &null_compression, 1)) { | |
f0659bdb | 1339 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
b3e2272c | 1340 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
9ceb2426 MC |
1341 | goto f_err; |
1342 | } | |
b3e2272c | 1343 | |
6b1bb98f | 1344 | PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions); |
0f113f3e | 1345 | } else { |
b3e2272c | 1346 | /* Regular ClientHello. */ |
6b1bb98f | 1347 | if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) |
e2994cf0 | 1348 | || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id) |
6b1bb98f | 1349 | || !PACKET_copy_all(&session_id, clienthello->session_id, |
e2994cf0 | 1350 | SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH, |
6b1bb98f | 1351 | &clienthello->session_id_len)) { |
9ceb2426 | 1352 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
f0659bdb | 1353 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
9ceb2426 MC |
1354 | goto f_err; |
1355 | } | |
32ec4153 | 1356 | |
b3e2272c | 1357 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
73999b62 | 1358 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookie)) { |
32ec4153 | 1359 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
f0659bdb | 1360 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
32ec4153 MC |
1361 | goto f_err; |
1362 | } | |
6b1bb98f | 1363 | if (!PACKET_copy_all(&cookie, clienthello->dtls_cookie, |
1ab3836b | 1364 | DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH, |
6b1bb98f | 1365 | &clienthello->dtls_cookie_len)) { |
1ab3836b MC |
1366 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
1367 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
1368 | goto f_err; | |
1369 | } | |
b3e2272c EK |
1370 | /* |
1371 | * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one, | |
1372 | * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet. | |
1373 | * So check cookie length... | |
1374 | */ | |
1375 | if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) { | |
6b1bb98f | 1376 | if (clienthello->dtls_cookie_len == 0) |
a230b26e | 1377 | return 1; |
b3e2272c | 1378 | } |
5e9f0eeb | 1379 | } |
0f113f3e | 1380 | |
6b1bb98f | 1381 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites)) { |
1ab3836b MC |
1382 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
1383 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
1384 | goto f_err; | |
1385 | } | |
1386 | ||
4bfe1432 | 1387 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &compression)) { |
a230b26e EK |
1388 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
1389 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
1390 | goto f_err; | |
b3e2272c | 1391 | } |
1ab3836b | 1392 | |
b3e2272c | 1393 | /* Could be empty. */ |
1ab3836b | 1394 | if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) { |
6b1bb98f | 1395 | PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions); |
1ab3836b | 1396 | } else { |
6b1bb98f | 1397 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->extensions)) { |
1ab3836b MC |
1398 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
1399 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
1400 | goto f_err; | |
1401 | } | |
1402 | } | |
1403 | } | |
1404 | ||
6b1bb98f | 1405 | if (!PACKET_copy_all(&compression, clienthello->compressions, |
e2994cf0 | 1406 | MAX_COMPRESSIONS_SIZE, |
6b1bb98f | 1407 | &clienthello->compressions_len)) { |
1ab3836b MC |
1408 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
1409 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
1410 | goto f_err; | |
1411 | } | |
1412 | ||
b1b4b543 | 1413 | /* Preserve the raw extensions PACKET for later use */ |
6b1bb98f | 1414 | extensions = clienthello->extensions; |
fadd9a1e | 1415 | if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, |
6b1bb98f BK |
1416 | &clienthello->pre_proc_exts, &al, |
1417 | &clienthello->pre_proc_exts_len)) { | |
1ab3836b MC |
1418 | /* SSLerr already been called */ |
1419 | goto f_err; | |
1420 | } | |
6b1bb98f | 1421 | s->clienthello = clienthello; |
1ab3836b | 1422 | |
6b1bb98f BK |
1423 | return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; |
1424 | f_err: | |
1425 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
1426 | err: | |
1427 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); | |
1428 | ||
1429 | OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts); | |
1430 | OPENSSL_free(clienthello); | |
1431 | ||
1432 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
1433 | } | |
1434 | ||
1435 | static int tls_early_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, int *al) | |
1436 | { | |
1437 | unsigned int j; | |
1438 | int i; | |
1439 | int protverr; | |
1440 | size_t loop; | |
1441 | unsigned long id; | |
1442 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP | |
1443 | SSL_COMP *comp = NULL; | |
1444 | #endif | |
1445 | const SSL_CIPHER *c; | |
1446 | STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL; | |
1447 | STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *scsvs = NULL; | |
1448 | CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello = s->clienthello; | |
1449 | ||
1450 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
1ab3836b | 1451 | /* Finished parsing the ClientHello, now we can start processing it */ |
6b1bb98f BK |
1452 | /* Give the early callback a crack at things */ |
1453 | if (s->ctx->early_cb != NULL) { | |
1454 | int code; | |
1455 | /* A failure in the early callback terminates the connection. */ | |
1456 | code = s->ctx->early_cb(s, al, s->ctx->early_cb_arg); | |
1457 | if (code == 0) | |
1458 | goto err; | |
1459 | if (code < 0) { | |
1460 | s->rwstate = SSL_EARLY_WORK; | |
1461 | return code; | |
1462 | } | |
1463 | } | |
1ab3836b MC |
1464 | |
1465 | /* Set up the client_random */ | |
6b1bb98f | 1466 | memcpy(s->s3->client_random, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); |
1ab3836b MC |
1467 | |
1468 | /* Choose the version */ | |
1469 | ||
6b1bb98f BK |
1470 | if (clienthello->isv2) { |
1471 | if (clienthello->legacy_version == SSL2_VERSION | |
1472 | || (clienthello->legacy_version & 0xff00) | |
b1b4b543 MC |
1473 | != (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)) { |
1474 | /* | |
1475 | * This is real SSLv2 or something complete unknown. We don't | |
1476 | * support it. | |
1477 | */ | |
6b1bb98f | 1478 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL); |
1ab3836b MC |
1479 | goto err; |
1480 | } | |
b1b4b543 | 1481 | /* SSLv3/TLS */ |
6b1bb98f | 1482 | s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version; |
1ab3836b MC |
1483 | } |
1484 | /* | |
1485 | * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check | |
1486 | * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later. | |
1487 | */ | |
1488 | if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
6b1bb98f | 1489 | protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello); |
1ab3836b | 1490 | } else if (s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION && |
6b1bb98f | 1491 | DTLS_VERSION_LT((int)clienthello->legacy_version, s->version)) { |
1ab3836b MC |
1492 | protverr = SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW; |
1493 | } else { | |
1494 | protverr = 0; | |
1495 | } | |
1496 | ||
1497 | if (protverr) { | |
6b1bb98f | 1498 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr); |
7d061fce | 1499 | if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) { |
b1b4b543 | 1500 | /* like ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */ |
6b1bb98f | 1501 | s->version = s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version; |
1ab3836b | 1502 | } |
6b1bb98f BK |
1503 | *al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; |
1504 | goto err; | |
b3e2272c EK |
1505 | } |
1506 | ||
1ed65871 DB |
1507 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
1508 | /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */ | |
1509 | if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) { | |
1510 | if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) { | |
6b1bb98f BK |
1511 | if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, clienthello->dtls_cookie, |
1512 | clienthello->dtls_cookie_len) == 0) { | |
1513 | *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
1514 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, | |
1ed65871 | 1515 | SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); |
6b1bb98f | 1516 | goto err; |
1ed65871 DB |
1517 | /* else cookie verification succeeded */ |
1518 | } | |
a230b26e | 1519 | /* default verification */ |
6b1bb98f BK |
1520 | } else if (s->d1->cookie_len != clienthello->dtls_cookie_len |
1521 | || memcmp(clienthello->dtls_cookie, s->d1->cookie, | |
1ab3836b | 1522 | s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) { |
6b1bb98f BK |
1523 | *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
1524 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); | |
1525 | goto err; | |
1ed65871 DB |
1526 | } |
1527 | s->d1->cookie_verified = 1; | |
1528 | } | |
1529 | if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) { | |
6b1bb98f | 1530 | protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello); |
1ed65871 | 1531 | if (protverr != 0) { |
6b1bb98f | 1532 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr); |
1ed65871 | 1533 | s->version = s->client_version; |
6b1bb98f BK |
1534 | *al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; |
1535 | goto err; | |
1ed65871 DB |
1536 | } |
1537 | } | |
1538 | } | |
1539 | ||
b3e2272c EK |
1540 | s->hit = 0; |
1541 | ||
1ab3836b | 1542 | /* We need to do this before getting the session */ |
70af3d8e | 1543 | if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_extended_master_secret, |
4b299b8e | 1544 | EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, |
6b1bb98f BK |
1545 | clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0, al)) { |
1546 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); | |
1547 | goto err; | |
1ab3836b MC |
1548 | } |
1549 | ||
b3e2272c EK |
1550 | /* |
1551 | * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello. | |
1552 | * TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty. | |
1553 | * | |
1554 | * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in | |
1555 | * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally | |
1556 | * ignore resumption requests with flag | |
1557 | * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather | |
1558 | * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on | |
1559 | * this for security won't even compile against older library versions). | |
1560 | * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to | |
1561 | * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains | |
1562 | * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the | |
1563 | * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be | |
1564 | * ignored. | |
1565 | */ | |
6b1bb98f | 1566 | if (clienthello->isv2 || |
b3e2272c EK |
1567 | (s->new_session && |
1568 | (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) { | |
1569 | if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) | |
1570 | goto err; | |
1571 | } else { | |
6b1bb98f | 1572 | i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, clienthello, al); |
128ae276 | 1573 | if (i == 1) { |
b3e2272c EK |
1574 | /* previous session */ |
1575 | s->hit = 1; | |
1576 | } else if (i == -1) { | |
6b1bb98f | 1577 | goto err; |
32ec4153 | 1578 | } else { |
b3e2272c EK |
1579 | /* i == 0 */ |
1580 | if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) | |
32ec4153 | 1581 | goto err; |
0f113f3e | 1582 | } |
b3e2272c | 1583 | } |
0f113f3e | 1584 | |
6b1bb98f BK |
1585 | if (!ssl_cache_cipherlist(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites, |
1586 | clienthello->isv2, al) || | |
1587 | !bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites, &ciphers, &scsvs, | |
1588 | clienthello->isv2, al)) { | |
1589 | goto err; | |
b3e2272c | 1590 | } |
5e9f0eeb | 1591 | |
90134d98 BK |
1592 | s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0; |
1593 | /* Check what signalling cipher-suite values were received. */ | |
1594 | if (scsvs != NULL) { | |
1595 | for(i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(scsvs); i++) { | |
1596 | c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(scsvs, i); | |
1597 | if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_SCSV) { | |
1598 | if (s->renegotiate) { | |
1599 | /* SCSV is fatal if renegotiating */ | |
6b1bb98f | 1600 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, |
90134d98 | 1601 | SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING); |
6b1bb98f BK |
1602 | *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
1603 | goto err; | |
90134d98 BK |
1604 | } |
1605 | s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1; | |
1606 | } else if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV && | |
1607 | !ssl_check_version_downgrade(s)) { | |
1608 | /* | |
1609 | * This SCSV indicates that the client previously tried | |
1610 | * a higher version. We should fail if the current version | |
1611 | * is an unexpected downgrade, as that indicates that the first | |
1612 | * connection may have been tampered with in order to trigger | |
1613 | * an insecure downgrade. | |
1614 | */ | |
6b1bb98f | 1615 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, |
90134d98 | 1616 | SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); |
6b1bb98f BK |
1617 | *al = SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK; |
1618 | goto err; | |
90134d98 BK |
1619 | } |
1620 | } | |
1621 | } | |
1622 | ||
b3e2272c EK |
1623 | /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */ |
1624 | if (s->hit) { | |
1625 | j = 0; | |
1626 | id = s->session->cipher->id; | |
d02b48c6 | 1627 | |
413c4f45 | 1628 | #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG |
a230b26e | 1629 | fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers)); |
413c4f45 | 1630 | #endif |
b3e2272c EK |
1631 | for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) { |
1632 | c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i); | |
413c4f45 | 1633 | #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG |
b3e2272c EK |
1634 | fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n", |
1635 | i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c)); | |
88f2a4cf | 1636 | #endif |
b3e2272c EK |
1637 | if (c->id == id) { |
1638 | j = 1; | |
1639 | break; | |
32ec4153 | 1640 | } |
0f113f3e | 1641 | } |
b3e2272c | 1642 | if (j == 0) { |
ec30e856 | 1643 | /* |
b3e2272c EK |
1644 | * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked |
1645 | * to reuse it | |
ec30e856 | 1646 | */ |
6b1bb98f BK |
1647 | *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
1648 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, | |
b3e2272c | 1649 | SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING); |
6b1bb98f | 1650 | goto err; |
32ec4153 | 1651 | } |
b3e2272c | 1652 | } |
9ceb2426 | 1653 | |
6b1bb98f BK |
1654 | for (loop = 0; loop < clienthello->compressions_len; loop++) { |
1655 | if (clienthello->compressions[loop] == 0) | |
b3e2272c | 1656 | break; |
0f113f3e | 1657 | } |
32ec4153 | 1658 | |
6b1bb98f | 1659 | if (loop >= clienthello->compressions_len) { |
b3e2272c | 1660 | /* no compress */ |
6b1bb98f BK |
1661 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
1662 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED); | |
1663 | goto err; | |
b3e2272c | 1664 | } |
f100b031 | 1665 | |
805a2e9e MC |
1666 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
1667 | if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG) | |
6b1bb98f | 1668 | ssl_check_for_safari(s, clienthello); |
805a2e9e MC |
1669 | #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ |
1670 | ||
0f113f3e | 1671 | /* TLS extensions */ |
24b8e4b2 | 1672 | if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, |
6b1bb98f BK |
1673 | clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0, al)) { |
1674 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT); | |
1675 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1676 | } |
1677 | ||
1678 | /* | |
1679 | * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake | |
1680 | * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before | |
1681 | * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket | |
1682 | * processing to use it in key derivation. | |
1683 | */ | |
1684 | { | |
1685 | unsigned char *pos; | |
1686 | pos = s->s3->server_random; | |
1687 | if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) { | |
6b1bb98f | 1688 | goto err; |
0f113f3e MC |
1689 | } |
1690 | } | |
1691 | ||
aff8c126 | 1692 | if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->ext.session_secret_cb) { |
4a640fb6 | 1693 | const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL; |
8c1a5343 MC |
1694 | /* |
1695 | * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for | |
1696 | * backwards compat reasons | |
1697 | */ | |
1698 | int master_key_length; | |
0f113f3e | 1699 | |
8c1a5343 | 1700 | master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key); |
aff8c126 | 1701 | if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, |
8c1a5343 | 1702 | &master_key_length, ciphers, |
0f113f3e | 1703 | &pref_cipher, |
aff8c126 | 1704 | s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg) |
8c1a5343 MC |
1705 | && master_key_length > 0) { |
1706 | s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1707 | s->hit = 1; |
1708 | s->session->ciphers = ciphers; | |
1709 | s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK; | |
1710 | ||
1711 | ciphers = NULL; | |
1712 | ||
1713 | /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */ | |
3f4bf115 DSH |
1714 | if (pref_cipher == NULL) |
1715 | pref_cipher = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, | |
1716 | SSL_get_ciphers(s)); | |
0f113f3e | 1717 | if (pref_cipher == NULL) { |
6b1bb98f BK |
1718 | *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
1719 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); | |
1720 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1721 | } |
1722 | ||
1723 | s->session->cipher = pref_cipher; | |
25aaa98a | 1724 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list); |
0f113f3e | 1725 | s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers); |
25aaa98a | 1726 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id); |
0f113f3e MC |
1727 | s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers); |
1728 | } | |
1729 | } | |
58ece833 | 1730 | |
0f113f3e MC |
1731 | /* |
1732 | * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other | |
b2ce0337 | 1733 | * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression |
0f113f3e MC |
1734 | * algorithms from the client, starting at q. |
1735 | */ | |
1736 | s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL; | |
09b6c2ef | 1737 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP |
0f113f3e MC |
1738 | /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */ |
1739 | if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) { | |
1740 | int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth; | |
9ceb2426 | 1741 | unsigned int k; |
0f113f3e MC |
1742 | /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */ |
1743 | /* Can't disable compression */ | |
1744 | if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) { | |
6b1bb98f | 1745 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, |
0f113f3e | 1746 | SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); |
6b1bb98f | 1747 | goto err; |
0f113f3e MC |
1748 | } |
1749 | /* Look for resumed compression method */ | |
1750 | for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) { | |
1751 | comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m); | |
1752 | if (comp_id == comp->id) { | |
1753 | s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp; | |
1754 | break; | |
1755 | } | |
1756 | } | |
1757 | if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) { | |
6b1bb98f | 1758 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, |
0f113f3e | 1759 | SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); |
6b1bb98f | 1760 | goto err; |
0f113f3e MC |
1761 | } |
1762 | /* Look for resumed method in compression list */ | |
6b1bb98f BK |
1763 | for (k = 0; k < clienthello->compressions_len; k++) { |
1764 | if (clienthello->compressions[k] == comp_id) | |
0f113f3e MC |
1765 | break; |
1766 | } | |
6b1bb98f BK |
1767 | if (k >= clienthello->compressions_len) { |
1768 | *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
1769 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, | |
8fdc99cb | 1770 | SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING); |
6b1bb98f | 1771 | goto err; |
0f113f3e MC |
1772 | } |
1773 | } else if (s->hit) | |
1774 | comp = NULL; | |
1775 | else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) { | |
df6741c9 | 1776 | /* See if we have a match */ |
9ceb2426 MC |
1777 | int m, nn, v, done = 0; |
1778 | unsigned int o; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1779 | |
1780 | nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); | |
1781 | for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) { | |
1782 | comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m); | |
1783 | v = comp->id; | |
6b1bb98f BK |
1784 | for (o = 0; o < clienthello->compressions_len; o++) { |
1785 | if (v == clienthello->compressions[o]) { | |
0f113f3e MC |
1786 | done = 1; |
1787 | break; | |
1788 | } | |
1789 | } | |
1790 | if (done) | |
1791 | break; | |
1792 | } | |
1793 | if (done) | |
1794 | s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp; | |
1795 | else | |
1796 | comp = NULL; | |
1797 | } | |
e6f418bc | 1798 | #else |
0f113f3e MC |
1799 | /* |
1800 | * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session | |
1801 | * using compression. | |
1802 | */ | |
1803 | if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) { | |
6b1bb98f BK |
1804 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); |
1805 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e | 1806 | } |
09b6c2ef | 1807 | #endif |
413c4f45 | 1808 | |
0f113f3e MC |
1809 | /* |
1810 | * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher | |
1811 | */ | |
d02b48c6 | 1812 | |
0f113f3e | 1813 | if (!s->hit) { |
09b6c2ef | 1814 | #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP |
0f113f3e | 1815 | s->session->compress_meth = 0; |
09b6c2ef | 1816 | #else |
0f113f3e | 1817 | s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id; |
09b6c2ef | 1818 | #endif |
25aaa98a | 1819 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers); |
0f113f3e MC |
1820 | s->session->ciphers = ciphers; |
1821 | if (ciphers == NULL) { | |
6b1bb98f BK |
1822 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
1823 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1824 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1825 | } |
1826 | ciphers = NULL; | |
1827 | if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) { | |
6b1bb98f | 1828 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); |
0f113f3e MC |
1829 | goto err; |
1830 | } | |
e27f234a MC |
1831 | } |
1832 | ||
1833 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers); | |
6b1bb98f BK |
1834 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs); |
1835 | OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts); | |
1836 | OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello); | |
1837 | s->clienthello = NULL; | |
1838 | return 1; | |
e27f234a | 1839 | err: |
fe3a3291 | 1840 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); |
e27f234a MC |
1841 | |
1842 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers); | |
6b1bb98f BK |
1843 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs); |
1844 | OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts); | |
1845 | OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello); | |
1846 | s->clienthello = NULL; | |
e27f234a | 1847 | |
6b1bb98f | 1848 | return 0; |
e27f234a MC |
1849 | } |
1850 | ||
24b8e4b2 MC |
1851 | /* |
1852 | * Call the status request callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1. | |
1266eefd | 1853 | * Upon failure, returns 0 and sets |*al| to the appropriate fatal alert. |
24b8e4b2 MC |
1854 | */ |
1855 | static int tls_handle_status_request(SSL *s, int *al) | |
1856 | { | |
aff8c126 | 1857 | s->ext.status_expected = 0; |
24b8e4b2 MC |
1858 | |
1859 | /* | |
1860 | * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be | |
1861 | * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed, | |
1862 | * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may | |
1863 | * influence which certificate is sent | |
1864 | */ | |
aff8c126 RS |
1865 | if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing && s->ctx != NULL |
1866 | && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) { | |
24b8e4b2 | 1867 | int ret; |
1266eefd | 1868 | |
24b8e4b2 | 1869 | /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */ |
a497cf25 | 1870 | if (s->s3->tmp.cert != NULL) { |
24b8e4b2 MC |
1871 | /* |
1872 | * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate | |
1873 | * et al can pick it up. | |
1874 | */ | |
a497cf25 | 1875 | s->cert->key = s->s3->tmp.cert; |
aff8c126 | 1876 | ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg); |
24b8e4b2 MC |
1877 | switch (ret) { |
1878 | /* We don't want to send a status request response */ | |
1879 | case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: | |
aff8c126 | 1880 | s->ext.status_expected = 0; |
24b8e4b2 MC |
1881 | break; |
1882 | /* status request response should be sent */ | |
1883 | case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK: | |
aff8c126 RS |
1884 | if (s->ext.ocsp.resp) |
1885 | s->ext.status_expected = 1; | |
24b8e4b2 MC |
1886 | break; |
1887 | /* something bad happened */ | |
1888 | case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: | |
1889 | default: | |
1890 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
1891 | return 0; | |
1892 | } | |
1893 | } | |
1894 | } | |
1895 | ||
1896 | return 1; | |
1897 | } | |
1898 | ||
be3583fa | 1899 | WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) |
e27f234a | 1900 | { |
d13dd4be | 1901 | int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
4a640fb6 | 1902 | const SSL_CIPHER *cipher; |
e27f234a MC |
1903 | |
1904 | if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) { | |
6b1bb98f BK |
1905 | int rv = tls_early_post_process_client_hello(s, &al); |
1906 | if (rv == 0) { | |
1907 | /* SSLErr() was already called */ | |
1908 | goto f_err; | |
1909 | } | |
1910 | if (rv < 0) | |
1911 | return WORK_MORE_A; | |
1912 | wst = WORK_MORE_B; | |
1913 | } | |
1914 | if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) { | |
e27f234a MC |
1915 | if (!s->hit) { |
1916 | /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */ | |
1917 | if (s->cert->cert_cb) { | |
1918 | int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg); | |
1919 | if (rv == 0) { | |
1920 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
a230b26e EK |
1921 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, |
1922 | SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR); | |
e27f234a MC |
1923 | goto f_err; |
1924 | } | |
1925 | if (rv < 0) { | |
1926 | s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; | |
6b1bb98f | 1927 | return WORK_MORE_B; |
e27f234a MC |
1928 | } |
1929 | s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; | |
0f113f3e | 1930 | } |
a230b26e EK |
1931 | cipher = |
1932 | ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s)); | |
e27f234a MC |
1933 | |
1934 | if (cipher == NULL) { | |
a230b26e EK |
1935 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, |
1936 | SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); | |
e27f234a | 1937 | goto f_err; |
0f113f3e | 1938 | } |
e27f234a | 1939 | s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher; |
4a419f60 | 1940 | if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, &al)) |
56723275 | 1941 | goto f_err; |
e27f234a MC |
1942 | /* check whether we should disable session resumption */ |
1943 | if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL) | |
24b8e4b2 MC |
1944 | s->session->not_resumable = |
1945 | s->not_resumable_session_cb(s, ((cipher->algorithm_mkey | |
1946 | & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) | |
1947 | != 0)); | |
e27f234a MC |
1948 | if (s->session->not_resumable) |
1949 | /* do not send a session ticket */ | |
aff8c126 | 1950 | s->ext.ticket_expected = 0; |
e27f234a MC |
1951 | } else { |
1952 | /* Session-id reuse */ | |
1953 | s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher; | |
0f113f3e | 1954 | } |
0f113f3e | 1955 | |
e27f234a MC |
1956 | /*- |
1957 | * we now have the following setup. | |
1958 | * client_random | |
60250017 | 1959 | * cipher_list - our preferred list of ciphers |
1960 | * ciphers - the clients preferred list of ciphers | |
e27f234a MC |
1961 | * compression - basically ignored right now |
1962 | * ssl version is set - sslv3 | |
1963 | * s->session - The ssl session has been setup. | |
1964 | * s->hit - session reuse flag | |
1965 | * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use. | |
1966 | */ | |
0f113f3e | 1967 | |
24b8e4b2 MC |
1968 | /* |
1969 | * Call status_request callback if needed. Has to be done after the | |
1970 | * certificate callbacks etc above. | |
1971 | */ | |
1972 | if (!tls_handle_status_request(s, &al)) { | |
1973 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, | |
1974 | SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); | |
1975 | goto f_err; | |
e27f234a | 1976 | } |
0f113f3e | 1977 | |
6b1bb98f | 1978 | wst = WORK_MORE_C; |
e27f234a MC |
1979 | } |
1980 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP | |
6b1bb98f | 1981 | if (wst == WORK_MORE_C) { |
e27f234a MC |
1982 | int ret; |
1983 | if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s, &al)) < 0) { | |
1984 | /* | |
1985 | * callback indicates further work to be done | |
1986 | */ | |
1987 | s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; | |
6b1bb98f | 1988 | return WORK_MORE_C; |
e27f234a MC |
1989 | } |
1990 | if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) { | |
1991 | /* | |
1992 | * This is not really an error but the only means to for | |
1993 | * a client to detect whether srp is supported. | |
1994 | */ | |
1995 | if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY) | |
1996 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, | |
a230b26e | 1997 | SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); |
7bb37cb5 E |
1998 | else |
1999 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, | |
2000 | SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND); | |
e27f234a | 2001 | goto f_err; |
0f113f3e MC |
2002 | } |
2003 | } | |
e27f234a | 2004 | #endif |
0f113f3e | 2005 | |
e27f234a | 2006 | return WORK_FINISHED_STOP; |
0f113f3e | 2007 | f_err: |
e27f234a | 2008 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); |
fe3a3291 | 2009 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); |
e27f234a MC |
2010 | return WORK_ERROR; |
2011 | } | |
2012 | ||
7cea05dc | 2013 | int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
0f113f3e | 2014 | { |
ec60ccc1 MC |
2015 | int compm, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
2016 | size_t sl, len; | |
f2342b7a | 2017 | int version; |
0f113f3e | 2018 | |
b97667ce | 2019 | /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove the DRAFT conditional before release */ |
f2342b7a MC |
2020 | version = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT : s->version; |
2021 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, version) | |
8157d44b MC |
2022 | /* |
2023 | * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in | |
2024 | * tls_process_client_hello() | |
2025 | */ | |
7cea05dc | 2026 | || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) { |
8157d44b MC |
2027 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
2028 | goto err; | |
2029 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2030 | |
e27f234a MC |
2031 | /*- |
2032 | * There are several cases for the session ID to send | |
2033 | * back in the server hello: | |
2034 | * - For session reuse from the session cache, | |
2035 | * we send back the old session ID. | |
2036 | * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket) | |
2037 | * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID" | |
2038 | * (which doesn't actually identify the session). | |
2039 | * - If it is a new session, we send back the new | |
2040 | * session ID. | |
2041 | * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use, | |
2042 | * we send back a 0-length session ID. | |
2043 | * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse, | |
2044 | * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed | |
2045 | * to send back. | |
2046 | */ | |
2047 | if (s->session->not_resumable || | |
2048 | (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER) | |
2049 | && !s->hit)) | |
2050 | s->session->session_id_length = 0; | |
2051 | ||
2052 | sl = s->session->session_id_length; | |
ec60ccc1 | 2053 | if (sl > sizeof(s->session->session_id)) { |
e27f234a | 2054 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
8157d44b | 2055 | goto err; |
e27f234a | 2056 | } |
0f113f3e | 2057 | |
8157d44b | 2058 | /* set up the compression method */ |
09b6c2ef | 2059 | #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP |
8157d44b | 2060 | compm = 0; |
09b6c2ef | 2061 | #else |
e27f234a | 2062 | if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) |
8157d44b | 2063 | compm = 0; |
e27f234a | 2064 | else |
8157d44b | 2065 | compm = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id; |
09b6c2ef | 2066 | #endif |
e481f9b9 | 2067 | |
71728dd8 MC |
2068 | if ((!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) |
2069 | && !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->session->session_id, sl)) | |
7cea05dc | 2070 | || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, pkt, &len) |
71728dd8 MC |
2071 | || (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) |
2072 | && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, compm)) | |
7da160b0 | 2073 | || !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, |
3434f40b | 2074 | SSL_IS_TLS13(s) |
1266eefd | 2075 | ? EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO |
30aeba43 MC |
2076 | : EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO, |
2077 | NULL, 0, &al)) { | |
e27f234a | 2078 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
8157d44b | 2079 | goto err; |
0f113f3e | 2080 | } |
d02b48c6 | 2081 | |
aff9929b MC |
2082 | if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) |
2083 | && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { | |
2084 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
2085 | goto err; | |
2086 | } | |
2087 | ||
e27f234a | 2088 | return 1; |
8157d44b | 2089 | err: |
7da160b0 | 2090 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); |
8157d44b | 2091 | return 0; |
0f113f3e | 2092 | } |
d02b48c6 | 2093 | |
7cea05dc | 2094 | int tls_construct_server_done(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
e27f234a | 2095 | { |
e27f234a | 2096 | if (!s->s3->tmp.cert_request) { |
5923ad4b MC |
2097 | if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { |
2098 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2099 | return 0; | |
2100 | } | |
e27f234a | 2101 | } |
e27f234a MC |
2102 | return 1; |
2103 | } | |
2104 | ||
7cea05dc | 2105 | int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
0f113f3e | 2106 | { |
bc36ee62 | 2107 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH |
e2b420fd | 2108 | EVP_PKEY *pkdh = NULL; |
ea262260 | 2109 | #endif |
10bf4fc2 | 2110 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
0f113f3e | 2111 | unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL; |
348240c6 | 2112 | size_t encodedlen = 0; |
0f113f3e | 2113 | int curve_id = 0; |
d02b48c6 | 2114 | #endif |
f695571e | 2115 | const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3->tmp.sigalg; |
c13d2a5b | 2116 | int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, i; |
0f113f3e | 2117 | unsigned long type; |
2ac6115d | 2118 | const BIGNUM *r[4]; |
bfb0641f | 2119 | EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); |
fe3066ee | 2120 | EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; |
c13d2a5b MC |
2121 | size_t paramlen, paramoffset; |
2122 | ||
5923ad4b | 2123 | if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, ¶moffset)) { |
e4e1aa90 | 2124 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
c13d2a5b MC |
2125 | goto f_err; |
2126 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2127 | |
6e59a892 RL |
2128 | if (md_ctx == NULL) { |
2129 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
6e59a892 RL |
2130 | goto f_err; |
2131 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2132 | |
e27f234a | 2133 | type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; |
e27f234a | 2134 | |
e27f234a | 2135 | r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL; |
85269210 | 2136 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK |
e27f234a MC |
2137 | /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */ |
2138 | if (type & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) { | |
2139 | } else | |
85269210 | 2140 | #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ |
bc36ee62 | 2141 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH |
e27f234a | 2142 | if (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) { |
94d61512 BL |
2143 | CERT *cert = s->cert; |
2144 | ||
e2b420fd DSH |
2145 | EVP_PKEY *pkdhp = NULL; |
2146 | DH *dh; | |
2147 | ||
e27f234a | 2148 | if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) { |
e2b420fd DSH |
2149 | DH *dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s); |
2150 | pkdh = EVP_PKEY_new(); | |
2151 | if (pkdh == NULL || dhp == NULL) { | |
2152 | DH_free(dhp); | |
e27f234a | 2153 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
0f113f3e | 2154 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
e27f234a | 2155 | goto f_err; |
0f113f3e | 2156 | } |
e2b420fd DSH |
2157 | EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkdh, dhp); |
2158 | pkdhp = pkdh; | |
2159 | } else { | |
2160 | pkdhp = cert->dh_tmp; | |
2161 | } | |
2162 | if ((pkdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) { | |
2163 | DH *dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0, 1024); | |
2164 | pkdh = ssl_dh_to_pkey(dhp); | |
2165 | if (pkdh == NULL) { | |
e2b420fd DSH |
2166 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
2167 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2168 | goto f_err; | |
2169 | } | |
2170 | pkdhp = pkdh; | |
2171 | } | |
2172 | if (pkdhp == NULL) { | |
e27f234a MC |
2173 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
2174 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2175 | SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); | |
2176 | goto f_err; | |
2177 | } | |
2178 | if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, | |
e2b420fd | 2179 | EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkdhp), 0, pkdhp)) { |
e27f234a MC |
2180 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
2181 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2182 | SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL); | |
2183 | goto f_err; | |
2184 | } | |
e2b420fd | 2185 | if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) { |
e27f234a MC |
2186 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
2187 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2188 | goto err; | |
2189 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2190 | |
0a699a07 | 2191 | s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(pkdhp); |
e27f234a | 2192 | |
e2b420fd DSH |
2193 | if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) { |
2194 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
ffaef3f1 | 2195 | goto err; |
e27f234a | 2196 | } |
e2b420fd DSH |
2197 | |
2198 | dh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(s->s3->tmp.pkey); | |
2199 | ||
2200 | EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh); | |
2201 | pkdh = NULL; | |
2202 | ||
0aeddcfa MC |
2203 | DH_get0_pqg(dh, &r[0], NULL, &r[1]); |
2204 | DH_get0_key(dh, &r[2], NULL); | |
e27f234a | 2205 | } else |
d02b48c6 | 2206 | #endif |
10bf4fc2 | 2207 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
e27f234a | 2208 | if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) { |
57be4444 | 2209 | int nid; |
e27f234a | 2210 | |
880d9d86 | 2211 | if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) { |
e27f234a MC |
2212 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
2213 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2214 | goto err; | |
2215 | } | |
2216 | ||
57be4444 | 2217 | /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */ |
de4d764e | 2218 | nid = tls1_shared_group(s, -2); |
57be4444 DSH |
2219 | curve_id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(nid); |
2220 | if (curve_id == 0) { | |
e27f234a MC |
2221 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
2222 | SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE); | |
2223 | goto err; | |
2224 | } | |
0a699a07 | 2225 | s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey_curve(curve_id); |
880d9d86 DSH |
2226 | /* Generate a new key for this curve */ |
2227 | if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) { | |
880d9d86 | 2228 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
57be4444 DSH |
2229 | goto f_err; |
2230 | } | |
2231 | ||
880d9d86 | 2232 | /* Encode the public key. */ |
ec24630a DSH |
2233 | encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->tmp.pkey, |
2234 | &encodedPoint); | |
e27f234a | 2235 | if (encodedlen == 0) { |
cae41364 | 2236 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); |
e27f234a MC |
2237 | goto err; |
2238 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2239 | |
e27f234a MC |
2240 | /* |
2241 | * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we | |
2242 | * can set these to NULLs | |
2243 | */ | |
2244 | r[0] = NULL; | |
2245 | r[1] = NULL; | |
2246 | r[2] = NULL; | |
2247 | r[3] = NULL; | |
2248 | } else | |
10bf4fc2 | 2249 | #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ |
edc032b5 | 2250 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP |
e27f234a MC |
2251 | if (type & SSL_kSRP) { |
2252 | if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) || | |
2253 | (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) || | |
2254 | (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) { | |
2255 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2256 | SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM); | |
2257 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e | 2258 | } |
e27f234a MC |
2259 | r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N; |
2260 | r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g; | |
2261 | r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s; | |
2262 | r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B; | |
2263 | } else | |
2264 | #endif | |
2265 | { | |
2266 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
2267 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2268 | SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE); | |
2269 | goto f_err; | |
2270 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2271 | |
f695571e DSH |
2272 | if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) != 0) |
2273 | || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) != 0) { | |
2274 | lu = NULL; | |
2275 | } else if (lu == NULL) { | |
2276 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
2277 | goto f_err; | |
e27f234a | 2278 | } |
0f113f3e | 2279 | |
85269210 | 2280 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK |
e27f234a | 2281 | if (type & SSL_PSK) { |
c13d2a5b MC |
2282 | size_t len = (s->cert->psk_identity_hint == NULL) |
2283 | ? 0 : strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint); | |
2284 | ||
2285 | /* | |
2286 | * It should not happen that len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN - we already | |
2287 | * checked this when we set the identity hint - but just in case | |
2288 | */ | |
2289 | if (len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN | |
7cea05dc | 2290 | || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->cert->psk_identity_hint, |
c13d2a5b MC |
2291 | len)) { |
2292 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2293 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2294 | goto f_err; | |
85269210 | 2295 | } |
e27f234a | 2296 | } |
85269210 DSH |
2297 | #endif |
2298 | ||
e27f234a | 2299 | for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) { |
c13d2a5b MC |
2300 | unsigned char *binval; |
2301 | int res; | |
2302 | ||
edc032b5 | 2303 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP |
e27f234a | 2304 | if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) { |
7cea05dc | 2305 | res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt); |
e27f234a | 2306 | } else |
78a01b3f | 2307 | #endif |
7cea05dc | 2308 | res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt); |
c13d2a5b MC |
2309 | |
2310 | if (!res) { | |
2311 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2312 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2313 | goto f_err; | |
2314 | } | |
2315 | ||
78a01b3f | 2316 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH |
a230b26e | 2317 | /*- |
78a01b3f | 2318 | * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS |
2319 | * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length | |
2320 | * as the prime | |
2321 | */ | |
2322 | if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK))) { | |
c13d2a5b | 2323 | size_t len = BN_num_bytes(r[0]) - BN_num_bytes(r[2]); |
ff819477 | 2324 | |
c13d2a5b | 2325 | if (len > 0) { |
7cea05dc | 2326 | if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &binval)) { |
c13d2a5b MC |
2327 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
2328 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2329 | goto f_err; | |
2330 | } | |
2331 | memset(binval, 0, len); | |
78a01b3f | 2332 | } |
c13d2a5b | 2333 | } |
edc032b5 | 2334 | #endif |
7cea05dc MC |
2335 | if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, BN_num_bytes(r[i]), &binval) |
2336 | || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { | |
c13d2a5b MC |
2337 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
2338 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2339 | goto f_err; | |
2340 | } | |
2341 | ||
2342 | BN_bn2bin(r[i], binval); | |
e27f234a | 2343 | } |
d02b48c6 | 2344 | |
10bf4fc2 | 2345 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
e27f234a MC |
2346 | if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) { |
2347 | /* | |
c13d2a5b MC |
2348 | * We only support named (not generic) curves. In this situation, the |
2349 | * ServerKeyExchange message has: [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] | |
2350 | * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by the actual encoded | |
2351 | * point itself | |
e27f234a | 2352 | */ |
7cea05dc MC |
2353 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE) |
2354 | || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) | |
2355 | || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, curve_id) | |
2356 | || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encodedlen)) { | |
c13d2a5b MC |
2357 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
2358 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2359 | goto f_err; | |
2360 | } | |
e27f234a MC |
2361 | OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); |
2362 | encodedPoint = NULL; | |
e27f234a | 2363 | } |
ea262260 BM |
2364 | #endif |
2365 | ||
e27f234a | 2366 | /* not anonymous */ |
f695571e | 2367 | if (lu != NULL) { |
a497cf25 | 2368 | EVP_PKEY *pkey = s->s3->tmp.cert->privatekey; |
f695571e DSH |
2369 | const EVP_MD *md = ssl_md(lu->hash_idx); |
2370 | unsigned char *sigbytes1, *sigbytes2; | |
2371 | size_t siglen; | |
2372 | ||
2373 | if (pkey == NULL || md == NULL) { | |
2374 | /* Should never happen */ | |
2375 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
2376 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2377 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2378 | goto f_err; | |
2379 | } | |
e27f234a MC |
2380 | /* |
2381 | * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p | |
2382 | * points to the space at the end. | |
2383 | */ | |
c13d2a5b | 2384 | |
f695571e DSH |
2385 | /* Get length of the parameters we have written above */ |
2386 | if (!WPACKET_get_length(pkt, ¶mlen)) { | |
2387 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2388 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2389 | goto f_err; | |
2390 | } | |
2391 | /* send signature algorithm */ | |
2392 | if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg)) | |
2393 | return 0; | |
2394 | /* | |
2395 | * Create the signature. We don't know the actual length of the sig | |
2396 | * until after we've created it, so we reserve enough bytes for it | |
2397 | * up front, and then properly allocate them in the WPACKET | |
2398 | * afterwards. | |
2399 | */ | |
2400 | siglen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); | |
2401 | if (!WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes1) | |
2402 | || EVP_DigestSignInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) { | |
2403 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2404 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2405 | goto f_err; | |
2406 | } | |
2407 | if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) { | |
2408 | if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0 | |
2409 | || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) { | |
c13d2a5b | 2410 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
f695571e | 2411 | ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
5f3d93e4 | 2412 | goto f_err; |
0f113f3e | 2413 | } |
f695571e DSH |
2414 | } |
2415 | if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]), | |
2416 | SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 | |
2417 | || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]), | |
2418 | SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 | |
2419 | || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(md_ctx, | |
2420 | s->init_buf->data + paramoffset, | |
2421 | paramlen) <= 0 | |
2422 | || EVP_DigestSignFinal(md_ctx, sigbytes1, &siglen) <= 0 | |
2423 | || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes2) | |
2424 | || sigbytes1 != sigbytes2) { | |
e27f234a | 2425 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
f695571e | 2426 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
77d514c5 MC |
2427 | goto f_err; |
2428 | } | |
0f113f3e MC |
2429 | } |
2430 | ||
bfb0641f | 2431 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); |
e27f234a | 2432 | return 1; |
0f113f3e MC |
2433 | f_err: |
2434 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
2435 | err: | |
e2b420fd DSH |
2436 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH |
2437 | EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh); | |
2438 | #endif | |
556efe79 | 2439 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
b548a1f1 | 2440 | OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); |
ea262260 | 2441 | #endif |
bfb0641f | 2442 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); |
e27f234a | 2443 | return 0; |
0f113f3e | 2444 | } |
d02b48c6 | 2445 | |
7cea05dc | 2446 | int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
0f113f3e | 2447 | { |
348240c6 | 2448 | int i; |
0f113f3e | 2449 | STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL; |
0f113f3e | 2450 | |
e27f234a | 2451 | /* get the list of acceptable cert types */ |
7cea05dc MC |
2452 | if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt) |
2453 | || !ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, pkt) | |
2454 | || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { | |
28ff8ef3 MC |
2455 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
2456 | goto err; | |
2457 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2458 | |
e27f234a | 2459 | if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { |
98c792d1 | 2460 | const uint16_t *psigs; |
a9669ddc | 2461 | size_t nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &psigs); |
703bcee0 | 2462 | |
7cea05dc MC |
2463 | if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) |
2464 | || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, psigs, nl) | |
2465 | || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { | |
28ff8ef3 MC |
2466 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, |
2467 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2468 | goto err; | |
2469 | } | |
e27f234a | 2470 | } |
0f113f3e | 2471 | |
28ff8ef3 | 2472 | /* Start sub-packet for client CA list */ |
7cea05dc | 2473 | if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { |
28ff8ef3 MC |
2474 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
2475 | goto err; | |
2476 | } | |
e27f234a MC |
2477 | |
2478 | sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s); | |
e27f234a MC |
2479 | if (sk != NULL) { |
2480 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) { | |
28ff8ef3 MC |
2481 | unsigned char *namebytes; |
2482 | X509_NAME *name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i); | |
2483 | int namelen; | |
2484 | ||
2485 | if (name == NULL | |
2486 | || (namelen = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL)) < 0 | |
7cea05dc | 2487 | || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, namelen, |
28ff8ef3 MC |
2488 | &namebytes) |
2489 | || i2d_X509_NAME(name, &namebytes) != namelen) { | |
2490 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, | |
2491 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
e27f234a | 2492 | goto err; |
0f113f3e MC |
2493 | } |
2494 | } | |
e27f234a MC |
2495 | } |
2496 | /* else no CA names */ | |
d02b48c6 | 2497 | |
5923ad4b | 2498 | if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) { |
e27f234a MC |
2499 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
2500 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e | 2501 | } |
d02b48c6 | 2502 | |
e27f234a MC |
2503 | s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1; |
2504 | ||
2505 | return 1; | |
0f113f3e | 2506 | err: |
28ff8ef3 | 2507 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
e27f234a | 2508 | return 0; |
0f113f3e | 2509 | } |
d02b48c6 | 2510 | |
0907d710 | 2511 | static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) |
e27f234a | 2512 | { |
85269210 | 2513 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK |
0907d710 MC |
2514 | unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN]; |
2515 | size_t psklen; | |
2516 | PACKET psk_identity; | |
efcdbcbe | 2517 | |
0907d710 MC |
2518 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity)) { |
2519 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2520 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
0907d710 MC |
2521 | return 0; |
2522 | } | |
2523 | if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { | |
2524 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2525 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); |
0907d710 MC |
2526 | return 0; |
2527 | } | |
2528 | if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) { | |
2529 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
a230b26e | 2530 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB); |
0907d710 MC |
2531 | return 0; |
2532 | } | |
85269210 | 2533 | |
0907d710 MC |
2534 | if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity)) { |
2535 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2536 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
0907d710 MC |
2537 | return 0; |
2538 | } | |
85269210 | 2539 | |
0907d710 | 2540 | psklen = s->psk_server_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity, |
a230b26e | 2541 | psk, sizeof(psk)); |
85269210 | 2542 | |
0907d710 MC |
2543 | if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) { |
2544 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2545 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
0907d710 MC |
2546 | return 0; |
2547 | } else if (psklen == 0) { | |
2548 | /* | |
2549 | * PSK related to the given identity not found | |
2550 | */ | |
2551 | *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY; | |
c76a4aea | 2552 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, |
0907d710 MC |
2553 | SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND); |
2554 | return 0; | |
2555 | } | |
85269210 | 2556 | |
0907d710 MC |
2557 | OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk); |
2558 | s->s3->tmp.psk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen); | |
2559 | OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen); | |
85269210 | 2560 | |
0907d710 MC |
2561 | if (s->s3->tmp.psk == NULL) { |
2562 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2563 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
0907d710 | 2564 | return 0; |
85269210 | 2565 | } |
0907d710 MC |
2566 | |
2567 | s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen; | |
2568 | ||
2569 | return 1; | |
2570 | #else | |
2571 | /* Should never happen */ | |
2572 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2573 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
0907d710 | 2574 | return 0; |
85269210 | 2575 | #endif |
0907d710 MC |
2576 | } |
2577 | ||
0907d710 MC |
2578 | static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) |
2579 | { | |
bc36ee62 | 2580 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA |
0907d710 MC |
2581 | unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; |
2582 | int decrypt_len; | |
2583 | unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good; | |
2584 | size_t j, padding_len; | |
2585 | PACKET enc_premaster; | |
2586 | RSA *rsa = NULL; | |
2587 | unsigned char *rsa_decrypt = NULL; | |
2588 | int ret = 0; | |
2589 | ||
d0ff28f8 | 2590 | rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA].privatekey); |
0907d710 MC |
2591 | if (rsa == NULL) { |
2592 | *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
c76a4aea | 2593 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE); |
0907d710 MC |
2594 | return 0; |
2595 | } | |
2596 | ||
2597 | /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */ | |
2598 | if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) { | |
2599 | enc_premaster = *pkt; | |
2600 | } else { | |
2601 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &enc_premaster) | |
2602 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { | |
2603 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2604 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
0907d710 | 2605 | return 0; |
0f113f3e | 2606 | } |
0907d710 | 2607 | } |
0f113f3e | 2608 | |
0907d710 MC |
2609 | /* |
2610 | * We want to be sure that the plaintext buffer size makes it safe to | |
2611 | * iterate over the entire size of a premaster secret | |
2612 | * (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). Reject overly short RSA keys because | |
2613 | * their ciphertext cannot accommodate a premaster secret anyway. | |
2614 | */ | |
2615 | if (RSA_size(rsa) < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) { | |
2616 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2617 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL); |
0907d710 MC |
2618 | return 0; |
2619 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2620 | |
0907d710 MC |
2621 | rsa_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa)); |
2622 | if (rsa_decrypt == NULL) { | |
2623 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2624 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
0907d710 MC |
2625 | return 0; |
2626 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2627 | |
0907d710 MC |
2628 | /* |
2629 | * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of | |
2630 | * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246, | |
2631 | * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and | |
2632 | * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt | |
2633 | * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1 | |
2634 | */ | |
20ca916d | 2635 | |
a230b26e | 2636 | if (RAND_bytes(rand_premaster_secret, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0) |
0907d710 | 2637 | goto err; |
0f113f3e | 2638 | |
0907d710 MC |
2639 | /* |
2640 | * Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part of | |
2641 | * the timing-sensitive code below. | |
2642 | */ | |
348240c6 MC |
2643 | /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */ |
2644 | decrypt_len = (int)RSA_private_decrypt((int)PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster), | |
2645 | PACKET_data(&enc_premaster), | |
2646 | rsa_decrypt, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING); | |
0907d710 MC |
2647 | if (decrypt_len < 0) |
2648 | goto err; | |
20ca916d | 2649 | |
0907d710 | 2650 | /* Check the padding. See RFC 3447, section 7.2.2. */ |
5b8fa431 | 2651 | |
0907d710 MC |
2652 | /* |
2653 | * The smallest padded premaster is 11 bytes of overhead. Small keys | |
2654 | * are publicly invalid, so this may return immediately. This ensures | |
2655 | * PS is at least 8 bytes. | |
2656 | */ | |
2657 | if (decrypt_len < 11 + SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) { | |
2658 | *al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2659 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); |
0907d710 MC |
2660 | goto err; |
2661 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2662 | |
0907d710 MC |
2663 | padding_len = decrypt_len - SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH; |
2664 | decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[0], 0) & | |
a230b26e | 2665 | constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[1], 2); |
0907d710 MC |
2666 | for (j = 2; j < padding_len - 1; j++) { |
2667 | decrypt_good &= ~constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[j]); | |
2668 | } | |
2669 | decrypt_good &= constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len - 1]); | |
5b8fa431 | 2670 | |
0907d710 MC |
2671 | /* |
2672 | * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then | |
2673 | * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The | |
2674 | * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack | |
2675 | * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number | |
2676 | * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in | |
2677 | * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error. | |
2678 | */ | |
2679 | version_good = | |
2680 | constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len], | |
2681 | (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8)); | |
2682 | version_good &= | |
2683 | constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1], | |
2684 | (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff)); | |
0f113f3e | 2685 | |
0907d710 MC |
2686 | /* |
2687 | * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the | |
2688 | * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the | |
2689 | * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites). | |
2690 | * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol | |
2691 | * version instead if the server does not support the requested | |
2692 | * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such | |
2693 | * clients. | |
2694 | */ | |
2695 | if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) { | |
2696 | unsigned char workaround_good; | |
2697 | workaround_good = constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len], | |
2698 | (unsigned)(s->version >> 8)); | |
2699 | workaround_good &= | |
5b8fa431 | 2700 | constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1], |
0907d710 MC |
2701 | (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff)); |
2702 | version_good |= workaround_good; | |
2703 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2704 | |
0907d710 MC |
2705 | /* |
2706 | * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to | |
2707 | * remain non-zero (0xff). | |
2708 | */ | |
2709 | decrypt_good &= version_good; | |
0f113f3e | 2710 | |
0907d710 MC |
2711 | /* |
2712 | * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using | |
2713 | * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not | |
2714 | * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees | |
2715 | * it is still sufficiently large to read from. | |
2716 | */ | |
2717 | for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) { | |
2718 | rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j] = | |
2719 | constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, | |
2720 | rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j], | |
2721 | rand_premaster_secret[j]); | |
2722 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2723 | |
0907d710 MC |
2724 | if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, rsa_decrypt + padding_len, |
2725 | sizeof(rand_premaster_secret), 0)) { | |
2726 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2727 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
0907d710 MC |
2728 | goto err; |
2729 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2730 | |
0907d710 MC |
2731 | ret = 1; |
2732 | err: | |
2733 | OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt); | |
2734 | return ret; | |
2735 | #else | |
2736 | /* Should never happen */ | |
2737 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2738 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
0907d710 MC |
2739 | return 0; |
2740 | #endif | |
2741 | } | |
2742 | ||
642360f9 MC |
2743 | static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) |
2744 | { | |
2745 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH | |
2746 | EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL; | |
2747 | DH *cdh; | |
2748 | unsigned int i; | |
2749 | BIGNUM *pub_key; | |
2750 | const unsigned char *data; | |
2751 | EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL; | |
2752 | int ret = 0; | |
2753 | ||
31a7d80d | 2754 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != i) { |
642360f9 | 2755 | *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
c76a4aea | 2756 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, |
642360f9 MC |
2757 | SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); |
2758 | goto err; | |
2759 | } | |
642360f9 MC |
2760 | skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey; |
2761 | if (skey == NULL) { | |
2762 | *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
c76a4aea | 2763 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); |
642360f9 MC |
2764 | goto err; |
2765 | } | |
2766 | ||
2767 | if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) { | |
2768 | *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
c76a4aea | 2769 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); |
642360f9 MC |
2770 | goto err; |
2771 | } | |
2772 | if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) { | |
2773 | /* We already checked we have enough data */ | |
2774 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2775 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
642360f9 MC |
2776 | goto err; |
2777 | } | |
2778 | ckey = EVP_PKEY_new(); | |
2779 | if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) == 0) { | |
c76a4aea | 2780 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_BN_LIB); |
642360f9 MC |
2781 | goto err; |
2782 | } | |
2783 | cdh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey); | |
2784 | pub_key = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL); | |
2785 | ||
2786 | if (pub_key == NULL || !DH_set0_key(cdh, pub_key, NULL)) { | |
c76a4aea | 2787 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
642360f9 MC |
2788 | if (pub_key != NULL) |
2789 | BN_free(pub_key); | |
2790 | goto err; | |
2791 | } | |
2792 | ||
0f1e51ea | 2793 | if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) { |
642360f9 | 2794 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
c76a4aea | 2795 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
642360f9 MC |
2796 | goto err; |
2797 | } | |
2798 | ||
2799 | ret = 1; | |
2800 | EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey); | |
2801 | s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL; | |
2802 | err: | |
2803 | EVP_PKEY_free(ckey); | |
2804 | return ret; | |
2805 | #else | |
2806 | /* Should never happen */ | |
2807 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2808 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
642360f9 MC |
2809 | return 0; |
2810 | #endif | |
2811 | } | |
2812 | ||
19ed1ec1 MC |
2813 | static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) |
2814 | { | |
2815 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC | |
2816 | EVP_PKEY *skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey; | |
2817 | EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL; | |
2818 | int ret = 0; | |
2819 | ||
2820 | if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) { | |
2821 | /* We don't support ECDH client auth */ | |
2822 | *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
c76a4aea | 2823 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY); |
19ed1ec1 MC |
2824 | goto err; |
2825 | } else { | |
2826 | unsigned int i; | |
2827 | const unsigned char *data; | |
2828 | ||
2829 | /* | |
2830 | * Get client's public key from encoded point in the | |
2831 | * ClientKeyExchange message. | |
2832 | */ | |
2833 | ||
2834 | /* Get encoded point length */ | |
fb933982 DSH |
2835 | if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &i) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i) |
2836 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { | |
19ed1ec1 | 2837 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
c76a4aea | 2838 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
19ed1ec1 MC |
2839 | goto err; |
2840 | } | |
19ed1ec1 MC |
2841 | ckey = EVP_PKEY_new(); |
2842 | if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) <= 0) { | |
c76a4aea | 2843 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
19ed1ec1 MC |
2844 | goto err; |
2845 | } | |
ec24630a | 2846 | if (EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, data, i) == 0) { |
fb933982 | 2847 | *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
c76a4aea | 2848 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); |
19ed1ec1 MC |
2849 | goto err; |
2850 | } | |
2851 | } | |
2852 | ||
0f1e51ea | 2853 | if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) { |
19ed1ec1 | 2854 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
c76a4aea | 2855 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
19ed1ec1 MC |
2856 | goto err; |
2857 | } | |
2858 | ||
2859 | ret = 1; | |
2860 | EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey); | |
2861 | s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL; | |
2862 | err: | |
2863 | EVP_PKEY_free(ckey); | |
2864 | ||
2865 | return ret; | |
2866 | #else | |
2867 | /* Should never happen */ | |
2868 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2869 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
19ed1ec1 MC |
2870 | return 0; |
2871 | #endif | |
2872 | } | |
2873 | ||
c437eef6 MC |
2874 | static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) |
2875 | { | |
2876 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP | |
2877 | unsigned int i; | |
2878 | const unsigned char *data; | |
2879 | ||
2880 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i) | |
a230b26e | 2881 | || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) { |
c437eef6 | 2882 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
c76a4aea | 2883 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH); |
c437eef6 MC |
2884 | return 0; |
2885 | } | |
2886 | if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL)) == NULL) { | |
c76a4aea | 2887 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_BN_LIB); |
c437eef6 MC |
2888 | return 0; |
2889 | } | |
a230b26e | 2890 | if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) { |
c437eef6 | 2891 | *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
c76a4aea | 2892 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS); |
c437eef6 MC |
2893 | return 0; |
2894 | } | |
2895 | OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username); | |
2896 | s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login); | |
2897 | if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) { | |
c76a4aea | 2898 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
c437eef6 MC |
2899 | return 0; |
2900 | } | |
2901 | ||
2902 | if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s)) { | |
c76a4aea | 2903 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
c437eef6 MC |
2904 | return 0; |
2905 | } | |
2906 | ||
2907 | return 1; | |
2908 | #else | |
2909 | /* Should never happen */ | |
2910 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2911 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
c437eef6 MC |
2912 | return 0; |
2913 | #endif | |
2914 | } | |
2915 | ||
2916 | static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) | |
2917 | { | |
2918 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST | |
2919 | EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx; | |
2920 | EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL; | |
2921 | unsigned char premaster_secret[32]; | |
2922 | const unsigned char *start; | |
2923 | size_t outlen = 32, inlen; | |
2924 | unsigned long alg_a; | |
2925 | int Ttag, Tclass; | |
2926 | long Tlen; | |
348240c6 | 2927 | size_t sess_key_len; |
c437eef6 MC |
2928 | const unsigned char *data; |
2929 | int ret = 0; | |
2930 | ||
2931 | /* Get our certificate private key */ | |
2932 | alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; | |
2933 | if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST12) { | |
2934 | /* | |
2935 | * New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too | |
2936 | */ | |
2937 | pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey; | |
2938 | if (pk == NULL) { | |
2939 | pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].privatekey; | |
2940 | } | |
2941 | if (pk == NULL) { | |
2942 | pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey; | |
2943 | } | |
2944 | } else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) { | |
2945 | pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey; | |
2946 | } | |
2947 | ||
2948 | pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL); | |
2949 | if (pkey_ctx == NULL) { | |
2950 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2951 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
c437eef6 MC |
2952 | return 0; |
2953 | } | |
2954 | if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) { | |
2955 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2956 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
c437eef6 MC |
2957 | return 0; |
2958 | } | |
2959 | /* | |
2960 | * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe | |
2961 | * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from | |
2962 | * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a | |
2963 | * client certificate for authorization only. | |
2964 | */ | |
2965 | client_pub_pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer); | |
2966 | if (client_pub_pkey) { | |
2967 | if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0) | |
2968 | ERR_clear_error(); | |
2969 | } | |
2970 | /* Decrypt session key */ | |
2971 | sess_key_len = PACKET_remaining(pkt); | |
2972 | if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, sess_key_len)) { | |
2973 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2974 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
c437eef6 MC |
2975 | goto err; |
2976 | } | |
348240c6 | 2977 | /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */ |
a230b26e | 2978 | if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&data, &Tlen, &Ttag, |
348240c6 | 2979 | &Tclass, (long)sess_key_len) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED |
a230b26e | 2980 | || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) { |
c437eef6 | 2981 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
c76a4aea | 2982 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); |
c437eef6 MC |
2983 | goto err; |
2984 | } | |
2985 | start = data; | |
2986 | inlen = Tlen; | |
2987 | if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt | |
2988 | (pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) { | |
2989 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2990 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); |
c437eef6 MC |
2991 | goto err; |
2992 | } | |
2993 | /* Generate master secret */ | |
2994 | if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret, | |
2995 | sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) { | |
2996 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2997 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
c437eef6 MC |
2998 | goto err; |
2999 | } | |
3000 | /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */ | |
3001 | if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl | |
3002 | (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0) | |
3003 | s->statem.no_cert_verify = 1; | |
3004 | ||
3005 | ret = 1; | |
3006 | err: | |
3007 | EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); | |
3008 | return ret; | |
3009 | #else | |
3010 | /* Should never happen */ | |
3011 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 3012 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
c437eef6 MC |
3013 | return 0; |
3014 | #endif | |
3015 | } | |
3016 | ||
0907d710 MC |
3017 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
3018 | { | |
3019 | int al = -1; | |
3020 | unsigned long alg_k; | |
3021 | ||
3022 | alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; | |
3023 | ||
3024 | /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */ | |
3025 | if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al)) | |
3026 | goto err; | |
3027 | ||
3028 | if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) { | |
3029 | /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */ | |
3030 | if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { | |
3031 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
a230b26e EK |
3032 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
3033 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
9059eb71 | 3034 | goto err; |
0907d710 MC |
3035 | } |
3036 | /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */ | |
3037 | if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, NULL, 0, 0)) { | |
69f68237 | 3038 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
e27f234a | 3039 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
9059eb71 | 3040 | goto err; |
69f68237 | 3041 | } |
0907d710 MC |
3042 | } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) { |
3043 | if (!tls_process_cke_rsa(s, pkt, &al)) | |
3044 | goto err; | |
642360f9 MC |
3045 | } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) { |
3046 | if (!tls_process_cke_dhe(s, pkt, &al)) | |
0f113f3e | 3047 | goto err; |
19ed1ec1 MC |
3048 | } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) { |
3049 | if (!tls_process_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt, &al)) | |
3050 | goto err; | |
c437eef6 MC |
3051 | } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) { |
3052 | if (!tls_process_cke_srp(s, pkt, &al)) | |
0f113f3e | 3053 | goto err; |
c437eef6 MC |
3054 | } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) { |
3055 | if (!tls_process_cke_gost(s, pkt, &al)) | |
0f113f3e | 3056 | goto err; |
c437eef6 | 3057 | } else { |
0f113f3e | 3058 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
a230b26e EK |
3059 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
3060 | SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE); | |
9059eb71 | 3061 | goto err; |
0f113f3e MC |
3062 | } |
3063 | ||
e27f234a | 3064 | return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; |
0f113f3e | 3065 | err: |
0907d710 MC |
3066 | if (al != -1) |
3067 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
85269210 DSH |
3068 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK |
3069 | OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen); | |
3070 | s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL; | |
58964a49 | 3071 | #endif |
fe3a3291 | 3072 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); |
e27f234a | 3073 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
0f113f3e | 3074 | } |
d02b48c6 | 3075 | |
be3583fa | 3076 | WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) |
94836de2 | 3077 | { |
94836de2 | 3078 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP |
c130dd8e MC |
3079 | if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) { |
3080 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
3081 | unsigned char sctpauthkey[64]; | |
3082 | char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)]; | |
3083 | /* | |
3084 | * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP | |
3085 | * used. | |
3086 | */ | |
141eb8c6 MC |
3087 | memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL, |
3088 | sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)); | |
c130dd8e MC |
3089 | |
3090 | if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey, | |
a230b26e EK |
3091 | sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer, |
3092 | sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, | |
3093 | 0) <= 0) { | |
fe3a3291 | 3094 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); |
0fe2a0af | 3095 | return WORK_ERROR; |
c130dd8e | 3096 | } |
94836de2 | 3097 | |
c130dd8e MC |
3098 | BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY, |
3099 | sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey); | |
94836de2 | 3100 | } |
c130dd8e MC |
3101 | wst = WORK_MORE_B; |
3102 | } | |
94836de2 | 3103 | |
c130dd8e | 3104 | if ((wst == WORK_MORE_B) |
a230b26e EK |
3105 | /* Is this SCTP? */ |
3106 | && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)) | |
3107 | /* Are we renegotiating? */ | |
3108 | && s->renegotiate | |
3109 | /* Are we going to skip the CertificateVerify? */ | |
3110 | && (s->session->peer == NULL || s->statem.no_cert_verify) | |
3111 | && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) { | |
c130dd8e MC |
3112 | s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2; |
3113 | s->rwstate = SSL_READING; | |
3114 | BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s)); | |
3115 | BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s)); | |
d99b0691 | 3116 | ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1); |
c130dd8e MC |
3117 | return WORK_MORE_B; |
3118 | } else { | |
fe3a3291 | 3119 | ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0); |
94836de2 MC |
3120 | } |
3121 | #endif | |
3122 | ||
149c2ef5 | 3123 | if (s->statem.no_cert_verify || !s->session->peer) { |
a230b26e EK |
3124 | /* |
3125 | * No certificate verify or no peer certificate so we no longer need | |
3126 | * the handshake_buffer | |
149c2ef5 MC |
3127 | */ |
3128 | if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { | |
3129 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); | |
3130 | return WORK_ERROR; | |
3131 | } | |
94836de2 | 3132 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; |
28f4580c | 3133 | } else { |
94836de2 MC |
3134 | if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) { |
3135 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
3136 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
fe3a3291 | 3137 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); |
94836de2 MC |
3138 | return WORK_ERROR; |
3139 | } | |
3140 | /* | |
3141 | * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support | |
3142 | * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op | |
3143 | */ | |
3144 | if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) { | |
fe3a3291 | 3145 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); |
94836de2 MC |
3146 | return WORK_ERROR; |
3147 | } | |
94836de2 MC |
3148 | } |
3149 | ||
3150 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; | |
3151 | } | |
3152 | ||
be3583fa | 3153 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
e27f234a | 3154 | { |
20dbe585 | 3155 | int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
e27f234a MC |
3156 | X509 *x = NULL; |
3157 | unsigned long l, llen; | |
b6981744 | 3158 | const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes; |
e27f234a | 3159 | STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL; |
e96e0f8e | 3160 | PACKET spkt, context; |
d805a57b | 3161 | size_t chainidx; |
0f113f3e MC |
3162 | |
3163 | if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) { | |
e27f234a MC |
3164 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
3165 | goto f_err; | |
0f113f3e MC |
3166 | } |
3167 | ||
e96e0f8e MC |
3168 | /* TODO(TLS1.3): For now we ignore the context. We need to verify this */ |
3169 | if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &context)) | |
3170 | || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &llen) | |
3171 | || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, llen) | |
3172 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { | |
0f113f3e | 3173 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
e27f234a | 3174 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
0f113f3e MC |
3175 | goto f_err; |
3176 | } | |
0bc09ecd | 3177 | |
d805a57b | 3178 | for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0; chainidx++) { |
0bc09ecd | 3179 | if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l) |
a230b26e | 3180 | || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) { |
0f113f3e | 3181 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
e27f234a | 3182 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, |
0f113f3e MC |
3183 | SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
3184 | goto f_err; | |
3185 | } | |
3186 | ||
0bc09ecd MC |
3187 | certstart = certbytes; |
3188 | x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, l); | |
0f113f3e | 3189 | if (x == NULL) { |
e27f234a MC |
3190 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); |
3191 | goto f_err; | |
0f113f3e | 3192 | } |
0bc09ecd | 3193 | if (certbytes != (certstart + l)) { |
0f113f3e | 3194 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
e27f234a | 3195 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, |
0f113f3e MC |
3196 | SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
3197 | goto f_err; | |
3198 | } | |
e96e0f8e MC |
3199 | |
3200 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { | |
3201 | RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL; | |
3202 | PACKET extensions; | |
3203 | ||
3204 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&spkt, &extensions)) { | |
3205 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
3206 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); | |
3207 | goto f_err; | |
3208 | } | |
3209 | if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, | |
fc5ece2e | 3210 | &rawexts, &al, NULL) |
e96e0f8e | 3211 | || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, |
5ee289ea MC |
3212 | rawexts, x, chainidx, &al)) { |
3213 | OPENSSL_free(rawexts); | |
e96e0f8e | 3214 | goto f_err; |
5ee289ea MC |
3215 | } |
3216 | OPENSSL_free(rawexts); | |
e96e0f8e MC |
3217 | } |
3218 | ||
0f113f3e | 3219 | if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) { |
e27f234a MC |
3220 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
3221 | goto f_err; | |
0f113f3e MC |
3222 | } |
3223 | x = NULL; | |
0f113f3e MC |
3224 | } |
3225 | ||
3226 | if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) { | |
3227 | /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */ | |
3228 | if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { | |
3229 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
e27f234a | 3230 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, |
0f113f3e MC |
3231 | SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED); |
3232 | goto f_err; | |
3233 | } | |
3234 | /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */ | |
3235 | else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && | |
3236 | (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) { | |
e27f234a | 3237 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, |
0f113f3e MC |
3238 | SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); |
3239 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
3240 | goto f_err; | |
3241 | } | |
3242 | /* No client certificate so digest cached records */ | |
124037fd | 3243 | if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { |
0f113f3e MC |
3244 | goto f_err; |
3245 | } | |
3246 | } else { | |
3247 | EVP_PKEY *pkey; | |
3248 | i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk); | |
3249 | if (i <= 0) { | |
3250 | al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result); | |
e27f234a | 3251 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, |
0f113f3e MC |
3252 | SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED); |
3253 | goto f_err; | |
3254 | } | |
3255 | if (i > 1) { | |
e27f234a | 3256 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i); |
0f113f3e MC |
3257 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
3258 | goto f_err; | |
3259 | } | |
8382fd3a | 3260 | pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0)); |
0f113f3e MC |
3261 | if (pkey == NULL) { |
3262 | al = SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
e27f234a | 3263 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, |
0f113f3e MC |
3264 | SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE); |
3265 | goto f_err; | |
3266 | } | |
0f113f3e MC |
3267 | } |
3268 | ||
222561fe | 3269 | X509_free(s->session->peer); |
0f113f3e MC |
3270 | s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk); |
3271 | s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result; | |
3272 | ||
c34b0f99 DSH |
3273 | sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->peer_chain, X509_free); |
3274 | s->session->peer_chain = sk; | |
0f1e51ea MC |
3275 | |
3276 | /* | |
3277 | * Freeze the handshake buffer. For <TLS1.3 we do this after the CKE | |
3278 | * message | |
3279 | */ | |
94ed2c67 | 3280 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) { |
0f1e51ea MC |
3281 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
3282 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
3283 | goto f_err; | |
3284 | } | |
3285 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
3286 | /* |
3287 | * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own | |
d4d78943 | 3288 | * certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c |
0f113f3e | 3289 | */ |
0f113f3e | 3290 | sk = NULL; |
2c5dfdc3 MC |
3291 | |
3292 | /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */ | |
3293 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) | |
3294 | && !ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash, | |
3295 | sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash), | |
3296 | &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) { | |
3297 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
3298 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
3299 | goto f_err; | |
3300 | } | |
3301 | ||
e27f234a | 3302 | ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; |
66696478 RS |
3303 | goto done; |
3304 | ||
0f113f3e | 3305 | f_err: |
66696478 | 3306 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); |
fe3a3291 | 3307 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); |
66696478 | 3308 | done: |
222561fe RS |
3309 | X509_free(x); |
3310 | sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free); | |
e27f234a | 3311 | return ret; |
0f113f3e | 3312 | } |
d02b48c6 | 3313 | |
7cea05dc | 3314 | int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
e27f234a | 3315 | { |
a497cf25 | 3316 | CERT_PKEY *cpk = s->s3->tmp.cert; |
e96e0f8e | 3317 | int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
e27f234a | 3318 | |
a497cf25 | 3319 | if (cpk == NULL) { |
e27f234a | 3320 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
e27f234a MC |
3321 | return 0; |
3322 | } | |
3323 | ||
e96e0f8e MC |
3324 | /* |
3325 | * In TLSv1.3 the certificate chain is always preceded by a 0 length context | |
3326 | * for the server Certificate message | |
3327 | */ | |
3328 | if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) | |
3329 | || !ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk, &al)) { | |
e27f234a | 3330 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
e96e0f8e | 3331 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); |
e27f234a MC |
3332 | return 0; |
3333 | } | |
3334 | ||
3335 | return 1; | |
3336 | } | |
3337 | ||
7cea05dc | 3338 | int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
e27f234a MC |
3339 | { |
3340 | unsigned char *senc = NULL; | |
83ae4661 | 3341 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL; |
bf7c6817 | 3342 | HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL; |
a00d75e1 | 3343 | unsigned char *p, *encdata1, *encdata2, *macdata1, *macdata2; |
e27f234a | 3344 | const unsigned char *const_p; |
a00d75e1 | 3345 | int len, slen_full, slen, lenfinal; |
e27f234a MC |
3346 | SSL_SESSION *sess; |
3347 | unsigned int hlen; | |
222da979 | 3348 | SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx; |
e27f234a | 3349 | unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; |
d139723b | 3350 | unsigned char key_name[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH]; |
30f05b19 | 3351 | int iv_len, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
a00d75e1 | 3352 | size_t macoffset, macendoffset; |
30f05b19 MC |
3353 | union { |
3354 | unsigned char age_add_c[sizeof(uint32_t)]; | |
3355 | uint32_t age_add; | |
3356 | } age_add_u; | |
e27f234a | 3357 | |
fc24f0bf MC |
3358 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
3359 | if (RAND_bytes(age_add_u.age_add_c, sizeof(age_add_u)) <= 0) | |
3360 | goto err; | |
3361 | s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add_u.age_add; | |
3362 | } | |
3363 | ||
e27f234a MC |
3364 | /* get session encoding length */ |
3365 | slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL); | |
3366 | /* | |
3367 | * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too | |
3368 | * long | |
3369 | */ | |
3370 | if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) { | |
fe3a3291 | 3371 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); |
e27f234a MC |
3372 | return 0; |
3373 | } | |
3374 | senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full); | |
a71edf3b | 3375 | if (senc == NULL) { |
fe3a3291 | 3376 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); |
e27f234a MC |
3377 | return 0; |
3378 | } | |
0f113f3e | 3379 | |
846ec07d | 3380 | ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); |
bf7c6817 | 3381 | hctx = HMAC_CTX_new(); |
83ae4661 MC |
3382 | if (ctx == NULL || hctx == NULL) { |
3383 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
3384 | goto err; | |
3385 | } | |
0f113f3e | 3386 | |
e27f234a MC |
3387 | p = senc; |
3388 | if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p)) | |
3389 | goto err; | |
687eaf27 | 3390 | |
e27f234a MC |
3391 | /* |
3392 | * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up | |
3393 | */ | |
3394 | const_p = senc; | |
3395 | sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full); | |
3396 | if (sess == NULL) | |
3397 | goto err; | |
3398 | sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */ | |
0f113f3e | 3399 | |
e27f234a MC |
3400 | slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL); |
3401 | if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { /* shouldn't ever happen */ | |
3402 | SSL_SESSION_free(sess); | |
3403 | goto err; | |
3404 | } | |
3405 | p = senc; | |
3406 | if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) { | |
3407 | SSL_SESSION_free(sess); | |
3408 | goto err; | |
3409 | } | |
3410 | SSL_SESSION_free(sess); | |
0f113f3e | 3411 | |
e27f234a MC |
3412 | /* |
3413 | * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does | |
3414 | * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx. | |
3415 | */ | |
aff8c126 | 3416 | if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb) { |
5c753de6 | 3417 | /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */ |
aff8c126 | 3418 | int ret = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx, |
5c753de6 TS |
3419 | hctx, 1); |
3420 | ||
3421 | if (ret == 0) { | |
a00d75e1 MC |
3422 | |
3423 | /* Put timeout and length */ | |
7cea05dc | 3424 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, 0) |
4a01c59f | 3425 | || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) { |
a00d75e1 MC |
3426 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, |
3427 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
5c753de6 | 3428 | goto err; |
a00d75e1 | 3429 | } |
5c753de6 TS |
3430 | OPENSSL_free(senc); |
3431 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); | |
3432 | HMAC_CTX_free(hctx); | |
3433 | return 1; | |
3434 | } | |
3435 | if (ret < 0) | |
e27f234a | 3436 | goto err; |
d139723b | 3437 | iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx); |
e27f234a | 3438 | } else { |
d139723b KR |
3439 | const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_aes_256_cbc(); |
3440 | ||
3441 | iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher); | |
3442 | if (RAND_bytes(iv, iv_len) <= 0) | |
687eaf27 | 3443 | goto err; |
d139723b | 3444 | if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL, |
aff8c126 | 3445 | tctx->ext.tick_aes_key, iv)) |
687eaf27 | 3446 | goto err; |
aff8c126 RS |
3447 | if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->ext.tick_hmac_key, |
3448 | sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_hmac_key), | |
e27f234a | 3449 | EVP_sha256(), NULL)) |
4f9fab6b | 3450 | goto err; |
aff8c126 RS |
3451 | memcpy(key_name, tctx->ext.tick_key_name, |
3452 | sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name)); | |
0f113f3e MC |
3453 | } |
3454 | ||
e27f234a MC |
3455 | /* |
3456 | * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified | |
3457 | * for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for | |
3458 | * new sessions will live as long as their sessions. | |
3459 | */ | |
7cea05dc | 3460 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout) |
30f05b19 MC |
3461 | || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) |
3462 | && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, age_add_u.age_add)) | |
a00d75e1 | 3463 | /* Now the actual ticket data */ |
7cea05dc MC |
3464 | || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) |
3465 | || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macoffset) | |
a00d75e1 | 3466 | /* Output key name */ |
7cea05dc | 3467 | || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, key_name, sizeof(key_name)) |
a00d75e1 | 3468 | /* output IV */ |
7cea05dc MC |
3469 | || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, iv, iv_len) |
3470 | || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH, | |
a00d75e1 MC |
3471 | &encdata1) |
3472 | /* Encrypt session data */ | |
3473 | || !EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, encdata1, &len, senc, slen) | |
7cea05dc | 3474 | || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &encdata2) |
a00d75e1 MC |
3475 | || encdata1 != encdata2 |
3476 | || !EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx, encdata1 + len, &lenfinal) | |
7cea05dc | 3477 | || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, lenfinal, &encdata2) |
a00d75e1 MC |
3478 | || encdata1 + len != encdata2 |
3479 | || len + lenfinal > slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH | |
7cea05dc | 3480 | || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macendoffset) |
a00d75e1 MC |
3481 | || !HMAC_Update(hctx, |
3482 | (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + macoffset, | |
3483 | macendoffset - macoffset) | |
7cea05dc | 3484 | || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &macdata1) |
a00d75e1 MC |
3485 | || !HMAC_Final(hctx, macdata1, &hlen) |
3486 | || hlen > EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE | |
7cea05dc | 3487 | || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hlen, &macdata2) |
a00d75e1 | 3488 | || macdata1 != macdata2 |
30f05b19 MC |
3489 | || !WPACKET_close(pkt) |
3490 | || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) | |
3491 | && !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, | |
3492 | EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, | |
3493 | NULL, 0, &al))) { | |
a00d75e1 | 3494 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
e27f234a | 3495 | goto err; |
a00d75e1 | 3496 | } |
bcaad809 DSH |
3497 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); |
3498 | HMAC_CTX_free(hctx); | |
e27f234a MC |
3499 | OPENSSL_free(senc); |
3500 | ||
3501 | return 1; | |
687eaf27 | 3502 | err: |
b548a1f1 | 3503 | OPENSSL_free(senc); |
846ec07d | 3504 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); |
bf7c6817 | 3505 | HMAC_CTX_free(hctx); |
a00d75e1 | 3506 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
e27f234a | 3507 | return 0; |
0f113f3e | 3508 | } |
67c8e7f4 | 3509 | |
f63e4288 MC |
3510 | /* |
3511 | * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to | |
3512 | * create a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure. | |
3513 | */ | |
3514 | int tls_construct_cert_status_body(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) | |
e27f234a | 3515 | { |
8cbfcc70 RS |
3516 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->ext.status_type) |
3517 | || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp, | |
3518 | s->ext.ocsp.resp_len)) { | |
f63e4288 MC |
3519 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_STATUS_BODY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
3520 | return 0; | |
3521 | } | |
3522 | ||
3523 | return 1; | |
3524 | } | |
3525 | ||
3526 | int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) | |
3527 | { | |
3528 | if (!tls_construct_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) { | |
cc59ad10 | 3529 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
cc59ad10 MC |
3530 | return 0; |
3531 | } | |
e27f234a MC |
3532 | |
3533 | return 1; | |
3534 | } | |
3535 | ||
e481f9b9 | 3536 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG |
e27f234a MC |
3537 | /* |
3538 | * tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. | |
3539 | * It sets the next_proto member in s if found | |
3540 | */ | |
be3583fa | 3541 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_next_proto(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
e27f234a | 3542 | { |
73999b62 | 3543 | PACKET next_proto, padding; |
e27f234a MC |
3544 | size_t next_proto_len; |
3545 | ||
50e735f9 MC |
3546 | /*- |
3547 | * The payload looks like: | |
3548 | * uint8 proto_len; | |
3549 | * uint8 proto[proto_len]; | |
3550 | * uint8 padding_len; | |
3551 | * uint8 padding[padding_len]; | |
3552 | */ | |
73999b62 MC |
3553 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &next_proto) |
3554 | || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &padding) | |
3555 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) { | |
e27f234a | 3556 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
c3fc7eea | 3557 | goto err; |
cf9b0b6f | 3558 | } |
0f113f3e | 3559 | |
aff8c126 RS |
3560 | if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->ext.npn, &next_proto_len)) { |
3561 | s->ext.npn_len = 0; | |
c3fc7eea MC |
3562 | goto err; |
3563 | } | |
3564 | ||
aff8c126 | 3565 | s->ext.npn_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len; |
0f113f3e | 3566 | |
e27f234a | 3567 | return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; |
a230b26e | 3568 | err: |
fe3a3291 | 3569 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); |
e27f234a | 3570 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
0f113f3e | 3571 | } |
6434abbf | 3572 | #endif |
d45ba43d | 3573 | |
e46f2334 MC |
3574 | static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
3575 | { | |
3434f40b MC |
3576 | int al; |
3577 | ||
e96e0f8e | 3578 | if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, |
30aeba43 | 3579 | NULL, 0, &al)) { |
3434f40b | 3580 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); |
e46f2334 | 3581 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
3434f40b | 3582 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); |
e46f2334 MC |
3583 | return 0; |
3584 | } | |
3585 | ||
3586 | return 1; | |
3587 | } | |
3588 | ||
7d061fce MC |
3589 | static int tls_construct_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
3590 | { | |
429ff318 | 3591 | int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
7d061fce MC |
3592 | |
3593 | /* | |
3594 | * TODO(TLS1.3): Remove the DRAFT version before release | |
3595 | * (should be s->version) | |
3596 | */ | |
3597 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT) | |
3598 | || !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, | |
3599 | NULL, 0, &al)) { | |
7d061fce MC |
3600 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
3601 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
3602 | return 0; | |
3603 | } | |
3604 | ||
3605 | /* Ditch the session. We'll create a new one next time around */ | |
3606 | SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); | |
3607 | s->session = NULL; | |
3608 | s->hit = 0; | |
3609 | ||
3610 | return 1; | |
3611 | } |